The Potential Battle of the Atlantic

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consumables—ammunition, POL, concertina wire, C-rations, and the like—while the Soviets were spending their military funds on research, develop­ment, and capital-intensive forces such as the Kiev, Kara, and Krivak class ships, nuclear submarines, and Backfire bombers.

During Vietnam, the U. S. Atlantic Fleet was weakened to augment the war effort in the Pacific. But by the mid-1970s, with Vietnam out of the way, there came a refocusing of attention toward Europe and the Atlantic, and onto the Soviet build­up. Then NATO was “rediscovered.” The Atlantic, too, was “rediscovered.” Americans realized, with considerable discomfort, that only when all the NATO forces were added together did the statistics look more reassuring, even though in total numbers the Warsaw Pact was, and still is, ahead.

While the U. S. Navy has shrunk from nearly 1,000 ships to about half of that, and while the Royal Navy has had to withdraw from the Far East, the Middle East, and the Mediterranean to home waters, the Soviet Navy has come of age. No longer merely a coastal and home water defense force, that navy’s officers and men have become seasoned, ma­ture, deep-water, worldwide sailors; men who now can maintain continuously and routinely well over 100 ships in the Atlantic, Pacific, Indian, Mediter­ranean, and Caribbean—a number equal to that the United States manages to deploy in distant waters.

Fortunately, the largest NATO Navy, that of the United States, is still superior, overall, to the Soviet Navy. It is more capable in power projection (carrier air and amphibious warfare), in underway replenish­ment, and in antisubmarine warfare. But the Rus­sians hold the edge in all aspects of mine warfare, in electronic warfare, and in cruise missiles, and they have the world’s largest shipbuilding industry. If it were not for the NATO navies’ several present advan­tages: higher quality equipment in most areas, train­ing and skill of personal at all levels, and overall technological superiority, the Western navies would be in serious trouble were war to start today.

Mission and Purpose of the Soviet Navy in the Atlantic

The 2,000-some vessels of the Soviet Navy are spread among four fleets. Only about one-third of the Soviet Navy is Pacific based. Half the entire Soviet submarine force, as well as a quarter of all major surface combatants are based on the Kola Peninsula—the Northern Fleet—while considerable numbers are also assigned to the Baltic and Black Sea fleets. That two-thirds of the Soviet Navy— including two-thirds of the submarines—have access to the Atlantic, speaks for itself. The Soviets see a greater weight of effort required—a bigg^er mission—in the Atlantic than in the Pacific.

The Soviet Navy’s chief, Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Sergei G. Gorshkov writes: “O^ur Country has built a modern Navy and sent it out into the ocean in order to support our own state interests. . . ,”¹

What are these state interests? Obviously, they are diverse, but all are derived from the Soviet constitu­tion which clearly charts a path toward world socialism, dominated by the Soviet Union. Broad powers are given to the Soviet communist party ^t0 direct the “struggle for the victory of communism- Foreign policy is aimed, among other things, at “consolidating the position of world socialism, [and] supporting the struggle of the peoples for national liberation. . . ,”²

Frequently the question is asked: “Why have the Soviets built such a large navy?” The Soviet need f°^r a strategic nuclear submarine force is fairly plain- Most people now accept the strategic nuclear balance of power as having a stabilizing effect. But the Soviet Navy’s numerous surface combatants, attack sub­marines, and anti-ship missile forces are far more than are needed for the defense of the homeland- Moreover, the resource-rich Soviet Union has not been dependent on sea lines of communication that need defending.

Certainly at least one purpose of the Soviet Navy becomes apparent from the foregoing excerpts frou¹ the Soviet constitution. In concert with its sister services, the Soviet Navy has already gone to distant places, implementing these constitutional aims ¹⁰ Cuba, Asia, and Africa. The large military and naval buildup has put real teeth in these words that have, since 1918, been viewed by Western Soviet watchers sometimes with contempt, suspicion, and fear, and other times—too often—lazily, with disbelief and lack of interest.

It is also possible that the Soviet conventional naval forces have been built, at least partially, be­cause of “me-too-ism”—a very natural, understanda­ble human trait. Gorshkov has recently boasted “that the Soviet Union will also in the future remain nor only one of the strongest continental powers but also a mighty sea power. . . ,”³

A variant on this theme was put forward by Pr°' fessor Michael MccGwire who argued that Soviet ‘For footnotes, please turn to page 125.

¹¹ USA

and USSR—a parallel of sea powers and land

Powers-—is certainly intriguing. Have the Russians j7^{So bu}«lt a “Risk Navy,” in this instance to redress eir perceived inadequacy and to intimidate the th***⁶^ States? Gorshkov has written, “The flag of ^ ^e Soviet Navy flies over the oceans of the world.

oner or later the United States will have to under- ^j-and it no longer has mastery of the seas.”⁶ Might ^e Soviets be thinking of sacrificing their navy to ^neutraliz_e that of the United States? If the Russians ^ad their history, and they most certainly appear to, ^ey know that the German “Risk Navy” failed in its

J^ective. And so would a similar Soviet objective.

Table 1

USSR/US Dependence on Imports of Strategic Material

100       75

Percent of Imports

50        25         0          25        50

75       100

MANGANESE

COBALT

TITANIUM

CHROMIUM

ALUMINUM

TANTALUM

PLATINUM GROUP

TIN

FLUORSPAR

NICKEL

TUNGSTEN

GERMANIUM-INDIUM

BERYLLIUM

ZIRCONIUM

BARITE

IRON

LEAD

COPPER

*j^aval policy—both its building program and its ^eployment—has been a direct reaction to the threat Posed by the U. S. Navy.⁴

Certainly there is no historical example of any na- k°ⁿ Producing such a large arsenal unless that nation * . ^SOrne purpose in mind for it. Even the so-called *sk Navy” of Imperial Germany had its purpose, ^aiser Wilhelm II agreed to Tirpitz’s proposed series naval laws commencing in 1898 in order to obtain ^rnore leverage on Great Britain, the traditional mis- ^tfess the seas, and thereby enhance German influ­^ence in world affairs. With no specific aggressive in- ^^ent in mind, the “Risk Navy” was constructed and ^^eP °yed on the assumption Britain would be cowed y the existence of a German naval threat.'¹ Could the Soviets’ purpose be similar? Their lack sea power, and hence their inability to influence ^w°rld events during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, ^Was a frustrating embarrassment, even a humiliation ^ them. The parallel between pre-World War I ^ritain and Germany and between post-World War

ob

^                   — • *»uu au wuuxu a annual                        wl/jvv«.i»v.

,,^S ^-pendent on the sea as is the United States, ^trading” _{a v}j_tai _asset f_{or a} “risk asset” would be ^acceptable to us. (See Table 1.) The price the ¹¹¹ ted States would have to exact would be much 'Suer; i_{n a} confrontation with the United States and ^s NATO allies in the Atlantic, the Soviets would be ‘C'tig _at ,-jsk f_{ar more} than their navy.

Even if it i_{s a}ccepted that the Soviets have not Hc-ccled a deep water navy to protect high seas inter- ^Cs in the past, they may be looking to the future. ^ey have developed large merchant and fishing ^6ets- Even though their operations appear uneco- ro'cal, they are ubiquitous. The merchant fleet— °^{w f}be world’s sixth largest⁷—carries third-nation ^^rgoes to earn hard currency. The fishing fleet—the ^rgest in the world—provides protein as well as _a ^ currency. Logically, these assets are valuable "'arrant protection. Moreover, there are many ^perts who predict that by the late 1980s—and at ^Cast by the early 1990s—the Soviet Union will be-

SOURCE: Report of Secretary of Defense to the Congress, FY 1978 Budget, FY 1979 Authorization Request and FY 1978-1982 Defense Program, Jan 17, 1977, page 7

come a net importer of oil. Thus by then, if not much sooner, the Warsaw Pact could be competing with the NATO nations for Persian Gulf oil as well as for the resources of the sea. Perhaps for this reason the Soviet Union has put a large surface naval force into the Atlantic and Indian Oceans.

The most revealing sources, however, as to the purpose of the relatively new distant-deploying Soviet naval forces, are the Soviet encyclopedias. Writing in the Great Soviet Encyclopedia eight years ago, Gorshkov listed five missions for the Soviet Navy, the last of which was “disrupting the enemy’s ocean and sea communications.” Gorshkov’s entire article is excerpted as follows (this author’s italics):

“THE NAVY (VMF; referred to in some states as the naval forces) is the branch of the armed forces intended to carry out strategic and operational mis­sions in the sea and ocean theaters of combat opera­tions. The Navy carries out its missions both inde­pendently and jointly with other branches of the

Next two pages: “Since 1492 the Atlantic has probably been the most important of the oceans of the world—and with the North Atlantic more important than the South. . Here is the North Atlantic. He who controls this barren, turbulent stretch of the earth’s surface can have, or gain, political control over both Europe and North America, to say the least. Most of the unfamiliar names on this map are air stations from which aircraft can fly to help ensure that those parts of the ocean vital to the Alliance come under Alliance control as soon as war begins. Some of the stations, however, are at great risk.

ICEV-AN°

FAEROE      \

ISLANDS

SHETLAND ‘

islandsi*

.1 ORKNEY J* islands

Stornoway

gbe^\

BRIT A'**

. BrawdV

THE ¹

iTHEBLANOS

St. Mawgan

\ > east -_v '

YGERMANY

GERMANY V

*^OvaK\A

Lannblhoue

Bay of Biscay

Espinho • ^

Montijo

MALTA

morocco

Nautical Miles

On 30°W between 60° and 70°N

Nautical Miles On 20°E between 60° and 70°N

armed forces. With respect to its combat capabilities, today’s Navy is capable of destroying important enemy ground targets, of destroying his naval forces at sea and in their bases, of supporting the ground forces in the land theaters of military op­erations, of landing, amphibious forces and repelling the landing of enemy amphibious forces, of disrupting the enemy’s ocean and sea communications and of protecting its own sea communications. The Navy carries out its missions by conducting major, mission-oriented naval operations.”⁸

More recently, Gorshkov revised this list of mis­sions. In the Soviet Military Encyclopedia of 1976, seven missions are listed, and the interdiction-of- sea-lines mission has moved up to third place in a list—with only the strategic deterrence and counter­force missions taking higher priority. The entire arti­cle follows (again this author’s italics):

"THE NAVY (VMF; referred to in some countries as the naval forces) is the branch of the armed forces intended to carry out strategic and operational mis­sions in the sea and ocean theaters of combat opera­tions. With respect to its combat capabilities, to­day’s Navy is capable of delivering strikes by its strategic nuclear forces against important enemy ground targets, of destroying his naval forces at sea and in their bases, of disrupting enemy ocean and sea communications and protecting own sea communications, of aiding the ground forces in conducting operations in the continental theaters of military operations, of landing amphibious forces and repelling the landing of enemy amphibious forces, of carrying troops and transporting materiel, and of evacuating sick and wounded. The Navy can conduct a naval operation both independently and jointly with other branches of the armed forces.”⁹

This shift in Soviet naval mission priorities, which it appears to be, places greater emphasis on the offen­sive potential of what has been traditionally a defensively-oriented navy. This would seem to follow along with Gorshkov’s apparent aspirations and be in keeping with the salty Royal Navy adage, “The na­tion that would rule upon the sea must always at­tack.” ¹⁰

What then is the real mission of the Soviet Navy in the Atlantic? In addition to the motive of “me- too-ism,” the probable answer is all of the above: Worldwide influence; strategic deterrence; intimida­tion; protection of shipping—but most important from a NATO perspective in any strategic assessment of the Atlantic—the interdiction of enemy sea lines of communication, because that is the dominant war­fare capability built into the Soviet naval forces.

A concluding note on the Soviet mission in the

Atlantic: It is probably time to stop hand-wringing about the “whys” of Soviet naval policy. Everyone has a perfect right to his or her opinions on the rea­sons for the Soviet naval expansion and deployments- But there is only one set of facts. The Soviet Navy ^lS in the Atlantic, in force, and astride the sea lines, both transatlantic and to the Persian Gulf, with “pit-stops” along the African littoral reminiscent of the nineteenth century imperial coaling stations. It^lS time to devote full energy to dealing with the new set of circumstances.

The NATO Navies’ Missions in the Atlantic

One cannot find a mission for the Navy in the United States Constitution to parallel that of the Soviet Union’s support of world socialism or strug' gles for national liberation. On the contrary, though most of the founding fathers were enthusiastic for in' ternational trade, they sought to avoid “entangling alliances.” This reluctance to engage ourselves polit¹' cally across the seas waxed and waned, but stayed alive until World War II. The big watershed came in 1948, shortly after that war, with the Vandenbetg Resolution paving the way for the North Atlanta Treaty. Because the Constitution places treaty law at the same level as domestic law, the NATO Treaty provides the basis for a fair share of the mission o( the U. S. Navy, as it does for all the maritime mem­bers. In this treaty, signed in April 1949, “The Pi­ties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be consid­ered an attack against them all. . . They each agree to assist those attacked in order to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic Area- This area is defined to include the territory, the is­lands, and the vessels or aircraft of member states m the Atlantic north of the Tropic of Cancer.

The purpose of the treaty is to deter through defense—to discourage a Soviet attack by pledging armed action, as necessary, to make the price of ag­gression too high, i.e. to cause the Soviets losses they would consider unacceptable. Such an arrangement, however, gives the attacker the advantage of the ini­tiative, of striking the first blow, at the times and places of his choosing. So NATO’s posture, by design- is reactive—one of absorbing that first blow. This b clearly reflected in the mission and tasks of the Su­preme Allied Commander Atlantic, or SACLant, which are to contribute to the deterrence of all form^s of aggression. Should aggression occur anyway, he <^s to take all the measures he needs to control the vital sea areas, to protect reinforcement and resupply

_sh •        .

'Pping in the Atlantic, and to support the Supreme ’^ed Commander Europe (SACHur). he U. S. Navy’s mission, as expressed by the °ⁿgress in Title 10, U. S. Code, is to conduct ^prorr>pt and sustained combat operations at sea in ^SuPport of national policies—one of which, of ^°^utse, is the commitment under the North Atlantic ^r^^aty. To this end, the Commander in Chief, U. S.

¹ antic Fleet (CinCLantFlt), the same person as SAC- ^nt> is tasked to support the NATO defense struc- ^ ^e> to conduct all operations necessary to support ^lrnself ^as SACLant as well as SACEur, and to be pre­^red for the quick transfer and support of forces ^c°rnmitted to NATO.

_ar he officer currently in control of NATO’s Atlantic ^ea' Admiral Harry D. Train II, also serves as ^’mrnander of the U. S. Atlantic Command ^lnCLant).ⁿ The taskings are compatible, and the ^>rnposit_e mission lends itself to easy analysis. These ^^)rAmands exist first to deter. If that fails, the sec- and third missions, to control vital sea areas and P^r°tect the reinforcement and resupply of Europe, ^e into play simultaneously, he deterrence mission is at once the easiest and ^>st diffi_cui_t to understand. Simply stated, and you' ^historically^ you don’t have to fight the war ^re prepared for. But too many people reduce de- la ^{nCe t0} fhings nuclear: as long as our submarine- ^hed ballistic missiles are as good as his, or as as our antisubmarine rockets are as good as his, cle ^W°^{n C} ^^{ave a strate}Ki^c exchange or a tactical nu- _0(j^ar. ^{War at} sea. That’s sound as far as it goes, but inability to conduct prompt and sustained con- _Ac_h'^0rial combat operations at sea could be the a-Hes heel of deterrence. If caught short in our All^t0 NATO’s reinforcements to Europe, the ^les could be faced with either of two unpalatable

alternatives: a back-to-the-wall nuclear response—or capitulation.

On the other hand, the Soviets are not apt to at­tack in Europe if they are convinced the reinforce­ments and supplies will arrive from North America. Their memories of the industrial strength of the United States, disgorging an endless stream of war materials to all theaters of war, convoy after convoy, in spite of heavy losses, must even today be a strong deterrent to a conventional attack in Europe.

Accordingly, SACLant/cinCLant places great em­phasis on protecting the reinforcement and resupply of Euorpe. Reinforcement means delivering to Europe some one and one-half million men—most by air—and 12 million tons of their equipment and supplies—mostly by sea. Resupply is by far the big­ger job. It includes the fuel, ammunition, food, spares, replacement equipment, and supplies for both the troops in place at the outset and those moved in as reinforcements. Moreover, resupply must include the minimum essential economic requirements of the NATO nations for food, fuel, raw materials, and manufactured goods to sustain the civilian popula­tion of some 300 million, the economies, and hence,

the war effort.

It will require between 3,000 and 6,000 merchant ships, each averaging one round-trip per month, to move all the necessary goods and materials. The wide range—3,000 to 6,000—is because so much de­pends on ship size and configuration. If large con­tainer ships, roll-on-roll-off ships, or supertankers are available, far fewer will be needed to do the job than if we must depend on smaller, less efficient ships. Also, the speed of the ship can make a significant difference in turnaround time. Either way, the stag­gering number of bottoms required is the bad news. That the NATO nations own more than 10,000 ships capable of being used for this purpose is the good news. Though roughly one fourth of these fly non- NATO flags of convenience, a simple calculation re­veals that there would still be enough ships, with some to spare for losses, which in the early days will be heavy. We probably should not count too heavily on those flag-of-convenience ships whose national leaders, ship captains, and crews may decline to serve as pawns in a NATO-Soviet battle in the Atlantic, a battle not of their own choosing.

Although getting the necessary number of mer­chant ships appears not to be a problem, defending them is. The problem is most acute outside the NATO area, south of the Tropic of Cancer, around the Cape of Good Hope, and into the Indian Ocean. With his U. S. Atlantic Fleet, CinCLant shoulders this responsibility for the South Atlantic, but as SAC- Lant, the same man’s world ends operationally at 23.5°N.

This is not to say that the worldwide expansion of Soviet forces has gone unnoticed in Brussels; NATO has formally recognized the threat as a global one. Although no expansion of NATO boundaries is pres­ently contemplated, SACLant has recently been au­thorized to plan for the protection of shipping out­side the NATO area in case of war or acute threat of aggression against NATO’s sea lines of communica­tion. Moreover, there has recently been established a Maritime Exercise Information Group, with head­quarters colocated at NATO’s Channel Command Headquarters in Northwood, suburban London. The activity collects and distributes information about the naval activities of participating NATO nations on a worldwide basis. This will facilitate the conduct and coordination of bilateral or multilateral training exercises between NATO nations in, for example, the South Atlantic or Indian Ocean as the opportunities arise.

But recognition of the threat and the small steps that implies do not go far enough to ameliorate the serious and growing deficiencies in the realm of pro­tecting NATO oil imports en route from their sources in the Middle East.

While SACLant/cinCLant’s missions—deterrence, sea control, reinforce-resupply—haven’t changed over the years, the other variables have. The Soviet naval capability has grown, increasing his tasks, while the Allies’ forces have shrunk, decreasing his ability to perform them. Only magicians can do more with less.

During the 1950s and into the 1960s, there were enough men, ships, aircraft, and equipment to pet' form all the missions simultaneously—to deter, to clear the sea lines, to reinforce the European flanks, to reinforce Central Europe, and to protect the eco­nomic shipping. But now this is not so. Some mis­sions must wait on the success, or at least compl^e' tion, of others. There is no way to spread the forces thin enough to cover simultaneously the reinforce­ment of the Northern, Central, and Southern R^e' gions and to provide for the oil routes; there are only about half the assets required. There will either be delays or there will be unprotected shipping. Clearly’ there will be tough decisions to make when SACEuf decides on the timing and destination for delivery his reinforcements.

Even if one includes all the forces of the French Atlantic Fleet—forces not currently assigned ^t0 SACLant—plus, optimistically, those of potential al­lies on the Atlantic littoral such as Spain and the countries of eastern Latin America, the forces still come to only about two thirds of those required to perform all Atlantic tasks simultaneously.

Moreover, the global threat now posed by the Soviet Navy calls into question the present and fa' ture strength of both the U. S. Pacific Fleet and the Soviet Pacific Fleet as these affect the NATO area- The epic voyages of the new Soviet nuclear icebreaker Sibir, first to the North Pole and second, trailblazing a new, more northerly and more direct Northern Sea route, could have strategic implications. Ships from the Soviet Pacific Fleet could reinforce the Atlantk during a longer spring-summer transit period that¹ heretofore has been available and, as the new route cuts the traditional distance by one-third, they cat¹ make the passage in less time than before. Or, they could stay in the Pacific and try to tie down the U. S. fleet in that ocean. The United States onc^e enjoyed sufficient numbers of ships to surge between the Atlantic and Pacific—a la Vietnam. But now, with the U. S. Navy halved and with the Soviet fleets strengthened in both theaters, the flexibility ^t0 surge U. S. forces between eastern and western hemispheres is degrading.

The main point is this: Because of the increasing

St;

‘‘mportant ^North Atlantir

^{1 reat}, together with the decreasing forces to deal ^Wlth the threat, our ability to carry out the Atlantic ^mission is declining. Concerned individuals will ^react to this dilemma in different ways. Some—those °’ l‘ke Mahan, believe that national greatness de­pends upon a worldwide exchange of goods and flow ^Wealth protected by a strong navy—will urge the th°^{CUrernent ac}W*^r*^onal naval forces. Others— ^ose who would cut the coat to fit the cloth—may

°°n be asking, “Isn’t it time to rewrite the mis­sion?"

^rategic Importance of the Atlantic ince 1492 the Atlantic has probably been the of the oceans of the world—with the

------  more important than the South—in

ttis offish taken, trade carried, and battles fought.

^{ls n}°t size that counts most, for the Atlantic is ^r quite half the size of the Pacific, unless one in­enclaves, coaling stations, and the like. The closer to Europe, the fiercer the competition and the crazier the quilt. Hence following World War II when the empires collapsed and fractionated into scores of in­dependent states, half the world’s 160 nations wound up with boundaries washed by the Atlantic and its branch seas. If one adds the landlocked countries whose rivers reach Atlantic waters, the total is about 100 nations, so there is no shortage of political inter­est in what goes on in the Atlantic.

The so-called population explosion has caused all nations to turn seaward for what the seas can yield—protein and minerals. The Atlantic is no ex­ception, and with the large number of countries— particularly heavily populated industrial coun­tries—bordering the Atlantic, the politico-economic competition can be expected to be keen.

J Li j

tan ^ ^r^^{e assoc}'^ated ^seas of both—the Mediter- On ^tan’ *“^arikbean, Bering, Okhotsk, and so the p^an<^ ^t^^{len r}^^e Atlantic *^s 59 percent the size of tic ^atl^^c- With all these associated seas, the Atlan- _eart^^0rnP^r*^ses 2 1 percent of the total surface of the Th ^an<^ ^ P^ercent of its water surface.¹² ers ⁶ ^^reat competitive rush by the European Pow- for ^C° ^co^^onize the non-European world created a ~^s°lution crazy-quilt political map of colonies, ^ectorates, mandates, spheres of influence,

Technology is progressing toward the day that metallic nodules can be harvested economically from the deep ocean floor. The application of deep-drilling techniques at sea—with the August 1978 striking of

natural gas 100 miles east of New Jersey over 14,000 feet beneath the ocean surface—adds the open Atlan­tic to the growing list of hydrocarbon-producing waters such as the North Sea and the Gulf of Mexico. If the reported success of Princeton University’s pioneer deuterium-fueled fusion reactor is not overly optimistic, the seas—with their vast supply of deuterium—will provide an almost inexhaustible source of energy by early next century. Man could become dependent upon the sea to a degree never imagined, not only for food, materials, and com­munication, but also for his energy.¹³

All this interest in the material things the sea can and will produce has brought out the instinctive greed in man, the principal element of which wars usually have been made. The rush of states to claim 200-mile economic zones is one manifestation; and a sort of neo-imperialism is extending the crazy-quilt to seaward. One might think 200 miles enough. But there are some who would carve up the entire ocean on the basis of whichever legal concept is most self­enhancing. One such scheme advanced by in­ternational lawyers—reminiscent of the papal bulls of the fifteenth century dividing the world between Portugal and Spain¹⁴ —is based on the equidistance principle. The ocean surface is geometrically par­titioned off to the nearest nation. When two or more nations are involved, the boundary is drawn so as to be equidistant to their respective mean low-water lines. Islands play a big role; the lion’s share of the North Atlantic could go to Portugal and the United Kingdom because of the Azores and Bermuda.¹⁵

Thus, as important as the Atlantic has been for centuries, its importance continues to grow. The long-term trend in take of fish, for example, is ex­pected to increase over the years. The Atlantic trade routes also continue to increase in importance. U. S. and Western European industry are many times more dependent on merchant shipping to transport the oil and raw materials needed than they were only a few years ago. One reason is that industry is producing more goods to satisfy greater demands and, as an un­avoidable consequence, domestic raw materials are being depleted.

The Arab-Israeli War of 1967 had a profound im­pact on transportation of oil. The closing of the Suez Canal—necessity being the mother of invention— produced the supertanker. When the canal reopened, alas, the supertankers were too “super” to get through the canal. So the pattern of oil shipping has shifted considerably from the Red Sea and Mediter­ranean to the Cape Route. At any one time there are two to three times more merchant ships operating in the Atlantic than in the Pacific.

Interestingly, from the point of view of fighting ^a war at sea, the open ocean is growing in importance- There was a time when mining—whether offensive or defensive—could be done only in shallow waters, hence the emphasis on shipping choke points, chan­nels, and harbors. This is no longer so. Mines can now be laid anywhere, not only in shallow waters, but also on the continental shelf, and it will be only a matter of time until most of the Atlantic will be susceptible to mining and mine warfare. This unfor­tunately is one area that has been neglected. Because it is unglamorous, in peacetime mine warfare, like logistics, gets less attention than those forms of war­fare wherein the taxpayer can be shown the results of his outlay—such as cruisers, fighters, submarines- When the shooting starts, the unglamorous can at­tain instant sex appeal, but by then it may be too late. This needs attention now, especially in view of the fact that the Soviet Union is prepared to fight at both ends of a mining campaign. Not only does it have the largest stockpile of mines in the world, but it also has the world’s largest fleet of minesweepers-

Oceans generally, the Atlantic among them, are becoming more important also in their role as an operating medium for “strategic” nuclear forces. The Soviets have been testing new generations of inter­continental missiles assessed to have greater warhead yields and greater accuracy than their predecessors- This increases the vulnerability of our fixed systems ashore. Unless compensated for, it may require us r° place even greater reliance than we now do upon the sea-based systems as a secure strategic nuclear deter­rent.

The Soviet “Delta” class SSBN, with a missile range of more than 4,000 nautical miles, is “on sta­tion” virtually alongside the pier in her home port, and is able to target anything in the United States, Europe, or China from the Barents Sea. The flexibib ity of such capability is self-evident. The Ohio class Trident system when deployed in about 1981 will provide the United States with a similar degree of flexibility. In the meantime, the United States is for­tunate to enjoy the convenience of a forward base at Holy Loch, Scotland, from which to deploy sub­marines bearing the 2,500-mile range Poseidon mis­sile. Until a few months ago, we also had the use of the base at Rota, Spain, for the same purpose.

The ballistic missile submarine is only one facet of NATO’s concern over the large Soviet submarine force. The Atlantic was the scene of a dangerous submarine campaign during World War I, even more so during World War II, and has the potential for providing the venue for an even more deadly World War III, should deterrence fail. With more

^S u^{PS t}^^{an ever to s}'ⁿ^ ^anc^ ^more submarines with ^ ich to sink them, the stage is set. (The Soviet ^vy could probably surge—but not keep—well °^Ver 100 torpedos and cruise-missile-shooting-sub- ^atines '^nt0 the North Atlantic in a saturation at- ^{ac a}gainst ships of the Alliance.)

, . ^{n a} third submarine war in the Atlantic, NATO •pping losses would be high initially as they were y in World War II. From the accompanying data ^lable 2) it can be seen that merchant ships lost ^er submarine sunk were very high early during the I ^on the order of ten to one—and quite low .               ⁰ⁿ> dropping to less than one to one. With the

D^k ^tact*^cs’ the United States and its allies could ably do better next time. When a submarine j ^ ^ain shoots a torpedo or missile he may sink, calp^a®^e’ ^{or m}‘^{ss a} ship, but in any case, he leaves his th ^ ^Car<^’ ^an<3 ^an antisubmarine aircraft will be on way. One could do mental gymnastics on the 10^ ^{Cr S}^'P^{S t}l’^e Allies would lose—or could af- to lose—before the submarine threat were con- the                       sounds appealing in view of the fact that

sly ^*^ance possesses those 10,000-plus merchant ‘Ps. But the problem is pot that simple.

Dr , ’■hough the number of merchant ships is not a , ^cm> the cargo is. We simply do not have an _tj_o^^ess supply of tanks, artillery, trucks, ammuni- an ' °^{r s}P^ares- The proper loading of ships will be ca ^extrernely important business. Diversification of k ” ^es although not time- or space-effective—will ^e«ential. There can be none of the “all-the- locomotives-in-one-ship” type of loading as in the case of the classic World War II example of how not to do it. Perhaps partial loads, perhaps decoys, would be used to minimize losses.

In World War II, on the average, German sub­marines on patrol were target-limited, not torpedo- limited, i.e., they did not encounter enough targets while on patrol to expend all their torpedoes, so they returned to port with some. But this was not always the case—it depended a great deal on the U-boats’ commanding officers. Personality research on those commanding officers disclosed that the aggressive, highly motivated captains were, as would be ex­pected, more successful than the others in sinking ships, and that these individuals were torpedo- limited, not target-limited.

Whether this World War II data, based on diesel submarine experience, would hold true in a war with long-range, long-endurance, high-speed nuclear submarines is open to question. But antisubmarine warfare capabilities have improved, since then, too, and merchant ships are much faster now than then. The whole equation will be subject to rebalancing.

What should not be considered open to question is the need on the part of the NATO Allies to be ready for a grueling and long-lasting struggle at sea. It is human nature to think “short war.” It certainly is attractive from a capital-outlay point of view. But NATO is a defensive alliance, and NATO’s strategy of flexible response does not lend itself to a short-war formula. NATO must be prepared to absorb a first

Number of German Period        U-Boats in Fleet*

German & Italian U-Boats Lost

Merchant Ships Sunk by U-Boats (Both German & Italian)

Ships Sunk Per Submarine Lost

Table II Submarine Campaign Statistics

Beginning End

unreliable for 1945. Generally, from 1943 to end of war, new construction of U-Boats kept up to losses.

t98 ₀ -|"^Umber U-Boats produced from June, 1935, to May, 1945, was 1158. ^rilonths^{t eSe WerC sun}k *^{n c}^^e fi^fSt f°^{ur mont}hs of the war, 3 Sept.-31 Dec., 1939, and 155 in (Based r° J⁹⁴⁰' ^a^^ter Norwegian and French bases were available to them, the U-boats sank the

the next six months, to 30 June 1940. In the last six other 289 ships destroyed during this period. Historical Section, Admiralty, London, 1957.)

1918

!9l4_

^eP 39-Dec 40 ^Jan4l-Dec4l ^^{an 4}2-Dec 42 ■J^an 43-Dec 43 44-Dec 44 ^an 4 5-May 45 ^ep 39-May 45

^l’¹8ures

°ⁿ figures and tables in Defeat of The Enemy Attack on Shipping 1939-1945 Vol 1A and IB

‘Total

blow, however debilitating, and then fight its way back.

Conversely, from the point of view of the attacker, the concept of a short war, decided in one or two battles is almost essential. The Soviet Navy seems to be so postured. Whereas NATO’s fleets in the Atlan­tic are structured to conduct sustained combat opera­tions at sea, Gorshkov’s writings, supported by Soviet fleet exercises, indicate Soviet forces would open the war by a massive attack, with an attempt to win on the first salvo. The limited reload capability in many Soviet warships and the general lack of focus on underway replenishment seems to support this be­lief.

This posture is clearly an intimidating one whether or not that be the intent. It is paralleled by the Soviet ground and air forces in Europe to the understandably serious concern of SACEur and the European nations. A Belgian officer, Brigadier Gen­eral Robert Close, has warned of the possibility of a blitzkrieg, crediting Soviet forces with the power to overrun Western Europe as far as the Rhine in 48 hours.¹⁶

If this is indeed a real threat it must be left to the land warfare experts. But to accept such a capability as foreordaining a “short war” scenario is not very complimentary to the fighting and recuperative qual­ities of those Belgian, Canadian, Dutch, French, German, British and U. S. forces in the Central Re­gion. It ignores the fact that there are highly capable naval forces—surface and air—close by. The Euro­pean navies are based forward. They are permanently in position to provide quick reaction, and to blunt any Soviet naval actions in support of the land battle, until such time as reinforcing units arrive from the other side of the Atlantic. Nor is such a short war thesis very flattering to the genuineness of the United States’ commitment to its treaty obligations. Worst of all, it ignores the experiences of history. Hitler “blitzkrieged” to the Channel in a big hurry, but years later he was pushed back. As long as the United States preserves its nuclear readiness to re­taliate and as long as the Soviet Union has visions of America rolling up its sleeves, retooling, mobilizing, and forming convoys for another D-Day, there will be no attack in the Central Region, blitzkrieg or otherwise.

Therefore, NATO must not give the USSR occasion to think otherwise. Rather, the Soviet leaders must be reminded of their 20th century war experiences. In 1914, “the Russians, like all the other powers, had gone to war believing that they would have vic­tory within a few months, and they were even less able than the others to adjust themselves to a long struggle.”¹⁷ “There was a general opinion that the war would be short. After fighting a month or two, the belligerents would be exhausted, financially arid otherwise . . . ,”¹⁸

By 1939, neither peoples nor governments were as optimistic about the shortness of the looming war as they had been 25 years before, although none foresaw a war lasting until 1945. Hitler, who marched to a different drummer than most people, believed he would succeed in a very brief period. His army had perfected the blitzkrieg technique which had caugh¹ the immediate .attention of the onlooking world. H^e saw no problem in reaching the Channel, as he p^er' ceived both that the French political system was cor­rupt and that that disease had infected the French Army. But perhaps his worst blunder was his failure to comprehend the potential military strength of th^e United States.

The British, who did not expect a short war, did not anticipate a long, drawn-out one, either. In Oc­tober, 1939, Churchill, as First Lord of the Ad­miralty, ordered work on various ships under con­struction stopped unless they could be completed during 1940—hardly the directive of a government anticipating a war lasting six years.

If these experiences are taken fully into account by the defense planners of the Alliance, then deterrence will be assured. If the Alliance does not wish ^t0 endure another long war of attrition across the Atlan­tic, it must gird itself for just such a fight.

A final point to be considered in this section °n the strategic importance of the Atlantic is geography which, overwhelmingly, is on the side of the Al' fiance. The Soviet Union suffers from the remotenes⁵ of her seaports from the main sea routes, from the icy conditions in many of them, and from the fact that all her fleets must pass through straits or “choke points” not under her control. This millstone* around the neck of every Russian leader since Peter the Great sparked the long Russian search for ³ “window to the sea” and warm water ports, has nn^c been dissolved by 62 years of Soviet socialism. Nor ¹⁵ it likely to be dissolved by any act less violent that¹ war itself.                                     •

The North Atlantic is ringed by the Alliance⁵ naval and maritime air bases. Many of the latter suP' port not only patrol planes but also fighters and at­tack aircraft. Several islands are important—some vital—to the defense of the North Atlantic. Icelan is foremost, the Azores second. But also very imp°^r' tant are Bermuda, the Bahamas, and the Madeiras fo^f the facilities they provide for the protection of ^sei1 fines of communication. Greenland and the Faeroe⁵ are strategically valuable, mainly because of the*¹

^ar y warning potential.

^ ^erefore, NATO is in a good position to control j ^^0rth Atlantic. If there is to be a naval battle, it ^e Soviet Navy that is to be the “visiting team,” as *ⁿ ^ATO stadium. Moreover, inasmuch la ^e ^^ov*^et ^^eet must pass through the North At- f'cu)^{10 t0 reac}^ ^r^^e South Atlantic, it would be dif- of k ’ ^ln<^^ee<^> f°^r the Soviets to control that portion th ^e ^^^ant‘^c- ^ *s probably true, in this instance, ^at he who controls the Norwegian Sea and the l_a ^tCT|land-Iceland-UK. Gap controls the North At- _f ⁿ.^tlc’ ^ar,d he who controls the North Atlantic, con- ⁵ * ^t*^le South Atlantic.

^Uts*⁽I^e the NATO area and in the South Atlantic,

_a members have bases of great value, for ex-

y ’ ^e those at Guantanamo Bay, the Panama Canal co_ne p                   .                       ’

^_as ’ ^ruerto Rico, and Ascension Island. Many such

q ^Can and do support maritime patrol aircraft. _m^{ne h}°pes that the maritime facilities of NATO _anj ^ers allies in Latin America (Brazil, for one) be ^^r‘^ca (^e-g., Senegal, with ties to France) would Waj*^Va^^a^^e to strengthen us in a NATO-Warsaw Pact Am ^ Atlantic coastal countries of South °^cean^{ICa 3n}^           there are approximately 250

_as Ports, many of them large and well developed, ^Usehd^ ^ ^{3 num}^^{er r}‘^ver P^orts which could be ^ith ®^ey°^ncI that there are more than 100 airfields ]_en hard-surfaced runways at least 7,500 feet in &t , of these 55 are 9,000 feet or longer. f_acjiit^num^^er ports are associated with air terminal ^Ies- Some of these in South America are La

A U.S. Army UH-1 helicopter is loaded aboard a freighter at Norfolk for delivery to the forces in Central Europe. There are many who hold that, under current conditions, shiploads of military equipment from the United States would not arrive in Europe until the war had already been ended. Those who hold such views seem to believe either that NATO’s armies will quickly be vanquished and the Alliance will surrender or that, on their first check, the Soviets will give up. Experience suggests that skepticism on both points is in order. Stemming from that, the Alliance, one way or another, should be prepared to protect such cargoes and the ships in which they are borne.

Guaira in Venezuela, Salvador and Rio De Janeiro in Brazil, Montevideo in Uruguay, and Buenos Aires in Argentina. On the African Coast there are Dakar in Senegal, Freetown in Sierra Leone, Lagos in Nigeria, Luanda in Angola, and Cape Town in South Africa. Thus, there are many usable ports with associated air terminal facilities along the Atlantic coasts south of the NATO area. Some ports are modern, well- equipped, and could provide facilities of strategic and tactical value to either side of a conflict. Others are not so well developed, but could serve as the sites of mobile logistics bases created out of repair ships, tenders, floating dry docks, and so on. If not made available to the naval forces of the United States or its NATO Allies, then these port areas should, at a minimum, be denied to an adversary in the event of battle.

The Potential Battle of the Atlantic

A NATO-Soviet naval campaign might start in the Atlantic in any of countless ways. Within the NATO framework generally it has been postulated that it would develop because the Warsaw Pact had attacked NATO territory in Europe and SACEur has asked for his North American reinforcements. There is also a growing recognition that an Atlantic war could start outside the NATO area and work its way back in.

During a period of rising tensions and with the presence of indicators warning of impending attack, NATO would hope to move as many reinforcements as possible to Europe before the shooting started. Our political leaders believe that this would show deter­mination and may in itself deter further Soviet moves and lead to a cooling-off period. Conversely, it runs the risk of offering lucrative targets—reinforcements in ships—and could accelerate the Soviets’ timetable if it were in their minds to attack in any case, and the war could then start at sea.

support of an interdiction campaign.

Fourth, an amphibious assault may be mounted on Denmark at the Straits. The Soviet Navy has been modernizing and enlarging its amphibious forces^ Recently, the Ivan Rogov, the first of a new class dock landing ship (LSD), made her maiden voyag^e from the Baltic. This is the place where other Wa^f' saw Pact navies—the East German and Polish'"' could have an impact on the battle of the Atlantic, a⁵ both are equipped for amphibious assault.

The assets available to the Northern Fleet for u¹' terdiction are primarily the attack submarine and tb^e naval aircraft. Additionally some aircraft from tb^e Long Range Aviation command might be assigned ^t0 this task. The Fleet Commander may assume that tb^c NATO Striking Fleet’s carriers will be employed ^c° protect the reinforcements bound for Europe. Eve^ with stand-off air-to-surface missiles, Badgers an Blinders could have a difficult time getting close ^t0 the carriers, though not to the multitude of unarrne

In peacetime, the only forces under SACLant’s op­erational control are the destroyers and frigates of the Standing Naval Force, Atlantic, occasionally aug­mented by an oiler or a submarine. This is only from five to nine ships, flying up to eight different flags. The ACLant navies, that of the United States among them, go about their peacetime missions in support of their own national policies and protecting their own national interests. These interests are diverse and only when an advanced NATO alert stage is de­clared, would these forces come under SACLant’s command. Then, their mission would coincide with that of SACLant—sea control and the protection of reinforcement and resupply shipping. The nations as­signing forces to SACLant are Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United King­dom, and United States. (West Germany sends ships and officers in peacetime. In war the German ships would be assigned to SACEur.)

Because NATO decisions require unanimity on the part of 15 nations, delays could be encountered in the declaration of alert stages or in the implementa­tion of contingency plans. So SACLant would parallel his recommendations to Brussels with bilateral re­quests, direct to the different capitals, that their naval forces start moving under national command in preparation for NATO tasks and, in many cases, per­forming tasks in coordination with the U. S. naval forces he is controlling in his capacity as CinCLant.

What form would the battle take? One can only guess. But perhaps the best guess would come from putting oneself in the shoes of the Soviet Northern Fleet Commander at Severomorsk in the Kola penin­sula. Given his offensive mission of interdicting NATO’s reinforcement shipping and considering SAC­Lant’s defensive mission of protecting that shipping, Vice Admiral Chernavin, the incumbent, must strike the first blow, assuming that SACLant will fight back.

From his home waters in the Barents Sea, the view of the Atlantic is grim. The entire seaway between there and his target in the Atlantic is bounded by hostile NATO lands—Norway, the Faeroes (Den­mark), and the United Kingdom to port, with Greenland (Denmark) and the United States at the U. S.-NATO base in Iceland to starboard. Moreover, it’s a long trip to his target—2,000 nautical miles—even assuming NATO’s shipping is traveling the closer, northern, great-circle route. If NATO’s reinforcements are traveling the southern route, it could be another 600 miles. Finally, Admiral Cher­navin must consider that once the shooting starts, his base at Severomorsk may come under enemy attack, as may that of his colleague, Vice Admiral Kosov of

the Baltic Fleet, at Kaliningrad. He feels he needs all the help he can get from the Baltic Fleet; plus, there are good logistics and support facilities in the Baltic Hence, NATO must not be allowed to attack the Kola or close the Danish Straits.

There are several tasks that CinCNorFlt, in concert with CinCBalFlt, and the Soviet Army and Air Force, could undertake to ameliorate the great geography disadvantages he faces. The first and foremost of these is to seize the U. S.-NATO base at Keflavik, Iceland. Iceland’s pivotal strategic position between the Atlantic and the Norwegian Sea—the “cork <ⁿ the bottle”—is enhanced both by the base and by the early warning sensors there. And the Soviet Navy must pass this island to and from the Atlantic. The Soviets could attempt to seize Iceland by amphibious or airborne assault or a combination of the two.

Second, in NATO hands northern Norway poses a serious retaliatory threat to the Kola, and is valuable to NATO for its early warning capability. The Soviet Union may elect to overrun northern Norway as fat south as necessary to place the Kola out of range NATO’s aircraft based in that country. The sam^e overrun airfields could then be used by Soviet naval attack aircraft, increasing their effective range. As ^,l companion action., the Kola would be heavily ^^e' fended against aerial mining and bombing attacks by long-range bombers and carrier air.   ^

of

Third, the Soviets might seize a number ⁰ Norwegian fjords to use as forward bases. The Ge^f' mans did this, increasing their sinkings of All*^e ships during World War II. This could cut as maⁿf as 1,000 miles off the voyage from the Kola to th^e Atlantic, each way, and considerably ease the logis^tli;

that is

°ur primary mission. How much less would

liai

enough military and naval might to deter Warsaw ^{act a}ggression—for they have not attacked—and

enough? If the present trends continue, the Al- uce may have the bad fortune of finding out pre- ^C1sely how much would have been enough, j . ^ course, the Soviet Union has its problems, too. k ^{IS mos}t certainly back-breaking for that country to ^ear such a huge military burden in the face of its oonomic setbacks and the internal pressures for a ^better life.

W71           .

^{nat ls} needed is an unemotional, considered ap­proach . It is frustrating to Western statesmen—who ^Wlsh to solve each problem quickly and get on to the . that the Soviet leaders can be so bulldoggedly ^^atjent and steadfast. When Khrushchev said, “We ¹ bury you” he didn’t say how, when, or where.

_Qr ^ey accept steps backwards—as in the case ^{1 e} 1948 Berlin and 1962 Cuban crises—as the ^v°idable price for taking steps forward. Through so ^S/^Stence’ eventually they will be steps ahead. And ^ey ^are, compared to 1949 or 1962, or any other y°u care to name. They will ally or accept ar- b)^^{ementS w}'tb anyone—Germany in 1922 and > Britain and the United States during World ^3r ^ and China afterwards, Vietnam more re­y> and even detente with the United States—

anything if it will give them maneuvering time and room to achieve long-term goals. Under the umbrella of detente, they are developing a power base that could give them the ability to step into any political, military, or economic vacuum and to take advantage of any unexpected opportunity anywhere in the world. By the time the people of this planet are plunged into the inevitable struggle for the control of its dwindling resources, the Soviets hope to have achieved the power necessary to dictate terms with­out the inconvenience of any battles in the Atlantic or anywhere else.

But the United States and its NATO allies need not accept this Soviet blueprint. Time may in fact be on our side. Firm NATO political determination to match Soviet military growth will assure continued deterrence and continued Western influence throughout the world. And—it might just put enough strain on the Soviet economic system to break the bank.