Professional Notes

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Contents:

Antiterrorist Contingency Readiness 100 By Major H. Thomas Hayden,

U. S. Marine Corps

The Need for a Super-FFG: One Solution 103 By Sub-Lieutenant Peter D. Jones,

Royal Australian Navy

Torpedoes: Our Wonder Weapon! (We Wonder If They’ll Work) 94 By Captain Frank A. Andrews,

U. S. Navy (Retired)

Is There a Future for Celestial Navigation in the Navy? 98 By P. K. Seidel mann and Sidney Feldman

Torpedoes: Our Wonder Weapon! (We Wonder If They’ll Work)

Captain Frank A. Andrews, U. S. Navy (Retired), Chief Scientist of General Physics Corporation and Professor of the Acoustic Graduate Program, Catholic University

A lack of in-depth concern about at-sea wartime performance of tor­pedoes exists today in the U. S. Navy. This human failure is highly under­standable, given that torpedoes have not had to be fired at a real enemy for more than 34 years. Stand by for the consequences, Navy, if you continue down this path.

I believe the well-known poor per­formance of U. S. Navy torpedoes in World War II can be traced to in­adequacies in pre-1942 training and tests; that the likelihood of this grim torpedo history repeating itself in the first few months of a future antisub­marine war is high; and that this sad fact is not due so much to a lack of historical knowledge, nor to some valid attempts at fleet testing, nor to a lack of a new torpedo construction program, but instead to three other reasons:

►  The inherent complexity of torpedo design and operation, which means that if anything can go wrong it will

►  The nature of peacetime priorities regarding fleet firings, which means the number of realistic opportunities for uncovering tactical and technical deficiencies is low and the opportuni­ties themselves are often not well de­signed nor utilized

► The existence of a division of re­sponsibility between shore-based ac­tivities, which are charged with proper torpedo maintenance and readying procedures, and the ship or airborne commanders, who are charged with the accurate placement of the torpedoes.

On 15 September 1942, as an ensign, I stood on board the USS Lansdowne (DD-486) in the South Pacific and witnessed the firing of five of the Lansdowne' s torpedoes at the battle-damaged and flaming aircraft carrier USS Wasp (CV-7). The Wasp had been torpedoed the previous afternoon by a Japanese submarine and could neither be saved by her crew nor towed to a friendly port for repairs. The first torpedo was set to run just below keel depth so that the new, very secret magnetic exploder would deto­nate right under the ship and break her back. The wake of the torpedo passed directly under the speed-zero Wasp but failed to explode. The sec­ond torpedo was set for a 25-foot run­ning depth. It ran hot, straight, and normal, and exploded directly beneath the island structure of the carrier but did no apparent damage. The charac­ter of the explosion indicated that it probably had occurred at a depth greater than 25 feet. The third tor­pedo was set for 20 feet, its wake passed directly under the Wasp, but there was no explosion. The Lansdowne s CO, in desperation, or­dered the magnetic exploders removed from the two remaining torpedoes and the torpedoes rigged to explode on contact. The last two torpedoes were set at 15 feet and 12 feet, respectively- Both hit and exploded against the Wasp, which finally sank several hours later.

In early 1944, as a lieutenant serv­ing in submarines, I encountered a re­peat non-performance of magnetic ex­ploders and torpedoes that ran deeper than set, in addition to two new prob­lems. The submariners had had a rash of torpedoes that broached or ran er­ratically, and had been plagued by contact exploders that failed absolutely if the torpedo impacted a target’s side at right angles. Since a 90° intersec­tion of torpedo track and target track was considered optimum, the anger and frustration of the submarine commanding officers could hardly be unexpected.

Fletcher Pratt, in “The Torpedoes That Failed” (Atlantic Monthly, July 1950), blamed the World War II steam torpedo problem on “official lassitude, official reticence, false economy, and inadequate research.” Pratt’s words can,

I think, be translated today into peacetime lack of concern; unwilling­ness to admit that there is a problem when one exists; not firing enough tor­pedoes, especially in the open sea, at real targets and under realistic operat­ing conditions like shallow water, rough sea state, and cold temperatures; and not identifying, then aggressively following up on, both tactical and tech­nical deficiencies.

According to Pratt, when wartime deficiencies started to be uncovered, the fleet blamed the Bureau of Ordnance (BuOrd), which in turn blamed the lack of peacetime funds. They both could be blamed for not placing guaranteed weapon perform­ances higher on the peacetime “do list.”

By late 1944, steam torpedo prob­lems had largely been solved; but then the wakeless Mk-18 heavy electric torpedo, and the acoustic-homing, half-sized “cutie,” Mk-27 torpedo began to arrive in the submarine navy. Naturally, a new set of problems was to be discovered—and where else, but out on the firing line. In late January 1945, my own submarine, Sennett (SS- 408), fired a spread of three electric fish at a 5,500-ton Japanese cargo ship, southeast of Bungo Suoido, on the east coast of Japan. We had tracked this target, her two escorts, and her three convoy mates by surface search radar for more than five hours while making a night end-around to get into position. We knew exactly what her speed and base course were when we went in for the attack, but all torpedoes missed aft. When we got back to Guam, we found out that, in cold operating waters, a sizeable cor­rection to the specified torpedo speed must be made because electric torpedo batteries generate less voltage and hence less power in cold temperatures. Two patrols later, the Sennett tried Mk-27s against large ocean-going

Japanese fishing craft which were operating in a barrier line north of Iwo Jima. This line was, in fact, an early warning net posted to visually sight northwest-bound B-29 flights and then to radio alert fighter commands on the Japanese homeland. Our proposed tac­tic was to maneuver submerged into a position directly under the fisherman, at about a depth of 200 feet, and re­lease one of our swim out acoustic units when the engine- or propeller- radiated noise received from the fish­ing craft exceeded a certain acoustic threshold. Following the acoustic directions to the letter, we released one Mk-27. We heard it swim out, its buzzing electric motor fade away above us, but no hammer click and explosion. We fired a second and third with no results. Finally, our tenth shot got a direct hit. Whatever hap­pened to the nine units that missed will never be known. Indeed, when I think back to those days and reread the story of how the USS Tang (SS-306) was sunk by one of her own torpedoes,

I say to myself it was great to be young and innocent (or maybe the word is “dumb”). In any case, it would have been far better to have discovered the Mk-18’s and Mk-27’s problems (and made the solutions) in the training operating area rather than where we did.

The powers that be in the Navy today are aware of the torpedo prob­lems of World War II. They have car­ried out what they think is proper ac­tion, given the pressures of serious budgetary constraints. There exists today a Navy-wide torpedo program consisting of fleet firings of the Mk-46 and Mk-48 torpedoes; a good semi­annual report of torpedo hits and misses with some reasons for the lat­ter; and a new construction program

for creating an improved capability for both the Mk-46 (NEARTIP—near-term improvement program) and the Mk-48 (ADCAP—advanced capabil­ity), and eventually a new air- and surface-launched weapon (ALWT—— advanced lightweight torpedo) which will replace the Mk-46.

Even with all this, it is not enough action, particularly at the fleet level. A good chunk of the hardware money could be used far more effectively in improving the performance of in-fleet weapons, thereby setting the stage for a continuity of readiness while simul­taneously providing more sophisti­cated and more frequent fleet feedback to the technical community. You can buy all the new and clever hardware that smart American industry is so ca­pable of delivering for a fee, but if it achieves only a fraction of its potential in the fleet, you will have made little progress against an ever more capable threat for all the huge sums of dollars which you have invested.

Now, let’s discuss three causes for predicted torpedo failure in a future sea war. First is the complexity of the torpedo and Murphy’s Law. A torpedo is an unmanned, self-directed, mini­volume vehicle, filled with moving mechanical and electrical parts, operating under large hydrostatic pressure in the ocean depths, loaded externally by sizeable hydrodynamic forces from high velocity water flow, and subjected to all the corrosion problems of a very hostile material environment. And so far we have de­scribed only the torpedo vehicle. The requirement for acoustic search and terminal guidance encounters all the vagaries of underwater sound refrac­tion, volume scattering, and absorp­tion which can cause the acoustic tor­pedo to chase after the ocean floor or ocean surface instead of the target. The requirement for an effective ex­ploder suffers from all the problems discussed above and an additional one. Full-scale exploder field tests require the destruction, hopefully, of a life- size real target which is rather costly, especially if instrumented properly, and hence are rarely carried out.

Given the large number of ways that a wartime torpedo attack can fail

and that peacetime operations cannot begin to anticipate all the possible counter actions by a future enemy, the probability of a torpedo miss on a single shot is apt to be very high. This is especially so if significant effort has not been made in peacetime to root out as many as possible failure mecha­nisms, both of a tactical and technical nature. This condition leads to the second cause, peacetime priorities.

There is a good explanation why pre-World War II operators failed to worry enough about weapon perfor­mance. It can be described variously as "first things first” or “the squeaky wheel gets the oil.” In the peacetime Navy—and this includes 1979 as well as 1938—the order of priorities is per­sonnel, propulsion plants, sensors, and—at the very tail end—weapons. The ordering element is visibility. Most visible in the peacetime Navy is keeping people happy, both senior and junior; getting under way for the operating area on Monday morning comes next because there is nothing more visible to the commodore than one of his ships alongside when she is supposed to be under way; and radar and sonar performance ranks third because these are items which can be checked out every minute of every hour of every day under way. Weapon performance is a distant last on the list with even an occasional birthday ball or VIP trip getting in ahead of it.

The degree of working-level interest in and activity devoted to weapon per­formance does vary among the three ASW communities. Submariners tend to know more about torpedoes, usu­ally have better weapon performance, and pay more attention to tactical de­velopment. The organization of a fleet operation test and evaluation program (FOTE) and the application of Mk-48 project dollars to support of fleet readiness have aided this attitude con­siderably over the past several years. Additionally, the history of World War II operations is very much alive in the present U. S. submarine force, particularly in the minds of the senior officers. The fact that a submarine’s target might shoot back also bears on the submariner’s interest in successful

torpedo performance.

The surface and air communities are about equal in inability to locate money, time, and senior-level interest in markedly improving Mk-46 in-fleet hit performance. This is particularly true for the light airborne multi­purpose system (LAMPS) and ASW squadron (VS) aircraft teams, and less so for patrol squadron (VP) aircraft and surface ASW ships. Indeed, in all three communities, with over 30 years of detecting, classifying, tracking, and closing, there have been no attacks on a real-live submarine with a real-live torpedo. This is bound to have a psy­chological effect on naval officers right up to and including the present corps of admirals.

The actual hit performance values of ASW torpedoes achieved in fleet firings are classified. The numbers would be semi-comforting if they could have been achieved under actual wartime conditions. In fact, they are obtained usually on a closed range, in good weather conditions, in a warm cli­mate, and by rested crews operating against a target which never shoots back nor evades radically. And with all this, the number of fleet firings, per-firing team, per-quarter is so low that feedback to those who miss and who ought to be told what to do dif­ferently the next time is not rapid- Such an approach might be similar to learning tennis by playing one stroke per week and only against easy oppo­nents.

The third cause of future torpedo failures is division of responsibility- There was a time in the days of steam torpedoes when the torpedo gang of a submarine, surface ship, or torpedo plane squadron made all readiness and pre-launch checks of torpedoes which were to be fired by their COs or squad­ron pilots. When weapon failure oc­curred, everyone knew it. Everyone also knew exactly and personally where the blame was to be placed. Al­ternately, when a torpedo “hit” a target, those involved in intermediate maintenance, pre-launch checks, and accurate placement were all together; in fact, all were working for the sam^e CO and could share in the feeling of pride associated with success. Signifi'

candy, this situation of immediate feedback of good or bad performance by those mainly responsible for its achievement also applies exactly in the case of propulsion plant and sensor operations in surface ships and sub­marines, and with some small modifi­cation to these latter systems in the VP/VS/LAMPS communities.

The acoustic-homing torpedo can­not, or at least has not, been treated like the steam torpedo. Those respon­sible for its proper operation are now divided into two groups which may not even know each other. In numer­ous instances, mainly in the air and surface communities, the team that fires the weapon may have to wait days or even weeks to know whether a hit or miss really occurred, and if a miss, why. The results are divided re­sponsibility and little feeling of joy or sadness over success or failure.

The complexity of the new acoustic torpedoes and the inability to do in­termediate checks on board ship or at the squadron level have resulted in the creation of a network of intermediate maintenance activities (IMAs) at vari­ous bases and tenders. Here the units are given both modified overhauls in­between firings and final readiness checks, usually with a witness from the firing ship, submarine, or squad­ron in attendance. The talent of the personnel in the IMAs can be good or bad; the standards from IMA to IMA are not necessarily uniform; and the spirit of accomplishment of the IMA can or cannot be tied to what happens to the units which it prepares. The communication between the men of the IMA and the men in the planes, ships, and submarines is all rather im­personal and distant.

An acoustic homer leaves no wake and usually is not allowed to impact a submarine target. The analysis of hit versus miss depends, therefore, on a tape recording in the torpedo head that records if, when, and at what depth the torpedo obtains acoustic ac­quisition, starts its run on the target, and finally shuts down. These data, when put with the target s track, allow an analyst to say the torpedo would have hit or missed, and if the latter, to give reasons. The whole pro­cess takes time and will often— particularly for Mk-46 firings—report results weeks later when the firing teams are well into another crisis.

In wartime, the failure of torpedoes prepared by one gang and fired by another will soon get sorted out, be­cause failures now will not be so easily dismissed nor will the firing team have to wait weeks to see how it made out. One may ask, why wait for a war to solve this problem?

At least three constructive thoughts come to mind which could partially offset the three premises upon which I have predicted excessive torpedo fail­ures in a future sea war. A more thor­ough student of the problem could probably uncover many others.

First, reinstitute the tactic of firing torpedo “spreads” to cover both fire control error and the possibility of failure of one or more units. It is a simple matter to design active acoustic systems which give no acoustic inter­ference to each other. This is done all the time with underwater navigation acoustic transponders. It would be well if material problems and weapon placement errors both were reduced in wartime, but the chances are high that they will go the other way. So at least one should hedge bets partially by de­signing weapons that can be fired two or more at a time.

Second, bring the IMAs into a closer personal relationship with the firing team. One method could be to estab­lish a series of blue and gold teams at the IMAs which go right along with the torpedoes which they ready for fleet exercise firings. No torpedomen would be allowed out of sight of a unit commander until they and the commander reviewed in detail the analysis of the firing. Associated with this ought to be a more critical evalua­tion of a unit commander’s proficiency in successful weapon firing at fitness report time.

Third, create a far more ambitious fleet torpedo firing and tactical analysis and evaluation program. This must emphasize firing under all of the hostile conditions so typical of war (night time, pilot and shipboard operator fatigue, targets that are skilled in the use of decoys or countermeasures and that shoot back, cold weather, shallow water, and rough sea states). Only such a pro­gram can reduce to a minimum all the likely difficulties to be encountered in a real shooting war.

In some way, the attitude which places weapon performance last on the priority list must change in spite of all the other demands of a peacetime Navy. Weapon performance is, after all, the bottom line.

Is There a Future for Celestial Navigation in the Navy?

By P. K. Seidelmann, Director of the Nautical Almanac Office, U. S. Naval Observatory, and Sidney Feldman, Radiation Division of the Naval Surface Weapons Center            .

The last two decades brought forth impressive developments of new sys­tems for navigation. Today the Navy has available, or under development, inertial navigation systems, radio navigation systems, satellite naviga­tion systems, and in most cases more than one implementation of each of the techniques. But what is the status and what are the plans for the age-old system of navigation called celestial navigation? Is there anything new in, or a future for, celestial navigation? Should the navigator learn or practice celestial navigation? Should the Navy support celestial navigation? Is the Navy realistic and logical in its devel­opment and plans for navigation in the future?

The essential equipment for celes­tial navigation, namely the sextant, the chronometer, the Nautical Al­manac, and the navigation sight reduc­tion tables, was basically developed prior to and during the 18th century. Improved methods of celestial naviga­tion were developed during the 19th century. Since then the changes in ce­lestial navigation have primarily been a matter of techniques for conve­nience, rather than fundamental changes of capability and methods. The sextant currently used throughout the Navy was designed during World War II. Navigators are taught the theory of celestial navigation; they practice celestial navigation during their training; and they use it to vari­ous degrees on board ships. But celes­tial navigation requires the navigator to make an observation by calculations using either the Nautical Almanac or sight reduction tables and to calculate his position by hand. Each determina­tion of position requires an ex­penditure of effort and time on the part of the navigator.

The navigator has’ available, with

some restrictions, various other methods of determining his position. Depending on the equipment on board the ship, this can include a Loran navigation system, when the ship is within the range of a Loran chain, a transit satellite system when a satellite is available, and an inertial navigation system. The Navy is further developing new navigation sys­tems; these include the Omega navi­gation system and the global position­ing satellite system. In these cases, if the navigator can receive and process the signals with the necessary hard­ware, then it is possible to obtain an immediate readout of his position. It is evident that it is easier and quicker for the navigator to determine his po­sition by means of one of these newer navigational systems than by using ce­lestial navigation. So why should the navigator use celestial navigation? What are the relative merits of the various navigational systems?

To evaluate the various navigational systems available and what they offer, we need a list of the essential and de­sirable characteristics. The following list was presented by Captain Bress in a paper, “Navigation Requirements in the Navy,” published in the Journal of the Institute of Navigation, summer of 1968.

Essential characteristics:

►  Worldwide coverage

►  Accuracy compatible with mission of user

►  All-weather use

►  Day and night usage

►  Effective real-time response

►  Non-saturable

►  No operational ambiguities

►  No electronic radiation by user

►  Determination of position upon ac­tivation of user equipment

►  Size, weight, tactical portability, and durability compatible with user application

►  Virtually self-contained

►  Common interface for combined operations

Desirable characteristics:

►  No foreign base rights required

►  Easy to maintain and operate with high reliability

►  Not line-of-sight limited

►  Free of frequency allocation prob­lems

►  Denies enemy use

►  No environmental propagation limitations

►  Jam/spoof/beaconing proof

►  Invulnerable to sabotage or destruc­tion

►  Optimum cost effectiveness

►  Optimum commonality and com­patibility with other systems

►  Usable by submarines without ex­posure

►  Places no altitude or maneuvering restrictions on aircraft

The new systems are limited to some extent with respect to the essen­tial characteristics, such as Loran not being available worldwide, and certain operational ambiguities can arise in some of the systems. In addition, radio techniques, which are subject to two common problems indicated under desirable characteristics, can be jammed, destroyed, or given false sig­nals by the enemy. Thus, with the ex­ception of inertial navigation systems, the navigator might well find, under adverse conditions, that he has been denied the use of these systems.

In planning for the circumstances of war, the Navy must seriously consider a navigation system which would be available to the navigator under the most adverse conditions imaginable- The conclusion might be reached,

therefore, that an inertial navigation system is the only system the Navy ought to develop. However, we all recognize that an inertial navigation system is subject to drift and must have a means of calibration. Also, the new systems all offer an increased level of sophistication and complexity that is accompanied by an increased proba­bility for failure. Electronic systems do fail and the more complicated the system, the more probable a failure. Power systems also fail on board ship and, all too often, such failures dam­age electronic systems.

Celestial navigation falls short in several areas of the essential charac­teristics required for a navigation sys­tem. It is not an all-weather system, and there are some limitations with respect to accuracy, although the accu­racy available from celestial navigation *s adequate for most purposes and could be improved at moderate cost. However, celestial navigation has some characteristics which are ex­tremely beneficial. It is an inexpensive and simple system which the enemy cannot deny. Therefore, it would be reasonable for the Navy to consider implementing some improvements in the practice of celestial navigation on board Navy ships.

There are some obvious im­provements to celestial navigation that can be introduced with very little ex­pense. These include a night vision image intensification telescope that enables the horizon to be seen all night long and which consequently permits celestial observations to be taken not only at twilight, but throughout the night. This, coupled with solar observations, provides day and night capabilities for celestial navigation.

A second improvement would be a digital readout of the sextant altitude observation through the use of elec­tronics, rather than mechanical vernier readout. This would improve the ac­curacy and speed of reading the meas­urements from the sextant. A third improvement would be a small-hand­held, low cost, sight reduction com­puter to reduce the observation im­mediately and provide rapid determi­nation of the ship's position. The small computer, which might contain

data from the Nautical Almanac in its memory, is programmed to solve di­rectly the celestial navigation equa­tions, thus eliminating the need to use the navigational sight reduction ta­bles. This provides not only speed in determining the position of the ship, but also the ability to increase the number of observations and thus in­crease the accuracy of the determina­tion of the ship’s position.

These improvements bring to mind an amusing, but effective, article entitled ‘‘Don’t Throw Away Your Sextants, Boys, the Stars Will Rise Again” by Lieutenant Commander Lawrence A. White, U.S. Coast Guard, (see pp. 54-61, August 1965 Proceedings). After reviewing the navi­gation systems from the basic buoys, foghorns, and stars to the various complex, expensive, all-weather navi­gational systems, Commander White ends with a prophetic paragraph:

“An interesting exercise might be to explore what could be done with a fraction of the money spent on ‘systems’ if it were put into, for example, celestial navigation. So many ‘insoluble’ problems have been solved in the last 40 years, maybe the classic shortcomings of conventional navigational tech­niques can be overcome. Call it an operator’s dream, but hang on to your sextants, just in case.”

In view of the current austerity program within the Department of Defense, can the Navy afford to sup­port and develop a large number of different navigational systems? Can it be justified that all ships will carry the necessary hardware for a Loran re­ceiver, Omega receiver, inertial sys­tem, and a satellite receiver? Can one believe that, in case of war, the enemy will not interfere with any of the navigational systems? There is a possi­bility that one of these systems will emerge as the sole future navigational system, although this would be un­satisfactory from the redundancy point of view.

It can be argued that there are eco­nomic, political, and psychological reasons for not funding improvements in celestial navigation. For example, it is not politically wise, when seeking the extensive funding necessary to im­plement radio, inertial, or satellite navigation systems, to admit the pos­sibility that these systems may not be 100% reliable, or may have some shortcomings. It is equally difficult to point out that, for a small expenditure of money, the present capabilities of a simple passive navigation system, such as celestial navigation, can be vastly improved. Thus, when preparing bud­gets, a small expenditure to improve celestial navigation may appear uncon­vincing when compared with a big ex­penditure to implement radio, inertial, or satellite navigation systems. Addi­tionally, since there is no big profit evidence in the production of an im­proved sextant, there is very little inter­est by contractors to push the system at various levels of government.

In addition to the economic and political considerations, there are psy­chological questions. Celestial naviga­tion has been practiced for a long time and each navigator has his own pre­ferred instrument, method, and pro­cedure for making and reducing ob­servations. The least disruptive change would be to first attach the night vi­sion image intensification telescope to the present optical-mechanical sextant design. However, the preferable long-term choice would be to develop an optical-electronic design permit­ting digital readout, which eventually could be fed directly into a specialized computer.

The specialized computer raises problems of its own, such as the form of input and output. Certain data cur­rently published in books must be available for observation reduction. It may not be desirable to require the navigator to look up data in an al­manac and then to key them into the computer. Rather, it might be prefer­able either to have the data already in the computer, or to be able to read them from a paper or magnetic tape, or card. Having the data already in the computer requires a changeable, read-only memory plugged into the computer, which increases its cost. Some people have reservations about the use of a magnetic tape or card, or paper tape, in a small computer at sea. With regard to output, there are sev­eral options. Either each celestial ob­servation can be reduced individually to obtain an altitude intercept, or all the observations at a given time can be combined to give a most likely posi­tion. The latter alternative has the benefit of automating the whole pro­cess. The former has the advantage of permitting the navigator to see exactly what is taking place, to judge the ob­servations himself, and to combine them as he sees fit.

Progress can be made and the op­erations of the Navy improved by up­dating the old sciences as well as de­veloping the new. Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, U.S. Navy (Retired), in his succinct foreword to Dutton’s Navi­gation and Piloting, 12th edition (Na­val Institute Press—13th Edition is now available) stated the following when he was Chief of Naval Opera­tions (1969):

“To men who go to sea, either off shore or on soundings, there is no skill more basic or more impor­tant than finding the position of the vessel. The ancient art of navigation has not been superseded in the Atomic Age.

"In today’s Navy, there is the natural danger that new, exciting areas of knowledge, such as missil­ery and nuclear propulsion, will claim an undue share of attention significant as they are—to the det­riment of the older sciences. Even a casual reading of this book, how­ever, should convince the seaman that navigation has its own share of the new and the exciting. Yet the book also underlines the fact that neither the sextant nor common sense has been replaced by any black box.”

In summary, it appears that the Navy should develop and outfit ships with a combination of navigation sys­tems which will ensure the availability of a means of navigating even under the most adverse conditions. Based on its simplicity, availability, and inde­pendence, celestial navigation should be an integral part of this combination of navigation systems. Therefore, it is advised that the navigator continue to learn celestial navigation and to prac­tice it on board ship in order to gain proficiency, to be a backup, and to be able to check the validity of the ship’s position as determined with the other navigation systems. It would also ap­pear prudent that funding should be appropriated for the development of (1) an improved day and night sextant and (2) a computer capability for ce­lestial navigation.

Antiterrorist Contingency Readiness

By Major H. Thomas Hayden, U. S. Marine Corps, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, 4th Marine Division (Reinforced), Fleet Marine Force

American vulnerability to in­ternational terrorism has been a sub­ject of recent academic and govern­mental symposiums. It has become a concern to many that kidnappings, murder, and massacre may become in­creasingly used methods of challeng­ing economic and political power in the United States.

Potential terrorists are all around us, some are in isolated groups, others are individuals. They usually take vio­lent action for the sake of a brief mo­ment in the spotlight of public atten­tion. The Palestine Liberation Organi­zation, Irish Republican Army, the Japanese Red Brigade, and less- structured radical groups compete for world recognition. And the in­ternational news media cover such ac­tivities extensively, giving terrorists and their causes the publicity that has become one of their major objectives.

One international guerrilla group stands ready for hire and may turn up in the United States at any moment. The Red Brigade has probably caused more havoc in more countries than any other urban terrorist organization. This group massacred 28 people at Israel’s Lod Airport in 1972, hijacked a jumbo jet in 1973, seized the French Embassy in The Hague in 1974, and occupied the U. S. Embassy in Malaysia in 1975. A year ago, mem­bers of this group hijacked a Japan Airlines 747 in Bangladesh, took it on a nation-hopping tour of the Middle East, and demanded and received a $6 million ransom before finally accept­ing asylum in Algeria.

Civilian law enforcement agencies face a growing problem with the ter­rorists’ increased accessibility to auto­matic weapons and high explosives. The continued existence of heavily armed terrorists is increasing the pos­sibility that Navy and Marine Corps personnel will be requested to aug­ment law enforcement agencies during terrorist or urban combat situations.

The encounter between the Sym- bionese Liberation Army (SLA) and the

have happened, and it still can hap­pen!

Court rulings have given many the false impression that U. S. armed forces cannot be used in civil dis­turbances such as the SLA incident. In a court case resulting from the Wounded Knee confrontation, U. S. v. Jaramillo [380 F. Supp. 1375 (1974)], advice and assistance by U. S. military personnel (making the lawful activities of the FBI “uncon­stitutional”) permitted acquittal of the defendant. In another case from Wounded Knee, U. S. v. Redfeather [392 F. Supp. 916 (1975)], the court laid down the rule that any participa­tion by U. S. military personnel must be entirely passive.

The debate in both cases centered on the Posse Comitatus Act (18 U. S. Code 1385). This act forbids the use of U. S. military forces “. . . except in cases and under circumstances, ex­pressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress. ...” The Con­stitution and Acts of Congress estab­lish six exceptions to which the Posse Comitatus Act prohibition does not ap­ply. In fact, the President of the United States has the authority to order the use of the militia and federal armed forces. However, in the court cases cited above, no such order was made by the President.

U. S. Navy and Marine Corps re­sources are part of the national reac­tion plan and can be employed if the President determines they are needed. Navy and Marine Corps contingency planning can be found in appropriate Department of Defense directives, Sec­retary of the Navy instructions, and Marine Corps orders, normally under the subject heading of civil dis­turbances. The Department of the Army Field Manual FM 19-15 Civil Disturbances, 30 October 1975, is an excellent source of information and a must for all naval security officers, Marine Corps commanders, and staff officers.

Training for countering terrorist operations should parallel urban com­bat training in an environment short of full-scale war. The marines sent to Santo Domingo in 1965 found them­selves ill-equipped to handle snipers and armed combatants in a densely

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Los Angeles Police Depart­ment (LAPD) on 17 May 1974 can serve as a primer for the study of urban terrorist combat.

The Symbionese Liberation Army surfaced in the Los Angeles area on 16 May 1974 with a shoplifting incident and a shooting at an Inglewood sport­ing goods store. After firing a large number of rounds of automatic weapon fire into the store front, the SLA members fled the scene. Thereaf­ter, a series of car thefts, a kidnap­ping, and an FBI-LAPD entry into an SLA hideout on 17 May culminated in the death of six SLA members.

Because of the military revolu­tionary activities of the SLA, FBI and LAPd special weapons and tactics (SWAT) units were employed. The joint FBI/LAPD operations plan is in­structive:

Preparation Phase:

► Establish a command post.

► Seal off the area and establish a perimeter for tactical control.

► Organize the security and assault elements.

► Use “sniffer dogs” to verify the exact location of SLA members.

► Organize necessary equipment.

► Organize an evacuation plan for the surrounding citizens.

Tactical Phase:

►        Control perimeter.

►        Preposition FBI and LAPD SWAT personnel, in case of resistance.

►        Evacuate residents, except in sus­pected homes.

►        Call for suspects to surrender using a public address system.

►        Employ tear gas if there is no re­sponse, after reasonable time.

►        Force entry if required.

The results of the FBI/LAPD ac­tivities of 1974 are history. However, what would have been the results had the remaining members of the SLA been in a position to attempt a rescue of those who were surrounded? What would have happened if the SLA mem­bers had broken out? What would have happened if other urban terrorist groups had decided to initiate armed actions in support of the SLA? It could

populated, urban environment where their full inventory of weapons could not be employed. Many cases in Viet­nam enforced the premise that the Army and the Marine Corps were not equipped to handle isolated pockets of enemy resistance in heavily populated urban environments. In fact, all Fleet Marine Force manuals and Army field manuals concerned with tactics for the combat employment of U. S. military forces are oriented to full-scale conven­tional war.

With the advent of terrorist groups operating in the United States and the potential employment of naval secu­rity forces and/or marines in heavily populated urban environments, mili­tary planners of doctrine and tactics must consider the special weapons and tactics concepts originally developed by the LAPD in the late 1960s.

The LAPD and the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department have de­veloped exceptional special weapons and tactics capabilities for urban environments with outstanding re­sults. The sheriff’s department spe­cial weapons team unit is part of the special enforcement bureau of the de­partment. This bureau, made up of approximately 50 sheriff’s deputies, has seven teams with one on duty at all times. Each team is composed of a sergeant, who is the team leader, and six deputies. Each team is equipped with two M-l6s, six .38 caliber revolv­ers, one Remington 700 (.308- caliber), and four shotguns, two loaded with double O shot and two with gas attachments.

The contingency readiness program for Fleet Marine Force combat ele­ments provides some civil disturbance orientation. During the progressive training cycle the marines receive only one week of civil disturbance training. The emphasis during this period is on operational task and techniques as­sociated with mob/crowd control. The contingency readiness cycle, which consists of mountain warfare, cold weather training, desert training, combined arms training, amphibious training, and amphibious raid train­ing, should also include a course of in­struction in urban combat. Each marine rifle battalion should have one

platoon fully trained as a special reac­tion force. The individual squads of that platoon would be the special weapons teams or special reaction teams as called for in field manual 19-15 Civil Disturbances.

The special weapons team would try to achieve fire control in dealing with combat activity in urban areas and coordinate a response which can effec­tively evaluate the situation and react to it in a responsible manner. Its pri­mary mission would be the speedy elimination of snipers with a minimum of weapons' fire. Addition­ally, in civil disturbance cases, it could assist and protect police and fire units whose effectiveness has been re­duced or neutralized by a concentra­tion of sniper firepower.

Members of the team could be used in determining strategic locations where sniper fire is anticipated and in establishing a combat operations cen­ter defense. By securing positions where sniper fire is most apt to de­velop, the team can operate in a pre­ventive manner. Depending on the terrain, the team may also be useful against the terrorist who has bar­ricaded himself in a strategic location and is engaged in sniper activity against either the civilian population or local authorities.

Each team should be composed of a minimum of seven members; the team leader, a scout armed with an M-16 rifle, an anti-sniper marksman armed with a Remington Model 700 sniper rifle, a spotter equipped with binocu­lars and an M-16 rifle, two men armed with gas attachment shotguns, and a backup man. Each team may be at­tached to different riot control com­panies depending on the need. A seven-man team is large enough to de­fend itself and have balanced fire power, yet it is small enough to achieve effective infiltration.

The team leader is responsible for deployment, and is equipped with radio communications, binoculars, and whatever maps are required. Each team member should have communi­cations equipment such as a Motorola radio, HT 220, with a Lear Siegler Ear-Corn device to permit transmis­sion and reception.

The marksman should be equipped with the .308-caliber Remington 700 sniper rifle with a Redfield Master 6X scope or similar weapon and a sling. The scout and backup man must pro­vide close-range security, and must also remain alert to the possibility of persons attempting to infiltrate or as­sist the sniper. The shotgun/gas men, under the direction of the team leader, are responsible for launching tear gas as required. Attention must be given to avenues of escape, also. Alternative return routes, if possible, should be set up prior to the mission, and a thorough perusal of the map of a con­cerned area is imperative. Predeter­mined rallying points in case of sep­aration must also be considered. Each team member carries all necessary equipment to perform the duties of his ■ position.

Each individual member must have the following essential equipment: protective vests, helmets with face shields, protective masks, individual flashlights, individual radio com­munications equipment, restraining devices (handcuffs or plastic flexi- cuffs), M-16 rifle or shotgun, and an individual sidearm. (M-I6s, shotguns, grenade launchers, and sniper rifles with scopes must be appropriately di­vided among the team members.)

Also, teams should have the follow­ing equipment: vehicles for transpor­tation of unit members and ap­prehended suspects; armored vehicles; portable public address system; riot- control-agent munitions and dis­pensers; smoke munitions; fire ex­tinguishers; tools (axes, crowbars, pinch bars, and power saws); cameras and recording devices; and ropes and grappling hooks.

There should also be medical corpsmen. Additionally, explosive ordnance disposal personnel are neces­sary for placing charges for forced entry and for bomb disposal.

For most requirements, basic marine rifle squad training, including tactics for cover, concealment, and maneuvering, complemented with special weapons tactics training, will be sufficient. However, for urban ter­rorist or urban combat situations, pla­toon and/or company-size special weapons and tactics training may be necessary.

Initial training can be condensed into a two-week concentrated course. The normal high state of unit training of shore patrol, military police, and marine rifle companies would readily permit a specialized course with con­tinual subsequent training and drill.

Some advances in this area have been made in recent years. The Marine Corps Air Station, El Toro, has or­ganized and trained a military police special weapons and tactics team. The team’s main missions are: protection °f visiting dignitaries, security of transporting special weapons, and the complementing of the regular military police force with a highly specialized unit in critical situations (i.e. hostage incidents, snipers, and armed suspects

barricaded in built-up areas).

This select group of El Toro mili­tary policemen attended two weeks training conducted by the special weapons and tactics inspector/ instructors of the FBI s Los Angeles of­fice. Although two weeks is a very short training period, basic marine and military police training had al­ready laid a firm foundation in prepa­ration for the group's missions. The El Toro special weapons and tactics team members hold daily military police as­signments. If needed, the special weapons and tactics military police­men are replaced by off-duty military policemen for routine assignments.

Whether for military police or Fleet Marine Force contingency readiness, the operational tasks and techniques developed must include the following basic primary planning considerations: Command and Control Plan, Crowd/Mob Control Plan for Civil Disturbances, Perimeter (Tactical) Plan, Civilian Evacuation Plan, De­ployment Plan, Surrender Announce­ment Plan for Civil Disturbances, As­sault Plan, and Preservation of the Crime Scene Plan for Civil Dis­turbances.

Terrorist operations are usually quick and dirty. One reason they are often successful is because the forces called to counter them are not pre­pared. As the population and urban centers grow, so will terrorist threat. The time has come for us to prepare.

While the “design to cost’ (DTC) concept in the FFG-7 program has pro­duced a very efficient and cost- effective weapon platform, the vessel does suffer from a number of restric­tions which affect her performance. The manifestation of changes required to overcome these limitations would be a frigate of slightly larger dimen­sions than the FFG-7, which would ^allow for a more capable platform. Such a “Super-FFG” would satisfy the needs of the U. S. Navy of the future and other navies such as the Spanish and Australian.

The FFG-7 was the response to the tequirement for a low-cost escort. This frigate was to be compatible with planned and existing escorts in the protection of underway replenishment groups, amphibious forces, and mer­chant shipping. These escort duties meant that speeds in excess of 28 knots were unnecessary. In addition, three basic restrictions were placed on the design. They were a unit cost of $45.7 million, a tonnage of 3,400 tons, and a complement of 185. As stated by Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., in September 1970, the Patrol Frigate would be one of the low-mix ships of the high-low concept.

The FFG-7 is primarily an antiair warfare (AAW) ship and has been criticized for her lack of comprehen­sive antisubmarine (ASW) and surface warfare weaponry. This AAW orienta­tion is a reversal of the ASW predomi­nance of the Knox (FF-1052) class. The ability of the FFG-7 to complement the Knox class in a task force situation was in fact specified in the approved characteristics published for the class in October 1972. One ASW weakness of the FFG-7 is that she lacks the SQS-53 long-range sonar, which was replaced by the smaller SQS-56. This decision saved 66 tons which allowed for the provision of the second helicopter.

In the area of surface warfare and AAW, criticism has been leveled at the Patrol Frigate for having a single 76-mm. gun and for not having the flexibility which a dual Harpoon/ Standard launcher possesses over the single one. While the OTO Melara 76-mm. gun does not have the surface capability of the Mk-45 5-inch, it is a much better all-round weapon system. However, the placement of the weapon can be criticized. The very re­stricted arcs of fire seriously affect the performance of the gun, especially in the antimissile mode. In addition, all the missile defense systems of the FFG-7 will be placed aft, leaving the large forward section blind.

The U. S. Navy is currently feeling the pressure of replacing its destroyer and escort forces built in the 1940s and 1950s. While extensive new con­struction programs are being carried out, rising costs and construction de­lays have seriously affected these un­dertakings. The U. S. Navy’s present difficulty in fulfilling its missions will lead, in a war situation, to a shortage of escorts and destroyers. The balance of high-low forces will also be difficult to maintain. The result will be that demands will be made of the low-mix units beyond the expectations of their designers. The answer to these prob­lems may be to backtrack from the ab-