Comment and Discussion

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Canadian Patrol Frigate Program

ENTER THE FORUM

We welcome brief comments on material published in the Proceedings and also brief discussion items on topics of naval, maritime, or military interest for possible publication on these pages. A primary purpose of the Proceedings is to provide a place where ideas of importance to the Sea Services can be exchanged. The Institute pays an honorarium to the author of comment or discussion items published in the Proceedings.

The Through-Deck Cruiser: The New Capital Ship

Women in Warships:

A Right to Serve

Sea-Based “Strategic” Weapons for the 1980s and Beyond

The Dilemma of the U. S. Pacific Fleet

The Recovered Sunken Warship: Raising a Legal Question

Changes in Status of Ships

Some Questions (and Answers) About the FFG-7

Command Authority and Professionalism

Contents:

Punishment, Discipline, and the Naval Profession

A New Approach to the Military’s Doctor Shortage

Extinguish the Smoking Lamp: Permanently

U. S. NATO Policy:

The Challenge and the Opportunity

Standardization or Bankruptcy for NATO

Division of Labor in the Western Alliance

“Punishment, Discipline, and the Naval Profession”

(See J. B. Bonds, pp. 43-49, December 1978 Proceedings)

Commander Eugene E. Bracken, U. S. Navy (Retired)—I agree with the au­thor that most members of the Judge Advocate General’s Corps are not sea­going naval officers, and I dare say most of them do not want to be con­sidered as such. Most of them consider themselves as lawyers first and as naval officers a distant second.

It might be said that the line officer contributed to this thinking when the Judge Advocate General’s Corps was established. Why was that name al­lowed? We do not have the Chief of Chaplain’s Corps or the Surgeon Gen­eral’s Corps, etc. Is not the Judge Ad­vocate General’s Corps the Navy’s legal corps, or did I miss something?

A New Approach to the Military’s Doctor Shortage

Howard Baer, D.D.S.—Relative to the shortage of health professionals in the military, I would propose a solu­tion: area by area per diem employ­ment, on a service’s need basis, of re­tired and non-retired health profes­sionals. As a former lieutenant in the Dental Corps of the U. S. Naval Re­serve, I would look toward such em­ployment in my professional capacity with pleasure.

“Extinguish the Smoking Lamp: Permanently”

{See J. K. Poole, p. 106, September 1978;

W. F. Stroji, p. 28, November 1978; C. L. Waite, p. 95, December 1978; R. L. Surface, pp. 23-24, February 1979 Proceedings.)

V. S. O’Hara, M.D., Chief, Surgical Service, Veterans Administration Hospi­tal, Fresno, California—If Rear Ad­miral Waite would link our victory in

World War II to the fact that the Navy contained a majority of smokers, he should also point out that smoking-associated illnesses are ram^­pant in our veteran population, and that cancer of the lung is the most common cancer seen in veteran pa­tients, accounting for 38% of all can­cers diagnosed. In 20 years of surgical endeavor, I’ve yet to see my first “smoker’s cancer” in a documented nonsmoker.

“U. S. NATO Policy: The Challenge and the Opportunity”

(See R. L. Beard, pp. 52-61, November 1978; D.G. Powell, pp. 21-22, January 1979 Proceedings)

“Standardization or Bankruptcy for NATO”

(See E. K. Daley, pp. 78-87, November 1978; D. G. Powell, pp. 21-22, January 1979 Proceedings)

“Division of Labor in the Western Alliance”

(See M. E. Geneste, pp. 42-51, November 1978; D. G. Powell, pp. 21-22, January 1979; H. E. Obedin, p. 27, Feburary 1979 Proceedings)

Alfred C. Mierzejewski—It was appro­priate that the Proceedings should de­vote attention to the problems con­fronting NATO in November 19?8- However, the level of discussion was unfortunately very uneven.

Probably the least informative con­tribution is Congressman Beard’s. H^lS approach is diffuse. He deals with ^a multiplicity of issues in a superficial way. He contradicts himself on ^a number of occasions and becomes entangled in jargon on many others- After reading the article, I wondered whether I had read a campaign speed¹ or a reasoned argument.

Lieutenant Colonel Daley does litd^e better. The bulk of his article ^lS merely a recitation of the status of cur­rent attempts to standardize and p^aSt failures. However, at the close of h^lS piece, he hits upon a crucial point: ‘Standardization of doctrine is the first and foremost step toward any standardization of equipment.”

Clearly, if the NATO allies could ^agree on precisely what threats they face and in which order of importance, they would have taken the longest step toward overcoming their equip­ment problems. As Napoleon pointed °tit, the psychological is to the physi­cal in war, as three is to one. The greatest advantage the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact possess is com­monality of doctrine and operating procedure. Concentration of effort, as Clausewitz notes, is of vital impor­tance. NATO could be defeated in the critical opening stages of a conflict through its inability to mass its re­sources at the crucial point.

While technology continues to grow in importance, we must never lose sight of the fact that, by them­selves, weapons do not win wars. Technological superiority does not ensure victory; this is a lesson which should have been learned from our re­cent struggle in Southeast Asia.

Colonel Geneste comes to grips with these basic issues. He underlines the vastly different perceptions of de­fense needs which exist on the two sides of the Atlantic. Colonel Geneste suggests that the United States and Europe each assume those tasks within the Alliance which they are best suited to fulfill: the United States—nuclear deterrence and sea control; Europe— local conventional defense and theater deterrence. He asserts that the defen­sive now, with precision-guided munitions, has a decisive advantage over the offensive. This advantage is so profound that it fundamentally al­ters the strategic equation and enables a nation to be secure without threaten­ing to turn to the offensive.

This is an interesting idea, but it seems a very dangerous one. An adver­sary must not be given to believe that the only price he will be made to pay for an attack which fails is the force used in the actual assault. This opens the possibility of his retiring, re­plenishing his resources, and renewing the attack ad infinitum. The aggressor must assume the risk of destruction of his sources of power, thus strategic de­terrence must be maintained.

Colonel Geneste also overlooks the vast improvements in strategic and tactical mobility which have been made over the last decade. These en­able an aggressor, or a resourceful de­fender wishing to transfer to the offen­sive, to strike at widely separated vul­nerable points with great strength, and to rapidly exploit any break­throughs. All in the West must re­member that the Soviet Union is pre­paring to fight and win a war of the future, be it nuclear or conventional. Deterrence is a secondary considera­tion, though not unimportant. Thus NATO must be prepared not only to deter an attack, but to follow the strategy of defense turning to offense.

We must never forget that, in the two major wars fought in Europe this century and, indeed, in the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the side which registered the initial gains ended up the loser.

regions of the world’s oceans, either independently or together with other branches of the armed forces.

The publication of an English language edition of The Sea Power of the State is an important event. Every naval officer and armchair strategist should be familiar with Admiral Gorshkov’s work; his thinking has affected us all, and will continue to do so.

The Admiral’s last book, also published by the Naval Institute Press, was Red Star Rising at Sea. 19791463 pages.

A Naval Institute Press Book

List price: $17.95                      Member’s price: $14.35

Add $1.00 to each order for postage and handling. (Please use book order in Books of Interest to the Professional section.)

In this book, Admiral Gorshkov, the creator of the Tiodern Soviet Navy, discusses in detail the seapower °f the Soviet state and its importance in the politics and defense of the U.S.S.R. He examines the main components of sea power, including the Soviet fleet of the present day—a fleet capable of conducting opera­tions and accomplishing strategic missions in far-flung

By Sergei G. Gorshkov Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union,

Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy

In short, NATO should first agree on

its basic political and strategic objec­tives. Then it will be able to construct the force, without waste and duplica­tion, which can best satisfy its needs.

Lieutenant Commander H.J. Miller, U.S. Navy, Commanding Officer, USS Leader (MSO-490)—By way of up­date, the Standing Naval Force Chan­nel (SNFC), pictured on page 44 of Colonel Geneste’s article, now con­tains two U.S. mine countermeasure ships. The USS Leader (MSO-490) and USS Illusive (MSO-448) joined the NATO force in September 1978, as a portion of a one-year deployment to Northern Europe. This is the first time since SNFC was formed in 1973 that U.S. ships have been assigned.

“The Recovered Sunken Warship: Raising a Legal Question”

CSee R. D. Wiegley, pp. 26-32, January 1979 Proceedings)

“Changes in Status of Ships”

(See S. L. Morison, pp. 119-120, October 1978 Proceedings)

James Drahos, Master, MlV Glomar Explorer—The Glomar Explorer (the AG-193, ex-Hughes Glomar Explorer) was taken out of the Maritime Admin­istration’s Suisun Bay Reserve Fleet on 1 June 78 and drydocked at the Hunt­er’s Point Division of Triple “A” Ma­chine Shop, Inc., in San Francisco, California, to begin demothballing and reactivation work. The ship is time chartered by Global Marine De­velopment, Inc., and operated for Lockheed Missiles & Space Company, Inc., as manager for Ocean Minerals Company, to engage in ocean mining.

On 1 July 1978, we departed San Francisco, under tow, for San Pedro, California, where reactivation con­tinued and conversion for ocean min­ing began at Bethlehem Steel Corpora­tion’s Terminal Island Shipyard. This, of course, was a familiar path for the Explorer as she had taken this route in reverse when she was laid-up in late 1976.

Ready for sea in late October, we departed San Pedro on the 28th and, after a call at San Diego for fuel and

water, proceeded to a point off Santa Cruz Island for an integrated systems test (1ST) in 6,000-foot water depth. Although numerous equipment prob­lems were encountered, the mining system was deployed successfully to the bottom and operated inspite of poor bottom conditions.

We departed the 1ST site on 15 November for the mining site and re­turned to San Pedro on 9 December. Although no nodules were collected on this trip, a great deal was learned about conditions in the area and equipment requirements which will make our next voyage to the mining site quite productive.

Some Questions (and Answers) About the FFG-7

Lieutenant (N) DJ.M. Fletcher, Cana­dian Armed Forces, HMCS Margaree CF-230)—In Jane’s Fighting Ships 1976-77, the article on the Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7)-class frigates mentions that the original single hangar had been changed to two adja­cent hangars for two helos. I have a series of questions.

►  Was the Oliver Hazard Perry class originally designed for one helo?

►  If the answer to question one is yes, what were the reasons behind chang­ing the design from carrying one helo to carrying two helos?

►  If the answer to question one is no, why was the Oliver Hazard Perry class designed for two helos while similar sized ships, like the Knox (FF-10521- class frigates, carry only one?

►  Finally, there is the philosophy that “it takes two helos to keep one fly­ing.” Did the maintenance aspect of helos’ operations play a part in the de­cision to place two helos on the Oliver Hazard Perry class?

Captain Louis J. Collister, U. S. Navy (Retired), served in the Surface Ship Ac­quisition Division of OpNav from 1972 to 1975 and as the FFG-7 Program Coor­dinator in 1974 and 1975—During the concept development stage of the FFG-7 Program (then designated PF), a single helo configuration was seriously considered. However, in May 1972, prior to commencement of contract design, the CNO decided to provide for two hangars in the ship charac­teristics.

This was not an isolated decision, but one of a matrix of decisions made in firming up the design of the ship—all directed towards maximum mission effectiveness within strict design-to-cost constraints. In this re­gard, it is well to recall the ship’s pre­scribed mission at that time:

“To provide self-defense and effec­tively supplement planned and ex­isting escorts in the protection of underway replenishment groups> amphibious forces, and military and mercantile shipping against sub­surface, air, and surface threats; and to conduct ASW operations in con­junction with other sea control forces tasked to ensure our use of es­sential sea lines of communica­tions.”

In short, the PF was envisaged to be an open-ocean escort, economical ^t0 build and operate, and designed to “supplement planned and existing es­corts.” Rigid constraints on displace­ment, procurement cost, and accom­modations were imposed and main­tained by the CNO in order to assure that the ship would be affordable to procure and operate in considerable numbers. Thus, many tradeoffs were considered in establishing the PF con­tract design characteristics. Two sig­nificant decisions in the area of AS'*' were

►  To install a relatively small’ direct-path sonar

►  To provide hangar accommodations for two helicopters.

Various factors led to these deci­sions, including manning and mainte­nance requirements, procurement costs, weight, etc. However, a princi­pal consideration impacting on both decisions was the estimate that the helicopter possessed greater potential for growth in ship mission capability. Hull-mounted, active sonars had been in existence since World War I and further major improvement in per­formance was considered not probable. Helicopters, on the other hand, were young in comparison and could be ex­pected to improve in capability and performance for the foreseeable future. Additionally, the helicopter possessed mission potential in other warfare areas besides ASW. The advantages of helicopters in exploiting the potential capabilities of future towed array so­nars were equally apparent. Further, the inventory of “large” sonars was considerable in the other surface com­batants which the FFG-7 was to complement”—i.e., the Knox (FF- ¹⁰52) and Spruance (DD-963) classes. Accordingly, it was with these consid­erations in mind that the CNO opted

for facilities for two helicopters.

With regard to the question as to why the Oliver Hazard Perry class is designed for two helicopters while the Knox class can carry only one, I have no direct knowledge of the basic rea­soning involved. However, the Knox class was designed considerably ear­lier, before LAMPS I had really proven itself and before the operational poten­tial of towed arrays had been clearly established. Thus, the Knox is a one helo/big sonar ship, while the Oliver Hazard Perry is a small sonar/two helo ship with a towed array potential. This is obviously an oversimplifica­tion, but is indicative of an apparent trend. The continued progress in LAMPS III development provides further evidence that this trend will not soon be reversed.

Again, I am not in a position to au­thoritatively address the question re­garding the degree to which helicopter maintenance considerations played a part in the FFG-7 helo hangar decision. However, it is a fact that the normal ASW employment of LAMPS helicopters envisioned at the time of the hangar decision was that of a relatively quick reaction localization and attack vehicle to prosecute submarines initially de­tected by other means—towed arrays, for example. It was well understood that the probability of having a helicopter up and ready for quick re­sponse during an extended operation was considerably greater with two helicopters on board. Thus, although all FFGs might not, in fact, carry two helicopters at all times, it would be highly advantageous to have the capa­bility when mission requirements so dictated.

EDITOR'S NOTE: For additional back­ground information on the FFG-7 Pro­gram see “FFG-7: The Concept and De­sign” and “The Navy’s Newest Ship: FFG-7,” pp. 148-153, March 1978 Proceedings. The FFG-7 is discussed in this issue in the lead article, “Destroyers in the 21st Centurya professional note, “The Need for a Super-FFG: One Solu­tion,” and in Notebook.

I-'

P Victorian and Edwardian

SAILING SHIPS

From Old Photographs By Basil Greenhill and Ann Giffard

The vintage photographs in this book commemorate the sailing ships and boats which have now com­pletely vanished. This book recreates that era through rare photographs and the authors’ enlightening com­m mentaries.

The book is divided into 15 chapters, the first eight

of which show sailing ships characteristic of the British coastline. Subsequent chapters cover related subjects such as the Royal Navy, the shipbuilders, and wrecks and disasters, while a final section illustrates specific boat and ship types and defines some of the terminol­ogy peculiar to an era long past.

One of the most photogenic of all seafaring themes is here recorded in a range of old pictures which are themselves of engaging beauty.

1977/144 pages 1150 photographs

A Naval Institute Press Book

List price: $8.95                          Member’s price: $7.15

Add $1.00 to each order for postage and handling. (Please use order in Books of Interest to the Professional section.)

Comment and Discussion

“Command Authority and

Professionalism”

(See J. F. Kelly, pp. 26-32, August 1978;

K. M. Smith, pp. 24-27, October 1978;

J. Bussert, pp. 115-119, November 1978;

C.         H. Gnerlich, p. 95, December 1978;

D.         J. Hackett and B. V. Tiernan, pp. 89-90,

January 1979 Proceedings)

Lieutenant Commander Brian J. Barry, U. S. Navy—Master Chief Bussert’s comments concerning the current “in­spection cycle” contain a large number of excellent points. However, it is ob­vious that the master chief is a sonar­man and not a hull technician. Any­one considering the proposal that all inspections occur within only one month of a given year, from the standpoint of damage control, would immediately recognize the significant hazard to a ship’s stability which would result from such a large addi­tion to topside weight.

If senior commanders have deter­mined that the most efficient method of ensuring that high standards of combat readiness are achieved and maintained in the fleet is by the “in­spection cycle,” then any proposal to lessen the derivative adverse impacts of these inspections must start from that premise. From the ship’s standpoint the most practical way of reducing this impact would be to reorganize the present inspection pro­gram which has been derived fron¹ staff organization to one based upon shipboard organization.

For example, examine the scullery operation of a ship, first as viewed from the ship, and then as viewed by the ship’s chain of command. To the ship the scullery is comprised of the space, equipment, and personnel who wash dishes. However, to the chain of command, this same organization is ³ potential health hazard (both “medi­cally” and “environmentally” speak­ing), a damage control problem, ^a space containing auxiliary equipment, a space containing equipment upon which preventive maintenance is p^er" formed, a space whose operation would affect a recommendation for the Ney Award, and is, of course, a spa^ce operated by the supply department- This shipboard functional area ^lS therefore inspected during the Medici Inspection, the Environmental Preven­tive Medical Unit Inspection, Fleet Training Group Inspections, the Aux­iliary Examining Board, 3M Inspe^c' tions, the Ney Committee Inspection, and during the Annual Supply Insp^e<-' tion (ignoring all “assist” visits an infrequent inspections such as an ^lfJ' SURV Inspection).

If this shipboard function were as­signed to one member of the tyP^e commander’s staff, it would seem P°^y sible for him to coordinate the vario^uS staffs so that many if not all of thes^e areas could be evaluated during °^ne annual inspection. The type coto mander would not lose the ability ^t0 monitor the operation of the scullery’ and the man washing dishes would s^e£ a dramatic reduction in inspections- An inspection program derived from listing of significant shipboard fu^nC^. tional areas, which in the chain ⁰ command’s viewpoint require periods

07®

the

y may wish to become involved in

At the very all inspection teams should be

di

Valuation and which includes all “in­jectable” aspects included in that area, would reduce the total number °f inspections, focus attention on im­portant operational factors instead of ancillary requirements of the myriad ^staff codes, and would be better re­ceived by the fleet. Adoption of the ship “functional area” inspection con­cept might have the additional benefit °f reducing the total number of in­spectors, permitting their reassign­ment to ship sculleries. There is no question that this reassignment would result in cleaner dishes, which is, after ah, the end result which everyone is trying to achieve.

If anyone believes that the scullery ¹⁵ an isolated case I should point out that during my first four months as the main propulsion assistant on board the Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN-69), the number and size of the holes in the bottom of my calcium hypochlorite ready storage lockers were counted and measured no fewer than three times; during a one month period, the ability °' the Ike's damage control organiza­tion to respond to a nuclear weapons ^accident was evaluated three times by three different inspection teams; and during a 30-day period, the Ike’s Sundry was inspected four times. In­terestingly enough some important ^afeas of ship’s operations are never in­jected, presumably because no staff ^Organization has accepted inspection responsibility for them. For reasons of self-preservation these areas shall re­main unmentioned.

One final comment: over the past several years there has been a steady movement on the part of inspection teams to abandon the prescribed Navy ^uniform and adopt some type of ^C°verall in its place. A shade of blue ^'th a command patch on the left feast seems to be the most popular ^style. In view of the uniform board’s recent interest in standardizing com- rr>and ball caps, I would think that [b>s phenomenon also, least

lrected to provide full-length color Portraits of their coveralls to the Navy ^useum so that this important aspect sartorial history does not pass unre-

c°rded.

“The Through-Deck Cruiser: The New Capital Ship”

(See M. A. Cairl, pp. 34-42, December 1978;

R. J. Schneider, pp. 26-27, February 1979

Proceedings)

Thomas S. Hohack—I am afraid that Mr. Cairl’s article will give us politi­cal science graduates a deservedly bad reputation among those naval profes­sionals who must try to use our work. If I had not completed a similar study on a capital ship’s specific needs, I might have been more amenable to his ideas. It is one of the tragedies of life that general ideas are very hard to convert to real engineering. I submit that most naval architects and engineers could produce his ship only at a prohibitive price and only after completely disrupting the rest of the naval construction program.

The through-deck cruiser (TDC), as offered by the author, is not practical. He assumes equipment is or will be available when it is not and will not be. This is especially true of the com­bat system which will just emerge as a functioning unit. I believe not only his statement that a TDC will not need escorts is rash, but that his proposi­tion that TDCs replace the service life extension program for the large car­riers is absolutely ridiculous.

He proposes to let the present car­riers go to an early grave. Their decks hold real aircraft. You know, the kind that go Mach 2, carry Phoenix, and fly for 400 miles without a fill-up. It is poignant to note that his TDCs’ decks are empty. Right now the only aircraft that could be ready in time for his cruiser is the AV-8B improved Har­rier and that depends on several touchy congressional votes.

Besides his phantom (small “p”) aircraft, he proposes a “magic” combat system. To begin with, the vertical launch antisubmarine rocket (ASROC) was killed a while back, along with the extended range ASROC. And as for the 203-mm. (8-inch) guns, the Navy is having a difficult time getting funds for the single barrel 8-inch Mk 71 mount, never mind a twin mount. In fact, there is no money in the FY-79 budget for the Mk 7 1. His large TDC shows five Mk 75 mounts and the small TDC bears three. Experts have criticized the selection of this smaller mount when the larger Mk 45 5-inch is a feasible alternative, because the latter provides better shore bombard­ment and antiair warfare (AAW) pro­tection.

Mr. Cairl devotes only one small paragraph to electronics. He men­tions only one specific system, the Navy tactical data system, and says that a fire control system is needed. No one would dispute this, but the question is “What Fire Control System?” All anyone can do is study the vague sketches and guess what he intends to use. There are no missile directors. And although there appears to be only one SPG-60 gunfire control radar that is AAW capable, four other radars, two SPQ-9S and two 3-Ds, are on the large TDC. The smaller ship appears to use the Dutch HSA’s 3-D MTTR, a political impossibility these days. If Mr. Cairl has a good concept, we will never know based on his presen­tation.

“Women in Warships: A Right to Serve”

(See J. F. Kelly, pp. 44-53, October 1978;

K. G. Hensel and R. Lane, pp. 86-87, January 1979; J. L. Byron, C. O. Cook, and F. R. Hamlett, pp. 82-84, February

Proceedings)

Lieutenant Jeffrey P. Simpson, U. S. Navy—Last October, President Carter signed Defense Authorization Bill 60.15. It contained provisions for amending Section 6015 of Title 10, U. S. Code which prohibited women from sea duty except on board hospital and transport ships. Several months earlier, the Pentagon announced that 55 officer and 375 enlisted billets on board 21 support ships would be open to female volunteers. BuPers ex­pected to be swamped with requests for reassignment, and on 9 August 1978, 164 women volunteered for the 55 officers assignments. But among the enlisted women, the response was much less than enthusiastic. By 3 November, 205 enlisted billets still required female volunteers. A De­partment of Defense spokesman said, “If we don’t have sufficient volunteers, it appears that some women will be assigned to ships on a non-volunteer basis.” On 4 December 1978, the

Navy Times reported, "Of the 62 going to Vulcan, 57 were volunteers, while the others were assigned through the regular detailing pro­cess.” By enforcing non-volunteer sea duty upon enlisted women, the Navy may greatly exacerbate its retention of experienced female petty officers who enlisted under different rules. This the service does not need in light of its failure to meet retention goals.

Captain Kelly fails to address .four salient points which directly affect the ability of the U.S. Navy to effectively prosecute its mission. It is well under­stood that the primary purpose of the Navy is to defend, preferably through deterrence, America's access to the sea. Overseas sources supply 50% of the petroleum which fuels our econ­omy. American industry requires sea transportation to provide vast quan­tities of natural resources not available in this country. The sea provides the medium for this country to directly project its foreign policy upon the rimlands of Eurasia and Africa. Before embarking upon a policy of detailing women to sea duty on board combat­ants, four questions must be answered in the affirmative:

►  Can female bluejackets adjust to the physical, emotional, and mental rigors of sea duty, and be accepted by their male shipmates without ad­versely impacting the combat effi­ciency of the ship?

►  Can women be assigned to ships without hindering either recruiting or retention?

►  Can women be detailed to sea duty without undermining our naval strength in the eyes of antagonists or allies?

►  Is the American public willing to accept a significant female body count in any future war?

Shipboard life is radically different from conditions ashore. Men are berthed in accommodations that are worse than prisons—bunkrooms 40 by 20 feet house 42 men and all their personal gear. Often, poorly venti­lated, temperatures within a ship de­ployed to the Western Pacific rise to 90 or 100 degrees. The work schedule on board an aircraft carrier is 12 hours on and 12 hours off for periods as long as 30 days. The pressure is intense, but so is the comradery. The men of a particular shop or division work to­gether, play together, and live to­gether. The shop or division assumes an identity unto itself. Since enlisted women will be bunked separately from their division shipmates, they will be looked upon as outsiders because they will not be fully integrated. Presently, when an enlisted man is berthed in other than his division’s bunkroom, he often has difficulty being accepted as part of his division.

While sexual relations per se be­tween male and female crew members are immaterial to this discussion, what is germane is the emotional fallout of those relationships and how they will directly impact on the efficiency of the crew. It is well known that 30- or 40-day line periods are a strain even among the most hearty seamen. In addition to the tensions inherent on board ship, the presence of women will arouse sexual emotions and jealousy. Combined with long periods of confinement such as exists on board a deployed ship, these social and emo­tional maladies would be exacerbated.

Another factor which subverts dis­cipline is sexual relations between offi­cer and enlisted. This type of conduct, which is not easily hidden on board ship, undermines an officer’s authority and clouds the impartiality of his ac­tions.

The Navy is preparing to assign 210 officer and 5,120 enlisted women to support ships by 1984. That women, with a few exceptions, are less powerful than most men, those ships which hold significant numbers of women may face serious morale dif­ficulties because fewer men will be performing the same amount of heavy manual labor.

In the next five years, the Navy ex­pects to increase the female contin­gents on board selected naval vessels to 25%. Since Pentagon projections disclose that 8% of the service women are pregnant at any one time, the con­sequences to shipboard manning are evident. The ability of ships with large complements of women to de­ploy on short notice with full crews will be sharply inhibited. And for female sailors who are divorced or have husbands deployed, the Navy must find some way to care for their chil­dren while the mothers are deployed.

The proportion of women in the American Armed Forces has increased by 450% in the last seven years and it is expected to double again in the next five years. This has been precipitated by the discontinuation of the draft, the growing shortage of qualified male volunteers, and the vociferousness of the feminists. Increasingly, young women have been required to fill the gaps left in recruiting quotas due to the shortage of male recruits so that the military could maintain its re­quired force levels. A recent study has shown that interest among both men and women to enlist in one of the armed services significantly declines if a woman’s chances of exposure to combat are the same as men’s, and women’s interest in a military life de­clines by 16% if there is some chance of them being exposed to combat- Obviously, radical changes in the utilization of female personnel, which would expose them to the hazards of combat, would adversely affect recruit­ing efforts of both men and women because the pool of volunteers would be reduced.

A very strong element in the reten­tion equation is the Navy wife who generally opposes the introduction of servicewomen on board Navy ships- Although there is no substantive evi­dence to confirm her fears, the Navy wife feels that the lady sailor is ^a threat to her marriage because of the close circumstances of shipboard life- Under these conditions, the v/if^e would be a negative reenlistment in­fluence.

No other nation has shown as much willingness to open its military ranks to women. Only a few enlisted occu­pational specialties directly relating ^t0 combat are denied to U.S. women. Iⁿ constrast, the Soviet military of f°^ut million has only 10,000 women, and the Israeli Defense Forces, although subjecting females to conscription, ^re' strict them to a smaller proportion ⁰ the military occupations than the United States and assigns none ^t0 combat-related duties. The militate services of the world either lim¹¹ women to clerical and support roles o^f exclude them altogether.