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Bv T *
y leutenant John Charles Roach, U. S. Naval Reserve, and Herbert A. Meier
the history of maritime nations there has been „ / . ,
r a Long and deeply rooted tradition
fr arcitng aesthetics in warship design. Aside
m *he role of being able to wage war, the
^as served as a political tool of
^ suasion intended to effectively project a
°n s naval power, prestige, and influence.
er t^)e past feiv years, hoivever, there has
a noticeable trend away from considering
Pearance as an important aspect in U. S. rsh ships
0
lP design. The Navy no longer builds as imposing as the heavy cruiser
x» ~
evvPort News.
slab °day S J^merican warships look large, top-heavy, See^Sl<^ed, static, and underarmed, and in general less fearsome than they could be or ought to be. as c°mpared with warships of other nations, such v: e Wore recent additions to the Soviet Navy, the
th 3 COntrast 's striking, leaving the impression a^h°V*et are more menacing and ominous.
s,ons?
iat are some of the reasons for such impres-
<n > j ^hy do some warships seem more threaten- ty, .' ^by do some appear faster and more powerful to * e otbers fail to fulfill aether? What looks good
lttedly subjective. However, effective looking are not designed tastelessly; therefore, it is cakeSSary t0 cons*der an artistic opinion and a vo- ^ su'table terms in order to understand at does make a better looking warship.
our expectations alin a warship design is
In addition to being a platform for weapons and sensors, the ship must meet the requirements of mobility, seaworthiness, operability under a wide variety of sea states, survivability in battle, and habitability for the crew. To design and build such a vessel utilizes nearly the full spectrum of a nation’s technical ability. Therefore, the warship is a form of architectural sculpture of equal significance to that of great buildings, bridges, automobiles, and aircraft.
In the past, the shape of each of these objects has generally been the result of the total mechanical and aesthetic vision of a principal designer. These designers succeeded because they shared an appreciation of the basic nature of materials and mechanisms and knew how they could be artistically synthesized into new and useful objects. Although the architects of land structures have maintained an intense interest in aesthetics, this has not always been the case in naval engineering. Because of the “design by committee” concept employed today, the type of aesthetic impact Donald McKay had on clipper ships, John Roebling had on bridges, and Eturio Bugatti had on automobiles has been lost in warships. To compensate for the effects of design by committee, other modern industry uses industrial designers to improve product appeal, particularly when appearance affects sales. This same design concept has been successfully used for yachts and merchant ships but is not always present in the warship design process, despite the ship’s requirement to show the flag.
Discussion of Terms: Visual clues help us determine our relationship with an object and also shape our opinion as to whether the object is benign or threatening. The industrial designer makes full use of visual clues to enhance a product’s appeal, knowing that human beings have a predisposition and preference for certain forms to perform certain functions. Just as we naturally have a preference for a
She looks almost as big as her island namesake, bloody Peleliu. She is big and there are four more just as big. But five of them can t cover the world. After LHA-5 is completed, no more are scheduled. If we don't build at least four more, and plan for replacements of our aging amphibious fleet, our inaction may be widely interpreted—and may indeed be true—that we are ceding Eurafrica to Soviet imperialism.
USS Newport News (CA-148)
pretty face over one which is plain, we also see sharp, spear-shaped objects as threatening and a stereo with more lights and knobs as more effective than one with fewer. Visual clues as to what function a form serves are an essential part of an evaluation.
Five basic visual clues seem to be common to better looking ships: (1) lines of force, (2) the Dunn curve and forward and aft slope, (3) profile envelope and silhouette, (4) tumblehome and flare, and (5) interval.
Lines of force unite the composition as a whole. Additionally, they can appear to spring out into surrounding space beyond the object, implying a ges
ture or pressure in that space. This visual interruP tion tends to give an object greater significance cause of its eye-catching quality and visual eX^,tC ment. The sheerline of a ship (joining the sides o ^ hull with the main deck) is the most obvious ample of a strong line of force as well as the si F most important expression of her character. D ^ lesser lines of force are found in the bow, stern, edges, and knuckles, as well as those of even gre ^ number and variety in the weapon and electronic s> terns, masts, and funnels. .
Vertical lines tend to appear relatively sta
Lines of Force
These lines most often lie on the surface of a form such as a sheerline or a rake in the bow, but may be internal such as the thrust of a mast or the projection of a weapon.
Dunn Curve
The Dunn Curve represents the general distribution of superstructure along the ship's length. The forward and aftward slopes represent the rate at which the superstructure is stacked.
Profile Envelope and Silhouette
Note active form changes
1 e lines set at an angle and thrust outward convey in tSe rnoti°n- Uncoordinated lines which thrust snb ' *erent directions work against each other and Vert a strong visual theme. There are two more Ser^s line to be considered. The Dunn curve repre- s rhe preferred distribution of superstructure
^aS!
Centi
along the ship’s length with the visual focus at about the first third of that length. In g ’ ^-awrence Dunn put forth the idea that the bet^ra^ distribution of a ship’s tophamper makes a p tr appearance when it follows this curve.1 shin the origin of the curve is in early sailing f0 ^S’ when the mainmast was taller than the 'fiast and the mizzen shorter than the other the But the curve became more apparent during Ration of passenger liners, for their appearance a Prime concern. This curve is amply apparent in
>rCe rence Dunn, “The Shaping of Passenger Liners,” Journal of Com- nual. 1958.
such ships as the Mauretania, the Normandie, and the United States. Because of the importance of this curve, it would seem equally applicable to warships as well. The forward and aft slope is nearly as important as the Dunn curve, because it represents the rate at which the superstructure is stepped upward.
Interval, tumblehome and flare are related to lines of force but convey different messages about the ship. The interval is the distance between decks or other major horizontals and, as such, is related to the ship’s length and freeboard. The greater the interval, the more bloated and chunky one ship will appear, while the same interval in a longer ship will produce a feeling of sleekness. Additionally, a ship will appear to have a higher or lower profile because of a discrete balance between the horizontal and' vertical distribution of the superstructure mass.
Tumblehome, whether found in the superstructure or hull, conveys a sense of the dynamic, unlike the static quality of straight perpendiculars. Flare can be thought of as a curve in the hull form which contrib-
utes to resisting plunging of the bow during pitching. Aesthetically, flare is effective in reinforcing a projecting bow and emphasizing a strong sheerline. Silhouette is the single continuous line which outlines the contour of ship’s shape as seen from all angles. Objects which project outward, causing an angular silhouette, are visually more demanding of attention because of their implied gesture and space interruption. Projections which give a ship a thorny, prickly appearance are caused by masts, radars, and weapon systems. The thoughtful positioning of these systems to fill in space rather than to appear as singular units in a large void, makes for a variety of new shapes in the open space surrounding masts, funnels, weapons, and electronic arrangements. In viewing the profile of a ship in terms of lines of force (which can now be thought of as the internal compositional lines flowing through and across an object’s form) and in terms of the profile envelope (which is the outline of the silhouette, including all guns, electronics, and other projections), it is apparent that these two features will largely determine how menacing an appearance a ship will have. There is one more consideration included with these elements—visual texture. As sunlight reflects off the surface of a form, it is possible to determine if the object is relatively smooth and unarticulated or highly articulated because of the color value changes of light and shadow. Articulated surfaces are more interesting than smooth ones; a multifaceted surface has more texture changes to catch the eye. The cactus is a good example of these two contrasting ideas: although the cactus itself seems smooth and inviting to touch, there are those ever-present spines pushing back at the viewer. The presence of spiky projections is a common characteristic of the more menacing and ominous-looking warships. Of course, these basic ideas have been overly generalized for the purpose of making the principles clear. Nevertheless, when applied to warship design, these principles and observations seem most appropriate and are the basis for why we react in certain ways when viewing a ship design. Examples and Analysis: A warship should appear to be threatening, well-armed, enigmatic, fast-moving and seaworthy. To achieve this effect, a warship should be low in profile, have strong coordinated lines, styling which unites the composition, and be covered with a variety of thorny projections. In general, the more effective appearing warships have the highest possible combination of these qualities. Let’s | Spruance (DD-963)-class destroyer, and the 0hver Hazard Perry (FFG-7)-class frigate. Later, we 11 c°n trast these examples with some foreign warships. ^ There are some general distinguishing qualities the California which are immediately observed, has a high-sided, chunky appearance. The super^ structure is distributed vertically more than ho^ zontally and confined almost to the center of c ship’s length; large empty spaces are apparent which proportionally small weapons project outwa The few projections on the California tend to dwarfed by the mass of the superstructure and hu ^ The distribution of superstructure places the vise* focus of the ship about midship and outside the U ^ curve. Additionally, interest is split fore and aft, £lV ing the ship a Pushmi-Pullyu effect of a ferry bo*1 ^ lacking a defined sense of direction of travel. ^ ^ are few horizontal parallel lines to give a sense ^ scale, and the interval between the waterline to sheerline and the sheerline to top of superstructure enormous and unbroken. The large vertical blocks the superstructure are predominant, giving the ship solid, static appearance—devoid of dynamic m°ti°^ The forward slope line drawn from the bow to mast truck describes a course which starts with^ relatively slow incline, then runs parallel to sheerline over the first set of weapons. Ic c abruptly jumps to the top of the bridge and flatte out again across the radars before accelerating rap1 to the top of the mast. The large empty spaces little which pushes back into the surrounding SP ^ and, therefore, make the ship look nude and un L j defended. Few shapes in the design seem coordinate with others in a compositional whole. The slab si of both hull and superstructure and the build*0^ block appearance of unrelieved planes, devoid of sUf face articulation, give the ship a sense of having b ^ designed with a T-square rather than with an ^ chitect’s ship curves. Finally, there are few convirj^ ing visual clues as to the contents of the ship in re tion to her enormous size or her ability to make vv£ir^ One is left only with the impression of large size a° uninteresting empty spaces. The Spruance and the Oliver Hazard Perry als° emplify a trend toward designs which, thoi?^ perhaps practical and functional, are less than apP ‘ ing in terms of appearance. The Oliver Hazard ‘ ^ seems to have been assembled from modular corn^s nents, squarely stacked like so many building bl°c on the hull. Large empty spaces, the vertical m ^ bution of superstructure mass, and the lack 0 |
look at three recent classes of U. S. warships: the California (CGN-36)-class nuclear-powered cruiser, the | anirn*1 2In Hugh Lofting’s book Dr. Doolittle, the Pushmi-Pullyu was a which had no tail, but had a head at each end. |
| ___ . iet® |
the there
a 1^^ t^lat tend t0 relegate aesthetic considerations to jSser role than they have occupied in the past.”
. t has already been pointed out that warship de- 0^. ’ as is the case with the design of most other of'^ts today, is now less the product of the talents °ne man. In place of the single senior naval ar-
ari^r *nated whole give the ship a bloated appear- t^C*' Bines of force are predominantly vertical, and etween-deck interval is monumental. The lack a clear delineation of decks results in a loss of the sc °f scale and makes it difficult to determine the Slze of the ship. The frigate suffers not only aj^rn abtupt level changes in the superstructure, but from the impression of having two Texas oil rigs r masts and a gun mounted on top of a barn. These ct°rs contribute to the belief that neither creative tiv 0 Utl^Zat‘on nor appearance was a primary objec- 1 C w^en designing this ship. If, however, such a t> v°lume is necessary, a more horizontal distribu- shjH suPerstmcture mass might have resulted in a P substantially different and more attractive and
U\x/°se^ ln aPPearance, . the Spruance has organizational qualities
t ctl enhance the ship’s appearance, she still suffers 111 large empty spaces, high volume, and a small oer of visible weapons. The abrupt break in the s r lne at the forward end of the massive ttia rstructure has the appearance of a concentrated 0n an inadequate supporting structure. This ... to a most unfortunate psychological effect at ^’ves rhe sh'P the appearance of being broken ,. Is point. The Spruance might have been a visu- sttonger ship if the volume of superstructure had r ?n horizontally distributed. Note the drawings of a $tr Ca reconf'8urat*on of the Spruance. Notice the forward slope and distinctive placement of aP°ns in the example.
ers Belknap (CG-26)- and Leahy (CG-16)-class cruis-
s and the Charles F. Adams (DDG-2)-class guided-
-■ _e destroyer of the early 1960s period have dis-
I IVe "American” appearances and are about the
of sh>ps to effectively marry the requirements
an v°hime with impressive styling. The appear-
^ e of American warships has not been an important
sor^11 COns*^eration for a long time. But from a cur-
$h. examination of pictures of most of our older
a 'l35, aPpearance was a definite design consideration
np* the end of World War II.
0r 0r engineers who are now engaged in the design
new U. S. warships, who in many cases were also
shV°,Ved in the design of early post-World War II
'Ps> the answer is, “Yes, of course, we appreciate
‘mportance of producing good-looking ships. But
, e ate many factors in the current design atmos- Pne
Principal lines of force in the California (cgn-36) class
Superstructure falls outside the Dunn curve and splits focus forward and aft. There are large voids and highsided planes.
chitect, who used to sign his name on all plans over such a title as “In Charge of Work,” we now have project managers who coordinate the efforts of many specialists. Not since the ships designed under the practiced eye of John C. Niedemair (principal architect in the U. S. Navy during the 19d0s and 1950s) have American warships had a strong advocate for appearance.
The computer is now used extensively, not only to perform most of the tedious individual calculations previously done by hand, but also to produce early- stage conceptual designs. Thus, the extent of human involvement in the design process has been greatly lessened. The project manager is in the unenviable
of the
the
eration, it has instead resulted in the escalation
number of early-stage studies from the tens into
hundreds. Also, in the present inflationary and tig
budget climate, the project manager is extren
conscious of design as well as construction costs < ^
may therefore be loath to devote much of his ^
sources to promoting aesthetic considerations leSt ’
be thought lacking in hard-nosed fiscal resp°nS1
ity. For example, in the absence of demonstra
cost-effectiveness, it has taken many years to ma
case for roll-stabilizing fins for U. S. ships. This
occurred in spite of the fact that virtually ah f°r
navies prescribe them as a matter of course. It W°U r • hie H1
appear that their advantages, while as intangm
some respects as aesthetics, are nevertheless £en£jjesS
agreed to be very great by others, yet require en
justification by our own design community
The Soviet Navy, on the other hand, has est
elec-
d an° dra"^ Kara’ imarf
outward thrust. As a result, the forward slope from the bow to the highest point of the
• r • » pr 0&
opaque outline of the ship’s superstructure.
nearly every viewing angle the ship appears r°
covered with thorns. Q(
does
The “Kara’s” superstructure shows signS
position of having to provide answers to the seer0 ingly endless “What if?” questions that must be^ swered during the early design stages. Thus, " the computer should have saved time and permit^ such things as aesthetics to be given greater cons*
sh-
Hshed a strong tradition of design preferences " hit
is reflected in all of the recent additions to the
^ . 'Tn15
Many are exhibited in the “Kara”-class cruiser, ship appears to be in the crouched, low-profile st ^ ^ of a fighter. Her superstructure and hull show HneS^ force which are coordinated and purposefully directs There are diagonals projecting outward, parallel reinforcing the sheerline, and a sense of internal m tion in the design. Large masses were kept l°w the high points surrounded by an aura of SP^ stinger-like projections. Her weapon and electr ^ systems appear larger than life as they stand out tive to the ship’s size.
Rather than aligning the axis of a weapon or ^ tronic system over a platform or with the ship s terline, these objects were often centered to the ^ treme sides and dressed to the forward edge o , platform. This practice accentuates an upwan passes smoothly through all of the ship’s prl war-making equipment and never once touches tumblehome and very few vertical surfaces. There
3 • u chip*
not seem to be a straight line anywhere in the
Flare in the hull and numerous bevels and turns
the funnel, deck edges, bridge, radar mast, ^
throughout, make a highly articulated and stirn
slleerline.
These lines give the ship a sense of scale
-C^ by the cobra-like, ready-to-strike appearance e pilothouse and visions of pincer-like missile ant110*16^ tentac^e eycs °f cbe fire control radar nna ( Headlight” illuminators) are strongly sug- ‘R a menacing insect. From all directions, the
Hot
a net,cs’ as a source f°r coordinating the appear-
n8ed to the Ministry of the Shipbuilding Indus- Which is responsible for designing and building k ‘ as well as merchant ships. The head of this a O- Arnal’d, has written at length about how
tj *P s silhouette is formed and has stressed, in par- 0p ar> the importance of the angular characteristics a ship’s extremities.3
snuVUrface- The roll of the deck edge catches the *8ht and the strong repetitious parallels to the
tL ' e accentuating a horizontal appearance that gives illusion of holding down the profile. There is a Ua^Vf Concentrati°n of lines of force, centering a vis- th °CUS aroun<^ tf*e ship’s bridge and radar mast, tf,e ship a strong compositional theme j area of high visual interest. Though the ship w es not conform strictly to the Dunn curve and defU ^ ^ose points here, there is nonetheless a well u ‘”e<f forward and aft slope which more than makes °r th*rs one defect.
t e ship’s strong dominant sheerline, supported <7 *are in the hull, is a fast-moving, thematic, ease ■ c*roPs back quickly from the bow,
j s lt;self under the superstructure and runs the the^^ r^e S^‘P ^e^ore briefly popping up again at Ca^/antail. Considerable flare in the projecting bow el]-S a strong shadow and sense of solidity, while the ^ PtlCal k°w bas a shark-nosed appearance reaching the°Ut °Ver t^le water ahead of the ship. This makes sou Waterbne run seem finer than it is and provides a Ce °f color variation along the length of the hull, fo ? appearance of a strong projection is again rein-
of
represents a formidable appearance which did tior)C°rne together by accident. Far too many associa- setl S seern deliberately intended to give the ship a he e °f speed, stability, and stinger-like quality in
[silhouette.
Cor> e appearance of Soviet warships seems to be a Vai^tl0us attempt to take maximum propaganda dts-t ^r°m cbe fleet through the artistic medium of R styling. Ships such as the Kiev, Moskva, and r,Vak are indicative of the concern for overall ap- fu r.ance and seem to have been designed with some . c ‘'mental ideas of what looks effective. It is h() ,'Vn that the Soviet Union uses a national design , cy. the All-Union Research Institute for Technical
Aesthe
dts of ‘ndustrial products. Among the six artistic
i Rt> bureaus in existence in December 1970, one °elon try,
The last example to be considered here is the British County-class cruiser introduced in the early 1960s. This class illustrates how a successful design solution can be achieved with a minimum compromise between maintaining high volume for weapon systems while achieving a well-balanced and good-looking ship. Though the County has a small number of weapons and electronic gear, the ship does avoid the slab-sided, static appearance of U. S. warships because she follows the principle of the Dunn curve and uses balanced lines of force, tumblehome, flare and knuckle, and a minimum of perpendicular lines. The County class is obviously less theatrical than the "Kara” and seems to represent the restrained style of a refined British attitude toward shipbuilding. The balance was carried out so well that this ship seems deceptively larger than she is and very purposeful in appearance.
The Cost of Aesthetics: Appearance cannot be 3See Raymond Hutchings, “Soviet Design Practices and Their Influence on the Design of Soviet Warships” (London: unpublished, 1977).
Principal lines of force in a County-class cruiser
ear
ral
not
to fall short of these ideals? There are perhaps sevei reasons which contribute to the problem. One is n having appearance as a goal. Naval architects of
lament, “If we could only put some more,
to
____________________ _______ ______ if *c
isn’t. Form does have its roots in the functional, b1* more is demanded if the form is to have apPe‘ ’ What is lacking in the equation “form follows funC tion” is that only some forms follow certain fn°c tions. To be appropriate, an object must have 1 emotional relevance to the viewer.
An illustration which may make this point clea*^ as to what seems appropriate is the new Mark 8-inch gun now under development for the Navl Here is a design which is meant to function as a £ but which looks more like an overturned Dixie clIP with a soda straw stuck through it. The lines of f0>l^ work against each other and a strong composit*(,n‘ theme. Had the shape of the gun been designed ‘T convey a visual message that the gun is capable 1 doing great harm, the shape would be more like a*1 Army M60 tank turret instead of a Dixie cup- * j lines of force of the Mark 71 gun could be redirect by developing a new shroud which better conveys t
/
plugged in like so many nuts and bolts. It must be engineered into the design from the very beginning and not as an added-on feature or afterthought. For this reason, employing stylists who can deal with only the superficial and not the engineering concepts as the design evolves should be avoided. Within narrow constraints, improved appearance—including major changes to the inboard profile—can be obtained at little cost. There is an impact, but it is small, relative to the total ship cost. Appearance can be bought relatively cheaply, but it will be bought only if it is a stipulated customer requirement.
In 1966, the Shipbuilding Inquiry Committee Report to the British Government made several points regarding the design of their merchant ships. One of the four points was that ships should be good-looking; also, since the British ships were held to be of high quality, the additional cost associated
with ensuring the desired appearance was consider an insignificant part of the whole purchase
Why, then, is it that recent U. S. warships apP'
visible weapons on the ship, it would look so much m°^ impressive.” The frustration expressed may really caused by not having a clear idea as to what a mo ern warship should look like, because there is yet be established a firm lexicon of design soluti°n which lead to an effective appearance in U. S. ship design. But the biggest impediment seems to the idea which some engineers use as a common juS tification for appearance, “form follows function.
In the United States, where the sophisticate0 level of technology is very high, there is a stronf cultural bias for such a myth. For example, ‘ there beauty in that which is functional.” Unfortunate r should we fail to grasp the significance of a Pure functional form, our opinions are dismissed as beinf ignorant of what constitutes good design. This ‘lt^ titude tends to ignore the facts that not everyth*11!’ that is functional is beautiful, or that people do ha' ‘ preferences and expectations of forms to perform cef tain functions. ^
The idea that form follows function is the result o an overly simplistic, self-serving attitude that if 11 “right” in functional engineering terms then *t necessarily aesthetically right in form. This point 1 comes further clouded by any coincidental beat* which we may discover after the fact in some objeCt* or more often may stem from our natural desire^ see something beautiful in every object, even
m«sage that it is Th<
a gun.
an ere is one last point to be made about achieving
itina^r°*5r*ate aPPearance t0 project an image. The g . r c°hesiveness of a composition, whether it is an ^‘nch gun or a sj1jp design wjtj1 many parts, is a seeCt'°n 0^t^lese parts. Large or small, a design must
ro work together if a successful result is expected.
Th
flu Cre are several orher factors which appear to in- ence a ship’s appearance in the U.S. Navy. One e Sl eration is the apparent bulk of our ships. An c lnation of the relationship between total ()Ur °se<a volume and displacement—the density of UrnJlewer ships—indicates a definite increase in vol- Per ton of displacement. This increase is fre- ards 1 ^ attr'huted to improved habitability stands- However, while the number of cubic feet re- ye^ d t0 support crew members has risen in recent p „S’ the total number of crew members in newer
i Here; ele,
warships has been reduced. The real volume ase has come about because of missiles, increased
‘■Tronic spaces, increased auxiliary machinery (for
SUch thi 'ty for
ngs as air conditioning), increased accessibil- repair and maintenance of machinery, and the quj auction of helicopter stowage and support re. ements, and can only be minimally attributed to c^eased habitability.
a ngrhening a stocky appearing ship may improve Poor appearance, but length is the most expensive Pos nS10n to increase and hence is avoided whenever sh' ' e' ‘s c^us htt:ie wonder that some U. S. gnfS ^*aVe £rown much higher, faster than they have s 0 ^onger> especially since the use of aluminum in rStruct“res has permitted this growth without an ity lnate weight increase or beam growth for stabil- Sta^ ^ should be noted, however, that in a few inav '^eS *n wi1'ch a fixed power plant is the only one a rf.i ^e’ such as a nuclear or gas turbine plant, and
shi^ exampie °f this for gas turbine-propelled
datively high speed is required, the hulls of these Ps have, of necessity, retained the longer propor-
t!0ns
)ips
Ca ls the Oliver Hazard Perry class. However, bee °f the way the superstructure mass and bUlk°nry were distributed, the ship still appears
Nuclear-powered ships, such as those of the
]Q l°rr,ia class, which might have benefited through ^Portions, present another unique styling lem because of the need to have a clear core re- hi k& area ^or t*ie nuciear reactors. This resulted in a and discontinuous superstructure profile and a I, ^ ^ge clear deck area for the forward missile
‘^cher
ternal
and gun mount. Judicious placing of in-
0ye ecluipment within the ship’s superstructure r che reactors, which would have allowed removal
during infrequent recoring, might have significantly improved the visual continuity of the superstructure.
Another factor is the constant fight for centerline placement of weapon systems, whereby each weapon system is stacked one higher than the other to secure the widest field of fire. The navigation bridge is then placed in the highest position. All of this contributes to the static verticality seen in American ships. An area of investigation aimed at driving down current volume requirements, which might reap even greater dividends, would be to reconsider the use of one- of-a-kind, high-cost, hard-to-maintain, multipurpose weapon systems. It may be possible to develop smaller single-purpose systems with lower power requirements, less maintenance, less volume, higher reliability, and lower cost which could be integrated in such a way that a failure of one of the components does not lead to massive failure of a complementary system. Use of systems which perform singlepurpose, primary functions would ensure that a ship has a thorny, filled appearance rather than one of open, empty spaces.
The enhanced producibility and cost-effectiveness that is assumed to be maintained by keeping all weld points at 90° and all surfaces flat cannot be entirely substantiated. Immediate improvement in appearance could be initiated with more tumblehome, flare, knuckles, and rounded deck edges to alleviate the stocky appearance of current superstructures. It may also be possible to draw up an appearance standard
Hoc
which establishes general guidance ratios, such as making the ship’s height a function of the ship’s length and making freeboard the determining factor of the between-deck interval.
In addition, there is propaganda value in once again placing the crest of the republic on the bow and the American eagle on the transom; this would leave no doubt in the viewer’s mind as to who built the ship. These simple decorative devices could be easily cast and welded to the hull for life as an appropriate touch to a worthy design. Ship’s names should also be more distinctive. Names such as Defender, Democracy, Challenger, and Courageous have a sense of action to them and could denote major units or classes of ships. In the past, similar names, including Hornet, Wasp, Constitution, and Constellation have been a source of inspiration which should not be lost.
Summary: It is necessary that we clearly define what it is we seek to achieve from a warship’s appearance and establish guidelines to spell out the characteristics which contribute to a strong visual presence. There is a need to develop an American-style lexicon of favored forms consistent with the type of ship, much like that which the Soviets and the British appear to have done.
Probably the most significant and immediate impact resulting from an improved appearance is in an improved confidence of the men who man a more warlike-looking ship. A sailor wants to be proud of his ship, and a ship which conveys a sense of purpose and ominous capability is easier to be proud of than one which does not.
Lastly, an effective warship design is meant to persuade. The warship is a political tool and her greatest weapon is to persuade effectively. Aesthetic concerns reinforce the persuasiveness of a warship, adding credibility to national policy.
the Seventh
red *'ith
32nd
the Third Naval Construction Battalion and the Naval Construction Regiment, both in Vietnam ^ has studied at the National Academy of Fine ^^
and
Paris and at the Stadel Institute in Frankfurt. 1° ‘
n, he holds a bachelor’s degree in liberal arts ^ sciences from the University of Maryland (1972) and a masters degt ^ fine arts from the American University (1976). As a lieutenant m Naval Reserve, he was assigned in 1978 as assistant public affairs
off**
ricao
with Military Sealift Command. A charter member of the m
Marine Artists Society, Lieutenant Roach is currently a consultant Spectrum Associates Incorporated.
Mr. Meier was employed from 1951 to 1975 ^
Ship Design Division of the Naval Ship Eng*nee ^
Center (NAVSEC) and its predecessor, the Bure*1 ^
Ships. He also served as head of the Advanced C°nC 1 h an^
Section of NAVSEC’s Preliminary Design Branc >
has had considerable experience in feasibility study
conceptual design. At present, Mr. Meier is a c0flS^s.
ing naval architect for a joint project by NAVSEC and Spectrum
and
;ult'
_________________________ Bibliography______________
• • • r second
Breyer, Siegfried and Polmar, Norman. Guide to the Soviet Navy.
edition. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1977. ^
Chapelle, Howard I. Yacht Designing and Planning. New York.
Norton & Company, Inc., 1936. „i
Gillmer, Thomas C. Modern Ship Design. Annapolis: United States Institute, 1970.
Guiton, J. Aesthetic Aspects of Ship and Yacht Design. London: Gmn‘
Publishing Ltd., 1971.
Kehoe, J.W. "Warship Design: Ours and Theirs.” United States Institute Proceedings, August 1975, pp. 56-65.
Moore, John E. The Soviet Navy Today. New York: Stein and Day, Moore. Jane's Fighting Ships 1974-1975. New York: Franklin Watts 1° 1974.
Roach, John C. "A Visual Analysis of Kiev.” Arlington, Virgin* • published, 1977. -
Skene, Norman L. Elements of Yacht Design. Kennedy Bros., Inc*.
Shipbuilding Inquiry Committee 1965-66 Report. London: HMSO.
NaN1
197
1966.
(The authors which to acknowledge the contributions of Captain Ja W. Kehoe, USN; Mr. Kenneth S. Brower; Mr. Arthur F. Low; and Charles D. Roach.)
--------------------------------------------- Let Us Pray . ___________________________
With the ship sinking rapidly, the captain called out, “Anyone here know how to pray?” “I do, sir,” said one man, stepping forward.
"Good,” replied the captain, “you pray, while the rest of us put on life preservers—we’re one short!”
D. Dolphin
(The Naval Institute will pay $25.00 for each anecdote published in the Proceedings.)