This html article is produced from an uncorrected text file through optical character recognition. Prior to 1940 articles all text has been corrected, but from 1940 to the present most still remain uncorrected. Artifacts of the scans are misspellings, out-of-context footnotes and sidebars, and other inconsistencies. Adjacent to each text file is a PDF of the article, which accurately and fully conveys the content as it appeared in the issue. The uncorrected text files have been included to enhance the searchability of our content, on our site and in search engines, for our membership, the research community and media organizations. We are working now to provide clean text files for the entire collection.
' Vlewpoint, submarines appear ln . areas of current U. S. leadership.
e offing is the DDG-47, a fleet air aritjnSe sfi*P whose Aegis/Standard ptQrJr warfare (AAW) system gives an • Ise °f a viable defense against an.S,'P niissile attack in the 1980s gbeyond. '
Ut fike many other U. S. defense
Pro;
effc
0vv the Aegis DDG-47 program is tra Way, with the first ship con- 'vh>ch^ t0 r^e bitton/Ingalls yard. Spr fitiilt her predecessors of the ar>ce (DD-963) class. But how many
n>o:
DDG-47S, which
^ith
have
>988
Comparisons of the U. S. and the soviet fl
0f leets tend to indicate few areas ityU'lqUestioned U. S. naval superior. Ircraft carriers and, from a qual-
to b,
()^arns’ the currently planned Aegis
u "oay be too little and even too ate- Th I 1
ne lead Aegis warship, the
Icjyg*7’ was authorized in Fiscal Year
oUsj ' ^et' for almost a decade previ-
l\ja ^ a succession of Secretaries of the
' and Chiefs of Naval Operations
adv A eg is ships to provide an
afced fleet air/missile defense.
No
under
f0cjj be ordered? Commander
Cell ^ades> in his otherwise ex- a tnt professional note "DDG-47: lyy °n Its Way to Sea” (January
sh‘ps ’ StateS that 1(7 DDG'47‘c,ass lg are planned. Who is planning
ThethpeSe ShipS?
Fy rive-Year Defense Program for
tj0 °fi'1984 provides for ten addi-
11
c0m^t, and various congressional everrr"tteeS ad approve them. How- ofth ^ve-year plans rarely produce all ships proposed. For example, in ■ wben the DDG-47 was au- Wa , ed> the five-year plan put for- pfQd that year (i.e., FY 1978-1982) A‘abuilding three DDG-47S per r°m 1980 onward.
The FY 1980-1984 plan, however, provides an annual DDG-47 building rate of only 1-2-2-3-2 ships, essentially a one-third reduction in the program. Also significant, the FY 1978-1982 plan listed two nuclear- propelled Aegis ships, then designated CSGN for “strike” cruiser. That category of warship has disappeared entirely from the FY 1980-1984 plan.
While the Aegis construction program continues to be reduced and slowed, the Navy’s requirement remains at 24 ships to provide two per aircraft carrier. At the planned Department of Defense building rate, the Aegis force could not be achieved until about 1994. But if aircraft carriers each require two Aegis escorts to survive in future threat environments, can the Navy justify having a 12- carrier force in the 1980s and early 1990s if 24 Aegis ships are not available?
Thus the dilemma: reduce the carrier force levels or reduce the number of Aegis ships per carrier, or accelerate the DDG-47 shipbuilding rate. Because the carriers, their aircraft, and their support infrastructure already exist, and because they are the principal capability of the U. S. Navy for all levels of conflict below nuclear holocaust, the answer seems to be in a reevaluation of the planned Aegis force.
The DDG-47, with her advanced Aegis radar/fire control system and Mk-26 missile launchers which has an 88-round Standard/ASROC magazine, represents the best AAW capability available. Smaller phased-array radars, now under development by RCA, General Electric, and Sperry, could provide an advanced AAW system in less weight and space. However, missile capacity and launch rates are also critical factors, and the DDG-47’s magazine capacity exceeds even that of the Virginia (CGN-38)-class cruisers
121
°6ec*ings / june 1979
de
Table 1 U. S. Navy Surface Combatant Force Levels
| 1980 | 1985 | 1990 | 1995 | 2000 |
Aegis DDG-47 | __ | 1 | 11 | 11 | 11 |
DDX or DDG-47 | — | — | (2) | (12) | (22) |
AAW Cruisers | 27 | 27 | 27 | 12 | 6 |
AAW Destroyers | 37 | 37 | 35 | 15 | 15 |
ASW Destroyers | 43 | 31 | 31 | 31 | 31 |
ASW Frigates | 65 | 94 | 112 (118) | 105 (120) | 76 (106) |
•Based on 30-year service life with ten DDG-2 class ships modernized for 40-year service. Ships completed and authorized through FY 1979 plus proposed FY 1980-1984 ships (latter includes purchase of four Iranian-ordered DDG-993 class ships). The figures in parentheses indicate additions resulting from a building rate of two destroyers and three frigates per year from FY 1985 onward.
force, (2) Soviet antiship missile velopment and deployment and (3) Third World navies con to add sophisticated missiles to arsenals.
Finally, looking at the retIft^jaVy rate for the existing U. S. ^ cruiser and destroyer forces >n 1990s, the smaller number of suf
continue5-
atinue their
ment
caP9'
ate«d
combatants will have to be more L • ,
which are more than 2,000 tons larger. A “breakthrough” in reducing the size and weight of an Aegis-type electronics system could permit smaller AAW “destroyers” or, still using the DDG-4l/Spruance hull, permit an even larger missile battery (with conventional launchers or, in the future, vertical launchers).
There are other reasons for continuing DDG-47 production even if smaller Aegis destroyers become feasible. The DDG-47 uses the same hull, machinery, and other subsystems of the Spruance class that will consist of 3 1 ASW ships, plus possibly up to four Iranian-ordered missile variants. Their similarities will simplify personnel assignment and training, maintenance, and support for all three types. And, of course, there would be the expenses of several tens of millions of dollars to design a new destroyer.
The arguments in favor of more DDG-47S rather than a smaller ship appear clear. At the same time, the Carter Administration has killed all promise of surface nuclear ships, the Aegis cruisers, or nuclear aircraft carriers. The higher costs of procuring nuclear ships and their more expensive crew requirements tend to offset the advantages of nuclear propulsion. There are some factors that could change this situation, including a decision to maintain a major U. S. naval force in the Indian Ocean, or possibly an American reaction to the new Soviet Kirov-class nuclear-propelled “battle cruisers.” At this time, the construction of nuclear-powered surface ships by the U. S. Navy appears
unlikely.
More likely is the conversion of the four nuclear-powered Virginia-class cruisers in the 1990s to an Aegis-type electronics system. (Unfortunately, the Navy resisted the opportunity to convert the Long Beach [CGN-9] to an Aegis configuration during her current mid-life modernization.) The four Virginias, converted from about 1990 onward, would help to alleviate the shortage of the advanced AAW escort shortfall.
Still another possibility that could ameliorate the DDG-47 shortfall is the installation of the Aegis SPY-1 radar system in aircraft carriers. In addition to increasing a flattop’s ability for radar search, aircraft control, and close-in defense, the carrier could data-link fire control information from her radars to accompanying non-Aegis missile ships. The proposed service life extension program (SLEP) for carriers could provide the opportunity for adding SPY-1 with minimum impact on carrier scheduling.
A radar/fire control system of this type in a carrier could conceivably reduce the need for Aegis-fitted AAW escorts, but would not affect the currently proposed 1 1 ships of the DDG-47 class. For example, the John F. Kennedy (CV-67) and later ships of the Ni/nitz (CVN-68) class will not require a modernization of SLEP magnitude before the year 2000. Nonetheless, the actual requirement for Aegis-type escort ships will probably increase if (1) smaller conventional or V/STOL carriers are constructed in addition to the planned 12-13 large-deck carrier
ble to survive against anticip threats. (See Table 1.) \e
At the least, a program to Pr°v^s 20 Aegis destroyers by 1990 aFl’e^s necessary; that means three per year authorized from FY , through FY 1986. These ships. the modernization of four VtfP would provide a modern AAW Sc ing force for 12 carriers with 5 flexibility for providing non-G*r . surface action groups in Third
areas where an antiship missile ^ exists but a carrier’s extensive ^ pabilities may not be needed. ^ scheme would permit two AeglS ^ per carrier in high-threat areas (vj^£ the Soviets could attack with ‘ numbers of air, ship, and subnvlf missiles). ^
In view of the already funded
tV
■ [hi'
availability of 63 antisubmarine . ates completed from 1964 some of the 25 additional FFG-?S ^ posed for the FY 1980-1984 Pr0^jjj- might be sacrificed in favor of 9 tional DDG-47S. (The ASW frigate ’’
ard P**
[FFG-7]-class) procurement and
sive ASW frigate (Oliver Hazar
(o<ce
has grown from about 4% of t^.^, tive fleet in 1964, the year the j nam buildup started, to about - the active fleet in 1988 when the rently authorized Oliver Hazard frigates will be completed.) ■
Hopefully, improvements in e* ^ ing ship capabilities, possibly sUf
effect ships, merchant ships " ^ Arapaho and other container . weapon systems, and other “advan naval systems will help to e° ^ U. S. superiority at sea in P0^^- confrontations and conflicts. Wit spect to “conventional” surface c jj
batants, the DDG-47 appears
va11
requirement, but the class n>us£ , procured in greater numbers than “planned” by either the Navy °r Department of Defense.
122
Proceedings / June