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Contents:

Bridging the ADP Gap

Alan Bauman

'T’i

e Land-Based V/STOL Aircraft’s

& I .

6 'ⁿ Our Maritime Strategy 106

^ Lieutenant Colonel Clifford A. Lindell, Marine Corps (Retired)

T'i

e Tug of Gravity 109 I Lieutenant Commander R. C. Montgomery, ^U- S. Navy

SS-N-14: A Third Round 110

By Norman Friedman Taking the hand to Sea 114 By Mark T. Clevenger

Planning for Future Combat Casualty Care 117 By Rear Admiral B. Eiseman, Medical Corps,

U. S. Naval Reserve

;^rou8h the use of automated data ^Cessing (adp). Unfortunately, the

mission of data between these in-

f_0l

Th

^e Navy Department budget is ■j^Ptoximately $45 billion annually. ^s° j_i^nia^ⁿ‘^tude °L t^¹*⁵ budget requires _tec^^lstlcated financial management cn ^nicl^ues- Further management Lltxity i_s necessary to ensure that '^vith^ ^^Un^^{s are s}P^ent *ⁿ accordance Th      ^and congressional intent.

Ria ^COrnerstone of Navy financial _t ^a8^ernent is information exchange/ P^o ^Srr>'^SS*°ⁿ' The Navy strives to im- ^e us information capabilities

PtOi f_aL|

^ speed and efficiency of ADP by ⁶ ^^een compromised in the Navy han'^nterSt'^CeS between the various fi- information systems. A situa- . ⁿ bas evolved in which there are pl_a^3rate ADP financial systems for programming, budgeting, > Ration, expenditure control, etc.

^rtansr •

Nation systems is either tortuous or

^-existent.

_tQ ^ne Navy may take five to ten years gta^^an’ ^execute’ ^and audit an inte- ted ADP system. This process has

loomed so massive, in terms of time and money over the years, that iso­lated ADP systems have been devel­oped for each stage of the budget pro­cess. These systems administratively imply that the budget process occurs in discrete steps. This results in func­tional and organizational fragmenta­tion, and again, efficiency, accuracy, and currency of data suffer.

This assumption of discrete budget­ary steps, however, is false because the budget process is continuous. Many planning decisions must be evaluated for their effect upon current and future year budgets. This was one of the original goals of the Five-Year Defense Plan. Through the concurrent identification of future resources and missions, the planning process was to be enhanced. Although the Five-Year Defense Plan has improved the plan­ning process in the Navy, the frag­mentation of data flow has under­mined full Navy planning effective­ness. The correlation between pro­posed action and its effect on the budget remains difficult to evaluate when interstices exist between the af­fected budget areas. This factor pre­cludes the use of ADP for analysis. The only option available is to bridge the interface with manual effort. With fis­cal constraints applied to both pro­gram and fiscal year totals, the task is often overwhelming. Consecutive Navy, OSD, OMB, and congressional reviews propose alternative courses which should be evaluated quickly and accurately. In contrast, the present system remains cumbersome and error prone.

Organizational fragmentation oc­curs when two offices, involved in dif­ferent ADP systems, work on the same budget phase. For example, higher echelon Navy offices frequently use models to determine the effect of re­vised assumptions on program funding levels. A decision to reduce the pro­curement of aircraft may lead the model to decrease specific support funds for that aircraft program. A summary of these changes is transmit­ted by written report throughout the organization. The lower echelon of-

for

control as the project administrat°^{r F}                • better

less

is a large range between the ideal ^an^ the possible. Recognizing that f^aCt’ is not expected that all financial A

will

fice, which must implement this deci­sion, does not receive the specific ele­ments of support (fuel, maintenance, etc.) to be reduced, only the total support reduction. This occurs because the lower echelon office does not have direct access to the model. Once again manual effort must gap this interface.

These problems are exacerbated by zero base budgeting and mission budgeting. Zero base budgeting re­quires the budget profile of each or­ganization to be arrayed by “decision package,” with consideration of possi­ble funding levels. Mission budgeting requires budget phases to be arrayed by both mission and resources. Prop­erly organized budgets must correlate these diverse factors. This places a greater emphasis on the integration of ADP financial information systems.

The model for a solution exists. The Navy is committing a great deal of ef­fort and resources to develop a tactical ADP “data link” system. Computer systems for sonar, radar, etc. on board ships can integrate and correlate func­tions of detection, tracking, and inter­ception. The Navy should attempt a similar integration of ADP systems for

administrative functions.

It is necessary to design Navy ADP systems to bridge the data interstices between the current isolated ADP sys­tems and to exchange data. This re­quires uniform data storage and re­trieval, which will, in effect, create a common data base. This will necessi­tate financial information to be re­duced to uniform, indivisible units of data, transferable among ADP systems. Compilation of these units would give more complex, sophisticated data. With these modifications, financial management information would form a contiguous network with rapid and efficient transmission between ADP systems.

This revitalized information system would have salutary effects upon the naval financial management structure. First, regulation would be improved. Presently, Congress, OSD, and DoD directives establish controls on the amounts and distribution of funds. With an information responsive sys­tem, these controls become more finely tuned to particular perturba­tions and therefore speed the flow of funds to the designated project. This

ultimately reduces the requirement and controlling offices are m communication, and intent is likely to be misinterpreted.

Second, correlation of financial ^a would be improved. This ‘^rn?.¹_on evaluating the influence of a deci on various phases of the flow or tu ^ For example, a decision made m planning phase would be autorna ically evaluated by the offices invo with the execution phase of ¹ budget process.               .

Third, there would be a savings ^ manpower as the manual effort m ^ formation integration would be ^vlft ally eliminated. ^

The Navy can greatly increase its

-but there nd

systems will be integrated. The ^stl^ of-art in data processing and do constraints will prevent attainment ^ the ideal. However, the closer we ^aP

proach this ideal, the greater             _

Navy’s efficiency, savings, and e tiveness.

To meet the growing Soviet naval threat, U. S. naval planners must look to new weapon system employment concepts to shape the future structure of the fleet. Foremost in current plan­ning is the possible development of vertical or short takeoff and landing (V/STOL) aircraft, but the U. S. Navy has not yet established a comprehen­sive, cohesive plan for V/STOL.

At present, only the Royal Air Force and U. S. Marine Corps operate V/STOL aircraft in NATO scenarios. The U. S. Air Force has not initiated new

V/STOL development programs in re­cent years but is following the. prog­ress of Navy V/STOL programs with interest. Air Force concern, though, has resulted in the establishment of a new study program to evaluate a single V/STOL concept to accomplish close air support/battlefield interdic­tion missions using the short takeoff and landing (STOL) capability and to accomplish counter air missions using the vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) capability. These Air Force missions are very similar to Navy “Type B” V/STOL missions.

The future course of Navy ^v'^,sl development is still uncertain. l^ss such as subsonic versus supersonic quirements and vertical takeoff ^ver short takeoff characteristics—the ing design factors—are unresoW^ Current subsonic V/STOL airc^ra technology is capable of 600-700 range carrying Harpoon missiles, w* growth to 1,000-1,200 mile range 1990. Future V/STOL aircraft will

•                                                             jjd'

potentially capable of carrying vanced missiles such as AMRA ’ Harpoon, Tomahawk, perhaps ^e Phoenix, as well as a wide range

five days of conflict, indicates ^re restriction on conventional air tan i^^10ns compared to peacetime ti_a| ^{1 ,£}y- Figure 1 shows the poten­cy p^rn°^Unt of sortie degradation per rand ^{0m a runwa}y which absorbs 15 _V/ST⁰ⁿⁱ craters a day. Note that the ^tacrical aircraft operating from °Pe^SaiTle airfield could maintain a full ^ational capability.

the ^C blavy and the Air Force share th, '

Problem of basing vulnerability of

Ou_r

part. This serious problem is

co.

p_ej^Vent‘^onal bombs, mines, tor- for °^eS’ ^an<^ depth charges. The per- unr^f^{nCe ca}P^a^*bty could include an 3 00. ^{kny ran}g^{e in} excess of ’ miles, enhancing quick reaction

As?^{ddWlde m0b,lity}'

;_n ^ ^Urrung a degree of early success

^rab] ⁶,^NaVy P^r°g^ram> it seems inevi- an ^{6 f at c}^^e 1980s and 1990s will be ^Cra. ^of advanced V/STOL develop­^ment for all Tl c    j ■

^ ^dI1 U. a. armed services.

^CaPahT^d‘^{baSed v}^^{STOL tac}ti^cal aircraft _stfa ^{1 ic}y ^would support our maritime

powe^               ^neutralization of air

i_n ^{er can} be accomplished by destroy- ^0r h'^rCra^ *^{n c}be air, on the ground, tan k- .^^e^^rading airfield operational to ^{1 d}'^ty' "bbe specter of being forced _a„ °P^erate conventional aircraft from _Co ^ltlterdicted airfield is of increasing tern to NATO members. The most our tactical on ^ter ^°^rce ‘^s i^ts absolute dependency for ^V-to-hit runways and taxiways ^takeoffs and landings.

t_u ^recent study of a standard NATO jectej^              ft. x 8,000 ft.), sub­

tly p. ^{t0 ex}pected interdiction during

^{a s}eve °Per_:

bai ^{r res}Pective aircraft. The U. S. fiance c

j,, j °r power at sea is concentrated p_ra . large carriers which contain ^naVal^{1Cally ad tbe str}‘blng power of tat- ^av>ation and are high-value ^ror the opposing Soviet fleet. ^valu '?^at‘ⁿ8 several of these high­ways ^ar^^e carriers during the first few b_ai °f war could rapidly swing the Nj ^ance °f seapower to the Soviet p_r ^y' ^ployed carriers on peacetime ., ^Ce rnissions are particularly sus- bfeal< ^{6 t0 sur}P^r‘^se attack at the out- sjbj[- °f hostilities. To ignore the pos- W_af *^Cy ^chat we may have to fight a _c ^{at sea} without some of our large 0,, ^rs would be egregious judgment

Pounded by the lack of adequate

DAILY

SORTIES

FLOWN

modernized carriers and aircraft in our reserve fleet. The development of al­ternative concepts to get adequate air power at sea in an emergency is im­perative!

The continued development of vectored-thrust aircraft and V/STOL ski-jump techniques offers attractive basing alternatives for future combat systems.

There are several observers who now advocate the construction of many, small V/STOL ships, such as the HMS Invincible, equipped with AV-8B-type aircraft. This may be one step in the process of increasing seapower sur­vivability.

There are further possibilities that can be pursued, including land-based V/STOL aircraft. First, the interchange of land-based and sea-based crews be­comes feasible because V/STOL opera­tions do not require special training in catapult takeoff and arrested landing techniques. Royal Air Force pilots will fly Sea Harrier aircraft for the Royal Navy. When VMA-542 qualified in AV-8A aircraft on board the USS Guam (LPH-9) in 1974, one-half of the pilots had never been on board any ship be­fore, yet the squadron was day and night qualified in only two days. The Spanish Navy pilots qualified in their

AV-8S Matadors on board their carrier, the Dedalo, in quick fashion, although none of their pilots had ever operated fixed-wing aircraft at sea previously.

Clearly, V/STOL aircraft can open a new dimension in crew training and interoperability. Thus, a new tactic becomes available which allows land- based tactical air power to base or stage from many air-capable ships available in NATO. The best example of land-based V/STOL mobility to date is the experience of VMA-231 in 1976­1977, when, in a matter of weeks, the squadron operated from its home base in North Carolina, from the deck of the Franklin D. Roosevelt (CAM2) in the Mediterranean, cross-decked to the Guam and transited the Suez Canal, and eventually operated from a civil airfield in east Africa.

'To

A second approach to applying V/STOL power at sea is on board Proj­ect Arapaho-type of commercial ship­ping. At present, there is a severe shortage of convoy escort ships to meet potential requirements in the At­lantic, the Pacific, and the Indian Ocean/Persian Gulf. In one critical scenario of total convoy escort re­quirements, the U. S. shortage of convoy escorts was estimated at 183 for the Atlantic sea lines of communi-

,aho

d^ve

,0ft

cation (SLOCs), 55 for the ^Pa° j SLOCs, and 340 for the Indian O^ce‘^l (­Persian Gulf, for a total shorta£^e 578 ships.

Variations of the baseline Ar^aP‘ _ concept for convoy support are ^c0*\ tinuing to be explored, with ^N medium girder bridging used ^aS shipboard ski-jump for vectored-th^f V/STOL aircraft. One proposed ^nl° ified containership design accorntf¹^ dates up to 16 aircraft. These ^vv'°^u^₍. consist of modern V/STOL aircraft LAMPS helicopters in varying comb¹¹’. tions of numbers, e.g. eight V/s> aircraft and eight helicopters, °^r V/STOL aircraft and four helicop^ter The embarked aircraft could perfofo¹ number of mission options, incfon ^ deck alert/airborne combat air P^atr

A third avenue to pursue wou

Fi

lcy been

ment

strik,

^ln Vietnam, the sea-based air

^es against North Vietnam could generated by two relatively

haye been' small

f_r ^{e Use} °f V/STOL air groups operating _0n^{tri austere}, rapidly deployable bases thi          '^slands. While we tend to

bod' °^{Ceans oE tEe wor}^ ^{as vast}

_0us ^les water only, there are numer- ^s islands in strategic locations from la ^{1C rna}i^or ait strikes can be ^unched against enemy shipping or ^Ses without risking a valuable large ^rcraft carrier

’J’

⁰ scenarios are discussed here.

kee” ^{IS t}^*^{e re}P^^acemerit °f the “Yan- q station carrier task force in the ; °f Tonkin. Had V/STOL capabil- available during our involve- ba a nava* V/STOL strike air groups

and °^{n Tl}S^{er Island} (¹⁷°N, ¹⁰⁷°^E) lOgop^'^htingale Island (20°N, _Carf. '• In this case, risk to the large th ^{er C0ldd} have been avoided and total logistic and personnel cost to r out the operational air strikes .p ^d have been reduced greatly, and ^{6 second case} is tnore complex _ac ^Coyers the resupply route to NATO the°^SS h^^orth Atlantic. This area is ^m°st likely to see heavy interdic­tion by enemy surface and submarine forces in the event of a hot war. V/STOL aircraft, operating from many small, rapidly deployable land bases can provide air cover over the North Atlantic. Conventional takeoff and landing (CTOL) aircraft operating from existing fixed bases would also be able to support fleet operations. The ad­vantage that V/STOL aircraft have over CTOL aircraft in this type of scenario results when new bases or operating areas are required. V/STOL bases can be constructed in a matter of a few days, and they can also be picked up and moved to new locations as required, avoiding the time delay and costly construction of large permanent CTOL bases, like was the case at DaNang, Chu Lai, Bien Hoa, Cam Ranh Bay, or Udorn, to mention but a few. The costly, irretrievable investment in those air bases would more than pay the development cost of a new V/STOL aircraft.

Many other scenarios can be envisioned for the practical use of land-based V/STOL aircraft to project seapower. The island-hopping maneu­ver, perfected by the U. S. Marine

Corps in World War II as a national strategy to defeat Japan, could again be used as a maritime strategy to rapidly deploy tactical aviation throughout a great percentage of the ocean areas of the world.

The unique basing flexibility which is characteristic of V/STOL could alter future employment of our military forces. As part of our future seapower reserve, it is not unthinkable that Air Force Reserve squadrons could, in an emergency, operate V/STOL aircraft from commercial ships manned by Naval Reserve crews. Equally impor­tant, Navy V/STOL squadrons could reinforce Air Force tactical squadrons for critical land operations. The ability of V/STOL aircraft to operate from small land or sea bases as well as large land or sea bases would give the United States the ability to rapidly mass tactical aviation anywhere in the world to meet specific threats.

In the best interest of our overall national policy, perhaps now is the time for the Navy and the Air Force to unite in a joint development program for an advanced V/STOL aircraft which can serve their common needs.

Th

^le Tug of Gravity

Mo_nt

By t ■

^eutenant Commander R. C. ■gomery, U. S. Navy

led

dr ,^e^^0at*ⁿg an aircraft carrier in a _s °^ck is one thing, but undocking a ^tug boat . . . well, that’s some- ^else. It should be much easier! °nsiderable advance planning is _s ^Cessary for a carrier undocking. De- _ari^ P^etsonnel must inspect the ship _v: . ^Verify weight change data pro- V j ^Ey the ship’s force and the ship- f_r • A certified tank sounding report r_e^0rri.^tEe ship’s commanding officer is t_Q^qUired by the docking officer prior j any water being allowed into the th °^Ck’ Stability calculations are _uⁿ_nJedand re-checked. Yet, when the °^cking time finally arrives, the

docking officer holds his breath, his stomach knots up, and he begins pac­ing until that final moment of relaxa­tion when the carrier lifts off the blocks and becomes safely waterborne once again.

Undocking a tug boat, on the other hand, is a piece of cake. These boats are always stable. There is really no need to expend needless hours in in­spections and calculations to undock a tug boat. When the docking officer arrives at the dock side he asks the tug crew if all tanks are filled the same as during docking. “You bet,” replies the tug crew, and the drydock flood­ing begins. The docking officer sits down on a bollard and relaxes as he waits for the boat to float. He sees the bow lift and thinks another foot or so and the stern will be off. The boat lists slightly to port. Good! She’s al­most off the blocks. Then as the stern comes off, the boat slowly lists some more . . . and then keeps right on turning until her pilot house dis­appears under water and smashs against the drydock floor. The order to “stop flooding” is too late!

^p>-o

It can and did happen as the photo­graphs show. The drydock was tied up for a week with the salvage operation.

of

Thousands of hours were expended in the operation and many more lost be­cause of delays in other ships waiting to be docked.

What happened? The results of the post-incident investigation revealed

that the production department had removed the tug’s main engines after the undocking conference had been conducted. The design division and the docking officer were not verbally informed of this removal, although

the appropriate official paper ^wa® ¹⁰ the shipyard routing system, tug’s crew assumed the docking ofric was aware of the situation. The ship superintendent, who knew the engi^ne had been removed, was in another P^aI^ of the shipyard checking the status critical material. Finally, the docking officer and the design division r^eP^re sentative did not conduct a final ⁱⁿ spection of the tug prior to comment ing the undocking evolution. Stab* ^ calculations made subsequent to incident showed that the removal the engines from low in the ¹¹ caused the boat to become top hea > and unstable when afloat.

Floating a tug boat is no pi^ece cake. She has a steel hull that obey* dynamic laws just like any ^ot ship—even an aircraft carrier ⁰ just maybe she’s less forgiving. 1° ^c incident only one weight change m* the difference.

The Proceedings’ publication of the ASW character of the Soviet SS-N-14 missile in 1977 was the final act in a lengthy intelligence drama. The container-launcher of the new weapon was first observed as early as 1971, at

•For round one, see N. Polmar, "Soviet Navy Surface-to-Surface Missiles" (July 1977 Proceedings, pp. 90-91); for round two, see E. Bonsignore, "SS-N-14: Another Look”

(April 1979 Proceedings, pp. 102-106).

which time it was assumed to be an antiship missile, merely because all previous Soviet shipborne cruise mis­siles had had that function. The SS-N-14 was unusual in that it was so small that it had to have a very short range compared to that of its predeces­sors. Although the Soviets classified SS-N-14 carriers as BPKs (large ASW ships) rather than RKRs (rocket, or missile, cruisers), Western analysts

Jy

had two great fixations: the ⁰ ^ worthwhile targets of Soviet ASW, ballistic missile submarines (SSBN ^ were such difficult targets as to be ^e fectively invulnerable, and the Sovie^ single obsession was the U. S. Na^vy (and other NATO navies’) strike ^caf riers. The BPK designation was dt missed as a corollary of Soviet sta^te^ ments that they had somehow sol^ve the SSBN problem.

analysis did not take into ac-

>nto

naval

^In Soviet eyes. Nor did it take account the evolution of Soviet

their

Possible

range to saturate the target

and

O'portant because, in Soviet eyes,

^as the Soviet ocean surveillance ,^ertl (SOSS), not integral with the

actually shooting.

t(j_e ^^tlcarrier warfare (ACW) is only W ^eSt P^ublicized example, but it il- j_s ^tes these points. The main attack mj_s^|°^Unted using very long-range fitfj¹ ,^{S ss}-N-3 (or, now, SS-N-12)—

^['red

sat_U;

not

if*

This

_tj₍^^{nt e}'^ther classical Soviet naval tac-

°t the evolution of the naval sio_n ' weapons in connection with

p ^tactical ideas.

0 ably the most striking charac- tenstic ■ .               .               .

_Mo$t soviet tactics is consistency.

j ^St Soviet warships are designed to

_So ^ Particular targets, to exercise

_tefJ^orrn of sea denial. They are in-

Co ^t0 operate in concert, generally

j_3attj^rnan<^^ed by an officer outside the

take *^tse^' Extraordinary pains are

tionV° ^ensure that all ships in opera-

^lre together and at the longest ^t0 ayoid counterattack. The latter nav_ai

_v , ^Vessels and aircraft are far too cri^Ua *^{e t0} Ee sacrificed indis- a_rt^m,nately. Finally, targeting data such^{enerally provitlecl} by some sensor, systi unit.

h_ers^{fate tas}k force defenses by num- g_en' The ships of the attack force tack*^{1115, separate} to make counterat- tfjji ^UnProfitable, and they are cen- Up ^ ^c°ntrolled. The carrier is picked y the SOSS, and her position is

Uii_t

S'les

can retire relatively safely.

^satu_:

C_ge^lnvisibility

^COrnpany and in firing from very h₀ ^ranges. That is why their ship­s'^{6 r}°cket projectors (RBUs) have long ranges. The Soviets seri­ously consider counterattacks by the submarine. For many years the RBU was dismissed in the West because it would have been worthless in a West­ern context: there was very little chance of a single ship scoring a hit.

Any ASW weapon suffers from a dead time, a time between the last shipboard sonar input and the time it arrives at the position deduced from that input. In the case of the RBU, that dead time extends from just be­fore the moment of launch to the moment at which the individual round sinks to the hostile submarine’s predicted depth; the faster the sub­marine, the smaller the chance of scor­ing a hit.

A ship-launched homing torpedo, no matter what its size, does not solve this problem. It suffers from a delay while it runs out to the point at which it begins to search. Again, the faster the target submarine, the shorter the effective range of a homing torpedo. Wire guidance should improve mat­ters, but it seems unlikely that it can be implemented in a trainable torpedo mount such as the U. S. Mk-32 or the Soviet quadruple or quintuple types. In fact, the U. S. lightweight homing torpedo began as a replacement for depth charges, and against modern fast nuclear submarines that function seems to be a fair characterization of any ship-launched homing torpedo without some form of mid-course guidance.

That leaves stand-off weapons with enhanced kill probabilities, through either a greater lethal volume (as in the FRAS-l on the Moskva) or through a homing torpedo (as in SS-N-14). From a Soviet point of view, longer and longer standoff ranges had to be more and more attractive as U. S. submarines gained speed (which im­proved their evasive abilities) and firepower (e.g., with the Mk-45 and Mk-48 torpedoes). It might be argued that the sonars they provided their ships were probably incapable of search operation at ranges compatible with SS-N-14; however, cooperative op­erations of the Soviet type entail the integrated use of several ships’ sonars,

be

ets

ch

the

(ex-DLG-18, now CG-18)

SA-N-3 of a “Kara” or “Kresta H P^r vides a useful measure of ^se^_e defense—but not of offense, gi^ven Soviet Navy’s model of long-f*¹⁰^ antiship fire.

In particular, there is no need ^ Mr. Bonsignore’s postulated ^SP

the It<^s

tern

and that in turn makes the best use of relatively poor sensors. For example, if five ships combine the outputs of so­nars, each of which has only a 20% chance of detecting a target, the net probability of detection rises to 67%. Moreover, the fire control performance of such sonars will be far better than their search performance, because knowledge of approximate target posi­tion makes for much better signal de­tection in noise. In each case, it is im­portant to evaluate Soviet equipment in Soviet—not Western—terms.

In typical Western operations, sev­eral ships screen a force or convoy. Each is responsible for one sector; a joint operation is a concentration of individual ships in individual sectors. In some cases attacks may be executed by several ships operating together, but the criterion for ASW effectiveness is one-on-one. Soviet tactics, which make full use of external targeting re­sources, are always many-on-one. In fact, Soviet tactics begin with an as­sumed approximate target datum. It is not at all clear how the initial datum is obtained, but it is clear that the Soviets look towards some (perhaps fu­ture) system which will give them such data.

The SS-N-14 fits well into the recent history of Soviet naval missions. In the late 1950s, the Soviets developed a series of short-range ASW ships, such as the “Petya” and “Mirka”-class frig­ates, armed with the RBUs and then with small-diameter ASW-homing tor­pedoes. Among possible explanations for this development was a Soviet ex­pectation that the West would de­velop a class of missile-firing sub­marine comparable to the Soviet "Golf’ and "Hoter' classes, which would have to come close inshore. The United States developed the Polaris, which in its earliest version had to come quite close to Soviet shores to fire its 1,200-mile missile. However, the U. S. missile had considerable growth potential, and the inshore ASW system lost much of its effect.

In the mid-1960s the Soviets began to deploy “blue-water” ASW forces as well as a longer-range SSBN, the “Yankee.” It appeared that Soviet doc­trine envisaged an offensive against SSBNs, which Western analysts dis­missed as impossible. However, the Soviets planned a much more complex course. Admiral Gorshkov wrote of the need to preserve his SSBN force during much of a war, looking to­wards late-war bargaining; he wanted to keep his boats in sanctuary areas, protected against the incursions of Western attack submarines and ASW ships and aircraft. This protective function is generally described as pres­ervation of “combat stability,” and re­quires for its accomplishment surface ships with considerable ASW capabil­ity. It also appears that in wartime the Soviets intend to attempt to purge the Mediterranean of SSBNs, which is probably a realistic goal, given a lengthy pre-strategic war.

Ships intended primarily to fight submarines must, however, survive air and surface attack. The Soviets regard Western SSBNs as our most important naval asset, and expect us to try to protect them from ASW attack; simi­larly, they expect us to try to break their ASW (pro-SSBN) barriers in places like the Norwegian Sea. That is why ships like the “Karas” are armed with powerful surface-to-air missiles (SAMs). Ezio Bonsignore asks why such impor­tant ships do not have specialized surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs). He forgets that virtually every SAM in the world has a significant antiship capa­bility; the example of Standard ARM on board many U. S. ships must not be all that forgettable. In the Soviet case, the usual command guidance system must be quite suitable to anti­ship attack, as long as the target is

somewhere near the horizon. Aim⁰ all SAMs carry quite respectable heads, since they are designed to lethal even if they miss their targ¹ by substantial distances; ^s ^ warheads may not destroy a large ship, but they can certainly dist^uP her electronics—as the U. S. learned in 1972 when a Shrike radar missile disabled the ‘

Thus

cialized antiship missile using other loading doors of the SA-N-3- far more likely that the SA-N-3 sys ^ employs a modular loader, one m°P‘ _f zine (say, loading ring) per door. r⁽ doors give twice the capacity of Given the small dimensions of * ships carrying SA-N-Ss, the fact that missile has large wings, and the P^r° able lack of any special finning ^sP^a^_s[ it seems that each magazine tn ^ have a very small capacity indeed, no great surprise that the Soviets n- crammed in as many missiles as P° ble, since they know that their ^s will be subject to the kind of heavy ‘ attack the U. S. Navy and its ^a* ' can mount. It seems unlikely ^c ‘ they will be willing to dilute this pacity in order to counter Wes surface ships, which are a relati^ minor threat—just as Soviet sut*^ ships are a very minor threat to

10T⁰

fleets,

ffari

compared to the Soviet sub-

^ne and naval air arms.

The

ls easy for large and competent

(jj . cnoral of the SS-N-14 story is

naval ,

^t‘^rn to wishful thinking or to imaging. The U. S. surface community was quite im

«ea '

,^be,‘eved had niar

_vjet• ^lnteiligence organizations to fall

^'ftor-ir

Warfare

^ ^ssed by Soviet antiship missiles. It •n 1971, that the Soviets ⁿ° particularly valid antisub- t^p! ^Ine mission, but that they were in- 1,, ^Sely interested in anticarrier attack. _s. aoing, it disregarded both Soviet _tj₁J^ernents and the fact that most of _a ^0viet anticarrier threat resided in ^combination of bombers and sub- ihl ^lfleS’ richer of them nearly as vis­as the local "Krivak" or "Kara."

the Part sty|_e

across a wide spectrum of Soviet

hav' ^rr’i^ssi°ns. That problem may

^Ve been a consequence of the com- Partn

or

^VVas there much appreciation of character of Soviet tactics and, in ‘cnlar, of the continuity of tactical

0r totalization of the intelligence ^^aoization, or of the interest in

^fdwn

^Stfati fa

^are rather rhan in tactical or ^e8'c style. Hardware is, after all,

easier to categorize,

and mirror- is terribly, and sometimes

_B ^{y> eas}y-

|j ^y ‘975, many within naval intel- believed the SS-N-14 ro be an j ^Weapon, based partly on the evi- y_c^^Ce adduced above, and within a official position had shifted, "'as ' Proceedings announcement ^shif ⁿ° ^more chan a report of that ' *^r has not had the publicity Mr

ratall

°Osi

Snore suggests it deserves largely

because of the same reason the SS-N-10 was created in the first place: a short- range Soviet antiship missile fits much Western wishful thinking and justifies the widespread European interest in weapons such as Exocet. In fact, the only Soviet blue-ocean combatants armed with short-range SSMs are in­tended as tattletales: their function is to remain in formation with carriers so that they can feed into the final target­ing equation the location of the carrier within the formation, and so defeat such electronic countermeasure devices as blip-enhancers on the destroyers screening the carrier. The tattletale turns away (aft) just before the mis­siles arrive, as otherwise it will act as an inadvertent missile absorber and so dilute the saturation strike—to which it adds its four aft-firing SS-N-2 “Styx" missiles.

Mr. Bonsignore’s article deserves much more comment. He seems, for example, to imagine that because the Soviets now arm rheir surface combat­ants with SS-N-14, they have given up on anticarrier warfare. The “Kynda” and "Kresta I" classes have not been laid up, or, for that matter, those SS-N-3-firing submarines and the air- to-surface missile (ASM)-firing "Bad­gers” have more to do with anticarrier strikes. Mr. Bonsignore also fails to address the sanctuary or “combat sta­bility” idea. Unfortunately, there is no such rhing as a purely technical ar­gument concerning ASW. ASW has many facets. There are indeed im­mense differences between offensive ASW forces, such as the old U. S.

The Soviet Navy's large inventory of antiship missile-equipped aircraft ("Backfire,” facing page), submarines, and surface combatants (Mod “Kashin," above) supports the argument that the SS-N-14-armed “Kresta 11s,” "Karas,” and “Krivaks” are not needed, or designed, for anticarrier operations.

hunter-killer groups, and convoy es­corts. Lacking the strategic and tacti­cal context, an analyst would find it difficult to explain why one navy built both.

Mr. Bonsignore also observes that the Soviet antiship inventory consists of SS-N-9 and SS-N-11 (actually a variant of SS-N-2) missiles; he seems unaware that the primary Soviet anticarrier mis­siles are ASMs and the SS-N-3 (with its newer descendant, SS-N-12). These lat­ter missiles have the range to carry out traditional Soviet ACW tactics; the others do not. They are integrated into the SOSS and use the specialized target data provided by "Bear-D;” the shorter-range missiles are not tied into the SOSS.

Moreover, Mr. Bonsignore seems totally unaware of the antiship capa­bility inherent in all SAMs. Is he un­aware that there exists a variety of dual-thrust pure rockets (such as Tar­tar and Standard) which has neither a separate booster nor an integral ram­jet? Is he unaware that command guidance, which the Soviets quite ob­viously (from the shape of the guid­ance radars) use for SA-N-3, can lead to considerable miss distances, and that a

command-detonated warhead should have a considerable lethal volume or that no U. S. naval SAM has vectored thrust?

Mr. Bonsignore’s underwater blast hypothesis* for the SS-N-14 is indeed interesting, but it assumes that the Soviets are willing to attack surface

*The nuclear warhead is less attractive than a homing torpedo because the disturbance it creates blinds sonars for some time and hence makes reacquisition of the target difficult. On the other hand, it is not susceptible to coun­termeasures. It would not be surprising if the Soviets were to develop a nuclear SS-N-14 a la ASROC. However, like us, they may well pre­fer a non-nuclear route where practical.

ships from close in. The assumption of short range for SS-N-14 is based, not on some kind of magic, but on analysis of the volume of the missile container, standard Soviet practice in propulsion, and on the form of the guidance transmitter. There is no way that the dish visible on SS-N-14-equipped ships is compatible with a 200- or 300-mile range missile. It implies command guidance and short-range operation. Mr. Bonsignore should compare the kind of guidance transmitter required for the SS-N-3, which goes about 200 miles. Moreover, given the kind of bang inherent in an SS-N-3, why de­velop a new missile? Why not just

dive SS-N-3 into the water? In case, evading the carrier’s point ^ fense would not solve the problem cause the missile would still have survive the defenses of the escorts.

The SS-N-14 is a study in the style of naval production and na operations, to the extent of production decisions (such as ^ which led to the “Kresta 1 ^a “Kresta II”) run afoul of changes^ operational doctrine (such as which led from SS-N-3 in “Kresta SS-N-14 in its successor). Much o study remains to be written, at in the unclassified literature.

Taking the hand to Sea

By Mark T. Clevenger, Instructor in the School of Business at the University of Washington and free-lance writer

and

an*'

;erv^e

was cancelled to release money to ^ for cost overruns in ships nlr^e‘* under construction.    ₅

Both the Spear and Land cl®⁵ were designed to keep pace with increasing size and complexity

.ay

of'¹*

submarine fleet. For example, the ^ major post-World War II subrnn'¹.^ class, the Skipjack (SSN-585), ^cornr^₍₁(l

bet"

well

The Emory S. Land (AS-39) is the first of a class designed to tend the Los Angeles (SSN-688)-class nuclear attack submarines. Built into the hull of a Simon Lake (AS-33)-class submarine tender, as was the predecessor L. Y. Spear (AS-36) class, the Land earned her lead ship designation because of exten­sive system changes required to sup­port the Los Angeles submarines. In­cluded in changes incorporated in the Land were new shops, modified helicopter facilities, upgraded habita­bility, increased crane capacity, anti­pollution arrangements, additional over-the-side services, modified service booms, and greatly extended electrical delivery systems. Total light dis­placement weight grew from the Spear's 12,770 tons to 13,842 for the Land.

The Land was named for submarine pioneer Vice Admiral Emory S. Land, a cousin and advisor to Charles Lindbergh, who supervised design and development of fleet-type submarines as the pre-World War II Chief of the Naval Bureau of Construction and Re­pair. Land subsequently served as head of both the U. S. Maritime Commis­sion and the War Shipping Adminis­tration.

Two more of the class are under construction at Lockheed’s yards. The Frank Cable (AS-40) joined the Land in tandem keel-laying ceremonies on 2 March 1976. The keel for the McKee (AS-41), ordered under FY 1977 fund­ing, went down the same day the Cable was launched, 14 January 1978.

Frank Cable was chief engineer and trial captain on John Holland’s pro­totype submarine which became the first submarine to be accepted by the Navy. Cable made pioneering contri­butions to submarine propulsion and crew training. The Cable is scheduled for delivery to the Navy in September 1979.

Rear Admiral Andrew I. McKee’s career as designer and builder spanned submarine development from diesel to nuclear propulsion, both as a naval of­ficer and research and development ex­ecutive for Electric Boat in Groton, Connecticut. (Admiral McKee’s story is told by Commander Alden on pages 49-57 of this issue.) The McKee is due

to be launched in February 1980 delivered in mid-1981.

The first U. S. submarine

iliaries, built from the keel up to S' nuclear attack submarines, the -V and the Dixon (AS-37) were bui¹ General Dynamics’ Quincy yard on FY 1965 and 1966 funds.* The commissioned the Spear in Febrn 1970, and the Dixon in August 1' y Congress funded the AS-38 >ⁿ ^ 1969. But construction subseqt*^en ^

firs'

in^e

sioned in 1959, is 251.7 feet long displaces 3,500 tons submerged- first of the Los Angeles (SSN-688)'^C submarines, approved for construct* in the FY 1970 defense budget, ha⁵ *Some older class submarine tenders have backfitted to serve nuclear submarines, as

llTg                 ““unit luiuimim, UUI1U

irrg ^tl^,e submarine tenders, includ Cu_rr. ^e third tender announced con

Cattle’.

history.

m_er ** ^length of 360 feet and a sub- Th_e ^ displacement of 6,900 tons. 19_?5 ^A»geles was launched in April ^c°ni -^at ^^^ectr*^c Boat, Groton, and •passioned *ⁿ November 1976. ta_rfi ^{C COr}>tract, with its original ^ °^{f 5252}>920,319, was the ing ^{t In} Lockheed’s history. Accord- ,^to L)on Page, Seattle Post- ‘kencer marine columnist, build-

W_as ^w'th the launch of the Land,

in c ^e largest construction contract oe- ■

l_Ustr ^nstruction of these three ships il- slrj f^tes the complexity of modern 3,oo₀^U,ldlng- Between 1,000 and 8r_eate L^eople will be employed for the Win ^r L^art °f seven years. Each ship ^some 12,500 tons of steel, hull ^wL'^ch would be used in the el_ect.^arid superstructure; 142 miles of ing p^^lcal cable; 30 miles of pipe rang- I5 * ^0rn L& to 18 inches in diameter; ^she_et P'P^e assemblies; 23 miles of tiota tttctal ducts for heating, ventila- ty_0r/. ^an<f air conditioning; 1,554 ^lr,g drawings; 20,000 purchase orders to some 4,000 different firms; and more than 1,500 tools, machines, appliances, benches, and stowage racks in 53 workshops. Each ship has 349 offices and living spaces, 51 fan rooms, 17 pump and machinery spaces, 154 storerooms, and 16 maga­zines among the 875 compartments and spaces spread over 13 deck levels.

These tenders will serve submarines and their crews with repairs, spare parts, ordnance, provisions, and medi­cal, dental, legal, mail, library, film, and spiritual services.

Combustion Engineering supplied the Land class boilers set for Navy marine diesel fuel in full automatic combustion mode. The DeLaval steam turbine generates 20,000 s.h.p. It drives the single shaft at 150 r.p.m. through a DeLaval double helical, ar­ticulated, double reduction gear. Each of the four DeLaval ship’s service turbo-generators (SSTGs) supplies 2,500 KW of electricity.

The six-bladed, right-handed, manganese-bronze fixed-pitch prop is 18 feet in diameter. The 290-square- foot rudder is swung by a Western

The Colt Industries-supplied emer­gency diesel generator uses compressed air for automatic start should the SSTGs shut down.

On the AS-39 class, three ship alongside service (SAS) stations are supplied through four switchboards. All four SSTGs can be paralleled in a split plant system in various two and three SSTG combinations. The system can supply continuous high levels of power from any two or all three sta­tions with all four generators in use. The stern SAS power transfer recepti- cals can receive power from shore sources, with additional capability for receiving shore power through port and starboard stations.

The larger Los Angeles-class sub-

crane with a 10,000 pound 1* ^c ^

fantail service and a 64-foot, P°^rca

conveyor belt.                                        ^

The AS-39 does not have a ¹

helicopter deck aft, but is set ^uP^_e

vertical replenishment (VertRep)-

VertRep deck on the 01 level is

tified to accommodate H-l, H-2» j

CH-46 helicopters and has an ass^oC1‘^l^_

control station with UHF radio, ,

■ no

and a

Antipollution features of the 7-

class—also being backfitted tenders—include sanitary hazardous pollutant, fuel over

^V                                                  disch*#*

sf

i of

on

and oily waste holding and systems. A bromine disinfectant

marines with their heavier propellers required installation of the stouter king-post repair crane amidships. Land-class cranes will hoist 60,000 pounds maximum as compared to the Spear’s original 30,000-pound lift crane. With king-post crane posi­tioned to handle propellers, heavy ma­

chinery, boats, and cargo, two travel­ing rotating cranes on 350-foot port and starboard tracks provide service to ships alongside. These cranes are rated at 10,000 pounds with a 55 feet out­reach. To handle cargo dockside and bring it on board, the AS-39 is pro­vided with a mobile, extendable boom

phone communications speaker.   •>

Services supplied to the alon£^s , service stations include comp^re^j air, oxygen, nitrogen, 150-P~ ^ steam, portable water, diesel fu^e diesel lube oil, turbine lube chilled water, pure water, sea '^,va ^ electrical power, and oily and safiU waste discharge.               m

oth«^f

was^te’

tern replaces the standard chlorin^¹ system.   0

Just as the three people for ^vV these ships served to make the • Navy’s submarine fleet what it ^lS^.|j day, the three Land-class tenders serve to keep that fleet ready.

116

Proceedings / June

casualty planning is impor-

planning 15 lllipui-

;_t • ^{t0 tke} combat line officer because tti_ei^^{Creases tke retu}rn of combat-wise bat ^t0 ^^{Uty an<d} '^c ‘^mP^roves the corn- talc ^S° ^*^{er S mora}^^{e and} willingness to Peth ^{neCeSSary risks}- ^But in the com- teq ¹⁰⁰ ^^0r Pruning time and skills j_Ces ^red by so many supporting serv- |₀ ’ ^rned'^ca^ planning is often given the ^;°^rity- ^ⁿ- P^art, this is because

0y_e ^m'^litary physicians have, in fact, to u° ^ ^the*r product. Soldiers seem f_0u ^ave unbounded and often un- thej_r ^tC. ^enthusiasm and confidence in ^Cause ^m'^Utary Physician colleagues be-

^recent ^t^*^e^ ^*^aVe ^^{one so weB} *^{n tke} P^ast; line officers assume their

^y ‘cians will automatically be able '' ^{So a}gain. Though flattering,

to dq .        .

i_{s u} ^{u a}gain. Though flattering, this fr₀ ^nreah^stic. Plans and techniques p_f0 ^a Previous war are no more ap- atfrj *^ate *ⁿ medicine than they are for

Th °^{r C}*°^{Se tact}‘^ca* ^a‘^r support. d_atl ^e Military Medical Corps is in p_a$(. ^r °b being a casualty of its own E_Ve ^achievements and publicity, the i ^{ne w}'^th access to a television in ^bOs witnessed the remarkable

Pcrf_0rm                        —- ----------------

Vi„. ⁿance of combat casualty care in ^etnam. But

Hot

like!

y-

a rerun of that scenario Vulnerable helicopter

^‘ctejj^{anteS and} open-lighted, unpro Mai

•n

ⁿni_n

■spitals are weak reeds to lean

long-range

combat casualty

et"«- They may quickly be oblit-

^ DV                                ___

³y modern weapons.

c°_mb ^evel°ping a plan for future Shr- ^casualty care, the following as­t i^^{tl0ns are} made: ^sho_rt ^{6 next} high-intensity war will be min;.^-. ^^resent plans, equipment, ad-

Hf^lve

structure, and possibly

to _c military personnel may have luj^ ^tke course. We won’t have the n,_ed^ry leisurely wartime change in 0_my^CJ policy of tactics and call-up. ^abj_e ⁿ°^se who are immediately avail- ^at the time of mobilization will

%

probably be of use during the active combat phase of the war.

►  Continental United States will probably be bombed. Even a token at­tack on the United States will sponsor a national outcry not to call up civil­ian physicians lest home towns be a target for attack.

►  Medical affairs will not have the high priority enjoyed in Vietnam. Austerity and cost-effectiveness are lessons forgotten by physicians during our last three wars and seldom empha­sized in peacetime (civilian or mili­tary) practice.

►  Because of precision-guided muni­tions, neither side is likely to have complete, close-to-the-ground air supremacy. Since helicopters for casu­alty pick-up will be vulnerable, casualties will not routinely be evac­uated by air within minutes of wound­ing. Extraction will probably have to be by hand litter or wheeled (perhaps armored) vehicles.

►  Casualties will reach forward hospi­tals for primary surgical care many hours or days after being wounded, re­sulting in many fatalities of those with head, chest, and abdominal injuries. Many wounds will be infected, not merely contaminated—a difference which totally alters the surgeon’s ap­proach to a wound and the patient’s chances for uneventful recovery.

►  There will be a high likelihood of radiation injuries, either alone, in con­junction with a burn, or accompanied by other trauma requiring surgical care.

►  All medical facilities, ashore or afloat, will be within enemy missile range.

The technology of modern war is so dynamic and its effect on combat casualty planning so crucial that pol­icy planning in this area must be shared between line and medical offi-

cers at every level. Understanding new weaponry and tactics inevitably affects methods for casualty evacuation and care which in turn dictate details of the injured soldiers’ surgical care. Yet the fact remains that professional in­terchange on the technology of future warfare has only involved a few medi­cal officers, who by seniority and career choice as administrators are sequestered from practical clinical care.

Military physicians, however, are currently almost totally involved in professional care of active duty per­sonnel and their dependents. For the majority, their self-image is more of a doctor than of a military man.

Most line officers have great respect for the military physician as a doctor, but they seldom consider it pertinent to update physicians on the technol­ogy and planning for a future war. But sound, in-depth combat casualty planning depends on interchange, and it will require administrative organiza­tion to sponsor such dialogue, not merely sporadic exhortation which will lose its impact when personnel change.

At the top are the few who make the final medical war plan policy. Currently this group consists of the Department of Defense Health Coun­cil, composed of the three services’ surgeons general, the DoD Secretary for Health Affairs, and a representa­tive of the Uniformed Services Univer­sity of Health Sciences. In addition, there is medical input to various work­ing groups of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The problem with the existing combat casualty planning -group is that there is no communication be­tween these planners and those who will have the clinical and tactical re­sponsibility for operating the plans. To bridge this communication gap.