Nobody asked me, but ...

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flight. And so the aviator expert

ences

stiq^ue

cion

expertise will be reduced to one qm ^ titative element which will be ^uSC ^ judge his ability. He may be able whip everyone in the squadron, *ⁿ eluding the skipper, in a dogfig^’ but if his carrier landing grades ^afe mediocre, he is a nobody.

The theory is to develop a w^e j rounded officer who isn’t just ^sUlte^ for piloting fighter aircraft. This treme can be seen to some degree

quickly learns that his entire avW¹

The Plight—and Flight—of Our Fighter Pilots

It is becoming obvious to the most casual observer that young Navy pilots are resigning at an alarming rate. Al­though it is a Navy-wide problem, it is particularly serious and somewhat mysterious among the ranks of the fighter pilots.

Two experience levels are leading the exodus: the pilot whose obligation to the service is fulfilled for the first time, and the more seasoned aviator with eight to ten years of active duty behind him, usually facing his second sea tour. Loss of either creates a critical, expensive shortage. The ‘‘polished nugget,” who has just com­pleted a cruise or two, is at the point where he can be of great value as an experienced fleet aviator. The void he leaves will take at least five years and many tax dollars to fill. The second- tour man, with two to four cruises to his credit, usually a tour as a flight instructor, and very often combat ex­perience in Vietnam, is currently an irreplaceable commodity. A strong core of these medium-grade pilots is an extremely valuable resource. Al­though a squadron can go to war with little or no combat experience, those who have enjoyed success with mini­mal casualties have had extensive guidance from veterans.

Prior to seeking causes for the alarming rate of abandonment, let’s look into the reasons a young man wants to join the Navy. The majority of aspiring naval aviators seek adven­ture. A childhood interest in aviation may have led to an interest in fighter pilots. And that’s what they want to be, for the most part, more than any­thing else in the world. Add to the glamour of being a fighter pilot a rea­sonable salary, a bit of flag-waving pa­triotism, and no hope of a job with an airline, and it’s more than the average young egomaniac can stand ... he happily signs on the dotted line.

He then experiences the humbling, though tolerable, time at the Naval Academy or Officer Candidate School, and primary flight training. Following these is the selection for the jet pro­gram, then the coveted Wings of Gold, and next, the elusive “Fleet.” The operational fighter squadrons are only a heartbeat away. But they can remain distant by an extended stay in the training environment as an in­structor, or worse, having a desk to fly for a year or two. If this should hap­pen, a disgruntled aviator has been created who may find himself stuck in the training command or a desk job through his tour of obligated service. It should come as no surprise when he resigns at the first opportunity.

But the resignation of the individ­ual who makes it to the fighter squad­ron is the primary concern here. All his expectations have to be realized at the squadron level. Unfortunately, complete disillusionment often comes with his first cruise. He soon discovers that he is a naval officer first and a pilot second. He is among the most junior, and is generally tasked with the most meaningless, unrewarding, and time-consuming jobs, as far re­moved from the business of flying as possible. Duties range from making coffee, collecting bills, taking pic­tures, inventorying belt buckles, and counseling an alcoholic, to visiting a criminal in the brig. He has only to doubt the importance of these duties to gain the attention of the command­ing officer or executive officer and earn a lower mark on his fitness report. Al­though derogatory statements are sel­dom made in these documents that control his very life, the numerical grade assigned will be justified primarily by the performance of his “collateral” duties, not by his flying abilities.

He also notices that he doesn’t get quite as much flight time as he ex­pected and that remarkably little o is devoted to air combat maneuvering Even the anonymous ‘‘they,’ by ^w grace we are provided the means to purchase aviation fuel, have that priorities reversed. They fund fig squadrons by flight hours rather t sorties, which forces the scheduling

long, unrewarding, fuel-conservati^v

flights, instead of short, realistic ^c0 bat simulation flights which consu more fuel per hour, but provide un ^ paralleled training at the same cost P the loss of the fighter pilot mys on a daily basis.

A saving grace could be equal ti devoted to his profession, if i^{nc t} ^ there were enough hours in the day fighter pilot should live and breat his aircraft, its weapons, and the tics to employ them. He should p and receive lectures on these top^lCS^ routinely, not just once a week at all-officers’ meeting.                                ^_st

Even at sea, the fighter pilot m^L^ run helter-skelter counting fire n° inspecting decks, heads, and sho and writing reports. There is, h°" ever, one dramatic difference from shore duty requirements: he is ^en gaged in stiff competition in la° on board the carrier. He spends t greater part of his usually unrem*¹ ^ able flights contemplating his up ^ ing pass at the deck. Back in the r room, he beams or broods over th^e grade assigned to his landing, ^s0 times for days. Why? Because he

oth ^ ^°^{rce s s}y^stem, which is at the fifih^{r en<}^ ^{tbe sca}*^e‘ Air F°^{rce Uf}ire^^er ^^°^ts have no collateral duties _an(.j^{C ate<}^ ^t0 flying, no troops to lead, _Writ^° ^evaluations of subordinates to in ⁶ ^ ^{S as t}h°^ugh they all worked Stations. As they become

't'ancT ^t*¹⁶^ ^^lnc^ themselves litj" ^ln& °fficers of squadrons, with t'Xp_tr °^{r n}° leadership or management oft ^ence- (However, their squadrons fe\yⁿff'°^nS'^{St onI}y (5 pilots and a Nay^0, *^Ce P^ersonneh a far cry from the ''y s 200-300 man squadrons.)

, ^S°. there ^developi_ng Promise

they

^he enemy,

nil -

tions department, dealing with flying. ► Fund fighter squadrons by sorties,

more as com-

is something to be said for managers. But a com-

pH_o , must be reached. The fighter ^ * ^S Personality is easily stifled by ave_r^SS*^{Ve bus}y^w°tk. He is not your oian^^{6 bus}'^ness person or people _avv ^a^^er- T° be sure, he can be lured _eXe^ ^{t0 c}he civilian world of junior hut ^{UtlVes an}d airborne bus drivers,

°f ,°^nly because of the fringe benefits ^sen ^{6r salaf}y ^ar>d minimal family _sho^^lon. If he is in the Navy, he _Co ^U he a fighter pilot first. Serious i_n ^eration should be given to hav- t_rui P^r<)fessional fighter pilots with {(• / ^lateral duties. Baron Von ,mh°fe_n put it this way:

^e fighter pilots have to rove the ,,^ea Plotted them in any manner see fit, and when they sight . they attack and shoot bi'h ^°^Wn' Anything else is rub-

The ^

aron would roll over in his grave

if he heard of the outrageous propor­tions of the average naval aviator’s in-basket.

A final aspect in the discourage­ment of the naval aviator, and one over which the Navy has no control, is the process of getting old. Maturity shifts our priorities to less glamorous endeavors. We tend to become cyni­cal, and get discouraged at the same aircraft accidents and fatalities which used to spice our lives with the ele­ment of risk. It becomes all too obvi­ous that these are tragedies of the greatest magnitude. We are no longer quite so willing to launch on a nearly suicidal mission with total abandon­ment and unquestioning faith that the powers that be know what is best for democracy and the world. We grow tired of what has emerged as the real fighter pilot, and the subrogation is finally completed as we find ourselves transformed into slaves of our desks.

What would I do?

►   Create legal, educational services, administrative, and first lieutenant of­ficer subspecialists and assign them to all squadrons to reduce the burden of the aviators.

►   Provide more maintenance ground officers to fill the majority of mainte­nance billets.

►   As an alternative to the above, pro­vide more chief petty officers for some of the same billets.

►   Create more billets in the opera­common resignation points. No flight pay is required for first tour. Most young aviators would pay the Navy to let them fly its jets. After 16 years, retirement is too close to consider res­ignation.)

►   Encourage commanding officers to live and breathe air superiority. Their viewpoints on tactics should be heard on a daily basis.

►   Organize and encourage air combat maneuvering competition.

►   Give awards for good performance in the air combat maneuvering arena and constructive criticism for poor performance.

►   Transform the ready room into a showcase of fighter pilot heritage, squadron history, old tailhooks, fa­mous quotations, and pictures of fa­vorite aces.

►   Encourage fighter pilots to be fighter pilots.

^°body asked me either, but . . .

P^tain E. R. Nordtvedt, U. S. Navy

Our Pilots Again

I _rea j^{s w}'^ch a sense of frustration th; a_Vj the current shortage of nav; hi_ri_n°^rs because of increased airline Hj_a ^he problem may stem from

having

c_au ^{y r}°°ts, but at least one major „_ark/^s the misapplication of free \Vo_ri₍j^t ^^abor economic notions to th military personnel manage- t- The specific issue is that highe executive and legislative authorities insist that we pay only what the mar­ket demands for skills we need.

The “pay-what-the-market- demands” philosophy, as it is applied to military personnel planning under current statutory and other con­straints, has at least two fatal flaws. It assumes that the member will receive and understand the message that pay increases and decreases are necessary to maintain the supply/demand equilib­rium. The current perception that prevails among our members is that total wages change in response to con­gressional and special interest group pressures and are “sticky” in an up­ward direction. In reality, wages are probably only “sticky” in an upward direction, and move very little down­ward, but therein lies the first fallacy.

^r»o

The free market mechanism re­quires unfettered movement in either direction in response to market

m-

> ente^f

all to

of

pressures. There is precious little up­ward movement of wages in direct re­sponse to market pressures. We are required to plan to a static market situation and are unable to adjust to the dynamics found in the real world. Under those conditions, and to pre­clude supply shortages under increased demand pressures (as is presently oc­curring in military aviation), we must either continually pay sufficiently above the market price to dissuade the individual from voting with his feet when another economic opportunity arises, or maintain an excess of supply. Otherwise, we will realize periodic shortages in critical skill areas.

That leads to the second fallacy in the market demand philosophy. Ex­cess supply or insufficient demand is called unemployment and that serves as a surge tank for shifting demand patterns. Barring national emergency, there is no unemployed reserve pool of aviators, doctors, etc. available to the military. There are naval reservists, but they are available only in a na­tional emergency. For the most part, our active force is composed of persons without much civilian work history. We are an employer of original sup­ply, which means simply that we train skills for all other employers. No other employer trains our personnel or has a pool we can draw from. This is a political decision, not an economic one.

Paying incentive above the market or maintaining an excess supply in certain critical areas represents an intervention in the labor market. It is expensive and inefficient by some definitions. It is a departure from al­lowing the supply/demand equilib­rium set the price of labor. However, it seems to me that the traditional jus­tification for government intervention, "clothed with a public interest,” applies in the case of critical skills re­quired by the military, and justifies the resulting inefficiencies and higher cost.

Finally, by way of footnote, one of the most fruitful investments made by

, _r r Rill whkh

our government is the O.i-                  ^

provided education for countless e servicemen. The payback has been realized many-fold in increased out puts of goods and services (GNP) creased taxes paid, and many other tangible and intangible benefits ing to our society and to the m ual. Our military does about the sa thing today, training individuals t acquire a wide spectrum of techn non-technical, and professional s '¹ The individual and his skill may the civilian sector after minimum military service. Maybe that s not bad if we were only smart enoug plan for it as a recognized missi°ⁿ the military. It’s expensive, and certainly need to retain some p^re determined skill mix and level ⁱⁿ _£ military. Sure it’s a subsidy to P^r‘ enterprise, but government subs' ^ business in many other ways, m°^s which provide lower returns on 'ⁿ vestment.