The Drift Toward the Draft

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Today’s Navy is manned by volunteers such ct- these young recruits. But there are those who call it the “All-Volunteer Farce,” and clai>¹¹ AVF has brought troubles in many ways W0?^se than those associated with the hated draft. J> then, voluntary military duty continues to jw to meet our manpower requirements, must not consider some form of compulsory service-

11'

4

als

which have addressed that subject in recent moot ^ The tempo of activity is increasing in proportion ^ the growing awareness among responsible c^ltiz that the AVF is in trouble and faces even more sen

Anyone following the fortunes of our nations *^l volunteer force (AVF) in the news media is awat^e the flurry of reports, studies, speeches, and editor¹

oi>s

voi c^eS

d

other

form of compulsory national service. Despite a l^ot

problems in the future. As more and more enter the debate, the discussion is turning towar pros and cons of returning to the draft or some °^l“ r

COURTESY OF RECRUITER

testing of the water, however, there has been n⁽ movement. As the reality of the AVF continues ^ become known, it is ever more clear that maint*¹¹ ing the status quo will not meet the nation’s de ^e ^ needs in the future, so alternatives must be f^0L\ⁿ ^ Clearly, a political roadblock exists where the dr*¹ ^ concerned, but it is time to examine the real ^111,1 power needs of our armed forces and to see how ¹ needs can best be met.

A decision to return to the draft would not ^ popular. On the other hand, no one has ever afg that national defense is a game devised by strategy for the entertainment of the citizenry. Any deci on the draft will be decided by the political fo^rceS c our nation, and one hopes that the ingredients

''mb

'n the service of one’s country. In fact, the draft

ⁿ°t used at the national level during the Revolu- States were given quotas which they filled in ^Way they could, often with considerable diffi-

45.

^^at decision will include a clear analysis of all the ^cts» including our traditions and precedents con­ning conscription. The issue cannot be ultimately ^eC’ded on popularity.

j ‘^storical Overview: Objections to returning to the , } ^are based upon many factors, not the least of thr'^Ch *^S °^Ur historical experience.¹ Americans have, ^0ughout most of our history, gone out of their j ^to avoid using the draft and to avoid being ^tc‘d, legally or otherwise. Aversion to the draft in _v ^v°|^ut;ionary times was, however, linked to another ^ y ^,rnportant issue, namely an attitude of fear and ^tred of standing armies or professional armies in _Co^ ^ra*- Indeed, the Declaration of Independence the ^aine<^ ^nurnerous specific complaints directed at _0rJ ^r*tish armies of regulars stationed in the col­l- ^S' ®ne of those complaints said simply that the • has kept among us, in times of peace, _tu^a_r^ndln8 Armies without the consent of our legisla- ^s- As Kipling’s famous poem “Tommy” ex- l_a ^Ses so eloquently, soldiers have never been popu-

^,nie^^eXCeP^t *^{n tlme war}^’ ^{and t}*^le P^r°f^esst°^naI ^ar_

^s °f the 17th and 18th centuries were among the dr ^^ated ‘ⁿ history. So the aversion to being ,. ‘ ^ted went deeper than a reluctance to risk life and ^as don.

any ^CUlty

_tj_l^^Ur‘ⁿg the War of 1812, suggestions were made

_tj_Q ^{a nat}ional draft be instituted, but fierce opposi-

f_()r Prevented any legislation from being passed be-

^ick • ^{W3r en<}^^e<^- Indeed, the bitter intersectional

_C] ^er,ng which threatened to lead to secession was

^S.^e|y related to the conscription issue.

_Coj ^{1 t}^^le beginning of the Civil War, President Lin-

ealled for volunteers to fill the ranks of the

ⁿ'°n armies, and for the first year or so, men vol- ^unteerp j          ¹           i

^re<J in adequate numbers. As the war dragged

For f

^otnotes, please turn to page

on, and as casualties and then desertions mounted, it became necessary to turn to a draft, first by placing quotas on the individual states in 1862, and finally in the form of the first federal draft act. Public reac­tion to the Enrollment Act of 1863 was violent. The act was full of loopholes, inequities, and weaknesses. Largely because of the obvious injustices, violence and rioting broke out in New York and elsewhere in the North. Bounties were offered to fill the ranks, and more abuses and fraudulent practices were intro­duced, with the result that the entire experience left a bad taste with most people, and the experiment was not repeated until World War I. In fact, the situation was so chaotic that relatively few draftees actually served in the Union armies, the number being less than 5% of the total manpower used dur­ing the war.

The World War I experience proved to be far more orderly, largely because a conscious effort was made to avoid the pitfalls of the Civil War. The most striking aspect of the Selective Service Act of 1917 is that all volunteer enlistments were halted during the latter stages of the war so that the orderly flow of draftees into the ranks would not be upset by uncontrolled enlistments. Certain inequities re­mained, however. Chief among them was the classi­fication of registrants according to their perceived value to the nation in their various civilian pursuits. The result of that provision, of course, was that the poor, underprivileged, and minorities were called in disproportionately large numbers. Nonetheless, some 24 million American men were registered for the draft; more than two million were inducted; an army of more than four million was raised; and well over one million men were delivered to France, all in just over a year.

The experience of World War I was repeated on a much grander scale in World War II. As events in Europe in 1939 and 1940 raised grave _t concerns among the American people about national security needs, the first peacetime Selective Service System was instituted in October 1940. Deferments were granted liberally until the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. The shock of that event resulted in the reg-

s oi°^e that

On 7 April 1917, one day after the United States declared war on Germany, the 1st Battalion of the New York Naval Militia marched to New York’s Pennsylvania Station to entrain for the Philadelphia Navy Yard where the unit was assigned to the USS Ohio. Under the Selective Service Act of 1917, 24 million registered and more than two million were inducted in just over a year.

istration of all males between the ages of 18 and 64, with those between 20 and 3 1 being liable for serv­ice. In November 1942, the top age was raised to 44, although a month later authorities decided that no one over the age of 38 would be drafted. Volun­tary enlistments were again terminated in December 1942, this time because the Army Air Forces and the Navy were getting excessive volunteers, the ground combat arms too few. Thus, no volunteers were ac­cepted between January 1943 and October 1945. Standards were raised and lowered throughout the war as manpower needs fluctuated. In total, of a population of more than 130 million, well over 16 million served in uniform during the war, including several hundred thousand women. A total of 4,828,000 potential inductees were rejected for one reason or another, the majority for physical defects.²

In the postwar period, the draft lapsed briefly in 1947 but was reinstituted shortly thereafter when tensions in Europe and Asia and the growing threat posed by the Soviet Union made it apparent that a standing military force of substantial size would be needed to maintain peace. Although never popular, the draft was tolerated without much overt protest until anti-Vietnam War sentiments led to growing feelings of hostility toward everything associated with the war. The foci of much of the hostility were the draft boards and ROTC units on college cam­puses. In what has been called by some a capitulation to social pressures rather than a realistic reassessment of defense needs, the draft was officially ended in mid-1973, with the last inductee actually entering the service in December 1972. In a paper published during that period, Morris Janowitz said of the in­stitution of the all-volunteer force:

“The termination of conscription was one issue upon which antiwar congressmen and pressure groups could unite with the Nixon administra­tion. The result was the effective political decision not to extend Selective Service legislation. . ,”³ Although the AVF experienced difficulties and the various branches of the armed forces ran into adjust­ment problems, the end of the draft was generally

viewed as a realistic measure because of the tenor the times. The hiatus in conscription allowed y°^un^ Americans to cool off from the riotous war years, as the political turmoil subsided, the nation cau£ its breath and watched the AVF develop.

The All-Volunteer Force to Date: The record has far been mixed. Few have called the experiment ^ total failure, and none have called it an unqualify success. Aided by the tail end of the post-^°^r ^ War II baby boom and serious econom problems—particularly high unemployment rates the services have been able to get reasonably cloS^e _ their recruiting goals, though with difficulty. sidering the rampant anti-military feelings abroad ¹ the country at the end of the Vietnam War, ¹¹¹³ ^ observers were surprised that the services recruiter ‘ successfully as they did. By the last quarter of ^ however, all the services were in trouble; even ^ Air Force, which had never before failed to reach ¹ goals, did not make its quota for that period.

Whether or not the services did as well or poorly as predicted in certain areas depends to extent on how one interprets the data. Claims the military would become unrepresentative of ^s°^c

press and elsewhere. It is clear that the services ^aye paid a price in recruiting personnel in sufficient I ^{btrs an}d of reasonable quality, and serious prob- Ms are emerging in certain crucial areas. For ex- th ^ ⁶         ^^as^^mK^ton P°^st reported in August 1978

^at> The Army and the other services have high _at^^s desertion, high incidences of abuse of alcohol other drugs, high percentages of dropouts before _cj. Potion of a first term, high figures on the de- _a^^e National Guard and reserve strength ...” ^ ^c°ncluded that the most worrisome aspect of the ^ls that it has ‘‘never been properly anchored,” _t ^a"ing, of course, that there is no draft machinery ^ad back on.⁶ Some three weeks after that article Qpeared *ⁿ the Post, General Bernard Rogers, Army Co*^e^                      ^toId ^rb^e American Legion National

Ration: “I believe that today’s soldiers are to ^<>ri^ ^tbe best ^w*th whom I have had the privilege ^Serve in over 35 years of commissioned service.”⁷ ■ recently, allegations of widespread abuses in re-

nave

serv

Mo_re ^Crui_t

^lng> particularly in the Army and Marine Corps Jtawn attention to the apparent difficulties the _n *^^es are experiencing in attracting sufficient _{st |} ^ers of recruits.⁸ Although investigations are

still

gest

Hak

^ty’ ^an army of poor, disadvantaged whites and inorities, have not been entirely borne out. In cer- ^^In rnonths, to be sure, black enlistments in the thT^{y were wel1 above} a representative figure, and . Percentage of blacks in the Army has doubled k^^ce the Vietnam War.⁴ That fact may or may not k ^Sl£ⁿ*ficant in terms of the Army’s effectiveness, in general—throughout all the services—the ^ ^F has not been distinctly different in makeup from , ^e ^^raft period forces. Many observers claim, then, ^s*nce the services have at least come very close to S|>als i_n recruiting, that the great social experiment Maintaining a military force of over two million and women solely with volunteers has worked, j V^be approaches the end of its sixth year, it is j-j ^ee<a difficult to call it a total failure. According to ^^r- John P. White, Assistant Secretary of Defense i°^r.,^^anP^ower' Reserve Affairs and Logistics, the AVF _as ' ■ • working surprisingly well, and in such areas Military strength, cost, personnel quality and dis- " Me, the evidence on the AVF runs directly p_r, ^ter_ ^{t0 m}any of the perceptions reported in the

Perceptions of problems have indeed been reported ^lr> the

^ln progress at this writing, the known facts sug- that at the very least, even if the services are _actj ^ln£ quotas or close to it, volunteers are not ex- th ^ ^beat‘ⁿg down recruiters’ doors. Furthermore, of ;_c°^{Se vv}ho do volunteer, many are ineligible for serv- °^r a number of reasons, including lack of educa­tion and failure to meet physical requirements.

Concerning the overall success of the AVF, and more particularly the future problems that may arise, strong opinions exist on both sides of the issue, and both supporters and critics of the AVF can point to facts and statistics to support their claims. Interpre­tation of those facts is, of course, subjective, and his­torical comparisons are difficult since reporting methods have improved or changed, and definitions and criteria have been altered substantially. For ex­ample, as “simple” a matter as desertion rates and unauthorized absences as measures of quality may be an invalid basis for comparison with past times. Definition criteria such as the number of days of absence which constitute desertion, or other legal or administrative factors, are substantially different. Be­fore the widespread use of computers, for example, a company first sergeant had “options” on reporting personnel absent which no longer exist because daily, computerized reports must be made. So comparisons with pre-AVF, especially pre-Vietnam, conditions must be examined carefully before conclusions can be drawn.

Why A Draft? If it can be argued that the AVF has been moderately successful, what is the real case for restoring the draft? Wouldn’t it be simpler to con­tinue to refine and fine-tune the AVF rather than take the drastic step of returning to conscription? Cannot the services find remedies to their problems?

First, it must be said that arguments stating that the AVF has worked are strained to the breaking point, and that certain inconsistencies exist. Most of the “success” stories are based upon analysis of the active forces. When the total force policy of the United States is called in, a different picture emerges. While General Rogers has indeed praised today’s soldiers, he has also indicated that resump­tion of the draft might be a solution for the standby pool known as the Individual Ready Reserve, which by late 1977 was short more than 400,000 men. Another viewpoint is provided by Kenneth Coffey, who stated the following in a recently published study:

“The capability of the U. S. Army to respond to the challenges of a major conventional confron­

tation in Europe between the forces of NATO an of the Warsaw Pact has been significantly reduce as a result of the decision to adopt an A Volunteer Force.”⁹

Coffey points out, as do others, that the current

size of the U. S. Army is based upon a total f°^rce

policy, which is based upon an effective reserve.

other words, if we have, in fact, a total force pol'tT’

the AVF can hardly be called successful if a vital P^art

of that force is not up to snuff. That is clearly ^{r e}

case with today’s reserves.

Second, the historical case against the draft ^aS

“anti-traditional” lacks validity. Where the draft h»^s

been administered reasonably fairly, it has been ^aC

cepted without serious complaint by the American

people. Anti-draft sentiments which go back to

Revolution were as much anti-military as ant>^

conscription. When the clear need for more arm^e • • ^r           hflS

military men and women than would volunteer ^

been perceived by the people, the draft was accep^te '

Complaints were registered against unfair provisi⁰^

of the draft—once the hatred of armies in genet*

had dissipated—rather than against the draft ^,tse^ Furthermore, the role of the United States in '^v°^r

the

affairs has changed drastically since World War and for most of that period, the draft has been

norm. So our historical experience has been that ^ have used the draft successfully when needed. ^ deed, it is worth noting that during the latter stag of World War II, a group of distinguished educat°^r

wrote to President Franklin D. Roosevelt, urg

in?

ftiee ^reasonable way to provide an opportunity to obl'^{C C}^^at °bhgation. Clearly, if all citizens felt that _t^*k^ation and acted on it, we would indeed not need p/ The crux of this argument is whether

the- ^{6 S}^^0u^ he forced to give a share of their lives to ^ ₍j^natl0n”^{s arr}ned forces. Perhaps a comparison can ■ ^raWn. Most people feel a reasonable sense of ob-

_tL °ⁿ to help the infirm, the underprivileged, and th ^W^° ^cannot adequately care for or protect

_tj_la^^1Se*^Ves- Charity would be a nice way to handle _Wq ! ^ everybody gave enough to charity, there - ^U he no problem. But people don’t give that charity, and so we have higher taxes as a

^mt*ch _t0

h- In other words, if volunteer action took care

tesm of all

_ari(. ^<>Ur social ills, life might indeed be more pleas- An °^{r a}^’ ^ancf ^we wooftf ^{not nee}d drafts and such. Put ^art'^c*^{e m} The Christian Science Monitor recently ^e point very succinctly :

. At present citizens of the United States have _sj^hts aplenty but few, if any, duties. . . . Why ooldn’t every citizen be reared to appreciate that

, ^e°se of his country is a common, shared respon- Slbility?”!!        ¹

Such

^Wei8ht

philosophical points do not carry much

_aricj . *n the realms of strategy, cost-effectiveness, h_an^^Internati^onal politics, to be sure. On the other Pev ' ^ITlany ^who have doubts about the AVF but are _CQti^erchcless reluctant to resort to the draft claim that ₀th^SCr’f^>t'°n is politically unfeasible. It cannot, in ^er 'words, be sold to the people. The Congress

"'Quid

therefore be very unlikely to pass draft legisla­

tion. But to make the draft palatable to the people, the issue of the citizen’s responsibility is one argu­ment that would logically be employed, and it would have to carry a lot of weight. If the people perceive that a real threat to our security exists, and if they believe the AVF cannot meet that threat, they may support the draft as a reasonable alternative.

Fourth, the matter of cost is a major issue, both against the AVF and against the draft. AVF advocates claim the draft won’t save very much, if anything. In his fiscal year 1979 posture statement, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown stated, “A return to the draft would not, by itself, save much money,” citing a figure of $500 million, a small percentage of the de­fense budget.¹² On the other hand, many have ar­gued that the costs of the AVF are going to go even higher as the manpower pool continues to shrink, and that even if the draft realized no major savings in the near term, it would save quite a bit more over the long haul. Still others have argued that costs should not dictate defense strategies, so why raise that argument at all? Again, returning to the draft will be a political issue, and defense budgets do have political impact, so the matter of costs cannot be ig­nored.

te

responsible under the Constitution for passing l^a'^vS “To raise and support Armies,” they might presum^ ably be allowed to dictate the general composition the armed forces, ERA notwithstanding. Again, ^c

if

issue of the draft should be decided on the basis

much healthier for the country to have a draft uu which all young people of military age are elig*bl^e be called up for a two-year period, so that we have army of trained civilians who can be called up *ⁿ emergency.”¹⁵

der

to

Most significant in the poll was the response young people of draft age. A total of 35% °h ^r^°^S polled between ages 18 and 29 would favor a t"°^

year draft as opposed to the present system. From _

to rh^e

olh

os*'

Secretary Brown added that the Department of De­fense does . . not believe that the American people would favor a return to the draft to achieve a dollar saving that represents less than one half of one percent of the total Defense budget.”¹³ Perhaps not. But what would that figure become if projected over the next decade or so? Part of the answer lies in pro­jections of the availability of manpower over the next ten years. The Congressional Budget Office has pub­lished a study demonstrating that manpower shortages will grow far more serious in the 1980s.¹⁴ The study concludes that between 1980 and 1990:

►  The number of high school graduates will di­minish by half a million.

►  The number of non-graduates reaching age 18 will shrink by 300,000.

►  The total number of l6-to-24-year-olds will shrink by 6.2 million.

These figures indicate that the struggle to attract manpower will become substantially more intense during the next dozen years. To attract more people, the services will have to provide more of an incentive for young men and women to enlist. Those incen­tives will either be higher pay or other costly items, such as educational benefits. So the answer to cost differences between AVF and the draft must be pro­jected over that period.

An issue that has further confused the picture is the Equal Rights Amendment. Opponents of ERA claim that if a draft were instituted and ERA passed, then women would have to be drafted in equal num­bers as men. Opponents of the draft use the same argument. Congress, however, has the constitutional authority to provide for armed forces, and if Congress determined that men are more effective in combat than women, then the question can be raised: would it be unconstitutional to draft more men than women to fill up combat units? Would women have to serve in combat? The answers remain to be found, but one thing is clear. The armed services have opened up virtually every field short of combat areas to women, and women are volunteering plentifully. They are not, however, solving manpower problems. If com­bat fields were opened to women without the draft, one must ask how many would then volunteer. It is clear that many women now serving would not have volunteered if they had been liable for combat duty.

What will occur if ERA passes and the draft re­turns is a subject for all sorts of speculation. It might be argued that even with ERA, Congress would not necessarily be obliged to recruit men and women in equal numbers if it could be shown that women did not perform equally as well as men in certain mili­tary fields—infantry, for example. Since Congress is

real defense needs, not upon what might happ^en ERA passes—or doesn’t pass, for that matter.

There are many forms which might be taken n ^c ^ nation indeed reinstitutes the draft. Proponents the various forms do tend to agree on one major point. If the draft is revived, it must be fair. Defiⁿ ing “fair” is something else again, particularly when the ERA issue is thrown in. On the matter of fairness, supporters of the AVF claim that no form of conscrip tion could be fairer than letting the burden of *■ fense be borne by those who volunteer to do it- ¹ question then becomes whether the volunteers «^ joining to defend the country, or if they are, m feet, mercenaries. If the latter is true, does it matr^er' More to the point, would it matter in combat? Tf>³ question is as tough to answer as all the rest, but can be bypassed by asking whether “fairness’ >^{s r} real issue. Is it that, or the nation’s security?

Another way of approaching the question invol^ve the alternatives for using the draft. All inducted might be drafted; some volunteers could be taken, men and women might be permitted to volunteer be drafted. A combination of those modes ^coU^ readily be employed, leaving the number to drafted dependent upon the number of volunteers-

The most crucial matter regarding the ^ac^. ceptability of the draft is ultimately the matter ⁰ public acceptance. An ABC News-Harris poll con ducted in November 1978 revealed the following-

►  53% of those surveyed favor a return to the draft -

►  66% of those polled favor immediate registrar*⁰¹¹ of all 18- to 28-year-olds.

►  76% agreed with this statement: “It would

an

an

by

61% who favor the present system, according contents of the news release concerning the P' cannot be concluded what form, if any, their opP¹ tion would take if the draft were reinstituted. ^ fact that more than one-third of those who would ^ affected favor the draft is certainly a surprising m^e£lS ure of acceptance and an indication that many y^ollllt

^ln 1968. After attending Amphibious Warfare School in 1971, he

^^ericans place national defense high on their list of

priorities.

T^^e ^^raft will not solve all defense manpower ⁰ lems. Many of the alternative management ac- k°^ns designed to make the AVF work better should k 'mplemented in any case.¹⁶ Better pay, more ef- ^ctlve use of women, modifying of standards for cer- ⁿ jobs, providing better educational oppor- m L.^{tlSS           r}hose improvements would not only

^a e the AVF work better; they would also make the ^ more palatable. If the effort needed to aid the _a *^S ^^Ut *^nt° ^ma^^lnS ^t^^ie draft fair and equitable, *nto educating the American public about the ^need for a draft, the long-term needs of defense _r ^anP°wer will not be a matter of chance but the ^u t of a positive choice by the people of how they ^{3nt sec}urity handled in the future.

Lieutenant Colonel Sage was graduated from the U. S. Naval Academy in 1962. He served in the 1st and 2d Marine Divisions in the United States and commanded the 3d 175-mm. Gun Battery in Vietnam. Following a tour as an instructor at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, he at­tended the University of Heidelberg, Germany, as an Olmsted scholar, receiving a diploma in political sci-

^Served _a

^rhis ^{3 t0Ur at} NROTC Unit, College of the Holy Cross; during Lj_eu^°^Ur earned a master’s degree in history from Clark University. Nav j^nant ^⁰l°^nel Sage was the Marine Corps aide to the Vice Chief of

‘ operations in 1974-1975. Since 1975, he has served in the Special rojectc r\^-   .               ..

Co ^u,rectorate of Headquarters Marine Corps. Previous Proceedings

"Nob ^Ut*°^nS ^^ave keen “The Military and Politics” (October 1974) and y Asked Me to Join a Union, But . . .” (February 1978).

'A useful summary of the history of conscription is contained in Richard V. L. Cooper, Military Manpower and the All-Volunteer Force (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 1977), pp. 46-59.

²C. Joseph Bernardo and Eugene H. Bacon, American Military Policy: Its Development Since 1775. 2nd ed. (Harrisburg: The Stackpole Co., 1961), pp. 428-430.

³Morris Janowitz, "The Impact of a Volunteer Force on Strategic Af­fairs,” in Frank N. Trager and Philip S. Kronenberg, National Security and American Society: Theory. Process, and Policy (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1973), p. 579. This paper was first delivered in 1971. ⁴Curtis W. Tarr, “The Future of the All-Volunteer Force,” Air University Review. May-June 1978, p. 6.

■’Quoted in Bernard Weinraub, "Volunteer Army Pros and Cons,” Wash­ington Star. 3 September 1978, p. 1 (emphasis added).

“Warren Rogers, “The All-Volunteer Army’s Bleak Future,” The Wash­ington Post. 6 August 1978, pp. Dl, D5.

⁷Department of Defense News Release No. 245-78, "An Address by General Bernard W. Rogers ... to the 60th Annual National Conven­tion of the American Legion, 24 August 1978,” p. 5.

“"Recruiting Scandals: Sympton of Trouble for Volunteer Forces,” U. S. News & World Report. 16 October 1978. p. 41.

^Kenneth J. Coffey, Manpower for Military Mobilization (Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1978), p. 1. ^I0Bernardo and Bacon, p. 446.

"Charlotte Saikowski, “Let’s go back to the draft,” The Christian Science Monitor. 26 July 1978, p. 23.

^,2Harold Brown, Department of Defense Annual Report: Fiscal Year 1979. 2 February 1978, p. 337.

^,3Ibid.

^l4National Service Programs and Their Effects on Military Manpower and Ci­vilian Youth Programs (Washington: Congressional Budget Offices, 1978), pp. 41-42. (For sale through Superintendent of Documents.) ¹⁵ABC News-Harris Survey, released 6 December 1978.

¹ “Edward W. Brooke, "Meeting Our Military Manpower Needs Through the All-Volunteer Force” (American Enterprise Institute: AEI Defense Review No. 5, 1977), p. 56, outlines a number of such management actions.

All-Volunteer Force in 1798

Lieutenant Daniel N. Wood, U. S. Coast Guard Reserve