Countering Soviet Imperialism

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j. ^ltT1Pose foreign influence upon Africa since it was ' ~ ’ among European powers in the late 19th

The most fertile ground for Communist conquests ^les *n those parts of the world where nations are jj^either strong nor linked in close alliances with great ,^fee World powers. Ideally, there should be internal pension or conflicts between and among states can be exploited. Africa, for example, has all ^e necessary prerequisites to invite Communist over- ^Ures- Within several newly independent African J?^tes> bitter tribal power struggles are under way. q ^ere are border disputes among African nations.

^Ust*ng white governments in Rhodesia and the Re- b^>ub>li_c of South Africa is an emotional issue which _s^many black nations consider more important than ^v'ⁿg their own internal problems. And Africa is ^art °f the “world island.”

^^eopoliticians refer to Eurasia-Africa, the world s ^8reatest landmass, as the “world island.” Located k^hin Eurasia, in the space generally occupied now ^ Russia, is the “pivot area” or “heartland, the ^°^Ssession of which theoretically will lead to world ^ination. The Eurasian littorals are commonly re- ,^rred to as the “rimland,” “marginal crescent, or ‘^ntler crescent.” The rest of the world, including ,, ^e British and Japanese Isles, is considered the ^^ter crescent” or “insular crescent.”

,^^e Soviets have wasted little time in exploiting _s- ^r‘^Can instabilities. Employing military aid, Rus- th^ ^atl<^ Cuban advisors, and Cuban armed forces, ^eV have undertaken the most aggressive campaign

JSx                                                                             '        '

^CntUry. The use of Cuban troops and advisors as _t^ro*ies in Africa is a subtle but sophisticated Soviet ^Ctlc- Apparently, the Soviets judged correctly that d opinion would not react adversely to a non- ^ *^te Third World nation from Pan-America _t ^ri0ther geopolitical designation) being employed to RPfe non-Communist African governments. Cuba

has more than 40,000 military personnel now operat­ing in at least 14 African nations and poses addi­tional threats to the governments of Zaire, Rhodesia, the Republic of South Africa, Chad, and the Western Sahara.

Soviet successes in Africa portend greater instabil­ity in the Middle East. Should the Soviets consoli­date northern Africa, nations in the Middle East de­siring to remain non-Communist would find them­selves in the perilous position of lying among strong Communist camps.

The pattern of Soviet expansionism and probes in­dicates that the U.S.S.R. has outstripped even World War II Germany in geographical reach toward establishing control of the pan-region known as Eurafrica. There is an important difference in the Soviet approach. Rather than emulating German sei­zure of territories through direct armed aggression, the Soviets are employing subversive tactics engineered through third parties to create new Communist satellites.

It is one matter for Communists to subvert a state and reconfigure its government. It is quite another matter to ensure the loyalty of the new state to its Communist sponsor. The crushing of the Hungarian revolution in 1956 and the Czechoslovakian revolu­tion in 1968 are vivid examples of how the loyalty of Communist satellites is to be maintained. The “Brezhnev Doctrine” has served notice that the Communists reserve the right to intervene forcefully in the affairs of any Communist satellite which forgets that its sovereignty remains qualified. Hun­gary and Czechoslovakia, of course, were im­mediately adjacent to Russia and easily punished by Soviet land forces.

It seems likely that Afghanistan, which recently fell to a leftist coup, would suffer the same fate as Hungary and Czechoslovakia should it choose to alter

tin?

salient

m the

en<J

phibious assault, would accomplish the same

il»r

its newfound political orientation. Its frontiers also abut upon Russia. But how will the alignment of noncontiguous Soviet satellites be maintained? Ex­tending the “Brezhnev Doctrine” beyond the reach of Soviet land forces will require Soviet naval power. The Soviets know they will be able to contain the tides of satellite nationalism and self-assertiveness only through threat of military intervention. To be effective, that threat must be stronger and more cred­ible than any hope of relief or assistance offered by any other nation.

The purpose of growing Soviet naval power, then, seems clear; it is a necessary tool for imposing and retaining Soviet dominance over the Eurafrican pan­region. Its initial function will not be to challenge U. S. naval power on the high seas of the world; that may come later. Its immediate function will be to deny use of the seas in the Eurafrican pan-region to Free World forces which might interfere with impo­sition of Soviet influence upon Africa, the Middle East, South Asia, and later, Western Europe.

The Soviet strategy in Eurafrica employs five basic interlocking themes:

►   Posturing as a nation which might seek peace: conducting arms limitation negotiations and avoid­ing direct Warsaw Pact troop commitment outside pact frontiers

►   Directing NATO attention and resources toward the European central front by amassing land power on the Soviet western flank

►   Protecting the Soviet southeastern flank by mass­ing enough land power against China to discourage “collection of old border debts”

►   Employing proxies and aiding dissident groups to establish Communist states in South Asia, the Mid­dle East, and Africa

►   Building a fleet which can control the seas within the Euroafrican pan-region in order to support Communist expansion, crush rebellious satellites, interdict Free World interference, and install a “Brezhnev Doctrine” over Eurafrica similar to Pan- America’s old Monroe Doctrine.

The Soviets have timed their African and South Asian adventurism to exploit apparent weaknesses on the part of other major world powers. China has in­ternal problems, is involved with Cambodia and Vietnam, and has about 40 Soviet divisions camped on its doorstep. Western European nations are neither so closely knit nor individually strong that they might face a mounting Soviet threat in Europe and also counter manifold Communist probes in Af­rica. The United States, still licking self-inflicted Vietnam wounds, has been judged and found lacking the will to resist Communist expansion unless di­

rectly and immediately threatened.                                    ,

The Soviets see that they have time on their si The turmoil in Africa will surely last through t turn of the century, leaving two or three decades geopolitical manipulations. Free World societies creasingly look upon military service and defense ^ penditures as undesirable burdens. The Soviet ^ class aircraft carriers are just coming on line, ^w we stretch the lives of already aged aircraft carri^er We have some grim years ahead.

Countering Soviet Geopolitical Strategy: Frustra

Soviet ambitions in Eurafrica will require two

traits on the part of the United States: dornm

naval power and the will to use it. Free World sur

val hinges on our ability to dominate both blue ^

and narrow seas in the Eurafrican pan-region, an

thrust armed men onto hostile shores when ^

where required. We cannot hope to counter ^

Soviet threat with a one-ocean Navy or a one-o

capability for forcible entry from the sea. Massing

control forces and amphibious forces from

oceans to counter a single area threat involves u

and risks which are simply unacceptable. A ^c'

ocean naval force will be a vital requirement

coming years.                                                                         j

We must have the depth in dominant j

strength to permit us to maintain freedom of ^v1^

strategic sea lines of communication and comm

worldwide while choking off acts of Communist

gression at their roots. It makes little sense, f°^{r 1}

ample, to commit U. S. forces to stifle Cuban *

gression at multiple points in Africa when a ^

naval and air blockade of Cuba, with threat of ³

nd-

Yet, correcting Cuba’s misadventures or sim ^ threats should not require that strategic naval ployments in the Pacific or Atlantic be withdra for such a course of action would invite other opP tunistic Communist activities into the vacuum- Nations of Africa, South Asia, the Middle ‘ and even Western Europe can choose to resist ^ pressures only if they can be certain of solid ' ^ support. That support must include the ass^Lira^.^ that overwhelming U. S. military power can and * be brought to bear when and where required m fense of an ally. The seas remain the crucial path"* for supporting alliances today and tomorrow.            j

In supporting allies or in planning for uniia ^ actions, we must be especially careful not to be l^u into a false sense of security by apparent advantag^ of air power and air transport capabilities. Vain³ as they are, they cannot provide the mass and vo ^ required for sustained military operations, and ^r

^re8io_n.

Third World states may be pressured to

^ertake actions, such as closure of strategic

*** secure terminals. Captain John Moore, editor

^artes Fighting Ships 1977-78, reminds us in his

^0reWord:

^ Despite the enormous technical advances of the .t fifty years, over ninety-five percent by weight Mankind’s commerce depends on sea-lanes. The nsport of armies requires the essential support snips whilst only a maritime strategy can supply ^ ^e long-term waiting game which could well in- ^^Uence the final outcome of a political crisis.” ^ith” ^^ov'^{ets nava}l power increases concurrently ex              ^^{Xlr e}fforts to consolidate Eurafrica, we may

'_e ^{Ct a} growing propensity on their part to chal- D. S. naval forces within the Eurafrican pan-

^und,

erw_ays which would threaten U. S. interests, hto ^{1 nava}^ forces may seal off both air and sea ap- _a ,^acfies to areas they are exploiting. We will require ^and^^nani'^C’ balanced fl^{eet to} meet those challenges <>p_e ^reta*ⁿ both freedom of movement on the seas and J¹ 1'felines to threatened allies. n_a ^r>ere safe passage through straits, canals, and _rria^°'^{v s}eas may require control of dominating land ^where strategic islands must be seized and q ^en<^^ed, and where advance naval bases are re- ₀f ‘T ^amphibious operations will be a vital element afc> ^{e Sea cont}r°l function. The rimlands of Eurasia ^Und in sites where sea control is dependent upon

the ability to control adjacent landmasses. Amphibi­ous assault is often the key to initiation and success­ful prosecution of land campaigns. The Eurasian rim- land is an excellent example of terrain which in many cases would demand an amphibious assault capability for successful military operations. Except for its link with Africa at Suez, Eurasia is surrounded by sea and ringed with peninsulas, islands, and isolated main­land terrain features which constitute islands in the military sense.

There are 8,000 miles of coastline from the north­ern flanks of Norway around to the Mediterranean, and the western edge of the Pacific consists of a 6,000-mile string of almost closed seas delineated by the East Asian coast and offshore islands. There are some places along those 14,000 miles of coastline where we would not nor could not conduct an am­phibious assault. But within that broad reach of ter­ritory are many suitable landing sites, and no enemy, no matter how powerful, can defend all of them si­multaneously.

While it may be difficult to establish a beachhead at some remote corner of the world, the fact remains that it can be done. Not doing so might well be the only unacceptable option. What are likely locales in the Eurasian rimlands where amphibious forces might be employed over the next few decades? We can pinpoint many of them just by looking at a world map. We will consider not only those sites strategically critical to the Free World but to the Warsaw Pact nations as well.

The flanks of Western Europe contain key choke points which control both air and sea-lanes required by friend and foe alike. Norway and Denmark over­look the Soviet Baltic Fleet egress. Iceland and the Faeroes flank the main thoroughfare used by the Soviet Union’s mighty Murmansk fleet.

To the south, the Azores are strategic stepping- stones to the European theater. Gibraltar, Malta, Crete, and the Suez are guardians of the Mediterra­nean. Greece and Turkey funnel Russia’s Black Sea fleet through the Thrace-Aegean corridor. Farther east, the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Persian Gulf are gateways to vital oil fields, and Diego Garcia serves as our Indian Ocean terminal. To the west, the Marianas are our link with the Western Pacific. The Straits of Malacca, Strait of Sunda, and Molucca Passage are important controlling valves in the maritime flow of oil and other resources. We have commitments to South Korea, Japan, and the Philippines. La Perouse Strait and the Kuriles, if dominated, can bottle up Russia’s Pacific Fleet out of Vladivostok. The isolated Soviet submarine base at Petropavlovsk would be a lucrative target for an am­phibious raid in time of war.

Three factors become evident in this brief ex­amination of strategic locales:

►  They are rather evenly distributed in the Atlantic and the Pacific. Despite the importance of NATO, we have major economic ties in the Pacific.

►  The U.S.S.R. does not face only toward the At­lantic, but has a Pacific flank and a Pacific fleet, both of which must be dealt with.

►  Our three active Marine Corps division/wing teams are so disposed as to provide flexible and swift

response to both major geographic areas.                      .

All these strategic locales are potential cont|^{n 6}      ₃hibi'

gency assignments for Navy/Marine Corps ampr ^ ous forces. Some of them are the same target areas ^ which Soviet naval infantry forces (the equivalent

our Marine Corps) are aimed, and rightly so. FroiA

those locations, the Marine air-ground team can

con­

tribute materially to both sea control and land

fare campaigns through interdiction, by its org*

air elements, of Warsaw Pact shipping and aviation ^ At this point, it is fair to ask why all the coast ^ states of Africa are not included as potential con^tin^ gency sites. Certainly, the southern African Iit^tor‘,^ should not be ignored. Yet, Communist activity Africa or elsewhere should not be permitted to ut our attention too greatly from the Eurasian rimlan

While the world recently mused upon Commu

nis^f

the

activities in Africa, Afghanistan slipped under ^r

irU^sl

Soviet wing scarcely noticed, and a Commu wedge was driven quietly through south Asia hal | ‘ ^

to

the Persian Gulf. The historical Soviet g^0.

al

gaining warm-water ocean ports in the Eurasian

riifl'

land has not been abandoned. We must frustrate

pot

_iiw„ ef­forts to control key choke points which now thro

only their drive for warm-water ports, but their ^

their naval ambitions. Control of the rimlan^

Eurasia remains the key to checking Soviet

ex­

pansionism.                                                                         . I

How effective can three Marine Corps divi^sl wing teams be against the massive might of Wa^f ‘ Pact forces and Soviet client states? The answer

this: extremely effective. Bear in mind that f^evV^

than 45,000 Cubans, referred to by one criti^c

seventh-rate fighters, have more than exceeded S°^v

•                                                                                  • Cot

expectations in exploiting Africa. A Marine

division/wing team offers more than 50

The Amphibious Assault Landing Craft ‘‘Jeff-Bseen undergoing tests last year with the Spiegel Grove (LSD-32), is one of only two air-cushion landing craft we have been able to develop in just over a decade of trying. The Soviets, who got the same idea about the same time, now have a fleet of 40 such craft.

198 0

Need to Build 3.37 Ships Per Year to Retain 70

1984

1998

Need to Build 4.27 Ships Per Year to Retain 70

(Start Building 1980) (Start Building 1984)

_ITlUt|^nes' ^all first-rate fighters—to counter Com- j_n ^,^lst challenges. Remember that the tide of battle 1^ . °^{fea Was} reversed by the landing of marines at r_eC()^Wn *ⁿ 1950. President Syngman Rhee of Korea ⁿ‘^{2ed the} significance of that reversal: “You ^vict ^neS bought hope to my people. You brought us _H^>fy ^when all we had known was defeat.”

_Stro ^lst0ry is replete with examples of how a few

^ri8ht

ⁿ8 men, committed at the right place at the

"'otld

^tlrne, have saved nations or rearranged the

^ap. U. S. Marines stand ready for commit- Pla *ⁿ ^^e^^ense °f U- S. interests at any time and H ^^0Wever' gating marines to the right place in ^Ufas’^{an r}‘^ml^and^{s at} the right time, and support- g_r / ^eni> may become a problem if we don’t up- ^{e 0L}*r naval forces.

0,

^fen_Se ^aval Force Shortcomings: Several top-level de-

sh;. ^stufiies have concluded that about 600 naval "ps

^Paf>abl,

^bes_t(

^w°uld be required to field a two-ocean Navy ^e °f countering the Communist threat. The

5qq °^{Ur cu}rrent shipbuilding rate promises is about a ip naval force, if that, in the 1990s. ^voi ■ j^ttlSe °ff'^c*^al^s> both civilian and military, have fl_e ^X doubt over the ability of the present U. S. S_ea ^{to co}unter Soviet naval power in the Norwegian ^^astern Mediterranean, the extreme flanks of • Such doubts do little to cement our alliances

on the NATO flanks. Moreover, in the latter case, it is precisely the Eastern Mediterranean which is re­quired by the Soviets to bridge land power to Africa and isolate the Middle East.

Our amphibious warfare ship forces, which will play a crucial role in retaining freedom of the seas within Eurafrica, are not only insufficient in strength, but they also face massive block obsoles­cence. In the four-year period from 1999 to 2002, 40 ships will reach retirement age. It would require building at least three amphibious warfare ships each year to retain even our current austere level through the turn of the century; we are building fewer than one ship a year.

In 1980, we will have 64 active amphibious war­fare ships, equally disposed in the Atlantic and Pacific. Since about 15% of our ships will be tied up in overhauls and repairs at any given time, we would have about 54 amphibs available for a contingency. It takes about 50 amphibs to lift a single Marine Corps division-wing team, or marine amphibious force (MAF). Assembling ships from around the globe to form a single MAF lift entails unaffordable,risk and delay.

We need an amphibious warfare ship force capable of lifting at least one and two-thirds MAFs in order to counter Soviet “peacetime” expansionism. Disposed with one MAF lift capability in the Atlantic and

Eurafrican pan-region. Only dominant na can provide the necessary military support to ^u Eurafrican nations an alternative to Communist fluence. A two-ocean navy with a two-ocean^ ^ phibious assault capability will be required to Soviet expansionism and protect U. S. in^ter worldwide in the coming years.

two-thirds of an MAF in the Pacific, the proposed force would provide a credible amphibious assault capability on both Soviet flanks without relying on either the Suez or Panama Canal for transit. Response time to NATO’s littorals with an Atlantic MAF would be cut in half; at the same time, a credible amphibi­ous capability would remain in the Pacific.

In addition to our shortage in amphibious lift shipping, we are plagued with old and slow surface assault craft. More than a decade ago, both the United States and the Soviet Union embarked upon programs to develop air-cushion landing craft. These true amphibians, which can cross the waterline to deliver loads to hard ground inland of the beach, offer tremendous advantages over our obsolete con­ventional types. The Soviets have tested a half dozen prototypes and have a fleet of about 40 air-cushion craft of three sizes supporting their naval infantry. During the same time, we have built only two air- cushion landing craft prototypes, both of which are now undergoing evaluation.

It will take time, money, and men to increase our naval strength significantly. Since naval programs span about ten years from inception to fruition, we

have precious little time to experiment further m ^ riving least-cost solution models for curing our ‘ ^ shortcomings. World events may already have p^ut a shade behind.

Conclusions: There is ample evidence to supP°^r^ speculation that the Soviet Union has embarked ^L1P^ a massive long-term campaign to extend Comm ^ influence over the area described by geopolitit^|C^ as the Eurafrican pan-region. As part of that ^ paign, the Soviets are building a strong naval which will be used to support expansionist activ enforce the Communist alignment of new sate and prevent interference by Free World nations Soviet activities within Eurafrica.        . j

To counter Soviet geopolitical strategy, the U States must maintain naval superiority within

aval Pof

operations within the Eurasian rimland. That will center upon both supporting sea control °P ^ tions in the Eurasian littorals and providing ^a P j_eS tive supportive link with nations whose p^e°P choose not to acquiesce to the Communist y⁰^^e\^ carrying out their role, fleet marine forces °P^er‘j from amphibious warfare ships must be prep^arL perform a broad spectrum of functions, to incm

64

Proceedings / J^une