Book Reviews and Book List

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°ne but inveterate, unreconciled

sUb

"'ay

ln the foreseeable future. He ar-

y‘ⁿg ourselves to fight World

ar II all                      ■      ■                  ,

a^u ^dU over again— twas ever thus

. ^q fon

te_C|

'*i

otever will be—unless we can knize the age-old but very natural

Th

£)_e^C ^^ecret War for the Ocean l ^s- Soviet American Tu ³ ^ ^^or Mastery of the Seas

*norr)Qo c _D

Assnr    “^urns. New York: Rawson

^APptnd^eS, ^P_J^ub‘^,shers' 1978. 334 pp.

^{1 nd}- Ind. $12.95 ($11.66).*

R •

B           By Captain Edward L.

’ l-¹- S. Navy (Retired)

^D .

Jub„_llt     ^eac'^{1 serve}d ^on board three

the -j-,^{,neS ,n} World-War II and commanded ^aruu_n'^T (SSN-586) when she made her Served ‘ ^e'^Wor^ submerged cruise. He also He j_s “1 ^{a nava}l aide to President Eisenhower, and (.₀u^<!W^^W °f B^un Silent, Run Deep «(l j ^{,s t}Be Sea, his new novel which pits in _tp_t ' an<l SSBN against a Soviet force

No

jo_hn^mp^{lners wil1 like the} message e_Ve^ . ^Urns delivers in this book, and its       ^°°k askance at some of

*_t^^aSSa^^es* Burns’ theory, in brief ^Certain reservations), is that ^^ay’s'^ar*^{neS are C}^^{e ca}P‘^tal ships of to- of ^ar,d future navies, and that most Piil ^{6 rerna}*ⁿder of our conventional bj *^tary forces, in all services, should ^othballed as soon as possible. s_trat^{C a}*so says that our forces, both itat ^e^^{1C anc}^ conventional, are qual- (j 5^^ superior to those of the ' and likely to remain that &Ues jL

tHjj. ^nat the diverse elements of our ^st'iQ^ltar^''ⁿ^^ustr‘^a* ^compl^ex uncon- t,_m^{Usiy 1} psychologically, and some­th,.^ ^^ehberately magnify the Soviet a_n(j ‘ . ^ln order to support need for, f_0f(. ^lrnPtovements in, our military ^t0 which they are wed. We are

% ^V

thin_L^Whlch has engulfed our military tit-ct *ⁿ®' ^ concerted effort will be Sqq ^SSary > and should be started as ^as possible, to curb this natural

tendency, get rid of the weight of the past, and take dead aim at our future needs.

War between the U.S.S.R. and the United States, he believes, is far from inevitable. But if it comes, it will cer­tainly involve nuclear weapons from the outset. A protracted war at sea can only follow, not precede, a nuclear ex­change. Any sea confrontation be­tween the two superpowers which in­volved attack upon major warships would instantly be followed by ex­change of tactical nuclear weapons and then, inevitably, by all-out employ­ment of every nuclear weapon in the arsenals of both nations. In such a war, the conventional forces of both, particularly those on the sea, will im­mediately be wiped out by satellite- controlled ballistic missiles. The only ships with even a chance of surviving will be those which are submerged when the attack begins.

Burns brings many statistics to his argument, and some of it is rather plausible. He has evidently given much thought to his subject, and, within the limitations of his grasp, the questions he has raised, if not the conclusions he draws, merit careful and very thorough study.

The trouble is that Burns’ entire theory is fatally flawed, and so, there­fore, is his conclusion; which is not to say that, therefore, he is wrong. I do say that he is unbelievable. I would like to be convinced, but am not.

Burns uses 29 chapters in some 300 pages to expound his theory; but while some chapters, particularly those at the beginning and end of his book, are well stated and carry convic­tion, others sound as if they came from speeches made before a high school audience. Indeed, the book may well be, in part, a compendium of such addresses. We have all met persons who fail to inspire conviction or confidence, just as we have also met those who can easily motivate their audience. Thomas Burns belongs to the former category, at least insofar as can be judged from his written word. His exposition is uneven, spotty, and filled with references he cannot, or at any rate does not, support. He fails to show authority for his arguments (with possibly a single exception, his entire bibliography consists of “trade” books [a wrong use of them]) and has insufficient credentials in his own right to sustain his positions. Some of what he writes has sensational impact, but the immediate question, “can this be believed?” is not answered.

The description of the exploit of the Glornar Explorer is a case in point. Some of the facts cited were never published in any account I have read, and I believe I have read all that are available. From where, then, did Burns draw them? Are we to assume that he must have been directly in­volved, perhaps through his associa­tion with National Research As­sociates or the Cable-Hydrospace Divi­sion of ITT—or was he perhaps a clan­destine CIA person? Burns does not tell.

In sum, John Burns has tried to show the direction in which we should seek our proper, most effective, least wasteful, and most efficient defense posture. Much thought should be de­voted to this subject as he has sug­gested some interesting conclusions. One could only wish that he had caught the numerous errors in his published text which detract from its validity. (Beginning a chapter with a lengthy quotation from “Senator” Les Aspin, who is in fact a Member of the House, is a large embarrassment.) And one must regret that John Burns did not devote more time to establish­ing his credentials. For a book of this type, such qualification is essential.

particularly by submarines, ^1S

ofJ'^c'

Deadly Magic

Edward Van Der Rhoer. New York: Scribner’s, 1978. 217 pp. Illus. Ind.

$9.95 ($8.96).*

Double Edged Secrets

W. J. Holmes. Annapolis, MD.: Naval Institute Press, 1979. 265 pp. Illus.

Maps. Ind. $11.95 ($9.55).*

Reviewed by Rear Admiral Edwin T. Layton, U. S. Navy (Retired)

A 1924 graduate of the Naval Academy, Admiral Layton was assigned to 0P-20-GZ, Translation/Code Group Recovery, in 1936 and served as intelligence officer on Admiral Nimitz's staff during World War 11. After the war. he was designated Deputy for Intelligence, Joint Staff, JCS, and subsequently became Director of Intelligence, Joint Staff. CinCPac and Director of the Naval Intelligence School.

Both Deadly Magic and Double Edged Secrets are personal narratives of the role of communications intelligence (COMINT) in our victory in the Pacific. Unfortunately, both were written be­fore any U. S. World War II COMINT records were released to the National Archives, so the authors had to rely on their personal recollections for details. Although still precluded from reveal­ing techniques or methodology of breaking codes, ciphers, etc., they give exciting insight into COMINT op­erations in the Pacific. Their principal theme is that tremendous feat of breaking the Japanese naval code and its encipherment—a five-digit-mixed code, widely used for plans and operations—thereby enabling our high command to know, in advance (with some exceptions), what our ad­versary was up to.

Van Der Rhoer, a Japanese linguist, worked in GT (the Translation and Code Group Recovery Section of OP- 20-Z), the headquarters of the Navy’s secret COMINT organization in Wash­ington, D.C. He tells a fascinating story of his work there, making thoughtful analogies to mental pro­cesses and code breaking/code group recovery, giving illuminating sidelights on Japanese history and psy­chology and interesting observati on the war in the Pacific as ^vieW from faraway Washington, D.C- , W. J. (“Jasper”) Holmes seN with the OP-20-G field unit at ^ Harbor and also as the steady h® on-the-helm of JICPOA (the J°*ⁿ^ j telligence Center, Pacific Ocean where strategic intelligence was P ^ duced for all arms of ^^<^^rn^_ef. Nimitz’s joint command. His ^c age of COMINT production and

ough and colorful; his coverage ¹ POA in action is an intelligent , cer’s “how to” handbook. Double Secrets tells (for the first time) o ^ assignment of Mobile COMINT ‘ to commanders of fleets and ¹¹¹ ^ naval task forces to provide on spot COMINT support.        ,j

Of the two, I found Double ^ Secrets to be the more comprehen ^ accurate, and authentic regaf COMINT matters. My recollect¹ °ⁿ sharply at odds with Deadly b ^ over several COMINT aspects of ⁿ®

Translated by Rear Admiral E. T. Layton, U. S. Navy (Retired)

America Deciphered Our Code

EDITOR’S NOTE: Over the past 12 years, the War History Room of the Japan Defense Agency has published about a hundred volumes covering the various Japanese Army, Navy, and Air (naval and army) actions in the Pacific War.

Volume 43 of that “War History Series’’ is entitled “The Battle of Midway.” Chapter 14, “Examination of the Failure of Our Operations. ” in a section entitled “3 ■ America Deciphered ('broke') our Code,” describes the Japanese Naval Code D. and related matters. Pages 591-592 are presented here. Dates and time are Tokyo Standard Time Zone (-9), Comments by the translator are enclosed in double parentheses ((. . .)).

Our Navy used many different codes/ciphers but an ex­amination of their message texts indicates that the system most certainly broken was in all probability the Navy Code "D.” Of all our regular codes, it was the one used principally for strategic matters. It was a five-digit mixed code made up in two volumes, one for sending and one for receiving, and was also provided with a separate table of five-digit random additives which, when applied in ac­cordance with special rules for use with Code “D,” com­pletely altered the original code-test. Navy Code “D” was first placed in effect on 1 December 1940; Random Addi­tive Table # 8 was put into use just before the start of the

war, 4 December 1941.                                                         , _c.

Three other separate tables were also in use in con| tion with Code “D (1) a Table of Grid Positions (ⁱⁿ latitude and longitude), (2) a Table of Geographic D^eS ignators, and (3) a Table for Enciphering Dates (of events). The first of these used three Kana ((a syllabi representing the 50 basic sounds in the Japanese lang^u ^ essentially the vowels A, I, U, E, and O alone or in c°ⁿ bination following the consonants K, S, T, N, M, ^ j and W)) plus two numerals. The initial Kana design®^ ^ the selected 15 degree by 15 degree square (of the ear latitude’and longitude, while the second and third Kd (using the 50 Kana) indicated the selected latitude an longitude within the above square, to the nearest 20 m utes; the two numerals further refined the designated P‘ tion in the above 20-minute square to the nearest ^c'-^v°.^ minutes of latitude and longitude ((less than a two-⁰¹ square in the middle of the ocean)).                                                           . J

The second table, for geographic designators, consi ^ of two or three Roman letters, which were used to *^nd a specific place, geographically; the first letter repress ing a common geographic entity (for example “A ^reP sented “America,” “P” stood for Japan’s Mandated I^s^^anj ((which they called their ‘South Sea Islands’)); the seco^ letter stood for a specific geographic place name; and

10

which

^radio.

Was delivered by hand, not by

Both ;

c°rnplete order of battle” (accord- 2 to - ^detail_s

I ^{tC es}' ^^or example, according to the _a i,    we intercepted" (emphasis

_te ,⁶ ^ ^an Imperial General Headquar- y_a ^{S 0r}^^er of 5 May 1942 to Admiral ^amamoto instructing him to occupy In                ^an<^ ^t^*^e '^^estern Aleutians.

Ie_a ^ISa8^reement, Holmes says that we _wa^fnf ^a^^out Attu, Kiska, and Mid- off ■ ^ater’ ^^rom other messages. The J^aP^anese War History shows wn- i ^orcIer as a written directive, ' authors err in crediting the in- _0r;^°n of a Yamamoto operations ^er 20 May 1942 with “detailing & to Holmes), “spelling out those

Car^.            • eleven battleships, five

ers> • • •’’ (according to Van Der ^°^{r t}^^le' ^assauIt ^on Midway, liv *^{Ctl accorc}ling to Holmes, was de- ^ered to Admiral Nimitz in person o May. As of 1 June, Holmes y ^es> “We did not know that ba ^J^3111010 • • • with an armada of nships, cruisers . . . was trailing

... a few hundred miles behind [their carrier force].” Had there been such a 20 May op-order with the complete order of battle, Admiral Nimitz would have immediately seen the vast discrepancy between “eleven battleships” and his current estimate of two to four battleships; with such information he would have not only changed his estimate of enemy forces bound for Midway in his 27 May op­erations order for Midway but would have known that Yamamoto was also en route with that large battleship force. I believe the origin of the mythical 20 May op-order is in Wal­ter Lord’s Incredible Victory (Harper and Row, 1967) and based on some­one’s confused memory.

Just before the Battle of Midway on 4 June 1942, the Japanese changed their five-digit code. Van Der Rhoer tells of decoding and translating inter­cepted messages during that battle “using IBM runs with earlier messages in the same code.” One of these mes­sages was from Yamamoto and ordered his forces “to pursue the retreating enemy and to occupy Midway.” This (and other) messages were also inter­cepted at Pearl Harbor but could not be read because they were in the new five-digit code. How could Van Der Rhoer read it using “IBM runs” of a superseded code? This skepticism applies to his reading messages from the carriers Akagi, Kaga. Soryu, and Hiryu which reported being attacked by dive bombers and being afire, as well as his reading distress messages from the heavy cruisers Mogami and Mikuma. None of these translations were sent from Washington to the Pearl Harbor Unit or to CinC Pacific Fleet, the officer most immediately concerned. Admiral Nimitz first learned of them months later, when an officer’s notebook containing many Midway messages was captured on Guadalcanal, forwarded to Pearl Har­bor, and translated.

Nonetheless, Deadly Magic is so engrossing it is difficult to lay aside. Its coverage of the ambush and death

pla ^{WaS 3 t}^^lr^ I^etter> that place was near the geographic ^Ce designated by the second letter (for example “PS”

° for Saipan, “PST” represented Tinian), he third table was a different type, three-Kana table

"’^as used for enciphering the date of an event or ac- tat

b, c . . . etc)). Both these latter tables were

tb

under

hsi_n

I Os

and

r °ⁿ’ this table was arranged in Kana sequence ((analogous ⁰ ou_r

ed, without change, from the beginning of the war. ^tter the plain text of a message was written out, all tlT ^^3tes’ K^r‘d locations, and geographic place names were ^ett enciphered by using their respective tables, and this je^ 'fled text of the message was then encoded into a . ^es of five-digit code groups taken from the transmis- ru] ^v°Iume of Code “D.” Now, following the special tV ^°^{r t}^^{C USe r}^^e ^^and°^m Additive Table with Code c ’ ^another series of five-digit code groups were selected ^Qhl the Random Additive Table and placed in sequence

each corresponding five-digit code group, and,

8 false addition-

without carrying forward

'the final code text was arrived at, e.g.

((^# According to Double Edged Secrets, all code groups and all random addi­tives were specifically divisible by three, so all message code groups were also [to assist in clearing garbles]. Note the Japanese apparently were not aware of this requirement.))

Since the Random Additive Table consisted of 500 pages, each containing 100 random five-digit groups, the (false) addition of these additives to the code groups com­pletely altered the original/modified code text of the orig­inal text, making it extremely complicated and very dif­ficult to “break.” It is said that our experts in crypt­analysis, and others connected with code and cipher mat­ters, were unable to “break” it.

The Japanese Navy issued orders to replace Code Book D with Code Book "D-1” and to replace Random Addi­tive Tables #7 and #8 with new Table #9 on 1 May 1942, although it is said that this had been originally planned for 1 April. According to the postwar statement of the officer in charge of code changes, this change in code could not be carried out because of the delays in dis­tribution of the new code books, and that this change was made just before the sortie of the fleet for the Midway operation ((27 May 1942—Japanese “Navy Day”—the anniversary of Admiral Togo’s victory in the Battle of Tsushima Straits, and the date the Japanese Carrier Strik­ing Force sortied from the Inland Sea for Midway)). . . .

Of the two books, A Matter of ^lS^ is by far the more professionally d°ⁿ' The story flows well, jargon is ^at ^ minimum, and authenticating often macabre details lend the boo' aura of accuracy, which turns out be largely undeserved. The display an appalling ignorance and intelligence operations and p^r0 dures. And, following in the f°^otst^_r of such writers as Phillip Agee, V>^ct

Marks, Seym°“ that

John

of Admiral Yamamoto is dramatic while the assessment is fitting—“Just as Gen. Stonewall Jackson’s death at Chancellorsville was fatal to the Con­federate cause in the American Civil War, Admiral Yamamoto’s death was fatal to Japan’s cause in World War II.” On balance, however, I fear Deadly Magic will grossly mislead hon­est historians and will provide the ref­erence for those writers whose aim is to distort the facts of history.

Double Edged Secrets sets a new standard of excellence for books on in­telligence; it should be required read­ing in all war colleges, staff colleges, intelligence schools, and for all those involved in the military decision­making process. As Holmes says, “In­telligence, like money, may be secure when it is unused and locked up in a safe. It yields no dividends until it is invested.” •For details on ordering books and special prices see the Book Order Service note in Books of Interest to the Professional.

A Matter of Risk

Roy Varner and Wayne Collier. New York: Random House, 1978. 258 pp. Illus. $10.00 ($9.00).*

The Jennifer Project

Clyde W. Burleson. Englewood Cliffs,

NJ: Prentice Hall, 1977. 179 pp. Illus. Maps. Ind. $8.95 ($8.06).*

Reviewed by Commander Robert E. Bublitz, U. S. Navy (Retired)

Commander Bublitz’ 15 years in intelligence included duty in such places as Manila, Baghdad, and Bavaria. During duty in Washington, he was an ONI collection desk officer and, later, head of the naval attache system. An intelligence specialist and graduate of the Naval Intelligence PG School, he retired from active duty in 1968 and is now Vice President of the Chase Manhattan Bank.

In comparing the information pub­licly available on “Jennifer,” there lies the challenge of answering the ques­tion: Just how much of the Soviet “Golf”-class submarine did the CIA succeed in raising?

authors

of naval

Marchetti,

Hersh, etc., who seem to believe ^ anything may be accepted at face ^v if it supports the theory that the C an uncontrolled, uncontrollable* ^ agency spending its time and mo conspiring against the virtuous de of the American people, Varner Collier devote many pages to ^SUPP^₍ the preconceived notions of the left. They find deep, murky cance in the name of the research ^s Mizar, which located the Soviet s Mizar is a word of Arabic meaning veiled or hidden; how p^ef ^ for a secret research ship, they say-

Breaking our code, even partially, undoubtedly in­creased the reliability of America’s strategic estimates and gave them some definitive intelligence on our concepts of operations and furnished them with a substantial outline of our plans for operations in the future. There is no doubt that from early May onward a great many of our radio messages dealt with operational matters. As there is very little of that material now available, it is not possible to speculate as to which of those messages were broken, but subordinate forces undoubtedly communicated their in­tended movements to other forces concerned, based on the overall plan. There is no doubt that there were many radio messages concerning the “Ml" ((Midway)) operation during the early days of May, but we have no reference material containing the geographic designators “AF" ((Midway)), “AO” ((Aleutians)) or “AOB” ((Kiska)); undoubtedly, there were radio messages concerning future reconnaissance op­erations by the ((auxiliary seaplane carrier/tender)). Kimikawa Maru and Submarine Squadron 1 that contained the geographic designators “AO” and “AOB.” We have no radio files to show how the enemy confirmed “AF” to be Midway, but the diary of Commander Sanagi of the Naval General Staff contains the entry “MIDWAY IS SHORT OF FRESH WATER,” and a radio message to that effect was indeed transmitted. ((This is apparently the authors ^afl swers to David Kahn’s [The Code Breakers] and Walter Lord’s [Incredible Victory] assertions of how U. S. i^nte gence learned in advance, that the Japanese objectives were Midway and Kiska.))

4. Our Intelligence Estimates ((page 593))

Our navy was not able to break the American mili^taI7 code(s); our intelligence appreciations and strategic esti mates were primarily based on communications intell*' gence which was derived from enemy traffic analysis. ^ca sign identification, direction-finder bearings, and the *ⁿ terception of plain language transmissions ((particularly ^ those of aviators when airborne)). As an example, we estimate when a strong American force sortied from P° or was operating, because their air patrols in that area b^e came intensified and expanded and many patrol planes messages then came up on the air; we could also ascer ‘ ^ the general area of the enemy’s intended attack because their custom of stationing submarines in that general are* in advance of the planned attack.

However, it is said that since the beginning of the '^v‘^lf only a few of our many intelligence estimates based on communications intelligence really "hit the mark," and navy’s confidence in them was, therefore, relatively l°'^v’

most all

AKs, AKAs, and AFs, was

cost Tk,.            .

f_ear *^ney tremble with melodramatic the ^a '°-^{Ut r}^^e P^oss‘t>ility that one of

Plod,

fa,

ooriously constructs, with more wishes than hard facts, the hu ^)ttles'^s that Project Jennifer was a ^sub ^Success> recovering the whole Ht'k^ar'^{ne an<}^ i^earn*ⁿ8 ^a l°t from her. Par ^fea^^s h>s boat in three pieces, ap- _wh^ent,y because he believes that is _Sj any well-mannered submarine y ^Irig three miles ought to do, and b_e^rtler and Collier keep theirs intact ^ it seems to make a better j ^rf- Varner and Collier accept with on_e^{Crity the} CIA statement that only ^Section of the sub was recovered, nothing much in that—a nuclear

h

_Co ^rnory serves me well, the Mizar is a ^Verted cargo ship, which like al-

Bi^rv ^a^^{ter a star}- T° get from the _evh 'PP^er (where Mizar is located) to ⁿce of convoluted minds assign- ;_n^^narnes- having hidden significance 1 ^er languages, to ships would be

cans ^{WSre not so man}y Ameri- so well conditioned to believe ^SUch drivel.

poVarner and Collier take the highest nifg^S|! ,!^e 8^uesses of the cost of “Jen- abl ^ass*8^{n t0} chat the lowest avail- _CQr^ statenient of the CIA’s “take,” and tha ^{t0 t}^*^e P^red*^ctakl^e conclusion ^at che operation wasn’t worth the

Suh s nuclear weapons might ex- 'nfo^’ ^^esP'^te the plethora of public ^ tniation which indicates that sub- °^ln8 unprotected electrical wiring _n ^e nailes deep in the ocean would ^te the ability to detonate nuclear

weapons.

y

et> despite many more errors of de ’.^ttrrn'nology, and common sense, argf^{lte C}^^e P°htical bias throughout, of f^{VCn des}P'^te the absolute inanity ^°ok ^{Clr conc}^^us'^ons’ I enjoyed the j_s . ' tecommend it to anyone who f_a '^nterested in salvage, intelligence, Stic technology, or just plain ad-

enture.

j_s ^Cl^e Burleson’s The Jennifer Project ho |^^Un|^0r G-man, amateurish kind of and ^W‘^{th l0tS} °^f wide-eyed innocence j_Srr) ^{a st}rong dose of Jack Armstrong- ₀ ' ^he book is short on facts, long Puffery, and weak on analysis. ^sub ^Ur^^{eson s}'ⁿks his “Golf”-class Q^l^tine tail first, while Varner and , ^ler send theirs down bow first. He ^also labor.Y fiood

torpedo or two, a so-called code book (none of the authors seem to have any concept of the difference between codes and ciphers), and a lot of rotting fragments of the submarine. Burleson sends the lifting device, a claw-like gadget on the end of 16,000 feet of steel pipe, on three trips to the bot­tom; Varner and Collier send their de­vice down only once, grab the whole sub and then drop two-thirds of her half way up. Sometimes it’s hard to believe both books are on the same project.

The two books, however, do have some common ground. The obscure legality of salvaging another nation’s warship* is given a lot of attention, with Burleson citing non-pertinent precedents (the Russian salvage of de­feated Nazi Germany’s U-boats in the Baltic), and Varner and Collier worry­ing that the Russians might be beastly about the whole thing. They agree, too, on Jennifer’s salvage technology, although they disagree on how the Hughes Glomar Explorer maintained her ocean station. They do agree on the magnificence of the technological achievement. And they agree that Howard Hughes’ motives in undertak­ing the project were obscure and com­plex, Varner and Collier finding them therefore sinister.

Well, back to the unanswered ques­tion: How much submarine did the CIA get? Some 15 or 20 years ago, when I was active in the intelligence business, a phenomenon became ap­parent to me. If you hypothesize a set of circumstances in an intelligence situation, and in the course of analyz­ing the hypothesis, you encounter a closed circle of reasoning, e.g., if you ask a man who appears to be involved a yes/no question, and you can be sure logically what his answer will always be, but you can’t be sure whether he is telling the truth, you must assume that he is part of the situation. The following exchange will help clarify: Question: “Are you involved?”

Answer: “No.” *See "The Recovered Sunken Warship: Raising a Legal Question,” R. D. Wiegley, pp. 26-32, January 1979; J. Drahos, p. 22, March 1979; A. Straub, pp. 28-29, April 1979 Proceedings.

Rationale (a): He is not involved, and telling the truth.

Rationale (b): He is involved, but is ly­ing.

Conclusion: As long as we can project the answer to the question, we must assume he is involved.

Result: We don’t have to ask the ques­tion, because, unfortunately, the an­swer will not help us determine the fact; it will only tell us what we al­ready know.

What does this have to do with the degree of success of Project Jennifer? Everything is the answer, and maybe nothing is the answer, too. As to con­volution, nobody ever said intelligence was simple. As to the “closed circle of reasoning” and its application to what these books tell us of Jennifer, let us assume that Herb Hetu, Admiral Turner’s public information officer, is waiting to answer one question for us. He needs only to give us a yes or no answer. What question shall we ask?

Varner and Collier say CIA got one piece of the sub. Burleson says the Agency got it all. All right, they either got part or all because CIA said they got at least part. If we ask Herb, “Did you get it all?”, he’ll say “No” because CIA said before, they got part. If we ask him, “Did you get part?”, he’ll say "Yes” because that’s what they said before. But in either case, we don’t know whether he’s telling the truth, and so, since we can predict the answers to both questions, why ask? In other words, the books tell us that the Agency recovered at least part of the sub. Whether “at least part” could mean “substantially all” is something that all the comparative analysis in the world of these two books won’t tell us.

I wonder if the question for Herb should be, “Herb, did CIA have any­thing to do with writing either of these books?” I’m certain I know what his answer would be, but I just wouldn’t know whether he is telling the truth. How about a game called “two questions,” Herb? And the sec­ond question will always be,’ “Did you just tell the truth?” But, then, I’m sure the answer to the second question would always be “Yes.’’ I just wouldn’t know whether he was telling the truth or not. . . .

“Double-Edged Secrets sets a new stand­ard of excellence for non-fiction books on intelligence; it should be required reading- by all those involved in the military deci-

0 ly-A                                                         -r\-nr\r>CSCSCS ” Admiral Edwin Layton, USN (Ret.) formerly Pacific Flee¹

p>li II I ~ I I lflir\ I I 1                        UL/CDOi Intelligence Officer to Admiral Chester W. Nimitz

DOUBLE-EDGED SECRETS By Captain W.J. Holmes, USN (Ret.)

Double-Edged Secrets is the first inside account of the gathering and use of intelligence at Pearl Harbor between 1941 and 1945. It is a story that few men living today could tell in the first person, for it covers incidents of the Pacific War that could not be recorded in those hectic days. Fewer still could write of them as brilliantly as has Captain Holmes.

Holmes was assigned to the Combat Center at CinCPac headquar­ters in 1941. In time, he earned his spurs and eventually became deputy officer-in-charge of the Joint Intelligence Center, Pacific- Ocean Area, JICPOA. Concurrently, there develops the story of a multiplicity of intelligence sources: photo interpretation; intelli­gence teams for major naval units; terrain models of Japanese held islands; captured documents; prisoner interrogation; indeed, the myriad ways in which our intelligence was gathered.

This story of how the commander in chief in the Pacific used the ever-increasing flow of intelligence is not complete without the details Holmes provides of the herculean efforts put forth by that selfless group of men in a crowded basement in Pearl Harbor. It is all here in this skillfully written book, and it is told with a touch of compassion and humor.

August /9⁷9. 240pages. 25 Illustrations. 2 maps list price: SI l.⁽J5 Member’s price: $9.55 Add SI.00 to each order for postage and handling. (Please use book order form in Hooks of Interest to the Professional section.)

A Naval Institute Press Book

DOUBLE-EDGED SECRETS

by Captain W.J. Holmes, USN (Ret.)

_tc«;

When the first bombs fell on Pearl Harbor 1 was i ^i^e

miles away at home in bed, the best place for a officer to be^a^Sunday momin^Sa

.    _ l_______ „ J— kn/1                    knc h nl ar«o f OT* A                              j4

Compiled by Professor Jack Sweetman, Associate Editor

^NavAL affairs

⁰¹¹ ral Bradley A. Fiske and the mer'can Navy' ^paol₀ p _r .

p_re ‘ '“°*^etta. Lawrence, KS.: The Regents a?! ^Kansas. 1979. 306 pp. Bib. Ind.

^{25 00} d22.50).

In

.c^.^vey of “Notable Naval Books of bon of ^We forward to the publica-

kno ^several important naval biographies p_ea'^{Vn tu} Be under way. The first to ap- _Wr- ’ ^admirably researched and crisply ^stif⁰               ®^raaky Fiske (1854-1942),

_Cru ^les °ur expectations. Inventor, ^ ^er’ organizer, and executive, Fiske _Sj_0n^tr,^u'^y’ ^t0 quote the title of its conclu- _Sn_ ’ ^A Versatile Naval Officer.” Profes­S ^oletta

P^artment at the U. S. Naval Academy.

federate envoys Mason and Slidell from the British mail steamer Trent in 1861, he survived two courts-martial on his way to flag rank. His charming and leisurely au­tobiography has remained unpublished until now.

|3I The Bluejacket’s Manual: United States Navy, 1902

Lt. Ridley McLean, USN. Annapolis, MD.: Naval Institute Press, 1978. 304 pp. IIlus. $14.95 ($11.95).

The first edition of The Bluejacket’s Manual appears in a faithfully executed facsimile edition. Historians and buffs will find it interesting as a reflection of enlisted life at

member of the History

^llUs' Mi

The

^sPan,

^aP- Ind. $13.50 ($12.15).

^ Uaval career of Charles Wilkes ^ rhe better part of the 19th cen

Exploring Expedition of 1838-1842,

U

"'hich

J' Best known as the leader of the

ascertained that Anarctica is indeed

°^ntinent, and for the seizure of the Con-

BOok

All

ORDER SERVICE

i

_0er P^r*ces enclosed by parentheses are mem- °th ^^r,Ces' Members may order most books of _a jQ^I^bUshers through the Naval Institute at ^lhis ° ^*^SCOunt I‘^st P^r*ce. (Prices quoted in ^refl ^C°*^{Urnn are} subject to change and will be ^ected j_{n Qur} bjjjj_ngj The postage and han­k I®* for each such special order book of a uniterl c

for ^btates publisher will be $1.00; the fee $1 ^a kook from a foreign publisher will be j_s ' ^ben air mail or other special handling Ml] ^^UeSte<^’ ^actual postage and handling cost - ^be billed to the member. Books marked Naval Institute Press Books. Books are Naval Institute Book Selections, use the order blank in this section.

the turn of the century as well as an invita­tion to naval nostalgia.

Boarding Party: The Last Action of the Calcutta Light Horse

James Leasor. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1979. 204 pp. IIlus. Map. Ind. $8.95 ($8.06).

Late in 1942, British intelligence learned that a German merchant ship interned at Portuguese Goa was secretly transmitting reports of British shipping movements to U-boats in the Indian Ocean. How to si­lence these transmissions without overtly violating Portuguese neutrality was the problem. Its solution was rather improba­bly entrusted to 18 members of the Cal­cutta Light Horse, a volunteer cavalry reg­iment. The story of their daring and suc­cessful raid is told here for the first time.

The Emergence of the Modern Capital Ship

Stanley Sandler. Newark, DE.: University of Delaware Press, 1979. .335 pp. IIlus. Append. Bib. Ind. $19.50 ($17.55).

An impressively researched and well-

written study traces the advance of ironclad naval technology from 1863 to 1870, by which date the outline of the modern battleship was clearly discernible.

La Marine Sovietique (The Soviet Navy)

Claude Huan and Jurgen Rohwer. Paris: la documentation franyaise, 1978. 157 pp. Fr. 18 (Approx. $4.50) paper.

The prodigious expansion of Soyiet naval power is examined and analyzed by two distinguished European naval commen­tators. The Soviet merchant marine, the fishing fleet, and oceanographic activities are included.

MARITIME AFFAIRS The Brendan Voyage

Tim Severin. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1978. 292 pp. IIlus. Maps. Append. $15.00 ($1.3.50).

Medieval chronicles consistently credit St. Brendan and his crew of Irish missionary sailor-monks with the discovery of a great land to the west—the New World—in the 6th century. Perhaps the greatest im­probability in these accounts, by modern standards, is that he is said to have made his voyage in a coracle—a boat made of cow hides stretched over a flexible wooden frame. Intrigued, the author of this beauti­fully illustrated book decided to determine whether a leather boat, built with medieval materials and techniques, could endure the rigors of a North Atlantic crossing.

For Those Still at Sea: The Defection of a Lithuanian Sailor

Simas Kudirka and Larry Eichel. New York:

The Dial Press, 1978. 226 pp. IIlus. $7.95 ($7.16).

On 23 November 1970, Lithuanian sea­man Simas Kudirka leaped from the Soviet fishing ship Sovetskaya Litva to the deck of the U. S. Coast Guard cutter Vigilant (WMEC-617)—and was immediately re­turned to the Soviets. This action precipi­tated a political and diplomatic incident of major proportions. After four years’ im­prisonment in the U.S.S.R., he was finally allowed to emigrate to the United States. His gripping account of the ordeal, com­plemented by the research of an American

journalist, is dedicated to “those still at sea” in political prison camps.

Marine Policy for America: The United States at Sea

Gerard J. Mangone. Lexington, MA.:

Lexington Books, 1977. 370 pp. Ind. $25.00.

American maritime policy from the 18th century to the present is reviewed in a sur­vey designed to serve both the general reader and the specialist. Topics covered include national security interests, the merchant marine, fisheries, undersea re­sources, and marine pollution. The author is Professor of International Law and Or­ganization and Director of the Center for the Study of Marine Policy at the Univer­sity of Delaware.

MILITARY AFFAIRS

Crisis Resolution: Presidential Decision Making in the Mayaguez and Korean Confrontations

Col. Richard G. Head, USAF, Col. Frisco W. Short, USA (Ret.), and Lt. Col. Robert C. McFarlane, USMC. Boulder, CO.: Westview Press, 1978. 323 pp. Ulus. Maps. Append.

Bib. Ind. $20.00 ($18.00).

The mechanics of presidential decision­making are examined by case studies of two recent crises: the Mayaguez incident of May 1975, and the Korean tree crisis of August 1976, when two U. S. Army offi­cers were murdered by North Korean sol­diers while supervising the pruning of a giant poplar in the Joint Security Area of the Korean Demilitarized Zone. The study is published in cooperation with the Na­tional Defense University. Lt. Col. McFar­lane is the author of “The Politics of Par­ity” (February 1979 Proceedings).

Medieval Warfare Dr. H.W. Koch, Ian Hogg, and P.L. Gwynn-Jones. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1978. 256 pp. IIlus. Maps. Ind. $25.00 ($22.50).

The characteristics and evolution of Medieval Warfare are traced in a lavishly illustrated work which also includes a sub­stantial and scholarly text.

Tactical Nuclear Weapons: European Perspectives

Frank Barnaby, Editor. New York: Crane, Russak & Co., 1978. 371 pp. Bib. Ind. $24.95 ($22.46).

In October 1976, the Stockholm In­ternational Peace Research Institute con­vened a panel of 12 experts—five from NATO lands, four from Warsaw Pact countries, and three from neutral nations—to consider the subject of tactical nuclear warfare. This volume is the out­growth of those proceedings.

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

France’s Vietnam Policy: A Study in French-American Relations

Marianna P. Sullivan. Westport, CT.: Greenwood Press, 1978. 165 pp. Bib. Ind. $15.95 ($14.36).

French attitudes and aims in regard to the American involvement in Southeast Asia, 1963-1973, are assessed in a scholarly

monograph. The author, an associate^P^ fessor of political science at Trenton • College, concludes that the Franco-Am ^ can discord over Vietnam was an m factor in the relationship between a ^eC ^ ing middle power and an ascending ^SUP power.

REPRINTS

Escort Commander: The Story of Captain John Frederic Walker, CB. DSO and Three Bars, RN

Terence Robertson. New York: Bantam B° 1979. 234 pp. IIlus. Maps. $2.25 (pap^cr)’

Next to the Victoria Cross, the D‘^5t guished Service Order, establish ^ 1886, is the highest gallantry award ac ^ sible to officers of the British armed ^or^ The subject of this biography, ^0T,^f published under the title Walker • _f was the second naval officer to win ^ times—all for his exploits as an ^e commander in the Battle of the At a The Admiralty summarized his ac ^ ments by the statement that he did m to free the Atlantic of the U-boat men than any other single officer.”

Queen of the Flat-tops: The U. S-S- Lexington and the Coral Sea Battle

Stanley Johnston. New York: Bantam Boo” 1979. 234 pp. IIlus. Maps. $2.25 <paP^er)'

Ofjg 0*

The story of the Lexington (CV-2) '             ^

the first two American warships but carrier—and the battle of the Coral told in a fast-paced narrative fi^fSt P fished in 1942. The author, a ne'^vsrT1 was on board her during the action-

Y-7 9

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