Andrew Irwin McKee: Naval Constructor

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Jn naming its latest submarine tender, the AS-41, after the late Rear Admiral Andrew Irwin McKee (1896-1976), the Navy has honored an officer whose contributions to the development and construction of the submarine force have hitherto been little appreciated outside a small circle of submarine design specialists. McKee was one of the leading spirits in the select and largely silent fraternity of men who brought the Navy’s undersea arm to the peak of material effectiveness reached during World War II and carried it forward to the superb nuclear-powered force of today. McKee’s talents as an all-around naval constructor were by no means limited to submarines, although that is where his greatest achievements were made. And behind the unassuming fafade of this officer, described by his brother as “the retiring sort,” was a man who pursued a naval career and reared a family through a period spanning two World Wars and a great depression—a period of profound change for the United States and its Navy.

Andrew Irwin McKee was born on 17 February 1896 in the small town of Lawrenceburg, Kentucky, in the bluegrass country about 25 miles west of Lexington. His father, Major Lewis Witherspoon McKee, was a successful lawyer, district attorney, and state senator who obtained his military title by virtue of service in the Kentucky National Guard, particularly during some of the violent feuds which rent that state in the years following the Civil War. Andrew McKee’s mother, Eliza Schenck, came from a well-educated and cultured family from Dayton, Ohio. James Findlay Schenck, Mrs. McKee’s grandfather, served under Commodore Robert F. Stockton in the Pacific Squadron and personally raised the U. S. flag during the occupation of California, at Monterey in 1846. He fought for the Union during the Civil War and ultimately reached the rank of admiral. The destroyer Schenck (DD-159) was named for him.

Irwin McKee (as Andrew was known to members of his family) was the oldest of three sons who survived infancy, as did three daughters. Three other children died shortly after birth. Mrs. McKee felt a strong ambition to see her sons attend thy U. S. Naval Academy. (Irwin’s brother Logan followed him into the Navy and also became a rear admiral, while his other brother, Robert, served in the Army during World War II.) In the fall of 1913, young McKee entered the Naval Academy, where he became known as Andy to his naval friends and did well in his studies. He

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marine construction and design facility. There busied himself as a ship superintendent on the su ^ marines under construction and repair, among ^w^^i1Cj₁ were three new fleet submarines of the V class, rnu bigger and more powerful than any of their predeces

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sors. There was much to learn, and McKee ma¹ good use of his opportunities to study practice

every type of U. S

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brought to this country after World War I. Whil^e ‘^l Portsmouth, his family grew with the birth

stood tops in navigation and was awarded a gold sex­tant for his achievement. On the athletic field he set a pole vaulting record and won his letter in track. With the outbreak of World War I, his course was accelerated and he graduated sixth in his class in March 1917. As a newly commissioned ensign he was ordered to the armored cruiser Huntington (ACR- 5), which had been recently outfitted with a catapult and four seaplanes for experimental operations at Pensacola. The ship also carried an observation bal­loon in which a lookout was sent aloft to extend the horizon of visibility. The ferment produced by these experiments must have been particularly stimulating to young Ensign McKee, whose ambition was to rise to command as a line officer in emulation of his fa­mous forebear.

In August, the aircraft experiments were termi­nated, and the Huntington was ordered to New York to escort a convoy of six troopships to Europe. Shortly after leaving New York, McKee was climb­ing a ladder up the mast when he lost his footing and plunged to the deck 40 feet below, severely injuring his legs. For many months his ability ever to walk again was in doubt. During this period of anxious waiting, his mother fell victim to the flu epidemic that swept the country, but before she died she was given the good news that Irwin would walk again. And walk he did, by virtue of grim determination and perseverance, with assistance from the Navy sur­geons. Unfortunately, however, the doctors could not certify him for return to sea duty. The alternative for an officer of McKee's talents and ambitions was the Construction Corps, a career path customarily re­served for only a few of the brightest members of each Naval Academy class.¹ Pending his admission to the next class at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, he spent most of the time in hospitals, on convalescent leave, and assigned to the Naval

Academy as an instructor in navigation and physic- in the fall of 1918 he reported to MIT.

While the country was at war, groups of younf women known as Liberty Belles organized dances an parties for the servicemen stationed nearby. Amon? the members of the group at Boston was Katherine Brown. At a dance in the Ho^te Buckminster she was introduced by the chaperone the young officer, who was able to dance despite hi⁵ lame ankles. When he entered Chelsea Naval Hosp¹ tal early in 1919 for further operations, she vis‘^te him with flowers, fruit, and conversation. The ^tN'⁰ corresponded while he was back in Kentucky f°^{r c} summer, and when he returned to Massachusett they became engaged. This time McKee did not directly back to school, but was ordered to Bethlehem Steel Corporation Shipbuilding Divi^sl(||J. in Quincy, Massachusetts, to work in the offi^ce the Supervisory Naval Constructor and get ^sorn practical shipyard experience.      .

In October 1919, Andrew Irwin McKee, weari the uniform of a lieutenant (junior grade) in the C°ⁿ^ struction Corps, and Katherine Brown were marn^e and set up housekeeping at Wollaston, on the shot three or four miles from the shipyard at Fore R'^v^^f' McKee’s experience with the submarines then on construction at Fore River undoubtedly stimulate his interest in specializing in their design and eon struction.

After a year at Quincy, McKee went back to to earn a master’s degree in naval architecture, couple’s first son, Andrew Irwin McKee Jr.

Portsmouth Navy Yard, the Navy’s foremost

submarine then in existence

former German U-boats that had b^een

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of

a daughter, Katherine Eugenia, and a son, Le"^lS Witherspoon McKee II.

In September 1924 came a transfer to New L°ⁿ don, Connecticut, where McKee served as construe tion officer at the submarine base. Here his duti^c mainly involved overhaul and maintenance of the a^c tive submarines based on the East Coast. He was

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almost daily contact with the officers and men

sponsible for operating the boats under the try>ⁿF

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itions of low budgets, public disinterest in the ^avy, and political pressure in favor of disarmament.

^{contacts w}*^th forces afloat at Portsmouth the ^^£W ^^onc^^on’ McKee gained great respect for ^ Problems faced by the operators and the practical ft, ^{Ut t}^^le*^r advice. He never ceased to appreciate ^lrnP°rtance of such mundane housekeeping tasks §^etting into the various tanks and areas of the

^tructure where rust tended to form and small his 1 ^^eve^°P^ed around inaccessible riveted seams. In •fiak ^ater ^^es*^^{n wor}k’ McKee took great pains to ^e sure that tanks and void spaces were big ^ugh and accessible enough for submarine crews to ^e^’ P^aint, and maintain.

_a ^{e r}°tttine of peacetime operations was broken by t_a|^Str’ⁿ8 °f submari ne accidents in which McKee’s ^ ^{nts We}re repeatedly called upon. The worst of J^Se mishaps was the tragic loss of the S-51 on 25 bv    ^925, when the submarine was rammed

1₀ ^{C e stea}mer City of Rome off Block Island with the _c ^S       but three of her crew. The hulk was suc-

^{s ull}y raised on 5 June 1926, just before McKee’s

detachment from the submarine base. These and other submarine accidents, such as the loss of the S-5 in 1920, had served to focus attention on the prob­lems of submarine safety. McKee’s experiences also convinced him of the necessity of providing adequate living and working conditions for submarine crews and of avoiding unnecessarily complex installations and gadgetry which were likely to prove unreliable in a crisis. McKee’s next duty station was the Bureau of Construction and Repair in Washington as an assist­ant design officer. The head of the Design Division was Commander Edward L. Cochrane, an experi-

The S-51 (below) was one of three major submarine disasters, all the result of collisions with surface craft, that occurred between August and November 1925. The Italian Sebastiano Veniero sank in the Mediterranean; the British M-l was lost in the English Channel. The challenge to McKee and his contemporaries was the dreadful finality of such accidents: all 69 of the British crew were lost; all 54 of the Italians were lost; and only three of the S-51’s 36 men survived.

by

pedo room, from which they signaled to divers

enced naval constructor who had designed the huge cruiser submarines V-5 and V-6, which were soon to be laid down at Portsmouth and Mare Island. In this position Cochrane was responsible for all ship design under the bureau’s cognizance. In addition, he was increasingly called upon to work on preparations for the international Limitation of Arms Conference that would lead to the London Naval Treaty of 1930. As the only other officer in the bureau with submarine experience, McKee served as the ship type assistant for submarine design, construction, and mainte­nance, a position colloquially known as the “type desk,” which involved broad responsibility for all matters dealing with submarines. Thus, McKee took over the principal responsibility for the preliminary design of the V-7 (later renamed the USS Dolphin[SS- 169]), the first U. S. submarine to be designed spe­cifically for independent offensive patrol operations in the Pacific. The V-7 represented a significant de­parture from all preceding classes of submarines. Displacing 1,560 tons surfaced and 2,240 sub­merged, she was nearly twice as heavy as the S-type boats that then made up the bulk of the operating forces. On the other hand, she was more than 1,000 tons lighter than the submarine cruisers V-5 and V-6 or the minelayer V-4 ■ The only earlier classes of fleet submarines, the T class and the first three V boats, had failed to live up to their designers’ expectations and were regarded by the operators as complete fail­ures. Forces afloat had also turned away from the concept of the huge cruiser-type boats in favor of a

'For footnotes, please turn to page 57.

smaller and handier submarine that would still big enough for long-range operations. McKee thff^e fore had nothing in the way of a successful preceo ^ to follow, so his design had to be largely ^or’^^,rJ _ef The Dolphin was not an unqualified success, but deficiencies were largely inherent in the liu¹¹^, technology of the 1920s. The development of ^we . hulls, high-speed diesel engines, and tefi^a ^ electric-drive equipment was still several years in future. However, in such characteristics as hull ^slZ j tank arrangement, external appearance, and intet^ layout, the Dolphin was clearly the prototype f°^r efficient fleet submarines of World War II.

Tragedy again struck the submarine force ^vV __ the S-4 was rammed off Provincetown, ^ ^ sachusetts, by the destroyer Paulding (DD-22) °ⁿ December 1927. The nation was horrified when ^ crewmen were found to be alive in the forward ^t(’

tapping on the hull until overcome by suffocatio^ The hulk was raised by salvagers on 17 March * 7-^ and the Navy’s efforts were mobilized to find ^a ' ‘ to prevent further losses of this sort. The escape 1^L

many key technical personnel to be “frozen their jobs for the duration.

McKee’s reputation as a submarine designer

was

da-

“. . . accommodations have been improve-

d to the

fort to rescue the survivors, which was accomplished by use of the McCann rescue chamber kept on hand at New London. He then concentrated on the more difficult problem of raising the partially flooded submarine from the bottom. In addition to making the necessary buoyancy and stability calculations and providing plans and guidance to the salvage crew, McKee designed much of the special equipment, such as a curved air pipe for tunneling under the hull and the cradle-like rig with which the boat could be lifted by pontoons. After a number of mishaps and unanticipated problems, including a premature sur­facing and resinking of the submarine, the Squalus was raised on 13 September 1939 and towed back to Portsmouth for complete reconstruction. McKee re­ceived a letter of commendation from the Secretary of the Navy for his outstanding work in connection with the rescue and salvage operations.

The outbreak of war in Europe in September 1939, followed by the invasion of Denmark and Norway and the fall of France in 1940, finally gal­vanized Congress and the nation into action. Almost overnight the submarine construction program for the year was raised from 6 to 71, while work was expedited on those already under construction. Portsmouth also was heavily engaged in modernizing older boats and recommissioning a number that had been laid up for years in the reserve fleet. McKee’s tour of duty would normally have lasted three or four years, but the needs of wartime mobilization caused

into

already such that he was given the Linnard Foum tion Award in 1940. One of his basic tenets was r superfluous equipment and material should be r out of the boats. First things must always be ' V first. He wrote:           j

“[A] submarine is supposed to be a naval ^veSS.^ which possesses certain military value and necessary that discretion be exercised in order ¹ devices be not adopted in the name of safety " ^

the added safety would not be commensurate ^vV ^

the loss in military value. For it must be ^reC°^_ nized [that] any non-military addition, which ^r quires either weight or space, does detract the military value in some degree.”³                    ^

In adopting this philosophy, McKee took the p tion that “one definition of‘adequate’ is ‘barely ^s dent,’” but in applying it he never compromise safety or real comfort of the submarine crews. ^ designers actually built a remarkably high stan of habitability into the cramped confines of a ^s ^ marine hull. By careful attention to the items o importance, McKee wrote:

such an extent that, on more than one occasion designers have been accused of providing ‘hotel aC commodations’ by the officers who serve on s^u marines. This improvement has been broug about by refinement of the arrangement and d^eta parts of the submarines so as to make the most of the space available. . . . Not so much by ^cr0"j_ie ing as by providing for each purpose only ^c minimum space which can be considered adequa^te' it has been possible to build up a reserve of ^sP^a . . . fitted out as a mess room in which more than third of the crew may be seated at tables at a rin¹^ . . . [I]t has been possible to reach these standar only by close attention to details over the en period of submarine development.”⁴ During this period, McKee was responsible for P^re paring detail and hull contract designs for every ⁿ . class of submarines. Significant milestones of techⁿ> cal advancement were marked by the Gato (SS-21 ’ Balao (SS-285), and Tench (SS-417) designs, ^sUP^f_e mented by a steady stream of improvements as lessons of combat were fed back to the designers an new equipment was developed and introdue^e McKee and his colleagues did not wait for the fi^e to demand changes before seeking better ways build submarines.         ^

Perhaps the most significant of all submarine a vances during the war was in large part the resulr

^Stroi

thanks to conservative design and sound con-

Savi ^{t S t}^^r^^t *ⁿ saving weight. Initially, weight ]_ea^ⁿ^^s had to be compensated for by the addition of kut w*^{1 ast t0 ma}t^ntain proper stability and trim, ^ ^ci^^ee had no intention of saving weight just to _Va|^ ^exP^ensive lead, which contributed no military ty_eil ^{t0 r}he boat and was in short wartime supply as tin          ^a*^{m was t0} "turn lead *^nt0 steel” by put-

^t^^{le e}xtra weight into heavier plating and fram- tjjjj. ^0r the pressure hull, which would have real a_nd‘^tary ^value in allowing submarines to dive deeper _VVarj^Stan<i ^up better to depth charge explosions. To- ^Vanc ^C^^{e en<}^ *941 it appeared that a major ad- _Cou ^Was possible. McKee and Armand Morgan, his thev^terpart at the Bureau of Ships, figured out that h_uU ^Could increase the thickness of the GWo-type J₀ , P^lating and framing sufficiently to practically °th ^{e C}^^e submarine's operating depth without bj| ^ervv*^Se changing the design in any way. The feasi- q₀ ^ this change was demonstrated to Admiral c_re ^ratle> who conservatively limited the depth in­s_tart ^{e to} provide a margin of safety. New submarines n₀ 'ⁿ§ ^w'th the Balao-c\ass were thus designed for a 3(jq '^na^ operating depth of 400 feet instead of the $_Uk °^ot limit previously in effect. Since the new a_ricj^1Tlar'^ries were unchanged in outward appearance l^r^ttime security was strict, the Japanese never _0Ur^ °f the change. This may have saved several of tl^. °^ats from destruction, because the Japanese set t₀ *^r ^pth charges to explode well above the depth _A ^lch the U. S. submarines could dive.

^Ctually, even the older U. S. submarines were so

struction, that they soon demonstrated their ability to survive depth charge attacks well below their nominal operating depths. The decision to shift to the heavy hull was confirmed just after the attack on Pearl Har­bor, but it would be well over a year before the first thick skin boat would be ready for sea. In the mean­time, cocky skippers began taking their boats well below their 250- or 300-foot operating depths in the knowledge that they had been designed with a safety factor of at least one and a half. Some of these daring submariners boasted of taking their boats to depths of 400 feet or more as a routine practice. McKee knew the dangers of such daredeviltry and became concerned that the operators might take excessive risks through over­confidence. When the Salmon (SS-182) and the Grouper (SS-214) were widely reputed to have survived inadver­tent submergence beyond 600 feet, he felt it was time to take action:                                        ,

I arranged to give a talk on hull strength to all the PCOs [prospective commanding officers] we had (14 of them) and told them what we knew about the strength of the various classes, the calcu­lations, models tested to failure and what our level

of confidence was. Buships had been telling them that the boats [of the heavy-hull Balao class] were good for only 400 ft. They knew better than that so I thought it was time to lay the cards face up on the table. I told them I was confident the ships were good for 600 ft but that my confidence de­teriorated rapidly after that. I recommended strongly that they not go below 600 ft unless they were in such dire straits that they felt warranted to risk collapse. I do not like to risk making them over confident.”⁵

Between them, Morgan and McKee practically ran the entire U. S. submarine construction and altera­tion program for the duration of the war.

Not until January 1945 was Captain McKee ^a lowed to leave his post at Portsmouth. Later he ^ ceived a Legion of Merit award for “. . . except*⁰⁰^ initiative, judgment and professional skill . • • ¹⁰ phases of planning, design and construction of ^sU ^ marines ... in large measure responsible for the ^ cellent material readiness and for the outstandi ^ success of the submarine throughout the war • • ■ Proceeding immediately to the war zone, McKee came senior assistant fleet maintenance officer ^w' ^ the Service Force, Pacific Fleet, attached to the ^sta of Rear Admiral Ingolf N. Kiland in the USS McKinley (AGC-7). The flagship was anchored ^ Kerama Retto, a group of small islands ⁿ Okinawa. The Japanese kamikaze attacks were ¹ at their height and the anchorage, dubbed Man’s Cove, was already filled with damaged s " that had taken a fearful beating on the picket h protecting the invasion force at Okinawa ^,tse __ McKee was given the primary responsibility      ¹⁰_$

specting the damaged ships and deciding which ⁰ ^ should be repaired. He carried out this work little assistance in spite of “red alerts,” screens, and kamikaze attacks day and night. For _it^_{ service he was awarded another Legion of Merit ^ exceptionally meritorious conduct. ...” For _ period from 14 April to 20 May 1945 he also ^re ceived a Bronze Star Medal “for heroic service • • under combat conditions. . . ,”⁷

194 ^{0 return t0 c}^^e United States in November > Andrew I. McKee reported to the Philadelphia ^avy Yard (soon thereafter renamed Philadelphia Shipyard), was advanced to the rank of com- shi ^{re> an<}^ subsequently took command of the . Pyard. The yard was heavily involved in complet- .. ® ^Wartime construction and repair work and in _s^^>t^^^>abing” ships of all types for layup in the re- in^ ^^Cet' however, the fleet was rapidly shrinking fo ^{[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]}*^2e’ ^an<^ ^r^^ere were no submarine design positions ^ an officer of McKee's rank. On 1 July 1947, he tan|< ^^rom active duty with advancement to the pjj °f tear admiral based on his combat decorations. _c ^retltement was merely nominal, however, be- ^Se the Electric Boat Company needed a new de- j_Q^ⁿ Erector and immediately offered McKee the j_eaj.^^or two mote decades, Admiral McKee played a jj ^^lng role in the continuing development of the ^vice ^SU^^mari^ne f°^rce- As design director and later _a , President of engineering and director of research ^ design, he was responsible for 14 new designs ^ went into production, several conversions of the _Ura°rld War II -type fleet submarines to new config- °ris, and innumerable experimental efforts. _a ourew I. McKee was further honored with the °f ^t‘^le Uavid W. Taylor Medal of the Society ^lth^<lVa^ ^obttects and Marine Engineers in 1956. gj °^ugh he formally retired from his position at _Cor^^tr'^c Boat in 1961, he remained active with the P^any as a senior technical advisor until 1974. _anj^r'ⁿ8 this period, he continued to provide advice |₍ ^c°tisultation to his successors in the Navy. Fol- the tragic loss of the Thresher (SSN-593) in w ' ’ he was appointed chairman of the so-called th ^Ce ^^an£d of design experts. A fellow member of 'dj ^^ane* ^recalls that McKee “. . . led (rather than _CQ(^^cted ) the efforts of the panel in producing a very V J^3re*^lensive review of recent submarine designs _ particular emphasis on Thresher’s design. A thi, ^her '^mP^ortarlt recommendations resulted from ] ^{S e}ff°rt, most of which have been incorporated in ^er designs.”^[8]

naval architect and constructor, Andrew I. h_e • ^{ee Was a} "designer’s designer,” which is to say _a$ ^lflv°lved himself to the fullest in every technical °f the work. He rather emphatically disagreed ^che managerial type who let others do the Off ^anc^ on,y ^s'g^ned the letters they prepared. . . . to '^CerS       [engineering duty] were not supposed

_an^^act that way until MacNamara became Sec Def and^{Started the} • • . project method of operation . . . downgraded technical competence among EDs.”^{[9] c}Kee the man was modest and self-effacing, * to play down his own accomplishments and

give credit to others. Invariably considerate of his colleagues and subordinates, he was a kindly mentor to scores of his juniors. Other officers who later headed the submarine desk at the Bureau of Ships were impressed with his breadth of knowledge and eagerness to help. Living by the precept of the “si­lent service” which he served so long, he left almost no writings in the open literature, being content to leave his mark in the plans and specifications for the submarines he designed.

At the time of his death. Admiral McKee was working with this author on reviewing the manu­script for a book on the history of the fleet submarine in the U. S. Navy. His memory was sharp and clear, even about details of boats that had long since been retired. Andrew Irwin McKee spent the remaining months of his life at his New London home with his second wife, the former Ingeborg Von Finck. He died unexpectedly on 24 January 1976 following an operation at the Hospital for Special Surgery in New York City. He was an officer and a gentleman in the finest sense of that old-fashioned term. Above all, he never forgot the primary mission of Navy ship de­signers and constructors: to serve the fleet. The new submarine tender AS-41, which will be christened with his name when she is launched later this year, will fittingly perpetuate the principle of service in which he believed and the naval tradition which he so well exemplified.

A graduate of Cornell University and MIT, Commander Alden served in the USS Lamprey (SS-.372) and the USS Sea Cat (SS-399) from 1944 to 1950. Subsequent as­signments included various duties at Supervisor of ^ Shipbuilding, Groton, Connecticut; San Francisco Naval Shipyard; and the Bureau of Ships. Prior to his retirement in 1965, he was quality assurance superin- tendant at the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, Kittery, Maine. Since 1978 he has held the position of accreditation director with the Engineers’ Council for Professional Development. Commander Alden, the author of several Naval Institute Press books and a number of Proceedings articles, was the 1973 recipient of the Naval Institute’s Author Award of Merit.