The All-Volunteer Force in 1798

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^ln 1968. After attending Amphibious Warfare School in 1971, he

^^ericans place national defense high on their list of

priorities.

T^^e ^^raft will not solve all defense manpower ⁰ lems. Many of the alternative management ac- k°^ns designed to make the AVF work better should k 'mplemented in any case.¹⁶ Better pay, more ef- ^ctlve use of women, modifying of standards for cer- ⁿ jobs, providing better educational oppor- m L.^{tlSS     r}hose improvements would not only

^a e the AVF work better; they would also make the ^ more palatable. If the effort needed to aid the _a *^S ^^Ut *^nt° ^ma^^lnS ^t^^ie draft fair and equitable, *nto educating the American public about the ^need for a draft, the long-term needs of defense _r ^anP°wer will not be a matter of chance but the ^u t of a positive choice by the people of how they ^{3nt sec}urity handled in the future.

Lieutenant Colonel Sage was graduated from the U. S. Naval Academy in 1962. He served in the 1st and 2d Marine Divisions in the United States and commanded the 3d 175-mm. Gun Battery in Vietnam. Following a tour as an instructor at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, he at­tended the University of Heidelberg, Germany, as an Olmsted scholar, receiving a diploma in political sci-

^Served _a

^rhis ^{3 t0Ur at} NROTC Unit, College of the Holy Cross; during Lj_eu^°^Ur earned a master’s degree in history from Clark University. Nav j^nant ^⁰l°^nel Sage was the Marine Corps aide to the Vice Chief of

‘ operations in 1974-1975. Since 1975, he has served in the Special rojectc r\^-   .               ..

Co ^u,rectorate of Headquarters Marine Corps. Previous Proceedings

"Nob ^Ut*°^nS ^^ave keen “The Military and Politics” (October 1974) and y Asked Me to Join a Union, But . . .” (February 1978).

'A useful summary of the history of conscription is contained in Richard V. L. Cooper, Military Manpower and the All-Volunteer Force (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 1977), pp. 46-59.

²C. Joseph Bernardo and Eugene H. Bacon, American Military Policy: Its Development Since 1775. 2nd ed. (Harrisburg: The Stackpole Co., 1961), pp. 428-430.

³Morris Janowitz, "The Impact of a Volunteer Force on Strategic Af­fairs,” in Frank N. Trager and Philip S. Kronenberg, National Security and American Society: Theory. Process, and Policy (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1973), p. 579. This paper was first delivered in 1971. ⁴Curtis W. Tarr, “The Future of the All-Volunteer Force,” Air University Review. May-June 1978, p. 6.

■’Quoted in Bernard Weinraub, "Volunteer Army Pros and Cons,” Wash­ington Star. 3 September 1978, p. 1 (emphasis added).

“Warren Rogers, “The All-Volunteer Army’s Bleak Future,” The Wash­ington Post. 6 August 1978, pp. Dl, D5.

⁷Department of Defense News Release No. 245-78, "An Address by General Bernard W. Rogers ... to the 60th Annual National Conven­tion of the American Legion, 24 August 1978,” p. 5.

“"Recruiting Scandals: Sympton of Trouble for Volunteer Forces,” U. S. News & World Report. 16 October 1978. p. 41.

^Kenneth J. Coffey, Manpower for Military Mobilization (Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1978), p. 1. ^I0Bernardo and Bacon, p. 446.

"Charlotte Saikowski, “Let’s go back to the draft,” The Christian Science Monitor. 26 July 1978, p. 23.

^,2Harold Brown, Department of Defense Annual Report: Fiscal Year 1979. 2 February 1978, p. 337.

^,3Ibid.

^l4National Service Programs and Their Effects on Military Manpower and Ci­vilian Youth Programs (Washington: Congressional Budget Offices, 1978), pp. 41-42. (For sale through Superintendent of Documents.) ¹⁵ABC News-Harris Survey, released 6 December 1978.

¹ “Edward W. Brooke, "Meeting Our Military Manpower Needs Through the All-Volunteer Force” (American Enterprise Institute: AEI Defense Review No. 5, 1977), p. 56, outlines a number of such management actions.

All-Volunteer Force in 1798

Lieutenant Daniel N. Wood, U. S. Coast Guard Reserve

t_a/^{n 1798} America, the problem of finding and re- ^lng qualified personnel for the sea services was in ^rt,cul^arly urgent. The United States was involved ^ ^{an Ur}*declared naval war with France, for which a ^Ss,Ve mobilization effort was required. The Conti- _at^^ta* ^^avy Lad been completely dissolved in 1785, sis ^t^*^{e countr}y'^{s or,}ly operational naval force con- ^tcd of a handful of tiny, aging revenue cutters op­. ^ed by fewer than a hundred men. Congress hast- ^created a Navy Department and authorized the ^ ¹ onshment of a Marine Corps to augment the ^avy and the Revenue Cutter Service (forerunner of

the Coast Guard); in the meantime, hundreds of merchant vessels were arming themselves for self­defense, causing an increased demand for experienced mariners. There was no reserve program, and nearly 20 years had passed since the naval campaigns of the American Revolution. Trained fighting men were hard to find. As a succession of new warships and revenue cutters was launched, an intensive recruiting effort began.

Impressment was a widely accepted method of se­curing manpower for contemporary European navies, but such practices were deplorable to the American

Government; whose military services were to be strictly voluntary. Although the war with France was not universally popular, and experienced sailors were in high demand, Secretary of War James McHenry nonetheless prescribed that:

“It being essential that those who enlist, should feel an Inclination for that kind of Life, no indirect Methods are allowable to inveigle Men into the Service of the United States; it is forbidden there­fore to inlist any Individual while in a State of Intoxication, or to have him sworn untill twenty four hours after he shall have signed the Inlist- ment.”

Beyond “an Inclination for that kind of Life” (and varying levels of patriotic enthusiasm), the principal incentive to enlist was money. Pay scales varied widely among the services. Marine privates received

six dollars per month, and Navy ordinary seam^clj started at ten. Sergeants in the Marine Corps recei'^c ^ only nine dollars per month, while petty officers an midshipmen in the Navy were paid from $ 18 to $”’ depending on specialty (longevity and seniority ^wef^ not considered). In the Revenue Cutter Service, ^a enlisted men received a standard wage of $20 on assumption that each carried an equal share of ^t'^ie work load. Enlistees in the various services could r^e ceive up to two months’ advance pay to discharp^e their debts, but apparently this was often insui cient, and Congress made special provisions exemP^c ing sailors and marines from arrest for personal >ⁿ debtedness during their period of service.

The sea services undoubtedly benefited from fact that pay in the Army was even worse than in Marine Corps. One Marine agent experienced do culty attracting recruits because artillery officers '^v’^efe giving a $10 to $12 bounty to anyone signing *^nt° their service. The Army’s recruiting efforts "'^ej^ hampered not only by low pay, but also by a bad ) tarnished image—the Army, which predated ^eve^ the Revenue Cutter Service, was never popular an

agents, who received a bonus of a dollar or more _u ^each man enlisted. The officers, in turn, received "fi ^t0 °^ne dollar P^er enlistee to cover the costs of off'⁶' ^Canch^e’ Liquor, house rent, &c&c.” Recruiting *^Cers were advised to be “. . . very civil and good th^rfl<>Ur ^ with every body, and endeavor to attach ^^ertl to the Service, by pointing out the rations &c _pr^C_o^all°wed.” Their instructions included additional ^v*sions, of which the following are typical:

hJo individual is to be inlisted (Musicians ex­^Cepted) who is not five feet and six Inches high ^•thout Shoes, and above Eighteen and under orty Years of Age. He must be healthy robust ^arid sound in his Limbs and Body. . . .

l^^Ver able to enlist enough men to meet its au- ^orized strength. When given the opportunity, my recruits eagerly volunteered for naval service at ^a P^ay; this was a genuine problem for the Army, ^a useful device for the Marine Corps. On several Occasions, the Secretary of War ordered Army officers allow their men to serve as marines when a ship’s ^^evv ^d to be hurriedly completed. The secretary ^Ve preference to the Navy because of the immi- naval operations and in the belief that in the lkely event of an invasion by a French army, the ¹'^t‘^a would serve to repel it.

aval enlistments were usually for 12-month ^1Qds, although some marines signed up for three _0n ^rs' Revenue Cuttermen were normally employed the'³ ^^ermanent basis by the customs collectors in _u !^r home ports, but when the cutters operated ^er the Navy during the war, extra crewmen were Th*^Ste^ ^an<^ P^a^ ^{on t}*^{ie sarne} basis as Navy seamen, of ^{ert Were no} recruiters as such; instead, the officers ^each ship, and corresponding marine officers, were Ponsible for enlisting their own men. Command- ^ officers selected those officers for this duty ”... Th^rna^ ^aPP^ear best calculated for the Business.’’ j_a^^{ese re}cruiting officers were often assisted by civil-

for

SNOW, USN

“No Negro, Mulatto or Indian to be enlisted nor any Description of Men except Natives of fair Conduct or Foreigners of unequivocal Character for Sobriety & Fidelity.”

An additional guideline called for recruitment of Americans wherever possible, because they could “. . . be depended upon to defend the rights and honor of their country.” When a naval surgeon was available, all recruits were subjected to a physical ex­amination to ensure that they were “. . . well or­ganized, healthy, robust, and free from scorbutic and consumptive Affections.”

Men were recruited for duty on board specific ves­sels, and the recruiting officers themselves were sometimes part of the problem; the officers received their commissions through political appointments according to geographical distribution, and not all were held in equal esteem. An unpopular command­ing officer could easily find himself with no crew. A citizen in Boston noted this situation on board the new warship Herald in his city, and Stephen Higgin- son, the local Navy Agent, wrote:

“Capt. N. [Nicholson] is in my estimation a rough blustering Tar merely, he is a good Seaman probably . . . but . . . prudence, judgement & re­flection are no traits in his character, nor will he ever improve. His noise & vanity is disgusting to the Sailors; but a belief that he wants courage goes much farther to render him unpopular with them. . .”

Other officers fared little better:

“Mr. Cordis the second Lt. is a young man, who possesses none of the requisites, he is defi­cient in every point, essential to a good Officer, he is said to be intemperate, & he looks like^it. [T]he Surgeon, Read, is the opposite of what he ought to be in Morals, in politics & in his profession. [T]here is not a man in this Town who would trust the life of a dog in his hands. [H]is second, Blake, is of the same cast of character as Read, but

persontv

1798

in

not so highly finished . . . Mr. Prebble [Edward Preble, who later led the third U. S. Squadron during the Tripolitan War] the first Lt. ... is a smart active popular man, judicious & qualified well for his station, or for the first command; but I do not believe he will go in the Ship when he sees his Associates.”

Naval officers, both good and bad, were paid $40 to $75 a month plus extra rations (a captain received six rations, as opposed to a seaman’s one). Revenue Cutter officers received comparable pay, but Marine Corps officers’ salaries ranged from $25 to only $50 for a major—a rank attained by only the comman­dant. Money was a significant enticement for the enlisted men, but it was occasionally a point of dis­satisfaction among the officers, at least one of whom resigned because of inadequate compensation. In spite of such discontent, and of problems arising from the appointment of aging Revolutionary War veterans and local politicians, the majority of ap­pointments must be considered successful. Good crews were assembled, and they performed well.

After enlistment came retention, which often be­came an immediate problem, because it was common for new recruits to change their minds quickly. When advance pay was provided, a bond was re­quired to discourage the recruit from deserting; if he did so, the recruiting officer had to defray any costs incurred. As insurance against this, new enlistees were not allowed to leave their quarters without a guard until they had proven themselves trustworthy. To be safe, the recruiters also sold the enlistees’ civil­ian clothing and used the proceeds to defray the cost of issuing uniforms. Some consideration was, how­ever, given to the sailors’ morale; in addition to rum rations, funds were allowed . . for music to in­dulge the Johns in a farewell frolic.” Marines were not afforded such luxuries, and they were even pro­hibited from visiting Navy recruiting areas “for var- ius good reasons.”

New enlistees were sent as soon as possible to the ships for which they were recruited; there was n° “boot camp” or other formal training. In the l^ate>t months of the war, to supplement training gain^et through shipboard evolutions, the Navy Department authorized schoolmasters (or chaplains, who P^er" formed similar functions) for its larger vessels. Men were recruited and paid according to their skills, an there was little need for special training. Privates ant ordinary seaman (also called “landsmen” in recogn¹' tion of their lack of nautical aptitude) were unskilw laborers who needed to know only how to follow or­ders', discipline was harsh to ensure that they did so- Nonetheless, some opportunity for advancement was available. Petty officer vacancies were frequently filled by qualified seamen, whose vacancies in turn were filled by promising landsmen. At the very bot* tom were “boys,” too young to serve as seamen, an recruited by each ship at the rate of one per gun. The boys were paid half the seamen’s rate, and the shtp^s authorized complements were reduced by one seaman for every two boys attached. The boys were, in fa^ct’ ^a source of seaman trainees.

The greatest factor in favor of the upward-mobd^c sailor was the turnover caused by the one-year term of enlistment. Living and working conditions were sufficiently severe to discourage all but the rno^st dedicated individuals. It takes little effort to imagm^e the misery on board a 56-foot revenue cutter crammed with 74 men, 14 cannon, and provision for a three-month cruise. Under such condition^5, more men died from such misfortunes as “an old sore leg,” “the fleux,” “mysterious fevers,” and shipboat accidents than as a result of enemy actions.

By 20th century standards, the no-frills management policies of the naval services were Spartan, but they served the needs of the mo­ment. During a period when the Army was unable to attract sufficient manpower to fill its ranks, the sea services filled theirs. In the war with France, they met the challenge of explosive growth and perform^e with distinction.