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Soviet developments in mine warfare during the past few years are forc- lng the U. S. Navy to take a new look at mine countermeasures—the loca- t*on and destruction or neutralization °fsea mines.
, The Soviets and their predecessors ln tsarist navies have had a long interest and several major successes in mine Warfare. During the past decade Soviet fTining capability has improved in tvv° important respects. First, Soviet b°ttom-laid influence mines, useful Iri shallow and coastal waters, have greatly increased the vulnerability of surface mine “hunters” and sweepers. Second, the Soviets have developed the CaPability to mine deep-water ship- P|ng lanes and choke points that pre- Vl°usly could not be mined.
The shallow and coastal mines could interfere with future U. S. ef- 0rts to land troops in forward areas, even if to reinforce an ally that had J^vited U. S. forces to enter the area.
massive North Korean mining ef- rt at Wonsan, that delayed U. S. andings at that port in 1950 for two Weeks (and at the cost of three sweepers sunk), was graphic evidence of a Sri)all nation’s ability to employ Soviet mines. More recently, in July 1973, °ne Greek merchant ship was reportedly sunk and another damaged by ^‘Oes said to have been planted at the currance of Libya’s Tripoli harbor by i Egyptian Navy. The Libyans had asked the Egyptians to mine the har- 0r because they feared an Israeli naval attack.
The Soviet deep-water mining ^Pabilicy is more ominous. The arter-Brown defense program is heav- ^ oriented toward the NATO war Scenarios wherein sea reinforcement C°uld be critical. Deep-water mining c°uld present a threat to U. S. ocean transit as well as to U. S. strategic S|Jbmarine operations.
These Soviet threats have served to motivate U. S. interests in advanced mine countermeasures (MCM). Traditionally, the U. S. Navy has had limited interests in MCM because of (1) European NATO emphasis on mine countermeasures, (2) U. S. Navy emphasis on deep-water operations, where minelaying opportunities were heretofore limited, and (3) the small size and low visibility of mine warfare forces, leading to few senior officers having had experience in the field and no “power base” for influence in the highly institutionalized Navy leadership. The institution or “union” problem led Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, while Chief of Naval Operations, to state,
“I think that we in the U. S. Navy . . . have frequently been accused of not giving sufficient interest to the field of mine warfare, and in part, I believe, this is the result of the fact that our Navy is made up of three unions: the Aviation union, the Submarine union, and the Destroyer [surface] union and I have therefore made myself the head of the mine warfare union to try to get an equal balance of interest within the United States Navy in this very important field.”
Unfortunately, larger, more complex programs and problems diverted Zumwalt’s attention away from the mine warfare problem, at least until 1973 when presidential permission was belatedly given to mine North Vietnamese ports.
For these and other reasons, relative U. S. mine countermeasure capabilities have declined over the past decade. In 1968, the active U. S. Fleet had about 65 ocean minesweepers (MSOs), 173- and 190-foot, non-magnetic-ships built in the aftermath of enemy mining in the Korean War; 24 smaller coastal minesweepers (MSCs) of the same vintage, most manned by reservists; and two large mine countermeasure ships (MCSs). The MCSs, converted World War II amphibious ships, were to carry small minesweeping launches (MSLs) and RH-3 A Sea King minesweeping helicopters into assault areas.
Ten years later, the only remnants of this force are 25 MSOs: 22 currently in the Naval Reserve Force with composite active-reserve crews, and three in the active Navy which are used primarily for research projects. This decline was justified, in part, because of the overall fleet reductions. Also, the MSOs were getting old, and, with a maximum speed of some 15 knots, they were too slow to accompany the new, 20-knot amphibious force. Finally, their mine-hunting and sweeping capabilities were becoming marginally effective against modern mines. (The 36-foot long MSLs remain in service.)
As a partial compensation for the MSO reductions and demise of the MSC force, the Navy developed a shallow- water helicopter MCM capability based on the large, RH-53D Sea Stallion. This twin-turbine helicopter can tow a variety of MCM devices for use against contact, accoustic, and magnetic mines.
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r°ceedings / February 1979
The Navy’s initial helicopter mine countermeasures squadron—HM-12 —was commissioned at Norfolk on 1 April 1971. The squadron, flying CH-53 helicopters modified for towing mine countermeasure devices, developed MCM techniques and tactics. During 1973, HM-12 joined Marine Corps squadrons HMH-463 and HMM- 165 to sweep North Vietnamese waters in Operation End Sweep. In six months, the Navy and Marine Corps pilots flew 623 sweep sorties totaling 1,135 hours. (Surface minesweepers swept for 309 hours in the area.)
Subsequently, HM-12 began receiving the RH-53Ds, specially configured for mine countermeasures. In all, the Navy took delivery of 30 RH-53Ds, with 21 being assigned to HM-12 and the remainder employed in research and test activities. The squadron was again deployed on an operational basis in 1974-1975, helping to clear the northern end of the Suez Canal in Operation Nimbus Star.
While HM-12 operated and maintained the helicopters, the Navy had two airborne mine countermeasure units (AMCU Alpha and AMCU Bravo) at Norfolk which maintained the various sweep devices, towing cables, etc. In 1978, the decision was made to reorganize the helicopter MCM force to provide more flexibility in operations. Two new squadrons were formed, HM-14 in May 1978 and HM-16 in November 1978, each with eight RH- 53Ds and one of the AMCUs. The original HM-12, with five helicopters, now serves primarily as a readiness training squadron. All three squadrons remain home-ported at Norfolk at this writing, although one probably will be stationed on the West Coast.
The RH-53DS are considered effective shallow-water minesweepers. However, they have several limitations. They must be transported to the forward area aboard ship or in Air Force C-5 transports. Then, in the forward area, they are based on amphibious ships, displacing assault
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Proceedings / February l0”79
helicopters or possibly Harrier V/STOL support aircraft. They have some opef' ational limitations, especially against pressure-activated mines in shallot waters (i. e., to about 200-foot depths), with essentially no capability in deep waters. And, of course, there are only 2 1 deployable helicopters, i°" eluding those in overhaul at any given time, too few when one considers the worldwide interests of the United States and the proliferation of se® mines in Soviet and Third World
six heavy helicopter squadrons,
each with 21 CH-53A/D helicopters as- Sl8ned that have “hard points” and other provisions for streaming mine- faring devices. However, the matines do not train for this role nor ls sweep gear available for them.)
The Navy had planned an improved elicopter MCM force with the new, eavy-lift, CH-53E triple-turbine vari- of the Sea Stallion. For use with « helicopter, a new series of MCM ev>ces is under development, includes the AQS-14 airborne mine-hunting S°nar, ALQ-160 acoustic device, the ^QS-17 acoustic mine neutralization ev‘ce, and the ALQ-141 electronic SV'eeP for countering the deep-rising, ^APTor (encapsulated torpedo)-type °viet mines.
. ®ut there are problems. The mobil- imitations of the existing helicop- ^ts continue with the newer birds.
original Navy and Marine Corps j^uirement was for over 100 of the hcopters, with 46 configured as ^■53Es. They will now buy only 49 ^der current planning because of contained aircraft-procurement budgets, ‘naily, even the MH-53E still could c provide a deep-ocean mine coun- rmeasure capability.
To cope with increasing Soviet, and j0trie Third World, deep-ocean min- threats, the Navy several years ago vitiated a program to produce the
MCM, a mine countermeasures ship. This would be a large ship which, operating in pairs, could sweep for deep ocean mines. Principal features of the 1,640-ton MCM ship would be (1) the advanced ship minehunting sonar (SMS), (2) the mine neutralization vehicle (MNV), and (3) a precise navigation system.
The sonar system would contain three acoustic sensors in one body that would be lowered beneath the ship’s hull. The three sonars are for large- area search and for looking ahead with high resolution, for detection of moored and bottom-laid mines, respectively, and a side-looking synthetic aperature sonar for mine classification and exact location.
The neutralization vehicle is a cable-controlled device. While details of the mine neutralization vehicle are classified, similar devices are under development in other navies. A vehicle jointly developed by France, Belgium, and the Netherlands is nine feet long, weighs 1,540 pounds, and is cable-controlled at 6-knot speeds to a distance of 1,650 feet from the mine hunter. The vehicle relays television pictures of the mine to the mother ship, and can drop a 220-pound explosive charge alongside the mine which is detonated after the vehicle has returned to the ship. The U. S. mine neutralization vehicle is known to carry both television and high- resolution sonar, is fitted with remotely controlled manipulators, and has the means of “neutralizing” enemy mines.
Related to these systems, the MCM ship will have the SSN-2 precision navigation system for plotting and relocating minefields.
Under the Ford Administration, the Navy succeeded in gaining Department of Defense approval for 19 MCM ships to be built in Fiscal Years 1979-1983. But the Carter Administration postponed the lead ship until FY 1980, with no follow-on ships until 1982, and only two that year and two the next. Thus, the overall program is both delayed and, in terms of five-year planning, cut from 19 ships to five.
Although the Navy can plan on NATO, Japanese, and Korean navies to help with the coastal and shallow water mine countermeasures in some situations, there is virtually no allied capability for countering deep-ocean mines.
A related factor is the conservative design of the MCM ship. It is a monohull, specialized for the mine warfare role, and without provisions to operate a helicopter. There had been proposals to use the SWATH (small waterplane area, twin-hull) configuration for the MCM ship. In a ship of about MCM’s size, SWATH could have provided increased stability and, with support vans embarked, the possibility of operating an ASW helicopter. The MCM is ideally suited to tow a sonar array or operate a variable depth sonar, that, coupled with the helicopter facilities, would have provided a secondary ASW role for the ship.
As in several other areas, there is significant research and development under way in the United States in the mine countermeasures field, mostly at the Naval Ocean Systems Center (San Diego) and the Naval Coastal Systems Laboratory (Panama City, Florida). However, for a variety of reasons, the programs are being delayed and reduced in scope. Ten years ago, the Soviets deployed their first advanced deep-water mine, followed a short time later by a second version. The U. S. Navy does not yet have an effective counter. At the same time, continued Soviet development and production of advanced coastal/shallow mines and the ability of Third World navies to use such weapons can be countered only by employing NATO or other allied MCM resources in collaboration with the small U. S. helicopter MCM force. Great Britain, Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands, and West Germany are all building modern coastal/inshore MCM ships and craft.
More extensive U. S. technology and equipment transfers may induce NATO and Japan to further upgrade their MCM forces, including those that might counter Soviet deep-ocean mining efforts. Beyond this action, within the current constrained defense budgets and the Navy’s institutional problems, little more appears possible in the important field of mine countermeasures.
^oce
'edings / February 1979
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