Setting Shipboard Priorities

This html article is produced from an uncorrected text file through optical character recognition. Prior to 1940 articles all text has been corrected, but from 1940 to the present most still remain uncorrected.  Artifacts of the scans are misspellings, out-of-context footnotes and sidebars, and other inconsistencies.  Adjacent to each text file is a PDF of the article, which accurately and fully conveys the content as it appeared in the issue.  The uncorrected text files have been included to enhance the searchability of our content, on our site and in search engines, for our membership, the research community and media organizations. We are working now to provide clean text files for the entire collection.

The authors have chosen nine broad categories of tasks with which a shipboard officer must concern himself, whether at sea or in port. Were you to be asked to arrange these chores in order of importance, how would you rate them? The authors’ priority list might surprise you—-just as yours might surprise them.

Today, U.S. Navy officers at sea are largely adminis­trative fire fighters, all laboring under a common and fundamental problem: there are simply not sufficient hours in the day to reasonably and conscientiously meet the myriad demands on their time. Much of this time is spent trying to stay afloat in a frustrating morass of ever-shifting priorities. Monday’s “number-one” prior­ity may be overtaken by Friday by several other “number-one” priorities intermingled with the usual assorted daily crises.

On board ship, crisis management has become a way of life; “short fuses” are the rule rather than the exception. Leadership manuals, the Division Officer’s Guide, and Navy Regulations do not specify guidelines for dealing with the pervasive “flap and flail” mental­ity. A “horizontal” priority system has given rise to conflicting demands for limited resources. The chain of command structure is becoming increasingly wasteful through “over-management” at all levels.

There are several reasons why the structure and in­grained tradition of the Navy often preclude a clear articulation of priorities on board ship:

► Maintaining Flexibility—Establishing a standing list of priorities calls for hard decisions. Avoidance of a clear-cut declaration of priorities can keep most of

the people happy most of the time, but fixed lists—unless carefully developed and kept broad— tend to ruffle feathers by subordinating one goal, one department, or one individual to another.

►  The Focus of Staff Attention—Staffs manage by ex­ception. In focusing on problems, it is clear that something must be given up to dedicate resources to a new problem. The determination that “X is our most pressing problem” is seldom accompanied by the corollary that “therefore Y is now a secondary problem.” The system established to solve problem Y remains in effect, requiring paperwork, inspections (often euphemistically called “assist visits”), and the attention of those who remember only that Y has not been officially downgraded from “top priority.” Hence, standard operating procedures, instructions, and standing organizations developed to solve prob­lems remain long after the desired result has been achieved.

►  Bureaupathology—Many naval procedures still bear the mark of “wooden ships and iron men.” Tradition becomes rhetoric, and new ideas, methods, or sys­tems are often ignored, establishing a breeding ground which eventually invokes “Parkinson’s Law”—that dictum which states that work expands so as to fill the time available for its completion.

As a result of all these factors, the shipboard offi­cer frequently finds himself in an environment in which the priority system simply has not been articu­lated. We believe that it is necessary to solve daily problems by establishing a system of priorities and making it work.

Setting Priorities—Current Climate: Usually a ship­board officer’s primary billet can be divided into his administrative responsibilities (division officer, de­partment head, etc.) and his operational assignment (communications officer, main propulsion assistant, gunnery officer, etc.). Additionally, he is charged with several collateral duties and is required to achieve special qualifications for his professional de­velopment. As a result, he often (if not always) finds a mass of conflicting requirements: the captain in­quiring about the progress of officer of the deck qual­ifications, the executive officer pinging on him for contributions to the monthly ship’s familygram, de­partment heads demanding plans for the next week’s training program, the operations officer advising everyone to bone up on the operation order for next month’s exercise, the chief explaining the problems with a piece of equipment, and assorted corre­spondence, reports, and messages due—all in a single day! What does he do first? Most officers who have served in ships will recognize the “crunch” just described as the normal flap-state that exists at most times on board most ships. But good grief, Charlie Brown, there must be some other way!

In order to cope with this state of affairs, it would be helpful if the officer could define a longer rang⁶ framework by which he can determine his priorities under any conditions—even those just described—^at any time. Developing such a list may not eliminate “flails,” “glitches,” and “crunches,” but it may help to control them, and in some cases may prevent then¹ from occurring quite so often. In any case, an office¹ may at least know what to do first.

In order to begin listing tasks in some sort of priority order, it is important to think first abou¹ those responsibilities which are of an ongoing and fixed nature. Maintenance programs, damage con­trol, shipboard cleanliness, and division organization all are enduring, while fleet exercises, inspection and major shipyard/tender availabilities are more periodic in nature. The key seems to be to establish priorities so that the routine is done automatically' We propose the following nine broad categories of tasks in an order which, it should be stressed, wiH not change regardless of whether the ship is in p°^ft or under way, deployed or at home, in overhaul ^ot operating:

►  Priority #1: Personnel Management: The fact th*¹ “people are our most important asset” is general!) used to justify every new program which is even f^e' motely related to people as immediately warranting³ “top priority” label. But we are speaking here only ⁰ routine and ongoing circumstances such as division³* or departmental organization, the detailing of ^re’ sponsibilities, personal counseling, and the promP¹ processing of personal requests, reports, and record⁵' In addition, “people-consciousness” includes ship’s services: laundry, barber shop, ship’s stof^e' and the general mess.

There are few things which irritate crew member more than to be constantly proceeding from °^ne crisis to another, to be unexpectedly called upon ^c° participate in working parties, to be inserted into watch bill without notice, or to have their duty ^seC tions changed repeatedly. Those who believe th^e5e inconveniences are inevitable are simply too lazy ^t0 plan sufficiently to avoid them. Personnel manag^e ment is probably an officer’s most important job-

►  Priority #2: Damage Control: After the ship bu^' up around you, all the equipment, training sche ules, and operation orders in the fleet are not g°^ to help. Bluntly put, preparedness to save the sh¹?' at any hour, under any conditions, against threat, is a life-and-death matter. Damage cont^f0 rates our second priority.

^ Priority #3/ Equipment Maintenance: Since modern ^naval ships depend on sophisticated equipment from the deckplates to the mast, any inoperative gear can ^ln some way limit the ship in executing her assigned Mission. Proper maintenance consists of three interre- tated programs: preventive maintenance, corrective Maintenance, and training. All the technicians’ time ^Cannot be obligated to scheduled maintenance. Al- h'wance must be made for casualties and both on- ^che-job training and off-ship training. The officer ^ho postpones or avoids schooling his technicians ^ecause of high preventive and corrective mainte­^nance levels may only be postponing his problems, ^nd the problems will intensify if his technicians f*^erceive themselves falling behind their peers in ad­^Vancement opportunities or feel limited because they *^re assigned to work on only one type of equipment.

* Priority #4: Cleanliness: Most sailors consider ^r°utine cleanliness to be boring, menial, and largely ^lrrelevant. Too often, officers tend to agree. Yet ^COrT>manding officers and executive officers keep joshing it. Why? Not because it is just one of those ^a°g-eared Navy traditions. It is because cleanliness is ^a state of mind. A clean ship looks smart. And it °^es not get that way unless her men care enough in ^e first place—care about themselves as individuals, ^Care about their ship, and care about their living and irking conditions.

Cleanliness does not require an excessive dedica-

Looking out for your men includes keeping sailors in touch with life ashore as well as life on board ship. Here, a traffic officer conducts a lecture on highway safety for a group of men at sea. The men of the USS Bronstein (background) will receive the same lecture.

tion of resources. Often, too many men are assigned to a particular task, or too much time is allotted for the job to be done. It is important to prevent overas­signing assets to routine cleaning functions, thus keeping as many men as possible free for more opera­tional activities. The key word in maintaining high standards of cleanliness is routine: routine sweep- downs, routine daily cleanup, routine watch-to- watch activities to ensure continual tidiness, and routine daily inspections. “Sweepers,” for example, can serve as any officer’s test for cleanliness. He should not have to go look; he should know it is hap­pening.

► Priority #3/ Specialty Training: Effective rate train­ing includes a balance of off-ship schooling, formal on-board training, rate-oriented personnel qualifica­tion standards (PQS), on-the-job training, and drills. A comprehensive on-board program can be main­tained effectively to a point, but off-ship schools are necessary to maintain technician efficiency at the state-of-the-art and to provide the concentration re­quired for learning new material. PQS is an effective tool for guiding and measuring an individual’s prog­ress in basic training, including schools, formal in­struction, and on-the-job training. Routine drills provide a realistic setting in which each man can practice and demonstrate his own expertise. (In port emergency drills we consider under priority #2.) The final step in the basic rate training cycle can often be accomplished effectively in a formal trainer. The inconvenience of not being able to use one’s own physical plant is often offset by avoiding routine matters such as watch standing, working parties, and housekeeping chores.

► Priority #6: Operational Training: A ship’s opera­tions are not limited to those under way. Whether forthcoming operations include an overhaul, refresher training, a major inspection, or a deployment, some amount and manner of training will be required in order to get maximum benefit and maximum crew performance. Operational training refers not only to cross training and team training; it is training above the basic level, and it is directed toward some specific objective. Often, the most difficult aspect of planning is to arrange the schedule so that the ship is prepar­ing for only one major event at a time. This may not be possible in all cases, and one may find inspections scheduled around or simultaneously with fleet opera­tions. Sometimes, however, conflicting demands can be rearranged if the "glitches” are discovered early. If not, the job of the shipboard officer remains that of putting his work in priority order so there is a logical progression from the planning through training to the evolution. Hard choices are necessary if priorities are to be observed, and, as often as not, it is the division officer/department head/executive officer who is in the best position to make them.

►  Priority #7: Major Preservation: Major preservation efforts are usually keyed to extended upkeep periods which may range from routine in-port periods to tender availabilities and restricted availabilities.¹ Major preservation has been listed in a separate cate­gory for a special reason. At all times, it is desirable to have all equipment working and to have spaces looking shipshape. However, at some point it be­comes necessary to get under way, to open the ship for visitors or inspections, or to begin the next major evolution, and the ship must go with what she has. Doing the best with what you have suggests that training at some point invariably takes precedence over maintenance functions. All other things being equal, a well-trained crew can usually do a better job with less equipment than can a poorly trained one with more equipment. We, therefore, have set our priorities so that major operational functions take precedence over major maintenance. In a war-fight­ing organization, there can be no other way.

►  Priority #8: Physical Fitness: We consider physical fitness to be an important aspect of any management system. Properly planned and supervised, exercise adds to a spirit of teamwork within divisions, im­proves morale, and adds balance to the routine schedule. Additionally, physical training channels frustrations and anxiety reasonably, preventing inad­vertent displacement of pent-up emotions. Activities are not limited to physical fitness, although exercise does provide a clear break from all other forms of work and thus lends freshness to the individual’s ap­proach to work. While some may count man-hours spent in physical fitness "lost,” most people recog­nize that output (achievement of objectives) and not input (man-hours) is the proper measure of effective­ness.

►  Priority #9: Special Programs: At any given time, one is likely to find the “top priority” label affixed to drug abuse, racial awareness, general security, gen­eral military training, or many others. Over the past

'Regular overhauls are considered to be one form of ''operational" ac­tivities such as deployments, refresher training periods, and major opera­tions.

decade, each of these has had its turn as the number one priority, and all still remain important. But they cannot all be "number one,” especially when con­trasted with the previously listed priorities. General awareness programs are important and should be ex­ecuted thoroughly and conscientiously, but the prior­ity which we have assigned them suggests that, where necessary, they may have to be held in abeyance to allow sufficient time for other important activities. The dilemma facing today’s officer is to make the time for them, not to deal them away from the bottom of the deck.

Four points seem to hold the key to effective im­plementation of the above system of priorities:

►  Results must he the measure of success, not the process (or even the priority system) by which fixed levels are to be obtained. There is little disagreement in prin­ciple with this argument, but as Commander Robert E. Mumford so clearly pointed out, there is now a persistent and pervasive pressure to emphasize the procedures rather than the objectives.² Instead o( waiting for standards of performance to be handed down from above, division officers must take the ini­tiative if “The Problem” (to use Mumford’s term) i^s to be reversed.

►  In developing any priority system, hard choice* must be made in advance. Theoretically, it is easier to make those choices before push comes to shove tha° after. Moreover, once the choices are made and the list is established, the division officer has to be p^re" pared to defend and support the reasoning on which his list is based.

►  The critical point in the priority system described is that the division officer must delegate the execution of ongoing and basic functions to his assistants. Although he must remain aware of status and progress in nil areas for which he is responsible, he should do so °ⁿ fundamental and repetitive items (PQS, preventive ; maintenance, record-keeping, etc.) by a system diligent spot checks, inspections, and reports. Only by keeping himself free from minutiae is he able ^t0 devote himself adequately to his own primary bill^et’ which includes functions closely paralleled by opef^a' tional training and major maintenance evolutions- The division officer, in short, sees to it that th^e routine occurs “in automatic” so that he can concen­trate on the unexpected, on special events, and ⁰⁽¹ broader issues which affect his department or

ship as a whole.

►  The divison officer’s main task, therefore, is to pl^a* and coordinate, not to administer the details. Ship⁵

²Robert E. Mumford, “Get off my Back, Sir!” United States Naval tute Proceedings, August 1977, pp. 18-23.

Proceedings / February 1