Professional Notes

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Contents:

The Soviet Anti-SLOC Mission 110

By Captain Mathew J. Whelan, U. S. Navy

Coast Guard Breaks Ice With New 140-Foot Tugs 113

By Lieutenant Michael R. Adams, U. S. Coast Guard

SEATAG: More than a Game 101 Ey Commander Robert M. Nutwell, U. S. Navy The Ombudsman: Who Needs Her? 104 ⁰y Harriet M. Howe

*Tver The Horizon with the Cruise Missile 108 Ey Commander Robert C. Powers, U. S. Navy

Modeling the complex interactions ^u‘ ^ar> engagement between opposing ^task groups, yet flexible enough to ac- ^COtT>modate several different scenarios

^'thout extensive reprogramming and debi Se:

^ugging. Thus was developed the ^a Control Tactical Analysis Game

In Pringle Hall, Naval War Col- ^e8^e, a manual wargame has been de- ^vHoped which is similar in concept to ^e board and chart games played at ^r'ⁿgle prior to World War II.

In 1976, several students in the ^enter for Advanced Research, en- j;^aged in a project to develop tactics ^0r employing the Harpoon antiship ^•ssile in a task group engagement, ⁿeeded a simulation technique capable

SEaTag). This tabletop game, which ^listically simulates an engagement ^etween opposing naval forces, pro- ^vJ'Ied the data required to meet the ® iectives of the Harpoon Task Group ^ployment Study, the results of >ch have been published as a CNO ^act*cal Note.

_to ^SEatag’s playing surface is a five- ^'Seve_n.foot square divided into grids . ^sHectable scale over which the play- jⁿ8 pieces are moved according to the ‘Actions of each tactical commander and subject to the constraints of the game rules. The playing pieces are small cardboard squares coded to rep­resent various ships and aircraft and to denote electronic/acoustic emission status.

The game rules specify the perform­ance and capabilities of the playing pieces and also provide for determin­ing the occurrence and outcome of de­tection and weapons engagement in­teractions. To increase realism most interactions are played as random events by comparing the appropriate probability of detection or kill to a random manner. Logic flow diagrams and worksheets are provided to assist the umpires in assessing interactions. Provisions are also made for varying environmental conditions and the rules of engagement, for using ex­ternal intelligence and surveillance as­sets, for employing merchant ves­sels, and for assessing damage. Game rules can be changed with the stroke of a pen to increase realism or to make the rules more compatible with the objectives of a particular group of players. Thus SEATAG is essentially a concept of flexible, low-cost gaming which can be tailored to almost any set of game objectives and a wide vari­ety of sea control scenarios.

The SEATAG facilities consist of a control room and two task group command centers. The control room contains the master playing surface and playing pieces, templates and compasses for determining detection and engagement events, status boards, and a rule book. The control group consists of the game director/chief umpire and an umpire for each oppos­ing task group. The latter two per­sonnel carry out the orders of their re­spective task group commanders after checking them for consistency with the game rules. The umpires also de­termine the results of any interactions which occur during each move and pass the appropriate intelligence to the command centers. Frequently the um­pires are required to act as individual ship or aircraft commanders in inter­preting and executing the orders of the officer-in-tactical command (OTC). This procedure adds realism and flexi­bility to the game.

The opposing command centers are austere—merely a small plotting sheet duplicating the master playing sur­face, plotting instruments, and a rule

101

ledings / February 1979

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

In the SEATAG control room, the control group, which also arbitrates, makes the moves directed by the opposing command centers. Fleet units are represented by cutouts and numbers; the 5" x 7" cards give ship and aircraft characteristics.

book. As a consequence of their physi­cal separation from the control room, the task group commanders cannot view the main playing surface. Their knowledge of the location, identity, and status of enemy forces is limited to that which is disclosed to them by control. Thus each player experiences the proverbial “fog of war” first-hand.

Although the game can be played with as few as five people, the recom­mended number of players is at least seven: three in the control group and two in each command center to share the plotting and recording tasks.

The game commences with the is­suance by the control group of a “start packet” specifying the scenario and ini­tial location of forces. The task group commanders then develop an overall tactical plan (essentially a mini- OpOrder) and specify their initial dis­position of forces. The game then pro­

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

ceeds as a sequence of discrete moves. The duration in game time of each move is selected by the director based upon the tactical situation and the ob­jectives of the game. Upon receipt of the move sheets from both command centers the control group moves the playing pieces, plays out all resulting interactions between the opposing forces, and discloses the results of the

interactions which would be avails^e to each commander. In order to P^re serve data for post-game analysis, ^a significant communications betwe^e° the control group and the comma⁰ centers are recorded on the mo^ve sheets.

The game continues until one f°^rCe has been effectively neutralized, °^r until the objective of the game ⁰

1

Proceedings / February ¹¹⁷

__________________________ Ji

SEATAG’s contributions are varied, h can be used for tactical research, the Professional education of naval offi­^cers, and training of planning by op- national commanders and their staffs.

As a complement to the traditional Methods of tactical research — Mathematical analyses and computer S'rnulations—SEATAG can provide im­portant benefits. First, manual war­gaming is better suited than the tradi- ^tlQnal methods for simulating the complex operations of an integrated ^naval task group. Realistic simulation °f rhe task group environment is ^necessary for proper evaluation of most ^new weapon systems and tactical con­^CePts. Second, as an adversary process, "argaming subjects each new idea to a More rigorous test than do one-sided analyses

the

fo,

cal

^expertise. The current lack of for-

taen achieved. Normally it is neither necessary nor meaningful to play each game through to the bitter end. Since ^m°st interactions are modeled as ran­dom processes, the outcome of any given set of engagements, while in­teresting, is not statistically signifi­cant. The important insights derived from playing SEATAG pertain to how the engagement evolved from the starting conditions to the point where ^weapons could be brought to bear on the enemy.

The objectives of professional edu­ction at the Naval War College in- ^Utt^e familiarizing each officer with principles of employment of naval rces, the capabilities and limitations naval units, and the ways in which ^e different types of naval units work ^together synergically in an integrated ^task group. These objectives are ^achieved quite graphically by partici­Pation in a wargame like SEATAG. j.^Urthermore, the knowledge gained ^0rn wargaming is instilled at a more j. ⁿdamental level than that derived °rn other methods of instruction. °rr of participating in an exercise or ^an actual conflict, wargaming is the °^nly means available for officers to realistic experience in the em- ^ °yment of naval forces.

Manual, tabletop wargaming offers Means for task group commanders ^Srid their staffs to sharpen their tacti­malized training in task group em­ployment is a serious deficiency in the preparation of officers to serve as tacti­cal commanders or on the staff of an OTC. This deficiency could be largely remedied by using SEATAG or a similar game. Realistic scenarios derived from the contingencies most likely to arise during the staff’s deployment and the employment of its available assets against the forces of potential enemies in the theater could be gamed. Periodic wargames would also give the staff valuable experience at coordina­tion and real-time evaluation and decision-making in a realistic tactical environment. SEATAG can also be used to play out a major exercise in ad­vance. This procedure enables the ex­ercise plan to be debugged, ensures that all units are fully employed dur­ing the exercise, and familiarizes the various staffs involved with the ex­ercise plan.

Like all simulations, SEATAG has limitations which restrict its use to certain types of problems. As a re­search tool, SEATAG is not well suited for problems that require rigorous quantitative analysis. The quantitative results of a single game are not statis­tically significant, and it is impracti­cal to iterate each problem numerous times, as is done in a computer simu­lation, to achieve a high degree of statistical confidence in the numerical results. The significant payoffs of a SEATAG game are the tactical insights gained by the participants regarding the effectiveness of the tactics or weapon systems under study. There­fore SEATAG is best suited for initial evaluation of new tactics and for de­veloping operational concepts for new weapon systems. SEATAG can assist in identifying the critical variables which should be subjected to more detailed analysis.

Perhaps the major limitation in the use of SEATAG for other than research purposes is that it is time-consuming. Although the setup and game play re­quire considerably less time than in many other games, the users of SEA­TAG must be willing to devote a day or two to each game. The actual setup and playing times vary with the com­plexity of the game and experience level of the players. An experienced control group accelerates game flow considerably. Efforts are currently under way to streamline the interac­tion assessment procedures. Pro­grammable mini-computers may even­tually be incorporated in the SEATAG package to expedite game flow by au­tomating the calculation of engage­ment outcomes.

An earlier article in this magazine ("Where Have All the Tacticians Gone?”, Capt. R. A. Bowling, USN [Ret.], pp. 58-64, June 1974 Proceed­ings) stressed the need for more officers to specialize in the art of employing naval forces. Given the limited at-sea exercise time available, wargaming is the logical vehicle to support a re­newed emphasis on tactical expertise. Furthermore, wargaming fills a gap in our research capabilities by providing a practical means of modeling task group-level engagements. Although many people have recognized the benefits of wargaming, this “new” art has not achieved wider application for research, education, and training be­cause existing gaming facilities are few in number, costly to operate, and rela­tively inflexible.

During the 1976-1977 academic year, SEATAG was used to investigate the employment of advanced vertical or short takeoff and landing aircraft in the sea control mission. Most recently, it has been used to study the tactical utility of surface effect ship aircraft carriers. The game is also used as a teaching device in the Employment of Naval Forces curriculum at the Naval War College. An unclassified version of SEATAG has been prepared for use by the Naval Command College and Naval Staff Course, and for use outside the Naval War College. Copies of the classified version of the game may be obtained from the Defense Documen­tation Center. Other inquiries con­cerning SEATAG should be referred to the Director of Tactical Research, Center for Advanced Research, Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island 02840 (Autovon 948-2270).

Perhaps the greatest promise of SEATAG is that, by virtue of its con­venience, flexibility, and low cost, it represents an opportunity to spread the considerable benefits of wargam­ing throughout the naval community.

The Ombudsman: Who Needs Her?

By Harrier M. Howe, Registrar and Coordinator of Volunteers for the Ombudsman University, Fall 1977

There are countless cases on recon

d

In the middle of the night, the phone rang until the ombudsman answered it.

An anxious voice of an older woman came through long distance asking if her son was all right; she hadn’t heard from him for five weeks. The ombudsman explained that the ship had been out on a long exercise, there had been no mail for a while, and she was sure the son was fine. She said that the captain always let her know if there were any personnel problems so that she could inform the families, and ended the conversation by explaining ways of sending messages to the ship if it was necessary to reach someone directly. The mother, greatly reassured, thanked the ombudsman and said she’d wait to hear.

In the Pacific, a harried CO read a typhoon alert. It meant that he would have to delay the transit home for several days. It had been an extra long deployment, and he immediately recognized that this delay would be yet another hardship for his crew’s dependents. But he knew his ombudsman would help; she would contact every wife with the news and help keep spirits up. Working closely with the CO’s wife, the ombudsman had dealt with morale problems during the entire deployment. And because she was there to turn to with problems, many difficulties had been resolved without burdening the CO’s men.

Until recently, the ombudsman idea didn’t really take hold, even though this program was established by Z-gram 24 on 14 September 1970. Originally, it was felt that Navy wives needed an official representative to ex­press their views on all issues to com­manding officers. But the Navy de­cided that any Navy wife could be eli­gible for the position of ombudsman and would be elected by a local wives’ club. The ombudsman’s main duties were to present the wives’ views to the commanding officer and help resolve grievances.

In 1973, it was decided that the CO would select the ombudsman and es­tablish working procedures, since she was his representative to the wives as well as their channel to him. This gave the CO complete control of the program. Accompanying this change was a booklet detailing steps in griev­ance redressing and outlining the de­sirable qualities in an ombudsman.

The most recent instruction con­cerning the program appeared in March 1978. This instruction clearly establishes the use of operations target (OpTar) funding for legitimate ex­penses of the ombudsman, her right to a complete roster, and the responsible use of the franking privilege. The name Navy Wives’ Ombudsman was also changed to Family Ombudsman and any Navy spouse is eligible to be one. An enclosure to this instruction reviews the grievance procedure and suggests the sharing of helpful in­formation through a newsletter and other means. However, there is spe­cific caution against exceeding the scope of outlined duties, assuming so­cial responsibilities, or counseling services more appropriately provided from other sources.

Historically, a sympathetic com­manding officer’s wife or an interested chief’s wife provided the channel through which the other wives in the command could make their views felt arid get injustices corrected. But sym­pathetic command wives are not al­ways willing to serve in such a role. Yet, the need remains to have some­one who can be counted on to be available to communicate the wives’ concerns directly to the command. The ombudsman program is the an­swer to that need.

The official Washington attitude toward the ombudsman program has been cautious from the start. In the major centers of development, San

Diego and Norfolk, for instance, there has been responsible and creative growth. As intended, the program ha* been adapted to local needs both i^fl individual command use and in sup­porting organization. Although one of the program’s greatest assets is its flex­ibility, there can be and have been some false starts. When an individual with the wrong kind of personality and motivation holds the position of ombudsman, the situation can de­teriorate quickly. Also some legal re­sponsibilities have not been clarified which have led some ombudsman councils to overstep their purely sup­portive role. This naturally reinforces the position of those who believe the ombudsman’s official position should be kept very limited.

The ombudsman program, far more than being just a complaint mecha­nism for wives, is turning out to be one of the most effective ways that the Navy, through individual commands, has of reaching out to dependents with both information and support. Noth­ing replaces the personal interest and response that an ombudsman can ex­press to a concerned wife. It’s becom­ing increasingly clear that a good om­budsman is invaluable in boosting morale, keeping information flowing’ and solving minor problems, particu­larly for deploying units.

already of ombudsmen’s efforts beyon¹ the call of duty. Ombudsmen ha^ve made a significant contribution to th^e welfare of Navy families and to favo^f' able reenlistment decisions by man/ servicemen. And many wives ha^ve changed from being complainers ^t0 becoming boosters and believers be­cause of the patient efforts of an om­budsman in a time of stress.

There are many fine programs ^an services available to Navy famib^eS’ but the problem has always been ho'^v

^t0 get the dependents to take advan­tage of the services—how to get the two together. This is where the om­budsman enters the picture. She is the •nstrument for bringing people in ^net‘d to the services that can help them. Experience has shown that de­P^endent’s briefings, handbooks, flyers, ^and advertising are ineffective in Caching people that need help the taost. It often takes someone person- ^a% telling them where to go to get what they need, and then checking to ^see that they got it. Only a few need this kind of hand holding, but they ^are the ones that need it badly. A good ombudsman will work with these people to get their needs met,

while guiding them toward self suffi­ciency and responsibility.

During separation periods, ar­rangements for close and regular communications between the CO and the ombudsman must be made. It is critical to the credibility of the om­budsman that she be informed promptly of all command actions that affect the dependents. Sometimes the CO’s wife may play a key part. She can relay messages, help make judgments, and work closely with the ombuds­man, becoming, as one CO put it, the “command management team” at home.

Some ombudsmen are planning ahead for deployments. For instance,

Commander Naval Surface Force, Pacific (ComNavSurfPac) in San Diego encourages setting up a program which may include videotaping, a half way dinner, a briefing about overseas travel, separation and reunion semi­nars, plans for homecoming, and ar­rangements for a tiger cruise. This gives the dependents something to look forward to and helps mark off the time.

When communication is good, the ombudsman can keep her CO informed about the morale of dependents and any specific problems that develop. Ideally, she works closely with the wives of the CO and XO, the chaplains, and assistance-type agencies in han­dling the more severe problem cases as they arise.

Besides phone calls, the om­budsman’s newsletter is her other main method for maintaining contact with dependents. Sent regularly, it is the best vehicle for passing on helpful information to the whole command community. Since most ombudsmen have limited background in writing or journalism, the quality of the newslet­ters has been very uneven. Om­budsmen often need help in putting out a constructive and readable prod­uct which justifies the use of the franking privilege. It is also helpful if the council or advisor provides sug­gested guidelines including examples of format and listing possible sources of information. The clarification of the ombudsman’s right to a complete ros­ter and the use of the franking privilege has removed many obstacles to effective monthly communication.

It is now recognized that it is un­reasonable to ask women to volunteer for such a demanding position without some training. Two kinds of education are needed: (1) to help the om-

budsman with the informational end of her duties, and (2) to help her with her own personal development and handling of other people and their problems.

The informational and resource training is already established in the Navy Wives’ Information Schools where they .exist. Other sources of in­formation include: Navy Relief courses, Career Counseling School ses­sions, community training opportuni­ties (such as the one offered by the United Way through Guidelines in San Diego), and ombudsman council meetings. To help ombudsmen under­stand and handle emergency situa­tions, "Crisis Intervention” courses have been offered in some areas, most often taught by chaplains. At the Miramar Naval Air Station, San Di­ego, a professional psychologist teaches the course and college credit is given for it. In Norfolk, a six-hour course is given by a team of experi­enced ombudsmen who have had in­tensive Red Cross training in social work skills.

Recently, an innovative approach to ombudsman training has been spon­sored by ComNavSurfPac in the San Diego area. Ombudsman University, the brain child of Chaplain Warren Magor, is an all-day educational expe­rience in which 12 courses or more are taught three times each. This allows the participants to choose the three courses they would most like to take in a given day session. Child care is provided and one set of classes is taught in the evening for working ombudsmen. Catalogs are sent out in advance and attendees are given the opportunity to register by mail. The university is open to any ombudsman in the area and to interested Navy per­sonnel and wives. Among the courses offered is a basic course dealing with job description, organizational skills, relationship with command, resource use, and helpful techniques. Other courses include an explanation of the official program, one on local re­sources, those directed at the om­budsman’s personal growth, and those that cover special problem areas. The university, staffed mainly by SurfPac chaplains, has been condensed and sent on the road to SurfPac installa­tions in Japan, San Francisco, and the states of Hawaii and Washington. This educational experience has been judged highly successful by all those who have taken part and is scheduled to be offered on a regular basis several times a year.

Concern that ombudsmen might consider themselves experts after sup­erficial training in some of the psycho­logical areas has proved unwarranted. The ombudsmen say they realize, as a result of their exposure, how limited their knowledge is and how careful they must be to get their people to the right source of help. Yet the courses do give them enough confidence to be able to handle initial contact with spe­cial problems.

The support structure for om­budsmen at local levels can come from the type command. An example is the SurfPac structure in San Diego in which the ombudsman councils are organized at group levels with chap­lain advisors. The SurfPac chaplain coordinates the whole effort with a monthly SurfPac council meeting of the group council presidents and the ombudsman for ComNavSurfPac.

Another pattern developed in the Nor­folk area. There the Fifth Naval Dis­trict sponsors the Tidewater Navy Wives’ Ombudsman Assembly. This council, which has more than 3^0 members, includes all types of com­mands in the area and has active par­ticipation from the master chiefs and senior enlisted advisors.

The councils act as clearing houses for information by having speakers from local agencies and by continually updating resource material with changes in times, telephone numbers, etc. They provide appropriate forums for recognition and appreciation of i°' dividual ombudsmen as they assume and relinquish their duties. Ofteⁿ workshop-type training opportunities are made available through the council format. COs’ and XOs’ wives are usu­ally encouraged to attend by invitation from their command ombudsman- Their support and interest can be val­uable contributions.

There are those working in the pro­gram who are concerned with over­training and overstructuring of rhc ombudsman. They view with reserva­tion: (1) any growth in council organi­zation and influence; (2) ombudsman having access to the top of the chain °> command for problems; and (3) °ffi' cial guidelines on ombudsman func­tions for a whole area. There is con­cern about anything that seems to d>' minish the fundamental CO* ombudsman relationship and the ind¹' vidual CO’s mandate as absolute guid^e for his ombudsman.

Yet one of the great advantages of the program is that the fundamental relationship between the CO and the ombudsman is left to the CO to de- ^Vel°p. But this means that COs need t° be made aware of various pos­sibilities for effective use of their om­budsmen and basic areas which require guidance and support, including the Present inadequate education of pro­spective COs (PCOs).

There are various possibilities for ^acquainting PCOs with the program. An overview of the different patterns °b development should be taught dur- ^lng the common PCO course given Navy-wide Local briefings could in­dude a seminar in which the basic role °f the ombudsman is reviewed and ^areas in which she needs guidance out- *'^ned. Selection procedures could be discussed, the local support structure ^and training opportunities could be ^explained, and an experienced CO- °mbudsman team could answer ques- ^tl0ns about the implementation of the P^r°gram. To update incumbent COs, [bey could accompany their om- ^udsman (at the type commander’s in- ^v‘tation) to a workshop council meet- ^Irig. A brief presentation about the Possible functions of an ombudsman ^ln the command would be followed by ^a conference between each ombudsman ^and her co.        •

The ombudsman must always guard ^against letting anyone set her up to ^play a “God” role. It is natural for ^ern°tionally dependent wives, espe- ^Clally during deployment, to look for ^SlaPport, and the ombudsman is the ^Dvious target. There are sometimes treasonable expectations that the ^0rr>budsman will have all the answers *ⁿd be willing to give large chunks of ^er time to one person. The wise om- ^uusman learns to establish some gtound rules for self-preservation, |t^e limits for routine calls, calling °^urs for non-emergency matters, and ^COnstant, firm encouragement of the '^VlVes in her command toward self­^Suffici_enCy.

Obviously, not all ombudsmen ^tfe into the program prepared. In ^e election process, COs need to rec- fitiize potential in the candidates. °^st grow in the process of carrying °^Ut their duties. The ombudsman’s

horizons expand as she gathers in­formation, puts out newsletters, suc­cessfully answers questions, and refers problems to the right sources of help.

Once in a while it becomes evident that the appointed ombudsman simply isn’t suited to do the job. Then it be­comes the CO’s responsibility to dis­miss her and replace her with someone who will be effective and responsive to his direction. Even though a CO does not have to justify his dismissal of an ombudsman, it is difficult to fire a volunteer and many COs find it awk­ward to perform this unpleasant task. But the program is damaged when the wrong type of person is permitted to remain as an ombudsman. Om­budsmen themselves talk about how hard it is to give up the position with its special status, even though they might have been reluctant to assume the responsibility in the first place. With this in mind, perhaps om­budsmen should be appointed with a specific term of office. This natural termination date affords both parties a graceful out if there is strain or dis­content in the relationship which does not require immediate action.

The chaplains have a special rela­tionship to ombudsmen. Since theirs is a natural association of purpose be­cause both are concerned with the wel­fare of people, it seems logical that the support and training for the om­budsman have been often assigned to the senior chaplain in the command. But since this is a collateral duty for chaplains, the ombudsman program sometimes gets low priority. There are a growing number of chaplains, how­ever, who are experienced in advising, teaching, and sponsoring support or­ganizations for ombudsmen. Perhaps as an extension of this special minis­try, teams of qualified chaplains could be made available to work with pro­grams just getting started. They could help with the development of the right type of support structure for the commands involved and in training local candidates in basic ombudsman skills so that a minimum standard of performance could be met. Experi­enced ombudsmen, scattered through­out the fleet by virtue of their hus­bands’ transfers, are also valuable re­sources for nurturing of the program

in areas where it is just taking hold.

A major obstacle to realizing the complete potential of the program is the resistance to it from the serv­iceman himself. He has to be con­vinced that the ombudsman is a legitimate, trustworthy, non-intrusive source of help for his wife. The image that the ombudsman needs to have in his eyes is that of a paraprofessional. At the same time she must maintain the volunteer spontaneity and em­pathy that give her rapport with the wives.

The command can help the men to accept the ombudsman’s role by giv­ing her high visibility. For instance, her activities can be included in the plan of the day, she can be introduced at quarters or on “captain’s call” where there is closed circuit TV, and her pic­ture with title and job description can be posted. Using this approach, word will get around if she is genuinely helpful and professional in handling the problems that come to her. It is advisable for her to be consistent, dis­crete, and reliable in the performance of her assigned duties.

The best advertisements for the program are the women it has at­tracted. The overwhelming majority are well-motivated, capable, interested people who are very conscientious about trying to do a good job. Most of them remember what it was like when there wasn’t any ombudsman to turn to, and they are determined to make it better for other wives. They more than justify the confidence, support, and encouragement they have received from key figures like Admiral Thomas B. Hayward, Admiral Isaac C. Kidd, Jr., who recently retired, and Vice Admiral William R. St. George. Their interest has provided a climate conducive to the constructive expan­sion of the program in recent years.

The importance of the well-being of Navy families as vital to the optimum functioning of Navy men is the reason for the Family Ombudsman Program in the “jigsaw puzzle of combat readi­ness.” The Family Ombudsman Pro­gram is open-ended in potential and limited only by a CO’s imaginative use of it and the quality of the om­budsman he selects to represent his command.

Over the Horizon with the Cruise Missile

By Commander Robert C. Powers, U.S. Navy, Ex-Head of the Surface-to-Surface Missile Section on the Staff of the Chief of Naval Operations, and now the Military Assistant to the Defense Science Board, OSD

The over-the-horizon cruise missile is bringing about changes in naval warfare, and the navy that successfully anticipates these changes and struc­tures its forces and tactics accordingly will gain the initiative in seapower. Just as naval aviation proponents struggled before World War II to structure forces to anticipate carrier warfare, so today are cruise missile proponents struggling to structure forces in anticipation of the tactics of a modern naval war. In looking over the horizon to the future, surface forces should be structured to (1) diversify the U.S. Navy’s offense, (2) overcome the horizon detection barrier in using cruise missiles, and (3) use the horizon to maximize the invisibility of surface ships.

The U.S. Navy, in order to diver­sify its offense, must find alternatives to the carrier-based aircraft. (See R. D. Tucker’s “The Cruise Missile: An Offensive Alternative,” pp. 111-114, January 1979 Proceedings.) Although naval aircraft are an essential part of commanding the sea, the right platform for keeping such aircraft in a sea control environment continues to be in ques­tion. The U. S. Navy is seeking new ways to base aircraft at sea, and the

cruise missile can complement the manned-aircraft capability.

For the immediate future, selected surface ships should be equipped with available vertical or short takeoff and landing (V/STOL) aircraft for use in antisubmarine warfare (ASW), over- the-horizon targeting for cruise mis­siles, and limited antiair warfare (AAW). An important surface warfare concept calls for the employment of air-capable cruisers, destroyers, and frigates which will disperse naval air­craft and give such ships more capabil­ity in the sea control role. Forces em­ploying this concept will eliminate the enemy’s potential to negate the naval air arm by disabling a few large ships. For the long-range development, new V/STOL aircraft are being designed for use on board small surface ships rang­ing from 2,000 to 10,000 tons. These small surface ships will be designed to fight the sea control war in a cruise missile environment, securing areas for the employment of power projec­tion transports and aircraft carriers.

The cruise missile can complement naval air by assuming more of the antiship and land-attack missions, thus freeing the manned aircraft for AAW and ASW. In particular, the Tomahawk land-attack cruise missile will provide surface ships with the capability to strike land targets at ranges over 300 nautical miles.

Cruise missile-equipped surface forces should be prepared to overcome the horizon detection barrier. Over- the-horizon targeting techniques must be organized so that all available in­formation from shore-based and task force sensors—including aircraft, elec­tronic intercept, passive sonar, and in­telligence sources—is correlated and passed to cruise missile ships. In addi­tion, new sensors must be exploited. The most promising sensor under de­velopment is a radar ocean surveillance satellite. Other sensors under consid­eration for the over-the-horizon target­ing role include the remotely piloted vehicle (RPV) and the tethered elevated sensor system. The RPV would be a small canister-launched airframe de­signed to classify and track a target. Current funding restrictions have pre­vented development of an RPV that would fulfill the surface warfare mis­sion. The tethered elevated sensor sys­tem would use a lifting foil tethered to a ship to take a radar or an elec­tronic support measures antennae to an altitude at which over-the-horizon

ranges can be achieved. Further defini­tion of system requirements is needed in order to develop a low-cost elevated sensor system.

Sensors external to the surface-to- surface missile-launching platform are important for cueing shipboard sen­sors. Shipboard sensors for the final tactical targeting task are essential, particularly in view of the limited availability and vulnerability shore-based sensors. For example land- or carrier-based aircraft will not always be available, may be preoccu­pied with other missions, and are as vulnerable as the carrier or airfield on which they are based. The ocean sur­veillance satellite system provides in­formation that is available as a func­tion of its orbital cycle, and is vulner­able to antisatellite operations. Ship' board sensors having an over-the- horizon capability will be essential for detecting, tracking, and classifying ^;l non-radiating target, particularly ^,n an area having high shipping density-

Launch criteria for cruise missile⁵ are being established based on the ^a<-' curacy of tracking data and the number of sensors available to classify the potential hostile target. T1>^|S launch criteria will provide the off¹'

cer-in-tactical command (OTC) with various targeting confidence levels ^upon which to base rules of engage­ment. Classification will be the critical element and will be highly de­pendent on own ship-generated in­formation except under the most per­missive rule of engagement criteria.

Combining the V/STOL aircraft with ⁽he cruise missile-launching surface ^ship is a way to provide accurate track- ^ln8 and classification information. This active air, passive ship (AAPS) sveapon system permits a moderate Performance V/STOL aircraft to take off ^with only a light sensor load, thus Permitting longer ranges and on- sration times. This V/STOL aircraft ^°es not have to have high- Performance characteristics, and can thus be small and suitable for use on hoard destroyers and frigates. The ^LaMPS iii helicopter system can par- rially fulfill this role; however, a fixed-wing V/STOL capability could Provide quicker reaction time and in­^Creased survivability. It could also per­form missions of limited AAW, strike, and reconnaissance to complement car- ner air. The V/STOL aircraft would re- ^sP°nd to cueing information and pro­vide tracking and classification data to [he surface ship cruise missile launcher. The V/STOL aircraft would ^e a modern “scout" plane, such as [hose employed by early cruisers and ^a[rleships, but the modern surface ^sh>p would be able to attack quickly at over-the-horizon ranges.

Surface forces should also be Quipped to use the horizon detection ^arr*er. Because long-range cruise missiles free surface ships from closing ^to the horizon of a target, the horizon t>°w provides a detection barrier be- md which surface ships can conceal themselves. Only surveillance aircraft ^arid satellite systems can negate this ^advantage, and their lack of complete ^ayailability and their vulnerability make the horizon detection barrier a ^Vafid concept. In order to take advan­ce of the horizon as a detection bar- ^r,er> surface ships must be able to op- ^etate offensively while remaining elec- ^tr°nically and acoustically passive. In °tder to do this, the ship should be ^e to launch an airframe that re­aves itself from the ship’s position, radiates electronically active sensors, and transmits targeting data. The sur­face ship, remaining passive, copies targeting data and uses it to launch of­fensive cruise missiles.

The AAPS airframe would be op­timized for carrying active sensors with a data link to the ship. The AAPS surface ship would be optimized to operate in an electronically passive mode while receiving cueing informa­tion from off-ship sensors and target­ing information from the AAPS air­frame (V/STOL, RPV, etc.). The AAPS surface ship would have a concentra­tion of passive intercept equipment, both electronic and acoustic. It would have a minimum amount of active equipment—i.e., only that necessary for defense within the horizon detec­tion barrier.

Looking “over the horizon” at naval tactics in a cruise missile environ­ment, a U. S. Navy task force of the future might consist of the following: ^ Amphibious, logistic, and power projection carrier task groups held in reserve pending establishment of sea control

►  A sea control task group made up of six or more 10,000-ton V/STOL cruisers, several air defense cruisers, numerous air-capable ASW frigates, and numerous AAPS cruise missile de­stroyers

►  A submarine task group operating in advance and in support of the sea control task group

The sea control task group would op­erate in a large area formation, con­fronting the enemy with a potent but dispersed offensive capability. The V/STOL cruisers would establish air superiority, protected by the air de­fense cruisers and the ASW frigates. The ASW frigates, with V/STOL and helicopter support, would conduct of­fensive ASW operations, aided by the advance submarine force. The AAPS cruise missile destroyers and the ad­vanced submarine force would conduct offensive antisurface operations. The AAPS cruise missile destroyers and submarines would conduct land-attack operations, striking those bases sup­porting enemy sea control forces.

The struggle by cruise missile proponents to structure forces for a modern naval war is taking place to­day. In order for surface warfare forces to play an important role in this struggle, surface warfare officers should recognize four facts. First, changing from a defensive to an offen­sive role requires the rearrangement of old priorities, sometimes discarding systems and concepts held sacred in the defensive role. Second, surface warfare can no longer be accomplished without the use of an increasing number of airframes (V/STOL, LAMPS, RPV, etc.) on board cruisers, de­stroyers, and frigates. These airframes are not the same as those used for tra­ditional air warfare, but they are products of aviation technology. Third, the age-old distinction between surface warfare ships and aircraft car­riers should cease. Ships of cruiser and destroyer size must be used increas­ingly to support manned aircraft in order to disperse and decrease the vul­nerability of the naval air arm. Fi­nally, dispersal of forces and budget­ary constraints point irrevocably to­ward smaller and more numerous sur­face ships. Battleships were large be­cause of the weight of their armor and the size of their heavy guns. Carriers are large because of the deck space and support required by numerous conven­tional takeoff aircraft. Modern tech­nology has provided an immensely po­tent weapon in a relatively small pack­age in the cruise missile, permitting smaller ships that retain a strong of­fensive capability.

It is time to begin the restructuring of U. S. naval forces and tactics to fit the cruise missile operational environment that lies just over the horizon.

The Soviet Anti-SLOC Mission

By Captain Mathew J. Whelan, U.S. Navy, Commanding Officer, U.S. Naval Security Group Activity, Winter Harbor, Maine

Despite the well-known dependency of the NATO countries on the Atlantic sea lines of communications (SLOCs) for resupply and the historical role of SLOC interdiction in wartime, there are those who argue that the most likely protagonist of NATO forces in Europe, the Soviet Union, does not intend to carry out anti-SLOC opera­tions.

For the first decade and a half fol­lowing the Bolshevik Revolution, the more pragmatic Soviet leaders recog­nized the inability of the industrial base to support a blue-water, capital ship commitment. Instead, a sub­marine fleet, approaching the largest in the world, was developed. Unfor­tunately, the imbalances of the fleet caused by this construction activity and the military purges of the 1930s resulted in a Soviet Navy ill prepared for war.

In the postwar years, Joseph Stalin moved to build, in his words, a “stronger and more powerful” fleet as befitting the Soviet Union’s status as a world power. However, Nikita Khrushchev, emphasized submarine and submarine-launched missile de­velopments. As a result, nine major classes of submarines were under con­struction or modification in the years 1958-1963, mostly at the expense of capital ship development.

The first definitive mission state­ments for the Soviet Navy appeared about this time in the 1962 edition of Marshal V.D. Sokolovskii’s Military Strategy. The main missions of the Soviet Navy, in the order presented by Sokolovskii, are

►  Anticarrier warfare (“the most im­portant task”)

►  "Defeat of the enemy fleet and dis­ruption of his naval and sea communi­cations lines”

►  “Maybe the task of delivering nu­clear missile strikes against coastal ob­jectives” (Emphasis added.)

►  “Support of the ground troops” Sokolovskii also commented that a “certain number of surface ships are also necessary to safeguard the ac­tivities of submarines.”

With respect to the SLOC interdic­tion mission, Sokolovskii noted that nuclear submarines with their high maneuverability would allow maxi­mum concentration of efforts against the SLOCs. Further, diesel-electric submarines would still be used to combat naval communications "as in the past war.”

Sokolovskii stated that these mis­sions would be executed despite the “increase in the role of the initial period of the war” with its emphasis on nuclear exchange and the “enor­mous spatial scope” of the expected conflict. Even in a short-term nuclear war, the Soviet Navy would “keep, the important task of disrupting the ocean and sea transport of the enemy- In fact, the “main aim of military op' erations for naval forces ... is the de­feat of the enemy fleet and disruption of his naval and sea communications

lines.” Operations against enemy communications, which “should b^e developed on a large scale at the very beginning of the war” i.e., “destroy' ing convoys and transports at sea by means of submarines and aircraft, would be “among the main tasks of the fleet in a future war.”

The 1963 edition of Military Strat' egy left the missions intact and with' out change in their relative priority- There was more discussion however, hence emphasis, on the need to <f^e' stroy the attack carrier strike units- The lead role in their destruction v-'as to be played by missile-equipP^eC* submarines and aircraft.

The 1968 edition suggested * changing emphasis in the missions ⁰ the navy. Specifically, the nuclei' powered, missile-equipped submarm^e was elevated to a position equal to th^e Strategic Rocket Forces. Although th^e earlier mission statements were ^f£' tained, the “basic mission” of the fl^eet was stated as “nuclear strikes aga*ⁿ*^c objectives on the continents.” ^^|S

j 97®

^ "destroying ground targets. ^ "destroying forces at sea. .

'^Vas justified by the fact that “funda­mental changes are taking place in the °^rrr*s of armed conflict on all scales—strategic, operational, and tactical.” This statement introduced Western reader to the concept, ^atet attributed to Admiral Sergei G. ^°rshkov, of that category of opera- ^tlons called “fleet against the shore."

If 1971, Admiral Gorshkov signed ^an article on the Soviet Navy which appeared in the Great Soviet Encyclope- ^la■ This article listed the capabilities the Soviet Navy in the following order

important enemy his [enemy] naval

^ "supporting ground forces. . .

^ "landing amphibious forces and spelling the landing of enemy am­phibious forces,

^ "disrupting the enemy’s ocean and sea communications and pro­tecting own sea communications.”

. In a similar article in the 1976 edi- ^tlQn of the Soviet Military Encyclopedia, ^a8ain published over Admiral Gorsh- °^Vs signature, a significant change °^Ccurred. In this version, “disrupting ^nerny ocean and sea communications

and protecting own sea communica­tions” was elevated from last to third place in the hierarchy of navy capa­bilities—read “missions.”

Insight into this trend and the ex­pansion of the anti-SLOC role was pro­vided earlier by Admiral Gorshkov. In the November 1972 issue of Morskoi Sbornik, Admiral Gorshkov mentioned in his summation of World War II antisubmarine warfare (ASW) opera­tions that “in World War II sub­marines were the main means of com­bating enemy shipping and they are even more important in today’s context. ” (Emphasis added.)

In the 1970s, Soviet war-fighting philosophy also began to reflect a con­cern for a protracted nuclear or con­ventional conflict. In this regard, Soviet appreciation for the massive re­supply requirements of Allied forces fighting on the continent crystallized. It is logical to assume in this scenario that initial Soviet naval efforts will be directed toward neutralizing the nu-

clear threat and the means of its deliv­ery. If they perceive themselves to be successful in neutralizing the NATO at­tack carrier force and the actual ballis­tic missile-equipped submarine threat is at a “Mexican standoff,” what will the Soviet submarines do then? Ad­miral Gorshkov and other Soviet naval writers answer the question for us. In his book, Sea Power of the State (1976), Admiral Gorshkov stated that the “oldest mission” of the navy, which “retains its importance even under present-day conditions, is the battle against sea communications and am­phibious landings.”

In tracing what appears to be the evolution of Soviet naval thought with respect to the relative priority of anti- SLOC operations, a significant mile­stone appeared in the May 1976 issue of Morskoi Sbornik. This issue con­tained an extensive treatment of anti- SLOC warfare entitled, “Some Lessons and Conclusions from Experience in the Battle for Sea Communications in World War II.” The article stressed the “further expansion” and increasing "role of ocean and sea shipping” in in­ternational trade. According to the au­thors, “it is of considerable interest to study the experience of the SLOC’s bat­tle in World War II and the possibil­ity of employing it under today’s con­ditions.” Of particular importance, the authors concluded that there is an “historical trend toward the expansion in the scale of combat on the SLOCs and the increase in its significance within the overall system of warfare.” On the strategic plane, anti-SLOC op­erations are "an integral part of the entire armed struggle between the bel­ligerents.” Tactically, there is a “close tie and mutual dependence of the combat operations on the SLOCs and the operations of the ground forces in the continental theater. ...” The au­thors made the point that the belliger­ents of World War II failed to prop­erly plan and conduct anti-SLOC opera­tions, emphasizing the "absence of mutual cooperation between the vari­ous arms of the strike forces."

They found that the results of the war clearly indicated that “submarines were the main arm of the forces in the battle against enemy shipping.” Com­bat experience also demonstrated the capabilities of aircraft and the promise of mine weaponry in anti-SLOC opera­tions. Finally, “under today’s condi­tions the greatest effect against enemy SLOCs will be achieved with the inte­grated utilization of various arms of forces . . . against all the main ele­ments of the SLOCs. . . .”

Since Soviet writings support the premise that anti-SLOC operations are a navy mission, the obvious question is whether the Soviets have such a naval capability.

In assessing this capability, atten­tion should be focused on the North­ern Fleet. Elements of this fleet could reach the open ocean despite an inter­diction effort at the North Cape, par­ticularly in a short-fused crisis situa­tion. On the other hand, over a rela­tively long-term period of mounting tension, the Northern Fleet could mount a breakout effort, if required, through the exercise of the Soviet ver­sion of sea control (as expressed by Admiral Gorshkov in his Sea Power of the State), i.e., control of a. given area, for a given time, for a given purpose. The Soviet Kiev-class carriers and the Northern Fleet’s surface and naval air forces are well suited for this task.

The Northern Fleet is made up of a surface force composed of the “Ka­nin,” “Krivak,” “Kresta,” and “Ka- shin”-class BPKs (large ASW ships), the surface-to-air missile (SAM)-modified “Kotlin” and “Kotlin”-class de­stroyers, a Sverd/ov-class cruiser, and maybe in the near future a Kiev-class aircraft carrier. The “Krivaks” and "Krestas” are equipped with SAMs and the SS-N-14 ASW weapon. The “Ka­nins” and “Kashins” are SAM- equipped, but some of the “Kashins” do possess the SS-N-ll surface-to- surface missiles (SSM). Older “Krestas” carry the SS-N-3 SSM. The Northern Fleet is thought to possess 30% of the total Soviet inventory of these classes of ships. Based on the weapon capabilities of the surface ships cur­rently assigned, it appears that there is little in the way of a surface-based anti-SLOC threat available or intended. This bears out Admiral Gorshkov’s 1976 statements that surface forces will be used in an anti-SLOC role only “in closed theaters and in coastal areas.”

On the other hand, Admiral Gorshkov has stated that the sub­marine will be the main platform for anti-SLOC operations. The Northern Fleet submarine order of battle por­trays this picture. There are four classes of antiship missile-equipped submarines, comprising some 70% of the total Soviet inventory, and at least six classes of attack boats, comprising approximately 60% of the total attack boats inventory. The Jane’s Fighting Ships order of battle shows a count of some 100 submarines of these two types assigned to the Northern Fleet- Clearly, the number and types of submarines represent a credible anti- SLOC force.

Some would argue that the Soviets would commit only one-third of their Northern Fleet submarine force to anti-SLOC operations, while others in­sist that the Soviets intend to pursue only targets-of-opportunity, and they point to the primary, anticarrier and ASW missions to support their view- The facts, however, are that the Soviets realize the import of the SLOCS to a Western effort in continental Europe; recognize the importance of the SLOCs to Western economic stabil' ity; have said that anti-SLOC operations are “among the main tasks of the fleet;” have said that “submarines (are) the main arm” in an anti-SLOC cam­paign; and have equipped their fle^et with the means to execute an anti- SLOC campaign.

Another argument often raised ¹⁵ that the Soviets do not intend to prex­ecute an anti-SLOC campaign because they do not have enough submarines to carry out an effective interdiction campaign. Again, the point is missed- Soviet naval literature and the chang' ing order of battle since the mid' 1950s reflect a gradual evolution i° both Soviet naval thought and capabil' ity. For example, from the mid-1950^s to early 1960s the emphasis was °n anticarrier warfare. The number Western carriers, their deploymen^c patterns, and the introduction of nuclear-weapon delivery capable A-5 aircraft made the strike carrier a prim^e threat in the eyes of the Soviets. Thei^f naval construction programs of ^fb^lS period reflect their concerns.

Prior to 1958, only three submarine

classes were under construction. From 1958 to 1963 nine major classes of submarines, six of which possessed an anticarrier capability, were under con­struction or modification. At the same time two types of strike aircraft, equipped with ASMs, made their ap­pearance in the Soviet Naval Air Force. Finally, two “rocket ship” classes armed with SSMs were built.

After 1963, the emphasis on mis­sions shifts. The strategic attack sub­marine is assigned the “basic mission” °f the fleet, i.e., “nuclear strikes ^against objectives on the continents.” Two new submarine classes, the Yankee” and the “Delta,” appear, ^which are designed primarily for a strategic strike mission. However, construction of antiship cruise mis­sile-equipped submarines continues ^with the introduction of two new classes ("Charlie” and “Papa”). Four ^ne'^v attack classes, albeit some limited Production models and one major— Ac nuclear-powered “Victor”—are in- ttoduced.

In the late 1960s, emphasis again Aifts. Open-ocean ASW becomes a mission for the Soviet Navy. The 'T S. SSBN fleet had grown in num­bers and capabilities and by this time P°sed a more significant threat to the Soviet heartland than the strike car- ^r'^er- In Sea Power Of The State, Ad­miral Gorshkov’s comments closely Parallel the statements appearing ear- '*^er in Sokolovskii’s Military Strategy.

“Diverse surface ships and aircraft are in our naval inventory to add combat stability to the submarine and closely support them, to combat the enemy’s submarines and ASW forces, and to carry out other specific missions.”

Again Soviet ship construction re­flects this change. The Moskva-class antisubmarine cruisers and the “Krivak” and “Kara”-class BPKs are introduced. The “Kara” and “Krivak” both carry the SS-N-14. Soviet ASW- submarine capabilities are not ne­glected; construction of the nuclear- powered “Victor” continues; and addi­tional diesel-type submarines appear.

Although over the last decade and a half primary mission emphasis did change, no missions or tasks were dis­carded, at least as reported in Soviet public statements. Obviously, the fleet’s primary missions, as perceived by the leadership, received the lion’s share in the budget allocation. The justification for such resource ex­penditures also received emphasis in the press. Growing Soviet naval force levels and capabilities obviously reflect these resource decisions, and the major mission changes cited above certainly caused a significant allocation of re­sources. But, at the same time, im­provements to existing capabilities to perform other types of operations were also effected. As Soviet naval capabilities expanded so did their per­ception of seapower and its applica­tion. Soviet appreciation for and broader use of naval power became more evident not only in the real world, e.g., increased out-of-area or blue-water deployments, but also in their public statements. Admiral Gorshkov’s "Navies in War and Peace” (a collection of articles first published in Morskoi Shornik and then translated and published in the 1974 issues of the Proceedings) and Sea Power of the State are representative of this growing appreciation. In both works, we find mention of all the traditional missions of the navy as well as the many other facets of seapower, e.g., oceanography, the role of the mer­chant marine, etc.

To seize a given point in time and count hulls or missile tubes in an at­tempt to gauge intent is to ignore both the evolutionary nature of Soviet thought and the realities of naval con­struction with its attendant long lead-time requirements. It is only through trend analysis of the long­term construction programs that in­tent can be defined with any reason­able degree of certainty. In looking at the Soviet Navy one trend clearly stands out: the Soviet Navy has and continues to maintain the largest multi-mission capable submarine fleet in the world. This fleet can do all those things that submarines do, and to ignore its inherent potential to per­form an anti-SLOC role is the same as arguing over whether a cocked pistol is an offensive or defensive weapon.

Coast Guard Breaks Ice ^ith New 140-foot Tugs

% Lieutenant Michael R. Adams, U.S.

^0ast Guard, currently stationed at the Toast Guard’s Vessel Traffic Center, San

Francisco

Ys part of its continuing efforts to modernize its fleets (both air and sur- ^ace). the U.S. Coast Guard recently m°k delivery of the first in a series of ^a*~new 140-foot, medium harbor ice­making tugs (WYTMs). These new ^Vessels have been specifically designed ^{t0 re}place the Coast Guard’s present '0-foot tugs, all of which are World

War II vintage.

Not only will the new class of vessels replace the older ships, its design is such that the ships should outperform the older vessels in all assigned mis­sions: ice-breaking, search and rescue, towing, and marine environmental protection.

Of the Coast Guard’s present fleet of 110-foot tugs, five are home-ported on the Great Lakes where the last two extremely severe winters and the con­stant efforts at extending the naviga­tion season have created greater de­mand for the icebreaking services of these vessels. Additionally, the hard winters resulted in freezing and ice­blocking of various waterways in the

Comparative Statistics

Coast Guard 110 Tug—Coast Guard 140 Tug

Chesapeake Bay and elsewhere along the Eastern Seaboard.

The new cutters have a greater dis­placement (662 tons vice 384 tons), more than twice the horsepower (2,500 vice 1,000), and a 38% greater beam (37.5 feet vice 27.17 feet) than the 30-year old ships they relieve. As a result, the new cutters should be more capable of performing Coast Guard icebreaking missions during adverse conditions like those of the last two winters.

Apart from her expanded size and power, the 140 will take advantage of a new technological improvement to further increase her icebreaking capabilities. A hull air lubricating sys­tem is installed in the forward part of the ship’s hull near the keel. This sys­tem allows large quantities of low- pressure air to be pumped through openings in the hull. As the air rises to the surface, it generates an upward flow of water which creates an area of “lubrication” between the ship’s hull and the ice.

Such a system should decrease the resistance between the ship and the surrounding ice, and consequently less of the vessel's horsepower is required to break through a given thickness of ice. An experimental forerunner of this system was first tested in 1972 when the Coast Guard Cutter Ojibwa (WYTM-97) was equipped with holed rub rails which permitted a combina­tion of air and water to be pumped through the rails during icebreaking operations. Later this month, the 140’s buble system will be fully tested on the Great Lakes.

The compressor for the l40’s air lubrication system is driven by a diesel engine totally separate from the cut­ter’s engineering plant. Both the engine and compressor are installed in a portable van, located just aft of the deck house, which can be removed after the ice season, providing more deck area for the vessel when not en­gaged in ice operations.

Another significant feature of the hull air lubrication system is that it is divided into four sections by mani­folds which can be selected in any combination by the conning officer- Thus the system can be used not only for icebreaking, but also as a boW thruster for maneuvering.

The ship is equipped with a singl^e screw and rudder, minimizing the possibility that these appendages will be damaged by ice.

When the icebreaking season is over the 140 will shift her emphasis duty to search and rescue. With ^a maximum speed near 15 knots and ^a range of 4,000 miles, the ship will t>^e a much more effective search and res­cue unit than the 110 which has an 11.5-knot maximum speed and only half the range of the new ship.

The 140 has a higher freeboard (six-foot minimum) than the 110- This greater freeboard should alio"' the 140 to continue on search and res­cue cases in weather that might stop or endanger the 110 and will also pro­vide safer on-deck working conditions for the crew in adverse sea conditions-

Proceedings / February lO'T® ____________________________________________________________________________________________________