Comment and Discussion

This html article is produced from an uncorrected text file through optical character recognition. Prior to 1940 articles all text has been corrected, but from 1940 to the present most still remain uncorrected.  Artifacts of the scans are misspellings, out-of-context footnotes and sidebars, and other inconsistencies.  Adjacent to each text file is a PDF of the article, which accurately and fully conveys the content as it appeared in the issue.  The uncorrected text files have been included to enhance the searchability of our content, on our site and in search engines, for our membership, the research community and media organizations. We are working now to provide clean text files for the entire collection.

“Leadership and Nuclear Power”

(See R. E. Chatham, pp. 78-82, July 1978;

C. P. Harris, pp. 21-22, September 1978;

J• W. Asher and P. W. Sparks, pp. 81-84, October 1978; H. C. Lowe and R. Peet, pp. 113-115, November 1978;. A. F. Campbell ^and T. Blades, pp. 96-98, December 1978;

R- N. Lee and T. B. Salzer, pp. 84-86, January 1979 Proceedings)

Lieutenant John C. Morgan, Jr., U. S. Navy—I am writing regarding what 1 consider to be an extraordinarily stimulating response by the readers of Proceedings to Lieutenant Ralph Chatham’s article. Having been Warded the second prize in the 1978 Vincent Astor Essay Contest, I must ^admit that I envied the first-place selection. When I learned that the Prize-winning author was not only a friend but a former shipmate, I was ^ehted. I anxiously anticipated reading Ralph’s essay, for I knew firsthand of h*s fine performance as a naval officer ^ar>d of his keen intellectual prowess. However, after reading his essay, I found myself in almost complete dis­^agreement with his argument. 1 con­fess that at the time I thought his was ⁿ°r the best available essay.

Now, seven months after the initial Publication of Ralph’s essay, I’ve changed my mind. In my estimation, che most significant aspect of Ralph’s essay was perhaps not its content but the overwhelming response that has been printed in Proceedings since its ^aPpearance. If the true essence of the essay contest was to invoke a thought, ^a response, a reaction, then surely Ralph was far more successful than his ellow contributors. Admittedly, most ^responses disagreed with him, as did ' Some responses provided supporting Personal experiences and at least one, Commander Campbell’s letter, was in ^Such poor taste that the author’s

emotionalism precluded an objective and constructive discussion of the issue at hand. Nevertheless, I have thoroughly enjoyed the dialogue.

I applaud and congratulate Ralph and the U. S. Naval Institute for such a thought-provoking and winning selection.

“Extinguish the Smoking Lamp:

Permanently”

($ee J. K. Poole, p. 106, September 1978;

W. F. Stroji, p. 28, November 1978; C. L.

Waite, p. 95, December 1978 Proceedings)

Captain R. L. Surface, Medical Service Corps, U. S. Navy—While I would not agree with all of Lieutenant Commander Poole’s recommendations relative to smoking, most are valid. Education on the harmful effects of smoking, encouragement and assist­ance for those trying to stop smoking, and the safeguarding of the rights of nonsmokers have a place in today’s so­ciety, which includes the U. S. Navy.

Rear Admiral Waite’s comments on Commander Poole’s article are inap­propriate. By his letter, Doctor Waite has put his blessing on a harmful ad­diction which, despite his claims to the contrary, does contribute to dis­ease and death. After all, if a physi­cian says smoking is not harmful, why should anyone quit? It’s a good thing Doctor Waite doesn’t work for the al­cohol industry, or he’d be telling al­coholics that drinking is not harmful to them.

Personally, I was finally able to stop smoking two years ago after 30 years of harmful tobacco usage. It took many attempts to stop though, be­cause tobacco is addictive. If Doctor Waite doubts this let him stop smok­ing immediately for a year to demon­strate his belief. Saul Shiffman of the University of California at Los Angeles

Contents:

Leadership and Nuclear Power

Extinguish the Smoking Lamp: Permanently

Coast Guard Vessel Traffic Systems

The 1782 American-Spanish Expedition

The Need for Trident

My Father Was a Hero

The Through-Deck Cruiser:

The New Capital Ship

Division of Labor in the Western Alliance

Air Force Maritime Missions

South American Navies: Who Needs Them?

KortenaerlF-122: A “Standard” Frigate for NATO Navies

Women in Warships: A Right to Serve

A Requirement to Serve

We Rode the Covered Wagon

Background for the Future of the U. S. Naval Reserve

Containerized Weapons . . . and Merchant Warships

The Violation of the “Liberty”

ASW for the Amphibious Task Group

in his recent study of cigarette smok­ers said, "it has become clear that the withdrawal syndrome is a major bar­rier to the efforts of smokers to achieve and maintain abstinence.” Without addiction you do not have withdrawal.

“Coast Guard Vessel Traffic

Systems”

(See M. R. Adams, pp. 54-61, October 1978

Proceedings)

Captain It⁷. E. Murphy, Southwest Alaska Pilots Association—As Lieuten­ant Adams indicated, vessel traffic sys­tems (VTSs) are here to stay. And most maritime professionals agree with the VTS concept, if not the mechanics. Be­fore the U. S. Coast Guard takes too many kudos, however, I’d like to de­scribe some of my own experiences and impressions as a frequent user of the Prince William Sound system.

The Prince William Sound VTS is mandatory and consists basically of traffic separation (lanes), regulations, and radar monitoring. The regulations require voice communications with the VTS at all times while in the sys­tem, mandatory reporting points, one-way traffic in Valdez Narrows (900 yards across), and speed limits of 12 knots for tankers in ballast and 6 knots loaded. Users generally agree that traffic separation and one-way traffic in the Narrows are necessary and make good sense. The speed lim­its are less appreciated but seem to be gaining acceptance. Roars of dis­content and even ridicule are heard, however, when pilots and shipmasters discuss the radar monitoring and con­trol aspects of the system. That reac­tion, in my opinion, is the Coast Guard's fault, and its cause is the most important problem facing Coast Guard-operated VTS systems nation­wide.

I am referring to the lack of train­ing, expertise, and professional stand­ing of the vessel controllers and other personnel who man the radios and radars of the VTS and who decide which vessels can transit the Narrows and when, whether they are on an imaginary track line, whether they can increase speed to facilitate good han­dling, and all manner of control—all without the Coast Guard accepting re­sponsibility or liability for the safety and navigation of the vessels con­trolled. Tanker captains and pilots wonder why young Coast Guardsmen with no merchant marine licenses, no pilotage endorsements, no radar en­dorsements, and no experience on large vessels are put in the highly responsi­ble position of directing large vessels manned and piloted by experienced, licensed professionals. Some wonder how a service whose largest vessel is 399 feet long can reasonably control the movements of vessels 1,100 feet long and displacing 300,000 tons. Others, less charitably, ask how the institution, whose personnel proved incapable of safely navigating the light draft cutter Cuyahoga on a clear night with only one vessel in the vicinity, at the cost of 11 lives, can manage com­mercial ship traffic on a local or na­tional basis.

Attitudes such as these have devel­oped because the following incidents have occurred:

►  VTS radar is calibrated in yards, military fashion, whereas the nautical chart for Valdez and Narrows and merchant ship radars are scaled in nautical miles, thereby rendering radar information from VTS to a vessel nearly useless.

►  VTS radar speed checks are fre­quently inaccurate.

►  VTS radio transmissions are difficult to understand because they are nearly drowned out by loud rock-and-roll music in the background.

►  VTS reported to a vessel inbound through Hinchinbrook Entrance in fog that there was no outbound traffic; shortly thereafter, a laden 225,000 dwt tanker passed the “controlled” vessel on an opposite course, out­bound.

►  VTS reports navigation buoys as vessels or “unidentified floating ob­jects.”

►  VTS personnel, riding as observers on an outbound tanker, rushed to the VHF radio to report a "vessel on fire,” which was, in fact, a crabber working his pots with working lights on.

Fortunately, most of the incidents of iheptitude took place during the start-up phase of operations. Thanks to a dynamic and open-minded com­manding officer, the Prince William Sound VTS has greatly improved since those first months. Still, mariners know the system is manned by “kids” and they tend not to trust it or, worse yet, respect its capabilities. And that, it seems to me, is something the Coast Guard must deal with. If the Coast Guard expects (as it should) the will­ing cooperation and assistance of us­ers, it must demonstrate that every ef­fort is being made to man VTS with people who are experienced and well trained, and who know how a mer­chant ship is run. Failure to increase the level of professionalism of control­lers and supervisors will breed resent­ment and ridicule by the very users traffic systems are designed to protect. That won’t be good for the Coast Guard or for safety.

“The 1782 American-Spanish

Expedition”                   .

<See E. Beerman, pp. 86-87, December 1978

Proceedings)

W⁷. J. Morgan, Editor, Naval Docu­ments of the American Revolution, and Head of the Historical Research Branch, Naval Historical Center—John Paul Jones has attracted more attention in print than any other officer in U. S- naval history. His tradition-making contributions to the nation’s struggle for independence are well documented. Unfortunately, and not infrequently, some writers have given Jones the laurels for exploits which do not war­rant them. A most recent example is in Eric Beerman’s Old Navy. Here the au­thor writes, "This base [British fort at Nassau on New Providence Island, Bahamas] had been captured in 1776 and in 1778 by John Paul Jones.”

Not so. The 1776 capture was an amphibious action by the first Conti­nental Navy fleet (six ships) under Commodore Esek Hopkins. Jones was present as a lieutenant in the Alfred commanded by Captain Dudley Sal- tonstall. The 1778 capture was a solo operation by Captain John Peck Rathbun in the small Continental sloop Providence. John Paul Jones had nothing to do with this adventure. In fact, at the time, he was commanding the Ranger in European waters.

“The Need for Trident”

<See G. K. Burke, pp. 32-41, November 1978

Proceedings')

D. L. Holley—This article, like so many others I have been seeing lately in defense-oriented publications, seems to go overboard in the doom- and-gloom department, especially in regard to the ICBM and bomber ele­ments of the strategic triad. I think it is a great disservice to refer to the B-52 as ancient merely because of its age. Such reasoning neatly dodges the ef­fort that has been made, and con­tinues, to permit these aircraft to ef­fectively perform their mission.

I also note that this article neatly fails to mention the air-launched cruise missile program and the fact that firm planning for deployment of a cruise missile carrier aircraft to sup­plement the B-52 now exists. The arti­cle also ignores major improvements which are being made in the ICBM force (accuracy improvements, new double force M-12A warheads, etc.).

But, of course, according to Dr. Burke’s article, none of these devel­opments is very important since our ICBM force is "vulnerable” to a theoretical first strike. Never mind the fact that this would be the greatest gamble taken in the history of the world, just look at the mechanics of it. Soviet ICBM readiness rates are much lower than our own. Think of the command and control problems of a massive simultaneous launch, and what of in-flight missile failures, re­entry vehicle fratricide, etc., etc.?

It is much easier to write about something like this than to actually plan to do it. I believe, however, that the United States will do something about deploying an improved ICBM in the 1980s. The Carter Administration apparently plans to put MX and Tri­dent II into full-scale development as a more or less “common” missile. And Congress apparently intends to force this issue as one of the prices for ap­proving a new SALT treaty.

I would like to conclude by saying that while the Trident program (in­cluding backfits into Poseidon sub­marines) is vital to our national secu­rity, so are other programs, and now more than ever we need the full triad to help offset the Soviet threat to us and our allies. We must go forward with modernizing the whole triad, not just part of it.

“My Father Was a Hero”

(See M. Hancock, pp. 88-93, November 1978

Proceedings)

Frank R. Hamlett, Jr.—I hate to “tell it to the Marines,” but during the years I was an officer in the U. S. Army I saw quite a number of Springfield 03s, but I have never be­fore seen one with the bolt handle on the left-hand side of the piece. Further close inspection of the opening picture of the article gives the impression that the man on the right (with his back to us) is wielding a rifle and bayonet in the same left-handed fashion as the man in the center. I had about de­cided that someone reversed a negative when I noted that the man in the lower right sector is holding the automatic pistol in his right hand.

Was the picture painted as shown, or was the negative reversed—or what?

EDITOR'S NOTE: A Tom Lovell painting, by a master of color, always loses some­thing when reproduced in black and white. On close examination, we found that Tom’s signature had also been lost. We found it in the lower left comer where not even left-handed artists sign their work. Sorry, Tom.

“The Through-Deck Cruiser:

The New Capital Ship” .

(See M. A. Cairl, pp. 34-42, December 1978

Proceedings)

Raymond J. Schneider, Jr.—Michael Cairl’s article, while interesting, de­serves a sharp rebuttal. I should begin by saying that I am all in favor of an alternative to the large carrier. The principal limitation of the CV is her vulnerability in the modern arena where sophisticated surveillance tech­nology prevents extended periods of concealment. If the CV can be found, she can be eliminated.

However, Mr. Cairl’s article does not indicate a viable replacement for the CV. Moreover, he makes a number of unsubstantiated claims for the through-deck cruiser. To begin with, the through-deck cruiser is not one- for-one comparable to the CV because it will take at least three or four through-deck cruiser? to match the firepower packed into a single CV. A proper comparison requires a force­matching methodology which com­pares the capability of a through-deck cruiser force to perform the Navy mis­sions against a comparable force con­sisting of a CV and her escorts.

The CV is big, expensive, and vul­nerable. But she’s big because econ­omy of scale considerations make big better. She’s expensive because that much high-technology firepower comes with a high price tag. The same firepower in more hulls will cost more—economy of scale again. The CV is vulnerable because she’s big and because all surface ships are becoming increasingly detectable by tactical and strategic surveillance systems.

The sea control ship (SCS), an austere air-capable platform studied extensively a few years ago, is not unlike the through-deck cruiser in air Capability- Studies conducted at Naval Research Laboratory concluded that the SCS could barely defend herself in a moderate threat environment with no assets left over to conduct other missions.

Vertical or short takeoff and land­ing (V/STOL) aircraft are not compara­ble in range or payload to conven­tional takeoff and landing (CTOL) air­craft. What you save in not having catapults you’ll probably end up

spending for additional fuel capacity. To get equivalent avionics capability into a V/STOL aircraft with the same weight as its CTOL brother you’ll have to push miniaturization to the limit ^and come up with wholly new avionics packaging concepts in the bargain.

The tighter quarters of a through- deck cruiser will call for a whole new ^aPproach to support functions. Sys­tems may have to be much more reli­ve, possibly fault tolerant, hence with a requirement for built-in redun­dancy. Gains made in miniaturization may have to be paid back in the form °f more extensive built-in-test capabil- ‘ty and redundancy.

The bottom line to all this is that you can't turn a mouse into an ^elephant. A through-deck cruiser force concept to replace the CV at a level comparison in firepower is going to cost more, not less. More hulls mean less vulnerability, but more and ^smaller hulls bring along a whole string of expensive problems.

The real problem is not the CV. She’s a victim of circumstance. The ^real problem is those aircraft she car- ^r,es. Every generation they’ve become digger and more sophisticated. They’ve packed more and more com­plex avionics into the package. That has required bigger aircraft, bigger ^engines, and more fuel to make the Whole thing go. The aircraft are the Problem. Turning them into V/STOLs isn’t going to make them any smaller, ⁿ°^r any more effective.

I’d vote for the through-deck cruiser form-factor, but not for her ^aircraft complement. The big aircraft ^ls as much a dodo as the CV. The air- capable ship for the year 2000 and be­yond should go to a mix of cruise mis- ^s‘les, sophisticated remotely piloted ^Vehicles which can perform most of ^tl^,e functions now performed by manned aircraft in less than half the form-factor, and finally I’d round the concept out with a few manned V/STOL ^a,rcraft performing wide-area standoff surveillance and force coordination ^r°les. With that kind of on-board mix assets you might have a chance to ring a through-deck cruiser up to the ‘repower equivalent of the CV.

A few minor points:

* Nuclear power shouldn’t be evalu­ated on the basis of cost to acquire, but on the basis of life-cycle cost and the military advantage offered by the nuclear-powered ship’s unique sea­keeping ability. In those terms, nu­clear power is cheap. y The whole approach of comparing the cost of systems, which are not comparable in capability, is unsound.

►  A through-deck cruiser needs es­corts and probably just as many as a CV by the time you get the force up to firepower comparability.

►  If beam-weapons or other defensive concepts can substantially reduce the CV’s vulnerability, they may extend the life of the CV concept.

“Division of Labor in the Western Alliance”

($ee M. E. Geneste, pp. 42-51, November 1978; D. G. Powell, pp. 21-22, January 1978 Proceedings')

Commander Harry E. Obedin, U. S. Coast Guard—Colonel Geneste’s penetrating analysis of the future course of action for NATO ignored the most important step that West Euro­pean nations must take to protect themselves from being overrun. He has forgotten the tradition of William Tell, who as a free citizen marksman fought to keep his country free.

Europe can trust its population. The Russians and the East European nations can’t. In addition to its cur­rent military reconstruction, Europe should immediately start a citizen re­serve army along the lines of the Swiss model. Local troops, fighting on their home terrain and armed with long- range rifles, plastic explosives, simple mines, land rocket antitank and rocket antiaircraft weapons, could make Europe costly to overrun and impossi­ble to control. Current weapon technology favors the defense. As an added bonus, this type of defense preparation cannot be considered a threat to the Russians as long as they intend to stay within their borders.

In the event that the Russians de­cide to attack, their columns would be quickly bogged down in a hostile countryside. Every village and hamlet would be strong points with defenders protecting their homes and families.

The shortage of fossil fuels, which would accompany any hostility, would also favor these citizen soldiers against an initially more mobile foe.

Any Russian concentrations to overwhelm local resistance would be ideal targets for tactical nuclear weapons. At the same time, regular NATO units would have the freedom to maneuver. Sorties into East Europe and Russia would only have to con­tend with regular East Bloc units. Armed local civilians in the Eastern European nations would not be a prob­lem as long as our troops behave themselves.

A story has been told that early in World War II, Adolf Hitler consid­ered invading Switzerland. When Hit­ler asked a Swiss leader how he would respond to Hitler’s sending 1,000 German soldiers into Switzerland, the Swiss leader replied, “I would issue one thousand rounds of ammunition.” Hitler then asked what effect increas­ing the invading German force to

10.0             men would have on the Swiss. The Swiss leader responded, “I would increase the ammunition issue to

10.0             rounds.” Hitler didn’t invade Switzerland!

Many West European nations have large numbers of unemployed young people. Training these youths as part of a reserve would have social and political benefits beyond the military advantages. The idealism and willing­ness to die for a cause could be chan­neled into the defense of democracy.

The American example of the min- uteman who stood for his freedom at Concord would be something Euro­peans could adopt now. They could even copy our Revolutionary War flag with the rattlesnake and the motto, “Don’t Tread On Me.”

ENTER THE FORUM

We welcome brief comments on material published in the Proceedings and also brief discussion items on topics of naval, maritime, or military interest for possible publication on these pages. A primary purpose of the Proceedings is to provide a place where ideas of importance to the Sea Services can be exchanged. The Institute pays an honorarium to the author of each comment or discussion item published in the Proceedings.

(Continued on page 78)

Comment and Discussion (Continued from page 27)

“Air Force Maritime Missions”

(See H. A. Caldwell, pp. 28-36, October

1978; J. T. Westwood, p. 27, December

1978; P. J. Doerr, pp. 22-23, January 1979

Proceedings)

Major Robert J. O’Rourke, U. S. Marine Corps, Air Operations, Headquarters Al­lied Forces North—Mr. Caldwell’s ex­cellent article is especially timely be­cause of the growing capabilities of the Soviet Navy. He has limited his discussion, however, to U. S. Navy- U. S. Air Force interoperability when, in fact, maritime air operations in Northern Europe at least involve more than U. S. national forces and head­quarters. His article also stresses the potential contribution to be made by B-52 aircraft, when U. S. Air Force tactical fighters may be able to offer a different, though equally significant, type of maritime air support. With this in mind, I would like to offer some views concerning the potential role of fighter aircraft in Northern Europe.

During a general war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, U. S. Air Force fighter aircraft presumably would be deployed as reinforcements to bases within NATO's Northern European Command. The maritime importance of Norway and Denmark, which, along with Schleswig-Holstein (West Germany), are included in this command, should be apparent from a glance at an area map. The Soviet’s Northern and Baltic Fleets pose a sig­nificant threat to the crucial wartime surface reinforcement of Europe from the United States and Canada. The growing amphibious capability of these fleets directly threatens Norway and Denmark. Because of these factors Norwegian and Danish air force attack pilots routinely practice anti-shipping attack tactics. The German Naval Air Arm, with its F-104 aircraft configured with the Kormoran antiship missile, exists primarily for the antishipping role. Reinforcement fighter/attack squadrons from the United States should also be trained in this role if they expect to make a significant con­tribution in this strategically situated area. By possessing such a capability, these forces will be able to provide much needed combat power against not only Warsaw Pact amphibious in­vasion forces, but also against surface action groups that may be within range of land bases.

When employed as reinforcements to Northern Europe, the use of fighter aircraft in an antishipping role may comprise only a part of the total offen­sive air support missions that they are assigned. Within NATO tactical air doctrine, such antishipping air attacks fall into the category of tactical air support of maritime operations (TASMO), which is governed by the command and control arrangements and procedures contained in ATP-34 (Navy) (Air). The potential command and control problem that Mr. Caldwell views as residing in U. S. Navy and Air Force headquarters does not exist in the situation of U. S. Air Force reinforcements to NATO, since they will be integrated into the NATO command and control structure. TASMO, like other offensive air sup­port, is tasked and controlled within the NATO structure, which ensures that air assets are centrally controlled in order to support naval, land, and air aviation requirements.

Much work remains to be done by all NATO air forces in order to increase .our antishipping capability. Mr. Caldwell’s article publicizes a very current issue and contains sound rec­ommendations. I would extend his remarks to include the U. S. Marine Corps air units as well, since they might find themselves in a situation where their powerful assets could pro­vide significant TASMO. Marine avi­ation may be required to conduct

TASMO as part of its mission of satisfy^­ing the air requirements of a marine air-ground task force, or as part of i^fS relationship of mutual support of other theater forces.

Whether the TASMO mission <^s flown against amphibious invasion forces or against surface action group⁵ attempting to gain control of the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom gap, TASMO is now a capability r^e­quired of air forces that have until very recently regarded it as a purely navy mission. Mr. Caldwell has done us a service.

“South American Navies:

Who Needs Them?”

(See R. L. Scheina, pp. 61-66, February 1978; G. J. Tarrico, p. 85, August 1978;

C. C. Herbert, p. 115, November 1978 Proceedings)

Captain Carlos Enrique Zartmanth Argentine Navy—I heartily congratu­late Dr. Robert L. Scheina. It cer­tainly requires a great deal of personal courage to write on such a topic.

Interestingly, his views closely parallel those of many South America⁰ naval officers. However, as one wh⁰ happens to be on the firing line, all⁰"' me to assert that the majority of South American naval officers I have known are concerned about the U. S. Stat^e Department’s current policy vis-a^-vlS South American countries. We recog­nize, as naval officers, the compatibil­ity we share with our colleagues in th^e U. S. Navy, but we are forced now ^t0 live by some U. S. policies and at^­titudes that we find both confusing and irritating.

Dr. Scheina’s article has generated ³ great deal of discussion here and is al' ways addressed at any informal gather­ing of my colleagues. The consensus ^,s that it is an excellent, although und^er' stated, article. For example, Latiⁿ

Americans have much more than sensed a changing attitude in U. S. policy towards providing material as­sistance to their navies;” we have felt fhe critical results of such changing attitude with pain. Not only has all ^a'd been cancelled, but credit sales have been reduced as well, in spite of the fact that they were merely a finan- ^Clal convenience, with interest rates attached, to allow for the military hardware to be paid on a short-term basis, instead of in full, after delivery. These reductions, in some cases, have been imposed in such a way that sev- etal of the major South American oavies have felt that to accept these conditions was not compatible with national dignity and have conse­quently rejected them altogether.

The problem goes further. In many Tatin American countries, one could easily draw up a long list of paid-for military hardware which was delivered Peking in essential parts, and many of ^th°se parts remain unprovided for sev­^eral years or even longer. As a result, ^c°mbat readiness has been reduced ^Slgnificantly for reasons considered un­just and beyond our control. Right now, there is equipment, which was sold to Latin American countries by the U. S. Government, ready for ex­port, but, because of endless delays in the U. S. State Department’s award­ing of export licenses, it is still sitting in the United States.

To complicate an already serious problem, the U. S. Congress has voted to prevent any U. S. private company, in the immediate future, from selling military hardware to some countries which are not up to the standards some people in the United States believe it is their divine mission to impose upon sovereign and independent states. As far as these “internal affairs” standards are con­cerned—and more specifically the “human rights” issue—such attitudes would be respected and admired for their idealistic content, even by those against whom they are applied, if everyone concerned could see that no matter in what part of the world a vio­lation of human rights occurred, or whatever the relationship between the United States and the offending na­tion, courageous American public opinion would rise in shining armor until the evil had been destroyed. But this is not the case.

The U.S.S.R. and its satellites could not care less about U. S. public opinion, and therefore are not attacked according to the degree or extent of their violations of human rights. In addition, several African nations, which are governed by medieval-style ' rulers who have no regard for human life, much less for human rights, seem to be able to go about their business. Who comes forward, may I ask, to condemn these countries? The human rights issue, I believe, should have no geopolitical boundaries, and the fight for its effectiveness should not be af-

Two Argentine destroyers were there when the United States needed them to participate in the blockade of Cuba in 1962, thereby displaying, in the author’s words, “the capability and the will to face the Soviets.”

fected by political considerations to­wards strategically located countries which are either staunch allies or favor the U. S. trade balance by spending large amounts of money on American military hardware.

Finally, we come to a small group of nations which has always been known for its permanent respect for the rules of a Western, civilized way of life and has always been on the West’s side in world affairs. But these countries have recently been forced to impose restrictions upon their citizens simply because they have been the ob­ject of a vicious and cruel aggression on the part of extremists and left-wing terrorists. Why these same countries are now the main target of the U. S. human rights campaign is something we have difficulty understanding.

It is bad enough to be misjudged, misquoted, and mistreated by people having little knowledge of the circum­stances involved in a given situation. It is even worse when these people provide themselves with a set of pre­conceived patterns in order to address their zeal to situations which they do not understand. However, to those who are thus condemned without the benefit of a jury, the hardest pill to swallow is to be told to accept their critics’ “moral right” to pass judg­ment on them!

It seems that the human rights of an attacked population to live in peace and freedom are, of course, not so im­portant as long as the gang of fanatical criminals, who show no respect at all for human life, may enjoy the human right to use every loophole in a legis­lative system, which was not con­ceived to apply to their type of crimes, in order to escape punishment. This attitude has gone so far as to induce the U. S. Government to vote against international finance agencies granting credits to some countries for allegedly violating human rights. Inasmuch as such credits were designed to provide housing, irrigation, and other public projects to raise the living standard of the poorer classes, the inflicted pen­alty only harms the very people who were to benefit from the credits.

There are different kinds of "elected governments” which seem to be to­tally unknown to people in the United

States. Take Argentina, for example, where military takeover was really the ultima ratio in order to recall this country from an incoming Marxist re­gime as well as from the deepest polit­ical, economic, and social corruption it had seen in its history. In this par­ticular case, the situation was not far from witnessing the arrival of the Cuban mercenaries.

Another argument that has been brought up time and again is that weapons sold to Latin American navies are being used to deny human rights, support dictatorships, and overthrow constitutional governments. However, neither destroyers nor antisubmarine patrol aircraft are suitable for such political purposes.

Another irritating point is the bad U. S. habit of choosing lower-level of­ficials to visit foreign countries with the purpose of examining the local human rights situation, giving advice on how these rights should be han­dled, and emphasizing their criticisms at press conferences. Patient, friendly governments, which prefer to accept such visits so as not to make things worse with the Big Brother, should not be mistaken for naughty school boys in need of a reprimand. Nor are self-righteous third- or fourth-rank envoys, who are sometimes not well experienced in foreign affairs, the best interlocutors to speak with sovereign states. Some people in public positions ought to think first if the national pride and dignity of their own country would accept a treatment such as the one they hand out to others.

This closely parallels the habit which some boards, commissions, and committees have developed of accept­ing as gospel truth the testimony and hearsay evidence that radical group leaders from foreign countries bring before them. These gangsters, who live like princes with the money they have acquired by blackmailing and kidnapping, indulge in such prop­aganda activities, normally after flee­ing from their own countries, in order to avoid the fate that awaits them there for their vicious crimes. The of­ficial statements of the accused gov­ernments, on the contrary, have, by far, much less weight, if and when they are taken into consideration by those not so objective and impartial courts, whose attitude seems to re­spond to the philosophy, "I have al­ready made up my mind, so don’t con­fuse me with facts.”

What would the U. S. reaction be if, for example, a Latin American country sent a deputy-assistant under­secretary of a ministry to Los Angeles to publicly investigate if the wiping out of the Symbionese Liberation Army had been carried out with due consideration for the human rights of those terrorists? Or, what would be the reaction if a committee were set up in that Latin American country to conduct hearings on a presumed viola­tion of the human rights of the “Man- son Family,” on the sole basis of statements given by a hypothetical ex­iled member of that gang?

When terrorist groups are allowed to grow up sufficiently into several thousands of so-called “fighters,” as was the case in Argentina under the preceding “democratic” government, to dispose of them requires a full-scale war such as the one the Argentine armed forces have been waging, quite successfully, for the past three years or so, against an enemy, of that kind- This war, incidentally, is a very “dirty” one indeed, because terror in every conceivable form is the main weapon which the Marxist opponent employs. Make no mistake about it, this is World War III, and, as in any war for that matter, civil liberties pose a problem.

A few years ago, when terror reigned over Argentina on a scale even worse than in Italy today and scores of military officers and government offi' cials, as well as business executives (U. S. citizens among them), clergy' men, journalists, lawyers, professors, judges, and whatever high-level intel­lectuals who were not absolutely “red,” were kidnapped and/or assassi­nated, no foreign government nor in­ternational group raised a single voice to defend the human rights of those people. But now, when law and order have been restored to a large extent m our country, the outcry about human rights violations in Argentina is sus­piciously escalating at the same rate the terrorists’ operational capabiliti^eS are diminishing. And as far as the things under its control are concerned, the Argentine government has been publishing lists of people who are held *n prison for subversive activities. These people are being judged by the courts with due respect for the process of law. This is, by far, more than the terrorists themselves have granted to their own victims. Incidentally, no­body has been jailed in Argentina for expressing dissenting opinions of the government's actions, and conse­quently there are no “political prison­^ers ’ in our country but only delin­quents who are in prison for endanger- ^lI>g the lives of their fellow citizens. Nevertheless, and as a member of the Argentine government put it, “it is a ^Sad thing to realize that this part of rhe world is considered negotiable and has therefore been abandoned by those ^We thought were our best allies!”

In 1977, and again in 1978, the Argentine Navy had to drop out of UNITAS naval exercises—for the first ^two times in nearly 20 years—because rhe restrictions on U. S. supplies forced ¹¹ m establish a tight rationing of the existing spare parts. As a result, ships and aircraft of U. S. origin could be used only for national operational re­quirements.

Prior to the UNITAS exercises, each South American navy operated with its own tactical procedures and signal books. Today, UNITAS exercises—and this might shed some light upon the “obscure origin of the word"—have brought about the unification of tactical doctrine and communications proce­dures all around South America. We now have an Inter-American Naval Communications Net, and every navy connected therewith is able to operate with any other Western navy using standard NATO procedures as well as the English language. During the Cuban Blockade, for example, Argentine de­stroyers A.R.A. Espora (formerly USS Dortch [DD-670]) and Rosales (formerly USS Stembel [DD-644]) were able to sail from Puerto Belgrano, Argentina, to the former U. S. Naval Station in Trinidad in nine days (at over 20 knots sustained speed) and were ready for ac­tion with the U. S. Task Force 137 off

Cuba. These ships were able to serve because of their operational readiness and knowledge of U. S. Navy proce­dures which they had gained a few weeks previously during a UNITAS ex­ercise.

SYNTHESIZED AT CHANNELIZED PRICES

The New SYNCH AN Family of Synthesized / Channelized HF SSB Communications Equipment

REMOTE CONTROLS

■  Synthesizei to generate up to 10 channels (20 frequencies)

■1.6-30 MHz In 100 hertz increments

■  LSB, USB, AME, FSK,

CW

■  3pp 10-⁸ standard, 1pp 10-® and 1 pp 10-® optional stability

Companion Programmable Antenna Couplers Are Available For The SR-240 and SR-140 Transceivers

Operating frequencies are programmed to the front panel switch by entering the desired frequency into a solid state memory using the internal keyboard and display. The channel frequencies can be changed in the field by entering the new frequencies into the memory from the keyboard. Operation on all frequencies Is inherent within the equipment. Changing frequencies does not require any crystals, other components, or test equipment.

SR-140 SYNCHAN 1 KW HF SSB TRANSCEIVER

~:l]

SR-145 SYNCHAN 10 KW SSB TRANSMITTER

.4

SR-1650A DIGITAL TELEPHONE LINE REMOTE CONTROL

■  Telephone Line Or Microwave Link

■  Full Remote Control of All Functions

■  Noise and Cross Talk Immune

m

Scientific Radio Systems Inc.

367 ORCHARD ST. ■ ROCHESTER, N.Y. 14606

CABLE SIRAD ■ TELEX 978-368 ■ PHONE (716) 458-3733

*•— SYSTEMS —■                     EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES AVAILABLE, PLEASE CONTACT PERSONNEL DEPT.-EQUAL OPPORTUNITY EMPLOYER

What purpose is there in the United States helping to weaken those forces which have shown both the capability and the will to face the Soviets? Besides making up a viable force capable of ■ combined operations, South American navies have now advanced a long way toward being prepared for the day when NATO will overcome its “Tropic of Cancer Syndrome” and its naval plan­ners will take action for the protection of shipping lanes in the South Atlantic Ocean. The facts are that this area and the Indian Ocean are their own back­yard and that their enemy, although he will of course attack them at their front door in the North Atlantic and Mediter­ranean, will also be intent on destroying at leisure NATO shipping in those waters where the Western Alliance has, until now, refused to include in its naval re­sponsibilities.

Besides the combat ships, aircraft, and well-fitted bases that the South American navies can contribute to Western defense, something more is needed to protect shipping: a naval shipping control organization. And the Atlantic seaboard countries of Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, and Paraguay have matched their navies into a shipping control organization called CAMAS. Its command shifts every two years between Brazilian and Argentine admirals, and it uses NATO procedures, has a regular communica­tions net, keeps track of shipping in the western half of the South Atlantic, is ready to assume control and protec­tion duties, gives schooling to mer­chant navy officers, carries intelligence and statistical data, and regularly ex­ecutes control exercises with NATO and other Western navies. CAMAS was born of the free will of the four na­tions involved, following recom­mendations of the Inter-American De­fense Board, as a contribution to the defense of the Western World. Al­though the United States was not a godfather at the christening of the newborn baby about 11 years ago, the U. S. Navy, which benefits from its close and continual relationship with CAMAS and has never had to contrib­ute significantly to this organization, must surely know what it stands to lose if this close relationship were to be severed because of the application of blunt, shortsighted, and irritating political policies.

Moreover, the very existence of CAMAS, with its integrated combined staff composed of naval officers from the four nations involved, is in itself a denial of any suspicion of unfriendly, or even aggressive, intentions among these countries.

“KortenaerlF-122: A ‘Standard’ Frigate for NATO Navies”

(See E. Bonsignore, pp. 154-158, November 1978 Proceedings)

Richard A. Haber, Marketing Manager, Naval Surface Armament, Electronics & Space Division, Emerson Electric Co.—We enjoyed Mr. Bonsignore’s article, and were also pleased to note that the SEM-30 Goalkeeper was men­tioned as a possible choice of defense system aboard the Kortenaer frigates. However, I’m happy to advise that it is a Signaal, Emerson, and Mauser venture and does not involve Hughes. We are very proud of Emerson’s par­ticipation in the program because we believe that we are setting a unique precedent in industrial cooperation in NATO countries for naval weapon sys­tems.

“Women in Warships: A Right to Serve”

(See J. F. Kelly, pp. 44-53, October 1978;

K. G. Hensel and R. Lane, pp. 86-87, January 1979 Proceedings)

“A Requirement to Serve”

(See R. L. Quigley, pp. 52-53, October 1978 Proceedings)

Lieutenant Commander John L. Byron, U. S. Navy—The assignment of women to the crews of Navy ships is a very bad idea. In it one sees the appli­cation of a difficult, risky, and costly solution to a nebulously defined prob­lem, one which has no direct relation­ship to either the Navy’s mission or national defense. The courts or legisla­tion may force the Navy to accept some version of women-in-ships, but that is much different from the Navy itself seeking this accommodation. Three problem aspects of women-in- ships which must receive more atten­tion have to do with litigation, reten­tion, and the predictable performance of women in combat.

Acceptance of some limited version of women-in-ships is an invitation to the judicial branch to take a major role in defining Navy manning and as­signment policies. As Captain Quigley notes, litigation will certainly follow token assignment of women to Navy ships. The men’s lawsuits will seek to put male shipboard duty on the same voluntary basis as the women’s and with the same sea-shore rotation, liv­ing accommodations, and other condi­tions of service. The women will want nothing less than absolute parity with men in their assignments. Such a move will produce two results. First, the final collection of court-imposed rules and policies will not be good for the Navy; it will be a grab-bag set of

disjointed guidelines related to the Navy’s mission only as individual judges understand that mission to be- Second, while this mass of lawsuits makes its way through the courts, the Navy’s business will likely be ham­pered severely, both by the work of litigation itself and by injunctions and other court orders incident to the suits. And some federal judge may even order a ship to remain in port pending resolution of a lawsuit involv­ing sexual discrimination.

Until the present, the Navy’s policy has been clear: males must go to sea; females cannot. Judge John J. Sirica’s findings that this stand is unconstitu­tional might seem to alter this, but his ruling has final meaning only if is sustained through all appeals and legal efforts to reverse it and then only if no legislative remedies can be found. The Navy must fight Judge Sirica’s ruling and vigorously defend its traditional policy forbidding the assignment of women to ships, if only to avoid the other legal battles which are sure to come.

As those with recent fleet expert" ence know, some of our sailors will bring suit against the Navy in a wink, and it would appear that there exis^ts in the legal profession a group eager to assist them without regard for the frivolity of their charges and lawsuits- The suits, sure to come if women-m' ships is accepted, however, will not be frivolous. If the Navy tacitly admi^tS that its traditional policy forbidding the assignment of women to sea duty was discriminatory and yet persists ¹⁽¹ some—any—distinctions in assig⁰' ment and manning for which sex ^lS the basis, it is giving every Navy P^er' | son standing to sue until no d^,s' tinctions remain. And sue they will- The impact of women-in-ships °ⁿ retention could not have been suff¹' ciently considered. A Navy wife cat>" not help but be deeply threatened by sexual integration of ships during ^e%' tended voyages and lengthy deploy' ments. Many wives will feel coO¹' pelled to attempt to induce their hu^s" bands to find new lines of work at tb^e end of the husbands’ obligated service The family man, officer or enlisted’ now so important to the manning ^str bility of the Navy, will be far l^esS

9?⁹

"fhe duality of roles became en­gined in the very nature of man and '^Vas Nemental in the success of the P^cies. The visible aspects of man’s ^UaI dimorphism which underlie ^^anV of the obvious problems of _lu ^eo-in-ships result from this evo- n'onary history; these, like the sexu- > ^termined emotions and mind- ^which also evolved, persist today. °^ugh modern conditions involve f ^etles and economies entirely dif- ,^rent from those which evolved the

^aod ^r°^^{eS t}^^{C sexes}’ ^t^^ie roles rheir underlying emotional and b_e ^nta determinants persist strongly f ^Cause insufficient time has passed the ^evolutionary f°^{rces t0} weaken

likely to remain in service if his wife Perceives that there is a good possibil- ‘ty of his going to sea with women. If Navy wives cannot feel secure in the essential aspects of their marriages be- eause their husbands will (or even ^rrught) be stationed with female shipmates, there looms a retention ^Cfisis of disaster size. This serious risk, ^which like the risk of endless litiga- ^tl0n> can be avoided only by keeping ^w°men off ships.

If the Navy reverses its policy to P^errnit women-in-ships, that change ^and the court-directed additional pol- ^lcy modifications which will follow ^w'll almost surely bring the situation ^which females will fill billets and ^e®dership roles which would involve ^t^^lern directly in combat. Here the Problem is a biological one. In the Past decades, there has emerged from anthropology, ethology, and other studies of man as a species an under­handing of the nature of man’s evolu- h°n and its present-day implications. _f^0st pertinent in this area is the work ⁰ Lionel Tiger, described in his book In Groups (Vintage Books, 1970). ^r- Tiger’s studies indicate that man ^e hunter, the aggressive predator, Sained clear evolutionary advantage ^r°^ugh the development of distinct ^roles for the male and female. The ^ale hunted, fought, took risks; the male, less capable in these activities, ^ad her own role, devoting her ^eriergies to child bearing and rearing ^aod to tending the fire and keeping home.

Thus, though women are certainly capable of crewing a ship, there is serious reason to believe that they will not fight their ships as well as men. It is not the nature of women to go in harm’s way. To ignore this obvious fact is to put to sea a Navy less able to defend the nation.

The matters discussed above bear on the impending test of the feasibility of assigning women to ships, a test in which the crews of five non-com­batants will be sexually integrated. This test may well start an irreversible process and may not be only a limited experiment. Whatever the designed scope of the test, its undertaking may make it impossible to legally prevent the full-scale sexual integration of the Navy at sea. Beginning the test in re­sponse to charges of sexual discrimina­tion will make it very difficult to use sex as the basis for any distinctions in policy in the future.

Within a narrow definition, the test will almost certainly succeed. There is the obvious determination to make it work and with the women being a screened, elite group of volunteers, specifically trained, supported, and given high management attention, they will do well. Indeed, experience already gained in the Sanctuary (AH-17), tugs, dry docks, and in the Coast Guard has shown that women can func­tion adequately as crew members.

The question, however, is not whether women can serve in ships, but, rather, whether they should. Be­fore the Navy moves ahead along its enlightened path, it needs to decide whether the assignment of women to ships is wise. That judgment seems to be missing.

If it must be that women are as­signed to ships, if pressures force this, or policy says it is wise, there is a bet­ter course than to sexually integrate crews: give women a ship of their

own. Give them several ships, all sizes, all types, as appropriate to the availability of female crew members and their ability to serve. In this mode, the dangers are more manage­able, the costs are predictable, and the majority of the problems associated with sexual integration are avoided, all in a fair, non-discriminatory man­ner that does not invite lawsuits.

The Navy’s concern for its female members is laudable, as is the re­straint and fairness of the women who serve so well in the Navy. The ques­tion of sea duty for women is an in­tractably difficult issue which may defy good solution even after any ex­isting elements of male chauvinism and feminist cant are removed. The Navy owes it to its women members to explore the matter exhaustively, but it also has an obligation not to take action which will weaken it as a fighting force either by placing women in combat roles beyond their biological capabilities or by creating a myriad of crippling problems in ships incident to a noble change of policy. As there is no situation here demand­ing immediate and drastic action, a slow approach would seem the intelli­gent course. Wisdom, patience, and a sense of history should guide the Navy in this serious matter. If the wise an­swer is to continue present policy and not assign women to ships, the Navy should hold firm.

Captain Charles 0. Cook, Jr., U.S. Navy (Retired)—I don’t see why it would be advantageous to mix the sexes in combatant ships, whatever the law, nor has Captain Kelly shown that it is required. Neither did he consider the question of homosexuals which, I submit, is relevant.

The exclusion of homosexuals from the withdrawn, crowded environment of the typical warship, which has led to their exclusion from the Navy as a whole, has not, so far as I know, been questioned in the Navy, yet the basic reason for excluding women is the same. Homosexuals are excluded be­cause, as experience has shown, homosexual relationships in the close confines of a warship can result in the subordination of duty to private inter­est and, when existing between junior and senior, in gross favoritism or at least in a general perception of it among others with disastrous results for morale.

There is no reason why the same re­sults should not follow from hetero­sexual relations in a ship’s company of both sexes, and nobody supposes that such relations can be prevented. Few would consider it wise to have the commanding officer’s wife serving in the crew, and it is difficult to see why the absence of a valid marriage certifi­cate in such a relationship would make the situation any more acceptable.

Frank R. Hamlett, Jr.—Captains Kelly and Quigley have addressed this complex situation carefully and thoughtfully from different points of view, and I think it is significant that they both conclude that the problems will be solved because they must be solved. However, neither officer has suggested a mechanism to give the women (and men) of the Navy some flexibility in the choice of duty and, at the same time, to avoid the quagmire of legal action in suits charging dis­crimination, both “forward” and “re­verse.”

I have no easy or complete solution for this, but I think it is worth while to consider rate, rank, and pay as in­centives to Navy people to choose among two or three options. In the ci­vilian work world, the difficult and disagreeable jobs are filled by paying a premium wage for their performance, and possibly offering fringe benefits as well. As cases in point, look at the construction of the Alaska pipeline and the manning of offshore oil rigs.

I suggest that the Navy consider placing different ceilings on the rate, rank, and pay of both men and women, according to their selection of a “service category.” As a start, we could say that Category 1 is restricted to shore duty only; Category 2 is re­stricted to service in non-combatant types of ships and aircraft; and Cate­gory 3 is completely unrestricted. The Category 3 volunteer agrees to serve where needed, when needed, and with no qualifiers. In return, he or she is given the potential for the greatest

rewards. Of course, then, the Category 1 and Category 2 volunteers agree to sacrifice potential rewards propor­tionate to the relative comfort and safety of their chosen environments.

“We Rode the Covered Wagon”

(See J. R. Tate, pp. 62-69, October 1978;

A. B. Bennett, p. 28, December 1978; A. M.

Price, p. 89, January 1979 Proceedings)

Rear Admiral Donald Royce, U■ S' Navy (Retired)—Admiral Tate re­ported that “Pennoyer took the flight course at Pensacola and became the only Construction Corps pilot in the j Navy.” However, Holden C- Richardson, “Captain Dick,” Class of 1901, had long been a naval aviator, conspicuous in the early development of naval aviation, particularly sea­planes, flying boats, catapults, and ar­resting gears. He did much design work on the NC boats and was a pil°^c on the NC-3 which landed off the Azores but was damaged preventing further flight. Pennoyer was not even the second naval constructor with wings, being preceded by myself and Art Miles. We qualified in late 1922 and received our wings in 1923- “Background for the Future of the U.S. Naval Reserve”

(See). H. Hessman, pp. 144-157, May 1978, J. S. Kellog, p. 23, July 1978 Proceedings)

“Containerized Weapons . . • and Merchant Warships”

(See N. Polmar, pp. 133-136, March 1978; R. S. Reade, pp. 24-25, June 1978 Proceedings)

Captain E. R. Fink, Judge Advocate General Corps, U.S. Navy, Deputy A*' sistant Judge Advocate General (Reserve Personnel)—James Hessman’s great ar­ticle recites the history of the Naval Reserve and gives us some good sight as to the future mission of th^e Naval Reserve. He stops short, how­ever. His article should be followed by the speculations of Norman Polmar to give us an indication of where the neW era in Naval Reserves is taking us.

After World War II, we built train' ing centers and mothballed perfectly good fighting ships. Thus, we wer^e

979

ready for another World War II. We ⁿ°w know that there won’t be another ^War like World War II; both sides ⁿ°w possess the capability for mass de­struction at the outbreak and technological improvements now come too rapidly for any mothballed ship to be of any value.

This country has a "minuteman” tra­dition which favors reserves over regu- ^Iars- In time of need, the patriot put down his plow, grabbed his trusty horse ^and hunting rifle, and defeated the ^enerny. This concept worked well through World War II, but modern ⁿaval warfare now is too complex and sophisticated for this type of citizen sol­dier. The role of the reservist must be restructured. The failure to do so, in my °P*nion, results in the Navy’s failure ^w*th the Department of Defense (DoD) ^ach year at budget time. As Mr. Pressman pointed out, the Senate Attned Services Committee called for a approach to the use of the Naval ^eserve in 1977. The House also tried ^teH us something in their proposed °tal Forces Act (H.R. 13164) in 1978. If enacted, this bill would provide for 102,000 Naval Reservists in the Selected Reserve under the command of a three-star Ready Reservist. Although the legislation didn’t pass in 1978, I believe it is a warning that Congress will restructure the reserves themselves unless we do something. Here is what the proposed act says, in part:

“§ 262. Purpose of reserve com­ponents. The concept of the United States of America military forces traditionally leans toward the citi­zen military force as opposed to a standing armed force. Reserves are the bulk of our military manpower and generally are less expensive than active forces, and the Reserves are expected to share equal respon­sibility with active component per­sonnel in providing for the Nation’s security. It is the intent of the Congress that the Reserve compo­nents shall be an equal element in a partnership with the active compo­nents of the Armed Forces. Accord­ingly, the forces and related assets necessary to provide for the national security shall be shared appropri­ately between the components in a manner which places the Reserve components in a readiness posture consistent with their mission and co-equal responsibility, except that development of certain weapon sys­tems, because of the international environment, and the elements for mobilization base requirements shall be in the active forces.”

Each year DoD asks for about 52,000 Naval Reservists to man the ships and aircraft assigned to the re­serves, and Congress raises this, there­after, to an arbitrary figure such as 87,000. We need to determine what naval missions can be better and more cheaply handled by a specific number of reservists and then fully justify the billets and hardware required. This calls for expertise beyond mine, but I would like to offer some suggestions.

“The Service isn't what it used to be—and never was." The quotations in this unique dictionary cover all aspects of the military art. It is a fascinating and comprehensive collection that includes more than 5,000 quotations spanning more than two thousand years.

The scope of the subject matter covered by the quo­tations is extensive. The table of rubrics runs from Ac­tion to Zeal, with 365 pages in between. Aggression, Causes of War, Detente, Duty, Loyalty, Luck, Profan­ity, Recruits, Victory, Weapons, and Women are but a few of the headings. Quotations under each entry ap­pear in chronological order.

Its appeal transcends the barriers of the profession of arms. There is something here for everyone. The words of hundreds of the world’s greatest philos­ophers, poets, admirals, generals, prophets, and politicians serve both to inspire and to remind us of Santayana’s words: "Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.”

Edited by Robert Debs Heinl, Jr. Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps (Ret.) Foreword by Samuel E. Morison

AND NAVAL QUOTATIONS

DICTIONARY OF MILITARY

First, whenever a new naval mission is being considered, it should be con­sidered as a possible reserve mission. This should be basic. Instead, we seem to take old planes and ships and

give them to the reserves. These are expensive to maintain and may be ut­terly useless in a war, having been completely overtaken by new technol­ogy. I would suggest that we assign some up-to-date hardware for every mission suited to the part-time sailor. We should strive to identify missions which are not required in normal peacetime operations but would be re­quired in the event of war.

For example, in World War II we had 12-knot merchant ships and 33- knot escorts. We now have 33-knot merchant ships and 27-knot escorts. Defense of merchant shipping should be a reserve mission. Reserve research units could develop sophisticated de­fense packages to defend each mer­chant ship. The Arapaho project de­scribed by Mr. Polmar is just this. Reserve units in the Midwest could drill with an air defense missile pack­age and with an antisubmarine pack­age. At the outbreak of war, the pack­ages and ships would head for the same port and the merchantmen would take on their own defense. The timing should be consistent since the ships would have to make port and the reservists could be deployed to these ports simultaneously.

Another mission that might be shared with the Naval Reserves is har­bor defense. Reserve units along the coasts could man small craft, even hy­drofoils, armed with missiles or sophisticated electronic gear not in the Coast Guard inventory. They might be assigned all minelaying or mine­sweeping capabilities, as there is no need to keep regular forces tied up in this type of mission.

Another possibility would be to have Naval Reserves maintain a pack­age which would quickly convert a specific fast merchant into a troop car­rier to supplement each active LPH. The LPHs’ helicopters then would have a second wave of marines to offload without returning to port. The mer­chantman would be designed from the ground up for her dual role, and the additional cost would be fully sub­sidized. In the same manner, we could build a subsidized keel up, backup jeep carrier. Such a commercial ship would be capable of conversion to a jeep carrier in about 24 hours after

arrival in the United States by her Naval Reserve crew. Inasmuch as her flight deck would be an integral part of the ship, she could receive helicop­ters or jet vertical or short takeoff and landing aircraft as soon as the Naval Reserve crew was on board.

These suggestions are offered sim­ply to start us thinking. I believe that Congress is telling us that it wants a larger, better defined, role for the re­serves. Congressmen seem to be saying that they would fund some modern equipment rather than to maintain ob­solete ships and aircraft or to pay for reservists without a mission.

Finally, an essential mission and modern hardware for the Naval Re­serve could be needed boosts for morale, and reserve units drilling with small craft up and down the coasts and with mobile packages inland would give the Navy exposure to the voters which should make our entire budget less vul­nerable.

There is an easy way to see whether I’m right or not. Simply assign a mis­sion such as Arapaho to the reserves and request funding for it. (Congress has recently appropriated $6.5 million to continue research on the Arapaho project.)

friendly flag vessel is commonly ac­cepted as falling within the rules of war, short of actual engagement in combat. In this context, such pacific postures as sunbathers on the forecas­tle could be viewed as deliberate role playing.

Like Mr. Truver, I find Dr. Smith’s comparison of the Liberty/Panay inci­dents as distinctly farfetched. More germane would have been a probing inquiry into U. S. intelligence gather­ing capabilities and high-level policy concerning intelligence ship move­ments. An emphasis on the appalling laxity, poor judgment, and inept planning, which repeatedly placed these exceedingly vulnerable vessels in the most hazardous and potentially awkward circumstances without adequate provision for support or res­cue in case of attack, would be most appropriate. If the Liberty tragedy needs comparison, let it be measured against the Pueblo fiasco or other less- reported incidents concerning U. S. intelligence ships and aircraft.

“ASW for the Amphibious Task Group”

<See W. F. Mellin, pp. 96-101, March 1978 Proceedings)

C. W. Vest, Vice President, Vector R^e' search Company—Generally, the points made in that article are well taken- However, certain points requir^e further elaboration and discussion- The author states:

“Detection ranges are highly de­pendent on a ship’s speed, and one traveling faster than 20 knots can be detected acoustically at very long ranges. Movement at 10-15 knots produces little noise, is comparable to that of many merchant ship^{[1] [2]}’ and is non-identifying.”

This generalization contains much truth, but it may be somewhat mi⁵' leading. Slower speeds do not alway⁵ mean less noise. For some ships very slow speeds result in higher radiated noise levels than do moderate speed⁵ because of extra machinery item⁵ necessary for operations at very slo⁵⁵' speeds. Movement at 10-15 knots cer' tainly produces less radiated nois^e than movement at 20 knots or more> bw "little noise” is an exaggeration f°t many ships. The author recognizes ^a key point when he says, “To limit task group detection to horizon ranges against _a submarine, ... all ships should be kept belo w cavitation speed." The problem is that cavitation speed varies widely from ship to ship ^atld may vary from time to time in any given ship as a function of propel­ler condition.

The author emphasizes the utility of ^educing radiated noise and employing ¹ • • quiet, deceptive, covert, and Passive tactics.” Practical application °f these concepts in a real situation re- ^^Ulfes knowledge of the acoustical characteristics of the ships involved, the Navy today does not have much °f this necessary information. My own ^w°rk has involved me with surface ^sh*P and submarine silencing pro- 8^rams and radiated noise and sonar ^Self-noise measurement programs. The ^formation noted above simply is not ^available for many ship types because has never been measured.

Submarines have benefited for many years from a well-funded and highly active silencing program which in- ^udes necessary acoustical meas- ^^retnents. Surface ships, on the other ^and, have never received similar sup- P°tt. The _on 1 y classes which have ^u°dergone extensive acoustical meas- ^Urernents, particularly for radiated ⁿ°^1Se> are the Garcia (FF-1040), Knox *T~1052), and Spruance (DD-963) j ^asses, the USS Oliver Hazard Perry . ^G'⁷), and certain aircraft carriers. ^Uch is known about the acoustical ^aracteristics of these ships. How- ^6Ver' similar knowledge about the ^air>Phibious vessels, which Com- ^rriander Mellin addresses, and about ^^ch support classes as ammunition ‘Ps, store ships, and oilers is practi- non-existent. Employment of ^mander Mellin’s ideas requires ^Uch knowledge.

There are two aspects of the overall ^c°ustical problem which must be

considered: (1) knowledge, or lack thereof, of the acoustical characteris­tics of Navy ships, and (2) the actual quieting of Navy ships through mod­ernization or new construction.

The obtaining of knowledge about the acoustical characteristics, particu­larly radiated noise, of a ship requires a measurement exercise. Such an ex­ercise can be lengthy and expensive or brief and economical, depending upon its objectives. If the objectives are to measure underway noise signatures, identify sources of noise, and deter­mine the relative contributions of each source, the actual measurement period can take nearly a week and the post­trial analysis and reporting several months. The total effort can cost in the neighborhood of $200,000. If the objectives are to measure underway noise signatures only for normal underway machinery line-ups without regard to source identification, the ac­tual measurement period need take only one-half day with post-trial analysis and reporting being com­pleted within two weeks at a cost of less than $20,000. Trials of both types are currently being conducted by the Navy. Each type of trial requires use of a radiated noise measurement facility, such as Atlantic Undersea Test and Evaluation Center (AUTEC) or Guam Acoustic Range Facility (GARF) or others.

Although a ship normally cannot measure her own radiated noise, the capability to obtain some very useful information can be established on board. One key item of information is the cavitation characteristics of the ship’s propellers. Techniques have been developed and used for determin­ing this information on the Knox-class ships. It has also been employed on other classes, both single screw and twin screw. The method is docu­mented in Propeller Cavitation Noise Monitoring Procedures For DE-1052 Class Ocean Escorts, NAVSHIPS 0907­004-6010, dated 1 June 1973. The

method is adaptable to other than the Knox class. I have personally employed the basic procedure during the past year on seven ASW escorts from four different classes while under contract to David W. Taylor Naval Ship Re­search and Development Center as part of a Commander Naval Surface Forces Atlantic-sponsored acoustical evaluation program. The procedure permits determination of inception speeds for blade tip cavitation and blade sheet cavitation. It does require some instrumentation such as a CAG- 155XC sound level meter or GR-1982 sound level meter, both with as­sociated vibration pickups. The neces­sary instrumentation is available in some ships of the Knox class as part of the “Chapman Number” program for machinery vibration monitoring. The skills necessary are readily learned, particularly by sonar technicians who are familiar with acoustics and ship noises. My point is that this valuable information can be obtained using on-board resources without trials and external test facilities.

The actual quieting of surface ships, either during modernization or new construction, is a very complex propo­sition. It can also be very costly. Dis­cussion of the cost-effectiveness trade-offs involved is beyond the scope of this letter. It should be noted though that the Navy has demon­strated that it can build quiet surface ships, namely the Spruance-class ships. The overall importance of quiet ships was recognized by the Chief of Naval Operations in establishing operational requirement OR-0229-AS.

Commander Mellin addresses am­phibious task groups in his article. His points are applicable to other task groups, to underway replenishment groups, and to convoys. The problem is that the information necessary to im­plement his proposals is lacking for many ship types. The information available is mostly for ASW escort ships.