Book Reviews and Book List

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The philosophy of history *^{s 3} abstruse subject. History gradual students usually take it only beca^uSe they must; scarcely anyone else P^^S attention to it at all. Yet from time time it has its uses. One such use i^s

Strategy For Defeat:

Vietnam in Retrospect

Adm. U.S.G. Sharp, USN (Ret.). San Rafael, Ca.: Presidio Press, 1978. 324 pp. Illus. Maps. Append. Ind. $12.95 ($10.35).*

Reviewed by Arleigh Burke

(Arleigh Burke held the office of Chief of Naval Operations from 1955 to 1961.)

Since the dawn of history many wars have been fought. Each war has had its impact on future events, and usually that impact has been grievous to the loser. The Vietnam War was no exception. But, for the first time in our history the United States was the loser, and we Americans will be the ones upon whom the impact will tell in the future.

In writing Strategy For Defeat, Ad­miral U.S.G. Sharp joins statesmen, historians, and military analysts who through the years have studied previ­ous wars, the events leading to war, and the consequences of the conflicts. The information and knowledge gleaned from these studies have re­sulted in many tomes on the lessons available from these past horrendous episodes. Nearly every generation has produced a military strategist and tac­tician, from Genghis Khan through von Clausewitz and Mahan to the present time. Those distinguished au­thorities on national strategy have endeavored to outline the principles on which war should be fought in order to win. There are many varia­tions in the conclusions the authors have reached; variations due to dif­ferent equipment, different weapon systems, different political systems, and different eras.

But, there are some simple, con-

•For details on ordering books and special prices see the Book Order Service note in Books of Interest to the Professional.

cise, and fundamental precepts com­mon to all the conclusions. Underly­ing them is the axiom that the results of losing a war are so severe that every possible effort should be made to win the war once it is undertaken.

We did not make that effort in the Vietnam War.

Admiral Sharp has written a dis­turbing, heart-breaking book of how and why we failed to do so.

We reacted to the enemy’s initia­tives instead of instituting our own.

We did not seriously try to destroy the enemy's war base, disrupt his communications, destroy his source of supplies, or demolish his command structure.

We did not take advantage of our superiority in air power and naval power and so capitalize on the enemy’s weaknesses.

We did not prosecute the war in timely fashion.

We did not even try to fight in the enemy’s territory.

And we could have done all of them.

Strategy For Defeat is not pleasant reading, but the points made should be thoroughly assimilated by our na­tional leaders—and by those who elect the men who will direct our nation’s destiny.

As Commander in Chief, Pacific, Admiral Sharp knew the area, he knew the enemy, and he knew the capabilities and limitations of our forces. His vast knowledge of war is born of experience, experience he and other responsible military commanders sought to bring to bear on the con­flict. This wise counsel was set aside in favor of new theories and half measures, bolstered by much wishful thinking.

It is not enough for this excellent book just to be read. Its lessons should be learned, and learned well. They should earnestly be taken into account by every person who takes any part in

the determination of our national policies and national strategy.

Those lessons will be ignored at out peril.

Winners & Losers: Battles, Retreats, Gains, Losses and Ruins from a Long War

Gloria Emerson. New York: Random House, 1976. 380 pp. Bib. $10.95 ($9.86).*

Friendly Fire

C. D. B. Bryan. New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1976. 380 pp. Map. $10.95 ($9.86).*

The Lessons of Vietnam

W. Scott Thompson and Donaldson D- Frizzell, Editors. New York: Crane, Russak & Company, 1977. 288 pp. Map⁵ Ind. $16.50 ($14.85).*

Never Again: Learning from America’s Foreign Policy Failures

Earl C. Ravenal. Philadelphia: Temple ^ University Press, 1978. 153 pp. $10.00-

Reviewed by Thomas H. Etzold (With a Ph. D. from Yale University, Professor Etzold has taught in the strategy department of the Naval War College since 1974. He writes and reviews frequently on topics in defense and diplomacy.)

to in an<*

thus bringing relative order into d‘^s cussions of the diverse literature ⁰⁽¹ subjects such as the Vietnam War- Many writers of history, wheth scholarly or of a less formal sort, b^e lieve that history is what you rem^e(l1 ber. As a corollary to that proposir*⁰¹¹' some writers believe also that the

ft

least, book

sPeak for themselves.

Gloria Emerson, a reporter, has ’■hus concluded that one ought to set own as much as possible about the ^letnam War, even small recollections

D°ut small people and small events, ⁵⁰ that via the written record people 'ⁿ later years will in fact remember. ^*^er book was to be about the war’s ^effects on the American people; it be- ^me more a book about the war’s ef- ^ects on her. And these were, it is ^^ear> quite unpleasant. Despite her •tterness toward the war, and her ^-Onviction that among Americans, at there were few winners, the is touching, for Emerson pos­^Sesses an eye for telling details. It is Settling, for instance, to be re- ^’oded that Vietnam was the “first ^ar to provide picture postcards of . ^rican troops in black and white or !^{n c}°Ior’’ to be mailed from the com­^bat zone itself.

G- D. B. Bryan, a professional ^Vlj’^r'^ter, has also described the effects of ^e 'var on Americans, but particularly °ⁿ one family, that of an American ^Setgeant who was killed by friendly ar- ^tl *^ery fire in 1970. Outraged by the ®°^vernrnent’s impersonal and clumsy ^aritiling of the necessary business con- ^^erning their son, the soldier’s parents ^ev°ted several years to anti-war ac­tivism. It is a powerful story, and in many ways it raises more difficult ques­tions than does Emerson’s rather per­sonal recollection. There is something wrong, both politically and psychologi­cally, when a soldier's death in war does not bring pride as well as sorrow. And it is not so easy to decide whether the people in Bryan’s book had unreason­able expectations or whether the gov­ernment showed inexcusable and care­less impropriety.

While for some writers, history is what you remember, for others, it is what you make of it. Facts may not always speak for themselves. The study of the past may be an exercise not only in memory but in the learn­ing of lessons.

In The Lessons of Vietnam, W. Scott Thompson, a political scientist, and Donaldson D. Frizzell, an Air Force colonel, have addressed principally the military, technical, and organizational lessons of Vietnam experience. Based on a 1974 conference, their volume contains papers and transcripts of dis­cussions among historians, political scientists, and distinguished political and military leaders of the war years. Topics include the political-military background of the war, earlier French and American experience, American strategy during the conflict, tactics, technology, and management in the war. The editors have concluded that the United States won the unconven­tional war in the south, but lost the larger war against North Vietnam in large part because institutional inertia afflicted the military, intelligence, and policy agencies of the govern­ment. According to Robert Komer, one of the discussants, when things did not work out, U.S. agencies usu­ally did more rather than doing their work differently. There are a good many worthwhile observations throughout this book. Its combination of broad coverage and judicious tone is likely to give it enduring value as a starting point for reconsideration of specific aspects of the war’s conduct.

Reflections on the possible lessons of Vietnam have led Earl Ravenal to

on the Code of Conduct training ^var' ied considerably. Principal disagree' ment centered on the means of resist' ance to interrogation. The Army ^atl0 the Sea Services urged their member⁵ to refuse to divulge anything m0re than “the big four” (name, rank, ser^v' ice number, and date of birth), whd^e the Air Force had begun to advocate the use of ruses and strategems f°^r “second line” defenses. The problem¹ was exacerbated with the publicati°ⁿ in 1959 of DoD Pamphlet 1-1^’ which took the following hard-l‘^ne approach regarding resistance to in^ter rogation:

“You must resist to the limit

your ability. Don’t expect to back on successive lines of ^reSlSj ance. Once you have gone bey⁰¹¹ the first—name, rank, servi^ce number, and date of birth— • ■ ’ you have taken the first step th^at leads to collaboration. ...”

write the most intellectually mature and ambitious book yet to appear in the Vietnam-related literature. For­merly an official of the Department of Defense, Ravenal has become a politi­cal scientist and defense analyst. His book is about the Vietnam War—its meaning and consequences in Ameri­can politics and foreign policy. It is also, and perhaps more fundamentally, a book about how nations and gov­ernments learn from their experiences.

The author’s reflections merit brief summary here. Ravenal distinguishes five types of critique of past experi­ence. “Instrumental” critiques repre­sent the conviction that nations can improve on past performance by de­veloping better tools or instruments. “Proportional” critiques attempt to explain past errors in terms of dis­proportion between costs and benefits in specific situations. “Consequential” critiques focus on ways in which American interventionism has dis­torted the economy and confused na­tional priorities. “Fundamental” critiques interpret mistakes in foreign and military affairs as the inevitable results of flawed and immoral politi­cal, social, and economic institutions. Finally, “strategic” critiques—the rarest and best of all—call for adjust­ment of American policy and action to salient constraints of domestic and in­ternational political structure.

Ravenal’s conclusions and prescrip­tions for contemporary American pol­icy are based on the logic of the strategic critique. He believes that foreseeable international conditions will favor frequent limited wars, but that the United States will be incapa­ble of carrying on such wars. Vietnam has lowered the tolerance of the American public for long and costly wars. It has brought the military pro­fession into widespread disrepute. Meanwhile, according to Ravenal, the international system has become in­creasingly immune to deliberate American efforts to extend influence. In his view, the United States has no choice: it must scale down its defini­tions of national interest and eschew intervention. It must seek self­sufficiency to reduce vulnerability and retain reasonable freedom of decision. Finally, it must divest itself of com­

mitments beyond its ability to fulfill. “What sense does it make to construct a wish-list of national interests," he asks, “if we know that we don’t want to bear the costs and suffer the conse­quences of attaining them?” He calls for a more modest American world view:

“We must recover a sense of the lim­its of foreign policy in a world that largely is no longer malleable. For­eign policy has been seen not as a lance but as a shield. It is not a vehi­cle for propagating our values or a pretext for projecting our fantasies, but a set of minimum conditions for preserving our vital internal proc­esses.”

Ravenal’s book will be controver­sial. But its clarity of prose, elegance of reasoning, and maturity of insight beyond question put the volume into that small group of durable, landmark writings. Never Again is very likely the most important single contribution to understanding the Vietnam War in American foreign policy. It deserves, and is certain to claim, the attention of this country’s highest political and military leaders. For such leaders, to remember the past is not enough, and Ravenal has proven himself an able teacher of “lessons about lessons.”

Prisoner at War: The Survival of Commander Richard A. Stratton

Scott Blakey. Garden City: Anchor Press/Doubleday, 1978. 398 pages. Append. Bib. Ind. $10.00 ($9.00).*

Reviewed by Major W. Hays Parks,

U. S. Marine Corps

(Major Parks has served in command and staff positions in the Marine Corps since he received his commission in 1963■ Previous contributions to the Proceedings include “ ‘If I Became a Prisoner of War. . .          ” “Law of War

Training in the Navy and Marine Corps,” and a combined review of four books dealing with American prisoner of war experiences during the Vietnam War. He is limiting a monograph in the official Marine Corps series on the Vietnam War.)

The Code of Conduct was promul­gated on 17 August 1955, when President Dwight D. Eisenhower

signed Executive Order 10631- Its formulation was intended to provide clear and concise guidance to U. S. servicemen in all situations leading to or resulting in capture by the enemy- In preparation of the code, the blue- ribbon Defense Advisory Committee on Prisoners of War (which included the Navy’s Vice Admiral Charles A- Lockwood and the Marine Corps Major General Merrit A. Edson) also established training directives which amplified the scope and intent of each of the six articles of the code. A sepa­rate Department of Defense (DoD) memorandum to the secretaries of the military departments entitled “Train­ing and Education Measures Necessary to Support the Code of Conduct” '-^vaS published. But the specific guidance written by the Defense Advisory Committee was published only in the official report of the committee, which received limited distribution.

Lacking the authors’ intent, monitoring, or detailed training gu'd' ance, individual service philosophies

of

fall

In 1963, the Air Force philosophy was challenged directly by the Chief⁰ Naval Operations as the result of ^seV eral Navy pilots’ attendance of the A^|f Force survival school. Efforts to & solve the difference by the Joint Chi^e of Staff resulted in a “split” paper P^r° senting the services’ positions to th^e

Office of Secretary of Defense. The in­consistency was resolved by publica- fion of DoD Directive 1300.7 in July 1964 which, for the first time, gave the services the official explanation or statement of intent written in 1955 by the Defense Advisory Committee. By the time the directive was “on the street,’’ however, Hanoi had its first S. pows. The damage had been hone in the nine years of training Phots who, for the most part, would the prisoners of the Vietnam War. Lieutenant Commander Richard A. Stratton’s plane was brought down by ^tw° of his own malfunctioning 2.75- ^lnch rockets while on a mission over hlorth Vietnam on 5 January 1967. ^mediately taken prisoner, his is ^rri0re than a representative case of the consequences of failing to provide pol- '^cy guidance, because Commander ttatton and his wife played signifi­cant roles in the saga of U. S. prison­^ers °f war in Vietnam.

Commander Stratton was led into in- ^terr°gation, confident in his ability to

resist interrogation and naive regarding the cruelty and determination of his captors. Ultimately forced beyond “the big four,” he suffered the common ex­perience of many prisoners, a feeling of betrayal of his fellow POWs and his country. Stratton began searching for alternate means of resistance. He had his chance on 6 March 1967 when, in a forced appearance before a news confer­ence, he appeared, seemingly en­tranced, bowing repeatedly in a stiff, robot-like manner. Because Washing­ton did not publicize the April 1966 Japanese television interview with Rear Admiral Jeremiah A. Denton, Jr., in which then-Commander Denton con­tinuously blinked T-O-R-T-U-R-E in Morse Code, photographs of Stratton’s automaton performance were the first suggestion to the American public that U. S. prisoners of war were not being treated humanely.

Stratton’s subsequent relationship with Seaman Doug Hegdahl is de­scribed in detail. Hegdahl, the only POW authorized by his seniors to ac­cept early release, returned to the United States to reveal the plight of the POWs. His revelations to Stratton’s wife Alice and their subsequent sepa­rate efforts played a significant part in the reversal of the previous ostrich-like position of the U. S. Government re­garding North Vietnamese mistreat­ment of the POWs.

Prisoner at War is an outgrowth of an award-winning television narrative about Commander Stratton and his family aired by PBS in 1974. It is not the in-depth narrative found in many of the preceding individual POW books; rather, it is the story of one POW told through the experience of that POW and those closest to him. The book is well written and, without saying so, a manifestation of the prin­ciple that the heart of the Code of Conduct and survival in a POW environment lies in Article IV, in (1) keeping faith with one’s fellow prison­ers, and (2) retaining, maintaining, and adhering to a military command structure.

Aircraft

past

and

present.

The Dauntless Dive Bomber of World War Two By Barrett Tillman

Here is an account of the SBD squadron which flew unex­pectedly into the Pearl Harbor attack; of the pilot who almost single-handedly knocked out a Japanese carrier and died in the process; of the air group commander who could have lost the Pacific War for the United States.

Written by the son of an SBD pilot, this is the first full-length book devoted to the classic Dauntless.

1976/192 pages/illustrated

List price: $14.95 Member’s price: $11.95

The Ships and Aircraft of the U. S. Fleet By Norman Polmar

This is the single most important volume for anyone needing accurate knowledge of the U. S. Navy of today. The ship and aircraft data presented in these pages is far more detailed than that of any other volume available. In addition, this unique reference includes an analysis of the current state of the Fleet, and chapters on future ship classes, personnel, Fleet organization, and naval air organization. Over 1,000 accurately dated photographs reveal significant details of ships, aircraft, and ship­board weapons and sensors. The new eleventh edition of Ships and Aircraft of the U. S. Fleet sets new standards for accuracy and excellence in a warship directory. 1978/359 pages/illustrated/index List price: $18.95 Member’s price: $15.15

Victorian and Edwardian Merchant Steamships from Old Photographs

By Basil Greenhill and Ann Giffard

Here are the passenger steamers, tugs, cargo steamers, coasters, and paddle passenger steamers of years past. As the illustrations in this book so superbly demonstrate, the steady development of steam since 1843 has been fully recorded.

Basil Greenhill, Director of the National Maritime Museum, and Ann Giffard in­troduce and explain the old photographs in an interesting and factual way which adds greatly to their significance. Where and when was a particular ship built? How was she powered? How many passengers and what kind of cargo did she carry? Between which ports did she sail? These are the kind of questions to which you will find full and satisfying answers. Visually, the book is immediately arrest­ing, but a highly expert text gives it a permanent value beyond that of a mere collection of fascinating photographs.

This companion volume to the authors Victorian and Edwardian Sailing Ships FrotV Old Photographs, also available from the Naval Institute Press, is a pleasurable ex­cursion into maritime history. Nowher^e else will you find the kind of detail that is presented in these pictures and their at' companying text.

1978/120 pages/lllustrated

A Naval Institute Press Book List price: $10.95 Member’s price: $8.75

Add $1.00 to each order for postage and handling.

(Please use hook order form in Books of Interest to the Professional section.)

Books of Interest to the Professional

Compiled by Professor Jack Sweetman, Associate Editor

ⁿaval AFFAIRS

dreadnought Battleships and Battle Cruisers

E. McMahon. Washington, D.C.: 'University Press of America, 1978. 318 pp. ^lllus. Bib. Ind. $10.75 ($9.68) paper.

Tj

rrom the launching of their prototype, DMS Dreadnought, in 1906, until their ^eclipse by the aircraft carrier in World '^Var II, the dreadnought battleship and ^attle cruiser were the measure of sea- P°wer. The history and specifications of ^every dreadnought ever to serve in any "^avy in the world are concisely reviewed.

"^e book is illustrated with photographs ®^n<^ a fine series of diagrams by John P. Morel.            •

Evasion: North Africa 1942

JV- S.w.c. Pack, RN (Ret.). New York: Varies Scribner’s Sons. 1978. 112 pp. Illus.

Maps. $12.95.

Th

^ne Anglo-American landings at Casa- ^anca, Oran, and Algiers in November ■M2 were the first great Allied amphibi- °ns operations in the European theater in orld War II. Their story is told in a pic- ^t0fial history by a British naval officer who '^Vas personally involved in their planning.

j,^reuzer Prinz Eugen . . . unter 3 ^laggen (Cruiser Prince Eugene . . . ^uid_er 3 Flags)

^0rvettenkapitan Paul Schmalenbach, Federal ^ernaan Navy (Ret.). Herford, West Germany: ^oehl,

111

^ers Verlagsgesellschaft, 1978. 240 pp.

^Us- Maps. Append. DM 48 (Approx.

*24.00).

^e heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen was the only ?^aj°r German fleet unit to survive World

^^ar II. Commissioned in August 1940, ^e seconded the Bismarck in the famous ^act'⁰ⁿ with the Hood and Prince of Wales,

'ook

the

er_at

part in the Channel Dash, and spent

last

two war years in army support op-

^lons in the Baltic. Delivered to the ^nited States following the German sur­^er, she was sunk in the atomic bomb

^rend,

test

hep

tech;

^at Bikini Atoll in December 1946. ^er career is recorded by her former gun-

V officer in this superbly executed nological and operational history. The

"three flags” referred to in the title are, those of the German Kriegsmarine, the old Austro-Hungarian Navy (of which, in the German practice, she was designated a "tradition bearer’), and the United States. A number of the illustrations are in color and a back pocket contains a 24" x 40" fold-out plan.

Marines and Helicopters 1946-1962

Lt.Col. Eugene W. Rawlins, USMC, Edited by Maj. William J. Sambito, USMC. Washington, D.C.: History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, 1976. 113 pp. Illus. Append. Ind. $5.25 paper.

The Marine Corps perceived the potential of helicopters for vertical envelopment op­erations in 1946. This monograph records the ensuing development of helicopter doctrine and practice down to the eve of American entry in the Vietnam conflict. Both the author and the editor have served in helicopter units.

Problems of Sea Power as We Approach the Twenty-First Century

James L. George, Editor. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1978. 364 pp. $11.75 ($10.58)

$5.75 ($5.18) paper.

This volume records the proceedings of a conference held in Washington, D.C., on 6-7 October 1977 regarding the future of American seapower. The participants in­cluded high-ranking naval officers, active duty as well as retired, members of Con­gress, and distinguished naval analysts. The editor will be familiar to Proceedings’ readers as the winner of the General Prize Essay Contest for 1978.

Professors of War: The Naval War College and the Development of the Naval Profession

Ronald Spector. Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 1977 (for sale by the Super­intendent of Documents, U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.). 185 pp. Illus. Bib. Ind. $2.75 ($2.48) paper.

The development and professional influ­ence of thy U. S. Naval War College, from its foundation in 1884 to its tempo­rary discontinuation in 1917, is traced in a

scholarly study, the second volume in the college’s Historical Monograph series.

g Strategy for Defeat: Vietnam in Retrospect

Adm. U. S. Grant Sharp, USN (Ret.). San Rafael, Ca.: Presidio Press, 1978. 324 pp.

Illus. Maps. Append. Ind. $12.95 ($ 10.35).

As Commander-in-Chief Pacific from July 1964 through July 1968, Admiral Sharp exercised overall supervision of the U. S. military effort in Vietnam. In this work, a combination of memoir and history, he de­livers a blistering indictment of the politi­cal decisions by which that effort was so constrained. His thesis is that timely and forceful application of American air power could have brought the war to a successful conclusion before 1970. The book is the subject of a full-length review by Arleigh Burke in this issue.

The Writings of Stephen B. Luce

RAdm. John D. Hayes, USN (Ret.), and John B. Hattendorf, Editors. Newport, R.I.: Naval War College, 1975. 262 pp. Illus. Append. Ind. $2.80 paper.

Founder of the Naval War College and pa-

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tron of Alfred Thayer Mahan, Rear Ad­miral Stephen B. Luce (1827-1917) was one of the leading figures of the late 19th century American naval renaissance. Vol­ume I of the Naval War College Historical Monograph series presents a selection and annotated bibliography of his writings, together with an introductory account of his life and times. First published in a lim­ited edition in 1975, the work went out of print almost immediately upon its appear­ance. This reissue will be welcomed by all those who were unable to obtain a copy at that time.

MILITARY AFFAIRS

The All-Volunteer Force and American Society

John B. Keeley, Editor. Charlottesville, Va.: University Press of Virginia, 1978. 206 pp. $8.95 ($8.06).

The current status and future prospects of the all-volunteer force are examined by a collection of six scholarly essays. The editor is a professor at the University of Virginia.

The Atlas of Modern Warfare

Chris Cook and John Stevenson, New York:

G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1978. 191 pp. Illus.

Maps. Ind. $22.50 ($20.25).

Conceived to provide a ready reference to the major conflicts fought since the close of World War II, this volume is divided into two parts. The first consists of capsule summaries of wars, illustrated by a series of small-size, large-scale maps. The second treats the development of weaponry since 1945.

Flight Manual for the B-24 Liberator

Glendale, Ca.: Aviation Books Company, 1977. 168 pp. Illus. $8.00 paper.

Designed to delight World War II avia­tion buffs, this book consists in the main of a facsimile reprint of the 1942 edition of the flight manual for the Consolidated B-24 Liberator four-engine bomber. It also contains a 22-page historical introduction on the development and production of the aircraft.

Panzers at War

A. J. Barker. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1978. 144 pp. Illus. Maps. $14.95.

The rise and fall of the German armored forces in World War II is traced in the latest of Scribner’s "At War” series of pic­torial histories. Few of the more than 170 photographs with which it is illustrated have appeared outside Germany.

On To Berlin: Battles of an Airborne Commander, 1943-1945

Lt. Gen. James M. Gavin, USA (Ret.). New York: Viking Press, 1978. 336 pp. Illus. Maps. Ind. $14.95 ($13.46).

In 1941, James M. Gavin was a 34-year old paratrooper captain. In 1945, he was a 38-year-old major general, commander of the 82nd Airborne Division. Between times he had participated in every major American combat jump in the European theater—Sicily, Salerno, Normandy, and

Nijmegen, as well as the Battle of the Bulge and the advance into Germany. He recalls these experiences in an absorbing memoir.

Royal Air Force Yearbook 1978

William Green and Gordon Swansborough, Editors. London: Royal Air Force Benevolent Fund (distributed by Ducimus Books, Ltd., London), 1978. 96 pp. Illus. $2.00 paper.

The Diamond Jubilee edition of this aⁿ" nual yearbook (which is not an officii publication) contains nine articles about the Royal Air Force, past and present- Among the most interesting are a descrip' tion of the RAF’s new warplane, th^f MRCA Tornado; an account of V-ForC^e’ the RAF strategic nuclear deterrent 1955-1969; and a 60-year chronology ⁰ the RAF, 1918-1978.

Shelters in Soviet War Survival Strategy

Leon Goure. Washington, D.C.: Advanced International Studies Institute, in association with the University of Miami, 1978. 74 pp- Illus. $6.95 ($6.26) paper.

The varieties and construction of Sovt^et bomb shelters and the strategic sign’h cance of the Soviet civil defense progr²'¹¹ are assessed in a well-documented mon° graph. The author is director of Sov'^eC studies at the Center for Advanced I*¹ ternational Studies at the University ⁰ Miami.

Price

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