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0viet politicallmilitary machinations in the
an Ocean area are often as unintelligible Us ns their maps of the region. We assume a^y move by them, such as the deployment of ^ e Minsk into the region earlier this year, to ^ nn exploitation of our weaknesses or unders; whereas they could claim, and many natives of the area might agree, that they are S*rnply reinforcing their role as protectors of the sloping states against the ravages ofU. S. trnperialism.
Soviet naval policy in the Indian Ocean, as it has ^eloped in the 1970s, can be attributed to bitter Ssons learned from the United States during the War period. Although the Soviet Navy was reaving the benefits of advanced technology and was Undergoing a fairly rapid modernization program, its Lfirnary roles during this period were strategic deter- fence and coastal defense. Nikita Khrushchev’s I960 sF*eech before the Supreme Soviet outlining the conCePt of a “limited navy” is ample evidence of the Secondary status then accorded conventional naval ^rfare by Soviet planners.1
. Two years later, the Cuban Missile Crisis dramat- |^ady emphasized the shortcomings of this policy.
ne of the major reasons that this attempt to project ^ military presence a great distance beyond the borers of the Soviet Union failed was that the Soviets o not possess the conventional naval power neces- ,3ry to neutralize the U. S. Navy’s blockade of the stand. The conventionally armed ships they did have ad not been used to project naval power that far e ore. The necessity for a conventional open-ocean
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navy was a lesson driven home forcefully to the naval planners of the Soviet Union. The result was a “balanced navy doctrine, which arose after Khrushchev’s fall from power in 1964. In 1967, Admiral Sergei Gorshkov publicly defined the balanced naval force as one which could perform both nuclear and nonnuclear roles in wartime and could “guarantee state interests on the sea in peacetime.”2 The recognition of a major peacetime foreign policy role for the navy was to assume major significance very quickly.
For more than 100 years, the military forces of Great Britain had imposed stability on the Indian Ocean, but in 1968 the British Government announced its intention to withdraw all of its forces from the area east of Suez to Singapore. The Soviets’ rapid response to the announcement gave a strong indication of their intention to step into the shoes of the vacating Royal Navy. Barely two months after the announcement, a small task force from the Pacific Fleet at Vladivostok entered the Indian Ocean. This four-month flag-showing cruise included port calls at Madras and Bombay, India; Karachi, Pakistan; Colombo, Sri Lanka (then Ceylon); Umm Qasr and Basra, Iraq; Bandar Abbas, Iran; Aden, People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen); and Mogadishu, Somalia. From the spring of 1969 onward, the Soviets have maintained a continuous naval presence.3 Despite the presence of the token U. S. Middle East Force (generally a command ship and two destroyers) and periodic appearances by larger groups of both British and American ships, by 1970 one knowledgeable Western analyst observed that the Soviet naval presence was “virtually without competition.”4 The statement is arguable, but in that year Soviet ship-days in the Indian Ocean outnumbered American ship-days by a ratio of more than two to one. Since that time, the ratio has varied between three and four to one, not including Soviet submarines. From the standpoint of being able to use naval forces to influence foreign policy in the Indian
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military), or the deployment of each would have to be significantly lengthened (wit the unpleasant ramifications for their crews). nizing these limitations, another naval analyst ^ eluded Polaris deployments could take place t0 Indian Ocean, but would cost much more than would buy.6 j
From the Soviet point of view, it can be assu that despite the costs involved, the United States tains the Arabian Sea as a deployment optmn-^^ Soviet planners it is a threat which must be co
tered; therefore, a significant naval presence is
in were
deployment of these forces taking place at the expe ^ of the fleet from which they come. This shifting ^ resources may not be an acceptable alternative^ Soviet naval planners, but if the Soviet Union v faced with a threat of the magnitude it publicly P . claims to exist, a larger ASW force would be re9u ^ in the Indian Ocean. Significant as the antisubmat1 ^ justification may seem, it is of limited value foreign policy context. To the Soviet Union, an gressive foreign policy is a vital component o ^
socialist battle against capitalism. The ultimate tory depends in large part on the success of the eign policy. Because of this important ideology
Ocean, the Soviet Union has clearly been in a superior position for several years.
Many reasons have been advanced by Western analysts for this rapid expansion of Soviet naval forces in the Indian Ocean. One which was put forth early regarded the Soviet presence as a counter to the rumored deployment of U. S. strategic naval forces to the Arabian Sea. With the introduction of the long- range Polaris A-3 ballistic missile (and the later Poseidon) into the U. S. arsenal, the Arabian Sea became one of the better deployment options for U. S. submarines.5 From this strategic position south of the Asian landmass, the entire heartland of the Soviet Union is vulnerable to attack. Although it received worldwide attention, the discussion was highly speculative. Since the United States has not and currently does not deploy a submarine tender to the Indian Ocean, Polaris patrols there would actually detract from its strategic posture. The closest operating bases capable of supporting these deployments are Guam and Rota, Spain. These bases are at such a great distance from the Arabian Sea that transit times to and from the projected patrol areas would significantly reduce the on-station time of each submarine. In order to keep a ship on station at all times, either the number of submarines involved would have to be substantially increased (a dubious prospect at best, given the current fiscal restrictions on the U. S.
rnan'
datory. In August 1976, a professor at the Mosc^ Institute of World Economy and International e ^ tions publicly discussed this strategic considerat)
In a paper presented to the Sixth National 6-0° ence of the Australian Institute of Internationa ^ fairs, he pointed out the Soviet belief that 1 submarines were active in the northern part o Indian Ocean very early in the 1970s.7 An exan^ofJ. tion of ship deployments presented at the same ^ ference indicated that since the entry of Soviet s into the Indian Ocean, the Soviet Navy has ‘ ^ tained a constant antisubmarine warfare (ASW) bility, but it has not been predominant. In 19' .
for example, fewer than 20% of the ships present any given month had an ASW capability. If lCy the intent of the Soviet fleet to effectively count ballistic missile submarine threat, a much larger vestment of ASW forces would be required, the
ica*
consideration, the entry of the Soviet Navy into Indian Ocean must be looked at in terms of Pol‘ benefits as well as military. One popular sc^0°.-n<T thought views shrewd opportunism as the impe* force behind Soviet foreign policy.8 According to theory, whenever the Soviets perceive an opportn ^ to profit from Western mistakes, retrenchment-^ lack of resolve, they move quickly to exploit it- viously there is truth in this theory, as far as it B f The naval presence can be seen in this light) ^ there exist more specific political factors. By ma
^H-timed appearances in Third World ports or decoying in well-publicized opposition to the U. S. . avy, the Soviets can claim to be protecting develop- ^8 states from the forces of imperialism.
I The use of seapower to obtain political goals had °n8 been an axiom of Western maritime governors, but it was not until the Soviets developed an °Pen ocean capability in the mid-1960s that they ere able to employ it effectively for themselves. In ®ne of the first instances, they did not even have to ePloy any ships. In 1969, after the Libyan military ^Ppled the monarchy, Radio Moscow broadcast a airn that the presence of Soviet warships offshore Evented a Western-inspired counter-coup. The ^ythical presence of the Soviet Navy was very profit- e- Although other factors prevented a counter- j^°up from taking place, Moscow’s claim was widely Sieved in the Arab world. This incident demon- s^fated that the Kremlin had become well aware of e foreign policy value of a naval presence.
This type of propaganda claim is especially value in dealing with Third World countries. Unlike e Western countries, whose populations have been ^°Oditioned by years of experience in dealing with 0viet propaganda, the populations of the developing a6ons have difficulty sifting the truth from the fic- '°n *n Soviet claims. It should not be inferred, how- jVer, that Soviet naval diplomacy is all propaganda. n the Mediterranean, the presence of a large Soviet , eet has reduced the Sixth Fleet’s freedom of action q Seyeral crisis situations. Likewise, in the Indian Cean the Soviet presence has raised the stakes in the Oe of naval diplomacy. During the Indo-Pakistani
The growing manifestation of Soviet seapower in the Indian Ocean is not confined to warships. Its fishing fleet, typified hy a fish processing ship seen in Port Louis, Mauritius, has found and is exploiting a major new fishing area.
War of 1971, both the United States and the Soviet Union deployed significant naval forces to the Indian Ocean.9 At the outbreak of the war on 3 December, both superpowers had only a nominal naval presence. The Soviets moved first by deploying two surface- to-surface cruise missile (SSM)-equipped ships (a Kynda -class cruiser and a conventional submarine) from Vladivostok on 6-7 December to support the non-SSM-equipped ships already in the Indian Ocean. On 10 December, the United States formed Task Force 74, consisting of the attack carrier Enterprise (CVAN-65), the amphibious assault ship Tripoli (LPH- 10), three guided missile escorts, four destroyers, and a nuclear attack submarine, ordering them into the Andaman Sea shortly thereafter. In apparent response to the U. S. task force, the Soviets deployed another task group consisting of a “Kresta”-class cruiser, a Kashin -class destroyer, and two submarines on 12-13 December. The deployments on both sides can be seen as an attempt to convince both allies and adversaries of the strength of the respective commitment to the area. Although the Soviet presence in all likelihood could not have prevented the U. S. force from intervening militarily had that been its mission, it could have made such intervention very costly, both in military and political terms. The
Soviet actions during this crisis are examples of how the Soviets can represent themselves as the adversaries of the “imperialist aggressors” and protectors of beleaguered nations. Thus can they reap huge propaganda benefits in the Third World.
Another dimension of the peacetime foreign policy role of the Soviet Navy can be seen in its timely visits to Third World countries. In late 1970, the Soviet Union sent a small combatant force to West Africa in response to Guinean President Sekou
Toure’s request for a show of support. Presi £ Toure had just survived a Portuguese-led coup * tempt launched from then Portuguese Guinea (n ^ Guinea Bissau). Initially, the Soviet Navy estabhs ^ an almost continuous rotating two-ship patro ^ Portuguese Guinea to deter further attacks agai Guinea. Since the autumn of 1971, despite the ^ that the Portuguese withdrew from the Hump 0 ^
demonstration of support apparently has continued 1 serve to strengthen President Toure’s governme against internal dissent. This use of seapower neither new nor unique, since the same principle long been applied by the major maritime powers- is, however, a new role for the modern Soviet N^1 ^ and is representative of the new status accorded C° ventional seapower by Soviet leaders. ,
For Soviet client states, a naval expression of s°
rica in 1974, the Soviet Navy has maintained a e African patrol operating from Conakry. The Sovi
arity and commitment can assume greater propor- °ns. In March 1973^ the Persian Gulf state of Iraq, a ,0Vlet military client since the late 1950s, attacked order post in neighboring Kuwait and occupied a arrow strip of coastal land inside Kuwaiti territory, la e 0ccuPat*on was an attempt to gain control of all j®nds surrounding the channel entrance to the new a9l naval base at Umm Qasr. Despite intense medi- f>on efforts by the Arab League and offers of mili- j®ry assistance to Kuwait by Saudi Arabia, Jordan, an> and Bahrain, Iraqi troops maintained the occu- ^ati°n f°r two full weeks. During this time, the ^viet Union publicly supported Iraq by condemning uWait for the attack and dispatching Admiral „ rsnkov and a contingent of naval units on a J'endship” visit to Iraq. The timing of the Soviet I I!- ^aPPened t0 coincide with the first anniversary j . cf,e Iraqi-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Coopera- I |°n, but that is viewed as merely a secondary con! ^'deration. By sending the ships to Umm Qasr and nrniral Gorshkov to Baghdad, the Soviet Union was i Pr°viding strong public support for, and hence vital 'plornatic approval of, the Iraqi military action. Al- °ugh the available evidence indicates that the 0viets did not fully support their client’s action, the Presence of their warships was widely interpreted as atl expression of solidarity with the military regime Iraq. It has been reported that the Soviets were forking behind the scenes, exerting pressure on the aqis to abandon their hard-line policy. This could explain why the withdrawal of Iraqi troops took place "'■thin 24 hours after the arrival of Gorshkov and the flaval units.
In the face of general worldwide condemnation,
.. Iraqis may have been tempted to withdraw ear- er- Had they done so, they would have forfeited ^ lr opportunity to draw public support from the °viet Union. Since Iraq’s vice president had gone on friendly visit” to Moscow only one day after the °Ccupation, it is reasonable to assume that he was asking for some public demonstration of support.
^hen viewed in this light, the Umm Qasr port pal1 of the Soviet Navy assumes a new perspective.
0r the first time, the Soviet Navy was being used, 3keit passively, to support an aggressive military ac- b°n by one of its client states. Although the Iraq- uWaiti border incident was resolved without further oodshed, it has implications for the future stability the Indian Ocean. Inhabitants of the littoral jtates, emboldened by the Soviet public support of ^a9> could decide to change the political complexion 0 their own or a neighboring state. Use of military atld political support of “wars of national liberation”
has been a Soviet national policy since the Khrushchev era, but direct naval support, either passive or active, is a fairly recent addition.
During their tenure as the guarantors of political stability in the area, the British proved that the most effective means of controlling the littoral states was to control the sea-lanes of the Indian Ocean. The Soviets seem to have learned the lesson well. Most Soviet activity in the Indian Ocean has centered around the vitally important sea-lanes from the Persian Gulf states to Europe and the United States. The dependence of the industrialized nations of the West on Persian Gulf oil was graphically illustrated during the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War. This unpleasant fact of economic life assumes even greater significance in view of the Soviet naval buildup. Since 1968, the Soviets have established an impressive chain of supply points, deep-sea mooring buoys, and fleet anchorages extending from the southern coast of the Arabian peninsula around both coasts of Africa. In the Indian Ocean their mooring buoys are off the island of Socotra at the mouth of the Gulf of Aden; off the Seychelles, west-northwest of Diego Garcia; and off Mauritius, east of Madagascar. Soviet supply points—which are gained through a constantly increasing web of alliances, treaties of friendship and navigation, base rights, overflight and landing rights—include ports in Vietnam, Laos, Singapore, India, Iraq, South Yemen, Ethiopia, Mozambique and Mauritius. On the western coast of Africa, in the South Atlantic, the Soviets have been provided access to the ports of Fernando Po, off the coast of Cameroon; Conakry, Guinea; and Luanda, Angola.10 Soviet naval aircraft stage from Aden, Conakry, and Luanda.
The most significant Soviet naval presence has been developed at the southern end of the Red Sea in the Gulf of Aden. In Berbera, Somali Republic, on the southern coast, the Soviet Union had, by 1975, constructed a major naval base, including communications facilities, fuel oil storage facilities, repair facilities, and, as confirmed by a U. S. congressional delegation, antiship missile sites.11 Since that congressional inspection, the Soviet Union has radically altered its alliances in the Horn of Africa. When the Western influence in Ethiopia declined, the Soviets began to supply that country with the same type of arms it had previously provided to Somalia. By the time of the 1977-78 Ethiopian-Somali conflict, the Soviet Union had switched sides completely, throwing the full weight of its political and military support behind the Ethiopian war effort. Whether the switch was motivated by the Somalis or the Soviets is
naval
The same logic can be applied to the U. S.
immaterial to the discussion. What is pertinent is that by shifting their alliances, the Soviets left behind their extensive investment in port facilities and lost perhaps their most important naval supply port. Whether or not this provides an exploitative opportunity for the United States remains to be seen, although as early as 1975 the president of the Somali Republic, Mohammed Siad Barre, offered to refuel U. S. warships.12 In May 1979, the USS Davis (DD- 937) became the first U. S. naval ship to visit Ber- bera.
Despite the loss of Berbera, the Soviet Navy still maintains an excellent strategic position from its use of northern ports on the gulf, Aden, South Yemen, and Massawa and Asab, Ethiopia. Using these facilities and such others as may become available in the near future, the Soviet Union possesses the capability to deploy significant naval groups on short notice and maintain them for extended periods. Demonstrating Soviet support for and interest in South Yemen, the first Soviet carrier task force to deploy to the Indian Ocean reportedly put on a show for the Marxist government. On 28 May of this year, the carrier Minsk's vertical takeoff and landing jets and the Soviet Navy’s new amphibious warfare ship Ivan Rogov were exercised for the South Yemenis. Because of the existence of missile boat support bases and antiship missile sites in Berbera, the Soviets had the capability to control the approaches to the Red Sea. This capability has been reduced significantly by the Soviet withdrawal from Berbera; however, it should not prove too difficult for the Soviets to obtain permission from some other Red Sea/Gulf of Aden government to install and maintain similar sites. Interdiction of the sea-lanes remains a prime mission of the Soviet Navy.
Prior to the reopening of the Suez Canal in 1975, the Soviet naval ships deployed to the Indian Ocean were forced to steam exceptionally long distances to reach the Horn of Africa. For ships of the Pacific Fleet at Vladivostok, the distance was approximately 8,000 miles. Ships of the Northern Fleet based at Severomovsk had to steam 11,200 miles around Africa’s Cape of Good Hope. Using the same route, the Baltic Fleet ships traveled 10,800 miles and the
A Soviet combatant ”sboufs the flag” at Massawa, Ethiopia. But there are pitfalls to such latter-day gunboat diplomacy. By allying themselves recently with Ethiopia against the Somali Republic, the Soviets lost the Berbera naval base which had been their most important port in the region.
Black Sea ships, 10,400 miles. With the °Pen“^e°[ the canal, the distance for the Black Sea dropped to only 3,300 miles, a reduction of nea^ 70%.13 Considering the Soviet force levels in 1 ^ Mediterranean at any given time, the distance C°U be reduced even more dramatically if some or t ^ ships already under way in the Mediterranean w ordered south via the canal. They could be qulC relieved from the Black Sea Fleet.
^ ---------------------- £a(;,
units operating with the Sixth Fleet, but anotne 1
tor must be considered. Historically, the most p
erful and effective warship which can be depl°^£
quickly to an Indian Ocean trouble spot has been
aircraft carrier. The present 38-foot depth of the
Canal precludes the passage of all active U. S. c
riers. To reach the likely operational areas *nf
northwestern Indian Ocean, carriers must ei
steam around the cape of Good Hope or deploy ‘
the Seventh Fleet in the Western Pacific. 0
Fleet has been assigned responsibility for the Inc
Ocean and has deployed carriers during the n
Pakistani Crisis of 1971, the October 1973 war, ^
Arab oil embargo of 1974, in response to
Ugandan troubles in 1976, and most recently ’ltl{
sponse to the North Yeman-South Yemen border
of 1979- At the present time, every Soviet naV
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Sel<§* C Lombok
.Fremantle
U. S. GOVERNMENT
q ances from Indian Ocean ports: Light lines indicate routes from Cape of Hope; dark lines indicate routes from Port Said.
^_0thbatant, including the 40,000-ton aircraft carriers lev and Minsk, is capable of transiting the Suez Ca- Considering the 4,000-mile track from the ^eventh Fleet operating base at Subic Bay in the ^•bppines, the SpeecJ with which the Soviet Union ^°ul(J reinforce ships in the Indian Ocean could not j e matched by the United States. This ability could I |Ive the Soviets a distinct advantage in time of crisis.
j.ecause the Soviets had to deploy ships from Vla- 1 ^vOstok during the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971, by I e time they reached the confrontation area, the war rfS 0ver- Task Force 74, deploying from the South L dina Sea, arrived three days before the Soviet ships, K.1 even so, it arrived fairly late.14 In future con- j tcts, assuming the canal remains open, the Soviets . dl be able to reduce their transit time significantly, 11 all probability arriving at a crisis scene concurrent lt:h or shortly before a Seventh Fleet carrier.
Early indications were that, despite the opening of the canal, major Soviet deployments would continue to be made by ships of the Pacific Fleet. As of late 1978, the major portion of the Soviet naval ships going through the Suez Canal were noncombatants. With the continuing deterioration of the relationship between Egypt and the Soviet Union, it is interesting to speculate what would happen in the event of a serious crisis which demanded an immediate Soviet naval reinforcement. As in the case of the United States, the Soviet Union probably would be forced to increase its fleet by deployment from the Pacific. If, however, as a result of unforeseen political considerations, Egypt permitted the passage of significant combatant ships, the United States could be at a tactical disadvantage, as discussed above.
Despite the apparent Soviet preoccupation with the oil routes to the West, there is some evidence to
but since the group did not reach the Andaman area until well after the end of the war and was traOs
indicate that concern about China provided partial motivation for the naval incursion. By 1969, the Sino-Soviet split was at a low ebb. In the wake of the Cultural Revolution, the ideological rift between the two Communist giants had intensified, and sharp border clashes were occurring with regularity. In its political battles with China to maintain the leadership of the world Communist movement, one of the Soviet Union’s main objectives became the containment of China. At the international meeting of the Communist and Workers’ Parties held in Moscow during June 1969, Leonid Brezhnev outlined a diplomatic offensive aimed directly at China. He proposed an Asian collective security system which would have excluded China.15 The creation of a Moscow-dominated security system to the south and west of China could have achieved the goal of isolating its rival, but the Soviet Union found it difficult to generate support for the idea among the intended participants. For individual reasons, each Asian nation has been reluctant to join such a system. Despite its failure, the timing of Brezhnev’s proposal provides an interesting backdrop to the spring 1969 establishment of a continuous Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean.
The anti-Chinese orientation of Soviet-Asian re^‘
rl fV
tions continued in spite of the failure of the secu system proposal. In 1971, as relations between ln^ ^ and Pakistan worsened, the Soviet Union signe treaty of friendship and cooperation with 1° ’
which was an open warning to China not to inter in the developing Indo-Pakistani crisis.11’ The So naval action in the crisis has been outlined aboveview of the demonstrated anti-Chinese orientation ^ Soviet foreign policy preceding the crisis, the 5o naval ships which departed Vladivostok on 6-7 cember (three days prior to the formation of l*1 ^ Force 74) could well have been a well-publicized r^ minder to the Chinese to remain neutral. __ surface-to-surface missile-equipped ships were iting the Pacific coast of China during the heigh1 the conflict. It has been assumed that the seC°^£ Soviet task group was deployed in response to
formation of Task Force 74. That is probably tr^£’
Sea
iting off the Chinese coast during the latter stageS ^ the war, it could well have had the secondary P ^ pose of serving as an additional reminder to Chinese. ^
As in the Western Indian Ocean, Soviet naval a tivity in the eastern part has centered around esta fishing a logistics network and acting as an *nSt^e ment of Soviet foreign policy. At the outset, Soviet client state of India provided basing arrang ments for the Soviet ships in four ports: Bombaf’ Marmagao, Cochin, and Vishakhapatnam. The dian Government has vehemently denied that tn arrangements constitute Soviet bases, but the Sov
een used to expand the Indian port facilities. In the Soviets secured bunkering rights for their H'ps at Singapore, which gave them an unbroken ain of logistics stops along the littoral from the eastern entrance of the Indian Ocean to the vicinity Mozambique.
Following the bloody birth of Bangladesh as a re- Suh of the Indo-Pakistani War, Soviet naval units listed in the port clearing operations in its vital F°tt of Chittagong. The original contract between two governments had committed the Soviet mon t0 dear both Chittagong and Chalna, the 0ther major port of Bangladesh. However, because of a combination of time-consuming salvage methods ^d many unexplained delays, the Soviets were un. Dw to clear all of the wrecks they had been assigned ln Chittagong and refused to undertake any salvage derations in Chalna. The Soviet officer in command,
Rear Admiral Sergei Zuyenko, was initially quite optimistic publicly, hoping the entire Chittagong operation would be completed in six weeks, but it wound up taking about a year and a half.17 Admittedly, the Soviets were up against a number of technical problems which lengthened their stay, but it seems clear that one of the major reasons for the extended stay in Chittagong was to use the navy to build Soviet influence. Thoughout the entire operation, Admiral Zuyenko engaged in a major public relations campaign, which included holding frequent press confer-
I he Indian Ocean has become an operating area not only for submarines such as the “F” class (above foreground), and for Kashin -class guided missile destroyers, but also for ^Uigator’'-class amphibious ships (below) which, when part of a Soviet squadron, give it a limited amphibious capability which could be used by client states.
Lieutenant Commander Hickman enlisted in the Reserve in 1964. Following graduation from the versify of Nevada at Reno in 1969, he receive
ences, taking newsmen on minesweeper cruises of the Bay of Bengal, and hosting ceremonies celebrating the first anniversary of the operation.
The use of the Soviet Navy in this role was in keeping with Admiral Gorshkov’s view of the navy as an instrument of state policy in peacetime, but in the case of Bangladesh it may have backfired somewhat. In its zeal to enhance its prestige in the new nation, the Soviet Union had publicly committed itself to more than it could accomplish. After the Soviet refusal to clear Chalna harbor, the government of Bangladesh contracted with the United Nations for the work. Working under physical conditions similar to those in Chittagong, but with more advanced salvage techniques, the UN-chartered team cleared Chalna in less than five months, causing acute embarrassment to the Soviets. In addition, Admiral Zuyenko’s activities, coupled with the establishment of a Soviet compound on the pier which was guarded by machine gun-carrying sailors, led to persistent speculation about a secret Soviet basing agreement, which had to be publicly denied by the Bangladesh Government.18
In summary, Soviet naval policy in the Indian Ocean offers nothing new to the concepts of seapower which have been developed over the centuries by the major maritime powers. What is new is the application of these concepts to the Soviet Navy. Its evolution from a defense-oriented coastal navy to an offensive blue water navy has roughly coincided with
Soviet expansion into the Indian Ocean. Not posses r . . . • Knt COA"
ing an extensive history as a maritime power
fronted with classic problems of projection of P°wer’
the Soviet Union developed predictable s0^utl°jjc
Since the Indian Ocean has been an area of Perl
confrontation with Western navies, as opposed to ^
Mediterranean, which is an area of continual con
tation, the Soviet Union has been more free to
periment with the foreign policy mission of its
For the past 11 years, the Indian Ocean has ^
both a classroom and an operational theater for c ^
Soviets. In it they have proven to be excellent ^
dents and competent seamen. Their presence may ^
be without competition, but they can offer ^orrn.^e
ble opposition to any existing or would-be man
power in the Indian Ocean.
Naval
Un>' rd his
commission via the Reserve Officer Candidate and was assigned to the USS Meyerkord (DE' . After Destroyer School, he served as weapons off*c ^ the USS Marvin Shields (DE-1066). While serving 1 ^ instructor on the staff of the Surface Warfare Officers School, he was assigned to the Middle East Specialist Training Program f°r In July 1976, he completed a 47-week Persian language course ^ Defense Language Institute. In August 1977, he received an M gree in government (Middle East) from the University of Texas at ^ stin. Since January 1978, he has been engineer officer of the USS ^ chatoula (AO-148). This coming autumn, he will report to Op^aV duty.
McC°n'
1 ()4'
‘Khrushchev claimed that conventional naval forces were outmoded for modern nuclear warfare and implied they would be phased out. George E. Hudson, “Soviet Naval Doctrine and Soviet Politics, 1953-1975,” World Politics, October 1976, pp. 98-99- 2Ibid., p. 104.
3The ships involved in the original cruise were a light cruiser, a guided missile frigate, a guided missile destroyer, a fleet oiler, and a merchant tanker. Alvin J. Cottrell and R. M. Burrell, “Soviet-U. S. Naval Competition in the Indian Ocean,” Orbis, Winter 1975, pp. 1111-12.
4T. B. Millar, Soviet Policies in the Indian Ocean Area (Canberra: Australia National University Press, 1970), p. 12.
5See T. B. Millar, “The Military-Strategic Balance,” in Abbas Amirie, The Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean in International Politics (Tehran: Institute for International Political and Economic Studies, 1975), pp- 83-84; and Geoffrey Jukes, “Soviet Policy in the Indian Ocean,” in Michael MccGwire, et. al., editors, Soviet Naval Policy: Objectives and Constraints (New York: Praeger, 1975), p- 311.
“Robert G. Weinland, “The Changing Mission of the Soviet Navy,” Survival, May-June 1972, p. 131.
7Igor A. Lebedev, “Soviet Policy Considerations Regarding the Indian Ocean,” Australian Outlook, April 1977, p. 139.
8Alvin Z. Rubenstein, “Soviet Policy Toward the Third World in the 1970s,” Orbis, Spring 1971, p. 110.
9This information is drawn from James M. McConnell and Anne M. Kelly, “Super-Power Naval Diplomacy: Lessons of the Indo-Pakistani
Crisis 1971,” Survival, November-December 1973, pp- 289-90- ^
1 “Cottrell, “Soviet-U. S. Naval Competition,” pp. 1115-1116; P*111 ^ Nitze, “The Global Military Balance,” in The Soviet Threat: My^s ^ Realities (New York: Academy of Political Science, 1978), p- .■
Kenneth L. Andelman, “Fear, Seduction, and Growing Soviet Stren.k Orbis, Winter 1978, p. 756. j|
“Cottrell, “Soviet-U. S. Naval Competitions,” p. 1117; J. Bowyer^ ^ “Strategic Implications of the Soviet Presence in Somalia,” Orbis, mer 1975, pp. 404 and 409- ”
12W. G. Hayden, “The Soviet Naval Presence in the Indian Oce‘ Australian Outlook, April 1977, p. 196.
13Cottrell, “The Soviet Navy and the Indian Ocean,” in Amir,e’
ns-w. . fche
14The war in East Pakistan ended one day after the arrival 0 ^
Enterprise task force. The war in the west ended one day later, nell, "The Soviet Navy in the Indian Ocean.”
15Rubenstein, “The Soviet Policy Toward the Third World,” PP-
iUJ. *
‘“Adam B. Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence: Soviet Foreign Policy 1973, 2nd edition (New York: Praeger, 1974), p. 765.
“Charles C. Petersen, “The Soviet Port-Clearing Operations^ Bangladesh,” in MccGwire, Soviet Naval Policy, pp. 325-327 and 336.
‘“Petersen, “Soviet Port-Clearing,” p. 336.