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On the other hand, the Soviets are showing ^ ..lhibitions about employing their naval forceS ^ other armed forces to support their interests *n
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1974 a new government in Malagasy told praIl'egO remove all its forces by 1975. To replace 1
Although the Indian Ocean is one of the earth's five great oceans, it has only recently become a strategically important area. What changed everything was the discovery of the vast oilfields of the Arabian Peninsula, Iran, and Iraq. Across the ocean’s vast expanses pass the major tanker routes. Japan depends on the Persian Gulf area for more than 90% of its oil and Western Europe, about 70%. The United States has become increasingly dependent, currently receiving more than 40% of its imported oil requirements from this area. Any interruption of oil to the world’s industrial nations would result in cataclysmic economic consequences.
As early as 21 November 1973, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger warned the Arab nations that the United States would consider countermeasures if the oil embargo then in force continued indefinitely or unreasonably. In a 1979 television interview, Dr. Harold Brown, the current Secretary of Defense, warned that “. . . the United States would defend its oil interests in the Middle East with military force if necessary. Protection of the oil flow is clearly a part of our vital interest, we will take any action that is appropriate to safeguard production of oil and its transportation to consumer nations without interference from hostile powers.”
In spite of the importance of maintaining the flow of oil, there is no agreed-upon joint plan within NATO to react to any emergency that might interrupt
that flow. Very few on-scene forces have been m available to react quickly and positively. Pr>or 1 ^ recent change in government, Iran was the country attempting to prepare to react to the dictable oil-disrupting changes in the pohtica ^ ership that might occur in the Persian Gulf an bian Sea areas. Ironically, it was Iran itself w underwent such changes.
Indian Ocean area. To offset this growing S°vie fluence, it seems only prudent that the We*ter”aVal tions, Australia, and Japan should deploy joint $ forces in the area, capable of creating Percep among the nations of the Persian Gulf and the ^ bian Peninsula that they will provide quick an P £ tive support to the pro-Western governments 1° of any attempt by radical forces to seize power- The British Government in 1968 announce decision to evacuate British forces from the are*1 ^ of Suez by 1971. In March 1977, they complete^ j process when they gave up their bases at Masira s Salalah in Oman. All that remain are five ba«a ^ of troops in Hong Kong and an occasional eP ^ ment of a British naval task force. The FrenC though they have withdrawn from most o ^ former colonies, are continuing to keep a sign11 j naval presence in the western Indian Ocean to g s the oil routes. French sea-lane control was predic‘ on using bases at Djibouti and at Diego Suare ^ Malagasy Republic, for their ships. However,^ ^
Suarez as a base in the south Indian Ocean,
An increasingly concerned Western world waits as thei ^ tankers wait at Kharg Island, Iran—while the detna» Persian Gulf oil grows greater and tempers get shorter-
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French have moved their naval forces to Reunion, where they have a modern air base, a communication station, a well-equipped port, and 1,200 paratroopers. They have also gone to Mayotte Island in the Comoros group. It is well located to control the Mozambique Channel, with its good deep-water bay and some naval facilities.
Djibouti, strategically located at the entrance to the Red Sea, received its independence as a country from France in June 1977. Within hours, the new nation signed a defense pact, permitting the French troops and the French warships and aircraft based there to remain. Djibouti continues as the nerve center and principal base for French military and naval presence. French Indian Ocean naval forces now normally consist of a helicopter carrier with embarked marines, two or three destroyers, an occasional Polaris-type submarine, minesweepers, landing craft, and support ships. Indeed, France has more naval ship-days of deployment on a yearly basis in the Indian Ocean than either the United States or the Soviet Union.
No sooner had the British made their 1968 announcement than a Soviet naval task force left Vladivostok bound for the Indian Ocean. This was the beginning of Soviet seapower in the Indian Ocean, paralleling the meteoric growth of Soviet seapower throughout the oceans of the world. As in other areas, the growing maritime influence of the U.S.S.R. has not been confined to naval vessels. Hydrographic ships have collected valuable hydrographic and environmental data concerning the Indian Ocean. The fishing fleet has found and is exploiting a major new fishing area. The merchant marine is carrying an increasing quantity of Third World goods across the Indian Ocean. The policy is to keep a rather small naval force in the Indian Ocean so that it can be quickly enlarged in times of crisis. At all times, the Soviet naval forces completely outclass the U. S. Middle East Force based in the Persian Gulf. To support these naval forces, the Soviets seem to have set up a fairly far-reaching system of accommodations. They do not classify them as bases, but that seems to be purely a matter of semantics.
Undoubtedly, the primary motivation for Soviet Navy deployments in the Indian Ocean is to engage in a contest for influence where the rewards are great and the risks are small. In an area where countries are often less concerned with facts than perceptions, Soviet claims that the presence of their navy deters U. S. intervention can be a significant factor in political actions.
With the naval forces and infrastructure now available to the Soviet naval commander in the In-
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another area. Subic Bay is roughly 6,000 miles
the entrance to the Persian Gulf, and Guam is
Zumwalt, Chief of Naval Operations, having P
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quest authorization and money to expanc
ous British concurrence, went before Congress t0
Soviets. There were proposals to make the Ocean a “nuclear-free zone” or a “zone of peace to bar warships of the superpowers. Actually’ merely resurrected the resolutions that had r' ^ been passed overwhelmingly by the General Ass bly at the United Nations in 1971 and 197- ^ which had been ignored by the three powers
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dian Ocean, he has a spectrum of actions available to him, starting with direct naval action by Soviet naval forces. This course is considered by most analysts to be extremely unlikely for the foreseeable future, especially since the Soviets have no vital interests in the area at this time. However, in the Third World, outside the realm of a possible superpower naval interaction, the Soviets are becoming increasingly bold in using them and reportedly have actively used their naval forces to bombard Eritrean guerrilla positions in support of Ethiopian forces defending Massawa.
On the other hand, direct naval action, blockade, mining, interference with shipping, or any hostile naval actions that might concern the Western powers and lead to possible escalation would seem to be unthinkable courses of action for the Soviet commander. Such actions are precluded by the Soviet politics of detente, the strength of the deployed forces, their comparatively meager infrastructure, the lack of air support, the inability to augment naval forces after the outbreak of hostilities, and the fact that Soviet shipping and fishing fleets in the Indian Ocean would become hostage to Western reactions.
However, other important courses of action are available to the Soviet naval commander:
\ He can exercise gunboat diplomacy to extend Soviet political influence at the expense of Western or Chinese influence.
\ He can use his forces to encourage and support internal subversion in the littoral states where it is to the Soviets’ advantage.
\ He can use his naval forces to actively support a client state in a war with other Third World nations as he has done in Ethiopia.
\ He can intimidate nations, such as Japan, which are wholly dependent on the continued passage of oil through the Indian Ocean.
► In addition to political advances, he can gain for the Soviet Navy expertise in tropical operations and in the logistic problems associated with long-range naval operations.
Since the late 1940s, the U. S. Navy has maintained a small force in the Persian Gulf. It now consists of two destroyers and the converted amphibious transport dock LaSalle (AGF-3), which serves as flagship. The purposes of the Middle East Force are to patrol the sea-lanes of the Persian Gulf and to show the flag in the Arabian Sea, Persian Gulf, and Red Sea areas, demonstrating direct support for U. S. foreign policy undertakings in the region. With the beginning of Soviet naval deployments to the Indian Ocean in the early 1970s, the perceptions engendered in the littoral states in contrasting the small,
lightly armed U. S. Middle East Force ships wy ^ more numerous, more heavily armed Soviet ship ^ viously strongly favored the latter. To o set ^ political influence of the constant presence of c ^ paratively strong Soviet naval forces require ^ ^ U. S. Navy to deploy more powerful naval iotce■ the Indian Ocean than those assigned to the 1 ^ East Force. Hence, soon after the first Soviet n^^ task force entered the Indian Ocean, the U. Son a recurrent basis has deployed carrier task *°rce^r. the area. Currently, the U. S. Navy schedules a ^ rier task force roughly once every three or ^ months from the Seventh Fleet for a one-m cruise in the Indian Ocean. .
It soon became apparent that if periodic “e^ere ments of carrier task forces to the Indian Ocean ^ to continue, a. forward base would be require support them. Even with assigned underway ^ plenishment forces, the carrier task forces ^ operating at the end of a very long supply l,ne'^jj the result of substantial cutbacks in Navy ships 0 ^ types, Indian Ocean deployments adversely at e . the Pacific Fleet’s ability to react at the same tirn
500
miles farther. Norfolk, via the Cape of Good is more than 11,000 miles, weeks away from Pr° ing quick response to a disturbance. j0g
In 1974, faced with the necessity for contin11 carrier deployments to this area, Admiral Elm^,^ facilities on the centrally located British island Diego Garcia. In addition to the communication ^ tion already completed, the Navy wanted to bu1 fuel storage facility, to dredge the harbor suffio'^^ to handle a carrier and her escorts, and to 1enl&1 the runway to 12,000 feet so that it could han e ^ patrol planes, KC-135 tankers, and C-141 an -s logistic aircraft. Admiral Zumwalt stressed that ^ would not set off an arms race with the Soviets, jf they were already in the process of expanding 1 presence and support facilities in the area.
Nevertheless, his request caused considerably ^ sternation among some of the littoral states an * course, received the anticipated blast frorn
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^°ying warships to the Indian Ocean—France, ' '^•®-» and the United States, nere was also considerable congressional opposi- q n t0 the proposed buildup of facilities at Diego j^arcia- Eventually, the Senate forces in favor of the thle8° Garcia buildup, led by John Stennis, approved instruction request. The go-ahead was post- ^ ned until April 1976, at which time the president § .t0 report on the status of negotiations with the ^Vlets on naval deployment limitations in the In- an Ocean. Subsequently, construction has gotten ^der way, and the airfield is now operational. en the work at Diego Garcia is completed, the j Navy will have a centrally located base in the f° *an Ocean (1,100 miles from India, 2,000 miles f0fn the Indonesian Straits, 2,100 miles from Aden, | the Middle East Force, even though the practice of , homeporting this force there was discontinued in 1977. U. S. P-3 patrol aircraft now based at Diego Garcia have access to the former Royal Air Force base on the island of Masirah with prior permission of the Sultan of Oman. The Australian Government under Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser has offered the United States the use of the naval base at Cockburn Sound in Southwest Australia and of airfields at Learmouth, Pearce, and the Cocos Islands. The Navy already maintains a communication station at Northwest Cape in Australia. However, the Australian bases are remote from the strategic sea lines of communication with the exception of the airfield on the Cocos Islands, which would be useful for aircraft patrolling the eastern entrances to the Indian Ocean. |
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2,600 miles from Bahrain, the areas where U. S. ^aval presence is most needed). More recently, the Air Force, realizing that in time of crisis the 0p '‘‘Ppines-Diego Garcia route may be its only way ^ Caching the Middle East or Persian Gulf, has ,^8ed further development of the island as a refuel- 8 point for tactical aircraft. ^ *n addition to Diego Garcia, the U. S. Navy still as the use of limited naval facilities at Bahrain for | Recognizing the critical importance of Indian Ocean sea routes to its nation, the Royal Australian Navy maintains bases on the West Coast and airfields at Learmouth, Pearce, and the Cocos Islands, and conducts joint operations with the U. S. Navy, such as this one involving the USS Gray (FF-1054) and FIMAS Vendetta. |
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Singapore remains available for refueling, supplies, and for ship docking and repairs. In addition, P-3 aircraft have limited use of its airfields.
South Africa in the past has offered the United States use of the well-equipped and strategically located naval base at Simonstown. However, with the shortsighted present U. S. policy toward South Africa, use of this base is out of the question—a victory for ideological expediency over vital strategic interests. One can only wonder what the position of the United States would be if, after taking Namibia and Rhodesia, a Soviet/Cuban force were to decide to “liberate” South Africa with its strategic location and vast store of strategic minerals. In 1965, 0.8 million barrels of oil rounded the Cape of Good Hope each day. By 1976, this had increased to 18 million.
In addition to the naval forces already considered, the navies of India, Iran, and Australia warrant brief consideration as do the air forces of many of the littoral countries such as Australia, South Africa, India, Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia. All these countries have sufficiently capable air forces to make it impossible for a naval task force to carry out its mission without having air support of its own, either land based or sea based.
A case in point was the cruise in 1977 of a Brltl naval task force led by the cruiser Tiger and inclu 1 five frigates and other smaller ships. The task °r air defenses included 11 quadruple Seacat miss launchers plus 6-inch, 4.5-inch, 3-inch, and 40 antiaircraft guns. Yet in scheduled exercises with t^ Malaysian Air Force and on a separate occasion w the Singapore Air Force, the task force defenses " _ swamped by the relatively small and obsolescent forces of these countries. .
India has by far the largest navy of the 1° Ocean littoral countries—one aircraft carrier, cruiser, 25 frigates with both surface-to-air * surface-to-surface missile capabilities, eight s marines (Soviet “Foxtrots”), three “Nanuchka -c ^ corvettes, and a wide variety of missile-firing P‘lt^e boats and smallcraft, including minesweepers. In c ^ last war with Pakistan the Indians acquitted the selves well. They have plans for updating their t° with newer ships (“Kashin”-class destroyers, rri^ Leander-type frigates, more “Nanuchka”-class ^ vettes), new attack aircraft for their carrier, and °e surface-to-surface and antisubmarine missiles. ^ ^ reported that they are constructing ah' airfield an naval base on the strategically located Nie° ‘ ^ Islands, which would put them in a position to e°
trol surface traffic through the Straits of Malacca
Iran, until the revolution against the shah,
had the
hi the u ake of the now-defunct CENTO, the United States and Great Britain help each other maintain a token presence in the Indian Ocean. They also periodically enlarge their forces for exercises. In this photograph, taken during a joint exercise, the USS Sellers (DDG-ll) and the British frigate HMS Andromeda refuel from HMS Plumleaf.
fastest growing and potentially the most modern
most capable navy of all the littoral states. The s
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fearing a military-political vacuum in the Gulf after the British withdrawal, had taken UP himself the peacekeeping role in the Persian Go Gulf of Oman, and the Northwestern Indian Oce‘
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Proceedings / August
Western technical assistance and support, 5er Iranian ships nor planes will be operationally Pable. It is hard to predict what will eventually 0 Ve from the present turmoil. At best, it would be th^°Vernrnent C^at Can ^r*ng law and order to Iran, lat will maintain a neutral stance between Soviet
°yers, 6 Oberon-class submarines, 2 air force squad-
ns
of P-3 patrol antisubmarine aircraft, and 2 hadrons of F-111C long-range strike/reconnaissance
His •
ar|^ 013111 concerns were to keep the sea-lanes open .j, t0 maintain the status quo stability in the area. aacc°mplish this role of leadership, the shah was a ” lring a modern navy and air force far superior to ne 0t^er country in the area. He had constructed g 31r an<^ 'nava^ kases at Bandar Abbas and Chah ^ ar and had acquired basing rights from ^-ius. His navy consisted of three destroyers, r ligates, four corvettes, numerous patrol craft, Qnesweepers, landing ships, and 14 hovercraft. On er was a wide variety of very capable ships and fart. The shah had already demonstrated that he 0 use force if necessary to maintain stability in Persian Gulf area. He was concerned with the ^estern powers’ shortage of on-scene forces and lack q fo protect the sea-lanes throughout the Indian ^ Cean. His orders of ships and aircraft were to give as**1 ^uture capability of sea-lane protection as far che Horn of Africa and the Indian subcontinent, j. accent events have completely destroyed the ^trner Iranian contribution to area stability. Orders ^ _ships and planes are being substantially cut back.
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f Australians also have a growing navy and air
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111 the Indian Ocean. They have 11 missile de Stfr 1
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ind Australia continue to hold joint naval exel\ with U. S. naval forces in the Indian Ocean an the logical nations to contribute forces to a permanent allied naval presence in this trouble important area. jjp
Actually NATO, as the principal political and & tary alliance of nations vitally concerned with Per g Gulf oil, should take the lead in issuing a str^0j[ statement guaranteeing the uninterrupted flow 0 ^ from the Persian Gulf and in providing credible scene military forces to back up the statement- , chances of this happening, however, are consi to be absolutely zero for the foreseeable future spite of the vital need of their members for PerS j. Gulf oil and despite the advice of their military *e ers. Therefore, the countries that would be will*n^^ contribute forces to a joint naval/air patrol and P
aircraft. They have recently built a new naval base and new airfields on their West Coast, thus emphasizing their realization of the importance to Australia of the Indian Ocean sea routes.
When President Jimmy Carter first took office, his administration came out favoring “deployment limitations” as a means of conventional arms control. The Indian Ocean was selected as a good area to initiate talks with the Soviets and thereby “avoid a potentially costly and new dimension of their arms race.
It was envisioned that an agreement would prevent the establishment of new bases by either the Soviets or Americans and would require dismantling of the existing bases at Berbera (Soviet involvement in Ethiopia has already taken care of this) and Diego Garcia.
In spite of many cogent arguments against deployment limitations of U. S. naval power in the Indian Ocean, the four series of talks held already on the subject have produced no basis for agreement. Recently, President Carter has voiced strong concern over the Soviet role in Ethiopia and over the increased Soviet naval presence in the Western Indian Ocean. He realizes he cannot permit the Soviets uncontested domination of the Red Sea, the Middle
East oilfields, and the tanker sea-lanes from base Aden and the Horn of Africa. As a result, in Fe ary 1978 Paul Warnke, chief U. S. negotiator, nounced that the United States was abandoning^ efforts to reach a quick agreement on limiting jj forces in the Indian Ocean because of annoyance the U.S.S.R.’s continuing military aid to EthioP1^ In recent years, there has been some inte ^ shown among certain of the Western-oriented c° ^ tries toward the scheduling of joint naval exercise ^ the Indian Ocean and toward at least talking ‘l ^ cooperative naval contingency plans in that area ^ 1974, ships and planes from all the CENTO coun^ ;n participated in the largest naval exercise ever hen the Indian Ocean. In the meantime, CENTO has terminated as a result of the defection of Iran, stan, and Turkey. However, France, Great ®rlt‘seS
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Proceedings / Augus
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the
01 control of the Straits of Hormuz. A similar ret lri Saudi Arabia would cause far greater interrup- n t0 Western oil supplies. However, in this case e Soviets probably do not have a “core” interest, ^tl quick Western intervention might well uphold estern interests.
r one looks at recent Soviet military and political pCtions, the Soviets’ political objectives of controlling ^ersian Gulf oil emerge clearly. The Soviets’ 1972 j aty of friendship and cooperation with Iraq, the Ciet-backed takeover in Afghanistan, the part ayed by Soviet-trained Communist cells and the
Kgb
nce in the Western Indian Ocean should formulate tingency plans and contribute on-scene forces lf 0ut further delay. An allied effort would provide 'Tiuch more effective deterrent to either Soviet or ,ICa Arab adventurism than would a solitary n eavor by U. S. forces.
Th •
th °e recent events *n Ifan provide an example of
ate ^UlCk changes that can take place in this volatile
with little advance notice. In the case of Iran,
fo 0 Presence large Western naval and air
rces might not have been able to change the out-
^rne, since both the Soviet Union and the United
ates have vital or “core” interests in Iran and any Overt • , 1
L intervention by one side could not have gone
Challenged by the other. The stakes in Iran are
A pro-Moscow regime would offer the Soviets
Ctrol of Iran’s oil and, more importantly, give m the overthrow of the shah in Iran, the part ayed in the installation of a pro-Soviet “hardliner” ,e8irne in South Yemen, and the Soviet intervention the Horn of Africa, first on the side of Somalia in Change for bases and then on an even more massive an<^ ruthless basis on the side of Ethiopia, all add up 0 furthering the aims of the Soviets to control Per
sian Gulf oil.
Once again, during the Ethiopian conflict as in Angola, the Soviets have demonstrated both an increasing capability to project military power into areas far from their own borders and an increasing willingness to do so. As Joseph Kraft wrote recently *u The Washington Post, unless the Soviets are given a strong warning to induce greater restraint in their expansionism, . . . they will talk themselves into the most dangerous of all positions, the self intoxicating position of believing they can get away with anything.”
Until the exit of the shah, the U. S. military commitment (three relatively impotent warships) to the increasingly important goal of maintaining the uninterrupted flow of oil had remained the same as it was 30 years ago when Persian Gulf oil was of com- paratavely minor interest to the United States. Granted, Diego Garcia, more than 2,000 miles away, has been developed as a limited logistic support base, and an occasional carrier task force steams into the Arabian Sea for a few weeks of operations and training exercises.
In view of recent happenings in the area, it should be a matter of urgent priority for the concerned nations to establish a stronger, more credible deterrent posture in the area. This would mostly involve naval and air forces but would include small, elite amphibious or airborne landing forces. With present U. S. naval force levels and worldwide commitments, it stretches available forces too far to keep a U. S. carrier deployed in the area at all times and still to maintain present commitments elsewhere Possibly it might be timely to explore the redeployment of one of the deployed Western Pacific carriers to the Indian Ocean. The alternatives are to rely on the deployment of one of the Navy’s new amphibious assault ships (general purpose) (LHAs) with her embarked marines and Harrier aircraft; to share the air support duties there with the French carriers; or to base ashore in the area several squadrons of U. S. Air Force, Marine, or Navy or of allied air forces tactical airplanes. Perhaps the best place to do the latter would be at the former Royal Air Force base at Masirah, in which case the British and/or the Australians might be induced to assume this contribu-
The U. S. Middle East Force, shown here in Bahrain, is modest: the flagship LaSalle (AGF-3) and the frigates Jesse L. Brown (FF-1089) and Valdez (FF-1096). Is it realistic to expect them to protect our oil interests or deter Soviet adventurism in the Indian Ocean?
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tion to the deterrent force. Actually the proposal to base U. S. Air Force fighter squadrons on two Sinai airfields following Israeli withdrawal would be a bonanza for the U. S. strategic interests in the Middle East. Finally, French aircraft based at Djibouti and the 4,500 troops stationed there would certainly provide a more significant contribution if they were part of a joint deterrent force.
Although a direct conflict arising between U. S. and Soviet armed forces in this area seems highly unlikely, it behooves the United States and other concerned powers to assign the joint planning priority and the required force commitments to cope with such a possibility. A more likely conflict situation than direct Soviet armed interference is an uprising or attempted coup by a Marxist or Moslem radical group within a country or by a combination of Islamic and Marxist opposition such as occurred in Iran.
To be able to combat a hostile attempt by radical forces to take over Saudi Arabia, for example, or to attempt to close the Straits of Hormuz, where tank
ers leave the Persian Gulf at the rate of one every minutes, on-scene forces (naval force projeC forces) including a carrier should be readily avails and capable of reacting quickly to the train of e"e The early arrival of U. S. and/or allied naval prior to the arrival of Soviet naval forces backing other side could be important, since the cut! operating ground rules between the superpowers ^ phasi2e avoidance of direct confrontation bet"' their armed forces. .
During the Iranian crisis, the opposite situa ^ existed as headlines announced, “Soviet Warsh'P^ Command Gulf.” They had a force of more than - ships in the Indian Ocean—more than three 1:1 ^ the size of the U. S. presence. This took place as situation continued to worsen and the United St held a carrier task force in the South China Sea week’s cruising time away, after first ordering 1<: steam from the Philippines to the Persian Gnl while the politicians agonized about the possible quirements of such on-scene forces. As one writer
P*- y put it, seldom have the limits of American Th^ °r r^e ^a<”^ 3 stron& Policy been so obvious.
e whole exercise was a first example of “no- Sunboat diplomacy.”
his fiscal year 1979 report to Congress, Secre- Stfy °f Defense Brown promised that the United ates would honor its commitments in the Middle ast (to Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Iran). He conceded t^at cbe areas concerned are sufficiently distant from . e United States to make exacting demands on such ltems as air/sealift, base structure, and communi- ations especially if the Soviet Union becomes ^•btarily involved. He said that the several army di- lsi°ns, marine amphibious forces, and air wings that ^°uld not be immediately required for an initial dense of NATO would be adequate for the task. But fett|ng these forces to the Persian Gulf in timely nion would present problems in accomplishment at have not been adequately addressed.
/The critical problem in any Persian Gulf area con
flict
With the Soviets will be to prevent the Soviets,
^•th their large proximate forces or their client local
fo,
ces, from presenting the U. S. (allied) forces with a fait for
accompli before the arrival of U. S. (allied) rces. Ports and airfields in friendly hands would be re9uired for the reception of U. S. (allied) reinforcements. To assist friendly local forces in this effort,
' S. (allied) naval, marine, and air forces on scene are the best guarantee that these required bases can e held until the arrival of reinforcements. This, of r°Use> implies that the currently assigned inadequate °rces are augmented and that there has been some l°*nt allied contingency planning for quick respon- SlVe actions to either threats or hostile actions in tlrt>es of crisis. After much hesitation and dillydally- lri8) the U. S. Defense Department has periodically S**d a carrier task force into the Western Indian Cean in order to provide a credible naval presence in .e area. This action is particularly necessary at this tlrne to provide support for the Saudis, who are feel- lr*8 vulnerable to Soviet and South Yemen pressure, specially after the events in Iran. This move, if ap-
f>r°ved as a permanent commitment, is bound h;
In summary, recent events in Iran, Afghanistan, South Yemen, and the Horn of Africa should require the United States and its allies to reappraise, on an urgent basis, their military plans and their force allocations to support their commitments in this area. The vital objective of providing for the uninterrupted supply of oil to Western Europe, Japan, Australia, and the United States takes on an ever increasing importance as the demand for Persian Gulf oil becomes greater and greater. This rather sudden impact of dependence on Persian Gulf oil for the functioning of the economies of the industrial nations requires foreign policy adaptations and additional military force commitments to support national interests that so far have not been faced up to by the countries concerned. From all possible approaches, a joint allied policy and a joint allied contribution of armed forces would be most effective in setting up a deterrent posture and in supporting any military situation that might develop. Since neither Iran nor Saudi Arabia will permit U. S. or allied combat forces stationed in their countries during peacetime, the military (deterrent) tasks are best carried out by naval forces including sea-based air power and augmented by proximate shore-based tactical and surveillance (ASW) air power (Masirah, Djibouti) and relatively small numbers of elite amphibious/airborne troops. To support these forces requires bases as near the scene of action as possible. Diego Garcia becomes highly significant from the point of view of being able to project and support U. S. naval and air forces in the Western Indian Ocean. Djibouti is of prime importance as a base for French naval, air and ground forces. Masirah is ideally located for supporting tactical and ASW aircraft operations. Finally, these added commitments should be met, at least as far as the United States is concerned, by providing additional forces (naval and air) and not by tighter stretching of our military forces which are already overcommitted politically.
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lave political repercussions elsewhere from whatever a^ea a carrier cutback is made. Obviously, the United . ates must think about increasing its forces to meet Itlcreased commitments.
A most welcome addition to the above U. S. naval rce has been a recent commitment by the British of ^Permanently deployed naval squadron of up to four ^'gates to the Indian Ocean. This support by the r*tish will greatly increase the political significance and deterrent posture of Western naval forces in the nAian Ocean.
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captain Lacouture, a 1V4U graduate Academy, served in the USS Saratoga (CV-3) and the USS Blue (DD-387), then became a naval aviator. He •v I commanded fighter squadrons, attack squadrons, two \a'r W‘ngS’ tHe USS Diamortd Head (AE"17)> and the USS Saratoga (CVA-60). He was assistant director of Tactical Test at the Patuxent River Naval Air Test Center, first program manager of the F-4 aircraft, SACLant’s representative in Europe, chief of staff to Commander Task Force 77, deputy director of the Naval Aviation Plans and Requirements division of OpNav, and Commander Fleet Air Lemoore. Captain Lacouture has a master’s degree in advanced flight testing from Princeton and is a graduate of the senior course at the Naval War College. Following his retirement from active duty in 1970, he worked for LTV Aerospace and is now in England at the University of Cambridge writing a thesis on the confrontation at sea between the U. S. and Soviet navies.
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