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The E-3A Sentinel is the U. S. Air Force’s and NATO’s new airborne warning and control system (AWACS). The time has arrived for the U. S. Navy to become acquainted with this sophisticated new system and to seriously examine its potential to support missions at sea.
The E-3A (AWACS) was developed to support Air Force tasks in large land campaigns such as those modeled for Central Europe or Korea. Little thought was given to possible E-3A maritime support roles until negotiations for foreign sales to NATO brought this issue to the forefront. There are those who believe strongly that the land-based E-3A has no role in war-at-sea scenarios. Since 1975, three factors have conspired to create an apparent adversary relationship between the Air Force and Navy with regard to the AWACS and its possible employment in maritime operations.
First, NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLant)— who serves as Commander in Chief Atlantic (CinCLant)—was asked to evaluate the suitability of the E-3A to support SACLant wartime objectives. This created the awkward situation where a U. S. Navy admiral was officially commenting on an Air Force program during a period of intense congressional probing. Questions raised by SACLant staff members about E-3A systems and performance were often treated as implied criticisms by understandably sensitive Air Force personnel.
Second, Boeing Aerospace, builder of the E-3A and a traditional Air Force supplier, battled vigorously with Grumman Aerospace, producer of the E-2C Hawkeye and a contractor with strong Navy ties, for the lucrative
NATO AWACS contract. While hard- fought political, financial, and promotional campaigns are an honored tradition between U. S. corporations, in this case the long-standing service associations of the two companies further abetted the “us” versus “them” syndrome between the Navy and Air Force.
Third, as program costs grew and congressional support for it began to wane, the Air Force began to tout the long-neglected maritime potential of the E-3A, both in the United States and in Europe. Some observers in the Department of the Navy viewed this new emphasis on E-3A maritime capabilities as an undesirable Air Force intrusion into traditional Navy command and control functions at sea.
In spite of the various political aspects of the E-3A program, the AWACS possesses excellent capabilities with which to support maritime missions. It is fair to question whether the E-3A will be available to support Navy missions in any future conflict. The very real problems of forward basing and tasking priorities for E-3A services are beyond the scope of this article.
While classification restrictions preclude an in-depth description of the E-3A, an overview of its capabilities is worthwhile:
Airframe: The E-3A is based on the well-proven Boeing 707-320 airframe and modified to carry a 30-foot rotodome. It has the long-haul, Iong- on-station characteristics inherent in such an airframe and can be refueled in flight. Its basic 17-person crew can be augmented substantially to alleviate crew fatigue on prolonged missions.
Detection system: The E-3A’s radar uses pulse Doppler techniques to detect air contacts in the presence 0 land or sea clutter and provide course, speed, and altitude inform:1 tion on these contacts. The radars de tection performance against air con tacts represents a substantial increase over airborne surveillance systems m current use. The most noteworthy (ea ture of the radar is its high resistance to electronic countermeasures (ECM), ‘j state-of-the-art capability unmatche in airborne systems to date.
Communications: The AWACS has an
especially flexible communications
suite, including HF, VHF (AM/FM), an UHF radios. These radios have a variety of transmission options, including voice encryption, radio relay, and data links (including both Link-4A and Link-11).
Data Processing: The E-3A has a powerful central computer supported by a variety of input/output devices and mass storage units. The data pm- cessing system includes bulk memory for premission storage of a data base substantially larger than that available in shipboard tactical data systems.
Navigation: Aircraft position >s maintained accurately by a combination of Doppler-inertial navigation and Omega.
The E-3A is not without its problems, of course:
y The radar design was so highly optimized for its intended overland use that the radar presently has only a limited capability to detect ships. All NATO E-3As and a portion of the Air Force’s inventory will be modified with a "maritime enhancement” package to correct this deficiency.
► Mission computer software is crude by Navy standards. Man-machine interfaces are cumbersome to the point of degrading mission performance,
and overall software architecture leaves fnuch to be desired. There is a learn- lng curve to software development in new systems, and future E- 3 A computer programs will undoubtedly overcome these weaknesses.
^ There are a number of discrepancies etween present E-3A data link mesSage formats and the standards set by che Joint Chiefs of Staff to ensure interoperability of the tactical data systems of the different services. These shortfalls are amenable to fairly straightforward improvement and corrective efforts are under way.
^ From an airborne surveillance viewpoint, the E-3A’s most glaring tveakness is its lack of an electronic support measures (ESM) system. No ESM suite is presently envisioned for Air Force’s E-3As. NATO desires a pas- S|ve surveillance capability for its E-3As but it has not yet made definitive progress in selecting such a system. Without an ESM system, the E-3A ls unable to work in a totally passive surveillance mode. It further lacks the capability to classify targets acquired hy its active sensors. (Non-visual target classification is a key factor in meaningful employment of the F-l4’s long-range Phoenix air-to-air missile and over-the-horizon use of the antiship Harpoon or Tomahawk missiles.)
As is often the case with advanced systems, the most serious impediment to effective use of the E-3A in a maritime role is a collection of human Factors. For convenience, these elements are separated arbitrarily as matters of Air Force concern and those of Navy cognizance.
The Air Force has yet to appreciate the intrinsic value of a mobile surveillance platform. The E-3 A is treated as an early warning/ground-controlled intercept site which just happens to be on a 30,000-foot mountain peak. The dynamics of war at sea demand a greater responsiveness and fluidity of stationing as the tactical environment changes.
E-3A mission crews are completely subordinated to command and control from the ground environment. Key decisions affecting E-3A mission success are invariably made by tactical commanders in facilities far removed from the scene of action. E-3A
operators and mission commanders on occasion have an almost mystical obsession with “the plan” when unfolding events demand a radical departure from the prebriefed scenario. Navy operations place far more reliance on local initiative by individuals within the constraints of a broad operational plan.
The Air Force has not adequately addressed the problem associated with the status and treatment of non-pilot aviation personnel—a problem largely resolved by the Navy ten years ago.
The Air Force has no parallel to the naval flight officer program. As a result, E-3A weapon controllers are not permanently flight rated, have virtually no aviation command opportunity, and experience poor promotion success. This official second-class status has a severe impact on the morale and motivation of individuals whose professional skills equal, and in many cases exceed, those of similarly engaged Navy personnel. Successful joint maritime operations will entail a sustained degree of special effort and long-term professional continuity difficult to maintain under conditions offensive to personal pride.
tasked to provide support in a locally tailored operating environment will be mystified as to their specific role. (P-3C crews presently tasked to provide ASW support of task groups and our ever-patient NATO allies will privately
The Navy has to adjust its philosophy in two important ways to create an atmosphere conducive to effective joint operations at sea. First, the Navy must overcome a penchant for wide- ranging individualism in tactics and procedures. Officers in tactical command (OTCs) invariably encumber their operating plans with local code words and special procedures which are anathema to successful joint operations. E- 3 A mission commanders
admit to similar frustrations.) The romantic image of bold tactical ingenuity notwithstanding, standardization is the cement of successful joint operations.
Second, the Navy must overcome its paranoia about perceived Air Force encroachment upon afloat command and control prerogatives. At some point, operational commanders must acknowledge the need for all available help in future sea battles and take positive steps to integrate this support into fleet operations.
What then, might an OTC realistically expect an E-3A to contribute to his tasks? The E-3A’s present maritime support capabilities include:
► Long-range air surveillance—The E-3A’s greatest strength is its ability to perform airborne early warning in a heavy ECM environment. An E-3A could be used to augment existing airborne surveillance about a carrier task group or to provide such coverage to a convoy or transiting amphibious force. The AWACS might also be used to monitor a specific choke point between an enemy’s bases and a battle group.
^ Air control—An E-3A crew can provide services ranging from air intercept control against hostile missile platforms to airspace management in a region of heavy traffic such as an amphibious objective area.
► Communications relay—To defeat enemy long-range direction-finding systems, OTCs frequently desire non-HF communications over greater than line-of-sight distances. The E-3A’s flexible communications suite offers a variety of possible networking options to meet this need.
► Data base updates—A characteristic weakness of seagoing forces is in" complete or outdated information relative to recent events and fluctuations in resources ashore, especially during combat. An E-3A operating from a remote base may have access to vital information on the current enemy order of battle, the availability of friendly support forces ashore, or the location and status of friendly surface units.
BOEING AEROSPACE COMPANY
F4 Defenders controlled by E-3A intercept
Attacking "Ultrol boat
A-7 Attackers
ySS Wainwrigbt ''engages attackers * using E-3A data
F4 Defenders controlled by USS Wainwright using data from E-3A
A-6/A-7 Attackers
voice and time-division multiple-access (TDMA) data link. Track data on attackers and defending aircraft relayed from the E-3A to the Wainwright resulted in simulated destruction of all attackers and demonstrated the interoperability of E-3A and the flight NTDS/TDMA data link communication systems.
The E-3A’s potential and desired maritime capabilities were demonstrated in a Mediterranean operation with the USS Wainwright (CG-28). The demonstration consisted of a simulated air attack on the Wainwright followed by simultaneous attacks by a patrol boat and aircraft. The Wainwright was equipped to communicate with the E-3A via
Some steps toward exploiting the E-3A’s maritime potential are under way. An E-2C-qualified lieutenant commander has been assigned to the Air Force’s AWACS staff at Boeing *n Seattle since 1976 to advise and assist on maritime interoperability matters- The Chief of Naval Operations has
given his unqualified support to efforts initiated in 1978 to foster tactical interoperability between the E-3A and Navy surface and air elements. CinCLant is acting as the CNO’s agent *n this venture, and a Joint Procedures Evaluation Team has been established Co coordinate follow-on test and evaluation of E-3A maritime support capabilities. On another level, one E-3A weapon controller is currently deployed with a Navy E-2C squadron 10 the Mediterranean.
Fleet units should also have the opportunity to widen their experience with E-3As in CinCLantFlt exercises in 1979, when AWACS becomes a part of the Blue (friendly) force and not Orange (opposition) force as has previously been the practice. If these first steps toward interoperability are greeted with patience and a sincere willingness to resolve mutual problems, the Navy will almost certainly gain the use of, and respect for, a valuable new asset.
As a naval flight officer, Lieutenant Commander Glaeser has flown in the EC-121, E-IB, E-2A, E-2C, and E-3A. He has served as a technical advisor to CinCLant and SAC- Lant staffs on E-3A matters and is assigned as CinCLantFlt’s representative on the Joint Procedures Evaluation Team, responsible for follow-on test and evaluation of E-3A maritime support capabilities.
The Growing Soviet Amphibious Warfare Capability
By Captain Mathew J. Whelan, U. S. Navy
Two new classes of amphibious ships have been introduced into the Soviet naval inventory within the last five years. The capability represented hy these ships and the continuing interest of the Soviet leadership in the development of an amphibious capability warrant a careful appraisal of Soviet intentions in terms of their actual capability and the probable circumstances in which the Soviets Would use these forces.
In order to arrive at a realistic estimate of the probable uses of this recently acquired lift capability, we must examine such gains within the context of the overall Soviet naval growth of the last several years.
In general, the last two decades have witnessed a concerted Soviet effort to develop their navy into a first- class maritime power. During his tenure as Commander in Chief of the Soviet Navy, which covers the entire period in question, Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Sergei G. Gorshkov has steadfastly pursued this goal. In addition to the introduction of new hardware into the fleet inventory, Soviet theorizing on the uses of maritime power has kept apace. The Soviets' burgeoning effort is indicative of their growing appreciation for and understanding of seapower.
Commensurate with its present capabilities the Soviet Navy today has, as all great power navies do, both a political and military mission. This dual mission is relatively new and has evolved conceptually over time as actual systems deliveries have been effected. This is not to say that naval construction programs have been initiated without a purpose. Rather, Soviet concepts attendant to the operational use of seapower have evolved as the actual capability of the fleet has been expanded or become apparent to its masters. As a leading Soviet naval theoretician, Vice Admiral Stalbo explains, “naval art develops . . . primarily under the influence of changes in the material means of armed warfare at sea." If one views the process as evolutionary, then, just as concepts are evolutionary, so too, new construction requirements and their ensuing programs should also be evolutionary.
During the “Cold War” epoch, Soviet development and use of naval power were dominated by a theory of “Defense of the Homeland.” Initially this reflected Soviet “lessons learned” in the war with Germany and, subsequently, the perceived needs of the Soviet Union to defend itself against the possibility of an amphibious invasion and the overwhelming maritime power represented by the NATO alliance.
Admiral Gorshkov, in several of his writings, makes the point that the Soviet Union entered World War II without an amphibious capability. Upon his accession to command in 1956 he set the wheels in motion to remedy that deficiency. Within one year of his appointment, a construction program was launched which gave birth to five types of amphibious craft and resulted in an estimated 100 ships joining the fleet. In line with the precepts of "Defense of the Homeland, these ships were designed for actions in contiguous waters and were meant to provide a lift capability for small units in support of ground force operations. Depending on the class, these ships were capable of carrying from four to ten vehicles each, either of the PT-76 amphibious tank or the BTP-60 armored personnel carrier variety and their troop complement. Only one of these classes, the MP-6, appeared to be oceangoing.
In the late 1950s and the early 1960s, “Defense” focused on the attack carrier strike force and the threat of the nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN). The weapon systems and platforms introduced into the Soviet Navy to combat these threats were more sophisticated and more capable. The defense now envisioned also caused a shift in emphasis to forward deployment and gave a "blue water” orientation to naval thought. Additionally, the introduction of the nuclear-powered “Yankee”-class SSBN gave the Soviet Navy a new status in the hierarchy of Soviet forces. The author of Military Strategy, Marshal Sokolovskii, stated in a 1964 newspaper article that,
1 1 1
Equipping our navy with nuclear submarines carrying missiles . . .
For more than ten years, the "Alligator"-class LST was the largest amphibious warfare ship in the Soviet Navy. Now, although the new Ivan Rogov LPD is larger, the “Alligators” remain the backbone of the Soviet amphibious capability.
permits a shift from carrying out wartime missions along the coast ... to independent and decisive operations on the broad expanses of the oceans.”
About the same time, in 1963, the “Polnocny”-class LCM made her appearance. This continuing program has resulted in some 60 ships being delivered to the Soviet Navy. The “Polnocny” is open-ocean capable, and she can carry a company of marines and eight to ten vehicles. The fact that this class was constructed in Polish shipyards can be viewed as an indication of the low relative priority that amphibious lift enjoyed in the construction program initiated during the period dominated by the concept of “Defense of the Homeland.”
Following the “Polnocny,” in 1966, a new LST joined the fleet. This was the lead ship of the “Alligator” class which can carry up to five times (or 1,700 tons) the load of the “Polnocny.” It is estimated that a battalion of troops and some 20 to 25 tanks (the PT-76 amphibious tank) or armored personnel carriers can be accommodated in this oceangoing ship. In 1966, the “Alligator” was the largest amphibious ship constructed in the Soviet Union, and, to date, 14 of these ships have been completed. Within a year of the “Alligator’s” appearance the “Vydra”-class LSU was introduced. This program produced some 35 ships, each with an estimated carrying capacity of 250 tons. The "Vydra” class is probably intended for medium- or short-range operations.
All of the amphibious ships constructed appear to have been fairly evenly distributed to the Pacific (the larger number), Baltic, and Black Sea Fleets, and a slightly smaller number allocated to the Northern Fleet.
The time frame covered by the delivery schedule of the “Polnocny” and “Alligator” classes coincides with the period of transition to a new concept of operations. By the mid-1960s not only was “Defense of the Homeland” attainable, but also the Soviet Navy had become strategic-offensive capable. The expanding SSBN fleet and the growing inventory of both aircraft, armed with air-to-surface missiles, and surface ships, equipped with surface- to-surface missiles and newly developed antisubmarine weapons, gave the Soviets a powerful array of weaponry at sea. Wittingly, or not, the force initially created in response to the defense mission now provided the Soviet leadership with a tool to further its diplomatic ambitions. As Admiral Gorshkov stated, the acquisitions of the fleet during these years “brought about a fleet requirement for new tactics, a new operational art, and for a theory covering the strategic utilization of its forces.” The theory evolved was “Protection of State Interests.”
It should be recalled that it was in 1963 that the Soviet Fleet CinC ordered his navy to sea. Although the first long-legged flights to cover U. S. aircraft carriers at sea occurred in January and February of that year, it was not until 1966-1967 'that the Soviets were able to effectively carry out the go-to-sea order. Soviet naval activity of this second period reasonably reflects the feelings of confidence gained with the introduction of new weapon systems and their platforms. The Arab-Israeli confrontation in 1967 gave the Soviet leaders their first major opportunity to flex their newfound muscle, and they did. During this period we see many references in the press to achieving parity with the West. Additionally, the blue water deployments of the navy, the conduct of long over water flights, and, finally, the growing presence and active interpositioning of Soviet ships during peacetime and crises are all if' dicative of the new power sensed and used by the Soviet leadership.
Although not related to maritime developments at the time, events m Czechoslovakia sparked the promulgation of the “Brezhnev Doctrine” late in 1968. This doctrine, now embodied in the 1977 Soviet Constitution, recognizes the territorial integrity of a nation, but, nonetheless, establishes the unilateral right of the Soviet Union to intervene in the domestic affairs of a socialist state in order to maintain the integrity of world socialism. This theoretical window dressing for the invasion of Czechoslovakia sets the stage for a third period of Soviet naval activity. Initially in 1969 and, certainly, in the 1970s, a new pattern of Soviet naval activity can be discerned as is reflected in Table I. This emerging pattern is dominated by a concept of “Pursuit of State Interests.” It should be recognized that the three periods under discussion have no definitive start-stop demarcation but, in reality, form a continuum in the evolutionary development of Soviet naval concepts and capabilities. Admittedly, there is a fine distinction between “protection” of interest and “pursuit” of interest. The contention here is that an inherent capability for the Soviet Navy to apply its power either defensively or offensively, depending on the situation and the end to be achieved, now existed.
In any event, the Soviet leadership has now perceived that the launching of several aircraft-capable ships during the late 1960s and early 1970s, the
Table 1 Selected Highlights of Soviet Naval Operations 1964 First sustained Mediterranean deployment
1967 First major Soviet interposition (Arab-Israeli crisis)
1968 First Indian Ocean deployment
1969 “West African Patrol” established in Gulf of Guinea First Cuban deployment Presence off Ghana
Inclusion of "Alligator” in Indian Ocean detachment “Alligator” visits Indian port
1970 Presence off the Horn of Africa Persian Gulf visits (Iraq, South Yemen, Somalia)
Interposition at Conakry (vs. Portugal)
Inclusion of "Alligator” in Cuban deployment detachment
1971 Presence off Bangladesh (including “Alligator”)
1972 Beginning of port clearing activity, Bangladesh
1973 Presence during Arab-Israeli crisis Presence during Iraqui-Kuwaiti border dispute Ferried Moroccan troops to Syria
1974 Minesweeping operations in Gulf of Suez
1975 As many as three “Alligators” deployed to Indian Ocean
1976 Interposition off Angola (including “Alligator”)
1978 Operations against rebels in Ethiopian ports (one report of shore bombardment from "Alligator” at Massawa)
1979 Ivan Rogov operates in the Indian Ocean with ASW cruiser Minsk. During Aden, South Yemen, port visit, Ivan Rogov demonstrated her new air cushion landing craft.
growing fleet and its capability for expended deployments, and the fact that °y 1972 Soviet marine forces and amphibious shipping had doubled in size had given the leadership additional tools for its diplomatic arsenal.
The highlights to date of this new period with respect to amphibious ship construction are as one would expect. Two new classes of amphibious ^hips have been introduced, the Ropucha”-class LST in 1974 and the Ivan Rogov-class LPD in 1977. In size, fhe “Ropucha” fits between the “Alligator” and the “Polnocny” classes, but the Ivan Rogov is comparable to the U.S. LSD and takes the place of the Alligator” as the largest amphibious warship constructed in the Soviet Union. The Ivan Rogov is estimated to displace approximately 12,000 tons, and, according to some observers, can carry a battalion of landing troops With their ancillary equipment. The ship is also capable of carrying conven- ttonal landing craft or air cushioned vehicles and at least two helicopters. At this time, there are at least eight Ropuchas” in the active inventory, and it is expected that the Ivan Rogov ls the lead ship of her class.
The introduction of a true shore- to-shore lift capability caps the modernization of the Soviet amphibious Warfare forces that began early in the 1960s with the reorganization of their marines. The Soviet Naval Infantry— *-e., the Soviet Marines—were apparently disbanded sometime after World War II. At that time they numbered over 300,000 troops distributed throughout the four major fleets and the river flotillas. It is thought that sometime in 1963 they were reconstituted. Today, their strength is an estimated 15,000 elite troops.
Some insight relative to how the Soviets propose to use this amphibious warfare capability is provided by Admiral Gorshkov,
“The presence of modern amphibious ships, the naval infantry, powerful forces and the means of their support in the struggle for the landing of landing parties in the inventory of the fleet, improves, far and away, our potentialities for the landing of naval landing parties for the accomplishment of important missions in joint combat operations with the Ground Forces.” (1977)
It appears from this statement that amphibious operations will be conducted mainly in support of the Ground Forces. Available Soviet writings from 1963 to the present support this mission statement. In addition, Soviet amphibious construction programs, prior to the launch of the Ivan Rogov, also appear consistent with this philosophy. Further, with but one or two exceptions since 1964, Soviet amphibious exercises seem to have been designed with this philosophy of operations in mind.
Soviet theorists differentiate amphibious operations into two categories. The first is the operational amphibious landing which is a large- scale operation conducted by up to two armies, 40,000-60,000 men, and is somewhat reminiscent of the Normandy landings. The second is the tactical amphibious landing conducted by up to two divisions. The operational landing is conducted with the intent of opening up a front in an independent sector of operations; the tactical landing is designed to assist the ground forces in maintaining a high rate of advance or to breach a defense on the seaward flanks. The objective of the first is the seizure of beachheads, and of the second, usually islands, naval bases, ports, coastal airfields, and securing beachheads and water crossings. It is envisioned that the presently constituted naval infantry units are capable of executing tactical landings, and in operational landings they are to be used as the first assault wave, followed by the main body consisting of ground forces trained in amphibious operations. Without differentiating between the two types of operations, Soviet authors generally conclude that the landings will be “simultaneous joint operations . . . from the front and the rear” and will consist of air drops and amphibi-
ous landings. The softening up process will be the delivery of rocket strikes by submarines, aircraft, surface ships, and ground forces.
In addition to supporting the ground forces in a European land campaign, Western theorists postulate that the Soviet amphibious capability is also destined for “breakout” operations, i.e., the seizure of the Turkish Straits, the North Cape, the exits from the Baltic (Schleswig-Holstein/ Denmark), the Tsushima Straits, etc. In addition, the seizures of maritime choke points and the coast of Norway are also included. In the event of war, these are all plausible targets in light of present Soviet lift capability and their proximity to the Soviet frontiers.
The capability of the newly launched Ivan Rogov suggests that there may be an additional mission: power projection ashore. The Soviet
Navy has evolved from a coastal defense force to a navy capable of demonstrating its power on a worldwide basis. Soviet naval thought has developed from defense-oriented concepts to plans for using the navy in active support of state interests. The Ivan Rogov can be viewed as one of the last pieces of the jigsaw puzzle of Soviet maritime intentions.
Not only is there in evidence a solid power base for executing the wartime missions of the navy, but also the Soviets now have the capability, albeit
fledgling, to execute the political (or peacetime) missions of a navy, i.e., interposition, presence, and projection. Table I, again, reveals that the missions of interposition and presence have been assigned for some time, and, in fact, are being carried out by the Soviet Navy. The Soviets have tested their lift capability in these situations. Projection is another matter. At the present time we have yet to see an actual case of power projection ashore using amphibious forces. But, to ignore this possibility is to ig-
n°re the evolutionary character of Soviet thought which we have been backing and, in particular, the tenets °f the ‘‘Brezhnev Doctrine.”
Soviet naval writings are replete w>th references to Western amphibious operations from “island hopping” t0 the Lebanon and Dominican Republic operations. These lessons of power projection have not been lost on the Soviets. The availability of the necessary weapon systems and an extant justification for their use make it reasonable to expect that the Soviet Navy is now assigned the traditional political-military missions which one would normally associate with the navy of a world power.
Captain Whelan is Command- W ■ ing Officer, U. S. Naval Secu
rity GrouP Activity, Winter M Mi Harbor, Maine, and author of
the February 1^'79 professional Nr note, “The Soviet Anti-SLOC
• mm Mission.”
An Amphibious Heavy Lift Ship for the Royal Australian Navy
By Commander P. J. M. Shevlin, A. M., Royal Australian Navy
In November 1977, the Australian Government signed a contract for the construction of a 6,000-ton amphibi- °us heavy lift ship (LSH) for the Royal Australian Navy (RAN). The ship is to Be named HMAS Tobruk, commemorat- lng the fact that ships of the RAN kept the beleaguered Australian Army garrison of the North African port of Tobruk supplied by sea for five months in 1941. She is being built by Car- dngton Slipways of Tomago, New South Wales. It is planned that she WH1 be commissioned in mid-1980. HMAS Tobruk will be the first major, purpose-designed, amphibious ship to be built in Australia.
After an extended study into requirements for an improved Australian amphibious capability, approval was obtained for the procurement of an amphibious heavy lift ship to provide the Australian Defence Force with some capability for all forms of amphibious operation and logistics-over- the-shore operations. HMAS Tobruk will train and work with the RAN’s squadron of six 310-ton Balikpapan- class landing craft heavy (LCH). These vessels have a 175-ton cargo capacity and can carry three battle tanks or 13 armored personnel carriers.
The design for HMAS Tobruk was developed from the last group of the United Kingdom’s landing ships logistic (LSLs), the Sir Bedivere class. While retaining the LSL’s roll on/roll off hull design, bow door, and combined stern door/ramp, the RAN has incorporated a number of improvements, some emanating from the U. S. Navy’s Newport (LST-1179) design. The following are included:
► The upper vehicle deck has been strengthened to enable it to operate a medium lift (CH-47) helicopter or to carry two LCM-8 landing craft as deck cargo.
► Two fast, lightweight LCVPs will be carried at davits.
► The after helicopter deck has been strengthened to operate an SH-3-size helicopter.
► Facilities are being provided to enable the ship to carry and operate three Wessex utility helicopters.
► A 70-ton capacity, twin post derrick, capable of lifting an LCM-8 or a main battle tank has been provided.
► The modified stern door enables ramp-to-ramp marriage with RAN LCHs (or the similar size bow ramps of the U. S. Navy’s LCUs).
► A joint operations room combines combat information center/tactical logistics and supporting arms coordination center facilities, and a joint communications center provides for the control of embarkation/disem- barkation, ship-to-shore movement, tactical lodgement, or disaster relief operations.
► Closed circuit briefing facilities will be provided for the embarked force commander.
^ Accommodations will be up to the latest Australian standards.
► A flying control position will be incorporated on the port side of the bridge area superstructure to facilitate efficient control of helicopter operations, and therein will be included a load control (U. S. Navy debark control) position.
The LSL s capability to side carry pontoon lighterage has been retained, and ship-to-shore movement of men and equipment will be accomplished by. beaching the ship and disembark-
Table 1 Amphibous Warfare Ships’ Characteristics
| Sir Bedivere Class (LSL) | Newport Class (LST) | HMAS Tobruk (LSH) |
Displacement (Full) | 5,700 tons | 8,600 tons | 5,800 tons |
Length (Overall) | 127 meters | 159 meters | 127 meters |
Beam (Overall) | 18.3 meters | 21.2 meters | 18.3 meters |
Draft (Maximum) | 4.9 meters | 6.4 meters | 4.9 meters |
Propulsion Machinery | 2 diesels | 6 diesels | 2 diesels |
Shafts | 2 | 2 | 2 |
Speed | 17.5 knots | 20 knots | 17 knots |
Armament | 2 x 40 mm. | 4x3 in. | 2 x 40 mm. |
Complement | 68 | 196 | 130 |
Troop Capacity | 340-500 | 4.31 | 340-500 |
Cargo Capacity | 1,400 tons | 2,000 tons | 1,300 tons |
Helicopters | none <a> | none (b) | (c) |
Heavy Lift | 20.5-ton | 10.1-ton | 70-ton |
| crane | crane | derrick |
Landing Craft | Nil | 3 LCVP 1 LCPL | 2 LCVP (organic) 2 LCM-8 (deck cargo) (d) |
NOTES: (a) Can operate Wessex helicopters from upper vehicle deck and flight deck
(b) Can operate up to one CH-53 helicopter from after flight deck
(c) Will have a ship's flight of utility helicopters
(d) When carried, LCM-8 and pontoon lighterage are alternatives
ing cargo directly onto the beach or over a pontoon causeway; using Wessex helicopters in a troop/cargo carrying role; using pontoons as dumb or powered lighterage; using the ship’s LCVPs or army LCM-8s (when embarked); "swimming” amphibians off the stern ramp; and employing accompanying LCHs in their primary role of ship-to-shore movement.
Cargo and vehicles will be discharged over either the bow or stern ramps, or over the side by using the derrick or the two 8.5-ton cranes
mounted forward.
HMAS Tobruk's RAN crew will also have, in the absence of Australian marines, a permanent army detachment made up of Royal Australian Corps of Transport and Royal Australian Corps of Signals personnel. These army personnel will be responsible for maintaining army spaces and workshops, assisting RAN personnel in planning force and cargo embarkation, assisting in manning the disembarkation facilities, and acting as an interface between the ship and the embarked army landing forces. Army personnel of the embarked force will man and operate the LCM-8s or lighterage equipment when carried.
There will be a small naval aviation department included in the ship s company to provide specialist expertise in control of helicopter operations and to provide on-board maintenance for visiting aircraft. On-board facilities for air operations will include a flying control position, aircrew briefing room, and aircraft fueling equipment.
The function of HMAS Tobruk will be to provide the Australian Defence Forces with a versatile, general- purpose, amphibious and sea transport capability, complementing other forms of civil and service transport- The Minister for Defence has stated that the LSH “will add significantly to our ability to transport military equipment and troops to areas lacking normal port facilities and will be particularly useful for civil aid and national disaster relief.”
It is hoped HMAS Tobruk will become familiar to the U. S. Seventh Fleet’s amphibious squadron in the 1980s.
After 29 years in the Royal Navy, during which Commander Shevlin served as the executive officer of the RN s first LPD and commanding officer of a frigate, he transferred to the Royal Australian Navy in 1971. He holds the post of Director of Joint Warfare Policy in Navy Office, Canberra, and since 1975, has been project director for the RAN’s new amphibious ship, HMAS Tobruk, the successor in name to the Korean War destroyer in which he was gunnery officer in 1953-1954.
Power
Third World Navies: New Weight in the Balance of
By Lieutenant (junior grade) Roily L. Chambers, U. S. Naval Reserve
The Red Fleet’s drive to become the foremost naval power in the world is a development of undeniable importance to other navies, but it often overshadows significant changes taking place in Third World naval forces.
During the past five years, the navies of Third World countries have become an important factor affecting the world’s balance of naval power. During this period, many less-developed countries with no naval tradition have built creditable coastal defense forces, while others have dramatically increased their ability to defend claims to larger maritime zones of economic interest. In 1973, the most powerful units in nearly all these small fleets
Were World War II-vintage handle-down destroyers equipped with torpedoes and guns, but these old ships are being replaced by new fast patrol boats which carry modern antiship missile systems and outperform older ships in virtually every way.
Today, a nation with ties to either the Communist Bloc or Free World Can arm itself with a variety of naval surface-to-surface missiles. For example, the Libyan Navy operates four types of fast attack patrol craft, and oach class is armed with an antiship missile system. The first units became operational in 1969 when Libya commissioned three 114-ton patrol boats manufactured by Vosper Ltd. They Were the first operational craft in the world to carry the SS 12(M), a short- range, wire-guided missile produced hy Aerospatiale of France. Five years later, the Libyans ordered four 550- ton missile corvettes from Cantieri Navali del Torreno e Riunid of Italy. Each unit carries four Otomat antiship missiles which are co-manufactured by Engins Matra of France and the Italian company OTO Melara. Otomat missiles have an effective range of about 32 nautical miles. They use inertial cruise guidance during the initial phases of flight, and active radar hom- 'ng guidance during the terminal phase. In 1975, the Libyans continued their naval buildup by ordering ten missile patrol boats from France. These craft carry four Otomat missiles. Finally, the Libyans reportedly began receiving “Osa”-class patrol boats from the Soviet Union in 1976. The Libyan Navy plans to acquire 12 to 24 of these units which will carry combat-proven SS-N-2 "Styx” missiles. While Libya’s navy operates a greater number of different systems than most Third World naval forces, its rapid rate of growth and increasing destructive potential are indicative of changes occurring in other navies.
Two prominent factors spurring these changes are the increased production of antiship missile systems by the industrial powers and the developing countries’ success at acquiring them. Developments in these two areas have altered the balance of naval power even in relatively peaceful and stable regions of the world. Five years ago, for instance, Brazil and Argentina were the dominant naval powers in South America because each operated and maintained a light aircraft carrier. The largest combatants in neighboring navies were World War II-era cruisers and destroyers. In 1973, the balance of power began shifting when Peru launched two modernized destroyers with MM38 Ex- ocet surface-to-surface missiles. (The Exocet cruises six-to-nine feet above wave height at Mach 1 and has a 20- nautical mile range. It is one of the most widely exported naval missiles in the world.) The following year, Chile also finished modernizing a destroyer and fitted her with Exocet. By 1978, Venezuela, Ecuador, Argentina, and Brazil were either fitting their newer ships with surface-to-surface missiles or buying new missile patrol craft from other nations.
Although the Exocet is the most popular antiship missile system in South America, some navies have obtained other sophisticated weapons. Venezuela operates six patrol boats armed with Otomat missiles. And Argentina is building two patrol craft which will carry Israeli-developed Gabriel missiles—a system used with devastating effect against Syrian ships in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. These sea-skimming missiles have a range of about 28 nautical miles. Despite the tensions between -Argentina and Chile resulting from the dispute over the Beagle Channel, no South American nation has displayed its new naval muscle in actual combat. There are, however, other areas where nations may not be able to exercise the restraint necessary to avoid open conflict.
A quick review of the naval orders- of-battle of North African countries reveals that every nation on the southern Mediterranean coast, except Morocco, operates patrol boats armed with antiship missiles. Large and small oil-rich nations bordering the Persian Gulf are also operating or acquiring modern naval units. Iraq, for instance, has received at least 14 "Osa” boats from the Soviet Union. As naval inventories continue to grow in these vital but unstable regions, the major powers face the increasingly difficult task of maintaining a naval presence that is strong enough to deter challenges from smaller but wellarmed Third VCorld antagonists.
The antiship missile and small fast attack craft gave Third World navies new offensive punch (Iraqi “Osas” pictured). As small, affordable antiaircraft and antisubmarine systems join these navies, the world's balance of naval power may rest in the Third World.
While the developing countries have improved their antiship warfare capabilities, their naval forces continue to be deficient in other aspects of naval warfare. Most of the units operated by less-developed countries, including modern missile patrol boats, are vulnerable to air attack, especially from high-performance aircraft. Few of these craft can remain at sea for extended periods or sail long distances. Thus, most have little ability to operate on the high seas. Additionally, not many Third World navies can locate and destroy submarines, even in coastal waters.
The Third World navies, however, can be expected to overcome these weaknesses by taking advantage of recent technological advances which permit the production of smaller, lighter weapon systems. Systems designed to destroy different types of targets can be mounted on small craft, allowing a single unit to fulfill antiair, antisubmarine, and antiship warfare roles. India, for example, has recently received modified “Nanuchka”-class missile corvettes from the Soviet Union. These units carry SA-N-4 surface-to-air missiles, as well as a modified SS-N-2 surface-to-surface missile, and can engage in antiair and antiship warfare.
Missile patrol boats are the most sought after naval craft in the Third World because they are comparatively inexpensive to procure, require less maintenance than larger ships, are easily manned, and are well-suited for antiship warfare. Although naval bat ties in the Arab-Israeli wars and the Indo-Pakistani War suggest that less-developed countries are more likely to use their naval power against their neighbors than against major navies, the types of craft being ac quired by Third World navies coul be used in a variety of roles besides direct combat.
The Third World’s growing potential to engage in such classic forms o naval warfare as blockading and maintaining sea control over a limited area is a serious threat to the current balance of naval power. In the past- major powers have successfully relied on overwhelming displays of naval strength to further their interests throughout the world and to contain
A New Class of Third World Ships
By Ezio Bonsignore
The Italian shipyard Cantieri Navali Riuniti (CNR) has recently delivered the Wadi Mragh, lead ship in a series of four high-performance corvettes, to the Libyan Navy. The other vessels have been launched and are now fitting out at the Muggiano shipyard.
With a 637-metric ton full-load displacement, the corvette designation seems rather high-sounding, because warships of this size are usually classified as large patrol boats. However, CNR’s corvettes are scaled-down frigates, which are designed to perform strike roles and antisubmarine warfare. Consequently, they boast such refinements as watertight bulkheads up to the main deck level, and their length-to-beam ratio is less favorable for high speeds in order to improve seakeeping qualities.
The armament selected by the Libyan Navy comprises. one OTO-Melara 76-mm. gun for antiship and antiaircraft duties; four container-launchers for OTO-Melara Matra antiship missiles, arranged in two rows amidship; one
CANTIERI NAVALI RIUNlT«
The Wadi Mragh, less her four Otomat antiship missiles and torpedo mountings, undergoes sea trials in the Mediterranean.
hot wars” between less-developed na- t'ons. Today, no naval power can expect its units to operate with unchallenged freedom in waters off Third World countries because even small nations are prepared and determined t0 defend their own interests. Since their concerns are often at odds with those of the industrial countries, one can easily imagine situations which tnight force naval units representing the major powers to become actively ■nvolved in conflicts triggered by aggressive Third World governments.
For example, in a future conflict between two less-developed countries, °ne nation might use its navy to blockade an opponent who provides s°rne indispensable raw material to a niajor power. If the larger country decided to support its trading partner, it would need a much more powerful force to break the blockade than it would have required five years ago. Since most recent wars have lasted only a few days or weeks, a major power may not be able to marshal sufficient strength to allow unhindered export of vital raw material from a beleaguered ally. The blockade would be particularly difficult to challenge in a timely and effective manner if it were established in a remote area of the world.
The explosive growth of Third World naval power shows no sign of abating, and the potential problems it creates for the major naval powers are becoming increasingly complex. Subtle shifts in the world’s balance of naval power have nearly passed unnoticed. Even in a world preoccupied with the arms race between the superpowers, any factor, no matter how small, which threatens to upset the precarious balance of power cannot be overlooked. The major powers must prepare to face the Third World’s navies or be prepared to steer clear of them.
twin OTO-Melara Oerlikon 35-mm. turret aft for close Point-defense against aircraft and missiles; and six ASW torpedo tubes (two triple Whitehead ILAS.3 mountings, similar to the U. S. Mk-32) for Whitehead A.244 homing torpedoes. In addition, there are rails for as many as 16 mines. It is clearly an arrangement suited for long-range •nterdiction and strike roles, thereby not subject to mission limitations (mainly linked to sea state) which are accepted when employing small missile boats.
The Wadi Mragh is powered by four MTU (Motoren und Turbinen Union) MA 16 V956 TB91 diesel engines, each driving one fixed-blade propeller through a reverse reduction gear. In tropical conditions, maximum engine output is 16,400 h.p., for a corresponding maximum speed of 32.5 knots; maximum continuous output is 14,600 h.p. (30 knots). With 126 metric tons of fuel (140 in overload), the Wadi Mragh will have a range of 1,400 nautical miles at 30 knots, 3,400 at 18 knots, and 4,400 at 14 knots.
The electronics suite comprises: one SMA-Selenia RAN HLx search radar, one SMA navigation radar, one Divisione Sistemi Navali NAlo Mod.2 fire control system (Selenia RTniox Orion radar), one Thomson-CSF Diodon search and attack sonar, one EW system, and one Selenia IPN-10 tactical command and control system. Because this latter item is not usually embarked on board small warships, the Libyan Navy may well plan to use the Wadi Mragh-class vessels as command and control units for its smaller ‘Combattante II”-type missile boats which are currently being built in France.
The Wadi Mragh requires a crew of 56 men. The Italian Navy started training Libyan personnel to operate these ships in the Taranto naval base about four years ago. It seems that the task has not been an easy one because the Libyan Navy has been seriously hit by "purges” since Colonel Ghaddafi’s revolution, and it is consequently lacking personnel with specialized training.
The four Wadi Mragh-class vessels will substantially alter the naval situation in the Eastern Mediterranean. Thanks to the boat s range and seakeeping qualities, the Libyan Navy will be able to perform missile strikes further from home than any other navy in the area. The only warships with similar characteristics are presently the Israeli Navy’s Reshef-class large fast patrol boats, but their Gabriel surface-to-surface missiles are clearly no match for the Otomat. In addition, the Israeli boats lack an efficient point defense antimissile system. Moreover, the "mating" of the Wadi Mraghs with the “Combattante IIs" will allow for the organization of very efficient and dangerous strike groups. The country most threatened by this force probably is not Israel, but Egypt. The Egyptian Navy’s counter rests with its modified—but aged—“Osas” and Komars and its only new naval program—the small Radamams (Egyptian-built “Komars" armed with two Otomats).
AUTHOR'S Note: The Equadorian Navy has reportedly ordered six CNR 650-ton vessels. Retaining the 76-ww. gun and the Otomat installations, the Equadorian boats will also boast a flight deck for an Agusta AB.212 ASW helicopter, two twin Emerlec 30-mm. turrets, and a four-cell, lightweight launcher for the Albatros antiair warfare system (Selenia Aspide missiles).