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A Fifth Fleet for the Indian Ocean
The United States should establish a meaningful, permanent naval presence in the Indian Ocean.
I was privileged to command the tiny U. S. Middle East Force during the fourth Arab-Israeli war when the accompanying oil embargo transformed the Indian Ocean—particularly its northwest quadrant— from a region of benign American neglect into a central focus of vital U. S. and Western interests. Not until the U. S. carrier Hancock (CVA- 19)—in the words of then U. S. Ambassador to India, Daniel Patrick Moynihan—“huffed and puffed" her way through the Straits of Malacca was the United States able to boast sufficient naval strength in the Indian Ocean to counterbalance that already present there wearing the Hammer and Sickle.
Protestations of domestic anti- navalists notwithstanding, the long list of international crises since World War II and the proportion of them which have involved U. S. naval forces directly in their resolution ought to convince the most prejudiced observer that, short of all-out nuclear war, seapower will remain a predominant implement in the bag of international, crisis-management options. Certainly, one can make the case that even the landlocked mentality of the Kremlin leadership has come to this realization. How else can one explain the remarkable rise of the Soviet Navy and the significantly changed manner in which it has been employed during the past decade and a half?
In this power-political world, military strength is the ultimate arbiter of conflicts between nations. The seemingly invariable diplomatic response to threats against vital American national interests—expressions of “grave
concern”—is not likely to deter the weakest antagonist, unless there is clearly military muscle to give effect to those words.
In these days of shrinking U. S. access to overseas bases as well as a patently diminishing ability of the United States to obtain clearance for overflight rights—Washington has been stunned by several such embarrassing denials just since the first of the year—seapower increasingly offers the only assured method of getting U. S. armed prowess from here to there in a crisis. Moreover, so long as the manned aircraft remains relevant to conventional conflicts, seaborne tactical aviation will continue to constitute the real cutting edge of seapower as it is normally known and used. Reports of a 60,000-ton, nuclear- powered carrier under construction at Severodvinsk suggest that the Soviets also firmly believe this to be so.
There are, of course, a number of difficult problems attending the notion of a “Fifth Fleet.” The first is that we do not presently have one, despite the rapidly expanding stake the nation has in the stability of the region and the friendship of its littoral countries. Thus, when the President is confronted with a sudden crisis affecting U. S. interests, he simply does not have the option of underlining diplomatic warnings with credible military force. Moreover, any attempt to deploy such force to the region immediately encounters the intractable problem of timeliness and the inevitable State Department objection that such action would be “too provocative in these tense circumstances.” Whether the latter explanation lay behind the recent backing and filling of the Constellation (CV-64) in the South China Sea—or, as has been suggested, Jimmy Carter didn’t want to get caught calling on a carrier right after vetoing a new one last year the p al fact is that neither the Connie nor an acceptable substitute was on scene when regional U. S. foreign policy began to come apart at the seams.
This is not to say that the carrier would have made any difference wit respect to the events in Iran, or that seapower offers a universal panacea m crisis situations.
Based on personal experience in countries like Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Oman, and Kenya, however, I contend that the presence of credible American naval prowess in the region would have gone a long way towar bolstering the confidence of friendly governments in the determination °
the United States to protect its vita national interests. This is in stark con trast to the growing perception that the “crippled giant” is likely to stan aside and let those interests as well as its local friends all go down the international drain.
Perception, of course, is a crucial factor in international relations. Insofar as the United States is concerned, the Vietnam syndrome, followed by events in Angola, the Horn of Africa, and Iran have drastically a tered the perception of American con stancy and commitment among the many heretofore close friends in the Indian Ocean region. This alteration in outlook explains in large measure such disquieting developments as the transfer of Pakistan’s premier diplomat—Ambassador Sahabzada Yaqub-Khan—from Washington to Moscow and the more recent opening of Soviet-Saudi Arabian talks addressing possible reestablishment of dipl°' matic relations. Parenthetically, one wonders if such indicators are penetrating the ken of those now in contro of U. S. foreign and national security policies.
The major problem with regard to a
98
Proceedings / August 1970
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Fifth Fleet, however, is one of resources. Where would the ships for a fleet or even a sizable squadron come from? The answer at the moment is that they would come out of the hides of the already overburdened Sixth and Seventh Fleets. It seems to me that the real solution is twofold.
For the long term, it lies in recognition by the Administration that this insular nation is maritime dependent and that without a proper navy— given our fundamental international interests, the current one is manifestly inadequate—we cannot hope to prosper, perhaps survive, in the years ahead. Reconstitution of the fleet, which today numbers fewer warships than at any time since the days before World War II, is obviously the first order of business. But warships are long-lead-time items. What ought to be done in the interim?
Even now, the United States should be hard at work convincing our NATO allies that a relevant U. S. naval presence in the Indian Ocean—given Europe’s overwhelming dependence on
Middle Eastern oil, as well as on t e mineral resources of East and Sout er Africa—will patently contribute to the security, along with the econom and political welfare, of every Wester European nation. The thrust of t e American approach should be that in stead of clutching—like a security blanket—the historic presence of two U. S. carriers in the Mediterranean, our NATO partners should be encour aging the United States to cut that force to one and use the freed carrier in the all-important Indian Ocean.
Establishment of a visible, credible symbol of U. S. interest, concern, an commitment would go a long way toward reversing the process of unraveling which has begun throughou the northwest quadrant of the Indian Ocean. One is constrained to note t at a Fifth Fleet would do a great deal more to salvage the deteriorating U. S. position in the region than sue actions as the trouble-plagued, comic-opera flight of a dozen unarmed” F-15 fighters to Saudi Arabia-
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Proceedings / August l9t0