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T
hough much has been written about Lawrence of Arabia, most of it fails to give proper emphasis to his close, cooperative relationship with the Royal Navy. For example, it is usually overlooked that:
► Once the Arab revolt against Turkey took place, the Royal Navy was immediately on the scene, supplying gunfire support, naval air support, landing parties, arms, vital equipment, and food to the Arabs.
► Contrary to a popular misconception, Thomas Edward Lawrence was not actively involved in leading the revolt until several months after it had begun.
► 1 he first great victory of the Arabs' cause after Lawrence joined them was the defense of the port of Yenbo by the Royal Navy.
► The second great victory was the capture of Wejh by amphibious assault. Lawrence later called this the turning point of the Arab revolt.
► For spreading the Arab revolt Lawrence used a coastal strategy involving a series of moves up the Red Sea from Jidda to Aqaba" a distance of 600 miles.
► Most of Lawrence’s guerrilla raids were directed against the Hejaz Railway, which ran parallel to the Red Sea coast, at an average distance inland of about 100 miles. Lawrence operated from bases on the coast, and only rarely did he conduct military operations more than 100 miles from the sea.
The Arab Revolt: Sherif Husein of Mecca proclaimed his revolt early in June 1916. The port of Jidda was attacked on 10 June by 3,500 Arabs. The Turkish garrison fought back stubbornly but surrendered on 16 June after bombardment by British warships and bombing by seaplanes, and after learning that no reinforcements would arrive. Medina was attacked by Husein’s son Prince Feisal, but here the Turks held a strong position and made effective use of their artillery.
With the help of the Royal Navy, Arab armies took the coastal cities of Rabegh, Yenbo, and Qunfidha. By the end of September 1916, about 6,000 Turks were held prisoner. With the exception of Medina, the principal towns of the Hejaz were in Arab hands. Husein had about 50,000 men under arms, but fewer than 10,000 had rifles. He greatly needed artillery and machine guns. The Turks in the Hejaz had about 15,000 well-armed men in good defensive positions.
the
hich
ber. Lawrence described his arrival in Arabia m first sentence of his book Revolt in the Desert, wr begins: , 1
“When at last we anchored in Jeddah’s [Jiddas outer harbour, off the white town hung between the blazing sky and its reflection in the miraPe which swept and rolled over the wide lagoon, the heat of Arabia came out like a drawn swor and struck us speechless.”2 .
The same day, Sherif Abdulla, a son of Husein, 10 command of one of the major components or father’s army, arrived at Jidda. Lawrence observe^ Abdulla closely and felt that he had some very g°° qualities but that he was not the man to lead c rebellion to success. He felt that Abdulla was toCj balanced, too cool, and too humorous to be an arrne prophet. His value would come perhaps in the PeaCe after success.
At Lawrence’s request, Abdulla gave permissr°n for him to go up to meet his brother, Prince Feisal-
British Naval Operations in the Red Sea: British naval operations in the Red Sea were under the command of Rear Admiral Sir Rosslyn Wemyss, who was promoted to vice admiral in December 1916. He was Commander in Chief, East Indies and Egypt Station. His command extended from Port Said to Singapore, including Egypt, Mesopotamia, the Red Sea, and the Indian Ocean. Captain W. E. D. Boyle was Admiral Wemyss’s able assistant and acted as Senior Naval Officer, Red Sea.
From the outset of the war, British patrols in the Red Sea had cleared it of Turkish gunboats and prevented the Turks from using that sea for any military purposes. A few French ships had.assisted the British in these operations. In addition to a variety of old cruisers and other smaller ships, the Royal Navy employed three seaplane carriers in the Red Sea during 1916. They were the Anne, the Raven II, and the Ben-my-Chree. Since these early seaplane carriers had no takeoff facilities, the aircraft were hoisted over the side to take off from the sea.
Laurence Becomes Involved in the Arab Revolt: In 1916, Captain T. E. Lawrence was 28 years old and
serving in the British intelligence bureau in Cair°^ He interrogated prisoners and ran a networ' agents concerned with political and military espi° nage. He made maps, kept up Turkish order of bate e> and published an Arab newspaper. He was also r sponsible for publication of the early numbers 0 intelligence journal, the Arab Bulletin. ,
When Lawrence learned that his friend Sir Rona Storrs, Oriental Secretary to the British Resident 1 Cairo, was planning a trip to Arabia in Octo 1916, he decided to go along. He took special Pa^ to make himself obnoxious to his superiors for a days and then applied for leave, which was hapP1^ granted. Storrs was unaware that the real purpose Lawrence’s visit to Arabia was to find the yet known master spirit of the revolt and measure capacity to carry it to a successful conclusion. On • October 1916, Lawrence and Storrs boarded c small converted liner Lama, en route from Suez Jidda. During his campaign in Arabia, Lawren^- made several voyages by sea to Egypt and back, later wrote: .
“Such short voyages on warships were delicious interludes for us passengers. On this occasion, however, there was some embarrassment. On mixed party seemed to disturb the ship’s companf in their own element. The juniors had turned on of their berths to give us night space, and by “ J we filled their living rooms with irregular talk- Lawrence and Storrs arrived at Jidda on 16 Oct0
*For footnotes, please turn to page 83.
Wrence left Jidda by ship for Rabegh, the headquarters of Sherif Ali, Abdulla’s elder brother. Sherif 1 would provide Lawrence transportation to reach eisal, who was camped at Hamra, 200 miles to the Uorth of Jidda. In port at Rabegh was the Royal In- lan Marine Ship Northbrook, which provided Ali’s 0nly telegraph link with Mecca by means of the suip s wireless.
Upon first meeting Feisal, Lawrence was greatly 'tnpressed. He knew this was the man he had come q° Arabia to seek—the leader who would bring the tab revolt to full glory. Feisal looked older than his ■ 1 years. He had dark eyes and hollow cheeks. He 'Vas tall, graceful, and vigorous. He had a royal dignity in his bearing, but he could be hot tempered and sensitive. His previous training in the entourage °f the Turkish Sultan Abdul Hamid had made him a faster of diplomacy, and his military service with t^le Turks had given him a working knowledge of ^ctics. Years spent in Constantinople and in the ^urkish Parliament had made him familiar with uropean questions and manners.
At the time Lawrence arrived on the scene, Feisal Was discouraged. His men were tired. Abdulla had S°ne to Mecca. His brothers Ali and Zeid were rest- in Rabegh, and Feisal was carrying the whole “runt of the war.
Lawrence promised Feisal that he would return to Cairo and arrange for the British to set up a base at 'Le port of Yenbo, where stores and weapons would
be landed by the Royal Navy. Lawrence promised mountain guns, machine guns, and British Army liaison officers to act as advisors.
Lawrence returned to Cairo. After making his report of circumstances in Arabia to his superiors, he was ordered to return to Arabia, link up with Feisal, and keep headquarters informed of Feisal’s needs. He returned to Arabia, arriving at Yenbo on 9 November 1916. He learned then that Husein had proclaimed himself King of the Arab Countries on 2 November.
HISTORICAL PICTURE SERVICES, INC.
Admiral Wemyss continued to support the revolt in every way. One small anecdote which illustrates how much the support of the ships was appreciated is recorded in Lawrence’s book Seven Pillars of Wisdom: “In the early days of the revolt it had been the Hardinge which played [the] role of providence to us. Once, at Yenbo, Feisal had ridden in from the hills on a streaming day of winter, cold, wet, miserable and tired. Captain [Thomas J.] Linberry sent a launch ashore and invited him to the ship, where he found, waiting for him, a warm cabin, a peaceful meal, and bountiful bath. Afterwards he lay back in an arm-chair, smoking one of his constant cigarettes, and remarked dreamily to me that now he knew what the furnishings of heaven would be.”3
The Defense of Yenbo: Early in December 1916, the Turks began to move forces toward Yenbo. Lawrence telegraphed Captain Boyle that Yenbo was gravely threatened, and Boyle replied that his fleet would be there in time to help defend the city. Meanwhile, Feisal suffered a serious defeat at the hands of the Turks and was forced to retreat with his army to Yenbo. It now appeared that the Arab revolt might be snuffed out before it had accomplished its objective. Yenbo was a small town protected on all but one side by the sea. Beyond the town a flat plain, affording no concealment, stretched for a considerable distance. It was thus an ideal defensive position, with all paths of approach capable of being raked by guns from ships.
Captain Boyle concentrated five ships, including the seaplane carrier Raven II, in Yenbo in less than 24 hours. Seaplanes flew over Turkish forces and attacked them with bombs and machine guns. The monitor M31, with a shallow draft, was placed in the end of the southeastern creek of the harbor, where she could cover the probable direction of the Turkish advance with her 6-inch guns. Larger ships were moored to fire over the town at longer range or to rake the other flank from the northern harbor.
Lawrence, Feisal, and many Arab notables took refuge on board British ships in case the worst came to pass. The night of the expected attack was tense, and nearly everyone sat up waiting to see what would happen. Outposts met the Turks about three miles outside the town. Seamen on the minaret sent the warning signal to the ships, whose combined searchlights slowly traversed the plain, but no attack came. Lawrence later wrote:
“Afterwards we heard the Turks’ hearts had failed them at the sileqce and the blaze of lighted ships from end to end of the harbour, with the eerie beams of the searchlights revealing the bleakness of the glacis they would have to cross. So they turned back: and that night, I believe, they lost their war. Personally, I was on the Suva, to be undisturbed, and sleeping splendidly at last; so I was grateful to the prudence of the enemy,
”4
The Amphibious Attack on Wejh: Having weathered a most dangerous episode, Lawrence and Feisal were now about to set out on a venture which would give them the offensive and change the whole character of the revolt. Feisal was about to strike north. If the Arabs could take the port of Wejh, the initiative in the war would pass to them. An attack on Wejh would counter the Turkish advance on Mecca by a flanking movement, threatening the communications
of Medina from the north. It would enable the Ata^ to threaten the Hejaz Railway, which, up to point in the war, had not been effectively attac 'e The railway was the sole Turkish means of supply' attacks were made on this lengthy and exposed bn - it might cause the Turks to use up in its protects the troops needed for an offensive against Mecca.
In order to raid the railway effectively, a base needed within reasonable reach of the line. te ^ was too far away from the lesser defended sections the railway and too close to Medina and the hea' defended sections. Wejh, on the other hand, wa athwart the lesser defended sections of the ra^'vj^ and provided an excellent sea-base from which t Arabs could launch raids.
Lawrence and Feisal spent part of New Years 1917 planning the attack on Wejh. On 3 January^ Feisal’s army began to move north, up the Red e coast. On 16 January, the seaplane carrier entered the Red Sea to cooperate with the other nav‘ forces involved in the planned attack. Captain B°y promised the Hardinge as depot ship throughout t operation to land food and water whenever neede ■
Feisal’s army had now grown to about 5,1 camel riders and 5,300 men on foot. They had Krupp mountain guns, 10 machine guns, and . baggage camels. The Turkish force in Wejh 'vaS about 800 men. Boyle took Lawrence in the Suva UP to Um Lejj, which was about halfway to Wejh. From Um Lejj to Wejh, 120 miles of waterless desert laf before the Arab army. The country was so barre° that there were not even thorns for the camels to eat'
The plan of attack called for the army to march OIj. Wejh and the Arabs to provide a landing party ° 400 tribesmen. Under the command of Major C • Vickery, the landing party would be transported °a board the Hardinge. This Arab landing party and 2 bluejackets would land north of the town, where the Turks had no defenses. They would turn the flank 0 the town and the harbor. Captain Boyle agreed t0 have at least six ships, with 50 guns, to occupy c^e Turks.' He also promised a seaplane ship to direct the gunfire.
The timetable of the march called for Feisal’s arm) to be at Abu Zereibat on 20 January 1917 and at Habban for the Hardinge’s water on 22 January. The landing parties would go ashore at Wejh on the morning of 23 January, and by then the mounter Arabs under Feisal and Lawrence were to have close all roads of escape from the town.
Because of the difficulties of the march, the Am army fell hopelessly behind schedule. The scout5 were incompetent. Communications between scat' tered units were hindered because often there was no
°ne who could read or write in either unit. Animals ^ere without food for nearly three days. The men ^arched the last 50 miles on half a gallon of water each, and they had nothing to eat.
At last, Feisal’s army met the Hardinge at Habban. In spite of rough seas, water was landed. Since the fallow bay gave little shelter, boat work was hazardous. First call for water was for the mules, '■hen the footmen. Lawrence went aboard the Har- dinge and learned that the amphibious attack on ^ejh had already been successfully carried out. Boyle and Vickery had feared the Turks would run aWay if they waited for the main Arab army. Captain Boyle had planned his attack on Wejh using photographs taken by the seaplanes and had flown over the Port himself before giving the order to attack.
The morning of the attack, 23 January, was misty as the landing party was put ashore by ships’ boats. Since the Turks had not expected the attack to come from the north, and had certainly not expected an amphibious assault by Arab tribesmen, most of their defenses were oriented toward the south. The defenses were badly organized and scattered in small detachments which could not support each other, so fhe landing party was able to destroy each small detachment in turn.
Seaplanes spotted the fire for the Hardinge and the light cruiser Fox, the range being indicated by smoke bombs and corrections sent by wireless. Vickery installed on the seashore a heliograph with which he flashed additional directions to the guns on the Hardinge. The range was too short for the 4.7-inch shells, and the flat trajectory prevented the shells from dropping into the Turkish trenches.
The fighting stopped at dark and resumed early the next morning. As the Fox stood in close to shore to attack enemy positions, a last stand by a group of determined Turks in a mosque was all that held up the conquest of the city. Captain Boyle, impatient with the Turkish resistance, decided that, mosque or
Name | Class | Tons | Guns | Remarks — |
Anne | Seaplane Carrier | 4,083 | 1-12 pounder | Ex-German vessel Aenne Rickmers', seized at Port Said, August 1914 |
Ben-my-Chree | Seaplane Carrier | 2,650 | 4-12 pounders 1-6 pounder | Former cross-channel steamer |
Dufferin | T roopship (Royal Indian Marine) | 7,457 | 8-4" 8-3 pounders |
|
Euryalus | Old Cruiser | 12,000 | 2-9.2" 12-6" 13-12 pounders 3-3 pounders |
|
Fox | Old Light Cruiser | 4,360 | 2-6" 8-4.7" 8-6 pounders 1-3 pounder |
|
Hardinge | Troopship (Royal Indian Marine) | 6,520 | 6-4.7" 6-3 pounders 4 machine guns |
|
Plumber | River Monitor | 1,260 | 3-6" 2-4.7" 4- 3 pounders 6 machine guns | Former Brazilian River Monitor Javary |
Lama | Armed Boarding Steamer | 2,198 | 3-4.7" |
|
M31 | Monitor | 5.35 | 2-6" 1-3" AA 1-6 pounder 4 machine guns |
|
Northbrook | Troopship (Royal Indian Marine) | 5,820 | 6-4" 6-3 pounders | Ex-German vessel Rabenfels\ seized at Port Said, August 1914 |
Raven II | Seaplane Carrier | 4,678 | 1-12 pounder | |
Suva | Armed Boarding Steamer | 2,229 | 3-4.7" |
|
(For purposes of brevity this list is restricted to those ships mentioned in the article; |
| |||
similar data are | available on a total of 22 Royal Navy ships which supported the Arab Revolt.) |
no mosque, an end must be put to the fighting, so he ordered the Fox to fire a 4.7-inch shell at the mosque. The effect was immediate. A huge hole was blown in the wall of the mosque, and 15 dusty and grimy Turks staggered out without their weapons. Once the garrison of the mosque surrendered, the rest of the city surrendered. Thus after 36 hours of fighting, Wejh had fallen. After the fall of Wejh, the seaplane carrier Anne returned to Port Said, while other ships of the Royal Navy took Arab landing parties up to Dhaba and Moweilah on 8 and 9 February. The whole of the northern end of the Red Sea, up to Aqaba, was now cleared of the enemy.
The capture of Wejh had the desired effect upon the Turks, who abandoned their advance toward Mecca and adopted a passive defense of Medina and its railway. As Lawrence had hoped, the Turks scattered small detachments of their army along the
railway. Lawrence called the capture of Wejh turning point of the Arab revolt. ^
By this time, the Arabs had raised a total force 0 almost 70,000 men and were armed with abot'1- 28,000 serviceable rifles. Their armies were dispose in three main groups. Ali’s force threatened Medio*1- Abdulla moved up to Wadi Ais to harass Turkis communications and capture supplies. Feisal maL Wejh his base for the operations to come.
In the operations of the following months the Arabs exploited their greatest asset, mobility. T^e necessary speed and range were attained by the ex treme frugality of the Arabs when mounted their camels. There was no system of supply. Each man was self-contained and carried on his saddle, from the sea-base at which each raid started, sl* weeks worth of food for himself. This consisted of a half bag of flour, 45 pounds in weight, from which
each man would bake unleavened cakes. Each man carried about a pint of drinking water. The camels required water every three days. Most of the men w°uld drink a great deal at each well and have a ‘Jrink during the intermediate dry day. Since the camels could do about 250 miles between drinks, ar>d since wells were seldom more than 100 miles aPart, water was not as great a problem as it might Seem. The six-week supply of food gave the Arab raiding parties a radius of more than 1,000 miles in ^hich they could operate, and that was far more than rhey ever needed. In describing his operations, Lawrence wrote:
“In character these operations were more like naval warfare than ordinary land operations, in rheir mobility, their ubiquity, their independence of bases and communications, their lack of ground features, of strategic areas, of fixed directions, of fixed points. ‘He who commands the sea is at great liberty, and may take as much or as little of the war as he will’ [quotation from Sir Francis Bacon]: he who commands the desert is equally fortunate. Camel raiding-parties, as self-contained as ships, could cruise without danger along any part of the enemy’s land-frontier, just out of sight of his posts along the edge of cultivation, and tap or raid into his lines where it seemed fittest or most profitable, with a sure retreat always behind them into an element which the Turks could not enter.”5
The Royal Navy kept the Red Sea clear of Turkish gunboats and stood in the way of the Turks’ using the sea for any military purposes. For this mission, the British employed some old cruisers and three seaplane carriers, including the Ben-my-Chree (.above). Planes such as the Short 184 were hoisted over the side of the carrier to take off from the water.
The Capture of Aqaba: Aqaba, once the chief naval base of King Solomon, was located in a vital position. It was the only Turkish port left in the Red Sea. It was near both the Suez Canal and the Hejaz Railway. It was on the right flank of the British armies defending Egypt and preparing to advance into Palestine. If the Turks could hold it, they could threaten the right flank of the British. If the Arabs
Figure 2 Some Seaplane Types Which Operated Off the Seaplane Carriers in the Red Sea
Type | No. Seats | Max Speed (m.p.h.) | Armament |
| |
Short 184 | 2 | 881/2 | 1 Lewis machine gun aft 1 torpedo or various bomb loads up to 520 lbs. |
| |
Short 827 | 2 | 61 | 1 Lewis machine gun bombs |
| |
Sopwith Baby | 1 | 100 | 1 Lewis machine gun 2-65 lb. bombs |
| |
Sopwith Schneider. | 1 | 92 | 1 Lewis machine gun 1-65 lb. bomb |
| |
pi 1 | mobile camel force and rush Aqaba from the east ward. Lawrence wrote: ^ “The eastern was the unguarded side, the hne 0 least resistance, the easiest for us. Our marc would be an extreme example of a turning move • f | ||||
_ r | ment, since it involved a desert juuiu^ hundred miles to capture a trench within gun ir | ||||
| of our ships: but there was no practicable aitci | ||||
| tive.”6 On 9 May, Lawrence, Auda, and the small patty of about 40 men set off for the Syrian desert to j°‘n the Howeitat. Nineteen days after leaving Wej > Lawrence and his party reached the tents of the How | ||||
V | eitat in the Wadi Sirhan. Auda recruited a came tnrrp xx/Viiph T Twrpnrf[1] rhen led toward ^^Qaba. Lin | ||||
° \f ' | 1UILC WHICH LdWltllLt llK.il K.U LUVYUiu i _ , July, Lawrence and his force reached Aqaba, whic | ||||
ft : ^ | was taken with virtually no resistance. The town was almost empty, having been shattered by several nav bombardments. There was no food and no wirelesS with which to request assistance. The condition of Lawrence and his party was nosv desperate. He had 700 prisoners in addition to his own 500 men and 2,000 new allies. The last mea^ for his men had been two days before. If he allowe^ them to eat their camels, there would be enoug | ||||
| meat to last for six weeks, but it would bring a*1 | ||||
Rear Admiral Sir Rosslyn Wemyss | immobility upon them. Supper time reminded Law rence of the urgent need to send news over the 17 | ||||
could take it, they could extend their revolution northward more than 200 miles and link up with the British. This would give them an increased importance in the war, that of protecting the right flank of the British. Of greater importance to the Arabs, it would give them greater access to supplies and equipment. Another reason for taking Aqaba was that the Turks had been using it as a base for planting mines in the Red Sea, and the Allies were afraid the Germans might use it to support submarines. Since an amphibious attack on Aqaba was not advisable, because of terrain uncomfortably reminiscent of that at Gallipoli, Lawrence decided to take it by land. In planning his attack, he was assisted by information received from Turks captured during a Royal Navy raid of 20 April 1917. Lawrence worked out his plan with the famous warrior Auda Abu Tayi, whom Lawrence described as the greatest fighting man in Arabia. The plan was for Lawrence, Auda, and a small hand-picked force to cross the desert to the eastward and march to Auda’s Howeitat tribe, in its spring pastures of the Syrian desert. From among these tribesmen they would raise a | desert miles to the British at Suez. Having no one else available who could make sue a trip and make a report which would be believe > Lawrence set out by camel and made the trip m . hours. The new commander in Egypt, General Sir Edmund Allenby, and Admiral Wemyss, who svere standing on a pier, were amazed when Lawrence walked up to them, wearing Arab garb, and calm ) announced he had taken Aqaba. Admiral Wemyss felt not enough could be done ro help Lawrence. He immediately dispatched the ship Dufferin, loaded with food and stores, and he sent his flagship Euryalus to Aqaba. This great ship’s appear ance assured the Arabs that the British were indee the winning side. A sheikh had once stated after vis iting the Euryalus that God had guided the Ara right in joining them to the nation which had “sue prodigious engines of war.”7 Lawrence now decided to move the main Arab ar mies north by ship from Wejh to Aqaba. The whole nature of the war had been transformed with the cap ture of Aqaba. The focus of the revolt had shifre from the Hejaz to Syria. Now the Arabs had a base more than 200 miles north of Wejh, and they coul raid the railway with great ease. For mining trains, Lawrence wanted to use direct | ||||
OT | Prnfififldincfs / Auffust | ||||
r* .
•nng by electricity of a charge under the locomotive lnstead of the less reliable method of automatic ntllnes. From Egypt he received an exploder and some lr>sulated cable, but he needed some advice on how 10 use them. Lawrence took his exploder and cable on °ard HMS Humber, the guardship at Aqaba, and in- tr°duced himself to Captain Arthur L. Snagge. When Lawrence explained he was having some difficulty with his detonator, Snagge rang for his gunnery warrant officer, who knew all about circuits. *^he gunner suggested a special type of electric deto- nac°r, of which the ship had six on board. Captain Snagge gave three of them to Lawrence, and the gunner explained and demonstrated how they forked. Of Snagge’s hospitality and assistance, Lawrence wrote:
“His inquiring nature took interest in the shore, and saw the comic side even of our petty disasters. To tell him the story of a failure was to laugh at it, and always for a good story he gave me a hot bath, and tea with civilized trappings, free from every suspicion of blown sand. His kindness and help served us in lieu of visits to Egypt for repairs, and enabled us to hammer on against the Turks through month after month of feckless disappointment.”8
Operating from their secure sea-base at Aqaba, the ^fab armies under Lawrence and Feisal served throughout the remainder of 1917 and 1918 as the right wing of General Allenby’s army as it advanced through Palestine and Syria.
What then was the role the Royal Navy played in Supporting Lawrence of Arabia and the Arab revolt? Lowell Thomas, who discovered, publicized, and tttade T. E. Lawrence world famous, wrote, Throughout the entire first phase of the desert campaign the Arabs were given invaluable assistance by the British Navy.”9 Thomas also wrote:
“In fact, the sailors were more important than the soldiers at the start of the Revolt. They were already aiding the Arabs with food, ammunition, and advice when Cairo decided to support the insurrection with a military force. Lawrence found the Navy operating in Arabian waters when he made his first historic visit to Jeddah to find out for himself what was happening in the desert.”10 The assistance given by Sir Rosslyn Wemyss was so great and so much appreciated by the Arabs that they
called him “Father and Mother of the Revolt.”11 Lawrence was always grateful for the assistance of the navy. He wrote:
' The Red Sea patrol-ships were the fairy- godmothers of the Revolt. They carried our food, our arms, our ammunition, our stores, our animals. They built our piers, armed our defences, served as our coast artillery, lent us seaplanes, provided all our wireless communication, landed landing parties, mended and made everything. I couldn’t spend the time writing down a tenth of their services.”12
Prince Feisal’s estimate of the value of the ships was given in a remark he made to General Louis Botha, the great leader of the Boers. During the peace conference following World War I, Feisal and Botha had lunch together at the Hotel Majestic and began to discuss guerrilla warfare. When Botha expressed surprise that the Arabs had been successful where the Boers had failed, Feisal replied, “Ah, that was because you had not Admiral Wemyss and his ships to help you.”13
t Commander Parnell received his bachelor’s degree in \ I960 from Rice University and subsequently graduated * from Officer Candidate School, the Defense Intelligence School, and the Naval War College. He has served on board two aircraft carriers and four amphibious warfare | ships, including a tour as executive officer of the USS I Charleston (LKA-113). He has served on the Staff of Commander in Chief, Atlantic, on the Defense Intelligence School faculty, and with the Defense Intelligence Agency. Commander Parnell is now the speechwriter for the Secretary of the Navy. He has published four previous Proceedings articles. * [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
‘Thomas Edward Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Doran & Company, Inc., 1935), p. 65.
[2]Lawrence, Revolt in the Desert (New York: George H. Doran Company, 1927), p. I.
[3]Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom, p. 456.
[4]Lawrence, Revolt in the Desert, p. 40.
[5]Lawrence, 'The Evolution of a Revolt,” The Army Quarterly, October 1920, p. 64.
“Lawrence, Revolt in the Desert, p. 67.
[7]Lady Wester Wemyss, The Life and Letters of Lord Wester Wemyss (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1935), p. 331.
“Lawrence, Revolt in the Desert, p. 130.
“Lowell Thomas, With Lawrence in Arabia (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1967), p. 60.
‘“Thomas, p. 304.
“Wemyss, p. 324.
“Ibid., p. 359.
“Ibid., p. 358.