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nes, U. S. avy- 'Jhe |atest effort in reporting °n our retention problems that I read ft’as commissioned by Commander Pa- tr°l Wings, U. S. Pacific Fleet. It was completed in 1978, but has only re- Centiy made its way to the attention of toP-Ievel managers. Why? Maybe beCause it paints a verv dark
The
We
fcch
that
of
th,
SALT and the Navy
The Tug of Gravity
SS-N-14
Retention: Our #1 Goal”
R- T. Anderson, pp. 82-85, July 1979 ^Mniander Jerry S. Jones, U.
paints a very dark picture report is a reasonably well- prepared document, contains some investing and revealing data, and aves the reader with the distinct impassion that “all is not well.” SecNav 0 said that in his report on man- P°wer and personnel problems to °n8ress jn January of this vear. The °ne thing that does hit the reader JSht between the eyes is that, in a lot cases, people discussed in the report are hungry” and must find second s in order to properly feed, clothe, and house their families. These second ,0bs take up the individuals’ evenings, Weekends, and, in some cases, all their aVailable free time. No one in our so- ^,lety should be forced to endure this.
train our personnel to be skilled mcians, then pay them a salary requires a second job and the use food stamps to exist. Is it any won- er that people don’t want to work for company with such a track record? . en to top it off, any pay raise pro‘s minimal and doesn't even ®eP pace with rising costs, while on e other hand, the private sector en)°ys much more substantial raises, p ®ot pay is not the entire answer. e°ple want to be able to enjoy the ^Wards they receive for their work. So have a situation in which time Went at the place of work does not e&ve much left for personal recreation, er> pay becomes meaningless. Work- lri8 hours—the time an individual Wends at the place of work for what- V‘r reason—is an area that is cause 0r concern. I am aware that we are studying the problem (again) and may institute some changes; but the fact remains we pay our personnel a certain amount of money, but seem to be insensitive to the amount of time spent beyond what is considered normal. Some “old timers” say that military personnel are on duty 24 hours a day and should have no complaint if they must work more than 40 hours a week. Fine, but if that is the case, then let’s calculate pay based upon 24 hours and compare that rate to a comparable job in the private sector.
Many other areas cause concern, e.g., leadership, management, benefits, family programs, deployments, training. Something must be done and soon. Studying the problem again will not halt our losses of people. We have become so enamored with the 1960s’ systems approach that we are losing the war against our personnel problems. There comes a time when the successful commander attacks because of a “gut” feeling. Such a situation exists now. Our leadership must stand up and be counted, pick up the phone if necessary, and “tell” the fleet commanders, for example, to set working hours at 40 hours per week. People will react positively, morale will improve significantly, and all Navy personnel will seek ways to get the job done within the time allotted. We may find out that our jobs can be done in a reasonable amount of time and that we won’t have to “brag” about working 70, 80, or even 90 hours a week. Certainly some things won’t get done—so what? Maybe some things don’t deserve to get done and should be scrapped in favor of our personnel.
“How Will We Man the Fleets?”
(See B. Harris, pp. 72-87, May 1979 Proceedings)
Commander J. J. Pursel, U. S.
Navy—Captain Harris’ article is an excellent simplification of general problems and avoids the real issues. It
Contents:
Retention: Our #1 Goal How Will We Man the Fleets?
The Plight—and Flight—of Our Fighter Pilots
The Drift Toward the Draft
U. S. National Strategy: Outward Bound . . . With Inadequate Charts
Warships Should Look Warlike
The Potential Battle of the Atlantic
Surface Warships Against Submarines
Tactical Complacency
Who Speaks for America?
The Future of U. S. Sea Power
The Soviet Navy and Forward Deployment
Countering Soviet Imperialism
I ime Out For Tactics
Tactical ASW: A Case for a Non-Nuclear Submarine
Counterinsurgency: Corrupting Concept
Survivability—A Science Whose Time Has Come
The Violation of the Liberty
resignation for other causes. A p 15 years would not appeal to
commercial airlines nor would the a
cost-
their
the
• ViPlf
money is not as much a factor in t leaving as is the extended and freq11 . separation from their families. 1
ignores the managerial rigidity that exists and avoids addressing the lack of real Navy commitment at high levels to correct the inequities that exist between the many special interest groups, usually at the expense of the sea components.
Our antiquated distribution system keeps people apprehensive of a transfer at any time. Home life can be disrupted on short notice—making it particularly difficult to own a home for any period of time and develop an estate. The movement of people to meet some statistical manning level on a ship detracts from the concept of unit pride and makes sailors temporary employees of a ship that has no control over their future. Commanding officers are held responsible for a retention program that is at the mercy of a nearsighted distribution system. Homesteading or multiple tour programs designed to guarantee personnel some geographic stability are dismissed as too difficult to “manage.”
How can Captain Harris complain about lack of people or billets for ships when we dump thousands into public affairs office (PAO) billets or tie up hundreds of people as religious program specialists to support a massive self-serving, taxpayer-supported, religious program? How can we talk about fair treatment when we have ratings that seldom go to sea, and some that have no sea duty? Yet, these “sailors” enjoy the same retirement and are probably the first to retire as their long shore tours facilitate their finding civilian jobs. I would not be surprised if most of the "double dippers” come from areas that already enjoy excellent shore duty opportunity. Again, the “system” penalizes sea duty and leaves untouched the special interest groups that have low sea duty and only indirectly contribute to actual fleet readiness.
The lip service the Navy pays to women is another area of bureaucratic neglect. Each rating has women quotas that have been agreed upon by the rating managers. Yet many of these, such as communications technician, almost refuse to recruit women, thus are hundreds short of their goal. As a result, women are pushed into “housekeeping” jobs where they have no opportunity to advance. In spite of nice sounding brief sheets from which the author is probably quoting, Washington is still practicing sexism in its treatment of women by not meeting the quotas for each rating.
Desertion is high in some ratings, such as boilerman technician, for many reasons such as bad working conditions, poor sea/shore rotation, and little opportunity for good shore or overseas duty. Why does the Navy not adopt programs for cross-training these personnel to improve sea/shore rotation and provide a better selection of shore jobs? Primarily because the stability of existing policies and management practices is given higher value than retention—and it protects the special interests.
Medical care is certainly bad and the associated administrative costs, schools, and general medical bureaucracy eat up the greater portion of the assets. Why not just end our system of medical care and let our people use a form of CHAMPUS with a participating medical plan? In actual cost it would probably be cheaper and would pay for itself in retention. Ships and overseas stations without adequate civilian hospitals could use a doctor “draft” with attractive bonuses.
In summary, Captain Harris leaves the reader with the impression that things are going along rather well. I don't believe that impression is widely shared.
“The Plight—and Flight—of Our Fighter Pilots”
(See J. R. Woodfield, pp. 94-95, June 1979 Proceedings)
“Surprise (?), Our Pilots Are Leaving Again”
{See E. R. Nordtvedt, pp. 95-96, June 1979 Proceedings)
Vice Admiral Allan E. Smith, U. S. Navy (Retired)—The commercial airlines are heavily subsidized by the military to the extent of the cost of the training an experienced aviator of the Navy and the Air Force.
Twenty-five thousand more pilots will be needed by the commercial airlines in the next decade. The best and
most experienced, younger aviators the services are the ones sought b> t commercial airlines. The problem 3 reached such proportions that a so tion must be sought. .,
The following is offered for consi
ClrtLIUIl. . .
By Executive Order or by legis a tion, require all candidates for avia1*0^ training to sign an agreement 1 they will not resign to join a comme*^ cial airline for 15 years, unless U. S. Government is reimbursed r cost of their aviation train*0? ($250,000). A clause appealing t° P‘l triotism should be included. A Pen alty clause also should be included- The agreement would not preV - the
lines rush to put up the training The airlines would rather train own pilots.
Some of our aviators state that
objection could be overcome by crea j ing a stockpile of aviators which c°u^ provide for relief crews similar to blue and gold crews of the so marines. This might require shorten ing the time of 15 years until r stockpile is created.
‘The Drift Toward the Draft
(See H. J. Sage, pp. 38-45, June 1979 Proceedings)
Master Chief Electronics Technic‘l’ Allan G. LeBaron, U. S. ^ (Retired)—Lieutenant Colonel Sage incorrect when he writes that • volunteers were accepted between January 1943 and October 1945- 5
a participant-observer who anxious) awaited a 17th birthday in Mat 194.3 so as to be eligible to join father and three brothers as a wh**e hat in the Navy, I know that the 1 year-olds were not an insignifie*111 group. Most of the boat coxswains >° the Pacific Fleet amphibs seemed to e 17, although there were some ol timers with as much as two years 1,1 the Navy. The replacement marine' who staged through Guam en route t0
many 17-year-olds among
kinawa in April-May 1945 must have had them.
cru'^e Navy ^as r^e ""kiddie
a ,'Se f°r a long time—enlist at 17 th ^'sc^arKed on the day before , e ~*st birthday. With computers, it u‘d be comparatively easy to comare a group of “kiddie cruisers” with Other i •
enlistees to determine if the th n^Cr £rouP's effective. If so, since ere are no plans to draft from this r°uP, the Navy might do well to re- i from this group aggressively, as before World War II. impression is that Lieutenant °ne* Sage represents the thinking those in the military who were tKainst dropping the draft and are de- j: mined to prove the all-volunteer fCe a failure. Never having served in artruly voluntary military force, they Unaware of the advantages to be Sained.
to m‘btary today is unattractive the young. Many of the reasons for ls are in the purview of officers such s Lieutenant Colonel Sage. Instead of Setting on with the job and address- il S the problems directly, he and his j Seem to think the draft will help. ^ tvon’t; the problems will just get "TI
• S. National Strategy:
Utward Bound . . . with Adequate Charts”
R. J. Hanks, pp. 30-35, April 1979; M. E. 0,nano, pp. 21-22, June 1979; B. M. "npson and D. P. Van Ort, p. 86, July 1979 Pr<“<*dmgs)
^eutenant Commander Paul D. Speer,
' Naval Reserve (Retired)—The ex- ent, thoughtful prize essay of Rear .. tuital Hanks deserves the widest pos- I k reading, not only at the highest evels of government, but also through- °Ut the Navy. It surfaces the major Problem for U. S. diplomacy, the ^aginot Line that is NATO. In a Strategic sense, well described in the /bde, the Soviets have outflanked estern Europe.
, L°r the present and future leaders of s^e Navy, the lesson is clear. We must ape the Navy to meet and prevail over e expected threat of the 1980s and
1990s wherever it might be. We must protect our sea lines of communication to permit the flow of raw materials to reach the United States and the flow of materials and men to reach our forces deployed overseas. We must be prepared to find and destroy the enemy at sea and in his support bases without regard to location in order to keep open our sea lines of communication and deny his capability to attack our shores.
The strategic nuclear strike forces (SSBNs and CVs) drain off a significant portion of the naval appropriation without adding to our capability to fulfill the major part of the naval mission outlined above. These forces are indeed an essential element of our national defense, but their existence should not be allowed to prejudice the sizing of the remainder of the naval appropriation in the name of “national defense balance.”
Thomas H. Etzold, Professor of Strategy, Naval War College—In classic fashion, Rear Admiral Hanks has demonstrated the truth of his own contentions: after decrying the fragmentation of national policy and the pressing of parochial views, he has presented a number of intensely parochial, not to say partisan, views.
We have captured the drama of a seaman’s life in an age of romance and change for the 1980 edition of the Naval Institute’s calendar. Highlighted with a full-color cover, this calendar is spiral bound so that it will lie flat when open on your desk. Ample space has been provided for daily notes and reminders.
19791128 pages/53 illustrations
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The only thorough and scholarly explanation of the reasons behind the establishment and expansion of America's first intelligence agency. Dr. Dorwart recognizes ONI’s contribution to the creation of our modern Navy and reveals the limitations, failures, and elitist and extralegal tendencies of naval intelligence. 1979/216 pages
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THE OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE
The Birth of America's First Intelligence Agency. 1865-1918
Jeffery M. Dorwart
First, his essay resorts to the hoary myth that there are such things as “the true national interest” and “the true imperatives of national security.” This is no more than an old debater's trick; associated with it in this piece are repeated references to high school levels of knowledge, elementary logic, and the absence of rational alternatives to the author’s own positions. These must be taken as statements reflecting the author's strong feelings about his subject, meant to load the argument, rather than as statements of fact or of objective circumstance. Our country’s—and indeed any country’s— interests are diffuse, diverse, overlapping, and conflicting. They are defined, brokered, and articulated in a real, vital, usually unpredictable political process, not in a school of logic or in some Navy “shop” in the Pentagon. This process reflects and embodies our most fundamental political values, even though it may result in policy less coherent than Rear Admiral
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extremely favorable position in
rpflt
in the United States during £ change in American global P°l,cl and postures. It is also related c
.ate
iff*'
the defense budget so as to put “released funds” elsewhere in
the
the
tion, Rear Admiral Hanks notes hard, unaccustomed reality that United States is no longer the sin£ most powerful nation on earth. I ^ simple statement cloaks an import®
Hanks might wish. Views of what may be in the national interest invariably reflect the circumstances, background, and interests of the individuals and organizations expounding them. It is easy to see what those are in the case at hand. There is, of course, nothing wrong with passionate advocacy, as long as authors and readers alike recognize it for what it is.
The assumption that there are such things as “true” interests and imperatives in national security policy permits Rear Admiral Hanks to reiterate the familiar complaint of Cold War military leaders, namely, that political guidance is either lacking or inadequate. It is perfectly understandable that military leaders and planners want unambiguous and authoritative delineation of the circumstances and contingencies in which they may have to conduct military operations; it is perfectly unreasonable to think that either our political system or world political conditions permit much improvement on current guidance in this respect. Contrary to the impression left by Rear Admiral Hanks, the administration has conducted an "indepth analysis of the current international environment.” Among the conclusions drawn from this effort is the sober thought that it is extremely difficult to get one’s way by resorting to force internationally, and even more difficult to sustain domestic support for such action. The problem of Navy and other military leaders is not the absence of guidance but the distastefulness of it, and especially of the budgetary philosophy that complements it.
In another complaint, Rear Admiral Hanks correctly notes that much U. S. policy seems “drifting” or “reactive,” but he does so in a way that leaves room for misunderstanding. Military men trained to the unquestioned virtue of initiative and schooled in the offensive as a favored principle of warfare will rightly perceive that “drift” and "reaction” are not meant to be flattering descriptions of American policy or style in national security affairs. It is important therefore to be reminded that the United States is after all a status quo power. In the
judgment of the administrate which in this matter is surely conS tent with its post-World War II Pr decessors, the United States enjoys ■
politics and economics. Recently. 1 an interview for The New York the President’s national security * viser emphasized that world tre mainly favor American values * ^ interests, despite the discomfort ‘in^ uncertainty of a few individual situ tions. Unless it seeks imperiurm status quo power will almost certa j be open to the charge of “drift a “reaction” in its policies and metn ^ The real point of debate, then, oU^e to be the question of whether ^ United States can continue to thin ' itself as a status quo power. ^
Rear Admiral Hanks’ remarks NATO in administration strategy ‘l1^ budgetary concerns also tend encourage a misconstrual of cur policy and action. In a classic dem° stration of the difficulties of cl ^ military relations, he criticizes on na^ row military and strategic gron11 ^ what is essentially a political and P5^
chological effort. The administrating
investment in NATO’s center is nOt^tl some might think, a “quick ^ undertaken in the expectation c either a confrontation or war is 1* e _ or near. Instead, this investment is tended to underpin alliance confide
postures.
American intentions to motiv higher contributions and more e cient efforts among the other all|e* Again, contrary to the impression in the article, there is no apprec**1 determination or effort in the curt administration to effect “savings
such the
budget, and certainly not in relat|° to the “Europe first” administrati priority.
As one of the most salient chanj
in the international environment suP^
posedly unsurveyed by the administ
Po s°mewhat more complex issue, fhis °^V'0US political reasons, neither j-i nor any other administration is ^ y to admit any time soon that the mted States is inferior in power to ^Soviet Union. That comparison, in y case, is somewhat harder to make tpeaningful than it would appear from ad essay nnder discussion. But the ^ministration beyond doubt recog- l06S t*lat the United States is no y^t tn a position to exert power beits borders with confidence of is ?S*Stent success. The policy question Ca °W t0 Protect and advance Ameri- n interests in this situation. The ^ministration's
°n. nA-„„ articulated, has been
s answer to this quest often articulated, has been th^ °^' ^*rst> ‘c has been argued that re is no reason to believe that the
the
li
th' >tar^ men 'n seerr,rog _ ___________________
at the recovery of military preemi-
Ce is the answer both to the Wth of Soviet power and to the ty, Itat*ons of power perceived in ^stcrn diplomacy.
Co^ he Carter Administration and the ntry are incJeecJ involved in the ^ aluation of American policies and aer 'n a world marked by rapid,
sometimes dismaying, devel-
°Pmi
e- The question at issue is, rather, t0 sustain American interests and
h,
a<JV;
and
^ nations of power affect only the sa eSt’ t^IC S°v'ets and others face the hip 6 S^stern‘c constraints on the usa- Iji *^y °f power and, over time, are Ur^ ^ C° exPer‘ence successes and faille m similar proportion to our own. thC°n<^’ aS hicnry Kissinger argued in pearly 1970s, many in the adminis- ^ahon now believe that the limited t uiness of power makes it necessary of CuUm confi'cts of interest into tests •pp. *li rather than contests of power. c ,1S *atter view reinforces the diffi- „ .ty °f formulating the kinds of
sir anCe t^lat military men most dee from political leaders. Rear Ad- rnip ^anks is far from alone among
to believe
^ ents. There is no question as to " ether the nation should have a ag°Un<^ national strategy”—on this all
'OVV
j antages without adopting either an tap er'3^ stfle or a garrison-state men- 0u;y. neither of which is congenial to ^at ^0rnesnc political structure and tl0nal character. American abilities Use the sea may indeed figure in the
answer to this question, but the litany of seapower will remain far from adequate as a response to the great questions of national purpose, national interest, and national strategy in a changing world.
“SALT and the Navy”
(See J. L. George, pp. 28-37, June 1979
Proceedings)
Dean Holley—Much has been written in defense-related magazines lately urging that the Navy be given control of more if not virtually all of our nuclear forces, thereby switching from the triad concept to a diad or monad concept. Not only is this impractical, but how could any responsible individual want us to be reduced to a single option? And would the Navy really want control over the whole ball of wax and have to bear the sole responsibility for the success or failure of the strategic mission?
“Warships Should Look
Warlike”
(See J. C. Roach and H. A. Meier, pp. 66-76,
June 1979 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Colonel Robert P. Chaney, U. S. Marine Corps (Retired)—The article contends that warships should look menacing to be wholly effective and that our current designs don’t. I agree because I vividly remember my first sight of an American man-of-war.
I was a first cruise NROTC midshipman who had never seen salt water before when 1 saw the Iowa (BB-61). In my opinion a more beautiful warship was never built. The ship's rangy, muscular lines conveyed one message only and that was that she was meant to deal lethal blows.
A wealth of previously unpublished photos and carefully researched information from squadron histories, combat action reports, and other official documents make this fastpaced operational history a unique contribution to the annals of aircraft lore. 19791228 pagesllllustratedl
Appendices/lrtdex
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The first inside account of the gathering and use of intelligence at Pearl Harbor between 1941 and 1945. It's a story that few men alive today could tell in the first person, for it covers incidents that could not be recorded in those hectic days of desperate war. The complete story is skillfully told here with a touch of compassion and humor.
19791240pp. 125 illustrations/2 maps
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Today, I look across San Diego Bay at new construction which ranges in appearance from bizarre to merely ugly and share the feelings of Roach and Meier. Admittedly, some types such as carriers and amphibs are too constrained by function to yield much
be
uals. Of course this could never
an
line
with
hausting until contact
to esthetics, but our modern surface combatants don’t look the part.
I’ve heard veteran aviators say, “If it looks good, it’ll fly good.’’ That old saw was borne out in another context by the Iowa-class battleships among others. Might it not be made to apply, at slight extra cost as the authors point out, to future designs?
Chief Sonar Technician (Submarine) Paul C. Franke, U. S. Navy, Member, The Heraldry Society (of England and of Scotland)—While not prepared to pass judgment on the suggestions in the article, I wish to correct the authors’ use of the term “crest” as used in the last paragraph of the main text. Actually, what is illustrated as the crest is the coat of arms of our nation. The true crest is the 13-star constellation within the circular nimbus, which is above the eagle in the Great Seal. (Properly, this device should be called a “crest-badge.” A crest technically is, or can be, affixed to the top of some pattern of medieval helmet, which has never been a part of the nation s coat of arms.)
The equation of a crest with a coat of arms is a rather common error by our countrymen. A coat of arms can exist (be granted) without a crest, but no crest can exist without a coat of arms.
Incidentally, the full coat of arms as shown in the Great Seal is the heraldic “achievement.” A coat of arms is properly only that which is shown upon a shield, or for a woman who is not a sovereign, upon either a lozenge or an oval.
“The Potential Battle of the Atlantic”
(See S. A. Swarztrauber, pp. 108-125, May 1979; D. P. Van Ort, p. 86, July 1979 Proceedings)
“Surface Warships Against Submarines”
(See W. D. Taylor, pp. 168-181, May 1979 Proceedings)
David Brown, author of Carrier Operations in World War II: The Pacific Navies and The Royal Navy—The differing attitudes derived from planning needs and the vast experience of a salt-horse captain are all-too-well illustrated by the articles by Admiral Swarztrauber and Captain Taylor. Had the former read the latter’s appreciation of trade protection and his comments on convoy, would he have continued to believe that “widely-spaced random dispositions . . . with ASW platforms scattered throughout . . . sanitized zones . . . Moving barriers will provide a credible defense in another Battle of the Atlantic? The admiral quotes data from a British official source (Defeat of The Enemy Attack on Shipping 1939-1945, London, 1957) but has apparently failed to read the book, which comes down heavily against the methods which he proposes and against the use of independent routing.
Those data are well worth examining—427 merchant ships were sunk worldwide by enemy submarines in 1941, 1,155 in 1942, and 462 in 1943. Of the 1942 total, 645 were sunk during the first seven months of the year, 572 of them in the Atlantic. Only 62 of those 572 ships were in, or straggling from, convoys. The other 510 were “independents,” 469 of them sunk west of 40°W, where the U. S. authorities were, for over four months, unable to organize any coast-wise 24-hour convoy system. Air and sea patrols were used extensively but achieved only four kills in the period, giving an exchange rate of only one U-boat for 117 ships. We couldn’t afford this then, and we certainly can’t afford it now.
The “we” is used advisedly. U. S. merchant losses to all forms of enemy action in all theaters in the year 1942 came to 317 ships, compared with 1,183 lost by the other allies (essentially those in NATO today). And, as partners in an alliance, we have a right to hope that the biggest single contributor will pause before coming to any policy decision which flies in the face of not only European naval experience but also that of such seasoned U. S. Navy poachers—turned game- keepers—as Captain Taylor.
As to the other forms of attack, World War II experience leads one to believe that convoy is the only way of
getting through in sufficient num e to deliver a worthwhile load. Convo to Malta and North Russia ^ fought through against all forms 0 a^ tack and, although one operation^ each theater went sour, this only re forced the obvious need for organic defense in the form of a carrier in c
company. ^
Analogies are boundless, but maritime threat is rather lihe ^ mugging threat: if citizens
round in large groups, there still be a small number of kni ,n^ muggings, and fates worse than ea mainly inflicted on those dawdling look in shop windows; but ^
majority would get through, ^ than they might have wished but ^ harmed. At the same time, the P° would pick up a large number o ^ lains driven by necessity to attac' crowd instead of waiting for ind1
UU1S. VV1 LUUI31 1.1110 mu.- - . . n
suggested, for it deprives the clt ^ of his right to be assaulted and, 111 ‘ please, city life will go on in splte increasing risk to individuals. the Atlantic muggers, organize work in large gangs, manage 10 ^
rupt traffic on that main street, r • u Attfl°
life as we wish to live it in the u
cratic West will end abruptly.
Captain Taylor sums up the si ^ tion in his excellent first paragrap “Tactics,” in which every sentence memorable.
"Patrol or Escort? Many ° erators consider escort to be de sive and dull, and hunter-killer P^ trol to be aggressive and glamor ^ This idea has been voiced ever s* , U-boats commenced unrestr £ warfare on shipping in the World War. It has always W* wrong. The fact is that all ant*Sl marine operations are dull and e
enemy is made. Then they bec° hectic, often brutal, contests of ^ and technology. Peacetime ^ ercises, where contacts are force provide training and in which body gets hurt, produce unreal* expectations of warfare. Convoy could be termed offensive sU^ marine hunting using cargo ship5 bait, but that also would be wr0^e The objective of convoying lS
Safe and timely arrival of the car- 8°es in the escorted ships. Convoy- 'nS 's an offensive operation directed at achieving a national objec- tlVe- A percentage of those submarines operating at sea will man- aSe to reach shipping lanes and attack the ships. Shipping requires and deserves all the protection necessary and available to escort it rough submarine threat areas 'v,rh a reasonable expectation of safe arrival. There is no point in sailing ?. *PS rhey have no chance of de- IVering their cargoes.” jj °wever, to be remembered, these foTf fnust be rea<3 by those responsible 0rmulating tomorrow's doctrine.
Tug of Gravity”
lnl RDC- Montgomery, pp. 109-110, June J Proceedings)
Q
^'nander W. 1. Milwee, Jr., U. S. Sb^' ^ePa‘r Officer, Long Beach Naval )y[ ^ard Lieutenant Commander ntgomery s point that a small ship is
equally as subject to the laws of physics as a large one is well taken. It has been my experience that small ships are much less forgiving than large ones; margins for error are smaller; events occur more quickly; and results can be more radical. Small ships are far from always being stable. A review of drydock accidents shows that a preponderance of capsizing incidents in drydock have involved tugs, minesweepers, fishing vessels, and similar small ships. A docking evolution for a small simple ship cannot be taken lightly. A docking officer sitting on a bollard during any undocking should be out of a job, as should the individual who fails to recognize a dangerous situation developing and does not take immediate action to stabilize and correct it.
In the situation described by Lieutenant Commander Montgomery, an accident was inevitable. Indeed, I cannot think of any other steps which could have been taken to assure disaster. The capsizing incident is an excellent example of how assumptions, lack of communication, and inattention to detail can be catastrophic in an industrial or any other activity.
As repair officer in a naval shipyard, I intend to bring the lessons of this professional note pointedly to the attention of my ship superintendents and perhaps to engrave the lessons on the forehead of the docking officer.
(Continued on page 87)
ENTER THE FORUM
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Comment and Discussion (Continued from page 29)
N;
Tactical Complacency: Change Now or Fail Later”
M. A. Libbey, pp. 34-43, April 1979; R. A. Da‘la Mura, p. 88, July 1979Proceedings)
Commander P. M. Shepherd, U. S.
avy> CinCLantFlt Staff—All officers, regardless of warfare specialty, should cheer Lieutenant Commander Libbey’s Plea for a return to tactics. I would °pe that his recommendations could e expander! to encompass all opera- Oons and training. Fighting a ship or ®>rcraft is a total undertaking and the amage control assistant’s needs, in terms of innovation, are the same as *Te tactical action officer’s.
Realistically, rhe operators in the avy are slaved to whatever equip- Irient and budget levels planners in Washington felt they needed some time ago. Whatever the deficiencies, VVe must get on with the training with '''hat we have.
As one senior officer recently stated, the next one will be a come as you are war.” The better systems for train- lng> better targets, etc., will have to ke left to the men involved in the budget cycles. The tactics, however, should be worked by the men in and around the bridges and cockpits.
One approach that would cost little aod pay immediate dividends is simply to put the thinkers where we need them. Tacticians, like Lieutenant Commander Libbey and the men he ^escribes, should not be, in my judgment, anywhere near Washington. They should be assigned in large numbers to ComTraLant, ComTraPac, Third Fleet, Second Fleet, and the CinCs’ exercise divisions. Most importantly, some of our very best personnel should be ordered to the fleet train- *ng groups.
We go to sea and take to the air now to train. If our tactics are in need °f change, it is a much simpler task l°r the operators or the operational
staffs to be innovative than a bureaucrat in Washington. Let’s beef up the staffs of the implementors and short- circuit some of the paperwork.
Lieutenant Commander Libbey has obviously suffered the same frustration that afflicts most officers today. Each warfare specialty provides basic and advanced tactics that prepare the operators for sea. When they are razor sharp and ready, their enthusiasm is dulled by the realities of the day-today management of the fleet. This need not be. A few more concerned tacticians in the right places might start the resurgence.
“Who Speaks for America?”
Jerrold V. Marsh, attorney—I believe that it is important that we as a group speak out with a firm voice on the military “abortion,” SALT.
Given the program of the Soviet Union, the progress of China, and the host of obvious security problems for the leaders of the West, now is not the time to compromise on questions of ultimate security.
It seems that defeatism and compromise have become part of the national mood, at least within the leadership of the country. One often wonders, “Who speaks for the real America?” I hope the members of the Naval Institute will.
“The Future of U. S. Sea Power”
(See Admiral T. B. Hayward, pp. 66-71, May 1979; W. S. Lind, pp. 22-24, July 1979 Proceedings)
Captain R. A. Bowling, U. S. Nary (Retired)—After reading Admiral Hayward’s article in the Naval Review, I was reminded of former Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson’s appraisal of
the U. S. Navy. Referring after the war to the “peculiar psychology of the Navy Department,” during World War II, Stimson wrote that it “frequently seemed to retire from the realms of logic into a dim religious world in which Neptune was God, Mahan his prophet, and the United States Navy the only true church.” The similarity of words and concepts in Admiral Hayward’s article to those of Mahan is unmistakable. With some transposing of terms it would have sounded very familiar to students at the Naval War College in August 1922 when Captain Harris Laning delivered a series of lectures on exactly the same Mahanian concepts. For example, substitute battleships for aircraft carriers and we have Mahan’s supremacy of the “capital ship” thesis; battlefleets for the current battle groups—Mahan’s concept of concentrating capital ships; decisiveness of battles between battlefleets for the current primacy of “prompt destruction of the opposing naval forces”— Mahan’s decisiveness of “big battles;” and the secondary importance of commerce raiding for the current denigration of the protection of our own shipping to a mission that can and hopefully will be carried out by our allies—Mahan’s commerce destroying is an inconclusive and secondary method of naval warfare.
Apparently, the fact that all of these Mahanian concepts were thoroughly debunked in both World War I and World War II seems to have had little effect on diminishing their application in the formulation of current naval policy. In World War I, the supposedly decisive “big battle,” Jutland, not only was inconclusive, but actually led to Germany’s adoption of the submarine version of the guerre de course. As a result, while the British Grand Fleet and the German High Seas Fleet stalemated each other, the
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submarine, not the battleship, became the type ship that came within a thin margin of being the decisive naval weapon by severing the Allies’ sea lines of communication (SLOCs)— Mahan’s conclusions regarding the supremacy of “capital ships,” the decisiveness of “big battles,” and the inconclusiveness of commerce destroying notwithstanding.
But the principles of Mahan die slowly in a profession steeped in the tradition of the offensive of Nelson and Jones. Barely in time, the Allies were able to muster the forces of ships, planes, and trained personnel necessary to defeat the U-boats again in the second Battle of the Atlantic. Ironically, one of the principal reasons that the Allies were afforded the time to recover and win was that Germany unwittingly cooperated between wars by building a fleet (Z-Plan) largely along Mahan’s “capital ship” and "big battle” concepts instead of building a fleet of U-boats as World War I indicated they should have and as Doenitz had recommended.
On the other hand, the Japanese, unlike the Allies, persisted almost to the end in not giving adequate protection to their shipping. As a result, Japan suffered the virtual annihilation (96%) of its effective merchant fleet by the end of the war—56% of which was sunk by U. S. submarines which comprised less than 2% of the total personnel strength of the U. S. Navy. Meanwhile, despite the tactical victory of the American fleet over the Japanese fleet at Midway in 1942 and the virtual elimination of the Japanese Navy as an effective fighting force as a result of the Battle of Leyte Gulf in October 1944, it was not until the last few months of the war that American-British fast carrier task forces could range up and down the coast of the Japanese mainland with acceptable safety.
During the Korean War, despite a monopoly of carriers and battleships— i.e. capital ships—and an overall awesome preponderance of naval superiority, the U. S. Navy— i.e. the United Nations—lost control of the sea at Wonson for about 30 days when the enemy used offensive (floaters) and defensive mine warfare. And in Vietnam, U. S. carriers for years made strategic air strikes against land targets with little apparent effect. But when the political decision was made to permit the Navy to blockade Haiphong, thereby cutting North Vietnam’s SLOCs, and the Air Force to carry out long-range strategic bombing of Hanoi, the light at the end of the tunnel soon became a reality. Thus, when the political decision on how to run the war became compatible with the decision to engage in a war, the Navy was able to do what it was best prepared to do according to its mission—naval blockade—and the Air Force was able to do what it was best prepared to do—long-range strategic bombing. As a result, the military phase of the war soon ended.
It would be prudent to consider whether three, or two, or even one carrier could have tarried all those years in the vicinity of "Yankee Station” with impunity if the enemy had chosen to engage in unrestricted air and submarine warfare within the war zone we ourselves had established. Equally questionable under those circumstances is whether we could have maintained the steady stream of logistic support into South Vietnam without convoying. And if we had had to convoy, who or where were our allies to provide the escorts?
The fact that debunked Mahanian
concepts are being applied in the • Navy today is evidenced by Admin ^ Hayward’s statement that curren U. S. naval policy is based largely^ the “existing division of labor on which the U. S. Navy provides the bulk of offensively capable forces w ^ the allies complement our effort wit forces for convoy escort, mine c ance, and port protection.” In furt ^ ance of that policy, the primary a'rn.C|| the Navy is “to preserve the essentia^ capability of our 12 battle groups Lcar rier task groups].”
With all due respect, such a p° lC> ’ with its almost exclusive dependence upon the offensive power of aircn ^ carriers—i.e. battle groups an which relegates other essential mlS sions and tasks, such as the protect^ of shipping and mine warfare, t0 ^ lies, constitutes a “strategy f°r L^ feat.” It ignores the costly lessons the maritime wars of this century 1 capital ships by themselves have fal e to be decisive weapons, but that ot ^ methods of naval warfare, such as guerre de course, have come within ^ slim margin of being decisive, an still others, such as mine warfare, have caused serious disruptions in °Per*| tions in spite of overwhelming na superiority.
What is needed is a different p1 that recognizes the lessons of the paS as well as the technology and rea^'e* of the present and the future. Sue 1
1 1 lfl
policy can be expressed in general terms of the overall mission, size, an composition of the Navy.
The overall mission of the ^a^ should be selected sea control: c Navy should be able to go, but not necessarily permanently control, whet ever necessary in the national interest! under whatever conditions, and °nCe there it should be able to survive’ fight, and win battles.
The size of the Navy will be bm ited, in both peace and war, by pobn cal and economic realities as well a the need to share available resources
with the other services. In the face
such realities, it that only after , w emergency or actual war will the NavY have sufficient forces to fight a two ocean war. Therefore, while it is P°s sible and even necessary during
Captain It7. J. Ruhe, U. S. Navy (Retired)—Mr. Charbonneau’s message is a comforting one—that the Soviet Navy’s forward deployment strategy which we have seen developing throughout the 1960s and 1970s is likely to shift towards a pull-back strategy of deployment “in home waters.” His thesis is based on the range and necessary protection for the Soviet’s submarine-launched ballistic missile systems.
However, following the same trail which Mr. Charbonneau explores, one is led to believe that the Soviet developments of the 1970s are increasingly supportive of a basic forward deployment strategy. This is consistent with declared Soviet intentions to become a world seapower for influencing political affairs globally. Moreover, the present actions of the Soviets seem little related to the character of their naval strategic weapon systems.
Admiral Gorshkov, in his recent book The Sea Power of the State (Naval Institute Press, 1979), sees his growing seapower as expanding outward to encompass all ocean areas. It is a means to “effectively utilize the World Ocean in the interest of building Communism” and “for further developing our political . . . and military ties with countries and people of all of the continents on Earth.” “The Soviet Navy,” he notes, “is emerging as a factor for stabilizing the situation in various areas of the world.”
This drive toward forward deployment for worldwide coverage is evidenced in the Okean-75 exercise which saw long-range, naval land-based air
discussion. Fortunately, over a 100 years ago, a group of “young Turks” established a forum in which to argue ideas for the future development of the Navy. That forum was and remains the U. S. Naval Institute and the vehicle for distributing such ideas is the Proceedings.
“The Soviet Navy and Forward Deployment”
(See G. Charbonneau, pp. 35-40, March 1979; T. Blades, pp. 83-84, June 1979; H. A. Caldwell, pp. 21-22, July 1979 Proceedings)
Peacetime to distribute our forces w°rldwide in order to show the flag, We will have to prioritize our commitments in wartime in order to concentrate those same forces. In World ar II that concept was manifested by 1 e policy of “Europe first." Current national policy is essentially the same: NATo first. Obviously, naval policy rnust conform with national policy.
The composition of the Navy certainly should be more balanced than t e current policy would indicate with 'ts emphasis on the primacy of 12 bat- r e groups. To hope that our capabil- *ty to control the SLOCs will never be c allenged or to assume that in such an eventuality we shall always have al- ,es who will provide the escorts for °Ur essential shipping is a poor substitute for the U. S. Navy having the a titty itself to protect our own ship- P'ng, at least initially. We must not epend exclusively upon others to c°ver such vital areas for us. Instead, We must develop and maintain the ability to conduct operations in all the major, and even some minor (e.g., mme warfare), areas of naval warfare.
This need to be "ready now” was stated by Admiral Hayward in his ap- Ptaisal that we shall have to fight the ^ext war essentially with what we ave at the outset. Yet, in order to achieve a balanced force that will be teady now to survive, fight, and win lr> today’s combat environment, some agonizing reappraisals of current pol- ,cy will be required. This means that res°urces will have to be trimmed from some areas now overemphasized ln order to develop and maintain Capabilities in other areas now negated or relegated to allies or reserve forces. And that change must be quite rapid. For none can predict with certainty when the test of our “maritime supremacy” will come. And when it comes, only a Navy that is ready now '''ill be ready then.
The foregoing might not be the fiest naval policy for the United States, but at least it is an alternative to the current policy which appears to be seriously flawed in several major rejects. The current and future mis- Sl°n, composition, and readiness of che U. S. Navy are vital matters that deserve the widest possible debate and
craft operating from Havana, Cona- krv’ Hargeisa, and Aden. Similarily, the present forward deployment of Soviet naval units in the Mediterranean, Indian Ocean, and Indochina area and the development of forward bases at Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam, Aden in South Yemen, Massawa in Ethiopia, Socotra in the Indian Ocean, Conakry in Guinea, Sao Tome Island near Angola, and Cienfuegos in Cuba are indicative of their thrust to exert naval power globally. Their use of mooring areas near the Seychelles and Mauritius emphasizes the totality of this naval movement—even into the remote areas of the Indian Ocean.
New naval units which the Soviets are producing ensure the credibility of a globally oriented navy. Their latest major 25,000-ton combatant is assessed as being nuclear powered! They’ve just introduced a 40,000-ton underway replenishment ship. Their 5,500-mile range “Backfire” naval bombers are being rapidly added to their fleet. And their growing merchant fleet is configured to supplement the Soviet at-sea replenishment capability as well as their amphibious capability. Even their costly satellites for surveillance, electronic warfare, navigation, and environment observation have been expanded in coverage to cover most of the “World Oceans ” Forward basing for the Soviets has been a tenuous business—in and out of Alexandria, in and out of Berbera, etc- bur they apparently aren't reducing their efforts to establish new basing areas around the world.
Indicative of the Soviets’ outward naval expansion is an increasing number of naval deployments designed to politically influence the affairs of foreign countries—gunboat diplomacy. In 1971, 16 Soviet ships were on station in the Indian Ocean in response to the Indo-Pakistan War.
For the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, large numbers of Soviet warships moved into the Eastern Mediterranean to stalemate U. S. naval pressures. In 1975, the three Soviet ships sent to Angola, of which one was a destroyer, were a clear show of moderate strength used as a weapon of diplomacy. The Soviet warships off Lebanon in 1977 served to reduce U. S. “gunboat” ef-
fectiveness. And so on and on, and on.
Mr. Charbonneau apparently regards Soviet doctrine and indicated strategy at any point in time as reflecting Soviet capabilities, and this seems to mirror the U. S. way of readjusting concepts of naval employments to fit the effects of budgetary constraints. Whereas in this examination of the Soviet deployment strategy it is assumed the Soviets derived their present naval doctrine in the 1960s. They then detailed the strategies for carrying out such doctrine based on what they considered to be a best employment of the latest technologies (satellites, missiles, cybernetics, etc.). They might not as yet have the capabilities to effectively use those indicated strategies—the first salvo strategy, the massive missile strike strategy for fleet battles, etc.—but their research and development programs have apparently been oriented toward solving the shortcomings of their strategy concepts.
When the Soviets begin to significantly curtail their naval spending, one might then entertain the hope that they’ve lost their ambition to be the world's leading seapower.
“SS-N-14: Another Look”
(See E. Bonsignore, pp. 102-106, April 1979; S.
Gorton, pp. 24-27, July 1979 Proceedings)
‘‘SS-N-14: A Third Round”
(See N. Friedman, pp. 110-114, June 1979; S.
Gorton, pp. 24-27, July 1979 Proceedings)
John Jordan—I welcome Ezio Bonsig- nore’s attempt to bring discussion of the SS-N-14 into the open, since consideration of the true nature of this missile is fundamental to any analysis of the design philosophy of Soviet surface ship construction over the past two decades.
His brief presentation of the case for the SS-N-14 as an ASW missile is fair, well-balanced, and difficult to fault. In arguing the contrary view, however, he is guilty of overstating his case. Any new theory should be based on an objective analysis of the available evidence. Having read Mr. Bon- signore’s views on the SS-N-14 in Proceedings and in another article, however, I believe that he is incapable of
such objective analysis because of a deeply rooted personal conviction that the “Kara,” “Kresta II,” and “Krivak” classes are surface raiders and, therefore, require an antiship missile with a 200-300 nautical mile range. The capabilities of other weapon systems carried by these ships are distorted to fit this thesis—yet presented in such a way that they seem to build up to it—and contrary evidence is ignored.
Mr. Bonsignore claims that lack of an antiship capability would make the “three Ks” “extremely unbalanced ships.” Yet, until recently, few major Western surface ships were equipped with anything but ASW and AAW capabilities.
His figures of 150-160 ASW missiles to counter 50 Western SSBNs are wrong. Jane’s 1978-79 credits the Soviets with 6 “Karas,” 10 “Kresta IIs,” and 19 “Krivaks” for a total of 204 ASW missiles. He also fails to take into account the large ASW missile magazines of the four helicopter cruisers currently in commission, which presumably would add another 100 missiles to this figure. The figure of 50 SSBNs is also suspect in view of the ambiguous position of the five French boats. Furthermore, Mr. Bonsignore appears to suggest that any anti-SSBN capability which does not pretend to dispose of every single submarine “at a stroke” is not worth having. This view does not take into account (a) the tremendous strike potential of each individual SSBN, and the extent to which the United States depends on this arm of the “nuclear triad,” (b) the smaller number of SSBNs likely to be on patrol during any initial nuclear exchange, and (c) the alternative deployment of Soviet ASW units to form a protective cordon for the “Delta”-cla'ss SSBNs against attacks by Western SSNs.
His comparison of the obsolescent MBU series ASW mortars with the latest Western short-range torpedoes is less than just, while his equation of the aging Soviet 5.33-mm. torpedo, which may well suffer in the antisubmarine role from having a dualpurpose capability (and which has apparently been removed recently from the Moskva), with Ikara, Malafon, and ASROC can have no real justification except to kill the more obvious and
logical comparison between the at missile and the SS-N-14. He asse moreover, that the ASW SS-N-14 wo be useless without the provision numerous helicopters to make c0'Jn^_ with submarines at long range. 0 ever, the three Western missiles
not appear to rely on helicopters
• • • j is noth'
target acquisition, and tnere «
ing to preclude the Soviet ships r0 operating in ASW task groups, Pos* f bly centered on one of the helic°P^ cruisers, with a number of helicop ^ available. Interestingly, Mr. Bonsit^ nore does not see the lack of helicop^ ters as a hindrance to the operation effectiveness of his 200-300 naU^j, mile cruise missile! Another possi
• • c is tn^t
ity that Mr. Bonsignore ignores n> ^ of ASW operations using “converge zone” sonar techniques.
“Countering Soviet Imperialist11
(See J. E. Hopkins and W. R. Warren, PP 58-65, June 1979; A. D. Bailey, p- 21, Ju 1979 Proceedings')
Commander A. 1V. Grazehrook, R°7‘ ^ Australian Naval Reserve, Fedetd Vice-President, The Navy Leagttt Australia—Colonels Hopkins an^ Warren’s article on Countering 5^ bnperialism and the role of the H- Marines Corps in that activity prompted me to try to put the curre U. S. debate on the strategic role an^ equipment of the Marine Corps in c perspective of a smaller maritime n< tion. Australia is closely allied to c United States, but is increasingly c°n scious of an isolation from countr who may still have the will, but :1 increasingly lacking in the means, support us in a military emergency- While it may not be widely teC°le nized, the current debate about 1 role of the U. S. Marines became un^.
avoidable with the announcement
President Nixon’s Guam Doctrine which effectively stated that 1 United States will honor its cornm1*^ ments to its allies but is not prep»re to stand the cost—in terms of re sources and unjustly incurte opprobrium—of being the won police force. The term “support for a lies” has been shown by time to be’ and is widely seen as meaning’
Primarily and on a priority basis, ^ATO- Some strategists argue that all f ' ' forces, including maritime
°rces, should be constituted (in men and equipment) primarily for a NATO °le- The raison d'etre of any arm or unit which does not have a NATO role 15 ^e*ng questioned, with many of the Questions being condemnatory in tone.
Ah this does not pass unnoticed outside the United States, particularly among those countries closely allied oth militarily and by way of life) ^*th the United States, but whose Peographic situation excludes them r°m NATO. Although we see much emphasis on NATO, periodic prominent (and very welcome) U. S. visitors reassure us that the United States retains the capability to deploy major strength quickly to our part of the w°rld. However, while the United States would have forces available in the event of an emergency in this part °f the world alone, there must be s°me question about the strength of the forces available if regional threats '''ere to develop simultaneously in our region (the Indian Ocean and South East Asia) and, say, the Middle East.
Turning to the future, strategists know that a major change in strategy, such as that involved in the Guam doctrine and the departure from Vietnam, is followed by a change in force capability to meet the needs of the new strategy. A study of new Maritime defense equipment that ultimately gets ordered each year shows that U. S. force levels are being adjusted downwards to meet the needs of the reduced strategic ambitions involved in the Guam Doctrine and more recent developments. It is not only the United States’ capabilities in 1979 which should concern strategists m the Indian Ocean and South East Asia; it is much more whether the United States will have the capability m 1988 to deploy and maintain in our region a major balanced maritime force appropriate to the peacekeeping and reinforcement roles.
In spite of the decline in strength of U. S. maritime forces when compared With those of its most probable enemy (modern Imperial Russia) in 1979, the United States still retains very power-
ful and highly flexible maritime forces well capable of filling the peacekeeping and reinforcement roles in an area, such as ours, where the technological strength of regional maritime forces is not yet high, and where Russia’s ability to deploy seaborne air and balanced seaborne amphibious forces is not yet at high levels. And a major arm of the United States’ maritime forces is the U. S. Marine Corps. The U. S. Marines (together with appropriate parts of the U. S. Navy) are far and away the strongest and best equipped amphibious force in the world. Apart from the much smaller French amphibious force, the United States has the only amphibious force presently capable of deployment with air support across extended ocean distances.
Built upon foundations laid in World War II and before and supported by tactical experience in Korea, Vietnam, and elsewhere, U. S. amphibious forces have advanced steadily in tactics and material over, the past 30 years. The advantages of trying out new ships, weapons, and aircraft in operational circumstances, and of developing tactical optimization of that new equipment, are exemplified by the Tarawa-class LHA. The five ships of this class, with the ability to undertake vertical assault, over-the-beach assault by their own LCUs, and air support for troops ashore, compare very favorably with the largest Russian amphibious warfare ships.
However, there are increasing signs of the United States' losing its lead over the Russians. No new amphibious warfare ships have been ordered for the U. S. Navy/U. S. Marine Corps since Fiscal Year 1971. Indeed, the last definite action in this regard was the cancellation of the last four of the original nine-ship LHA order. Prior
to that, construction of an amphibious command ship was cancelled.
The only amphibious warfare ships envisaged in the current Five-Year Construction Plan were six ships of the LSD-41 class. Even that number was reduced to two and now, so far as we can tell from reports received in Australia, the whole LSD-41 project seems destined to be removed from the Five-Year Shipbuilding Program, FY80-84. The grounds for the reduction, given by the U. S. Secretary for Defense, were that the technology being used is outmoded—a questionable reason when no alternative design, of newer technology, has been announced.
Although little has been published about the size and features of the LSD-41 class, the fact that six new ships were intended to replace eight older Thomas ton (LSD-28)-class ships leads this observer to conclude that one LSD-4 [-class ship is intended to have a carrying capacity some 25% higher than that of one LSD-28 class. Therefore, the cancellation of four of the LSD-4 is can only lead to a reduction in the strength of the United States amphibious forces.
The ten-year gap in new U. S. amphibious warfare ship construction approvals is not the only aspect of U. S. amphibious warfare material procurement that suggests that the United States will maintain neither its current
level of amphibious warfare capability nor its lead over the Soviet Union in that regard.
There are persistent reports of the U. S. executive branch’s wish to cancel the development and construction of the McDonnell Douglas AV-8B V/STOL ground attack aircraft needed to replace the AV-8A.
The U. S. Marines are widely recognized as having developed the operational use of V/STOL aircraft in the ground support role from ships. Confirmation of the AV-8B cancellation would involve a U. S. decision not to maintain its technological and operational lead in this vitally important aspect of amphibious warfare.
It may well be that conventional takeoff and landing (CTOL) aircraft operating from attack carriers (CVs), or even the smaller medium carriers (CWs) that are still in the conceptual stage, would be capable of operating aircraft for the ground support role. However, the prolonged debate and coincident delays in construction of new CVs and CWs lead this observer to the conclusion that there will be insufficient CVs and CWs to fill both the ground support and multitude of other roles that the United States is likely to require of its maritime air power in the 1990s.
When the current debate in the United States on the role of the U. S. Marines is coupled with the undeniable evidence of the new construction ship order gap and the executive branch’s cancellation of the AV-8B development project, the overseas observer can only conclude that the 1980s and 1990s will see a decline in United States’ amphibious warfare capability—a decline in the capability to apply a type of force which many argue is the optimum method of supporting allies in the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean region.
Well-balanced and strong amphibious forces, such as those in service with the United States today, offer governments an extremely attractive method of applying military pressure. To the geographic flexibility of maritime forces can be added a political attraction: the avoidance of deploying substantial ground and land-based air forces in foreign countries. The inflexibility of the latter carries with it the risk of involvement in internal strife, an involvement which is anathema to a substantial portion of the electorates of a number of Western democracies.
No diplomatic verbal or written assurances of continued U. S. support in the 1980s and 1990s can carry weight with realistic local observers unless the U. S. Marines and U. S. Navy are seen to be maintaining the ability— the forces—necessary to implement those assurances.
“Time Out for Tactics”
(See M. A. Libbey, pp. 52-57, January 1979;
C. F. O'Leary, p. 27, April 1979; B. A.Daly, pp. 88-90, July 1979 Proceedings)
Second Lieutenant Henry J. Donigan, III,
U. S. Marine Corps, Second Platoon Commander, Co “l”, 3d Battalion 4th Marines — Lieutenant Commander Libbey’s concern for the level of tactical proficiency of naval officers is certainly an equal concern in the Marine Corps. The problem does not lie so much with the individual marine officer’s lack of tactical knowledge, but with the need to apply tactical expertise in the form of realistic individual and unit training.
Although most marines state that the Marine Corps is always “combat ready,” oftentimes our goals toward achieving this state of readiness are misaligned. As Lieutenant Commander Libbey points out, inspections play a limited role in determining who will be decisive on the field of battle. Our equipment may be clean and ready, but will the individual trooper have the experience to use his equipment effectively in combat? Sometimes we place a higher priority on maintaining service record books than we do providing subordinates the benefit of our tactical knowledge which can be effectively taught in a classroom and reinforced by innovative, realistic field training. Instead of becoming goal-oriented toward passing inspections, we must make a conscious effort to concern ourselves with developing and successfully monitoring a unit’s level of tactical proficiency
from the individual on up.
Another related issue is our pre° cupation with command post-leve ercises. Battles can be conducte ^ maneuvering units on a plottin ^ board; however, success cannot be e1^ pected unless these maneuvered uni themselves are tactically proficient-
Navy and Marine Corps lea e must rededicate themselves actively focusing our training 0 Je ^ fives on tactical competency an^ realistic application because they the best gauges for our potential su cess in the next conflict.
“Tactical ASW: A Case for a Non-Nuclear Submarine
(See A. Van Saun, pp. 147-151, Novembe 1978; W. Hansen, p. 93, April 1979 Proceedings)
E d-
Lieutenant Commander Hans Saeger, eral German Navy (Reserve), Project e partment of Howaldtsiverke-Deutii: ^
Werft (HDW)—Based on the experience which HDW has gained construct ing diesel-electric submarines between I960 and today, I wish to take t ^ opportunity to quote costs and to a dress the 14 specification element^ which commander Van Saun identi i for a new SS(X). ,
The procurement costs of die5 electric submarines are approximate
$70 to 80 million (1978). This um price includes: .
► The operational unit ready 0 commissioning .
y Harbor and sea acceptance tria s’ including torpedo firings at sea by c 1 shipyard crew .
) Training of the navy crew and *n termediate maintenance active (IMA)/base personnel ^ On-board spares, tools, etc.
^ Technical manuals and document'1 tion, spares catalogs, etc. ,
) Depot spares for two-four yearS supply
Sensors and weapons are manui tured in different European countries’ as well as in United States, and inte grated by HDW as the prime contrac tor. And the personnel cost calculating per unit is based on a complement 0 about 30 men.
Under assumed random condition
HDW built and delivered 47 submarines since 1960; today, the German company has 17 subs under construction. HDW works with the Ingenieur Kontor Liiheck design office for which Professor Ulrich Gabler designed the Class 201, 205, and 206 subs for the Federal German Navy, Class 207 for the Norwegian Navy, and the Class 209 (pictured) for South American and Asian navies.
listing in Germany, each unit would require an approximately $1 million Overhaul/maintenance budget per year
Table 1 Submarine Base Loss Factors
| U.S. SSN | HDW 1200 Tons | HDW 1500 Tons |
| HDW Tvhe 7onn |
SOA (kt.) | 20 20 | 6 | 8 | 6 | 10 10 |
Patrol (days) | 60 60 | 50 | 50 | 90 | 60 60 |
Refit (days) | 30 30 | 10 | 10 | 15 | 15 15 |
Distance (nm.) | 2,000 3,000 | 2,000 | 2,000 | 2,000 2,000 3,000 | |
Days en route | 4.2 | 13.9 | 10.5 | 1.3.9 | 8.3 12.5 |
Base Loss Factor 1.7 1.9 2.7
1.7
1.7 2.1
Note: Base Loss Factor = numbers of submarines required to support one submarir continuously on station.
during its lifetime. Predicted availability is established in the following Maintenance model:
^ Turn-around time after a 50-day- 90-day mission: 10-15 days ^ Intermediate maintenance activities Per year: one four-to-six-week period ^ Main overhaul every five-to-six years: one six-to-eight-month period
These costs and figures are based on actual experience with Class 209 submarines and on planning figures for Che HDW/lKL (Ingenieur Kontor Lii- beck) Type 2000.
In addressing the 14 specification elements of the basic concept of the new SS(X), 1 will quote Commander ^an Saun’s elements and follow with comments relating to the HDW/IKL Type 2000.
The SS(X) should cost no more than °ne-fourth of the true cost of the nuclear attack submarines currently being produced.”
Comment: Off-the-shelf technology, s>ze, and series production, as HDW bas experienced, result in cost ratios far better than those mentioned and assumed by Commander Van Saun.
‘The SS(X) hull form should be no larger than the Barbel class, capable of speeds in excess of 20 knots, . . Comment: Speeds in excess of 20 knots are normal and proven with duration remarkably higher than those of the barbel class.
"The SS(X) must be capable of 90-day operations and be able to patrol in areas at ranges in excess of 4,000 miles from home bases. . . .” Comment: Table 1 provides base loss factors, derived from the calculation
used by Commander Van Saun, for four submarines.
‘‘The SS(X) weapon’s capability should include at least six torpedo tubes. . . .”
Comment: The HDW-manufactured and iKL-designed submarines have eight torpedo tubes center-lined. Besides firing existing U. S. torpedoes, initial trials show that the encapsulated Harpoon also can be launched. The total weapon load is 20 long torpedoes/ missiles.
‘‘Design and construction of the SS(X) should follow the modular concept. ...”
Comment: The modular concept is answered in the German submarines by a redundant installation of subsystems. Maintenance activities, especially IMAs, are minimized, although a large access hatch on top of the engine room would allow the exchange of complete engines. All equipment is designed to pass through the normal hatches, so that even battery exchanges do not require the cutting of the boat.
“Major overhaul intervals should be at least five years or longer.”
Comment: The major overhaul intervals are orientated to the normal battery exchange period of between five and six years.
The SS(X) should be designed and one prototype constructed and operationally tested. All changes should then be included in one final design that should then be mass-produced in a single yard in a straight production line, delaying backfits and updates to post commissioning and acceptance for service.”
Comment: Proven elements of the Class 209 submarine, Types 1200 and 1500, are in service in several navies and provide reliable data for a Type 2000 submarine. Since 1970, HDW has contracted delivery times between 42 and 48 months; actual delivery times, including sea trials and torpedo firings, have been between 40 and 45 months.
"The SS(X) should have a significantly more effective sound-mounting
2.
system . . . than currently exists in the Barbel class. ...”
Comment: The effectiveness of soundmeasuring systems in conventional submarines has been proven in various exercises with U. S. naval forces, as well as with naval units of Norway, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Turkey, Venezuela, Columbia, and Peru.
"The SS(X) auxiliary power systems should be mostly 440 volt/60 cycle AC with static inverters to provide 400 cycle for sonar and fire control. . . .” Comment: DC and AC components and auxiliary power systems have proved suitable for several different sensor and weapon configurations.
"The current space in the Barbel class for the main storage battery should be increased. ...”
Comment: Parallel to the continuously running production of conventional submarines, the corresponding development of lead acid batteries took place and resulted in maintenance-free periods oriented to operation times. And the relative weights of batteries have just about doubled since the end of the 1950s.
"The electronic suite and fire control equipment for the SS(X) should be developed from existing technology. . .
Comment: The IKL designs have provided the flexibility which has accommodated different types and generations of fire control as well as sonar equipment.
"Habitability in the Barbel class is adequate. ...” AND "Manning for the SS(X) should be kept to a minimum. . . .”
Comment: Habitability on the Class 209 submarines, with their crews of 28 to 32 men, has proved to be more than adequate.
“The tactical employment of the proposed SS(X) would supplement— not replace—the tactical employment of nuclear attack submarines.” Comment: The tactical employment of the conventional diesel-electric submarine was never that of a nuclear sub. Conventional subs are preferably attack boats patrolling operational areas and threatening surface forces, as well as SSNs, due to their silent operation and long-ranging, silent-running, guided torpedoes.
“Counterinsurgency: Corrupting Concept”
(See W. F. Long, pp. 56-64, April 1979;
J. C. Snedeker, pp. 86-87, July 1979 Proceedings)
Hugh McCaffrey, a veteran of CIA counterinsurgency programs in Thailand, Laos, and the Philippines—The timing of Colonel Long’s perceptive article on the perversion of the counterinsurgency weapon into a strategy in South Vietnam seems all but prophetic in the light of recent events. Colonal Long’s “autopsy,” like The Counter-Insurgency Era (New York: Free Press, 1977) by Douglas S. Blaufarb a senior member of the civilian (CIA) side of the house, provides an excellent list of “don’ts” for anyone confronted with counterinsurgency requirements in the future.
It is no coincidence that both writers pinpoint the two major causes of failure in similar themes. Colonel Long expresses the first one beautifully, "Domestic power [is] continuous at home and transferable abroad, regardless of internal changes or external differences.” When it became apparent that this assumption was false, the hydra-headed U. S. effort turned on itself.
The second major failure was command and control, most seriously at the very top. The chains of command were there all right—they just didn’t lead anywhere. When they reached the tops of the respective agencies, they just stopped. As the falseness of the first assumption, that we could transfer “power” abroad to the Vietnamese Government, became apparent, the “headless horsemen” in Saigon more and more resembled the blind men and the elephant. Such minor successes as were attained by proper use of the counterinsurgency weapon were negated because everybody tried to get into the act and there was no boss.
With our Vietnam scars still raw, as Colonel Long points out, we are hesitant “to re-engage with the Communists anywhere.” While we have been licking our “self-inflicted wounds,” insurgency of one sort or another has proliferated worldwide. During our absence from the scene, Communist-inspired or -assisted insurgencies have flourished. Angol > South Yemen (People’s Democrat! Republic of Yemen), Ethiopia, an^ most recently Afghanistan are no within the Soviet fold. North Yeme (Yemen Arab Republic) and au Arabia’s southern flank are mena<~^e from the new Soviet power base in 1 ^ Horn of Africa. Iran has gone, almos^ overnight, from relative stability chaos. Nicaragua is on the verge emulating Iran. The unlikely sPec£af of the Soviets and the Chinese *8 ing their proxy war in KampuC e (Cambodia) and Mr. Deng s Vie^ namese adventure are no comfort especially to neighbors like Thai an and Malaysia, both of whom face ser
ous Communist-supported insurgen cies. As a nation, we could proba live with all of these except Iran- Iran is now showing every in ica tion of becoming the kind of politic* vacuum so beloved by the S°v'et. They already have healthy foothol s 1 Iraq to the west and Afghanistan t the east. Pakistan, on the southeast, less than stable and more than a lit ^ worried. The oil-rich mini-states 0 the Persian Gulf are defenseless, an all the F-18S in the world won t rna ' Saudi Arabia a major military p°wer^
The only military force of consequent- in the area, Israel, is anathema to t rest, and it faces serious fuel Pr0 lems. To top things off, Egypt atl^
Sudan have Communist-incline
neighbors (Libya and Ethiopia), a ing to their already large intern< problems. One does not have to be ‘ war college graduate to see the threat to the United States and the rest 0 the Free World if Middle East 01 turns red.
What makes the situation particu Iarly unpalatable is the all but assure fact that the Soviets will employ in surgency as their major weapon at * time when the United States still has ^ Pavlovian reaction to the very w°r counterinsurgency. .
There are only two moderately bright spots on the horizon. First, the American public is already conversant with fuel shortages and their effects—thanks to the 1973 Arab 01 embargo and recent long lines at the local service stations. Second, we have a modest reservoir of people like Colo
Long and Mr. Blaufarb who have earned their counterinsurgency lessons the hard way. Given the premise c at sooner or later the nation will a&ree that something must be done to protect our vital energy supplies in the iddle East, it would seem proper to eed the words of Publius Syrus and orace, "... provide in peace what We need in war.” Namely, a coun- termsurgency weapon that can be employed tactically to implement strategy. t>ot the other way around.
Developing a new U. S. counterinsurgency weapon per se should not be 'tricult. All the hardware can come °ff the shelf, as can most of the expe-
ttenced brainpower. What will be dif- ^cult is setting up an organization w*th the sole function of counterinSurgency, and placing it within the governmental structure where it will be used, not abused.
Given the advantage of hindsight, IC seems clear that a new counterinSurgency unit (CIU) must be a separate and permanent unit—not a jury- rigged mishmash of temporary duty Personnel or a temporary task-force stew. Since decisions to deploy such a Unit must come from the President ar>d the National Security Council (NSC), the less organizational distance between the decision makers and the Unit the better. All logic points to the CinCs as the proper field commanders
for a weapon which will, more often than not, involve more than one foreign country, complex long-range support, and quick command decisions. The CinCs and their staffs are already used to thinking at least semi-globally, if not globally. They also control the support mechanisms vital to a Ciu’s success.
To be effective, the CIU must combine the best of both civilian and military worlds appropriate to its mission and discard all the rest. In this regard, the Marine Corps and the Seabees appear to provide the most promising base on which to build. Both are far more flexible than their Army equivalents and are more used to responding immediately to changing situations. Both also had experience in counterinsurgency operations during Vietnam days. They also share the common denominator of relative smallness and the consequent familiarity with “making do” when necessary.
The Marine Corps-Seabee base provides personnel for security, public works and construction, medical support, and administration familiar with Navy ways. This team also has the logistical expertise to cope with long- range support.
Other specialists in the fields of intelligence, psychological warfare and propaganda, agriculture, education, culture, and religion, and local area
knowledge will be required. These people can be drawn from other government agencies or from the civilian world, as necessary. To the greatest possible degree, the CIU should be composed of volunteers selected at least as much for their leadership and initiation as for their specialist qualifications, because their operational function is to train and inspire locals, not to defeat the enemy by themselves. The unit itself must strive for the lowest possible profile, and in action look and act as civilianized as possible. No volunteer should be accepted for less than six-to-eight years service. One- year tours in Vietnam did almost as much damage as the Vietcong. By the same token, unit personnel should not have their careers penalized if they come from the military or civilian agencies.
The major task of a CIU prior to deployment would be to study and learn as much about potential target areas or specific countries as possible. The wealth of existing material supplemented by “guest specialists” and continuing input from intelligence sources can provide the majority of this. Given a reasonable smattering of ignorance from such classroom training, various elements of the unit can also be given “off-Broadway" situations in which to try out techniques in friendly countries at least similar to their proposed targets.
Lest the reader infer that a prototype CIU would be a large affair, it should be made clear that we are talking about a unit no larger than a rifle company. In Laos, 12 Americans and 100 previously trained Thais developed and supported General Vang Pao s Meo (Hmung) guerrilla forces which at one time numbered over 50,000. The legendary Edgar “Pop” Buell never having more than four
or five American assistants—did an incredible job of taking care of several hundred thousand Meo refugees. But “Pop” was one hell of a scrounger. Another cogent argument for Seabees and marines!
Next, the difficult problem of the CIU’s effective employment must be considered. Countries with active insurgencies almost axiomatically have governments which lack broad popular support. Unfortunately, we can’t pick and choose, so our potential targets must have weaknesses which the Communists have begun to exploit. In the past, particularly in Vietnam and Cambodia, we failed to make any serious effort to use the carrot and stick approach. As Colonel Long points out, in Vietnam, we rewarded failure with more carrots!
On the other hand, as Mr. Blaufarb details, we have to keep our patient alive while curing him. Reforms which destroy a shaky government’s power base, without shoring it up during the transition period, can result in the kind of chaos that now exists in Iran. Before we begin prescribing medicine to cure a target country’s illness, we had best make reasonably certain it won’t kill the country as well. In most cases, options will be limited, but they will exist. Thus enters the carrot and stick. The host country must agree to implement such programs or actions as are deemed the minimum necessary to allow a counterinsurgency program to become effective. These measures will probably exist but are ignored or, at best, badly managed. In this respect, our Communist enemy will usually provide us with chapter and verse in his propaganda literature.
It has been my experience that relatively minor personnel changes—ousting corrupt or incompetent officials—can work wonders. The stick comes in if such officials happen to be the prime minister’s relatives! Distasteful as it may be, sending such people “off to foreign study” is usually a cheap “carrot.”
Once in operation, a CIU will at least initially ruffle a number of other U. S. agencies’ feathers even more than during its original formation. The most likely prospect will be the
U. S. ambassador. The CinCs, however, can prevent the CIU from being misused by an ambassador as a new toy or frustrated by an ambassador s refusing to apply NSC-directed carrots and sticks as appropriate. Other U. S. agencies may also resent the “new boys” for any number of reasons, but the CIU commander’s direct line to his CinC should soon resolve these situations as well.
I firmly believe that an organization like the CIU, placed directly under a CinC and buttressed by a calculated carrot and stick approach, would give the United States an effective counterinsurgency weapon, and our “lessons bought in blood” in Vietnam can be applied to the future.
“Survivability—A Science Whose Time Has Come”
(See C. N. Sapp, pp. 58-67, December 1978 Proceedings)
George Chernowitz, American Power Jet Company—Survivability involves numerous design details which are not readily specified at the early stages of acquisition. Rather, it is an objective which must be made a part of the design and the ongoing design-review process.
As an illustration, our company was engaged in work on survivability in the post-World War Il/Korea era. It was argued at the time that jets were much more vulnerable than piston engines. (This was actually used as one of the arguments against their early adoption for tactical air!) The results of tests seemed to confirm this until we did a detailed analysis which showed this “vulnerability was entirely related to the way in which fuel lines and controls were closely grouped and unprotected. The simple addition of a strong protective tube made all the difference, eliminating this type of cheap kill.
Commander Sapp’s objectives can be advanced in a single stroke by getting survivability included as a specific “call out” in the acquisition review process. Similar approaches in the areas of reliability and maintenance are bearing fruit.
“The Violation of the ‘Liberty
(See R. K. Smith, pp. 62-70, June D78,
S. C. Truver, pp. 91-93, September 19/ • N. Polmar, p. 88, October 1978; V. ltz‘ pp. 111-113, November 1978; V. L. Brownfield and P. E. Tobin, pp. 104-1 ’
December 1978; W. L. McGonagle and A. Friendly, p. 88, January 1979; D. *lP p. 86, February 1979; D. H. Robinson, PP- 90-91, June 1979 Proceedings)
Frank G. McGuire, Editor, Helicopter News—As an editor of specials periodicals dealing with helicopte and lighter-than-air vehicles, I °or mally would not become involved the events surrounding the atta upon the USS Liberty (AGTR-5L Nonetheless, I did by accident play ^ small role in this episode long ate the fact, and your readers should kno' about that.
In May 1978, I was preparing f°r trip to Israel as part of a group *r°n the Aviation/Space Writers Associa tion invited by the Israeli ^°ver^£ ment. As it so happened, one of t e pieces of mail I received during thos last few pre-trip days in the office waS an advance proof copy of an artic scheduled to appear in the June 19 Proceedings. It dealt with the insta > tion of helicopter landing decks 00 hydrofoil vessels, and accompanyinb
this was the table of contents page 0
else
should be of interest.
What was of interest was the reter ence to an article concerning the at tack on the Liberty. In view of my ,r0 pending trip, I telephoned the Proceti ings offices and requested a copy of Dr' Smith’s article.
I read the article on the plane e° route to Tel Aviv, with no more fhan the intention of filing the informati00 mentally. Until, that is, one portio0 of the article caught my eye:
“Although the United States submitted a claim of $7,644,1 for the material damage inflicte ^ upon the Liberty, the government 0 Israel has refused to pay it.” Whatever the other aspects of t*1® incident, this did not seem right, the claim was valid, why did Israelis—a friendly nation—not pay lt and clear the record? If the claim ",lS not valid, why wasn’t it?
One of the privileges of journafistS
ls t*le oft-presented opportunity to ask questions of government officials directly, on behalf of the journalist’s readers. On our group’s schedule was a j^eeting with Israeli Defense Minister zer Weizman. I decided to ask him. Journalists facing any nation’s de- ense minister in front of a battery of television lights are vulnerable to as |^uch stage fright as anyone else, owever, and until I actually heard 'fyself speaking I could not have guaranteed that I would ask that provocative question, nor that I would n°t fumble it badly.
The United States was at that time arranging to transfer F-15 jet fighters t° Israel (the only nation outside the n*ted States to operate this aircraft at the time), and the relatively new government of Prime Minister Begin was *n power.
We had the scheduled press conference on 5 June 1978 with Defense Minister Weizman in a dining room °f the Tel Aviv Hilton. There were several dozen U. S. journalists in the r°om, as well as an undetermined ournber of Israeli journalists and others.
In a short preliminary talk, the personable and articulate Weizman referred to the fact that it was just 11 years since the Six-Day War. He recapped the aviation history of Israel, expressing the hope that eventually aviation would become a more constructive influence in the Middle East than its past uses had indicated.
Subsequent questions from the press centered about the role of U. S. aircraft and equipment in Middle East conflicts, what countermeasures were being taken against Soviet-designed surface-to-air missiles, and similar topics.
I should have prepared my question *n writing for my own use, but neglected to do so, and posed it ad lib. My cassette tape recorder was operat- •ng throughout the exchange, and the following is taken unedited from the tape:
"My name is Frank McGuire with Kimberly Communications. The United States Naval Institute Proceedings ... is about to publish an article going into considerable detail on the attack on the USS Lib
erty which Israeli forces carried out. ...”
At this point, the tape recorder preserves a general outburst of “Oh, my God ...” and other exclamations from those in the room, there being no way of telling if this distress was coming from the Israelis or their guests. Weizman’s voice is clear, however, saying: “Oh, my aching back. You're going back that far?”
After pausing as a result of the commotion, I continued:
“. . . in 1967. They are about to publish the article this month. The magazine makes a point of noting that the Israeli Government has refused to pay a claim that the United States Government has against it of seven-some million dollars. Do you have any expectation that this will be settled, in view of the friendship aspects or the F-15 package, or anything like that?”
Weizman at this point can be heard saying: “Oh, my God ...” and my own voice continuing: “It is obviously going to rankle American military people with this fresh publication.” Weizman hardly hesitated before replying.
“My good friend . . . first of all, this is a real knocker. A real surprise. [Some uncertain laughter from others in the room.] We have inherited . . . you know, we are in office only a year. And we have inherited a government that lasted 29 years. We have inherited lots of things. I, by now, have found out certain things that I did not know.
I can tell you one thing: we did not inherit this . . . and if we did,
I haven’t heard about it. [Much laughter.] And it could be that . . . well, I hope that they settled all their accounts with the U. S. Government before they were kicked out of office.
“If not, I think that we’ll sit down with the Treasury and talk if things pop up again. In my year of office, and having been to Washington once and seen the Secretary of State of the United States more than once, I never had an account pushed on my desk, and if it comes along we 11 take it with due respect, as we take everything that comes on our desk from the United States Government.”
That was the end of the exchange. There are some things, of course, that a tape recorder transcript does not reveal, and so I will note that Weizman s reply was not couched in hostile terms by any means and was, in fact, far more gracious than replies I have had from U. S. military officers and government officials to whom I have posed equally valid and provocative questions. These things always hinge, it is said, on whose ox is being gored.
As for publication of the exchange, if any articles concerning this question or Mr. Weizman’s reply appeared in print, I have never seen them. I had assumed at the time that representatives from the U. S. embassy in Israel were present and would be aware of the question and of the Israeli Government s implied position concerning the unsettled claim. From this assumption, I also concluded that the information would be passed through interested services, i.e., the naval attache, and eventually to the offices of the Proceedings.
Since it appears that this flow of information did not occur as I had assumed, and my tape recorded version of the exchange sat here unpublished for nearly a year, I owe the readers of the Proceedings an apology (and possibly Mr. Weizman as well) for being negligent.