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“Retention: Our #1 Goal”
(See R. T. Anderson, pp. 82-85, July 1979;
J- S. Jones, p. 23, August 1979; J. Siembieda 2nd R. H. Galles, pp. 79-81, September 1979 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Joseph J. O'Connell, U. S. Coast Guard, Officer-inCharge, U. S. Coast Guard Marine Inspection Office, Seattle, WA. —I agree w<th the author that retention is a command function. But how can anyone in command—either at the Washington-level or in far-removed operating units—compare what is happening in the civilian community ■with what is happening in the military and recommend to someone that he make the military his career?
Let’s look at what is happening. The inflation rate is exceeding 12%. The private sector is permitted 7% annual wage increases. Military per- s°nnel have been held under a cap of 5-5%. if there is enough political clout involved on the private side, the coles will be bent as was done for the ‘canasters Union. Even in those cases which stay within the 7% guideline, niost employees will also receive, depending upon their contract, cost of hying increases either quarterly or Semi-annually. For example, the members' wages of one local maritime union increased 12.1% between 1 February 1978 and 1 February 1979 because of negotiated raises and cost of hying increases. A deckhand on a towboat now makes more money per ^ear than most military personnel elow the rank of commander, receives a half day off with pay for each hay worked, and, more importantly, e, his wife, and all dependents have medical, dental, and optical care included in his contract.
Another factor in non-retention is the out 0f the pocket (non- ceimbursement) expenses to a serv- ‘ceman at each transfer, especially Wien no government housing is avail® *e at the other end. Even within the ederal service, there is unfairness. A
military member is reimbursed less than a civil servant.
Let us suppose for a moment that the many thousands of people who work the day shift at the Ford Motor Company in River Rouge, Michigan, and who for the most part are members of the Union of Auto Workers arrived at work, parked their cars, and crossed Miller Road to the Ford plant and were given a notice that, effective 1 October, they were going to be charged for parking their cars in the company lot. Such a program would never get off the ground in River Rouge or at any other similar activity. Such a program, however, will fly at military installations.
Why, as a military member, do I get reimbursed at $.07 per mile for using my vehicle on "out of town government business, and a civilian making the same trip in his vehicle receives $. 17 per mile? Our individual expenses are the same.
The emphasis over the years has been on developing managers and “management by objectives.” This emphasis has added to our retention problems in that we try to manage our people rather than lead them. If you can’t lead your people, you sure as hell can’t manage them.
I offer a few words of advice to those senior people involved with retention.
► If you are more concerned with your own promotions than the well being of your men, you have lost them. You can’t dump on a man and manipulate him for four years and expect him to come back for four more years.
► If you are serious about retention, then show some leadership—rather than management—and fight for suitable pay and benefit increases to achieve at least a par with the private sector.
► Throw away your graphs, tables, and textbooks from your management and personnel administration postgraduate schooling and start dealing
Contents:
Retention: Our #1 Goal Fields of Fire
Needed: Heavy Firepower
Where Are You, John Andrews?
Andrew Irwin McKee, Naval Constructor
The Future of U. S. Sea Power
Speed in Modern Warships
Mine Countermeasures
Rx for Shipboard Morale
We’ve Come a Long Way, But . . .
Drift Toward the Draft
Which Williamson Turn?
The Plight—and Flight— of Our Fighter Pilots
Punishment, Discipline, and the Naval Profession
The New Breed Of Sailor
Navy Needs to Improve Its Treatment of Retirees
Surface Warships Against Submarines
Tactical Complacency
A Freshwater Navy
Naval Guns
A Strategy Proposal for the Pacific Fleet
Total Force
The Soviet Navy and Forward Deployment
Coast Guard Vessel Traffic Systems
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19791240pp. 125 illustrations 12 maps
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realistically with real people.
It appears to me that we are not trying to retain our good people but, rather, are driving them out. With increased emphasis on meeting recruiting quotas and lowering our standards every time we turn around, we are going to end up with an all-volunteer force of functional illiterates. Anyone with the ability to think for himself and who has anything on the ball will not stay. To paraphrase the child’s query, "Suppose they gave a war and nobody came?”—better yet, "Suppose they gave a war and there’s no one to send?”
While I realize my thoughts are contrary to the official thoughts and policies of the armed services, I also realize that the Proceedings is a forum where controversial matters can be discussed. There will probably be much negative criticism generated by the publication of something of this nature; however, I believe these are things that need to be said to, and heard by, the policymakers. 1 am not slamming the military, but rather trying to get people to look at the real reasons why people are leaving.
“Fields of Fire”
CSee J. C. McKay, pp. 85-86, June 1979;
J. P. Morse, pp. 87-88, July 1979 Proceedings)
Michael C. Riggle—I fully agree with Lieutenant Commander Morse’s statement that the Proceedings should review military fiction. Sound, well- reasoned reviews by obviously knowledgeable reviewers, appearing in a respected journal such as the Proceedings, might well do much to influence the reading public’s view of the merits of a work of military fiction, and indirectly through that, their view of the military as well.
On a more personal note, the Naval War College Library does acquire occasional works of military fiction. As Collection Development Librarian, my work in this area would be made easier if I could locate reviews of such titles in the Proceedings.
Yours is a fine journal that I always enjoy reading. However, I believe that it would be even better if it provided reviews of military fiction.
A Freshwater Navy
Commander J. J. Pursel, U. S. Navy, Trident Training Facility, Bangor, WA.—The MX missile system is in trouble—which is only logical. Legal and environmental objections have been raised, and logic indicates there are better alternatives to a plan for several thousand miles of circular tunnels, filled with hundreds of 335-ton trucks, employing thousands of people in the middle of a dry desert, just to support 200 yet-to-be developed MX missiles. There is a need for a mobile strategic system that has a first strike survivability at a cost the nation can afford. But the MX only responds to the Air Force’s need to have its own strategic system, or the need to create jobs through the development of unnecessary technology.
One alternative is to expand the Trident submarine missile system. No new technology would be required, and the expansion would lower the overall unit cost of the submarines and missiles. But if the existing Trident is too expensive, which is questionable when compared with the "circular thinking” of the MX, then a Trident submarine program for the Great Lakes might be the answer.
The Great Lakes have a greater area than the combined areas of Nevada and New Mexico, and nuclear survivability would be enhanced by the submarine being able to sit on the bottom or in shock-sheltered areas during periods of potential attack. Shielding and emissions devices might further complicate the Soviet detection problem in the Great Lakes.
But there are other savings. The freshwater Trident submarine would be very cheap to build and operate. Expensive detection and evasion equipment is not required, nor is there a need for weapons other than the Trident missiles. A 500-foot depth capability would reduce hull costs as would the elimination of expensive noise reduction systems. The submarine could be diesel-electric powered, which would greatly reduce costs (as compared with nuclear power) and eliminate environmental complaints. This might require the sub to snorkel occasionally, but the
waters are friendly. Fuel costs would certainly be cheaper than required for hundreds of 335-ton trucks chauffer- ,r>g the MX in circles. The net result would be a cheap submarine that could even carry up to 40 missiles, hive or six of these submarines would equal the total MX program at about 25% of the cost. It would bring industry and employment to the Midwest, rather than the middle of the desert.
Envision a submarine base in Es- canaba, Michigan, supporting six Trident submarines operating in Lake Michigan and Lake Huron. Three Trident submarines could also operate in Lake Superior, from a support base at Marquette, only a few miles from the uiain base at Escanaba. Lake Superior submarines would get their docking accomplished in Escanaba during the summer months by coming through Sault Sainte Marie. Training would be m*nimized, as the missile and fire control personnel could be trained at other Trident sites. The absence of other equipment required for ocean operation greatly simplifies the train- lng of the remainder of the crew.
This freshwater Navy would not replace the existing Trident system, but Would use Trident technology as an alternative to developing new technology for the MX. Therefore, it could be ■n operation well before the MX target date of 1986 and fill the gap in our strategic forces as the older SSBNs and ^tt Force systems are retired. The alternative is a massive system of gopher tunnels which is really putting our head in the ground.
Needed: Heavy Firepower”
{See T. Blades, pp. 50-54, July 1979; A. W. ^ear> p. 27, September 1979 Proceedings)
Commander William J. Stewart, U. S. ^aval Reserve—Commander Blades’ article is a succinct treatise on the need for additional shore bombardment capability in today’s Navy. ^Very segment of the Department of rhe Navy is in justifiable competition Mr the Defense Department’s dollar, and certainly one can understand that sh°re bombardment research, devel- °prnent, and implementation would
Pro not be highest on the list. Still, if the Navy is called upon to exercise its amphibious capability in future combat, the soldiers and marines on the beach deserve nothing but the most devastatingly accurate gunfire support possible.
As one who aerially spotted naval gunfire for a year in Vietnam, I hope that more research will be done on fire direction from the target end between the end of the Indochina conflict and the next war than was apparently done between World War II and Vietnam. We flew in virtually the same aircraft in Vietnam (Army L-19S or Air Force O-ls) as were used in World War II and Korea. The introduction of the OV-lO Bronco later in the Vietnam War was a positive step but does not solve the problem of the Communist bloc infantryman who in future combat can be expected to have access to a hand-held missile launcher which will make the aerial spotter’s life an unacceptably hazardous one.
The Naval Surface Weapons Center at Dahlgren has done some absolutely first-rate research and development over the years in surface gunnery. It is hoped that the scientists and technicians at that fine institution will follow through with laser guidance research and other target acquisition aids that will concomitantly give the marine or amphibious soldier the best in naval gunfire protection while at the same time making an aerial observer nearly obsolete.
“Naval Guns”
(See N. Polmar, pp. 121-122, August 1979
Proceedings)
Bruce R. Blakeley, Lockheed Electronics Company, Inc. —Norman Polmar s discussion of naval guns was as interesting and informative as all his discussions are; however, I must contest one point.
The Spruance (DD-963)- and California (CGN-36)-class ships are equipped with the Mark 86 Mod 3 Gun Fire Control System. This system includes the AN/SPG-60 radar set which is quite capable of tracking and computing gun orders for combating high-performance air targets.
Other modifications of the Mk-86 system, containing the AN/SPG-60, are currently installed on Tarawa (LHA- l)-class ships where it controls three 5-inch lightweight guns, and on the Virginia (CGN-38)-class ships where gun orders are computed for two 5-inch guns and, if desired, launcher orders and continuous wave illumination are provided for Standard missiles.
So, while the 5-inch lightweight gun is somewhat hampered by limited elevation and a slow rate of fire, its fire control system is more than capable of tracking aircraft targets.
“Where Are You, John Andrews, Now That We Need You?”
(See Special, pp. 18-21, August 1979 Proceedings)
Lieutenant (junior grade) H. B. Harris, U. S. Navy (Retired)—The Navy missed the boat in not paying John Andrews $2,000,000 on his terms. His reason was based on the fact that his formula was so simple that once it was told, the Navy would have tried to get out of paying him. Thousands of more complicated inventions have been stolen from the inventors with the courts siding against the rightful inventors. No one can blame John Andrews for being cautious. We can blame the Navy brass for letting him
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get away. Someone there should have been able to come to the conclusion that John Andrews had something grand and glorious.
The fact that Andrews’ demonstration for the Navy was a true test experiment should have been proof that there was no sleight of hand. Admiral Burd should have had the experiment written up on the spot. The “writing-up” seems to have been done long after the experiment was conducted and of course had lost much of its force.
The British officer who witnessed an Andrews demonstration was no better an observer. He even forgot the exact date. His report—done after the experiment—carried no weight. Andrews saw that he was being used by an ignoramus and called off the next interview. Who can blame him?
John Andrews may have been a chemist, and he may have been a tin- kerer. It makes no difference.
I salute him.
“Andrew Irwin McKee, Naval
Constructor”
(See J. D. Alden, pp. 49-57, June 1979
Proceedings')
Rear Admiral David B. Bell, U. S. Navy (Retired)—The article is a thoroughly researched summary of Admiral McKee’s professional life. But what I liked about the article was the author’s ability to project so much of Andy McKee’s character and his attitude toward his fellow men. He always had time to listen to others— juniors, seniors, or friends. I remember when submarine skippers would return from war patrols to the shipyard where he was. He’d seek them out for constructive comments to help make submarine performance better. He never spared himself when something needed to be done.
Personally, I hope that his great sense of personal involvement and professional responsibility will be passed down the line by those who knew him and watched his methods of accomplishment. He did not seek personal glory but strove for better ways to do things through improvements in engineering. He was truly an officer and gentleman in the finest meaning of those words.
“The Future of U. S. Sea
Power”
(See T. B. Hayward, pp. 66-71, May 1979;
W. S. Lind, pp. 22-24, July 1979; R. A.
Bowling, pp. 87-89, August 1979 Proceedings)
“Two Anchors in the Pacific: A
Strategy Proposal for the U. S.
Pacific Fleet”
{See K. R. McGruther, pp. 126-141, May
1979; D. P. Van Ort, p. 86, July 1979
Proceedings)
Captain William Outerson, U. S. Navy (Retired)—I read Admiral Hayward’s article with great interest. I thought that it was a very readable presentation and accept that everything he said was true. Nonetheless, I was left feeling unsatisfied and disturbed.
First, it seems that Admiral Hayward treats the Navy very much in vacuo. I get the impression that I am being presented with a group of set pieces tailored (by implication) to show the U. S. Navy in its best light and in situations with which it is adequately fitted to deal. In situations in which we have the initiative, can choose the times and places of engagements with Soviet naval forces, and have everything going in our favor, we will undoubtedly fare quite well.
I note, moreover, that not only in Admiral Hayward’s article but in articles by other writers, emphasis is placed on such concepts as "maritime superiority,” "power projection," “seapower,” “amphibious capabilities,” “technical superiority,” and such, and that these concepts are sometimes used to counterbalance our inferiority in the size of our naval forces vis-a-vis the Soviets. I have an uneasy feeling that none of these concepts is nearly as important in the scheme of things as is popularly supposed. There is no doubt that some of them are of vital importance to us but may be a matter of much less interest to the Soviets.
When I thumb through The Shift and Aircraft of the U. S. Fleet (Naval
Institute Press, 1978) and note our inventory of ships and aircraft, I am not reassured, particularly in view of Admiral Hayward’s assertion that we will have to fight the next war with what we have at its beginning.
Colonel V. Kennedy, U. S. Army Reserve, U. S. Army War College—Mr. Lind misses the point both of Admiral Hayward’s article and of Lieutenant Commander McGruther’s article in the same issue.
Neither Admiral Hayward in his statement of the broad concept nor Lieutenant Commander McGruther in his identification of specific applications is talking about sailing aircraft carriers into the teeth of “10,000 surface-to-air missile launchers and 2,700 interceptors.”
First of all, the Soviets cannot concentrate and support any more than a t'ny fraction of that total air defense force at the points of attack Lieutenant Commander McGruther cites. Further, by recommending the fortification of Attu, Lieutenant Commander McGruther would assure land-based air support for the offensive naval strategy he proposes—the only place in the world where such a strategy can be supported from American soil and territorial waters without asking anyone’s by-your-leave.
Mr. Lind disposes of the greater part of the argument by slipping in a vast assumption—i.e., that the war won’t last long enough to work out the problem. In this, he stands firmly in ranks with all those general staff officers who solemnly concluded prior to both World Wars that no modern war could last more than a few months.
In general, both Admiral Hayward and Lieutenant Commander McGruther obviously are writing in the context of the sort of "combination of forces”—u. S. and allied—that the Russians understand and articulate so well. The difference between us and the Russians is that their analysts usually think and write from a background of personal military service and a practical knowledge of military operations. The American “analysts” Mr. Lind cites are too often people who have been preserved from contact with the more or less unpleasant realities of military life by a long series of educational deferments from the draft. Living as they do in a world of theory, they tend to spend so much time measuring the trees that they can now no longer find their way out of the forest.
“Speed in Modern Warships”
(See N. Friedman, pp. 150-167, May 1979;
A. Jones, p. 21, July 1979 Proceedings)
Lieutenant William M. McBride, JJ. S. Navy—As a naval architect and former executive officer of the late USS Plainvietv (AGEH-l), the world’s largest and fastest combatant hydrofoil ship, I read Mr. Friedman’s article with intense interest. Among Mr. Friedman’s strongest criticisms are that hydrofoils are designed and built to very limited weight and volume restrictions, that they possess poor sea-keeping ability
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while hullborne in heavy seas, and that they are significantly more costly per ton than traditional hull forms to design, develop, and construct.
As to the fact that hydrofoils are built to limiting parameters of weight and volume, as are aircraft, one would be foolish to argue the point. Unfortunately, many people still picture the hydrofoil as a small, cramped platform, such as Tucumcari (PGH-2) or
Flagstaff (PGH-1), built with little or no weight or volume margin. The fact is that the Plainview, with her 212- foot length and 355 long ton displacement, possessed significant open-deck space, internal volume, and weight margin. The Plainview’s after three main compartments were never really used (except as engineers’ storerooms) and offered approximately 20,000 cubic feet of volume margin. The main deck and forecastle offered close to 4,000 square feet of unobstructed deck area. Since takeoffs and sustained flights were achieved at displacements varying from 295 to 355 long tons, it may be adjudged that the ship easily possessed an approximate 30 long ton equipment/ weapon weight margin, depending upon desired mission durations.
While operating in a hullborne mode, the Plainview possessed all the attributes of a 212-foot ship with a deep draft since her three foil-carrying struts, which totalled 40 long tons, gave the ship a draft of 26 feet. The struts also acted as significant sea anchors while increasing the ship’s stability in the face of adverse sea conditions.
Mr. Friedman’s comment that hydrofoils are more costly per ton than traditional designs is economically correct—at least superficially. Perhaps, though, an economical parameter of “cost per firepower” should be used when equating combatants. Our current warship designs are driven by complex and variable motivational factors which often produce ships so sparsely armed that many operators are openly skeptical of their ship’s performance in the real world of naval warfare.
The vulnerability of a 200-foot hydrofoil, when compared with a 400- foot all-aluminum, unarmored, computer-automated and controlled displacement frigate, seems to be incorrectly overemphasized.
The preliminary designs exist for a large, reduction gear-driven hydrofoil ship. The operational experience exists, as does the propulsion technology. Important, viable missions for the combatant hydrofoil exist, especially in the era of our 200-nautical mile territorial limit. Perhaps advanced marine vehicles, and the hydrofoil in particular, are not the Sirens Mr. Friedman claims, striving to draw us, like Ulysses, onto the rocks.
“Mine Countermeasures: The British Go It Alone (Again)”
(See M. G. M. W. Ellis, pp. 102-105, July 1979 Proceedings)
“Rx for Shipboard Morale”
(See R. J. Brown, p. 94, July 1979 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Rex A. Buddenberg, U. S. Coast Guard, LJSCGC Campbell (WHEC-32)—I found it very intriguing to reread Commander Ellis’ article and substitute the term WMEC (medium endurance cutter) for the present MCMV (mine countermeasure vessel). It seems logical for the U. S. Coast Guard to acquire vessels similar to the MCMVs to be used for the peacetime missions of search and rescue and law enforcement and to also be “always ready” to assume the mine warfare role in wartime. The MCMV’s specifications match those of present WMECs’ pretty well.
There are three major problems with ship configurations for U. S. Coast Guard ships of this size. First, many command and control situations are still manually handled on our ships. The MCMV command and control system, especially if equipped with data link, would appear to ameliorate this condition. Second, some current WMEC designs are legendary in their ability to exhaust crews in a seaway; fin stabilization and a sea kindly hull form should be high in the priority list of ship’s characteristics. Third, I don’t think it a serious problem, but someone will insist that the vessel be flight deck equipped. For the peacetime roles, the WMECs normally operate well within range of shore- based air. The combat mission of mine warfare does not appear to need organic air capability, at least according to the British model.
Plastic ships may cut down on the hundreds of man-hours per year, per ship we waste clipping and painting. We may also be able to arrest the declining hull count in the Coast Guard as well, and maybe help cure the professionalism problem Lieutenant Brown alludes to in his “Nobody asked me, but ...” column in the same issue.
By purchasing WMEC/WMCM vessels, the Coast Guard would be equipping itself for a wartime role suited to the size ships we need for our peacetime missions. This approach would be an obvious change from our current efforts to build small destroyers that are too big for most peacetime uses and too small to be effective in wartime ASW roles.
(Continued on page 87)
ENTER THE FORUM
We welcome brief comments on material published in the Proceedings and also brief discussion items on topics of naval, maritime, or military interest for possible publication on these pages. A primary purpose of the Proceedings is to provide a place where ideas of importance to the Sea Services can be exchanged. The Institute pays an honorarium to the author of each comment or discussion item published in the Proceedings.
Comment and Discussion (Continued from page 24)
‘We’ve Come a Long Way,
But . .
(See B. F. Coye, pp. 41-49, July 1979; W. J. O’Connor, p. 22, September 1979 Proceedings)
Commander Gail M. Ward, U. S. Navy—J would like to speak on my 0wn behalf to the opinion expressed by Commander Coye that she is bothered that some senior women have failed to adopt a feminist attitude— that “their actions seem not to have caught up with their thinking.”
I am certainly one of those senior worrien officers who have not adopted a feminist attitude, but not because my actions have not caught up with tty thinking. I am not an ardent feminist for the simple reason that 1 have never felt discriminated against by the Navy.
Unlike Commander Coye, I have had a tour as an action officer in the Politico-Military Division of OpNav (OP-61) and one as a history instructor at the Naval Academy. I am now the executive officer of an NROTC unit and have orders to attend the senior course at the Naval War College. Assignment to these billets involved, to my knowledge, no arm-twisting to have tfe accepted. My seniors, without exCeption, have treated me fairly and vv*thout any apparent signs of having t° struggle to do so. I might add that my male contemporaries and juniors ave done the same.
Furthermore, I cannot believe that my assignments have been made on che basis of what Commander Coye refers co as “a superstar record.” My fit- "ess reports have been good, but 1 ave never been selected for early
Promotion, which is my definition of
a Superstar. I think 1 have received my assignments because I am a competent °fficer and nothing more.
f chink the Navy has an excellent record in women’s equal opportunity atld see no indication that it will not c°ntinue to make progress in this area.
From: Col. John M. Verdi,
USMCR (Ret.), USNI 0-137935 To: Secretary-Treasurer and Publisher, U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings Subj: Unsuitable material, return of Enel: (1) My subscription copy, Proceedings, July 1979
1.Enclosure (1) contains unsuitable material, namely one more in a series of feminist polemics; accordingly it is returned herewith.
2. In three letters to your publication over the last four years, I set forth in full my position with regard to the feminist movement, its propaganda, and its historical precedents. I will restate the following:
a. Feminism is a manifestation of a degenerate society; specifically, of a society whose “men” have degenerated.
b. Feminism is accompanied by, and exchanges mutual support with, concurrent manifestations of social degeneracy; viz. infanticide, pederasty, satanism, and drug addiction.
3. Bearing in mind the character and history of feminist movements, it should not surprise you that many men and women find propaganda in favor of feminism fully as objectionable as propaganda promoting abortion, homosexuality, cultism, and hallucinogens. I had hoped that the Proceedings might be persuaded to provide at the very least an equality of opportunity to debate the matter . . . equality not only of quantity (number of words) but also of quality (eloquence of words) and of emphasis (prominence of display of words). To the contrary, the past four years have seen more and more persuasive, and better-packaged words for feminism than against. Besides evident editorial bias, the printed record is one of editorial dishonesty.
4. If the Navy is resolved upon a program of institutional transvestism, neither I nor the number of members opposed thereto are likely even to be heard, much less to dissuade the leadership and their spokesmen. But we are not obliged to admit this poison to our households, nor to support its distribution with our money.
Therefore, I request that you delete my name and address from your distribution; I no longer wish to receive the Proceedings, and will return any future issues posted.
5. The business of the Navy is to win the war at sea, not to conduct social experiments in defiance of history and decency.
“The Drift Toward the Draft”
(See H. J. Sage, pp. 38-45, June 1979; A. G.
LaBaron, p. 24, August 1979; R. A. Gabriel,
p. 91, September 1979 Proceedings)
Commander F. W. Rohm, U. S. Navy, Commanding Officer, USS Cavalla (SSN-684)—The military worker today is a volunteer. His performance and job satisfaction depend on the same factors as do his civilian counterpart’s. His country is at peace, and he perceives no immediate threat to himself or to his country. Like his civilian counterpart, he is a complex individual whose motivations vary and change with time. He is seeking selfsatisfaction and looks to both his leaders and country to provide it. Since he is a volunteer, if he finds self-satisfaction he will perform well and remain. If he does not, he will leave.
In the post-Vietnam era, the military worker is not receiving a lot of encouragement and support from the civilian populace. Because of the perceived mistakes made in this war, the military is looked upon with suspicion and distrust by a significant portion of the populace. Because most Americans perceive no immediate threat to themselves, they feel less need for a large military and its attendant demands on the economy.
The military leader must, in light °f the existing situation, redefine his role to meet two needs. First, he must provide a type of leadership which will meet the needs of his people and provide them with job satisfaction so that they will perform at their best. Sec- 0nd, he must work to change the •mage of the military in the eyes of c*vilians to eliminate the suspicion
afid distrust which exist.
To meet the needs of the military workers, the leader must be aware of their perceptions, of what is important to his men, and then attempt to fulfill these needs. He must genuinely care about his men; yet this in itself is not enough. He must also act to support them. He must keep open the lines of communications to them and back them when they make mistakes. This ability does not come naturally to all leaders, so training is necessary. The leader must accomplish the above while being ever aware of his organization’s goals and must inspire his People to meet them. He must also be aware of those traditional virtues which are important to a smoothly functioning military organization and not eliminate or downgrade them through the mistaken impression that all he is inquired to do is please his people.
To meet the second objective, the military leader must work to correct the errors made and impressions left y the Vietnam era. He must be ^tupulously honest. He must never 0rget that he works for his elected eaders and must strive to carry out their goals. He must present these eaders with his honest assessment of any situation they ask him to evaluate and then accept their decisions and ^0rk to his utmost to carry them out. e must be aware that his perception, ecause of his service background and Welfare specialty, will differ from that ° his civilian leaders. He must work ard for what he believes in and to get ■s views understood, but must realize at his views must be subordinate to ls civilian leaders’ views in our dem- °Cratic society.
The military leader must always be ready to go before the public, partici- ^ate in civilian events, and give speeches. This is a necessary part of ls job if any adverse public opinion of
the military is going to be changed. Obviously, not only must he do these things, but he must do them well and present a good impression of the military or the public impression will only worsen. It is not enough in the allvolunteer force era to just perform well in the military arena; public relations is also important.
As was stated previously, it is necessary for the military leader to subordinate his views to his civilian leaders and to carry out their wishes. He must recognize that his perception of what is in the best national interest may not coincide with the views of others and may in fact be in error. If the military leader reaches the point where he honestly disagrees with national policy, however, he has three choices. First, he can accept the policy and then continue to try and make his views felt in private to influence those holding opposing views. This method has the advantage of still having his voice of dissent available for consideration. Second, he can resign and go public with his disagreement, and present his views to the general populace. This has the advantage of gaining a wider audience but brings his influence within the organization to an end. A third method is to pretend agreement with the stated policy and then attempt to sabotage the policy by going to the press anonymously. To do this would destroy the honesty and integrity which the military leader must have to function in the post-Vietnam, all-volunteer environment.
“Which Williamson Turn?”
(S« O. F. Williams, pp. 112-113, July 1979
Proceedings)
“Man Overboard!”
(See B. R. Linder, pp. 110-112, July 1979
Proceedings)
John A. Williamson—After graduation from Northwestern University Midshipman’s School in March 1941, I reported to the USS Livermore (DD- 429), a 1,630-ton destroyer which Lieutenant Commander E. F. McDaniel was the executive officer. Ours was one of the first destroyers to report to the North Atlantic and started convoying in September 1941. By the time Pearl Harbor came along, to the best of my memory, we had attacked some 13 German submarines using the then very new sonar and haphazard submarine attack methods that were developed by our own ship’s company.
When Commander McDaniel became the commanding officer of the Sub-Chaser Training Center in Miami, he asked the Bureau of Naval Personnel to have me work with him in the development of the training center. At the outset, those few of us who were there as instructors taught everything that was offered, including seamanship, antisubmarine warfare, shiphandling, etc.
One day, while at sea, I was instructing student officers on how to do various ship maneuvers, including man overboard on a 173-foot subchaser (PC). One of the older lieutenant commanders (a student) mentioned the fact that it would be great if we had a method to pick up a man overboard using a reference point like our own track. I thought that this was an excellent idea and told him so.
At lunch time in the PC’s small wardroom, I took a maneuvering board and, using the ship’s turning circle characteristics, worked out a turn that when reversed would bring the sub-chaser back down the original track.
After lunch, 1 tried several man overboard drills using this procedure and found that every time, when we turned the required 65° to starboard or port (it was, as I remember, 65° on a sub-chaser, 60° on some ships; it will vary slightly by a ship’s turning circle characteristics), that we would run exactly back down our original track, almost regardless of wind and sea conditions.
Pr
89
I felt this was a much more effective man overboard procedure than the haphazard way of turning and trying to find the man in the open sea. Therefore, I began to teach this procedure. I particularly recommended it for man overboard maneuvering at night and in periods of low visibility. I also recommended this procedure to the other instructors.
Several months later, I was given command of the PC-1196 and proceeded to the Caribbean for several months duty there convoying between Guantanamo Bay and Trinidad.
Upon returning to the Sub-Chaser Training Center to be trained in destroyer escorts and then reassigned, I was at sea one day practicing man overboard drills on a destroyer escort. The instructor said, ‘‘We are now going to do man overboard drills using the Williamson Turn.” I asked him, “What is that?” He then proceeded to explain the men overboard procedure that I had started and called “Man Overboard Procedure for Night and Low Visibility.” After I had been transferred from the Sub-Chaser Training Center, they decided to call the turn the "Williamson Turn.” Hence, its name.
I believe the credit for the idea should go to the lieutenant commander who mentioned the fact that we should have a reference point to which to return for men overboard. His thought motivated me to develop and teach it. I have no idea who he was and, at the time, it seemed of little consequence. All in all, I am thankful it came about and that some lives have been saved as a result of it.
“Total Force”
(See E. R. Zumwalt, pp. 88-107, May 1979; D. P. Ort, p. 86, July 1979; J. E. Lacouture, pp. 89-91, September 1979 Proceedings)
Captain Thomas H. Suddath, U. S. Navy (Retired)—I would like to set forth my reactions to each of Admiral Zumwalt’s eight components of his Total Force concept and his view of “sea power.”
Nuclear Military Force: Admiral Zumwalt spends four pages principally discussing the SALT I and SALT II agreements, rehashing numbers of missiles and their technical details which have been done ad infinitum. On page 91, however, Admiral Zumwalt says, “As the accuracy of the missiles has grown, so has the vulnerability of ICBM silos. In consequence, both sides have developed mobile missile concepts, with the Soviets leading the way." (Emphasis added.) I am startled that Admiral Zumwalt would completely dismiss discussing the heart of this country’s mobile nuclear capability—the nuclear-powered submarine’s ballistic missile capability with its proven reliability and invulnerability! He seems to be entranced with the MX program, and he does not give any views as to the relative values of the MX and the nuclear-powered submarine’s ballistic missile program. I understand the relative issues of these two programs lie before President Carter at the present time. It would have been interesting to have received Admiral Zumwalt’s views and conclusion on this important issue.
Conventional Military Force: Admiral Zumwalt addresses himself to the quantitative superiority of the Soviet conventional military forces over the U. S. forces which is indisputable. However, he states, "in the last ten years or so the size of the U. S. conventional military forces has declined, and the U. S. qualitative leads are less pronounced than in the past.” (Emphasis added.) This statement is in direct contrast to the views expressed before Congress by Admiral Thomas B. Hayward, the present Chief of Naval Operations, who has stressed that the quality of our Navy weapon systems is superior to the Russians’. At least, that is the way I have read Admiral Hayward’s testimony.
Political Force: Here Admiral Zumwalt dives into waters where he has no business being. Admiral Zumwalt states, “The United States is currently in irons with regard to projecting military power, for it is still questioning its desire or ability to do so.” I submit that President Franklin D. Roosevelt was faced with the same problems prior to World War II, along with every other President of the United States who questions the “will of the American people to devote enough resources of the United States to obtain superior total force.” My comment on this issue is that oftentimes the American people get completely fed up with retired admirals and generals lecturing to them and questioning their “will to fight.”
Ideological Force: After delving into many platitudes concerning Communist ideologies versus democratic institutions, Admiral Zumwalt concludes his discussion on this subject by saying, “Ideological force is therefore a toss-up between these two superpowers. Each has its strengths and weaknesses in the modern world. The one that is best supported by political resolutions, and most effectively linked to the other factors of total force, will probably prevail.” I don’t quarrel one iota with Admiral Zumwalt’s words, but as the trite saying goes, “What has that to do with the price of eggs?”
Economic Force: After discussing America’s industrial might and productive know-how, Admiral Zumwalt makes no mention of America's largest economic strength—the vast and probably most important economic asset—its agriculture production. Agriculture exports from this country not only feed millions of people but they contribute to a favorable export balance of trade more than any single factor.
Technological Forces: Admiral Zumwalt devotes all of his views on this subject to development projects which lead to military hardware. He makes absolutely no mention of the U. S. Navy’s unstinting backing of pure and basic research, particularly by the Office of Naval Research (ONR) since 1944. The Naval Research Laboratory in Anacostia, a branch of ONR, has an outstanding record in the quality of its scientists who participate in basic research. It is a blessing to the Navy and to the scientific community that ONR reports directly to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research and Development, and not to the office of the Chief of Naval Operations for support and funding.
Social Force: Admiral Zumwalt defines social force as the substance, morale, and will of the people and the health and ability of their institutions to support their security and solve their problems. He goes on to discuss the Soviets’ attempt to portray the strength of their social forces “through such things as education and sports.’ One of my professors at the Harvard Business School would respond to the above words with, “And so, therefore, Admiral Zumwalt. . . ?”
Diplomatic Force: Here again Ad-
miral Zumwalt is treading on thin ice. His last paragraph in this area is very disconcerting. Admiral Zumwalt states, “I see the non-competition for a power base in Africa to be the factor that will tip the diplomatic component of total force in favor of the Soviets unless the United States takes action to stop Soviet imperialism there.” (Emphasis added.)
bl
Unt observation. He said, "you
I would like to venture the opinion that the continent of Africa consists of three diplomatic and geographical areas—i.e., Africa north of the Sahara, including the Horn of Africa; Equatorial Africa, south of the Sahara; and the rich, complex, but terribly strategic Republic of South Africa. I submit that Admiral Zumwalt should have discussed Africa in its diplomatic context within those three separate areas—each of which is a huge, wigging can of worms.
Sea Power: This appears to be an afterthought in Admiral Zumwalt’s ar- t'de, because he states at the com- tnencement of his article that his concept of "Total Force” has eight components. I certainly have no quarrel tenth the thousands of words which have been written on this subject, plus Enumerable presentations, some of te'hich would make General Curtis t-ernay’s presentations in the late 1940s on Strategic Air Command look arnateurish in comparison.
Finally, I have an anecdote concerning Harry Truman and seapower.
resident Truman was invited to John Kennedy’s inauguration, and in the eyening he arrived it was discovered rhat President Truman had not been assigned a military aide. The protocol People in the White House called the C*0 duty officer about 2200 and requested that a Navy captain be designed to report to President Truman early the next morning as his naval a*de. The CNO duty officer was no prinking violet, and he volunteered Jrnself. It turned out that President rurrian and the captain hit it off very and both communicated with no ifficulty. Toward the end of Presi- ent Truman’s visit, he and the Navy captain were sitting in Blair House footing the breeze, and President fuman made a characteristically know I have been listening to you sailor boys talking about sea power for about ten years and still to this day I don’t know what the hell you are saying!”
“The Soviet Navy and
Forward Deployment”
(See G. Charbonneau, pp. 35-40, March 1979;
T. Blades, pp. 83-84, June 1979; H. A.
Caldwell, pp. 21-22, July 1979; W. J. Ruhe,
pp. 89-90, August 1979 Proceedings)
Andrew P. Guzowski, formerly a lieutenant commander in the Polish Navy—Mr. Caldwell accuses the U. S. Navy of “conducting a slick, sustained advertising campaign promoting the image of an awesomely powerful Soviet Navy” and later states that, “as a continental power, Soviet war plans simply require a basically defensive rather than offensive navy.” A navy with over 400 submarines, more than one-third of them nuclear-powered, hardly fits a description of a “defensive-oriented force.” Neither can we draw any comfort from the fact that “Russian navymen have not gained victory at sea since the Ottoman Empire threw in the sponge.” Germany, until almost the eve of World War I, had no navy to speak of, no naval tradition, and no naval victories. Yet, the Imperial German Navy came perilously near a major victory at Jutland, almost severed the lifeline of the Allies with submarines, and proceeded with a repeat performance in World War II.
The fact that the Soviet Navy is largely a submarine navy with important antisubmarine warfare capabilities of its surface ships should make our choices quite clear, remembering lessons of two World Wars. As a maritime nation with our allies across the oceans, we face a paramount problem of how to protect our sea routes. Mr. Caldwell aptly states that "past performance does not win future wars,” but the second part of his sentence, that "history, recent and remote, should be a greater source of confidence for the U. S. Navy than for the Soviet Navy,” seems a rather cold comfort as confidence alone does not win battles either.
The existing situation seems quite clear: our security and the security of our allies depend on the safety of our sea routes. Those sea routes are threatened by an inordinately large Soviet submarine force. Nothing, therefore, but a navy capable to deal effectively with this submarine menace should be of higher priority in our defense planning.
There are those who say that the Soviet submarine threat is exaggerated and that the size of a submarine fleet is not a guarantee for its effectiveness. For example, Fascist Italy had the largest submarine force of any combatant at the early stages of World War II and yet achieved relatively little with it. This is a most dangerous speculation in view of the stakes involved. Great Britain, underestimating the German submarine threat, entered World War II critically short of escorts but powerful in battleships which, except for the Bismarck incident, were pretty useless. Britain had to go, hat in hand, to Uncle Sam for 50 obsolete destroyers. We do not have an Uncle Sam to turn to. It took a massive combined effort of the two most powerful fleets in the world and of a few smaller ones to win the Battle of the Atlantic.
It may be that Soviet submarine commanders are not in the same class with the Otto Kretschmers and Gunther Priens of the U-boat force, but are we going to be foolish enough to risk such an assumption? The Soviet Union is primarily a land power—agreed! For what purpose, therefore, are the Soviets building such a massive submarine force?
“The Plight—and Flight—of Our Fighter Pilots”
(See J. R. Woodfield, pp. 94-95, June 1979; A. E. Smith, p. 24, August 1979; C. Kline and C. N. Meyers, pp. 81-82, September 1979 Proceedings)
Captain David E. Cummins, U. S. Navy (Retired)—For 30-odd years many surface types believed that the aviation side had a system that trained junior air officers to be lazy. Some flying types have been known to admit it—but, never before have I seen it in writing.
^eutenant (junior grade) Jim Poole,
' T Navy, Navigator /Personnel Officer, ^SS Lynde McCormick (DDG-8)— oth Captain Shockley and Lieutenant °ole discuss discharges and offer dif- T'ent suggested approaches to address e problem. However, the majority
of
cha
dischar tho: ‘
arge, the member’s command would
^Ve the authority to separate him. e catch is that the-person would re- Ve absolutely no benefits of any "lnd from his military service. If this
Punishment, Discipline, and the Naval Profession”
J. B. Bonds, pp. 43-49, December 1978; E- E. Bracken, p. 20, March 1979; R. Hradecky, p, 28, April 1979; J. E. Pons and Spock, pp. 91-92, June 1979; J. G. Shockley, pp. 83-84, September 1979 Proceedings)
The New Breed of Sailor”
R. H. Hasson, pp. 41-45, March 1979; B- Jolly, p. 26, June 1979; D. B. Collins, E- 92, July 1979; j. k. Poole, pp. 82-83, eptember 1979 Proceedings) persons involved with admin dis- rges are only concerned with get- t'ng out of the Navy as soon as possi- e- Obviously these people are not w°rried about what potential employes think of their military record. °st important, why should a person 0 does not live up to his part of the n istment contract be given the same Puvileges and assistance as those who n0rably serve throughout their nlistments have earned?
propose that the existing admin ge system be modified. For se cases in which a service member ‘ lves his right to an admin board in
Urn for a not less than general dis- Ctl"- 0
ha
•ph
e catch is that the-person would re-
- ..................... itary
Posal seems too harsh, have the rt-'ii°n sign a waiver stating that he 12es that in return for a not less an general discharge from the com- ‘nu he is to receive no benefits for '^military service.
f Wo 'mmediate benefits could arise a0lTl tbe change. First, there would be Slgnificant reduction in the adminis- e .'°n requirements throughout the Sj^re chain of command. An added Co6 k^efh would be the saving of k t ess man-hours by the legal anch, thereby freeing them for the rej e sefious cases which would help ce the court-martial backlog that
presently exists in our military courts. Second, and most important, the individual commands would recover the responsibility for making decisions concerning their own people.
Who knows, maybe retention/ morale would improve as people would come to realize that those who perform would indeed receive more than those who simply exist.
“Navy Needs to Improve Its
Treatment of Retirees”
(See S. Dombroff, p. 76, March 1979; H. W.
Kinsley, R. A. Cooke, and S. Dombroff, pp.
89-90, June 1979 Proceedings)
Rear Admiral S. D. Frost, U. S. Navy, Deputy Comptroller of the Navy—As the official responsible for Navy pay matters, I read with special interest Captain Dombroff’s “Nobody asked me, but ...” in which he expressed his dissatisfaction with the service provided by the Retired Pay Department of the Navy Finance Center. While 1 appreciate Captain Dombroff’s feelings, I want all active duty and retired Navy readers of the Proceedings to know that a concerted effort has been made over the past two years to upgrade the service provided to our Navy retired community. The activities under my command involved in retired pay matters, both the Navy Accounting and Finance Center in Washington and the Navy Finance Center in Cleveland, recognize and appreciate the responsibilities that we have to our retired community.
During the past year, we have increased the number of technicians assigned to the Retired Pay Department in Cleveland and devoted over 20,000 hours to their training. As a result, we have reduced the retired pay transaction backlog by over 40% and the average time required to establish a new account by nearly 50%. At the same time, we have also cut by 50% the average time required to start a widow’s annuity (most of the remaining delays result from late receipt of death notices and tardiness in returning the claim forms required by law). In addition to these significant improvements, we have recently made available to our retirees electronic funds transfer (EFT), the most modern payment technology available today. This new service provides speedy, error-free, and traceable delivery of net pay, without dependence on the postal system, to the retiree’s account in the financial institution of his choice. Today, our service to our retirees compares most favorably to that provided by the other services.
We are genuinely concerned about serving Navy retirees. Of course, this does not mean that there are no problems. Unfortunately, there are occasional “busts.” Some errors are inevitable because of the extreme complexity of retired pay administration, with personnel retiring under 37 different laws and coordination required among 12 different offices and bureaus. However, it’s not for lack of trying that errors sometimes take place; Navy people have my personal commitment that every effort will be made to continually reduce errors.
The restrictive allotment policy discussed by Captain Dombroff results from a DoD directive that regulates which allotments may be changed and which may not after a member retires. All services are required to enforce this regulation, and the Navy Finance Center is no more restrictive than our Army or Air Force counterparts in this regard. However, in view of many comments received from the retired community similar to those expressed by Captain Dombroff, this policy is again being reviewed by Navy, our sister services, and DoD.
In summary, we are very appreciative of the past service of our retirees, and we fully recognize our continuing responsibilities to them.
“Surface Warships Against Submarines”
(See W. D. Taylor, pp. 168-181, May 1979; D. Brown, pp. 28-29, August 1979 Proceedings)
Second Class Radioman David R. Putnam, U. S. Navy—Why do submariners wear the “Hi Skimmer, Bye Skimmer” T-shirts? Why do the submariners say there are two types of ships in the Navy—submarines and targets? Active sonar is the answer of
course. It seems to be a death wish on the part of tin cans.
A year ago I had the privilege of riding in the USS Barbel (SS-580), commanded by then Lieutenant Commander A. Van Saun (author of two recent professional notes: "Tactical ASW: Let's Fight Fire with Fire,” December 1976; and “Tactical ASW: A Case for the Non-Nuclear Submarine,” November 1978), during an exercise in which the SS tried to penetrate a screen of destroyers protecting the heavy—an ammunition ship (AE).
I was not standing any watches and had the freedom to move about the sonar and control rooms. I could not believe all of the noise in the sonar room. The destroyers were saturating the ocean with all kinds of sound. When the destroyers would come close, the SS would go deep, or at least below the layer, and the sub crew would just snicker as it passed out of range. Commander Van Saun had all the opportunity in the world to “kill” the destroyers, but the objective was the AE. After numerous maneuvers in and about the screen, the Barbel spotted the AE. The AE had changed her running lights to disguise herself, but the active sonars on her escorts provided sufficient information to warrant a green flare. After the shot, the Barbel went hard left and deep to avoid the expected destroyer response— pinging. With the Barbel traveling fast and cavitating, it seemed like a passive sonar would have heard the noise the diesel was making on her evasion. But the destroyers were masking their own sonars because of their active pinging. With all the saturation of active noise, a passive variable depth sonar (VDS) could not have done its designed job.
I realize that there are restrictions when using VDS, but it could be a very effective tool if the surface community would use it more often in tactical applications. Noticing the grin on the faces of the Barbel’s officers and crew members after the successful mission, I was embarrassed to say that I was involved in surface warfare. Commander Van Saun made it look easy.
A majority of the things I learned during the exercise were amplified in Captain Taylor’s article.
► The tin can’s active sonar is a beacon for the submarine to home in on.
► There was so much active noise that the ASW platforms were masking their own passive capability.
► The high-value target was near all of the noise saturation of the destroyers. You could pick out the heavy because she was the only one on the submarine’s passive sonar that was not pinging. If only one destroyer was not active, the sonarman would have had to made a choice, and the surface force would not have “told” the submarine which ship was the high value one.
► Ship’s noise—paint chipping, deck machinery, air-conditioning, etc.-" can be heard by the submarine’s pas" sive sonar. Perhaps during an AS^ search the ASW platforms should cease all causes of this “active” noise.
Captain Taylor went into a lengthy and somewhat technical explanation or active and passive sonar. All of which adds up to the fact that there will still
The USS BOIVF1N (SS-28I)
A lady that sank 38 enemy ships in WW2 survived to tell about it. A tribute to the great silent service of our country is still around as the oldest ship in Pearl Harbor.
But she badly needs repair if she is to continue as
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be only two types of ships in the Navy until the surface community stops the ^discriminate saturation of the ocean
What is wrong with having the destroyers pick up the submarine act? In other words, go completely passive: eease all deck noise, passive sonars, and perhaps even go dead in the Water- Let the sonobuoys go active and the tin cans “hover.” Herding seems to be an effective method of flushing out the submarine. Perhaps the old say- lnS> All good things come to those ^ho wait,” can be applied to the ASW °tce. The old timers may feel naked w'thout an active sonar, but the submarine is waiting to hear the destroyer’s ping.
I work in communications and not sonar, but the principles are the same. bnV radiated energy can be exploited y direction-finding systems. To cut °wn on detection, the surface community will impose EmCon on all radio and radar gear, but sonar keeps P'nging along at a steady pace. By efinition, EmCon is defined as the c°ntrol of all electromagnetic radia- t'ons. In my Radioman 3 & 2 Manu-
‘ s, there is a sentence under EmCon that
elect
mediately detected and the position of e transmitting ship will be fixed by the enemy.”
If the active/passive trade-offs are obvious
y ought to be obvious to a qualified surface warfare officer.
y .
uctical Complacency: Change N°w or Fail Later” "
®ec M- a. Libbey, pp. 34-43, April 1979;
' A. Dalla Mura, p. 88, July 1979; P. M. "epherd, p. 87, August 1979; S. D. Arnotc, p- 24, September 1979 Proceedings)
C^ptain W. K. Mey ers, U. S.
■J,vy Recently finishing a tour as raining Officer at Fleet Training I r°uP (FTG), Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, . Can heartily second many (but not > or Lieutenant Commander Libbey’s Ws. "Why do so many ships have pOch a traumatic experience at the eet Training Group’s version of re- resher training?”
Based on seeing upwards of 150 (U. S. Navy and Coast Guard) ships arrive, undergo, and complete refresher training (1976-78), it is evident to me that this is relatively true in the first part because many ships on arrival were not in compliance with fleet standards. That is to say that their preparations for arrival were incomplete. This resulted from, for the most part, ships’ companies being unaware of fleet standards and the fact that FTG, acting for Commander Training Force, Atlantic, and the fleet commanders, insists that these standards be complied with. Trauma ensues when the ship must both bring herself up to standards and complete a very full training schedule at the same time. As refresher training (RefTra) is usually the first time that a specific ship’s company has worked as a team, “superbly trained men aboard advanced ships” may not do justice to the situation, particularly during the beginning stages of RefTra.
Lieutenant Commander Libbey’s criticisms of current gunnery training are well taken. Having been at FTG when the gunnery mishap to which Lieutenant Commander Libbey refers occurred (an ATF hit by a projectile fired by a ship using the Mk-86 Gunfire Control System), I know well enough the problems of providing safe but demanding gunnery exercises, not only for that fire control system, but for the other gunfire control systems in the fleet. His call for adequate numbers of drone surface targets also is well taken. These targets exist as assets under the control of Utility Squadron Six (VU-6). However, their use is not called for by the fleet commander in refresher training. Although Lieutenant Commander Libbey’s experience may have told him otherwise, not all ships reporting for refresher training are ready to conduct exercises using a high-speed drone— although all would benefit from it.
Our use of other simulators such as the British Simflak system for gunnery training against targets which cannot be fired at—i.e., aircraft simulating air-to-surface missile combat—is long overdue.
As an aside, the ATF which was hit during an exercise in 1978 had the
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round impact just above the waterline immediately under the bridge wing. Other projectiles of the same salvo landed beyond the ATF. Pending the arrival of terminally guided projectiles, I do not believe we possess, at ranges of 12,000-20,000 yards, the option of selecting "the waterline or the radar antennas.” For the present, hits, hopefully multiple hits, are what we should aim for; and short-range, secondary control system gunnery should not be neglected either.
I concur that “rice bowls will have to be broken,” but perhaps this is just as well. Anything to get past the current complacency.
“Coast Guard Vessel Traffic Systems”
(See M. R. Adams, pp. 54-61, October 1978;
W. E. Murphy, p. 24, February 1979; M. R.
Young, p. 87, June 1979 Proceedings)
Captain James F. Drahos, M/V Glomar Explorer—Quartermaster Second Class Young and his fellow Coast Guardsmen might take offense at Captain Murphy’s comments concerning Coast Guard operation of vessel traffic systems (VTSs), but Mr. Young’s remarks are chauvinistic and, in themselves, indicative of what is wrong with present Coast Guard policy and attitudes regarding VTSs.
Mr. Young’s comments are, in addition, significant not only for what is stated but also for what is not said!
I wonder if the VTS administrators in The Netherlands and the United Kingdom (the foreign systems with which I’ve had experience) really consider that having licensed (I do not know what Mr. Young means by “registered”) deck officers manning their systems is “a waste of manpower."
I am a little amazed that Mr. Young believes that it is adequate that “each enlisted watchstander must know (memorize) every prominent point of land, every navigational aid, the soundings of the main channel, and where the shoals are.” Certainly that is a beginning, but it accounts for only half of the job—what about the ships? The VTS is not a “war game” where toy pieces are moved about a board with no regard to the consequences. There are real ships out there, often carrying volatile cargoes, and manned by human beings. Mr. Young does not state what his present assignment is, but I would infer from his remarks that he is assigned to a VTS. If so, that a member of the Coast Guard, in a VTS position, feels or concurs that a VTS watch stander is "qualified” based solely on the memorization of geographic/hydrographic features, with no consideration whatsoever of the vessels, their sizes, maneuvering characteristics, etc., certainly indicates a glaring deficiency in Coast Guard operation of vessel traffic systems and the attendant reasoning.
Mr. Young’s relation of the Cuyahoga to the Argo Merchant is an unfortunate example of faulty reasoning and suggests that he might not be too well informed about events in his own organization. In the first place, the Cuyahoga was a Coast Guard vessel, manned by Coast Guard personnel, for the training of Coast Guard officers. It is very possible that these same officers would man a vessel traffic center (VTC) or be responsible for licensing U. S. Merchant Marine officers at some time in the future. In sharp contrast, theArgo Merchant was a Liberian-flag vessel, with Liberian-licensed officers, outside of pilotage waters, without a pilot aboard. Certainly, comparing the Argo Merchant to “all tanker crews,” assuming that term means U. S.-flag, Coast Guard-licensed officers, is not valid, when one considers that the Coast Guard presently exerts a tremendous influence over the latter but very little over the former. And it should be obvious that the Coast Guard has much more control over the competency of U. S. Merchant Marine personnel than those personnel have over the Coast Guard! Equally, Mr. Young should be aware that “a Dept, of Transportation task force has found the Coast Guard’s training programs susceptible to safety problems, short of proper equipment and training aids and lacking in professional seagoing preparation.” (National Fisherman, May 1979)
Finally, I must question what Mr. Young terms as “our degree of professionalism.” My dictionary defines “profession” as “a calling requiring specialized knowledge and often long and intensive academic preparation" and “a principal calling, vocation, or employment.” Vessel masters or pilots spend many years becoming qualified in their profession and, once qualified, the vast majority continue in the practice of that profession for many more years. Equally, the air traffic controller, when finally qualified as a supervisor, will likely spend many years in his profession. Contrast the two foregoing examples with the VTC watch stander: after spending only six months or a little more to memorize geographic/ hydrographic features and complete additional VTS training, how long will the VTC watch stander practice this so- called profession before being transferred? Two, three, or four years? And then on to other duty stations, but probably not immediately to another VTS! A professional Coast Guardsman—yes; a professional vessel traffic controller—no!
Perhaps, Mr. Young and others m the Coast Guard should consider “reason” instead of “reaction" when the Coast Guard is, with no malice, criticized. As a result, problem areas can be pinpointed and beneficial changes can be made. Is it too idealistic to expect the Coast Guard to at least match the same or equivalent standards set for the industry it regulates?
Correction
(See Naval Review Issue, May 1979 Proceedings)
Lieutenant George Galdorisi, U■ $• Navy, Officer-in-Charge, Helo Detachment, USS McCandless (FF-1084)— On page 123, you show a picture of HMS Eskimo being shadowed by a Soviet ship. This ship is incorrectly identified as a “Kashin”-class "guard ship.” The ship in question is a “Krivak”-class destroyer of the same class as that portrayed on page 101-
On page 229, you report the Cushing (DD-958) being christened at PaS' cagoula, Mississippi, on 29 Juty 1978. While the date, place, and ship name are correct, the Cushing is not DD-958 but rather a Spruance-class destroyer, DD-985.
Your outstanding publication lS read with great professional interest by a plethora of readers. We look f0 scouring its pages for minor errors as a professional challenge.