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Richard S. 1977 (pp.
Mathews, Jr.—In April 76-77), you published a
H
tvin
°wever, the first thing to do to a War, is not to lose it at the out-
T . .
cal n Peacet>me, our Western politi- ventSySte,Tls and our philosophy pre- off °Uf democtacies from keeping an ^bsively oriented military posture, nj 'c^ would require prohibitive man- ate^ *eve^s- We have no choice. We condemned to “defense first” on htoc°ntinent.
n'y totalitarian states can afford feact*ve army oriented toward of- freT because they can distribute t^e*r GNP between Gutter and s according to the needs of their cl strategy. It’s exactly what the ^Hns are doing today. pos»'s is why the system I pro- e tactical nuclear defense in
an
rjVe Ranged My Mind, n>onization Is Not the Answer
etter I wrote favoring military ni°nization. I’m still in the Navy, ut I have changed my mind about
\vh°nS ' n°W a8ree w'c^ t^lose wr‘ters said that the existing institu-
al machinery protects the interests che enlisted sailor.
P’v*si°n of Labor in the Western Alliance”
1971^' ^ Geneste, pp. 42-51, November ,o7 ’ G. Powell, pp. 21-22, January ^ E. Obedin, p. 27, February 1979;
' Mierzejewski, pp. 20-22, March 1979
Pro«edings)
Marc E. Geneste, French Army etired)—My artjcie raised very in- sj stlng reactions in Proceedings issues e lts publication last November. m°ng these, I’d like to answer the an<je ent remar^s °f Mr- Mierzejewski thank him for raising a crucial a He is right in pointing out that kfrely defensive system is not the Way to deter an aggressor.
Europe—offers the West the necessary delays required in order to mobilize its overwhelming potential for the final counter offensive, like in World Wars I and II. Initial defense, at least in Europe, should be vested in active forces, and subsequent offense to the reserve forces. This is another “division of labor” that I did not point out in this article. (I had stressed this point, however, in my article, “Fence and Defense,” published in the October 1963 Proceedings).
I congratulate your Comment and Discussion forum for allowing such important precisions.
“U. S. National Strategy: Outward Bound . . . with Inadequate Charts”
(See R. J. Hanks, pp. 30-35, April 1979 Proceedings)
Captain Matthew E. Romano, U. S. Navy (Retired)—Once again we are privileged to savor a brilliant analysis of the perilous naval course our nation sails. Once again there will be scores of critical comments alternately pointing out the perceptions and shortcomings of the essay. And once again, following the initial period of excitement, the essay’s salient points will be largely forgotten.
Why? Because Proceedings readers have heard it all so often in recent years that the theme has become a refrain rather than a blueprint. Thus, the Naval Institute does its readers a disservice in offering them an article cut from the same cloth as so many others which have been published in the Proceedings, and then calling it a “prize essay,” implying that its contents are somewhat special.
Fighter Crews:
You Fight the Way You Practice April Proceedings Cover A Future for Celestial Navigation? Women in Warships: A Right to Serve Tactics
SEATAG: More Than a Game
The New Breed of Sailor
Budget Cuts Marine AV-8B
U.S. Civilians in Europe:
Potential Hostages of War
Old Proceedings—A Clear Voice
Setting Shipboard Priorities
Soviet Navy and Forward Deployment
The Soviet Anti-SLOC Mission
U.S. Navy: Mine Countermeasures
Fields of Fire
A National Merchant Marine Policy
Coast Guard Vessel Traffic Systems
Misuse of the Fast Battleship
Bombarding Japan
Bring Back the Corps
Navy Needs to Improve Its Treatment of Retirees
The Violation of the "Liberty”
Punishment, Discipline, and the Naval Profession
Destroyers for the 21st Century
Through-Deck Cruiser
Contents:
Unionization Is Not the Answer
Division of Labor
U.S. National Strategy: Outward Bound . . . With Inadequate Charts
Although Rear Admiral Hanks knows how to say it much better than most of us, there is little in his treatise that is new, especially since he
with
minimum impact on numbers of ,1,r^ craft launched because the first an ^ second launches are usually fueled an armed before flight operations beg'n and there is not usually a requirem61^ to refuel and rearm all of the aircra
on the second to last recovery until ui . n an
operations are over. Fighters on
hourly cycle and others on multip of an hour would give the aircra handling officer extra ulcers becauS’ recoveries/launches would be on-g°*^ while he is trying to respot for
the
are
tain
he
keeps the rest of the wing, it, on deck. Periodically, this can done.
be
is preaching to the choir. If memory serves, in his winning 1970 essay (“Against All Enemies,” March 1970) Admiral Hanks called on all ablebodied disciples to spread the word about seapower on all fronts and galvanize the public into action. Although the strategy didn’t work, it was a highly functional proposal and worthy of a much better reception than it got.
Regrettably, there is none of that in the present essay, and one gets the disconcerting impression that the admiral has opted (retreated?) for the sanctuary (seclusion?) of scholarship for its own sake. That would be a great pity because what is needed now, above all, is a modus operandi that will raise the admiral’s warnings to a flash point and ignite his insights into a workable formula.
It’s easier said than done, of course, but shouldn’t the Naval Institute be looking a bit more toward material that offers possible solutions as well as probable conclusions? Isn’t it time that the Proceedings became more than just a compendium of parallel thinking and strove harder to present ideas coupled with the suggested means for their achievement?
If the Navy and nation are indeed at an 1 1th hour, as we all keep saying over and over, then why do we simply continue to keep telling each other what time it is?
EDITOR'S NOTE: Because of an editing error in one sentence of Rear Admiral Robert J. Hanks's prize-winning essay, his meaning was reversed. The sentence, near the bottom of page 32, should have read: “And, of course, since the massive Allied demobilization following World War II. the United States and its European allies have been unable to match the Gargantuan ground and air forces of the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact minions. ”
“Fighter Crews: You Fight The Way You Practice”
CSee L. Carter, pp. 65-69, April 1979 Proceedings)
Commander D. N. Rogers, U. S. Navy, Commander Carrier Air Wing 14 — Lieutenant Commander Carter’s concern for combat proficiency deployed is shared by all aviation carrier warfare specialties. I think there are some inaccurate generalizations in his argument, however, which could lead the reader to an overly pessimistic conclusion. The carrier’s mobility and striking power, which require some tradeoffs in individual warfare proficiency, are not addressed. The recommended solutions to the problem are generally on target, but a few do not take into account the facts of life of the operation of a carrier/carrier air wing team.
The repeated implication that fuel and flight hour constraints preclude good training is not totally accurate. Fighter squadrons, as well as other carrier squadrons, do not consistently use all their operating funds. Reasons for this situation include bad weather, uneven ships’ operating schedules, and periodic maintenance difficulties. Periodically, more funds are required, which can be a limiting factor. Changing readiness criteria to reflect sorties vice hours will not in itself produce more funds. Flight hours are a standard which can be applied to all communities, and the commanding officer of each type squadron must use what he has in the way he sees fit to ensure the best readiness ofhis command.
Carrier landing practice prior to deployment is one of the tradeoffs which Baron Manfred Von Richthofen was not faced with when he stated “fighter pilots have to rove in the area allotted to them any way they like. ...” The area he was talking about was limited as compared to the area the carrier can prowl. The ability to launch carrier aircraft from anywhere on four-fifths of the earth’s surface must be paid'for with carrier landing practice. A fighter squadron is not precluded from practicing air combat maneuvering in conjunction with carrier landing practice, and continual practice ashore prevents massive “bounce only” hops just prior to a cruise.
Depending on wind, weather, operating condition of the ship, and seasoning of the air wing, operating during the transit in “blue water operations” is a realistic expectation. If this can be done, the edge can be kept honed and the one-to-two week no- ) period can be avoided.
Lieutenant Commander Carter s s°^ lutions include more tankers dedicate exclusively to fighter training missi°nS and a tanker version of the S-3 Viking From time to time tankers can an should be dedicated exclusively t0 fighters. However, consistently assi£n ing attack aircraft tanker missions re duces the combat training of these pilots. The single S-3 tanker we have has about 3,000 pounds more fuel t° give than the present KA-6 for a tyP1 cal cycle, but the S-3 is not cotncn°n to all our present air wings. LoglStl cally, this would create problems.
The shorter cycle times mentions • as a help to fighter training, include v tradeoff. The shorter the cycle timej the fewer aircraft that can be launch^ because of the time needed to resp0^ refuel/rearm — hence, less overa training, assuming the fighters take ‘ proportional cut in the number of a,r craft launched. At some point, shorte
cycle times become counterproductn^
to all. Some shorter cycles, such as first and last, can be done non-hour launch.
One option not mentioned is flex deck, where only fighters launched and recovered at will- f presumes space exists for the cap to stay into the wind and that
most1
The basic question to be asked 1 which is better, to have a fi£“t: squadron at tip-top proficiency °Per^r ing within 500 miles of Miramar 1 Oceana, or a fighter squadron, wh may not be quite as good, able to °P erate almost any place in the world-
pje^tenant L. J. Lakser, U. S. Navy, ^ ter Squadron 101—/ compliment
beautiful shot.
"P
r"ceedi
Standi
araderie—outweighed the disad
"n Acting a photo of the VF-41 of ^ces P~14 Tomcat for the ewer ne ^pril Proceedings. Unfortunately. fj <as Printed upside down. As I recall thi<te>Iant PHI "Willy Boy" Lindner took q t>arlicular shot as we. Lieutenant u^nianc^r Gary "Silk” Allen and 1. ^lart Start'n8 UP ^e front side of a vertical °f ]UVer ab°ut six miles off the west coast c . a y during our last Mediterranean J'se aboard USS Nimitz (CVN-68).
K'ni ne C0Ver caPt,nn states, "above Vir- * Peach. " Despite the small errors, it
Eersonnel Priority for OP&T *d*Jals Investment in the ;^avy’s Future”
r/ J- Davis, pp. 92-93, January 1979
Junior Officer Retention, Why s It a Problem”
j P- Fisher, pp. 88-90, February 1979; p ■ Stavridis, pp. 91-92, April 1979 0,ee‘tinRS)
^ ■ Cook. Jr.—When I crossed quarterdeck of the USS Austin a ~p for the last time, over a decade pj ’'t was with ambivalent emotions. tUrirl8 my three-year tour the advan- s °f naval service—the increasing abilities, service under out- ng COs/xOs, and wardroom vantages—redundant inspections, paperwork, and lengthy in-port time. I certainly fell into Lieutenant Fisher’s Category III, maybe into Category II.
To my recollection, none of my fitness reports was discussed with me so that I could determine how I was performing vis-a-vis my peers. The extent of one XO’s retention effort was, “I guess you are getting out, too.” Maybe the fault was mine, but had a senior officer shown an interest or counseled me on career possibilities, I might be in the Navy today. Part of the junior officer retention problem might just be, “Nobody asked me. ...”
“Is There a Future for Celestial
Navigation in the Navy?”
(See P. K. Seidelmann and S. Feldman, pp.
98-100, March 1979 Proceedings)
Lieutenant (junior grade) Timothy R. Dring. U. S. Naval Reserve—I found Mr. Seidelmann’s and Mr. Feldman’s comments most appropriate in light of my experiences as the navigator of the USS Francis Hammond (FF-1067) operating from Yokosuka, Japan. During the training prior to reporting to the ship, I found that many officer trainees and junior officers believed celestial navigation to be a necessary evil rather than a necessary skill, readily forgetting all they learned by the time they transferred to their ships. Being a boating enthusiast and practicing celestial navigation as a hobby, I maintained iny proficiency, putting it to great use, in particular, during an Indian Ocean deployment. As soon as our task group passed south of the Malay Barrier, we lost all Loran and Omega coverage because the Australian Omega station was not in operation and polar cap absorption was oc- curing. From that point on, until we returned to the South China Sea via Singapore nine weeks later, the only means of determining our position was by celestial navigation. In this regard, we were fortunate in that clear skies and horizons prevailed during the deployment.
In support of the proposed night vision intensification telescope, numerous attempts on other deployments at obtaining a twilight fix were aborted when the horizon was obscured because of the frequent low evening haze which occurs in the Western Pacific. This haze usually cleared by very late evening giving a satisfactory horizon for observations, although too dark for viewing through a conventional telescope. A night star shot was attempted if the moon was available usually giving a fix of satisfactory accuracy, but a means of intensifying the image of the horizon would have proved invaluable under these circumstances and others, such as when the cloud cover breaks up sufficiently during the night to permit celestial observations.
Loran, Omega, and satellite navigation systems are not the final solutions to the navigation problem. Not only are the required receivers expensive and dependent on the availability of electrical power, but the systems themselves are susceptible to natural and man-made interference. Because celestial navigation is subject only to the effects of the weather, it remains as one of the most dependable means of position determination in peace or war. It makes sense, therefore, to supply each Navy ship with the best quality sextants and associated equipment for celestial observations, and to demand the necessary navigational proficiency on the part of all officers and quartermasters.
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t'Ons
mative or pre
an integral and enormous part
negative for any gender.
The
“\w
°rnen in Warships: A Right to Serve”
k'V F' Kclly’ pp- 44'54' October 1978;
Ian Sensei and R. Lane, pp. 86-87, p n3ry *979;J. L. Byron, C. O. Cook, and j-p- Hamiett, pp. 82-84, February 1979;
Ma ' Simpson, pp. 81-83, March 1979; R.
IQTcid311^ McM«nagle, pp. 90-91, April J feedings)
James Bradley. U. S. Air Force Mired)- Seldom have I read such a reb 3n^ chauvinistic article as the 0Utta* by Lieutenant Simpson. For
^ent6rS ■ ^'eUtenant ^‘mPson's f°ur sa"
the jX>lnts that must be answered in gap 3 ^rrnat've are the height of arro- f0Ce' One only has to substitute men ^iv^0rnen in those questions to per- e the flaws in his glittering gener- les- Also, the first and fourth ques- could be answered in the affir- ►: i e Prejudice articulated in this ar- lc*e is
Of [L 0‘“‘ 1"“*-
the l/ .Tro^^ern that the Navy—and ^ nited States—is trying to correct
°ugh intelligent and reasoned change.
Hat' eVen ^*nt’ f°r example, that the c°u-a- security of the United States ^ he perceived as weak because tel en are employed in combat- tj tasks is a monumental injus- a . 0 state categorically that this is Past '°na* assumPt‘onbecause of the p.s tat us of women is heinous. statlnally. the asinine and jingoistic geri^rnent that contrasts the intelli- Wa 'ntegration of women on board S ‘Ps to the Vietnam debacle is cheap chicanery. I think the lieutenant “doth protest too much.”
Captain Robert C. Peniston. U. S. Navy (Retired)—Lieutenant Simpson’s clear and concise response to Captain Kelly’s article is one of the best pieces written in opposition to women serving in naval vessels. If the four questions posed are truthfully answered by those in authority, the case for the assignment of women to sea billets goes aglimmering. It is most regrettable that the Navy has to contend with this annoyance at a time when it is striving to remain superior to the Soviet Navy—a task of sizable proportions.
“Tactics”
(See C. H. Johnson, pp. 37-43, October 1978; J. E. Callahan, pp. 23-24, January 1979 Proceedings)
Commander Roger M. Daily. U. S. Navy. Surface Warfare Development Group. Little Creek—“Tactics,” which is focused primarily on tactical development in the surface force, deserves a word in passing from the small island in that institutional sea charged with a measure of responsibility for such matters: the Surface Warfare Development Group (SurfWarDevGru). Lieutenant Johnson does not mention this relative newcomer to the field, nor do his organization charts show its more venerable counterparts among the aviation and subsurface communities. This is unfortunate, since it may lead the unfamiliar reader to suppose that tactical development at the intra-type level takes place solely among the rear echelons of the type commanders’ staffs. SurfWarDevGru is in the complicated and often perplexing business of tactical experimentation and documentation on a full-time basis.
Lieutenant Johnson leads off with the provocative assertion that a viable approach to tactical development has not evolved, and that this is because of a misunderstanding of the nature of tactics rather than to a lack of effort. I agree with his first perception, but suggest that “lack of interest” be substituted for “lack of effort,” and that no deeper cause need be sought. “Tactical excellence,” like “good order and discipline,” has no overt detractors. Nevertheless, in the gritty business of hammering out fleet schedules and exercise requirements one finds with dismaying regularity that tactical development falls into the “when feasible or NIB (not-to-interfere-basis) categories. Since, short of war, fleet exercises are the very laboratory of tactics, one must ask, "Not to interfere with what?" The answer, it turns out, is: nearly everything else. No single command or agency is responsible for this; it is rather the cumulative effect of an incredible burden of beancounting and card-punching requirements which have grown up in the stale atmosphere of burgeoning staffs, dwindling operating forces, and prolonged peacetime operations. Hollow
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lead
they are in, it is quite easy to
exhortations for "command attention” are not the answer, nor will they add one single minute to the crowded steaming schedules. It is a question of priorities, and the evidence suggests that whatever the rhetoric, the priority of tactical development is low.
I find Lieutenant Johnson’s analysis of the structure of tactics, involving the dependent relationships between systems capabilities, tactical concepts, and tactical procedures, to be soundly reasoned. His explanation of the problems generated by a confusion of procedures with concepts is especially penetrating, but I would add the caution that the line between concepts and procedures is not easily drawn.
And the argument for the tactictraining-systems capabilities relationship, so well brought out in the article and so clearly applicable to the complex interrelationships of surface units, could be strengthened by adding a fourth factor: operational requirements for new equipment or the modification of existing equipment. Nowhere are the shortcomings of material more obvious than at the leading edge of tactical development, yet the surface navy practices a sectarian separation of tactical experimentation and procurement. It is tempting to invite a comparison with our colleagues in the submarine force.
Turning to Lieutenant Johnson’s remedies for the expense nature of the development process, one must ask if the cure might not be worse than the disease. The creation of a Tactics Development and Evaluation czardom at the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations level would certainly bring about reorganization on a grand scale, but whether reorganization equals revitalization is at least debatable. The recent
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upgrading of OP-953 (Director, Tactical Development and Evaluation Division) to a flag billet under Rear Admiral Allen E. “Boot” Hill is a heartening indication that more attention is being given to tactical development at the top. But the responsibility for the tactics themselves must be left where it is; with the operational commanders upon whom the responsibility for wartime operations will ultimately fall.
Finally, Lieutenant Johnson is right on target in calling for an avenue for the rapid exchange of ideas, information, and suggestions. I applaud his implicit sense of outrage that so important a subject could have become so muddled.
“SEATAG: More Than a Game”
(See R. M. Nutwell, pp. 101-103, February 1979 Proceedings)
Midshipman Stephen Surko. U. S. Navy, U. S. Naval Academy—Commander Nutwell presents many applications and possibilities of wargaming to the military. Several further considerations would increase the effectiveness of SEATAG.
► The game board design would be improved with the use of a hexagonal grid superimposed upon the playing field. Such a grid would facilitate, and more accurately control, the movement and combat ranges of units. The hexagonal grid has proven very successful in the civilian wargaming field.
► Wargaming realism is limited by the subjective determination of unit strength values and an appropriate combat results table. The more objectively these values are determined, the more realistic the wargame becomes.
An awareness that wargames can00 faithfully simulate a military confro0 tation places the results and lessons learned in proper perspective.
► There would be two significant a vantages to having the players part in the simulation from all Par ticipating sides. Players would hav the chance to experience the adva0 tages and the difficulties of the ot e side. Results from the simulati00 would also be more accurate because they would not reflect the tendency a more skilled player to continua ) produce a certain result.
“The New Breed of Sailor
CSee R. E. Hasson, pp. 41-45, March 19^1 Proceedings)
Jon B. Jolly—Chief Quartermaster Hasson states that “right or wro0?j for today’s breed of sailor, person* convictions and desires outweigh c sense of duty and loyalty to country-
This simply is not right. It can0Ot be. If it were, no one would ever j°in the services, and if they did, the) would never ship-over.
If you approach members of 1 armed forces today and ask them "hy
them into self-serving answers Moreover, these are the things wm are on the tips of individuals’ tongueS' Unfortunately, today’s service me01 bers are seldom subjected to reaso0 able inspirational material or leader
ship- he Yet, if one interrogates beyond
surface responses, the real teas00
people enter the armed forces is
cause of some version of patriotis01
Moreover, these individuals want
be patriotic and want to feel that the^
work has value beyond the money .
personal preferment. This is true
any endeavor. Every individual des>
greatly to feel that he is making a 000
tribution. To digress briefly, *c -
been said that the only things i0
worth doing are those which we c‘lP
do for others for which they ca00
possibly repay us. I think service
the armed forces to the United State
comes under this category, and there
fore it is an exceedingly worthw0
thing to do.
cal V, Tient
Qg. reaches print, several points will 'vit-l, riev,ew’ng as we come to grips vertical or short takeoff and
®udget Cuts Marine AV-8B”
G. C. Wilson, p. 107, March 1979;
- Suddath, and S. C. Truver, pp. 25-26, Apnl «79 Proceedings)
h\ ^"r ^enera^ Fred Haynes, U. S. und'ne ^°rPs (Retired)—In March, of nf C°n&ress*°nal pressure, Secretary ea ]' e^ense Harold Brown reversed an ljoler dec*sion and released $108 mil- ti(>n rGrn Year 1979 appropria-
Ve,ns ^or AV-8B Advanced Harrier de- ^ oprnent. And, although Cong ress 3y have restored AV-8B funds for Fis- ear 1980 by the time this com- ^ding (v/stol) question. The aaynes Board (1975-1976) considered , lety of weapon mixes to provide Co >r ^*re suPPort f°r the Marine Ps over the next decade or so. The fje^ consisted of skilled officers of tear*d general officer rank with ex- et)cJVe a‘r and ground combat experi- ^hat Board was in solid agree- that the Marine Corps required a sh i attach force; that that force tnar ^ v^STOLi and that for three sne amphibious forces, eight Bo3 ,r0ns w°uld be adequate. The att i B*aced highest priority on light all^ V/ST°L, and close behind came lan ^eatBer conventional takeoff and Ing (CTOL) attack aircraft.
I am even more convinced today that the AV-8B must be developed for the light attack role and, if a forced choice is inevitable, should be given priority over a large CTOL fighter/ attack force. Certain elements of the question deserve emphasis.
► The AV-8B is a bird-in-hand; the technology exists, and it shows substantial growth potential. The B + version, for example, can be given more than 1,500 pounds of thrust beyond that of the current AV-8B engine.
► The AV-8B can be based close to the battle area, ensuring that the ground commander’s needs can be met rapidly. Close-to-the-front basing minimizes unproductive transit times and maximizes high sortie rates.
► The AV-8B’s capability to operate either vertically or with short takeoff roll ensures that the aircraft will continue to operate in spite of damage to air bases, and enables the aircraft to disperse to other operating sites when required for survival, and, therefore, to continue their availability as a support weapon.
► The AV-8B’s fuel economy, realized from “ground loiter” and shortened takeoff-to-target runs, minimizes the logistics burden. The payload/range capability is enhanced further by the “ski jump” takeoff. For example, with slightly over a 1,000 foot horizontal takeoff roll an AV-8B, armed with six 500-pound bombs and a full loading of guns and ammunition, can fly a 600-nautical mile mission. With the ski jump, the same mission can be accomplished with a takeoff roll of approximately 500 feet. I feel certain that the A-18 Hornet, to accomplish the same mission with the same load, must require a 3,000 to 4,000 foot takeoff roll.
y There are several advantages to the ski jump in addition to enhancing the payload/range capability. The ski jump can be carried in regular 40-foot shipping containers to the objective area. The ski jump can be constructed from standard NATO tactical bridging. Perhaps, above all, the ski jump V/STOL concept makes possible the provision of excellent close air support, as the amphibious fleet diminishes and we lose the capability to haul the expeditionary airfield with the leading Marine Corps forces.
► The AV-8B will require fewer support personnel and less fuel than the A-18. While near-term costs of AV-8B development and procurement are substantial, the life-cycle costs of a V/STOL light attack force would be about equal to the alternative A-18 force and provide more effective fire support.
Finally, the AV-8B should be developed even if this means fewer CTOL fighter/attack aircraft. Fighter/attack modernization is essential, but the top Marine Corps fixed-wing priority must be the light attack and allweather attack forces to ensure adequate firepower for the close support mission.
(Continued on page 82)
ENTER THE FORUM
We welcome brief comments on material published in the Proceedings and also brief discussion items on topics of naval, maritime,,or military interest for possible publication on these pages. A primary purpose of the Proceedings is to provide a place where ideas of importance to the Sea Services can be exchanged. The Institute pays an honorarium to the author of each comment or discussion item published in the Proceedings.
Hoc
Comment and Discussion
(Continued from page 21)
“U. S. Civilians in Europe:
Potential Hostages of War”
CSee W.H. Parks, pp. 94-95, April 1979
Proceedings)
Specialist-6 Paul M. Sayles, Jr., U. S. Army—I would like to propose that in the future, ships of frigate size and larger, which are deployed in potential areas of active U.S. military involvement (i.e., the Middle East, Caribbean areas, etc.), have a squad of marines assigned as part of the ship’s complement. This proposal would put a trained nucleus of 12 to 13 men at the disposal of the commanding officer for situations such as evacuation of refugees, boarding of ships on the high seas (the Mayaguez rescue comes to mind here), repelling boarders and, in short, being available for any situation where highly trained hand-to- hand combat professionals are required with little or no delay.
A number of frigates and patrol vessels of the Royal Navy presently carry a detachment of Royal Marines for just such situations.
A by-product of this proposal is that more marines would get the opportunity to go to sea than is currently the case. This would also give the squad leader or officer experience and exposure to an independent command.
while political minds in their earnest but fumbling way have led us down the path to certain confrontation.
If it is true that wars represent the failure of diplomacy, it seems to me there is a big gap somewhere in our selection of diplomats and in their training.
We do not make generals and admirals from merchants and lawyers, but from selected men who have made a career of the study of warfare and who are masters of their trade. Politicians, on the other hand—whose failure may make war necessary, and who control the military—are voted into office largely on personal appeal. They may not have any particular background in the deadly matters over which they will preside; yet their decisions, good or bad, put the lives of admirals, generals, and soldiers in the field on the line. And in these recent days, the civilian population is also jeopardized.
Review of such articles in the Proceedings reinforces the need for elaborate preparation and also continuity in the training of our diplomats. Rare is the man who can excel as a professor one year and as diplomat the next. Rare is the man who can do all things well. Rare is the man who can perform in the top job without years of training.
simply stupefying. I would endor5 their choice of personnel managed
as the top priority if they are
talking
about “leadership”—the cultivatiHfl
and forging of mutual trust ana
spect between junior and senior,
tween shipmates and fellow °®ce^
whereby those who lead and those '
7 ther
of
follow are able to stand toge1
through all the stresses and trauma
battle. The authors, I am sorry to say’
do not touch upon this notion.
Their Priority #2 — “Danuag
Control”—is grossly out of P^aCe • ° . . . r shlP
Certainly the survivability or a
depends on her crew’s ability to c<’n
tain damage whether fighting anot
unit, a hurricane, or a fire. But let^
face it, we build warships so that
may have the capability
damage on the enemy, not to alongside the pier and hold fire Rating “Operational Training Priority #6 is a logical but
sit
drills-
softy
product of a strictly peacetime men1
ity. Something also bothers me ai
tab
.bout
din£
say
From the Pages of My Old Proceedings—A Clear Voice
Milton C. Fitzgerald—The time has come for me to discard some of the old issues of the Proceedings, and I do so reluctantly, re-reading many articles.
1 have just re-read "U. S. Destiny in the Middle East” (November 1956, pp. 1161-1169) by Rear Admiral E. M. Eller. This article is a preview— even a prediction—of exactly the situation we have in the Middle East today. One wonders how it is that military people could foresee so clearly
“Setting Shipboard Priorities”
(See K. R. McGruther and J. P. Morse, pp.
36-41, February 1979; D. L. McDonald, p.
27, April 1979 Proceedings')
Lieutenant (junior grade) Matthew Frederick Culen, U. S. Navy. USS Preserver (ARS-8)—1 don’t doubt that the authors are competent and successful naval officers, but we are in a “war” navy and not a peacetime navy. To associate anything like “the ship’s laundry and barber shop” with Priority #1—“Personnel Management”—is
the authors’ attitudes regaf “Cleanliness”—Priority #4. To that “cleanliness is a state of m<n may make sense to their mou
minds, but to me clean is clean at1
tne
wh°
take pride in their floating home af> their profession. And I know that t “clean ship is a smart ship” n0t ,£ makes good impressions, but it lS^ true for ships any more than pe0!1 Let’s not confuse causes with effeC^ The main idea is to be smart, not i - look smart. And looking smart _ out being worth your salt is detrimen tal in the long run because, 411 ^ simply, it is hypocrisy and the ma of a paper tiger.
dirt is dirt. Yes, a clean ship 1S natural product of clean people
with'
“Physical Fitness” rates a P1
oof
Priority #8 on the incredible list- ^
amazing that the authors speak 1
itlOh
they
physical fitness in terms of recrea
and therapeutic effects. Here have not put the cart before the horse they have forgotten about the
lrely. While it is true that exercise ideneS ^ene^ts which the authors icaH’ ' *n the military context, phys- tole *tneSS ^as two ^ar more important str S ^’rst> our people should be the ^ an<^ hearty- so that enduring a , r,®°rS m'htary life both in peace *n war is a small obstacle. Second,
It IS 3 . ’
necessary ingredient in the de- cloprni
c°nfid,
lent of a fighting man’s self-
super.
. ence, a kind of a personal
over the enemy, jjj y no challenge can intimidate
challenge can intimidate M * arri not suggesting that the £ ^ should be turned into a Marine in lfS an<^ * ^ave no v‘si°ns °f sailors svhoan°'to'hand combat, but the man ;s ■ ls afraid of hand-to-hand combat rUnln.CaPahle of winning in the long
I
tiari
spite of his billion dollar sub-
l^nes ar>d carriers.
t^ent C^e*r cr't*c'sm crisis manage-
simi ’ tbe authors have fallen into a
ar trap. Their entire outlook and prior •
Ptes:
fact
fries
are a reaction to peacetime
SUres. If their approach does, in m ’ rePresent the priorities of our We will never win another war.
“Tl
e Soviet Navy and Forward ePloyment”
Jet G
Charbonneau, pp. 35-40, March 1979
(^ander T- Blades, U. S. Navy ''aval ^hy tfo so many American Ad COrnrnentators delight in seeing C-l Gorshkov’s Soviet Navy as a
\r CtlV defensive instrument? The
^Navai T . .
i'll k lnstitute has published a
p. i er of them in recent years, fjer&Ps beginning with Robert W.
the newest developments in Soviet surface ships, attack submarines, and naval aircraft probably aim at a major mission, if not the prime one, of supporting and protecting their own ballistic missile submarines. But to see the Soviet Navy in only that light is to ignore a lot of other evidence.
For one thing, Mr. Charbonneau’s Soviet warship classification table is the narrowest one I’ve seen. To put only Sverdlov cruisers in the “Antisurface Surface Forces” is truly startling. With the exception of “Kara,” “Kresta II,” and Moskva, all the other ships he puts in “ASW Surface Forces” would be much better classified as “General Purpose.” He ignores the guns on all of them and the surface- to-air missile and surface-to-surface missile batteries on most of them. (The “Krivak”-class destroyer can be called primarily an ASW ship because of four modern SS-N-14 missiles, but with two 100-mm. and four 76-mm. guns and two SA-N-4 launchers as well, I call her one of the heaviest-armed general-purpose destroyers in the world.) Mr. Charbonneau certainly plays down the “Antisurface Submarines.” Although the percentage of these built versus that of strategic submarines has decreased, the Soviets haven’t stopped building or modernizing them. Maybe having 1,090,000 tons worth already—Mr. Charbonneau’s own number—allows the Soviets to feel comfortable enough for now.
Mr. Charbonneau also ignores completely entire other growth areas of the Soviet Navy: frigates (not very effective against strategic submarines), fast patrol boats (ASW, torpedo, and missile types), and, perhaps most puzzling, its amphibious lift capacity. This latter force certainly has neither ASW nor submarine support use.
By ignoring these other weapon systems and the other components of the Soviet Navy, one can be led to see Soviet long-distance deployments as a one-mission exercise—just as Mr. Charbonneau does. The Soviets are too conservative to specialize in anything that much. Admittedly, antisubmarine warfare and strategic strike (by submarine) are prime Soviet Navy missions, but the 1976 edition of the Soviet Military Encyclopedia lists some others, including anticarrier warfare, interdiction of the sea lines of communication (and protecting its own),
The Soviet Navy’s emphasis on amphibious warfare—which neither supports ASW nor pro-SSBN missions—has increased, if its shipbuilding programs are an accurate indication. In the past five years, the Soviets have introduced two major amphibious warfare ship classes—the 4,500-ton Ropucha-c/rm 1ST (below), and the 12,000-ton Ivan Rogov-class LSD (pictured on page 64).
northcott:
30 ^s book, Soviet Naval Strategy: bast °f Theory and Practice (1968). C|es ^ear> the Proceedings carried arti- by J.T. Westwood and Andrew Vei which were in this same
boLNow alon« comes Gary Char- b"eau with yet another, abn er^thing Mr. Charbonneau says tr^Ut the Soviet trend toward concen- b\s\y°n 0n ant'suhmarine warfare t;0ln recent years as a counterac- t0 the threat of Polaris/Poseidon taj "bfident) strategic missiles is cer- ^ y true, and is seen by almost all Servers. To most, it is also clear that
^Oo
/ June 1979
83
Captain Whelan correctly P01
inP
ful
SovietS
perceive they have been “success:
.trie'
force and the ballistic misSI
le-
th*1
Jr
marines available for SLOC inter1
■dic
tion. But this does not appear to cern them, since there is no appaf crash program to rebuild the shnn
fofCe
10°s
;0nS
fol'
SLOCs. Soviet force level limitaf' and observed tactics suggest the lowing SLOC interdiction scenario- How: A combination of m*ne*’ missile-firing submarines, and -1 craft, with the precise mix <depef1j dent on developments in Aafl
and peacetime service of the state’s interests. Why not believe them, and see long-range deployments as supporting all these as well? Their ships’ weapon suites certainly provide credibility in these other missions, and such a view is much more in tune with the whole range of facts.
For instance, let’s look at this matter of serving the state’s interests. Since early 1968, the Soviet Navy has had a sizeable “presence” in the Indian Ocean. To ease its logistic support problems so far from home, but also to practice a little "chokepoint” strategy, the Soviet Navy obtained basing privileges at Aden in the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen). Perhaps to try to get a hold on another major Indian Ocean chokepoint—Straits of Malacca—the Soviets have been negotiating for port usage (although not with much success to date) in Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia. Similar overtures have been conducted with Sri Lanka, India, Mozambique, and Iraq. It’s clear that the U.S.S.R. plans to maintain a permanent naval presence in the vital Indian Ocean area. It is more logical to see this move as a means of furthering its long-range national interests—demonstrating support for all, but especially to left-leaning Third World littoral nations there—than to see it in a strategic ASW mode.
Besides, the Soviets understand what advantages “presence” brings with it. Soviet Navy ships have maintained an almost continuous patrol of the West African coast since 1970, using it that year to bolster the government of Guinea against Portuguese-supported rebels. It came in handy to cover the Cuban intervention in the Angolan civil war in 19751976, including protection of the Soviet merchant ships used for military sealift at the time. During the 1973 Iraqi-Kuwaiti territorial dispute in the Persian Gulf, a Soviet squadron led by a Sverdlov-class cruiser showed up on the scene, coinciding with a visit to Iraq by Admiral Gorshkov. And a sizeable naval task force deployed to the South China Sea shortly after the beginning of the Chinese invasion of Vietnam. When Mr. Char- bonneau says that “the U.S.S.R. has only occasionally engaged in ‘gunboat diplomacy’ of one sort or another in recent years,” he should note that the frequency is beginning to increase. And he might also notice the increasing finesse with which the Soviets practice it. It has been alleged that Mr. Brezhnev was able to dissuade President Carter from sending a U. S. carrier task force to the Persian Gulf area during the recent Iranian crisis because it would be too provocative. If it’s so, that thought didn’t prevent Brezhnev from placing about 15 of his own warships off the coast of Vietnam shortly thereafter.
As the number of “Delta”-class strategic submarines increases in the years ahead, Mr. Charbonneau expects to see the Soviet Navy turn away from forward deployments. Don’t count on it.
“The Soviet Anti-SLOC
Mission”
(See M. J. Whelan, pp. 100-113, February
1979 Proceedings')
Captain Thomas A. Brooks, U. S. Navy—Captain Whelan’s article- places an excellent perspective on the Soviet naval threat to our sea lines of communication (SLOCs) and the increased emphasis this mission has been receiving in recent Soviet writings. Particularly valuable are Captain Whelan’s observations regarding the nature of the threat: it involves “the integrated utilization of various arms of forces.” Although submarines are surely the backbone of the threat to the SLOC and surface ships play little part, the roles of Soviet Naval Aviation and mine warfare must not be overlooked. In many areas, the most efficient application of forces for SLOC interdiction might be minefields backed up by missile- and/or torpedofiring submarines. Submarine- launched missiles pose an antiair warfare (AAW) problem more than an antisubmarine warfare (ASW) problem—particularly if the missile is an SS-N-3 or SS-N-12 fired from well outside any ASW screen. Just how well equipped are we to cope with mines and AAW defense of convoys? For too long we have thought of the SLOC
threat in terms of the torpedo-fif‘n‘ submarine only.
out that it is only after the neutralizing the NATO attack c®1 equipped submarine threat . they will have the number of
cof'
eO1 k-
ing general-purpose submarine to levels they enjoyed in the ^ and 1960s. Indeed, in keeping "|t. Soviet views of how the war is 1* ,jj to be fought, a NATO war will st^. probably be a short war, where SLOCs will have little opportunity impact the outcome and a modest location of forces is adequate. Shoo ^ the war drag on, then SLOCs will ^ come increasingly important; but, ^ that time, additional forces may available from other higher prl° j tasks—e.g., anticarrier warfare (A^ and ASW. . _
Soviet writings do point to an ^ creased awareness of the importance
anti-:
c°mi
sab.
And
Ports
p 111 OUVICI pi lul lllCj .
fQ °ngtatulations to Captain Whelan
Pointi
ar.
gui
SSBn/pro-SSBN ASW. A con- •tant emphasis on attacks/ otage to destroy or incapacitate JJption ports.
*n: Limited forces (e.g., mines some submarines) at the outset 'Vlth an increased priority as it be- op,Tles apparent that the war is to be longer duration. Again, a con- >tant increase in emphasis on ttacking or otherwise neutralizing ^teption ports.
oy ere’ *~aPta'n Whelan points ’ the Soviets have conducted ex- ensive studies of SLOG interdiction .Ur‘ng World War 11. Soviet writ- ngs indicate that they view as im. ttical the conduct of open-ocean nttrcept of convoys. Rather, it ap- ats more likely that their anti- j '' efforts would be concentrated the natural chokepoint—the approaches to the Western European ePtion ports (e.g., a barrier from * to Cape Finisterre and across northern North Sea). In these ers, diesel submarines, mines, 'tcraft, and the full bag of Soviet aPability could be brought to bear.
again, interdiction of reception ls high in Soviet priorities.
•ng out the senselessness of •tit °Ver whether the Soviets will rpj r *ct SLOCs. They clearly have the to Sl°n an<^ the capability. It is time °ncentrate on the important tactical implications of when, where, and how the Soviets will interdict.
“The U. S. Navy: Mine
Countermeasures”
(N. Polmar, pp. 117-119, February 1979
Proceedings)
Captain E.F. Jardine, Jr., U. S. Navy, former Commander, Mine Squadron 12—The situation described by Mr. Polmar is a rather concise statement of our Navy’s dilemma in this rather unglamorous and oft-forgotten warfare area. Decisions made in the late 1960s and early 1970s at the OSD and OpNav level are apparently too expensive to carry out in the late 1970s. In essence, air mine countermeasures (AMCM) were to have the sole responsibility for shallow water (200 feet or less) mine clearance, while surface mine countermeasures (SMCM) would be responsible only for the deep ocean mines. Until the new MCM ship was to be introduced in quantity by the mid-1980s, the present-day ocean minesweeper (MSO) was to fill the gap by providing both shallow and deep water mine clearance capabilities. By acquiring sufficient AMCM helicopters and building the new SMCM ship, our Navy was to establish a credible MCM force to counter the very impressive Soviet Bloc mining capability.
At this time, there is no new SMCM
A Soviet Navy anti-SLOC mission is supported by antiship missile-equipped submarines (“Echo II" SSGN, facing page) and a significant mine warfare capability. The U. S. Navy, however, has only three MSOs in the active fleet. The Leader (MS0-490) and the Illusive (MSO-448), standing inside the HNIMS Sittard (M-830) and aft of the BNS Truffaut (M-908), recently were deployed to NATO’s Standing Naval Force Channel.
ship class firmly decided upon to be constructed—even if funds were to be made available—and no new helos funded for the AMCM squadrons. Our current capability in MCM resides in the two operational MCM squadrons with eight RH-53DS each and the two mine squadrons with 25 MSOs (22 of these are Naval Reserve Force ships). Obviously, the conscious perception of the mining threat against the United States at the OSD and OpNav level must be that, although the Soviet Bloc has a formidable mining capability, our enemies have no intention of using mines. In this era of nuclear weaponry that perception may be valid. It is becoming increasingly apparent to those familiar with mine warfare that Soviet client countries and/or Third World nations could easily deny the U. S. Navy the capability to project power across the seas by employing even very old, unsophisticated mines. The present-day MSO was constructed in quantity in the mid- 1950s when North Korea taught us that lesson. Must we always relearn history?
Fields of Fire
Major John C. McKay, U. S. Marine Corps—I am aware that the Proceedings does not publish reviews of works of fiction. Too bad. I would like to read a good one about Jim Webb's novel, Fields of Fire (Prentice-Hall,'1978).
Because the novel often becomes a vehicle for pet grievances, for crusades or vendettas, it is interesting (perhaps entertaining) but hardly relevant to the serious student of war. There are
85
Meetings / June 1979
years, quantified by a range scenarios from localized military °P
ations to all-out global warfare.
for'
wisd0111
of sub
A*
in-
the
id«
ing subsidy for each .5% that American-flag portion of this tra declined. .
One must wonder how effect such a formula would have been in 0
havC
ither
exceptions where the novel is a serious form of commentary on historical events. Such is the case with Fields of Fire. Just as any serious student of World War I can not ignore the works of Erich Maria Remarque, Siegfried Sasson, Wilfred Owen, Emilio Lussau, plus a host of others, he ought not ignore fictional works emerging from recent tumultuous times.
Compared to World War 1, World War II produced very little that was historically relevant and literarily great. The same can be said of the Korean conflict. But the Vietnam War was different.
That a very large segment of our society chose to avoid the messiness of combat in this war is well known, as is the fact that they chose virtually to ignore those relatively few who did go, did fight, and did die. If the combat veteran was acknowledged, it was usually through non-recognition, or worse, through derogatory and vulgar epithets. James Webb has done a superb job in capturing this sad condition. The effect it had on those who fought was to alienate them further from a society that had not given them much of a chance to begin with. Aptly enough, the prologue of Fields of Fire begins with the words of an anonymous general to correspondent Arthur Hadley:
“And who are the young men we are asking to go into action against such solid odds? You’ve met them. You know. They are the best we have. But they . . . know . . . that no one cares. They know.” Unprepared, these young men were thrown into a bloody and deadly war. They survived against both the enemy in Vietnam and the ignorant at home. That they transcended mere survival and became a bold and courageous team, welded together by the com- radery of combat, is a point wonderfully well described by Jim Webb.
Webb points no finger, lays no blame. Nor does he exaggerate. He depicts a cruel war in a most accurate manner: the ethical confusion which every combat soldier found himself confronted with is done tastefully but no less poignantly. In a sense Webb has done for the combat marine in Vietnam what Leon Uris did for him in the South Pacific. But Jim Webb has done it better.
In World War II, the Second Marine Division spent approximately three-and-a-half years in the South Pacific; its men spent six weeks in combat — not continuous at that. Admittedly, the combat of those six intermittent weeks was extremely intense (e.g., Tarawa). The travails of Vietnam were no less rigorous, but the regular infantryman was faced with 13 months of the most passionate, least forgiving of all combat: war against a well-prepared, dedicated guerrilla foe. There were essentially two escapes from the 13-month tour: to receive a disfiguring, often decapacitating, wound; or to be killed. Yet there were those who extended their tours in Vietnam to remain with their units. They had come to identify, to be accepted, to share a purpose which many had never had before, and, if they lived, probably would never have again. The vulgarity of combat—this type of combat in particular — bound them, shaped them, endeared them to others as others were endeared to them, while it held out a morbid fascination which in giving meaning to their lives (for once) hypnotized them and held them. Many never broke away from the spell.
Herein lies the beauty and worth of this book. Jim Webb has created a glimpse of a complex war at the level where it was fought. That the fighter of that war was not immune from its complexities, its many nuances, and was not immune from bearing the cross of blame for something he did not understand, is superbly portrayed by Webb.
This is not an anti-war novel. Rather, it is a masterful portrayal of a savagely fought war. Nor is it an apologia for what was done in Vietnam (or should not have been done). It is a book about a very different war fought by un-named brave young men—the best we have. It is a book by an ex-marine officer who knew that war intimately. What Jim Webb has to say warrants serious consideration by all professional military men as well as anyone concerned about our Vietnam experience.
“Toward a National Merchant Marine Policy”
(See L. C. Kendall, pp. 42-47, February IJ>79’ N. E. Vacakis, p. 29, April 1979 Proceeds
Robert J. Blackwell, Assistant Secretat) of Commerce for Maritime Afft»rs Colonel Kendall is to be comrnen e for the attention he has focused on °u nation’s maritime posture.
While I can agree with many ofc points he cites in his essay, there ‘ two that warrant comment.
He recommends that DoD planners in the future should est‘ ^ lish what they need in the for01 merchant-type shipping” to tn military sealift requirements. 1 ^ implies that such assessments have been undertaken. The fact is that su ^ evaluations have been made and UP dated on a continuing basis for m* ^
or
While
the needs are known, the capability of our merchant marine to fulfil 1 logistic support missions, in cer major-scale military operations, un tunately, are not fully adequate In addition, I question the of Colonel Kendall’s proposal to *ntl^e duce incentives and penalties into operating-differential subsidy progra to improve the competitiveness
sidized steamship companies, stated, he would provide a 5$ crease in subsidy to the subsidized rier for each .5% in increased ear? carriage it was instrumental in gatnef^ ing for the American-flag portion this trade. Conversely, an Arnerit^ flag carrier in this trade would penalized by a 2% reduction in °P€t\,
Pacific trades last year. Would it prevented the bankruptcy of elt _ Pacific Far East Line or States ship? Would such a formula offset t ^ overtonnaging and rate cutting nonconference cross-traders, inclua1 government-owned liner fleets? I d0(1 think so.
The proposal could have the eti of increasing subsidy to those
°ast Guard Vessel Systems”
VV pf ^dams, pp. 54-61, October 1978;
p,' MurPhy, p. 24, February 1979 °ceedi
ne IT" *ncreased revenues, actually subsidy, and of reducing su ^ t0 t^10se operators who are less eviMu^ ‘n obtaining cargo. The in- tbge net effect would be erosion of its S-~flag f]eet an£j a recjuction 0f National defense capability. tQ ° °nel Kendall's apparent solution to 1S Pr°blem is for the government profPro^ts> an£i to have excess jv lts turned over to the Treasury ten^artrnent Actual|y’ ronch more ex- 7e reviews of operator finances '''Quid ^ re8u'recb Astute operators the j’ /0r tax purposes, assure that <««»-l subsidy revenues gained tyL- be reinvested in a manner (f0|IC would not reflect in profits. tle>n>tf^^ ^endall has not offered a solu- ygaror the operator who has a bad jtand whose cash position and abil- U recover from that bad year Sufc>sid adverse,y affected by reduced
diff^'^ ^'°^onel Kendall and I may COnori s°me points, I wholeheartedly PqI Cur w'rh his thesis that our maritime in *C^ must be carried out in the best resrs of the nation.
"»«0
yriJter,naster Second Class Michael R. Us . U. S. Coast Guard—Some of
- n the Coast Guard have taken of- ‘ense tn r-
COn o Captain Murphy’s statements trabpern*n8 the operation of the vessel So, IC serv>ce (VTS) at Prince William pnd- Alaska.
f-°ast;St’ every effort is made by the pr()p Guard to maintain safety and quess‘°nalism. Obviously, the Coast pil ^ cannot afford to have registered thej 0r tanker captains manning all VTss on a round-the-clock basis. Pj Would be a waste of manpower. a j. Ver, the officer on watch (usually itlgleUtenant) bas bad sufficient train- cbto make him competent to dis- Iti f^e ^lls duties safely and effectively. 6r dition, each enlisted watchstand- irienriUst know (memorize) every promaid ^0,nt of land, every navigational ’ die soundings of the main channel, and where the shoals are. It takes at least six months in watchstanding to become qualified to stand watch without supervision.
Granted, the vessel traffic service is not infallible; human error must be taken into consideration in any navigation problem. But tanker captains and pilots should be able to appreciate the range and scope of the job that the Coast Guard is required to perform and the sincere efforts being made by the organization to make the VTS as efficient as possible.
Since Captain Murphy believes that the Cuyahoga incident is a reflection on the competence of all in the Coast Guard, should we, in turn, consider the blunders of the Argo Merchant and the many similar incidents that have taken place recently as typical of all tanker crews? We are not so short sighted that we would do that.
Finally, the “incidents of ineptitude” that Captain Murphy mentions are small problems that occurred during the first days of VTS, Valdez. I am sure that any competent mariner can convert yards to nautical miles without too much trouble. I think that even though, according to Captain Murphy, “mariners know the system is manned by kids,” they will find that our degree of professionalism and regard for safety are as high as that which they will find among their associates and shipmates.
“Misuse of the Fast Battleship in World War II”
(See M. Muir, pp. 57-62, February 1979; G. Aerrsen, p. 86, April 1979 Proceeding)
“Bombarding Japan”
(See E. J. Mathews, pp. 74-75, February 1979 Proceedings)
“Bring Back the Corps”
(See P. W. Snyder, pp. 48-55, February 1979 Proceedings)
Admiral James L. Holloway, Jr., U. S. Navy (Retired)—Fortuitously or by design, three papers in the February Proceedings seemed closely related to fast battleships and inspired a nostalgia sufficient to cause me to take pen in hand to you for the first time in over a
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artist could convey the meaning
that signal, but then I turned my
tention to the flag hoists. The
half century of U. S. Naval Institute membership.
First came Ching Lee—may the biography of this genius and unsung hero appear soon—as seen in Malcolm Muir’s account. Having been navigator of the Idaho (BB-42) in 1938, I was not exactly a green horn in a big ship, but handling the Iowa (BB-61) at 60,000 tons with twin rudders, four props, no dead wood aft, and good for 30 knots-plus and able to turn inside a destroyer, was a joy. And there were those triple 16-inch gun turrets with bores well separated (the result of pressure of Willis Augustus Lee in Bureau of Ordnance) which gave a 200-300 yard salvo pattern instead of a 1,000 yards or so in prewar construction—the mass of radar-controlled 5-inch/38, and 40 mm. quads remotely controlled by the Mark 14 sight (again Admiral Lee)—what a weapon system—and so appropriately called fast battleships.
Second, there was Commander Mathews’ story under Old Navy! Rear
Admiral Oscar Badger’s group in the Iowa, Missouri (BB-63), and Wisconsin (BB-64) was doing the same thing at about the same time as the bombardment Mathews described—our group bombarded Muroran, Hokkaido, on 15 July, and Hitachi, Honshu, 17-18 July. We also had a Royal Navy battleship along—but well removed. The British were not used to doing— executing—the whirling dervish after only one ship was required to "Roger.” Third, and finally, in the Snyder article that great Ned Cochrane who built not only good but beautiful ships appears. His was a great feat, raising the Pearl Harbor victims to fight again—our magnificent fire support ships all the way across the Pacific. The Pacific was the U. S. Navy’s oyster! Rear Admiral Kemp Tolley, whose inimitable stories are so delightful, implies persuasively that there were some who anticipated “just a little attack” at Pearl to unify the nation and were badly shocked by the disaster. But sad and regrettable
though our losses in people wer^ what a blessing it was to go down water only a few feet under the This made it possible for Ned an people to raise and modernize t old heroines to participate enormous and gloriously in our final victory-
Frank R. Hamlett, Jr. —After reading Dr. Muir’s and Commander Mathe^ accounts, I took a closer look at at Jack Coggins’ painting on the co Having felt the sense of P°"^_ emanating from Coggins’ battle ^ gons, admired the interplay of sea *
sky colors, and almost felt the rest 1 • j that
surge of the ocean, I then noticed
the third ship in line is signaling
flashing light. There is no way
at'
South npe
Dakota (BB-57) is flying Corpen ^ Two Six, and her sisters seem to s the same signal.
The fast battleship was one of the most powerful and m vincible ships ever built. Originally regarded as the uln mate naval weapon, these extraordinary vessels have no'*’ all but vanished from the seas they once dominated.
Jack Coggins has captured the majesty and authority of ll type of ship that will probably never be seen again. In d'c lead is the USS South Dakota (BB-57), the famed “Battleship X” of World War II communiques. She is followed by two of her sister ships in column somewhere in die Pacific. This original painting is now available from die U. S. Naval Institute as a full color print measuring 26 N 21”. It is the latest addition to the distinguished series o prints that make up the Institute’s Gallery of Fine Color Reproductions.
List price: S7.00 Member’s price: $5.00
Add S) .00 to each order for postage and handling. (Please use order form in Books of Interest to the Professional section. J
Adn
^ar
' as I tried to find a context into
tCV cou^ fit this signal. My first
dashJ7'ral W.A. Lee’s TF-34 about to $tr„. ,ack to the San Bernardino
South
°wever, the idea that this is the
Dakota
"cist of P'cture.
signal flags would help my A glance at my file of signals,
?°d Co
^ird
ship invited an attempt to show
secret while the North was the “showboat.” The
Aft,
Th
the IS SSnt *ne ba<-k into the text of ^ tVV0 articles and also into Rear tfttral S.E. Morison’s The Two Ocean
„r . , 1 was this may have been a part f Admiral VYr a t
^ back _________
c°urs ^Ut ^oes not seem a bkely „,l ■ , t0 Set there from the point at ^ Halsey detached TF-34.
to -“■«««, Indiana (BB-58), and to 5*ac^Usetts (BB-59) retiring (or about da ?tlrel on course 126 after the bom- u ent °f Kamaishi seems to be at glrJ, reas°nable. Was this Mr. Cog- lr>tent when he did the painting?
ten ■<~‘°88*ns—I must disavow any in- ticai°n Portrayin8 a particular tac- ^tnaneuver in my painting.
land tbe cyPes vessels ever built Iforn ^ ^3Ve Pa'nte<^ many of them, bar l ^abeons t0 racing yachts), the Pers tSfllP bas always seemed to me to jn(jnify the epitome of power and ^ squadron of such a S’ smashing through huge seas,
PainT' ^ t0 me aS tbe subiect ^or a
evln8- Just as a figure or two, how- scaf Srr|all, often adds life to a land- llQ;_ 0r harbor scene, so I felt that a rpen One Two Six was soon fly- .,&■ The dull sky and dark hull of the
Slgnal flash
Ham/ j 'yi
0 1 “ T. Berc—Dr. Muir’s essay not n\er brought attention to a subject tri *tln® more detailed study, but ah^erecl “ancient angers” in me °Ut the journalistic neglect of the ftior ^as^ln&ton (BB~56), unlike the (Bg 6 Vl8°rously treated North Carolina ^ and South Dakota (BB-57). sh' S tbe “)unior” sister of the two- t,,y^ort^ Carolina class, the Washing- _ Was the
fe" .
Wid ‘n^t,m s men smarted under the ^ e Publicity given to her sister in . years and now repeated in Dr. Ulrs article.
er the 1942 actions, the South
Dakota was given justifiable headlines for her Santa Cruz performance. Dr. Muir perpetuates this recognition, as he points up North Carolina’s dominant role in the Eastern Solomons, to say nothing of his cheers for the Massachusetts' action against the docked and incomplete Jean Bart\
But when it comes to identifying the most significant surface action in modern American naval history involving battleships, the Washington is obliged to share the sinking of the Kirishima with the South Dakota.
It seemed to me that Dr. Muir was using Samuel Eliot Morison as his authority. But Morison’s account does not show the Kirishima to have ever been a South Dakota target. In fact, Morison makes it clear that 9 of 75 16-inch shells from the Washington scored hits on the enemy battleship along with 40 5-inchers. The Washington had a clear fire control solution on the Kirishima and was, in fact, dividing her batteries to knock out ships which had illuminated the South Dakota and were visiting great harm upon her.
Why, then, does Dr. Muir decide that the South Dakota and the Washington “turned the tide at Guadalcanal by sinking the Japanese battleship Kirishima in a night action, thereby saving American troops on the island from a devastating bombardment?” The achievement belonged to the Washington alone!
Having been damaged in the action, the South Dakota returned to the United States for repairs and got the public credit for the victory. The Japanese had identified the Washington as the “Idaho" and it was deemed necessary at that time to foster the error. But in this later-day review by Dr. Muir, all the Washington's men will believe he should have brought “historic justice” to their ship.
“Navy Needs to Improve Its Treatment of Retirees”
(See S. Dombroff, p. 76, March 1979 Proceedings)
Commander Harry W. Kinsley. Jr., U. S. Navy (Retired)— Captain Dombroff has done a fine job of articulating some of the annoying disparities between the way that other services treat their retirees and what the Navy does for its people. The Army and Air Force provide casualty assistance calls for the widows of retirees. The Navy, for the most part, provides nothing. The Navy, which prides itself on its “human goals” program for its active people, apparently has a very callous “what have you done for me lately” attitude toward its retired community. This approach is very shortsighted. Proud retired people appreciative of thoughtful treatment might just provide the impetus necessary to convince their children and grandchildren that a career in the all-volunteer force is worthwhile. [1][2]
impossible) explanation of the Li ^ incident. Perhaps this is the ^ world” Mr. Polmar writes about w failing to make it coherent.
The comment offered by Capc‘
m°r ,eak' put
de
stroyer Kocatepe (D-354) on the aSSUl^if. tion she was a Greek man-of-war ing the Turko-Greek clash over
dor'
cr
helP
destroyers were absolutely confusa The same cannot be said of the alle?
re-
numbers of retired persons living near our naval bases have grown in sufficient numbers to overwhelm the Navy’s delivery systems for everything from medical care to package goods. Those active duty only perquisites are perquisites of duty, not rank, and they go to those who are charged with our nation s defense. We who have retired are excused from those responsibilities. We must accept that the business of those on active duty takes precedence over the exercise of our privileges, which we can enjoy at a much more leisurely pace.
Captain Seymour Dombroff. U. S. Navy (Retired)—1 just received a letter from the Director, Personal Services Division, Bureau of Naval Personnel, which was most gratifying to me. 1 have no objections if you wish to quote from it for those of your membership who have expressed an interest in my original comments.
“Your comments published in the March 1979 Proceedings come at an opportune time, although, as you might have suspected, a number of actions already are underway to redress the grievances you cite:
► The autumn seminars we have run for the past seven years have traditionally been aimed at dispensing information to retired members. Feedback from those sessions has been minimal, and primarily concerned with commissary hours, CHAMPUS eligibility questions, and the like. However, in January 1979, the Chief of Naval Operations directed that increased emphasis be made to obtain information from those attending these seminars for forwarding to the Secretary of the Navy Advisory Committee on Retired Personnel (ACRP). That is where action is recommended for policy changes concerning retired personnel.
► I couldn’t agree more with your comments about the Newsletter. . . . you will be pleased to know that even as you were preparing your letter for Proceedings, we were initiating changes in the format, content and timeliness of the Newsletter. Effective with the Summer 1979 issue and thereafter, the Newsletter will be a significant improvement over previous years.
I’m glad you raised these issues. Your letter gives us a perfect opportunity to inform you what we’re doing to keep retired members in the family.
“The Violation of the ‘Liberty’”
{See R. K. Smith, pp. 62-70, June 1978;
S. C. Truvcr, pp. 91-93, September 1978;
N. Polmar, p. 88, October 1978; Y. Nitzan, pp. 111-113, November 1978; V. L. Brownfield and P. E. Tobin, pp. 104-107, December 1978; W. L. McGonagle and A. Friendly, p. 88, January 1979; D. Tapp, p. 86, February 1979 Proceedings')
Douglas H. Robinson. M.D.—Many Americans have waited 1 1 years for such comprehensive information on “The Violation of the Liberty. ” It was most satisfying to see the subject treated in such clinical fashion and gratifying to have it published in a magazine such as the Proceedings. The editors are to be commended.
At the same time 1 have been hard put to understand the comments offered on the article by Mr. Truver and Mr. Polmar. Mr. Truver quibbles over the “cultural” differences between the Japanese and the Israelis relative to their responses to the respective Panay and Liberty incidents. While raising a point he also misses it completely. If cultural differences are of any significance, it is a matter of Japanese vis-avis Americans and Israelis vis-a-vis Americans. He ignores the obvious that in both cases it was the United States which was the aggrieved party. It was incumbent upon the attackers to appreciate what American “culture” expected by way of adequate amends. The Japanese understood and handled the matter expeditiously. The Israelis did not, and after more than a decade have not yet paid for the ship. And it is specious for Mr. Truver to fault Smith’s article for not explaining the "how” and “why” of the attack from Israeli sources. If the U. S. Government, with so many instruments of coercion at its disposal, could not obtain a satisfactory explanation from Israel, it is foolish to expect a lone U. S. citizen to be more successful.
To recite a litany of similar >nC dents in which U. S. ships and aircr^ have been similarly attacked, stroyed, or seized by Communist tions, as does Mr. Polmar, ^P^jts talent for collecting interesting t* ^ without the capability of understan^ ing the context in which they curred. While the United States rn^ anticipate such hostile actions by War belligerents, it should not *■ to be apprehensive about similar ^ tions by “friends”—especially a c ‘ state such as Israel. Unless. Was 1 ^
in fact a covert “cold war on ^ day in June 1967 between level U. S. and Israeli policyma ^ who were in disagreement as to p j ous agreed “limits” on the P°^tI" scope of the war, and the Liberty waS.s pawn in a silent conflict? This strongly suggested by British I nalist Anthony Pearson in his Cottsp acy of Silence (New York: Hofiz Press, 1978), a new book which 0 an intriguing and dismaying (but
Yaakov Nitzan, Israeli Navy, 1S understandable. He is at least sp1 ing on behalf of his own country- v when he cites the Turkish Air accidentally sinking the Turkish prus in 1974, and expects it t0 explain away the Liberty incident, premise is faulty. The Kocatepe ^ Gearing-class destroyer (ex-USS wood [DD-861]). The Greek destroy^ Kanaris (ex-USS Stickell [DD-888]) a Themistocles (ex-USS Frank Knox l ^ 742]) are also Gearing-c\ass ships- ^ sister ships, the Turkish and U^
ed
similarity between the small EgyPcjj_ supply ship El Quseir, with her fashioned hull lines (typical or .
1920s), and the USS Liberty whose distinctive Victory s ^ silhouette was well known (more *■ 750 were built) on the oceans o world.
10
It deserves note that the captain
fi;
doi
Jln8 Noratlas aircraft. This
activity
es
comment informs us of a overflight by a Piper Cub-type Pare'3116 hew very close and ap-
erty ntJy took photographs of the Lib-
this lone, noncombat
'mptession the “Egyptians” had
fo,
tgott,
Urtherrnore, the captain’s assertion Plac ^anay incident of 1937 “took
t^S vv*thout correction. A of
face ■
.ccurred, the Japanese and Chinese
a'rfields seized in China; the oCc P°rt city of Shanghai had been uP>ed; and other Chinese
ports
*e;
a j' two belligerents were under aefinite ; -• >- -r
sive^ ^r0m comment on the inten- jjy Pre-attack air surveillance of the hQ,->' s*x overflights in almost nine rs' most of them by the slow-
the n0t suPPort “snap decision" 4g CaPtain suggests. Eight hours and ]0nrrilnutes makes for an unbelievably held’ SnaP' And now Mr. Brown-
Seyenth ,
a,rPlan ..g When
0ufPt.an ship, operating in hazard- ivhe^atCrS w‘thout an escort at a time to l ^srael had air supremacy, failed Wjth a enge these several overflights no | an^ h°tm of antiaircraft fire, it is °ccu SS t^lan amaz'n8 that it did not ''^^r t0 someone to blinker the ship: tj,e . are you?” Or were they under en to sound reveille?
that
Ce In peacetime” is too frivolous to reader of
younger generation who is ignor-
face°h the episode might take this at
it Vaine. I well remember that when c Oc
had h
tafy een conducting large-scale mili- sjx °Perations against each other for JabarTl0nths (not a mere six days). tl0rt^ese armies were swarming over Pla efn '■'hina; hundreds of their air- fr0i^ts wcre bombing Chinese cities adee^!°se<^ hy a Japanese naval block- impression that a state of war existed (the gruesome “rape of Nanking” in which half a million civilians were literally put to the sword had just occurred), and the rest of the world of 1937 regarded it as a war. To nitpick over the lack of a declaration of war is like wondering precisely when the parties to the Arab-Israeli wars of 1948-1973 formally exchanged declarations of war in the quaint fashion of the 19th century.
Finally, with all respect to the captain’s statement that “a cornerstone of Israel’s foreign policy is the maintenance of close friendly relations with the United States,” I, and I believe most other Americans who have become familiar with the details of the Liberty incident, find it inexplicable that Israel has for all these years refused to pay for the damage to the ship. In view of Israel’s dependence upon American largesse (e.g., $2.4 billion from the U. S. Treasury, plus $1.2 billion from other American sources, in the one year of 1976), remittance of the Liberty damages would amount to little more than a charade in bookkeeping. But it would have been a wise stroke of public relations; it would have demonstrated Israel’s good faith. More important, it would have fulfilled Prime Minister Eshkol’s public promise of 1967 to “make amends for the tragic loss of life and material damage. ” (The emphasis is mine.) More than a few Americans cannot help but think that with those same $2.4 billions of 1976 the U. S. Navy could have laid down the keels for two sister ships to the carrier USS Nimitz (CVN-68); ships that will be missed by the Sixth Fleet before the end of the 1980s.
“Punishment, Discipline, and
the Naval Profession”
(See J. B. Bonds, pp. 43-49, December 1978;
E. E. Bracken, p. 20, March 1979; R.
Hradecky, p. 28, April 1979 Proceedings')
Captain J. E. Pons, U. S. Marine Corps—At the outset we must recognize that prerogatives of commanders in the military judicial system have been taken away because of demonstrated abuse. Commander Bonds recognizes that, even in the military, rights of individuals are important. But these rights have suffered unnecessarily. Abuses have ranged from execution of the death sentence without benefit of higher review to widespread improper influencing of individual court members.
Congress and the courts are limited by their own respective political or procedural inertia. Changes in military justice have not been made spontaneously but in response to instances of power being misapplied. Thus it is line officers, and more specifically commanding officers, who must shoulder the real responsibility for the deterioration of their judicial power.
There is some aspect of visiting the sins of the father upon the son in blaming present commanders for the system under which we now labor, but it is important to realize, too, that the current retinue of lawyers is even less to blame. (It is ironic, but the very power that commanders so jealously guard from the lawyers is often willingly abdicated to a mob. I have on two separate occasions [once in the Navy, once in the Marine Cprps] witnessed a commander publicly surrender his legal responsibilities and authority by announcing to all hands that they were responsible for identifying and dealing with their own barracks thieves.)
air assets.
ting
large
ble
desig1
tools, and improved materials and m* ufacturing processes), structures proved materials and design niques), and avionics (micromini*1 zation, digital controls, and imp software) will produce a “big etl0l*u[lg vertical or short takeoff and lan , (V/STOL) aircraft no larger than a rier or LAMPS Mk-III and consider*1
and turbulence, and the state-1 art in avionics has improved ctl point where guidance and contro ^ terns up to the task of landing ^ board a destroyer are feaS1 especially if the U. S. Navy l0
the
Commander Bonds decries the dearth of seagoing experience among some judge advocates. This problem is in some part due to a conscious decision made by the Navy a few years back when the Funded Legal Education Program (FLEP) was first authorized by the Congress. At that time the Navy scrapped its Excess Leave Program (Law) (ELP[L]). There are, no doubt, many able young officers who aspire to a legal career in the Navy who, because of the relatively few FLEP billets available, are given a Hobson’s choice. (In the very issue which contains Commander Bonds’ contribution is an article authored by a former regular officer who resigned that commission in order to pursue his legal studies with the hope of returning to the Navy.) Maintaining the ELP(L) along with the FLEP would have allowed the Navy to reduce the number of no-prior-service lawyers that it must recruit yearly.
Interestingly, among lawyers at a large Marine Corps Air Station, the line officers are targeted as the reason for sagging discipline. In recent months at that command, courts composed of line officer members have returned the following sentences among many similar: (1) for taking a government .45 caliber automatic, keeping it two months, and then selling it to an informant—a finding of guilty of wrongful appropriation and a sentence of no punishment, and (2) for a one-year unauthorized absence—a sentence of $500 in forfeitures and extra duty.
Benjamin Spock, M.D.—Commander Bonds has court-martialed me and convicted me of permissiveness without my presence in court.
This accusation never came during the first 22 years after Baby & Child Care was published. It came first from Rev. Norman Vincent Peale, Jr., a month after I was indicted for my opposition to the war in Vietnam, and it was taken up eagerly by other supporters of the war, particularly Spiro Agnew, without any evidence that they had read my book. It was essentially a political accusation, I believe.
I’ve always urged parents to respect their children, but also to ask respect from them and to give them firm, clear leadership.
Human beings cooperate in any group primarily because they have been given a feeling of belonging, of being respected, not because of fear of punishment. But to have this feeling in adulthood they must have felt loved, must have felt they were an intimate part of a family in their early childhoods. It is those who were neglected in childhood who make up the ranks of the irresponsibles—in a factory, in an office, or in the Navy, as I witnessed when I was a Psychiatric Ward Medical Officer during World War II.
A borderline irresponsible can be inspired to perform his duty reasonably well if he has an officer who is a better than average leader in the sense of being quick to show respect, trust, and friendliness whenever these are due, and of being very clear about what he expects.
A borderline irresponsible may flounder when assigned to a new station before relationships are formed or if his officer appears to him to be indifferent or hostile.
A military group may need discipline that is more prompt and automatic than a civilian organization, but the basic ingredients are the same, I believe.
Punishment plays a secondary role in discipline. Repeated severe punishments usually have no effect on the highly irresponsible or aggressive law breaker. It has a deterrent effect only on those who have at least fairly good consciences to start with.
Children raised in families where there is love, mutual respect, and clear leadership will turn out fully responsible, cooperative, and polite, without the use of punishment. First-rate schools believe it is their business to find a way to motivate each student who has some difficulty in adapting and think of punishment as an admission of their own failure. This is not mollycoddling, but normal human relations, such as are carried out in thoughtful adult organizations, too. Even commanders, captains, and admirals respond better to the respect ^ their superiors than to threats punishment.
“Destroyers for the 21st Century”
(See D. G. Clark, pp. 24-33, March 197 Proceedings)
Stanley G. Kalemaris, Project ^n^'n^ce V/STOL Program, Grumman Aer»sPa Corporation — I found Comman ^ Clark’s summary of the design ProC which led to the FFG-7 enlightefl1 n and his suggestions for future stroyers innovative and thought voking. The one area in which he 1 to project improvements from to ^ systems is aviation, although he allude to the desirability of dediG1
While today there is no dispn' the fact that, "A VTOL plane enough to do the job is uncomfort® on board a pitching and rolling stroyer with limited supP facilities,” this will not always ^ true. Foreseeable advances in Pr°P^_ sion (higher temperature, better ponent efficiencies, better
(irf>'
tech'
more effective than either (or 0 . Programs to develop these advance^ ^ technology are already under way* ^ only necessary to integrate them an aircraft development program- .
These small, highly capable ^rC -ag will provide reactive antisubm*1^ warfare, over-the-horizon targe airborne early warning, and e^tCt^jng, warfare capability to the Pltc rolling destroyers” to which they assigned. V/STOL aircraft are inhere0^ less sensitive than helicopters r° F
92
Proceeding’s / June
e-of'the
i_»c iciittivciy mainte- shouhj ’ anc^ the electronic chips
c°mme
Proach
will be affordable both ir
terms c
sPar °f rnonetary cost and required cs weight and volume aboard ship. majne. Path to highly reliable and tamable engines and mechanical
ems i
*s less clear. Better design
inst ,e.a<: op aH other major navies and Th 1 S f0^ stabilizers on its ships, the ^ Sta^'*'2ers will not only increase increCOrn^ort” °*r t*le a*rcraft> they will °f ^se che comfort and effectiveness ^ ■ e crew, and make the job of gaining the aircraft easier. ajrcre Sreatest challenge to the use of Sufa c ^rorn destroyers will be logistic rriech>rt- esPecially of the engines and stran*cal systems. The composite nCtUres should be relatively
at least as reliable as their ujarj erc*al counterparts. With mod- d avionics packaging, avionics I’rnift^jnanCe °n ^oard sh'P will be nos6 to replacing units which diag- themselves as needing replace-
these ^*e S*2e’ cost. ar|d reliability of ^ e modules are such that this ap- syst(
tool$ a i «-»
exte ■ rnanufacturing processes and Wii,— use of electronic controls Win 'ncrease reliability. But engines cOnc Stl ^ occasionally. Support
shJpts such as mother ships and arin» nf •
in„ 6 r assets among units operat-
so|vet0^ther will help, but cannot ist^le problem for the ship which ca$etearning independently. In that vote' t^lt ^est solution may be to de- Pow SOrne °f the volume and man- n0v . Savings achieved through in- c0r)tlVe ship design and operational ctcas • t0 av*ation support; the in- ,n total system effectiveness will be well worth it.
In the final analysis, the practicality and value of V/STOL aircraft on board destroyer-type ships can only be determined by closer cooperation between ship and aircraft designers and operators.
“Through-Deck Cruiser:
The New Capital Ship”
(See M. A. Cairl, pp. 34-42, December 1978; R. J. Schneider, pp. 26-27, February 1979; T. S. Hoback, p. 81, March 1979; J. Buziak, J. T. Hayward, and N. Friedman, pp. 86-89, April 1979 Proceedings)
Rear Admiral Wayne E. Meyer, Project Manager, Aegis Shipbuilding, Naval Sea Systems Command—Mr. Cairl concludes that “The luxury of the carrier task force as now constituted is no longer affordable, for economic and operational reasons.” He would eliminate the need for the escorts, or most of them under most circumstances, by putting defensive shipboard weapons in the defended ship herself.
His choice of defensive weapons includes Standard Missile in a system supported by an SPS-48 radar, 3-inch guns, and a close-in weapon system such as Phalanx. He rules out the Aegis weapon system because it “would increase costs of the through- deck cruiser to an unacceptable level,” and because it “might well be obsolete” when the new ship appears. I don’t suppose the whole ship concept need be tied to this specific weapon suit, but it is symptomatic of the Navy’s search for at least the last 15 years for the small, simple, cheap defense which will be adequate to the threat. In the most detailed, repeated, diligent reviews over these years, no way to meet the threat has been found short of advanced, very capable systems of which Aegis is the only current Navy implementation. Even with such capability in one or two escorts, additional ships in the force are important for mutual support, antisubmarine warfare, sometimes magazine capacity, and the separated geometric response to electronic warfare measures. The single-ship, with the austere weapon systems imposed in Mr. Cairl’s proposal, would be defeated by the present threat. Presumably a replacement ship for the large carriers will have to face the increasingly severe and increasingly widespread threat of the future. No new breakthrough in capability, however, is suggested in the article.
The claim that DDG-47, with the most advanced antimissile, antisubmarine, and antiship capabilities that U. S. technology can provide, under the most capable control yet devised, is “utterly useless” apart from a carrier force is not realistic. Any force going into dangerous areas would fight better with such a ship present, for defense, for control, and for offense. What is offense in war at sea if not the killing of targets in the air, on the water, and under the water?
An air-capable cruiser, in some form, might be a useful addition to the U. S. Navy. It deserves thoughtful study, not preconceived claims supported by unsubstantiated data.
NJe
.Special Treatment.
chie;*ly assigned to Miramar Naval Air Station, I was being shown around by my crew ta)(. vvhcn we received word of an inbound transient aircraft. We waited at the end of the Int;tf.P in the “FOLLOW ME” vehicle, while the small jet bounced off the runway, careened a*r several times, and finally managed to land in one piece. chje(-*Ct We d caught our breath, we led the plane to the parking area and got it parked. The an st°od at attention and with a broad grin saluted the pilot—who turned out to be
y0it ^ Force second lieutenant—as he climbed out. Impressed, the lieutenant asked, “Are „ °ys always so courteous to Air Force personnel?”
Iji sir,” said the chief. “But in the Navy, only an admiral would dare make a landing e that.”
Henry E. Leabo
'The
^uval Institute will pay $25.00 for each anecdote published in the Proceedings.)
Commander Robert A. Cooke, U. S. Navy (Retired)—I, too, have been retired for more than five years; but unlike Captain Dombroff, I do not suffer mounting irritation over the Navy’s handling of retirees.
All my experiences with the Finance Center have been good. Its employees have been courteous and responsive to my telephone inquiries and extremely prompt in acknowledging my correspondence. True, the W-2 form does not arrive on 1 January, but I don’t care since it always arrives in sufficient time to file my tax by the April deadline.
As for allotments, we retirees should not expect the Navy to do our banking for us, nor should the taxpayers pick up the cost. The allotment system is tailor-made for men at sea who are far from local banks. A similar case for retired persons is not evident.
[2] must agree with Captain Dom- broff’s criticism of the Newsletter. however. It’s a turkey. But where else should we learn of changes to CHAM- PUS regulations? And the one thing retirees need is the official word on legislative and regulatory changes which impact on our lives. That’s, admittedly, a dull chore, but one we must insist the Newsletter do for us. There are many other sources to tell us what is happening in the Navy; and the Proceedings is not the least of them.
Finally, “active duty only” signs are the signs of our times; times when the