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Destroyer types in today’s U.S. Navy, in sizes ranging from the 11,000-ton CGN (formerly a destroyer leader) down to the 3,600-ton FFG, have evolved slowly, each generation greatly similar to the previous one. The degrees of change have reflected not only advancing technology and revised missions but also the urgency of the design effort. In times of Peace, more radical changes could be tried and proved, while in war, or at other times when it was eritical to get additional hulls into the water, more rnoderate changes could be accepted.
Should the Navy continue with this steady evolution of displacement-type hulls, or is this the opportune moment to break with tradition and examine destroyer-sized versions of such new designs as the surface effect ship, hydrofoil, or semi-submerged bull? Current programs seem to move in several directions at once. The Navy would like to continue building nuclear-powered cruisers to accompany the nuclear carriers. A massive program of frigate construction is under way and will bring the total number of that type in the fleet to more than 100. The guided-missile destroyer DDG-47 will exploit more of the potential of the Spruance (DD-963)-type hull. And, although the beginning of construction has been postponed until 1980, the Navy is still planning to build an experimental surface effect ship °f 3,000 tons to explore the potential in this radical high-speed design.
The essential distinction between frigates and destroyers can be drawn as a measure of offensive capability. The former are clearly supportive and defensive, while the latter have more offensive capability •n independent operations. Cruisers were traditionally designed as commerce raiders and scouts, offensive in mission. They had less armament than battleships but at least had light armor, of which the destroyers had none. Because most of today’s cruisers 'vere formerly destroyer leaders (and, to add to the confusion, were also known as frigates), even such subtle distinctions can no longer be drawn. Today, any ship worthy of the name “destroyer” should have sufficient speed and endurance to accompany any task group while retaining the armament necessary to threaten any enemy en route.
Why DestroyersP Before offering any suggestions for the type of ship which we call destroyer, the necessity for her very existence should be addressed. Sound arguments might be offered that acoustic limitations on hullborne sensors, combined with the capabilities of modern nuclear submarines, have taken destroyers out of the antisubmarine warfare (ASW) business. It has frequently been contended that ASW is more effectively performed by submarines and aircraft. Similar arguments might be made that both antiair and antisurface warfare are better performed by these same sophisticated weapon systems. Recent destroyer designs have been assailed as costly, austere, and ineffective, especially when compared with the ships of our major potential enemy.
In response to criticisms that destroyer missions are more effectively performed today by aircraft and submarines, the most persuasive argument is one of economics. At any given level of effectiveness for submarines performing traditional surface combatant supporting missions, an equal-cost task unit of destroyer types could perform not only those missions but several others as well. It’s far cheaper to submerge a sonar than to submerge a whole ship! There are many other offensive missions perfectly suited for submarines in which their capabilities and covertness can be efficiently applied. A trade-off of destroyers for aircraft sounds appealing until one realizes that to put a force of aircraft continuously on station (as destroyers would be) requires many more aircraft in the system, along with an expensive floating base or one on friendly shores nearby.
In any future conflict, there will definitely be a requirement for defensive surface combatants which
Destroyers have been evolving since the early part of this century, so there is no reason to believe that the evolution won't continue into the nest century. The mind’s eye can conjure up all sorts of visions of what future ships will look like. This artist’s vieiv is one possibility, and there are probably as many others as there are individuals thinking about the need
for new destroyers
Until the 1960s, there was a fairly clear demarcation of types among cruisers, destroyers, and destroyer escorts. Their functions have since hlurred, and so have their sizes and weapons. Thus, the cruiser Arkansas (CGN-41), shown here being launched last October, will have 5-inch guns, while the Spruance (DD-963)-class destroyers are due to have 8-inch guns installed during future overhauls.
can cross the ocean without refueling, have a combined advantage in speed, maneuverability, and/or numbers over the main body, and be considered relatively expendable because of the quantity available. If ships are not designed with these characteristics in mind, then the more expensive ships, designed for sophisticated offensive warfare in high-threat areas, will be assigned the many missions better suited to destroyers—much as the direct-support attack submarine is now employed. This would lead to an excess of defense in the vicinity of a few major combatants and to a reduced capability to place any level of presence in many other areas because of a shortage of forces. Such a realization led to the philosophy which generated the buzzwords “high-low mix.” The concept is noble but misunderstood; it deserves further discussion.
Quantity Versus Quality: Whether the enemy force is large or small, employing nuclear or conventional weapons, there are obvious benefits to be gained from operating a larger number of ships. First, there is the possibility of saturating the opponent’s systems by attacking from several directions at once. Second, a fact often overlooked by the analysts and egotists who would place ever more systems into fewer hulls, there is the reality that the size of today’s weapons may permit one hit on any size warship to put her out of action, at least for that battle. (The design and mission of the aircraft carrier make her a possible exception.) If the damaged ship is not sunk, then the disruption to her sophisticated electronic systems may still make her ineffective. This situation changes little whether the warship is a fossil-fueled frigate costing $100 million or a reactor-propelled cruiser at many times that cost. A third advantage in quantities of hulls is in the detection of submarines. Active and passive acoustic sensors are still the primary means for detecting this covert enemy, with active sonar becoming more important if the enemy reduces his radiated noise. Within current technological limitations, there are no economies of scale to buying fewer ships with larger sonars; the payoff comes in having more ships doing the searching.
Although never carried to its logical conclusion, this theory of trade-offs between quantity and quality
is far from new. In November 1962, an article on the subject appeared in the Proceedings. Its importance and influence on the Navy’s thinking were not to be appreciated until eight years later. The author noted: ”... the combatant roles of both cruisers and destroyers are blending into a single surface ship destroyer combatant category of several types. For the future there may be a need to define missions and tasks of each destroyer type with greater clarity and with degrees of gradation. Those at the less exotic end of the spectrum should not become overloaded with equipment so costly as to restrict unduly the numbers we can afford or so complex as to create a pressure to increase their individual size.
”... the DD’s of the future will probably be limited to the provision of superior ASW support. . . . [T]hey will probably have drone or pi' loted helos whichever proves technically least complicated. They may have very rapid fire conventional guns. . . . They should contain simple* uncomplicated, reliable equipment, capable of mass production. . . . They will be designed to provide greater endurance . . . than the present era destroyers. Space . . . will probably be ob-
tained by [using] capsulized, light equipment, and by elimination of general purpose functions.”1 In 1970, the article’s author became Chief of Naval Operations. He arrived on the scene at a time when the military’s civilian leadership was demanding change. The hierarchy was in the process of withdrawing from the unpopular war in Vietnam and desired to limit severely any growth in the military budget. These budget constraints, combined with the superannuated condition of many of the existing ships and an immense backlog of maintenance which had been deferred to fund the war, caused the CNO to take the calculated risk of reducing fleet size in the early 1970s. The number of active ships was cut from 769 to 512 during his tenure, and the resultant savings were used to fund new construction and Maintenance. The fleet could be rebuilt under the restrictive budgets of that time only by making some sacrifices in individual unit capability. The philos- °phy of Captain Zumwalt in 1962 became the policy °f Admiral Zumwalt in 1970.
The concept of building lesser quality ships designed for supporting roles was neither new nor Popular. The Knox-c\ass ocean escort (DE-1052, now IT-1052) had recently entered the fleet. She was designed for convoying with a single screw and no sys- tern redundancy, optimized for ASW. However, the ships of the new class had grown during design to be larger in displacement than the destroyers of that day. Perhaps, under the restrictive ground rules within which the Navy had to operate, the designers knew that the Knox would be the only vessel similar t0 a destroyer they would get a chance at for years, so they decided to make the ship as big as possible. NChile the Knox was seen as adequate for convoy escort and might have performed superbly in that role against the enemy of the late 1950s (when the ship Was designed), she was never conceived as a proper destroyer for missions against the missile threat of the 197()s. In what was the most controversial article Published in the Proceedings in a decade, one author
stated:
. . the 1052-class of DEs [is] the greatest mistake in ship procurement the U. S. Navy has known. . . . [W]e have given up irrecoverable features of simpler, less costly sonars, to get one whose very operation is tactically self-defeating. The 1052s cannot compete in the threatening environment of today; they cannot defend themselves , let alone provide protection for others. Their engineering plants are unreliable and their single
I°r footnotes, please turn to page 33.
screw provides neither the speed for ASW nor the redundancy that a worthy warship must possess.”2 Despite such criticism, and there was plenty, the CNO took the position that to debate the existing Knox design was a waste of effort. Even before he became CNO, Admiral Zumwalt had initiated studies to investigate ship designs of lower displacement. Out of these efforts came the SCS (sea control ship), the NATO PHM (patrol combatant-missile [hydrofoil]), and, of most importance here, the PF (patrol frigate) which has since become the Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7) class. A closer look at the evolution of the FFG-7 would be educational for anyone designing future destroyers.3 Compulsory guidance provided by the Office of the Secretary of Defense tied all weapon systems’ procurement to support of a NATO war in Europe. The effectiveness of all systems had to be proven analytically in that environment. For the PF and the SCS, this meant that they were placed (hypothetically) into a 1980s variation of the Battle of the Atlantic. Given this scenario, the $45 million-per-ship constraint in procurement cost, and the absence of antiair warfare systems on board existing frigates, it is far from surprising that the CNO’s concept of an inexpensive destroyer became a mis- silized ocean escort. The design was finely tuned for a supporting role in the open ocean and optimized to complement (or supplement) existing escorts in that mission. In the cost benefit analysis of the PF, no provision was made for capabilities in gunfire support; larger ships could do that. No mission considerations were permitted which would place a premium on loiter capability or endurance at speeds less than 20 knots. Her twin gas turbines were considered sufficient for a possible NATO war. No redundancy was built in; there would be other ships in the escort screen to pick up the slack. No consideration was given to multiple launchers or to the inherent weaknesses in having all antiair and antisurface missiles competing for the same single launcher rail. Of greater long-term significance, little analysis was done addressing new concepts which might have led to a breakthrough in design. Rather, the urgency forced existing systems and manpower-intensive models to be changed on the margin to arrive at the FFG-7.
In my view, the FFG-7 is the finest ship which could have been designed for the NATO environment—under a restrictive constraint on procurement cost and by a bureaucracy which could not accept any greater change, within the existing philosophy, in meeting the urgent need for ships. She is a credit to her program manager. Analytically, a group of Oliver Hazard Perrys will prove a more effective fighting
force in a NATO war than would an equal cost quantity of any other design on the drawing boards.
Not everyone agrees with these contentions. Retired Vice Admiral John T. (“Chick”) Hayward, in his chest-clearing denouncement of Admiral Zum- walt’s On Watch, stated:
“. . . nearly all the reasons for convoying in World Wars I and II are no longer valid ,(e.g-> area defense of ships is no longer more effective than point defense; it’s no longer difficult to locate ships on the surface of the seas; ships no longer are restricted to move at less than 4-8 knots speed of advance; and the ability to load and safely congregate 15 to 20 ships off our coast is very questionable with the array of weapons against us). His [Admiral Zumwalt’s] low is so low it can’t compete with the enemy.”4
A Starting Point: While we must attempt to overcome design dogma, changes in the U.S. Navy as a whole must be evolutionary and not revolutionary- There are two reasons for this. There is no threat or technology on the horizon which would make our existing fleet totally obsolete. Second, no navy faced with a major threat can stand the risk of casting our most current forces to start anew. It takes five to ten
We have assumed in the past that a force designed to fight the NATO war could handle any lower level conflict. The assumption has proved incorrect. Until this realization is reached at all levels, we stand the risk of repeating the mistake of the Dealey (DE-1006) class on a broader and more costly scale—building ships for a mission which will never be assigned and finding them less than acceptable for any other.
years to get a ship from concept to steel. Even if the apparent panacea offered by some new system causes us seriously to question current forces and plans, within a limited budget and facing a constantly growing threat, it is doubtful that an aggressive and perceptive enemy would patiently stand by during the long period of vulnerability caused by such a revolution. Hence, the next generation of ships must he designed to complement those which exist today °r are in production.
Not only must existing U.S. forces be considered prior to moving forward, with notice being taken of those units next facing retirement, but our designs and those of other navies must be closely examined for ideas and capabilities. This action must be taken without the “not invented here” bias which has affected previous attempts.
During conceptual design of the PF/FFG-7, an insufficiently vocal minority argued for modification of an existing design—either the Coast Guard’s Hamilton (WHEC-715)-class cutter, or the British Vosper Thornycroft Mark V or Mark VII frigate—in order
save time and physically limit the size of the ship. Alternatively it was hoped that by choosing a smaller
U. S. NAVY (FIRST NAVAL DISTRICT)
hull (maybe even a gunboat [PG]) as the baseline design, and scaling up if necessary, further economies might be achieved than were being done by modifying existing frigate plans and expertise.
The bureaucracy could not accept such a reorientation in the short time allotted to get the PF on the ways. Expedience and strict guidance to employ off-the-shelf systems with low technological risk made the PF design process inhospitable to major new ideas. There is a newspaper saying which goes, “Do you want it good, or do you want it Tuesday?” The Navy wanted the patrol frigate by Tuesday. It was more important to get hulls in the water than to strive for the best at a time when the Navy was about to drop below 500 ships for the first time in decades.
Looking Left and Right. Now that the FFG-7 program is well under way, there may be time to examine new and more radical designs. As shown by the previous quotations, ships of the U.S. Navy have been compared unfavorably with those of the Soviets. Has the Soviet Navy really arrived at breakthroughs from which others might learn? Captain Jim Kehoe presented an analytical comparison of Soviet ship designs with our own in a 1975 Proceedings article.’’ The analysis was thorough, objective, and conclusive, avoiding the polemics often found in comparative critiques of our capabilities. He concluded that the Soviet Navy of the 1970s—like that of the World War II U.S. Navy—places primary combatant ship design emphasis on weapons and propulsion. The current U.S. Navy, on the other hand, emphasizes electronics and habitability.
The smaller amount of space allocated to propulsion and electronics in Soviet ships reflects less concern for compartmentation and damage control and “. . . minimum provision for future payload modifications and equipment maintenance. (> It could be added that many of the Soviet warship characteristics derive directly from the fact that the Soviet Union is an economically independent continental power which could lose its entire surface navy without hazarding national security. It would be incorrect for the U.S. Navy to try to duplicate Soviet design practice in its totality, even if such a change were possible. This nation relies upon seaborne commerce for
When the USS Dealey (DE-1006) and her sisters were commissioned, they were envisioned as low-cost, mass-produced ocean escorts. But the mission for which they were built never came about, and they were not acceptable for more demanding roles. The lesson of the Dealey is an apt one to bear in mind for future designs.
continuation of its current way of life and perhaps for its very survival. From this reliance comes a vulnerability which demands naval protection of shipping. Furthermore, our policy of nonaggression and the resultant defensive/reactive strategy demand that we be able to halt the initial onslaught, or, that failing, survive it and then prevail.
The 40% reduction in Soviet habitability standards over our designs reflects the lesser standard of living in the U.S.S.R. and an absence of a presumed need to lure and retain a volunteer force. We would do well to question the need for plush habitability on board our ships which will spend most of their time in port because of the cost of fuel. Motivational research has shown that removing items of dissatisfaction (hygiene factors such as living conditions) from the working environment does not lead to job satisfaction.' If, through our improvements in habitability, we are hoping to improve performance, we may be wasting money along with valuable space in our warships. If we are hoping to use this habitability to improve recruiting and retention, then we might do better to substitute fighting capability. Men would rather be valued members of a well-armed team with a good chance of survival and victory than exist comfortably on board a ship that is visibly under-armed.
Billet allocations for warships are determined by Condition III (wartime steaming) manning and by maintenance requirements. The technology exists today to permit threat reaction from Condition III without keeping systems manned around the clock. Additionally, a hard-nosed look at operating and maintenance philosophies might show the benefits of reducing some of the self-sufficiency of the destroyer to gain space for weapons. The additional procurement investment, if indeed it proves to be larger, might be more than offset in reduced manpower expenditures over the life of the ship. Strides were made in this direction in design of the FFG-7 when the CNO placed a severe (and seemingly arbitrary) limit on manning. Regrettably, the Navy did not follow up by providing required maintenance and repair manpower from shore billets. As a result, it is now increasing the crew size for ships of the class.
Other steps may be possible in light of current trends in command and control. From the time of the Cuban Quarantine through Vietnam to the present, more and more authority and latitude have been removed from the domain of a ship and her commanding officer. The legacy of those carefully directed situations, and the controls which came with a nuclear Navy, have headed us away from John Paul Jones’s description of a naval officer toward an era of inflexible checklists, standardized procedures, and casualty control when these fail. If this trend *s deemed irreversible or beneficial, then it should have a major effect on ship design.
Looking Ahead: Several areas of technology can have a major impact on destroyer designs:
► Cruise missiles
► New hull designs (for example, the surface effect ship)
► Vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) aircraft 0n' eluding helicopters)
► Lasers
this list would have to be added one more general field which ties together at least three of the four telecommunications. The emerging potential of such hardware as fiber optics, lasers, miniaturized circuits 'v>th micro-chip computers, and others can be combined in command and control systems which can afier naval warfare dramatically. This is a technology ’•hat could lead to a society in which men need not Physically commute to work but merely “commute”
The early studies for what eventually became the FFG-7 class called for a patrol frigate (PF) which initially resembled a gas-turbine-powered version of the Brooke (then DEG-1) class. During later designs of what was temporarily the PF-109 class, the gas turbine exhaust was moved to the superstructure to make room for a two-helo LAMPS hangar on the stern. The PF-109 design is essentially that used for the FFG-7-class guided-missile frigates, one of which is the Duncan (FFG-10), now under construction in Seattle.
their ideas instead.
In the extreme, this field might lead to ships which are not manpower-intensive maintenance facilities but efficient fighting platforms. Rather than carry a comprehensive variety of technicians and decision-makers on board each destroyer, the expertise could be retained ashore or on board a tender. Diagnostic advice to correct casualties in the sophisticated equipment could be “telecommunicated” to the ship and repairs effected on board. Similar techniques might even be employed for some of the information and data processing required in target detection, acquisition, tracking, and kill systems, as well as in the administrative and logistic functions now performed on board each warship. This is not as futuristic an idea as it may seem; anyone who has watched our Gemini and Apollo manned space missions has witnessed just such a process.
The Navy has made some use of these techniques already in its linked tactical data systems and centralized 3M (Maintenance and Management of Material) system. However, we have not yet exploited the cost savings of reduced manpower that these systems can provide. One caution: wartime vulnerability to communication disruptions requires detailed analysis; organic unit fighting capability under various electronic conditions must be considered carefully. In 1922, former Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels observed, “Nobody now fears that a Japanese fleet could deal an unexpected blow on our Pacific possessions. . . . Radio makes surprises impossible.”8
Any of the above technological factors, alone or in combination, could affect the appearance of destroyers in the future. Moreover, tomorrow’s destroyers should have the longest range weapons that can be included in the design. After a search of the existing literature, it seems too early yet to offer definitive forecasts of where the other technologies will contribute. Lasers and other developments in that region of the electromagnetic spectrum may improve directional communications and security as well as offering a capable new weapon system.
The surface effect ship could be the destroyer of the future, if the concept proves feasible in an expendable size capable of transiting the oceans. Luckily, since the SES is being designed and built by those familiar with aviation procedures rather than shipbuilding ones, it may avoid stereotyped approaches to design. The final procurement cost may appear prohibitive at first glance, but lifetime costs still have to be carefully weighed against the immense potential of this hull.
It would be encouraging to forecast that each future destroyer will have piloted or remotely controlled VTOL aircraft embarked; however, previous efforts with aviation facilities in destroyers have met with limited success. A VTOL plane large enough to do the job is uncomfortable on board a pitching and rolling destroyer with limited support facilities.
A reader who has come this far awaiting a single answer to the future of destroyers is about to be disappointed. Rather than pretending to wrap it up in a specific, definitive, crystal ball prediction, I shall toss in a few parting observations in an attempt to stimulate creative thinking and extend the discussion.
► Future destroyer designs must be optimized not only for an anti-Soviet war at sea but must also be given offensive capabilities and staying power for missions in the interim. In addition, they must be designed to fight after a nuclear burst, since our adversary has made nuclear warfare a likely option at sea.
► Conceptually, there is no reason that a destroyer bridge should be larger than an airplane cockpit. Especially on a gas turbine driven ship, the similarities and benefits are too great to be disregarded. Ship control should be accomplished on the bridge and computer-assisted command decision-making done below decks in a space more secure and better suited to this purpose.
► Capabilities must be found to permit destroyers to collect and process information from over the horizon, whether from satellites and non-organic aircraft or from the ships’ own systems, ranging from "balloons and kites” to remotely piloted vehicles.
► If we cannot reexamine current habitability requirements of 700 cubic feet per man, while saving only 20% of the ship for payload, then many functions now done on board must be centralized off the ship, either ashore or afloat. It makes little more sense today to carry redundant support and maintenance personnel on board each ship than it would to carry yeomen, cooks, and mechanics on board a fighter aircraft.
► Current propulsion and engineering spaces in destroyers are designed to facilitate access for underway maintenance and for damage control. A more compact design with more space for payload could be attained by performing more maintenance and repairs in port, adding a moderate level of redundancy, and emphasizing modularity in design. Damage control in a nuclear war may be a moot topic.
► Some of the space saved and the redundant systems added should be used to provide efficient propulsion (probably diesel) at slow speeds. Future missions such as static sea control and ocean resource protection/denial may demand on-station endurance not available in a strictly gas turbine design such as the DD-963 and FFG-7. Alternately, an amphibious warfare ship with command, control, and communications and repair facilities could carry VTOL aircraft on the flight deck and PHMs in the well deck to provide an interesting combination of staying power and high-speed, multi-threat response for sea control.
► Receiving maximum benefits from any new class of destroyers will require improvements to guns, ammunition, and other weaponry. A destroyer or even a smaller hydrofoil would make an excellent counter-trailer vessel, but she would require both antiship and antimissile systems. It would be encouraging to forecast such a ship with infrared homing, gun-launched weapons to counteract the threat posed by short-range, missile-firing ships on the trail of a carrier.
► Our dependence on overseas allies and resources demands that our warships be visibly capable in comparison with the Soviets’ and not merely analytically so in a battle group. One way to accomplish this would be to reexamine the benefits of tnultiple weapons launchers. More systems with
ammo in the hoist” could provide rapid response without extensive Condition III manning, redundancy, and reliability. There must be a rational compromise between strictly “go/no-go” systems, boxed in vulnerable container-launchers, and contemporary systems which place all missiles in the same magazine and fire them from the same rail.
► The addition of Harpoon and Tomahawk missile batteries to these designs is a must. A destroyer with these long-range weapons can hold any surface combatant at bay while offering projection capabilities now available only in aircraft.
Other areas could be addressed, but a reader who does not agree with the foregoing would be uninterested in further breaks with tradition. On the other hand, anyone who agrees with the direction of such ideas, can easily think of other concepts of his own.
Conclusion: There definitely will be requirements for multi-mission destroyers in the Navy of the future. The special capabilities of surface combatants under, on, and above the oceans of the world are certain to be enhanced by forthcoming technologies. These future destroyers must be multi-mission ships, yet still expendable by virtue of their numbers. Design of these ships is a task worthy of the finest minds that our Navy can bring to bear.
‘Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., "A Course for Destroyers,’’ United States Naval Institute Proceedings, November 1962, pp. 35-36, 38.
‘Robert H. Smith, “A United States Navy for the Future,” Proceedings, March 1971, p. 22.
3This account is from the author’s experiences with the PF/FFG-7 design. 4John T. Hayward, ’’High-Low” (Comment and Discussion), Proceedings, August 1976, pp. 71-72.
5James W. Kehoe, Jr., "Warship Design: Ours and Theirs,” Proceedings, August 1975, pp. 56-65.
6Ibid., p. 64.
‘Frederick Herzberg, "One more time: How do you motivate employees?” Harvard Business Review, January-February 1968, pp. 53-62. 8Quoted in Erik Barnouw, A Tower in Babel: A History of Broadcasting in the United States to 1933 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966), p.
103.
Commander Clark was graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in the class of 1962. He served in destroyers .is first lieutenant of the USS Decatur (DD-936), aWl weapons officer of the USS Hawkins (DD-873), and executive officer of the USS Damato (DD-87 1). He holds a _ master’s degree in operations research/systems analysis from the Naval Postgraduate School. He is a graduate of the Naval Staff Course for international officers and was graduated from the College of Naval Command and Staff with highest distinction. His shore tours have included duty in the Systems Analysis Division of OpNav (Op-96), Headquarters, U.S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam in Saigon, and as aide and executive assistant to the president of the Naval War College. Commander Clark is now assistant director of the Center for Advanced Research at the Naval War College. He is scheduled to report next month to the Senior Engineering Course at Idaho Falls, Idaho, and to take command of a DDG-2-class guided- missile destroyer in the fall.
No Laughing Matter ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The tough captain of an old cruiser was fond of telling non-humorous jokes to which his °fficers responded with laughter because they dared not do otherwise. An ensign, visiting a friend in the cruiser one day, failed to react when the captain began one of his appalling Tories. Noticing this insubordination, the captain bellowed, “Son, what’s the matter with you?” Calmly, the young man replied, “Sir, I am not assigned to this ship.”
Commander Carlos Conejero, SC, Spanish Navy (The Naval Institute will pay S25.00 for each anecdote published in the Proceedings.)