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For well over a decade, the Soviet Union has been involved in a massive buildup of its conventional and strategic military forces. That buildup extends far beyond purely defensive requirements. Indeed, it appears quite clear that the Soviets are engaged in a systematic effort to achieve a military superiority over the West in order to achieve both political and military leverage.
Some will argue that the numerical superiority of Soviet conventional military forces is offset by the West’s qualitative advantages. Many will argue that the United States and the Soviet Union today are in rough equivalence strategically and that we are ahead qualitatively. While I am firmly convinced that our industrial and technological capacity and ingenuity are of fundamental importance, it is unfortunately true that national governments of the West are increasingly stifling rather than harnessing, undermining rather than motivating, the industrial genius of our societies. Moreover, we are increasingly using such terms as “technological edge” and “qualitative advantages” as buzzwords to justify our inaction in the face of Soviet military developments. We continue to underestimate the quality and technological achievements the Soviets have shown themselves capable of.
Regardless of how we view the present U.S.-Soviet military balance, unless we contain or reverse the adverse military trends that now confront us, the Soviet Union and its allies will achieve military superiority over the West in every relevant index of conventional and strategic military power.
Even when it was in a militarily inferior position, the Soviet Union did not hesitate to fill power vacuums or challenge the West to determine our resolve. Now, while we define the military power balance as being in “rough equivalence,” the Soviets and their proxy Cuban military forces seem to believe they can pursue an aggressive foreign-military policy with impunity. Today, Soviet military presence in Africa is well known; in time, the Soviets may develop an overt presence in other parts of the world as well—perhaps even in Latin America, the Middle East, or Berlin. How will we respond?
It is the objective of NATO to preserve global stability and peace and to maintain the integrity of our member nations. To that end, the alliance cannot ig' note what is happening elsewhere in the world. The European members of the NATO alliance must be concerned with U.S.-Soviet efforts to negotiate limitations on strategic weaponry.
NATO is a political-military alliance composed of sovereign nation-states, an alliance originally formed to meet a threat. That threat is greater today than ever before in our history; the magnitude of that threat must drive us toward even closer cooperation.
For more than three decades, the NATO alliance has preserved the freedom and security of the nations
Soviet military exercises, whether they involve boarding airborne troops on a giant 11-76 transport plane or ferrying tanks across a river by pontoon, demonstrate the formidable conventional forces which confront the NATO nations. Thus, it is up to the NATO allies to work together for the common defense—in terms of commitment, strategy, and standardized weapons. In an era when detente seems to be deteriorating, we must ensure that NATO foreign policies, both collectively and individually, are credible and that we have the military capability to support those policies.
of Western Europe. That has been our greatest success. But today, we find ourselves outmanned, outgunned, outspent on defense, and, I fear, “out- strategized.” There are 560 million people in the North Atlantic Alliance, as opposed to 360 million people in the countries composing the Warsaw Pact. Our combined gross national product is 235% greater than that of the Warsaw Pact nations. That we should find ourselves in our present position is the result of the failure of our political processes. Our failure is summarized by commentators on both sides of the Atlantic who say we cannot afford to maintain conventional forces adequate for the defense of Europe.
The U.S. strategic umbrella does extend to Europe. But our response to a conventional attack against Western Europe can no longer be based on an exclusive reliance on the strategic nuclear deterrent. We must be prepared to meet any Soviet-Warsaw Pact conventional threat against NATO, not so that Europe will be a battleground for the superpowers, but so that we will have a credible conventional defensive capability and can meet the threat at the level at which it is posed. With that kind of capability, we will remove any incentive for a preemptive attack with conventional forces. We will have stability, and in conjunction with our nuclear umbrella, we will have deterrence. For this reason, we have no alternative but to maintain conventional forces adequate for the defense of Europe.
Today, the nations of the North Atlantic alliance spend more than $120 billion annually on general- purpose forces. Why is this amount not enough to preserve an adequate balance of conventional military forces for NATO? The reason can be found in the basic lack of coordination that generally characterizes the alliance. Without an effective system of standardization, large amounts of money are wasted on duplication of effort within NATO. Recently, NATO has begun to address this problem by defining a 15- year Long Term Defense Program. But members of the U.S. Congress and parliamentarians in the assemblies of the NATO countries have, prior to the long-term program, taken initiatives to remedy these failures.
In legislation enacted in 1975, Congress directed the Secretary of Defense to assess the consequences in cost and loss of combat effectiveness of failures to standardize. In addition, the secretary was directed to make specific proposals in order to make standardization in research, development, procurement, and support an integral part of the NATO planning process. In 1976, Congress passed legislation committing the United States to a national policy of procuring weapon systems for the use of American forces in Europe that are standardized or at least interoperable with those of other nations. Implicit in the language of the legislation was congressional recognition that it is unreasonable to expect the European members of NATO to accept standardization on the basis of American equipment alone.
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Almost 30 years ago, when NATO was founded, much hope was expressed for extensive peacetime defense cooperation to permit the most collective defense in time of war. For the most part, however, this did not come to pass. Largely because of their confidence in the U.S. nuclear umbrella, the NATO allies continued to design their defense postures along primarily national lines.
Today, driven by growing Warsaw Pact capabilities, the allies are reassessing this situation- They have agreed at last summer’s NATO summit conference on an innovative Long Term Defense Program, whose central theme is greater “Alliance Cooperation” in the interest of the common defense- The sheer military need for rationalization, standardization, and interoperability of NATO’s disparate national forces and their support establishments is at
Our Leadership Responsibility to NATO
Last year, Congress undertook a major step when
lc authorized the Secretary of Defense to waive the ^ Buy America” Act in cases where he may find it ^consistent with the public interest.” During the May 1977
economic summit conference in London, resident Jimmy Carter pledged that the United rates would procure more European weapon systems °r the use of U.S. troops. That same year, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown initiated a number of re- 0rms in the area of weapons procurement practice •ntended to strengthen the NATO standardization initiative. His directive requires, among other things, at military departments consider standardization and interoperability in the defense systems acquisi- tl0n process.
In addition, Secretary Brown appointed AmbasSador Robert Komer, a forceful and articulate advocate in his position, to the newly created position of visor to the Secretary of Defense on NATO Affairs. e intent of this action was to ensure that a full- tlrne senior DoD official is vested with the rank and responsibility necessary to direct all elements of U.S. j^TO policy. In his capacity as a member of the De- ense Systems Acquisition Review Council, the so- CaHed DSARC process, Ambassador Komer will be in Position to influence the department’s consideration European weapon systems for U.S. procurement. Now, in addition to the various legislation that as been passed in Congress, there have been other Very positive developments within NATO itself. The nat'°ns of the alliance have committed themselves to “Creasing their annual collective defense expenditures by some 3%. To the extent that this increase is not offset by reductions in other areas, it is an important commitment. NATO’s Long Term Defense Program, mentioned earlier, is also a significant step.
NATO must now put the theory of those resolutions into practice. It will take hard work, cooperation, and sacrifice, but will provide the critical test of the commitment. The central dilemma is how to resolve the problems of “rationalization,” “standardization,” and “interoperability.”
The alliance has recently experienced both success and failure in these areas. In 1975, the United States selected the French/German Roland 2 missile as the winner in the multinational short-range air defense system competition. The transfer of this European technology to the United States caused some difficulty, but the problems were not insoluble, and the learning experience has proven valuable. The 1977 awarding of the U.S. Army contract for the Belgian MAG-58 machine gun, the first 10,000 of which will be manufactured in Belgium with possible later coproduction in the United States, also contributed to the objective of the “two-way street.” Paradoxically, it created problems for our objectives of achieving greater standardization, because West Germany will continue to deploy the German MG-3 machine gun on its XM-1 and Leopard 2 tanks. In spite of this discrepancy, the U.S.-German pledge to seek standardization in the elements that dominate logistics support has enabled us to salvage some success for our objectives. The European multirole combat air-
ally
utes
•Meeting them is far more difficult. Some meas- Can be carried out relatively easily. But others
°ng last being fully recognized. In short, NATO is aving a second wind.
nese needs are as great in the maritime field as in ny other. NATO navies must be capable of operating ^et‘ler as a team so that, regardless of nationality, atever allied assets are at hand can be brought texibly to bear. To do this, NATO naval communica- s and tactical data systems must accommodate p| National forces and command relationships, ^xibifity also demands that food, fuel, and ammu- 'on from one national support structure should be ^•triable by other allied forces.
ode these needs are easy to demonstrate, actu
1 *VV4 vzut 1C1UL1 VCIJ V do 117 • out Ol lie. 1 J
our VC ^un<^amental adjustments to our thinking and ways of doing things. Many will involve difficult
decisions or tradeoffs. The new Long Term Defense Program provides an agreed blueprint for meeting some needs, but it is only a promising beginning. To achieve the military as well as economic benefits of greater operational and equipment collaboration will require overcoming narrowly self-interested attitudes on both sides of the Atlantic.
The United States, as the strongest and most technologically advanced of the NATO allies, must take the lead in these endeavors. Our allies look to us for such leadership. Fortunately, the U.S. Navy already provides so large a share of NATO’s naval capabilities that it is even better able than other U.S. services to play such a leading role. But only if it does so energetically can the allies collectively achieve high-confidence maritime deterrence/defense at a cost politically acceptable to our free societies.
craft (MRCA) development illustrates what joint European defense cooperation is capable of achieving. However, we remain at a crossroad—a fact that is illustrated by the replacement of the F-104 fighter- bomber now in the aircraft inventories of nine NATO countries. Four of those nations have selected the F-16 as a follow-on aircraft, two have chosen the MRCA, and two an improved version of the F-4.
Sovereign nations tend to look to industry to provide jobs and export items. To political figures representing local constituencies, jobs and exports are fundamental issues. When unemployment among constituents is an issue, the objective of the “twoway street” or standardization can be jeopardized if the more immediate concern of maintaining local jobs is given priority. Government officials, however, do have a special responsibility to go to constituents and explain the importance of NATO objectives. In spite of this reasoning, European members often criticize the United States for not contributing a fair share to the "two-way street” objective.
How do the individual nations of Europe compete with the United States in terms of the cost and quality of weapon systems? Can they compete, or should this country, in the interest of achieving a “two-way street,” lower requirements, pay more money for weapon systems, or field less capable systems? The answer to these latter questions must be “no.” Does that negate our objective of achieving a “two-way street”? I believe not. But to the extent that the European nations of the NATO alliance fail in their own efforts of collaboration, their criticism of the United States cannot be justified. Europe must move toward closer collaboration. Europe must achieve the quality, quantity, and cost of weapon systems that would be inherent in a common European defense effort, and it must make an effort to approach the U.S. standards for these matters.
I can well understand the European trepidation with some U.S. actions regarding arms sales, transfers, and exports. But it seems to me that the export of arms from the West is not the cause of instability- but rather a response to unstable situations. While we should collectively seek restraints on the level of global weapons deployment, we in the West cannot and should not do this alone. Our arms transfer policies are an extension of our foreign policy interests. We cannot and should not deny our friends and allies the ability to protect themselves and redress local imbalances of power.
But let us return to the problems of promoting the “two-way street,” of achieving greater interoperabil' ity and standardization. First, we must be realistic in the objectives we set for ourselves. The Long Term Defense Program has provided a workable framework within which we can operate. Second, 11 joint European defense industrial base, preceded by increased joint European defense efforts, is, in my view, essential to a successful “two-way street” pt°'
gram. Competitive research and development with licensed coproduction may not be a panacea for the problems we face, but clearly it can provide immediate and tangible results which, if properly conceived and developed, will contribute to our longer- [erm objectives. European and American industries, with the proper support from their governments, and acting as coequal partners, could, through such programs, set the tone and provide the experience for closer increased cooperative efforts. The problems in- ^erent in seeking interoperability—not the least of which may be cost—are real and troublesome, but rhcy must not become insurmountable obstacles.
We in the West have one common failing when We view our defense requirements. We ask: Can we afford it? That is not a valid question. Instead, the Question we must ask is this: Can we afford the al
lat.
Co
er than the close of the second session of the 95th ngress, which will be sometime later this year. While I recognize the importance of NATO ^eapons interoperability and standardization, I be- eVe We should not lose sight of a far more funda- feetlta^ Pr°blem: that our objective is to deter or de- at any act of aggression that might be taken against . e countries of Western Europe. What good are er°perable or standardized weapons if they never ctl the men who are supposed to use them? What °d are our weapons if they permit NATO to make a I Cessbfi ground defense in Central Europe, only to Se control of the northern and southern flanks, and
ternative? Can we accept the consequences of not oing what is necessary to preserve an adequate de- ense effort? The answer, of course, must be “no.” We ,n democratic societies seek a sensible balance in Hense spending as part of our national priorities. 0r that reason, we also have no alternative but to Undertake, on a constant basis, every effort to avoid waste and duplication.
I believe the U.S. Congress is doing precisely that. aflier this year, the Chairman of the House Armed ervices Committee, Melvin Price, announced the °rrnation of the Special Subcommittee on NATO tandardization, Interoperability, and Readiness. 1115 subcommittee, of which I am a member, is C°nducting a detailed study of the present state of
°rts at standardization and interoperability within k e North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The mem- ers have been asked to identify readiness problems ln the alliance which result from a lack of joint proCedures, doctrine or standard equipment. They have So been asked to identify those areas where stand- ar<Jization and interoperability might be most advantageously pursued. The findings and recom- JTlendations will be reported to the full committee no
control of the Eastern Mediterranean?
NATO may be gearing up for the wrong kind of warfare, in the wrong theater, and for the wrong periods of conflict. Budgetary pressures may be driving NATO toward an obsession with a rigid mode of warfare and a specific set of theater contingencies, at precisely the time when Soviet-led forces are acquiring multi-theater capabilities and would have every incentive to implement multiple and varying combat options. We are in great danger of projecting our defensive priorities onto the Soviets. We are in danger of identifying as pivotal stakes for NATO strategic areas which may easily be of secondary concern to the Soviets. NATO’s present posture is defensive, reactive, and geared for a short war. As a result, the alliance is heavily reliant on adequate mobilization and warning times. Because of this, the NATO commitment to the E-3A airborne warning and control system (AWACS) is an important decision. It is important, first and foremost, because the system will provide us with critically needed warning and a vital command and communications network for air defense. The decision is also important because it poses a challenge for U.S. and European industries to prove that they can work together with a large and complex program that will provide for our common defense and also provide tangible economic benefits for all of the participants.
Our present NATO posture gives the initiative to the Soviets, while at the same time it saddles us with
a force structure that is unable to counteract multiple Soviet initiatives—much less unconventional Soviet initiatives—along with various axes of attack they are capable of mounting. In focusing on NATO’s central front we are, in my view, depending on our ability to reinforce adequately, but we are too dependent on vulnerable airlift and prepositioned equipment. We have serious logistics deficiencies, and our manpower mobilization policies require drastic overhaul. The consequences of a Warsaw Pact attack, fashioned after the Israeli aerial blitzkrieg of the 1967 war, would devastate our immobile stocks of equipment, manned by troops deployed from vulnerable bases. Moreover, these troops’ deployment routes and chokepoints can be mapped out in advance.
Let us assume the Soviets want to launch an attack that would minimize damage to NATO’s industrial infrastructure and keep civilian casualties to a minimum. Let us also assume that they will have first-use options for tactical nuclear or chemical and biological warfare. Let us also assume that the Soviets would mount a sudden attack that would be so decisive that it would make it very difficult for the West to recover or to remount its mobilization. Under these assumptions, rather than pour massed armor across the borders and unleash their airborne or heliborne assault forces, assault gunships, and follow-on infantry, the Soviets would instead opt for a short, intense aerial attack. Specifically, they might concentrate on NATO’s stored equipment, including nuclear storage units, troop barracks, airfields (to prevent our strategic airlifters from landing), railroads, bridges, roads, overpasses and other choke points used by deploying NATO forces. They could drop thousands of mines, weapons which could deny whole areas to friendly forces and which would completely overload our mine-clearing capability. They could drop chemical-biological contaminants into our equipment parks, thus capitalizing on NATO’s lack of comprehensive chemical-biological defensive gear. This would result in the Soviets disabling NATO’s mobilization prospects or preempting a NATO mobilization and presenting our alliance with a fait accompli.
What would happen if the Soviets used tactical nuclear and chemical-biological preemption, striking selectively and in great depth, with an eye to maximizing the success of those Soviet ground forces that would exploit the results of such attacks? What if the Soviets used such tactics in conjunction with control theater tactics, employing their navy out of the Kola peninsula, using ground forces to sweep through northern Lapland and Sweden to capture the Norwegian North Cape, denying us access to the island of Jan Mayen, driving Iceland out of the conflict, while moving against the Bosporus and Dardanelles? In such a case, the Soviets could also make preemptive nuclear strikes against NATO’s naval ships, maintaining a post-attack naval superiority- From this position, the Soviets could dominate the air and sea routes between Europe and the United States with long-range air power and with their large force of submarines.
The Soviets, for their own reasons and requirements, may well prefer to consolidate their grip NATO’s northern flank. Or they may first seek to send “symbolic forces” to assist in a post-Tito civil war in Yugoslavia. They may—in no small part because of U.S. policy—be able to drive a wedge into NATO’s southern flank by consolidating their position with a very important friend and ally, Turkey- (It is important to note here that one of the greatest NATO-related resolutions passed recently by Congress was its decision last July to restore U.S. aid to Turkey. Now we must do all we can to work out a peaceful settlement to the Cyprus problem, for both Greece and Turkey are critical to a strong NATO.)
We tend to envision Soviet offensive operations or moves against NATO in almost apocalyptic terms- Soviet armored forces surging across the German borders; Soviet infantry occupying towns and cities in classic World War II fashion; intense conflicts m the urbanized terrains and open spaces along the central front. Nevertheless, is there not a compelling case to be made for less-than-apocalyptic poS' sibilities, such as a quick disarming war followed by a politically coerced settlement? Might not the Soviets also be interested initially only in neutral*2 ing West Germany? What if the Soviets mounted 11 limited land-grab or a “demonstration attack 10 Europe, instead of the all-out blunderbuss that is onf doctrinal fixation? Are we prepared to handle the bewildering array of threats against NATO’s northern and southern flanks—the latter condition impliOy involving our friends and allies in the Middle East-
The Warsaw Pact forces in the future will be ab e to mount devastating attacks with little or no warn ing. The sheer mass and technological capabiHtie* that the pact forces demonstrate today, coupled wl their strategic umbrella, threaten to make obsolet^ our highly politicized calculations of today. Yet, lC^ these same calculations today that will provide t options that we will have available to us in the ture. We need flexibility in our military capabifitieS’ we need to reassess and integrate our doctrine w these new flexible capabilities. of
The United States must not pare down its nava ^ strategic forces at the expense of an increased coot
nental NATO effort. We must intensify our research and development activities and integrate our new technology into systems that can be fielded. We must integrate our new anti-arms technology with new precision technology and integrate our laser and ^nfrared technology into weapon systems. We must niprove our early warning intelligence capabil- *es" effectively utilizing the benefits of remotely P1 oted vehicles, for example.
t ^ ex*st: ^ which we can exploit new c nologies and combine them with new types of ^nbat support platforms to increase our readiness n flexibility. One possibility involves the highly Promising concepts of “assault breaker”—our ability isperse and operate away from fixed pretargetable ases by using, for example, the British Harrier SToL aircraft; the road-dispersable Jaguars; the 1()As; the Alpha Jets now being deployed; the hun- fe s helicopters we now operate; the highly 0 de ground-launched cruise missile; dispersing 0rnmand and control systems; target acquisition sys- and adequate ordnance stocks and other innovative systems. We might also begin to develop ^8 ting vehicles that can be used in a standoff mode °rn the forward edge of the battle area to act as cxible multipliers for surviving NATO systems on ce. 8rourid. We need a NATO ground-launched u*se missile or a similar system that could provide 0 flity and accurate warheads; we need a ground- 0 ile medium-range ballistic missile for assured °mpt responsiveness. We need a massive invest- eent ’n defensive chemical-biological warfare ^Ojpment; new defensive tactics for survival under and Car PreemPt*ve attacks; new means of regrouping for redePloy‘ng existing forces. We need mobility Ces naval and airlift—that we can deploy on fla S^0rt not*ce to NATO’s northern and southern a n s in the very earliest stages of a Soviet move ®a,nst these areas.
pr^n)0win8 this, Congress this year overruled the j-j, ' ent s proposed cancellation of the advanced gfa ^sh°rt takeoff and landing) aircraft. This proof 01 meets the requirement for NATO’s new doctrine 0peaPid and widely dispersed airlift capability able to erate away from geologistical constraints of fixed
air bases or landing zones. Advanced STOL aircraft could give us the revolutionary capabilities that amphibious forces gave to navies—the ability to operate unpredictably and flexibly, which is an asset desperately needed by an alliance facing the threat that NATO faces. We need to improve dramatically our readiness and logistics capabilities, and we need to set about doing these things now.
The final subject I would like to review concerns the U.S. strategic posture and the ongoing arms control negotiations. Some of our European friends who recently visited the United States told us that we should not risk detente or the SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) negotiations by overreacting to Soviet-Cuban transgressions in Africa. “Detente" has always been a nebulous term. The term “Cold War” is blunt and provocative, and it reminds us that we want to be able to settle our differences with the Soviet Union in a cooperative and peaceful way. But let us not delude ourselves about detente. Detente does not mean that Soviet society has become more open, that human rights (even in the aftermath of the Helsinki accord) are more respected, or that freedom of emigration from the Soviet Union is being conducted in an enlightened way. It does not mean that the Soviets have shown restraint in their global adventurism. The Soviets remain committed to supporting so-called “wars of liberation,” a guise for Soviet incitement and interventionism. It does not mean that
exploited for either military or political purposes.
► The terms of any future agreement must be adequately verifiable. An agreement that is not verifiable would be a source of continuing dispute, 1°' stability, and a bar to further arms control agreements.
y A future SALT agreement cannot permit the Soviets the ability to acquire a significant strategy advantage were the agreement to be violated or abr°' gated. Such a so-called “breakout” would leave the United States and its allies vulnerable and couk dramatically shift the balance of power. y The final broad criterion for measuring the adequacy of SALT II is of special interest: the terms ° the prospective SALT II agreement cannot be pef' mitted to infringe on the independent interests 0 U.S. allies, nor should it restrict joint U.S.-ally e>' forts to preserve regional force balances.
Concerning this last point, anything in a future
the Soviets have shown restraint in the development and deployment of their conventional and strategic forces. On the contrary, during the era of "detente," the Soviet military buildup has continued at an unprecedented level.
Detente has meant that the West has shown significant and unilateral restraint in its own weapons development and deployment—a consequence perhaps not so much of detente but based, nonetheless, on very calculated political decisions made in our own countries. Detente has meant that the West has not found clearly defined and consistently implemented policies with which to respond to Soviet-Cuban activities. Detente has meant that the West has taken at face value the promises and agreements that we have entered into with the Soviet Union, regardless of how the Soviets (and their Cuban proxy forces) have lived up to our expectations.
I am not advocating a return to the Cold War. I feel, however, that if the West would begin to respond to the Soviet challenge, as we did during the Cold War period, the atmosphere under detente, under those circumstances, would not be much different than it was during the Cold War period. The point is that the Soviet Union will not abandon its fundamental global objectives. To the extent that we find our objectives incompatible, to that extent we will have competition. To ensure that competition does not escalate into uncontrolled conflict, we must ensure that our foreign policy is credible and that we maintain the military capability to support those policies. SALT may indeed be separate and distinguishable from an adventurous and aggressive Soviet foreign policy, and SALT can—and should — be judged on its own merits. But let us not forget that arms control is only one element of national policy designed to enhance military stability and contribute to a peaceful environment. It is not a substitute for weapons acquisition.
If a nation is not ready to accept arms control as a means to promote a militarily stable environment, but instead seeks to use that policy, if not to achieve unilateral advantages, at least to undermine the awareness of Western societies of the need to maintain a vigorous defense effort—then achieving meaningful controls on weaponry through a dynamic arms control process becomes exceedingly difficult, if not impossible. The Soviet leaders are rational, cautious men, convinced of their righteousness and their de- terminist view of history. For the present, they will not seek to confront the United States or its European allies on their home grounds. But they do believe that military superiority is achievable and that it can be used as an instrument with political and military leverage. We must deny them that objective, because otherwise, at some point they will threaten us as they have before—possibly in Berlin again, or possibly the Middle East.
A future SALT II agreement will not enable us to reduce our defense expenditures, any more than the failure to achieve an agreement would result in a dramatic increase in the U.S. defense effort. With a SALT II agreement, as it is now envisioned, we may have to undertake a major air defense effort m the continental United States to negate the capabilities of the Soviet “Backfire” bomber; without SALT we would be in the same position. With or without SALT, the United States must redress the vulnerability of its fixed silo-based intercontinental ballistic missile force, and there are cost-effective, verifiable ways to do this. With or without SALT the United States will upgrade the bomber leg of its strategic triad; the preferred solution now is the air- launched cruise missile program. With or without SALT, the United States will need to reexamine its future ballistic-missile submarine force structure- With or without SALT, the United States must maintain an intensive research and development effort, particularly if we wish to retain that qualitative advantage we are said to enjoy over Soviet forces.
The cost of our defense budget should not be the exclusive criterion for measuring the merits of a future SALT II agreement. In discussing the prospective SALT II agreement, members of both the House o Representatives and the Senate have established the criteria by which SALT II will be measured: y Any SALT II agreement must be balanced and equitable. The Soviet Union cannot be permitted any real or perceived strategic superiority that could be
SALT agreement which prevents the United States r°m transferring technology—including cruise mis- Slle technology—to its European allies would not be acceptable to the majority of the members of the •S. Congress. Similarly, Soviet programs such as e SS-20 mobile intermediate range ballistic missile and the “Backfire” bomber create overlapping conCerns- They present potential breakout problems as strategic systems against the United States, but also are formidable systems for possible use against Western Europe. Congress is also concerned over possible restrictions on the U.S. ability to redress the vulnerability of its strategic forces. In particular, there a growing awareness that because of the large c row weight and improved accuracy of Soviet *CBMs, the United States can no longer be confident at an acceptable number of its fixed silo-based . M force could survive a surprise Soviet attack early ln the next decade. For that reason, a future SALT II agreement must explicitly provide for the deploy- rr[1] [2]er|t, counting, and verification of a survivable ICBM Astern. Finally, research and development activities lch cannot be verifiably prohibited must be per- ^*tted as a safeguard against possible future Soviet
breakouts.”
There is one other arms control effort under way arr>ong the United States, the Soviet Union, and Brit- air>. This is to secure an agreement to stop all underground nuclear testing, a so-called Comprehensive est Ban Treaty. Underground nuclear testing is necessary not only for new weapons development but ofso t0 maintain confidence in the existing stockpile j nuclear weaponry. An agreement banning all un- ^rground nuclear testing is not now within the state me art of our verification capabilities. Thus, under Ucb an agreement, the Soviets could conduct a °Vert nuclear test program sufficient for them to retain confidence in their nuclear weapons, while the United States could no longer maintain sufficient confidence in the reliability of its tactical and strategic nuclear weapons. The consequences of such a serious military assymmetry and the impact in Europe and elsewhere of the declining credibility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella would be devastating. Such a treaty which would not permit the United States to maintain confidence in the reliability of its nuclear weapons would not be acceptable to this country.
The United States has been accused of suffering from a post-Vietnam/Watergate malaise. There is some justification for such criticism. But we in the United States are also concerned with some of the things we see happening in Europe. The central issue which we jointly face, is this: Are we, the nations of NATO, going to allow Soviet propaganda to intimidate us, or are we prepared to meet the Soviets on their own terms? Are we prepared to do what is necessary for our common security? I believe that if we harness our strength and resolve, if we set out- selves to the task, we can maintain a prosperous and peaceful world. No challenge we face is more urgent.
Our Side and Their Side
Aiy^n 4 b*ecember Sunday morning in Danang, the briefing room at headquarters III Marine Phibious Force was filled with senior officers, set for the daily ritual. The commanding j ®ra* was a Naval Academy graduate, as were several others present. As usual, the G-2’s th 6 I^ence briefing officer led off but, instead of a recital of Viet Cong encounters during Preceding 24 hours, the young marine captain started, “In yesterday’s action at ^ 1 adelphia, it was Army, 14 . . then lapsed into the ritualistic, “during the past 24 . Urs> there have been 27 VC contacts. . . .” He was sternly interrupted by the command- 8 general, “What the hell was the Navy score?” be unperturbed young captain calmly replied, “Sir, the G-3 briefer will cover the endly situation,” and continued to recite enemy contacts. (Navy won 19-14.)
Colonel James W. Hammond, Jr., USMC (Retired)
Naval Institute will pay $25.00 for each anecdote published in the Proceedings.)
Congressman Beard is now serving his third term as I representative of the Sixth District in Tennessee. He is
a rnem!>er of the House Armed Services Committee and
[2]ts NATO subcommittee and chairman of the House Republican Research Committee's National Defense Task Force. In addition, Representative Beard serves as congressional advisor to the Geneva SALT negotiations and to the U.S. delegation to the conference of the Committee on Disarmament at Geneva. He was also congressional advisor to the United Nations special session on disarmament in New York from 23 May to 28 June of this year. Mr. Beard, who holds a B.A. degree in history from Vanderbilt University, served for four years in the Marine Corps. He was the USMC officer in charge of the Gemini IV offshore recovery mission. He remains active as a major in the Marine Corps Reserve.