Surface Reflections

but it requires not only their efforts but a significant effort on the part of their command as well. Depart­ment heads are about equally divided between lim­ited duty officers, surface warfare officer department head school graduates, and those on “get-well” tours for various reasons.

The enlisted ranks contain a disappointingly high percentage of rejected submariners, up to first class petty officers, mostly for marijuana use; retreads from the alcohol rehabilitation programs; and men just released from court-martial confinement. Even the “virgin” drafts from boot camp have been skimmed pretty carefully by the programs with clout. We get the rest, and a lot of them are “los­ers.” An extraordinary proportion of our psychic en­ergy is spent in the continuing effort to convert them into “winners.” It is eloquent testimony to the in­herent resiliency of these ships in terms of equipment and organization that they continue to operate quite well despite lapses in both areas that would be ut­terly disastrous in ships that operate closer to the margin. Our large amphibious warfare ships have so much reserve capability in design (redundancy of equipment, for example) and personnel (warrant offi­cers, limited duty officers, second-tour department heads, and even lieutenants as navigators) that they can absorb these challenging drafts of personnel. Smaller ships simply can’t accept rehabilitation cases because everyone must pull his share of the load al­most immediately. Ships in this category are frigates, attack submarines, minesweepers, etc. Other ships, such as guided-missile cruisers, are so broadly scat­tered over the warfare mission spectrum that they re­quire a similar high level of personal contribution. Although they have large crews, the members are highly specialized and fully committed to their own particular roles such as antisubmarine, antiair, sur­face, and electronic warfare. The personnel assign­ment policies are justified by these mission dif­ferences and can be expected to continue.

But there is a bright side to the all-volunteer force. Most of these young men are here for positive reasons, not the negative ones of the Vietnam War era. They believe the recruiter and thus expect to be trained, helped to mature, entertained, taken to ex­otic places, and cared for. Their disillusionment quo­tient is directly related to how well the Navy as an institution can fulfill these youthful expectations. It seems to take a lot more effort on our parts to satisfy these expectations than it did when we were ensigns, but there may be a difference in perception (or wis­dom?) involved in that. Significant amounts of time must be spent with the younger men, or they be­come increasingly reluctant contributors to the common effort at best, and deserters at worst. We have found that establishing positive goals for our men pays great dividends when enforced with gentle but firm counseling by their leading petty officers. The burgeoning PQS (personnel qualification stand­ards) system provides a nearly ideal vehicle for this goal-seeking behavior.

In fact, the personnel qualification system forms the basis of the current professional programs of most surface ships. But it has illustrated a dilemma which is present in many amphibious warfare ships. The program presumes, indeed requires, the existence of qualified personnel at the top. Speaking frankly, that is not the case consistently in the senior enlisted ranks nor in the upper levels of the wardrooms. Chiefs and first class petty officers are currently re­turned to positions of leadership from long shore tours with little or no schooling en route. This is most critical in engineering, but applies in nearly every rating in terms of leadership/management training, 3M techniques, retention programs, PQS familiarization and administration, and the other new or inherently changing tools and methods of the profession these days. No one is more acutely aware of this shortcoming than the chiefs and first class petty officers themselves. They sometimes express bitterness and feelings of betrayal when the com­manding officer and executive officer know more about their jobs than they do as a result of good en route training. The PQS for surface warfare officers presumes that the commanding officer is an expert in the details of his current assignment. In a basic sense, the SWO PQS is a junior version of the surface command qualification examination, and in some amphibious warfare and logistic support ships, no one on board has successfully passed that examina­tion. The en route training is excellent for COs and XOs, but it cannot supplant the fundamental mastery of the profession required by command qualification. This shortcoming is a serious obstacle to full im­plementation of the SWO PQS program and challenges both its necessity and credibility. The professional development of the junior officers may, in fact, be jeopardized. It would be unthinkable to order a non-submariner to command a submarine or a non­aviator to command a squadron of aircraft. But the routine practice has been to reverse that formula, and it has hurt the surface ships and their wardrooms. It is clear that if logic is to be employed in the pursuit of professionalism, any line officer, regardless of pre­vious duty, who is ordered to command must be qualified by the same method he is to qualify his charges. No ship these days should be used as a basic trainer for future assignment. The price is too high

^lV[ terms of material degradation and lack of profes- ^s>onal development in the wardrooms.

Shiphandling constitutes a particular problem in ^large amphibs or underway replenishment ships. The developing officer has little opportunity to conn the ^ship during landings and departures. Tugs and pilots ^are usually employed. But this training could be Provided in a satisfactory manner through more ex- rensive use of small craft and training facilities. The 1/16-scale models of ships at Little Creek provide one Possible solution to the problem which lies at the ^c°re of professional development throughout the ^I]10 (surface warfare) community. Few junior offi­cers g_et sufficient seamanship and shiphandling expe- ^r'c^jnce these days, and the future does not seem much lighter in this regard. Where the l/l6-scale models ^t5cist, they are underused since they are tied to one specific curriculum, during working hours only, taking the facilities available to whole wardrooms ^under CO/XO supervision on weekends could provide ^a badly needed compensation for the understandable reluctance of a commanding officer to take the conn ^l)f an underpowered 18,000-ton amphib with enor­mous sail area from a pilot and give it to a lieutenant (junior grade) SWO candidate. The captain s expertise ^tan be passed on to the next generation with the 36- ^f°ot model ship, and young officers qualified in one °f the essential (and most enjoyable) elements of their profession. Currently, this is not possible because of 'Ustructor and maintenance limitations, and thus Very f_ew officers receive the training, almost none at ^tbe hands of their commanding officer.

Imaginative use of other existing facilities can help fill the conning gap. Several surface officers are now ^Us‘ⁿg sail training for seamanship and relative mo­rion development. YPs (small yard patrol craft) are used in some areas, and MSBs (minesweeping boats) *n others. My own pipe dream is to use a ship s own I-LPL landing craft for tactics training, with a porta­ble flagstaff and homemade signal flags. The in­stalled RPM counter can suffice for speed control of like boats, and the addition of a commercial rudder- angle indicator will put us in business. With another pair of boats from a sister ship, we have a division of four for practicing tactics. The result won’t be quite like operating 2,100-ton destroyers at 25 knots, but it will be closer than LPDs at 12 knots and one-mile intervals!

The remaining perspectives are probably similar to those seen by any surface ship exec. Our problems are shared to some extent by them all, but it might be worthwhile to state them to complete the picture from the amphibs. I will list them topically, in order of concern:

Unauthorized Absences and Desertions: Why are there so many? Several reasons appear in my ship:

^ Disillusionment with the Navy, induced by re­cruiter promises. This is very difficult to document, because in nearly every case the young man acknowl­edges that nothing was promised in writing. Rather it was an assurance on a personal basis. The fellow then feels that he has been betrayed and is bitter from then on, unless we can break through to him. We try, but sometimes we fail.

► Feeling that nothing serious will happen. Given the current upgrading of discharges, many of the po­tential deserters just do not think they have much to lose. It is very difficult to get a court-martial going these days because of the heavy case loads in major fleet concentration areas. Very few bad conduct dis­charges are given, particularly for desertions. In some cases, the penalty for unauthorized absence (which is meted out by courts-martial) is fewer days in con­finement than the number of days the man w'as gone. For a boilerman working 12-hour shifts to get ready to deploy, this can look like a pretty good exchange. Needless to say, the ship loses the man for both periods and for the time required to prepare his case and stand trial. Many of us at sea feel strongly that members of the Judge Advocate General s Corps should be assigned to sea duty as junior officers. Ships with complements of 350 or more could use their services to great advantage, and they w'ould ap­proach their subsequent work with the fleet in a far different manner.

►  Encouragement from home. Several of our young men now come from homes in which the anti­military sentiment of the early seventies is prevalent. The parents side with the young man against the in­stitution, to his detriment. This can be expected to expand as more of these children come of age.

►  It is a way out, or is so perceived by some. They will do almost anything to get out, a la the pseudo­homosexual Klinger in the television program "M*A*S^#H.” Some are just unable to adapt, get into trouble, and then desert while facing discipli­nary proceedings.

►  A basic lack of concern for fulfillment of one’s promises or contracts, which reflects the society’s similar lack of concern. There are clearly sociological factors here that we can do little about.

► Brutal working schedules incident to operational commitments or major inspections. We have been spared much of this, but when one of our boilermen was ordered to transfer temporarily to a guided- missile destroyer in trouble with a propulsion exam­ining board, he deserted en route. And the reason he had been ordered to the destroyer was that she had already experienced wholesale departures of engineer­ing department personnel.

Drugs: The drug problem is still very much with us. In fact, probably more than half of our first-term sailors use marijuana while off duty. In some places where the fleet is concentrated, simple possession of less than an ounce is a misdemeanor and usually draws a $25 fine from a civilian court—less than that for running a stop sign. Our young men reflect the society at large in this, and there is not a great deal we can do to change that. Most commanders concentrate on keeping it off the ship, and we can be reasonably successful with careful use of non-judicial punishment. Still, it is much more of a problem than alcohol was in the old days, because drugs are so ^much easier to hide. Marijuana is quite easy to detect 'ⁿ use, although difficult to prosecute, but the chem- •cals such as PCP (“angel dust”) are nearly impossible

find before they are used. Even when detected, offenders can be charged only with incapacitation, because the tests available cannot definitely pinpoint ^^rug abuse. Fortunately, only a minority of the first-termers use chemicals, and isolation of them is fairly easy. To prosecute for marijuana use, one must first get the evidence—what they were smoking. Smart smokers find a compartment with an exterior °pening and throw whatever they have been using °ver the side as soon as the space is in danger of being violated—as they see a dogging handle begin ^to turn, for example. The heavy odor is sufficient for ^captain’s mast in some cases, but never enough for ^c°urt-martial.

Moreover, because of large case loads, many Navy lawyers do not want to see drug cases come up for ^sPecial courts-martial unless they involve selling. In ^tbeir communicated judgment, mere use on board ^ship, _{even on watc}h, is not a court-martial offense. 'Me on sea duty disagree, of course, but the lawyers Provide the judicial prosecutors and defenders, and ^afrer continued delays in prosecution ashore, one gets ^the idea and handles these cases on board. However, "dth resolute pursuit by all supervisors, the first- termer eventually understands that drug use on board ^ship is a losing proposition and confines his Marijuana use to shore liberty for the most part.

Alcohol is a growing problem. In many cases, it ^Seems to be more severe because the youngsters hide ^their drug usage but feel free to overindulge in the i^egal drug so readily available in the clubs we pro­^vide. The alcoholic rehabilitation programs are a great help, but a sizable percentage do not respond ^to the treatment because it requires a self-discipline ^they Jo _not possess and an ability to deal with the ^stresses of life that they have never mastered.

Inspections: Admiral Isaac C. Kidd, Jr., Com­mander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, hit the nail on tbe head last year when he stated that there were too many inspections. Everyone in the fleet agrees, but ⁿ° one agrees on how to reduce them and which ones should be eliminated first. From this vantage, I ^ould advocate an inspection policy as follows. They should normally be scheduled at the request of the ^c°mmand, unless there is an obvious problem of the type that would invoke a JAG Manual investigation ^at the ship level—a missed commitment, a serious material casualty, or obvious problems in morale or readiness of some other sort. Judge the command on Performance, nor on some artificially derived measure which inevitably reflects the parochialism of the staff officer who conceived it.

Command inspections are valuable tools when applied at the right time. That time is when a com­mand is changed, not in the middle of a captain’s tenure. Squadron commanders can provide a useful service to the relieving commanding officer by giving him a thorough picture of his command incident to his assumption of duty. And the commodore can be provided an equally valuable measure of the effec­tiveness of the commander being relieved, to be re­flected in the detaching fitness report. It would elim­inate the phenomenon of the new fellow inheriting the sins of the old without him or the boss knowing it. It would also shorten the learning process of the new man by a considerable measure. It would pro­vide a working list with which he could structure his first few months in command, rather than devoting them to the derivation of that list, as he must now do. It might also preclude the elevation of inept but lucky commanders to higher command.

One mistake that many commanders make is to ask their staffs to tell them which inspections should be eliminated. Only an exceptional staffie is going to admit to the boss that his inspection can be elimi­nated. Pride and misplaced professionalism will pre­clude that admission in all but a very few. But if the commander asks the COs of ships, he is quite likely to get a long list from each one, and they will dis­play a great deal of consonance. As a general rule, I would recommend a concept of assist visits rather than inspections, except in cases of obvious failure to perform. In the latter, I would hit the ship with a full load of competent inspectors of propulsion exam­ining board quality, so that the full story can be re­vealed. Trust the skipper until he proves that you cannot. Then relieve him for cause if he gives you cause. In a small Navy, there is no excuse for incompetence in our commanders.

Administrative Overload: This is compounded of the inspection problem and the natural desire for ad­ministrative perfection. The effect is to induce a kind of “crisis management” in which the next inspection or report is served at the expense of many of the other functions which the command knows must also be accomplished. The very best of ships may be able to do everything required, but the majority will rob Peter to pay Paul in a frantic effort to get ahead of the ever-steepening power curve. What falls in be­tween the cracks are those continuing programs which may be of most significance in the long run but which lack current high command interest.

The other side of this problem is the tendency to

seek administrative perfection, which results from the nature of the correspondence system. One is judged by the formal quality of reports, so we retype to avoid a bad reputation, while the real object of the exercise is the communication of data. The price of this perfection may be the denial of help to a man with a financial or family problem, or not enough time left to provide counseling on the requirements for A school. At sea, there is enough administrative work to fill more hours than are available. Overkill costs are high. We need to be aware of that cost and constantly assess our commitment of manpower.

At the intermediate command levels, it sometimes seems that the major concern is form rather than con­tent. Are the correct references indicated? Are the en­closures numbered correctly? Is the format in accord­ance with the instruction? The present system en­sures that these staffs have plenty to do, as they thus process enormous amounts of paperwork which re­quire forwarding endorsements or returning en­dorsements to correct errors. The system also slows to a snail’s pace the resolution of questions that are raised at the ship level. It worked well when the pace was slow and the administrative burden small. But now, it is one element which could easily be removed from the administrative system. At its base, the sys­tem is essentially conservative, and it serves that end admirably. It is much easier to criticize proposals for change than to offer alternative solutions to acknowl­edged problems, and every intermediate commander is required to comment before forwarding. It is not surprising that most comments are negative, but the result is to stifle the flow of suggestions upward from the primary source.

Recommendation? That correspondence of all types be sent directly to the type commander when he is the action addressee. Copies should go to all others in the intermediate chain of command. The addressees receiving only copies would have five working days to provide the type commander with negative comments. If such comments were not re­ceived in two calendar weeks, the intermediate commanders in the chain would be presumed to con­cur with the originator, or at least not to disagree. There would be a serendipitous effect from this, in that the type commander would not be “shielded” from non-consonant ideas, which the present system fosters. The type commander needs to know what his COs are thinking even if he does not agree, and the CO needs to know that his ideas will get to the type commander.

Assistance to the Fleet: All too often, ships get too much of the wrong kind of help and too little of the right kind. From a fleet perspective, staffs criticize in inspection and correspondence roles, frequently without providing any guidance as to how the prob­lem can be resolved. They also levy new require­ments to ensure compliance with broadly stated ob­jectives of their superiors, again without providing assistance to overburdened fleet units in terms of how the requirement can be met. The requirement simply appears in the action paragraph of a new instruction or notice: “Commanding Officers shall ensure that ...” Given the number of higher echelons to which a ship is responsible, the situation is analogous to a hydraulic system with many input valves, and only one outlet. Each staff controls an input valve, and the CO must do something with all the liquid which emerges at the other end. No one in between is really aware of the volume or pressure of the effluent contained within the manifold system, but ask any fleet commanding officer!

Recommendation? As a guideline to staffs, no new requirement should be levied on the fleet unless it is accompanied with specific advice (not direction) on how it can be done most expeditiously, with assets committed simultaneously in terms of training °^r material requirements. Concrete examples abound- All-hands training is left up to individual fleet units, although it is quite susceptible to staff solution via TV cassettes and/or film. An entire general military training program could be provided at relatively low' cost. The ships would gladly purchase the blank TV tape from their own funds if given the opportunity to be able to redirect the endless thousands of man­hours spent reinventing the educational wheel at every command in the fleet. The system of personnel qualification standards provides another splendid example of “Commanding Officers shall ensure . . •” with little assistance. In one case, the availability of materials to do the job was delayed long past the delivery date scheduled. Why? There was a shortage of typists in the Washington office responsible for the final draft. An administrative problem ashore has an operational impact afloat.

Awards: Awards are an extremely valuable tool in an atmosphere of positive goals and incentive leader­ship. Everyone that we want to keep seeks approval, and an award at the end of his tour for superior per­formance is good for his morale, his wife’s, and that of his parents. There is a beneficial side effect for recruiting in the hometown. The sacrifices required for exceptional performance are formally recognized, and he leaves sea duty with a good feeling about it. The effect on an assembled crew is of even more benefit. Here is the reward for service beyond the

assistant for strategy in the Center for Continuing Education until 1976 when he reported to his present ship, the USS Ponce (LPD-15) as execu­tive officer. He has written one previous Proceedings article, "The Navy Needs More Sailors," which was published in the February 1976 issue.

ⁿ°rm; this is what the “super pros” receive for those j°ⁿg hours of extra work and dedication. And this is how the profession recognizes them. Current practice ^rriakes these results nearly impossible to achieve.

Award recommendations are subjected to several kvels of screening, in each of which the judgment of the man’s commanding officer is reviewed, and fre­quently found wanting, as the recommended award ^ls reduced. This is basically objectionable at any level below that of the awarding official, as no recom­mendation can be written to adequately describe "■'hat a co knows about a good man. What is judged by the review board is the quality of the recommendation, ^n,lt the man. And the review process takes time, lots ^of time. Given the 50% annual crew turnover which most ships experience, it is difficult to reward per­formance while there is substantial corporate memory ^of that performance. In fact, the philosophy specif- ‘^ca% stated by the CNO is that end-of-tour awards ^should be awarded at the next command. We give ^UP a lot of what Napoleon recognized as the primary mason for awards—motivation of the troops. Presen­tation before a ship’s company is by far the most use­ful method, both for those leaving sea duty and for those coming to it. Awards earned ashore should be presented afloat to establish credibility for their re­cipient, who is generally in a leadership position. ®ut post-tour awards should be presented before a ^ship’s company too. A return to the practice of direct ^submission for forces afloat, with copies to the ad­ministrative chain, would go far toward restoring the beneficial effects of awards by making it more dif­ficult to dilute the CO’s intent and by speeding the process so that reward could be public in the forum ^which observed the action. Delegation of the primary judgment in the matter of propriety of award to the commanding officer would be equally beneficial, at least in the case of those awards intended for sus­tained superior performance. If an award is to be re­duced by the approving authority, an informal Notification to the command submitting would be a courteous gesture. It could tell the captain why re­duction was being considered and what justification m the original recommendation was lacking in order Co ensure that the flaw was not merely an omission through administrative error or oversight. If it is ^s'mply a judgment call (and the difference between a Navy Commendation Medal and a Navy Achieve­ment Medal is hard to discern), the CO deserves at least equal time in the matter, and it can be sought by memo, phone call, or personal message. From the Perspective of sea duty, service at sea is arduous duty, more like the stress of combat than most shore duty billets, particularly for our enlisted personnel and junior officers. Superior performance at sea may be obtained from a significant minority of them, up to 10% or so. They should be rewarded.

In summary, amphibious duty today is challeng­ing, demanding, frustrating, satisfying, . . . and dif­ferent. It is also great fun at times. We don’t share the intense stimulation of a long-range missile inter­ception or the cat-and-mouse interaction between a frigate and her underseas quarry. But we have our moments, beginning with the predawn run into the beachhead in darkened formation, while reconnais­sance helicopters whop-whop to and from the beach areas off our flight decks. Then comes the 90° turn to parallel the beach, on schedule, and the lowering of the stern gate while diesel engines roar in the gloom of the well deck. At the proper moment, the word is finally passed, “Land the landing force,” and the amphibious tractors lurch into the sea like pre­historic monsters snorting and spitting one after another while the ship continues to move down the line of departure and the first CH-53s lift off our deck for their vertical assault. Ahead lie several hours of closely coordinated effort, to match the vehicles, ma­terial, and men to the transport available at the mo­ment, using TV monitors of the well deck and flight deck and command by negation to avoid interference between continuous operations on the flight deck and in the well deck. The job requires more of seaman­ship than of tactical genius, more forehandedness than a capacity for split-second decision-making; but it is fascinating all the same. And when the troops are finally ashore with all their equipment, where else can you launch a whole fleet of your own sail­boats out the backdoor of your ship and sail in the tradewinds of the Caribbean while the homefolks are shivering in the coldest winter on record? Or where else can you go ashore for a divisional shipping-over party on a deserted beach in your own landing craft and then enjoy volleyball and steak afterward? It can be pretty special duty, and it should be. The volun­teer expects that the recruiting slogan will be ful­filled: “It’s more than a job; it’s an adventure!”

If we don’t deliver, we lose.

Commander Bonds was commissioned through the reg­ular NROTC program at Rice University in 1962. He has served in destroyers and on a destroyer flotilla staff. Following a tour at the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group, he commanded the USS Firm (MSO-444) for 32 months in the Pacific. A student at the Naval War Col­lege in 1972-1973, he remained at the college as an