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his issue of the Proceedings devoted to surface warfare is particularly timely and in keeping with the purpose of this most prestigious of naval journals. It is timely because the three decades ahead constitute for the nation and the Navy a time of maritime challenge unprecedented in the three decades just past and because the surface navy is a key element of our response to that challenge.
The Soviet Union has been traditionally a land power and is not dependent upon the seas for links with its allies or for import of strategic materials and energy. In the past decade, the size of the Soviet Navy, and indeed its very composition, have far exceeded the requirements of what just a few years ago we all considered to be a homeland defense force. Thus, it is clear that the Soviets, who in the past elected to match or exceed us in land and air forces, have now issued the challenge at sea as well.
This development has occurred at a time when the U.S. Navy is at its smallest size since pre-World War II days. The force level cuts that reduced us to such a size were made for one principal reason to find the money necessary to modernize the Navy- This modernization is needed in its fullest sense. We need to build more ships, we need to improve the capabilities of those we have, and we must pursue new technology with all deliberate speed while so doing. But all of this must be done within the framework of certain fundamental considerations.
First, the mission of the Navy—to be prepared to conduct prompt and sustained combat operations at sea in support of our national interests—requires the use of aircraft, surface ships, submarines, and their weapons. No one weapon system can do the job alone. Each has its own capabilities and limitations. It is the coordinated employment of all ships and aircraft, usually in task groups, that maximizes effectiveness and provides mutual support, both offensively and defensively. Wartime experience, exercises, and analysis all bear this out.
Second, the two basic functions of the Navy—sea control and power projection—cannot be treated i° isolation, as convenient as this may be for analysis- In the prosecution of a war, naval forces must be prepared to destroy enemy aircraft, missiles, submarines, and surface ships; strike enemy targets ashore; and seize enemy territory by amphibious assault. At times, all of these tasks must be performed simultaneously. A Navy sized to oppose only enemy forces at sea or only enemy targets ashore would be ill-prepared to fight in the many possible scenarios o the future and thus provide that balance of naval superiority so essential to a maritime nation. Or put another way, a Navy sized to do half the job would
deny a significant and unique contribution to the overall effort to deter war and control crises.
Third, Soviet naval forces (aircraft, submarines, and surface ships) are becoming more capable in all Warfare areas. It is especially important to recognize that Soviet doctrine and tactics stress coordinated cemployment of forces and saturation of defenses. In Peacetime, Soviet naval forces are fast becoming an important arm of the U.S.S.R.’s foreign policy.
Fourth, new technology must be pursued vigor- °usly, but it must also be accompanied by thorough engineering analysis and design, a realistic appraisal
costs and risks, adequate testing, and sound production methods. One should resist the temptation Co postulate new ships and weapons on paper, ar- tl(-'ulating their capabilities as though they were here a°d assuming away years of tough engineering. Furthermore, ships must be adequately manned with trained personnel and logistically supported throughout their active service. In addition, ships built to operate 25 to 30 years must be updated periodically, Particularly in the weapons area (including sea-based aircraft).
With these fundamentals in mind, the Navy is modernizing its surface ships, improving their opera- t|Qnal and material readiness, and establishing firm requirements for the training and professional development of the personnel who man these ships. In the mrcraft carriers, surface combatants, amphibious orces, underway replenishment, and support ships of fhe fleet, significant improvements are planned in all Warfare areas. In particular, the offensive and defence capabilities of the individual ships are being en- lanced to the maximum extent possible.
Our shipbuilding program contains a balance be- rWeen very capable but relatively expensive multipurpose ships and the less costly ships which can be Procured in larger quantities to provide the fleet with c e density of force needed. Specifically, the follow- ’ng ships are all either in design or under construc- t*°n: the fourth nuclear-powered carrier, Carl Vinson j ”N-70), two more nuclear-powered cruisers of the *rginia (CGN-38) class, Aegis-equipped cruisers CiN-42 class), Aegis-equipped gas turbine destroyers IiDG-47 class), Spruance (DD-963)-cIass destroyers, liver Hazard Perry (FFG-7)-class frigates, Tarawa ' HA-i)-class amphibious assault ships (general purpose), and new oilers, tenders, minesweepers, land- lng ships, surveillance ships, hydrofoil patrol craft, aud support ships. These ships are optimized for ueir respective missions.
the area of new technology, the Aegis antiair Warfare system has been developed to keep pace with t e projected threat. When teamed with carrier- based tactical aircraft, it will permit offensive operations in high-threat areas. All new cruisers, destroyers, and frigates will be equipped to embark two LAMPS III (light airborne multipurpose system) helicopters. When combined with a passive towed array and an active sonar, these helicopters will provide a significant antisubmarine warfare capability. Studies are under way to examine various new ships on which other V/STOL (vertical or short takeoff and landing) aircraft might be based. Tomahawk and Harpoon cruise missiles will provide significant offensive capabilities to a number of surface combatants. The major-caliber lightweight gun will fulfill an urgent requirement in naval gunfire support and shore strike. New point-defense gun and missile systems will increase the survivability of surface ships. The 3,000-ton surface effect ship prototype construction program will demonstrate the engineering feasibility and operational utility of a future high-speed frigate, specially configured for area antisubmarine warfare. Amphibious assault capability will be significantly improved by development and production of the air cushion landing craft. New minesweeping equipment, both airborne and shipborne, is under development. Improved missiles, guided projectiles, advanced torpedoes, mines, swimmer delivery vehicles, new sensors and control systems, increased survivability, and more reliable equipment are all part of the new technology efforts. Nuclear propulsion, gas turbines, and steam and diesel plants are all vital elements of present and future propulsion systems. The unlimited endurance, flexibility, and operational advantage of the nuclear-powered carrier task groups, especially in view of the dwindling sources of conventional fuel, are of special importance.
As can be seen, the years ahead are a time of particular challenge to the surface warfare community—a time in which we will need our finest young people to come aboard and keep us on course. We know that the language may change and that the weapons and ships of the future may look different. We know also that the United States and its allies must retain maritime superiority. And finally, we know that achievement of the future Navy can be realized only with the support of a well-informed American public.
Therefore, we in the surface navy must be able to state our case compellingly, to manage the development and acquisition of new weapons and ships responsibly, and to exercise the leadership necessary to bring aboard and retain the officers and enlisted people to make it all work. Informed discussion of the subject in public forums such as this issue of the Proceedings is an important and necessary step.