This html article is produced from an uncorrected text file through optical character recognition. Prior to 1940 articles all text has been corrected, but from 1940 to the present most still remain uncorrected. Artifacts of the scans are misspellings, out-of-context footnotes and sidebars, and other inconsistencies. Adjacent to each text file is a PDF of the article, which accurately and fully conveys the content as it appeared in the issue. The uncorrected text files have been included to enhance the searchability of our content, on our site and in search engines, for our membership, the research community and media organizations. We are working now to provide clean text files for the entire collection.
U.s. Navy and NATO planners are considering sending high-speed merchant ships with military cargoes to Europe at the start of war or a crisis independently, without escorts. This idea becomes feasible when one confers the time necessary to form and load convoys; the high speeds of cer- tam modern merchantmen; the several thousand allied, neutral, and even Communist-bloc merchant ships that would still be in the North Atlantic during the first week or two of a con- H‘ct; and the vulnerability of large concentrations of ships in convoy to Satelfite and other detection and targeting techniques.
During World War II the high- sPced passenger liners, pressed into Service as troop ships, crossed the Atlantic unescorted without loss to hos- t'le forces. The 20-knot-plus ships could escape with relative ease from fEe capability-limited, diesel-pro- Pdled, torpedo-armed submarines of that war. However, the contemporary Soviet air and submarine threats, supported by advanced sensor systems, ra‘Se the question of “arming” modern Merchantmen steaming alone. Indeed, che limited number of escorts available 0r convoys makes the arming of merchant ships in convoy an important
consideration.
The first self-defense system suita- te for modern merchant ships is the M-called Arapaho containerized ttelicopter facility. Arapaho, under development by the Naval Air Systems Command, is designed to provide rapidly installed antisubmarine helicopter facilities for containerships. *he system provides for the entire clicopter support facility to be fitted M a number of standard (8 x 8 x 20- °°t) container shapes: the flight deck, hangars, crew quarters, galley, fuel, 0rdnance, power supply, repair lockers, and even administrative offices.
The containerized helicopter facility would be installed at the loading port atop several hundred standard, cargocarrying containers. The exact number of filled containers in the Arapaho facility would depend upon the size and configuration of the ship to be armed. Once installed, the Arapaho facility will support several SH-3 Sea King ASW helicopters. Once at sea, the Sea Kings would prosecute contacts detected from electronic intercepts or other shipboard sensors, or from the shipboard helicopters’ sensors, or by third-party sensors. Upon arrival at the overseas port the Arapaho containers would be removed first, then returned to the original ship after the new cargo was loaded, or attached to another ship. Preliminary design of Arapaho has been completed; although the project has been delayed because of commercial management problems, an at-sea evaluation is planned for 1978.
The major advantage of Arapaho over previous concepts of modifying merchant ships to operate aircraft— such as the escort carriers, merchant aircraft carriers (MAC-ships), and catapult fighter ships of World War II—is that the armed ship requires no structural changes. The helicopter facility can be loaded and unloaded as simply, and almost as rapidly, as loading standard cargo containers.
If helicopter operations from merchant ships prove to be successful, then the next step would be to replace the helos with fixed-wing VTOL (vertical takeoff and landing) aircraft. VTOL aircraft could increase the scope of merchant ship self-defense capabilities with longer-range reconnaissance, airborne early warning (AEW), and possibly the interception of long-range reconnaissance aircraft.
The AV-8A Harrier, basically a light attack aircraft, is already in service with the U.S. Marine Corps and has been flown successfully from small landing decks on various U.S. amphibious ships as well as from British fleet auxiliaries. When flown from the helicopter carrier Guam (LPH-9) during tests of the sea control ship concept in 1972, Marine Harriers successfully intercepted Soviet Tu-16 "Badger” reconnaissance aircraft. Subsequent
VTOL aircraft, such as the McDonnell Douglas AV-8B, the Grumman Type A design, the Rockwell XFV-12A, and other proposed aircraft, could provide a wide range of fighter, attack, AEW, electronic jamming, and ASW capabilities. Until these aircraft become available, Arapaho-fitted merchant ships could fly SH-3 Sea Kings, the SH-2 LAMPS, and later the new SH-60B LAMPS III helicopters. While there is a shortage of these helicopters in Navy force planning, and the schedule for the production of an operational VTOL ASW/AEW aircraft is unclear, the containerized concept does not appear to face any major technical problems.
The effectiveness of an Arapaho- fitted ship would be enhanced if she also carried a long-range ASW sensor. Obviously, a sonar could not be used at high speeds; however, there may be value in merchant ship sonars for slow-speed operations when approaching coastal areas, or other special situations, such as supplementing escorts in a convoy. The escort towed array sonar (ETAS) system is a long-range detection system being developed in containerized modules for installation in the Coast Guard’s new “Famous-” class medium endurance cutters. ETAS will provide target data to a LAMPS helicopter, or V/STOL aircraft, through an electronic data link. Again, the actual ETAS equipment, personnel accommodations, and even power supply and fuel could be containerized for rapid installation and removal in standard merchant ships.
Container installations seem feasible for certain other combat systems. Of course, a containerized system is not constrained specifically to 8 x 8 x 20- foot modules, but in multiples of that size. For example, a military systems module could be 16 feet high and 8 feet wide and 20 feet long, or 40 feet long. A number of active and passive countermeasures against antiship missiles appear suitable for containerization. Passive countermeasures include active jamming, chaff dispensers, and decoys. These devices could be fitted into containers for use on board merchant ships, as well as for certain amphibious ships and fleet auxiliaries that have space for containers on their decks. In addition, radar systems and, if necessary, diesel or turbine power generators and their fuel could also be fitted in container shapes.
Active defense systems which appear suitable for containerization and surveillance are the threat-detection radars and some form of close-in weapon system (CIWS). The current 20-mm. Phalanx “Gatling” gun CIWS weighs approximately 12,000 pounds. This system possibly could be containerized, but there is a proposed austere CIWS with only three rotating barrels (instead of six) which would be lighter and probably more suitable for container configuration.
Once a decision is made to arm con- tainerships with weapons, the question could become where to stop. A simple launching system for short ASW torpedoes, such as the Mk 46 in U.S. service, is an obvious candidate for containerized launchers. Successful tests of vertically launched Standard SM-I missiles and vertical launchers speak well for the possible development of a whole line of vertically launched missiles for surface combatants and, possibly, merchant ships. (For a detailed report on this subject see “Vertical Missile Launchers: Parts I & II in the October and December 1977 Proceedings.) It is anticipated that later ships of the Aegis-equipped DDG-47-class destroyers and the FFGX, the mid-1980s successor to the FFG-7- class of frigates, will have vertical launchers for antiair, antiship, and antisubmarine missiles.
Possibly these launchers could be configured in some multiple of standard container size. If not the first generation of vertical launchers, then perhaps a subsequent lighter-weight, vertical-launch system would be suitable for merchant ship installation. Current designs provide for the same launcher to fire the current Standard-MR (SM-i), ASROC, and Harpoon missiles or their successors.
Command, control, and communications (C3) facilities could also be containerized.
Should one or all of these defensive, offensive, and C3 facilities be installed in a high-speed merchant ship, that ship essentially becomes a warship. The merchant ship, obviously, does
not have the warship’s hull design and compartmentation intended to reduce damage from near misses and flooding. However, the nature of modern warfare may alleviate the need for specialized hull design. Current warship survivability features date from the 1930s and 1940s, when flights or squadrons of dive or level bombers would attack an evading warship- Relatively few of their bombs struck the evading ship, but the underwater concussion from near misses would inflict the killing blows. Similarly, only a few of the aerial torpedoes launched against a warship would score.
Modern technology has changed the “odds” in favor of a higher ratio of hits-to-weapons fired. For example, an aircraft like the A-7E Corsair, with a ten-mil computer bomb system, that can reach a release point over a destroyer or larger warship will probably score a hit with every bomb released. A salvo of missiles with advanced, multi-seeker guidance will score a direct hit with every missile that leaks through the ship’s active and passive defenses.
Thus, modern weapons make warships more vulnerable to direct hits and less likely to suffer damage from near misses. In this context, the relative vulnerability of a warship and a merchant ship becomes less distinguishable. The availability of damage control parties and other features of a warship’s operation enhance her survivability; still, the vulnerability difference is less.
The warship is also more effective in the integration of sensors, weapon control systems, and weapon launchers. Containerized sensors, fire control systems, and weapons would have to be cable linked upon installation in the merchant ship. Although this is a relatively simple procedure, the amount of time needed and the opportunities for problems increase with the number of containers and complexity of equipment. However, technology exists that could alleviate some aspects of this problem. For example, today’s sensors transmit rasv data to command and weapon control centers. Computer technology in the United States has now reached the point that the author’s 11-year-old son
ha* a hand-held “computer” game '''hich simulates maneuvering reentry Vehicles and a ballistic missile interCePt system, while his 13-year-old ^aughter’s Texas Instrument calculator, which is even smaller, per- 0rms 48 functions plus memory. Such advances in computer-related technol- °8y> “chip” memory capabilities, and other characteristics of this technology Petrnit simple “sealed" computers at c”e sources of data (e.g., radars, sonars, threat detectors). The connecting Cables can then transmit semi- Pfocessed data to the containers, Amplifying the connecting network, reducing the number of installations, atld improving effectiveness. Also the evelopment of fiber optics, which likely replace data transmission Cat>les, provides for a much higher ^ata transfer rate and requires less space.
Still another future step toward the Etchant ship armed with concretized systems would be to include Cable “grids” in new-construction rrierchant ships. These grids, probably inning along the sides and athwart- sbips bulkheads, would permit containers to be simply plugged into power or data cabling. This would reduce installation time, hookup errors, etc. The grid could be considered a national defense feature for new construction in the same way that the government now requires specific speeds and hatch sizes for certain merchant ships.
This concept of developing containerized naval systems for installation in merchant ships is attractive in the areas of flexibility, personnel, and force level considerations. With respect to flexibility, container suites could be developed for, perhaps, ASW, air/missile defense, amphibious assault (i.e., to support troops and cargo helicopters), and ocean surveillance. As specific military requirements arise, the necessary containers would be embarked, either in ships carrying cargo or in merchant ships chartered or commandeered specifically to support military operations. Thus, for ships carrying cargo to a war or crisis area, either ASW or antiship missile defense (ASMD) containers could be embarked; for an amphibious operation these same systems, or a packaged amphibious troop/helicopter “system,” or possibly containerized shore bombardment weapons could be embarked. Even mine warfare systems may be suitable for containerization: Captor/Mk 46 mines could be rapidly loaded in containerships, with the necessary navigation and command facilities being fitted in containers; or, a modified Arapaho system could support RH-53 Sea Stallion mine countermeasure helicopters.
In this context, consideration should be given to the adoption of commercial LASH (lighter aboard ship) or Seabee (sea-barge) ship designs in place of the specialized naval design being proposed for the eight-ship LSD-41 class of dock landing ships. The commercial ships have large cargo capacities, the ability to carry large landing craft or even air cushion vehicles, and broad main decks or “superdecks” suitable for helicopter operations. These ships also have speeds of almost 30 knots. Realizing that, in some respects, they may be less efficient than built-for-the-purpose LSDs, and providing them with certain naval features will add to their cost, the overall construction and life-cycle costs should still make them less expensive ships.
The proposal has also been raised of modifying supertankers (i.e., ships over 100,000 tons deadweight) for' naval missions. The supertankers appear attractive because of their large, broad decks, which could be modified into some form of a flight deck, and large tank systems, which could be partially filled with buoyant foam or some other damage-retarding system to increase the ship’s survivability.
However, the supertanker approach
CONTAINERSHIPS
Advantages
• Designed for modularized cargo of standard dimensions
• Already designed for restraining containers with high local loads
• High speed (30-knot range)
• Can carry military load and cargo containers simultaneously
• Can be self-loading
• Currently on scheduled runs to and from U.S. ports, increasing availability
• Numerous U.S. and foreign ports can accommodate
Disadvantages
• Various hatch and deckhouse arrangements, requiring preplanning for various classes
• Some or all military containers must be unloaded to handle cargo containers
• Ship motion is more severe than loaded tankers
SUPERTANKERS
Advantages
• Very large ship with deckhouse aft arrangement in most ships
• Loaded tanker is very stable
• Potential high survivability if tanks filled with foam
• Cargo can be handled without affecting military containers on superdeck
Disadvantages
• Not designed to carry solid cargo, thus requires extensive modifications (including superdeck)
• Slow speed (circa 15 knots)
• Difficult to handle when empty
• Difficult to maneuver
• Some cargoes highly flammable
• Few U.S. ports can accommodate supertankers
• No self-loading capability for containers
has severe limitations for containerized weapons and other systems. While the containership is designed to carry solid modules of a standard size and configuration, the tanker is intended to carry liquid cargoes.
The main deck of the tanker is cluttered with piping and other equipment which prevent the installation of containers. These obstacles cannot be removed or covered over without a major redesign of the tanker’s piping systems. “Superdecks” can be installed, as was done in World War II for carrying heavy deck cargo on tankers, but this would limit installation of containers to those specific tankers with the special features and would have no other value or utility because of the nature of tanker operations. A further limiting factor would be the problems associated with the tanker’s loading and unloading specialized containers because the ship would be too large to use standard container docks and other facilities. In addition, she would be diverted from normal tanker loading and unloading facilities.
Also, the structural design of tankers does not permit heavy deck loading. The tanker’s internal structure is intended for containing liquids in essentially vertical tanks. Thus, special deck strengthening would be required which probably would be difficult to accomplish because of the arrangement of pipes and other topside equipment at the existing tank-bulkhead intersections (i.e., strength points).
Finally, the tanker, whether traveling loaded or in ballast, is highly vulnerable to accidents which involve friction, flame, and heat. Such accidents would be of major concern in operating helicopters or VTOL aircraft from a tanker employed to support aircraft activity. While the danger from accidents or battle damage could be reduced by carrying nonflammable ballast or foam (empty tanks could retain explosive fumes), this would result in non-availability of the ship for cargo carrying.
The accompanying table summarizes the physical advantages and disadvantages of the containership and supertanker in quasi-military roles. Based on this information, the modern U.S. and European high-speed con-
tainerships appear to be the more suitable platforms for containerized weapons and sensors, either in the merchant self-defense role or for full conversion to “containerized warships.”
Two other factors should be considered in the context of containerized systems. First, some systems appear suitable for operation by the Naval Reserve Force. The mobility and flexibility of containerized systems would make for relatively low maintenance requirements, and, with plug-in target simulators, they could be operated by reservists. In time of crisis or during a prolonged campaign, the reservists could embark in the ships using the same equipment on which they had trained. (The current Arapaho planning provides for the use of reserve ASW helicopter squadrons.) In general, containerized systems’ mobility and flexibility would enhance and standardize the training of regular personnel and reservists, as well as foreign students.
Second, containerization is another form of modular replacement, and thus permits the rapid updating of systems. A containerized missile launcher or radar could be replaced more rapidly with an improved version, even if some rewiring and other shipboard modifications are needed, than could a “built-in” system.
In today’s changing naval environment, which includes (1) the declining U.S. fleet size, (2) increasing active Navy personnel problems, which may lead to new emphasis on the Naval Reserve as a source of trained personnel in wartime, (3) increasing ship construction costs, (4) increasing ship construction times, and (5) the increasing capabilities of the Soviet Navy, the traditional and, in general, time-consuming methods of developing and maintaining a fleet probably will not be adequate. Alternative approaches to fleet design and development must continue to be examined. And, although it has been more than three decades since the U.S. Navy has had to use merchant ships in combat roles, the time has come to at least develop specific concepts for exploiting more effectively the combat potential of commercial merchant ships.