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The Soviet “Yankee"-class fleet ballistic-missile submarines, facing page, bear a great deal of resemblance to the U.S. Navy’s Ethan Allen (SSBN-608)-class ships. As a result, conventional U.S. wisdom has been to ascribe to the Soviet SSBNs a “mirror image” in naval missions as well as physical appearance. An examination of the ways in which Soviet submarines actually operate suggests we ought to take a closer look at our deceptive looking glass.
On 15 November I960, the first U.S. fleet ballistic-missile (FBM) submarine, the USS George Washington (SSBN-598), went to sea on deterrent patrol. Nearly seven years later, the Soviet Navy took delivery of its first counterpart to the George Washington. This “Yankee”-class submarine turned out to be the first in a series of 34 ships that completed delivery in 1975.1 “Yankee” was a fitting name for the class because of the submarines’ startling resemblance to the U.S. Ethan Allan (SSBN-608) class. That is, the two classes of nuclear-propelled ships have similar hull and sail configurations, and each ship is armed with a battery of 16 missile-launching tubes.
In addition to the similarity in appearance of the U.S. and Soviet SSBNs, American strategic submarine missions were defined and patrol procedures were established some seven years in advance of the first
Yankee” delivery. Accordingly, it is understandable that many Western naval analysts initially ascribed to the “Yankee”-class ships a role similar to that of the Polaris FBM submarine. But casting their SSBNs as mirror images” of ours turned out to be erroneous. As Soviet naval writings became more revealing, aud as Soviet SSBN operations and hardware were observed and subjected to rigorous study, a debate arose among Western analysts as to the assigned mission and priorities of the U.S.S.R.’s SSBN force.2
Within this debate, some of the more stimulating arguments centered about these missions:
^ Strike against land-based targets: This mission sug- 8ests the Soviet SSBN force and U.S. FBM force have similar roles.
^ Combating the enemy fleet: This is a traditional S°viet naval mission applied to SSBNs in an antiship or anti-SSBN role.
► Withhold for intra-war fighting or war termination bargaining: This mission assumes protection of a substantial portion of the SSBN force (pro-SSBN operations) during an initial nuclear exchange so that effective fighting or bargaining can take place at a later date.
With the advantage of hindsight, the purpose of this article is to reflect upon arguments set forth by Western analysts in order to derive a likely set of present and future SSBN missions. The final analysis will suggest an eclectic set of priorities made possible by geography, ship characteristics, weapon systems, and operational considerations.
Strike Against Land-Based Targets: If the
“Yankee”-class SSBN is credited with an identical, or a near-identical mission to the American SSBN force, then one would expect to see a posture indicative of launching a maximum number of missiles with a minimum of warning. This would include: a two- crew concept, about 50% of the force at sea at any time, operating the submarines from overseas bases to maximize targets covered, and an emphasis on overall force readiness. Observation over the years has made it clear none of these elements exists in the Soviet scheme. In fact, it is apparent the Soviets are not attempting to emulate the U.S. model—no matter how much we think they should. The closest relationship one can find, perhaps, is the fact that the U.S.S.R. has based its “Yankees” in two fleet areas—Northern and Pacific—in a manner not dissimilar to the distribution of U.S. FBM submarines in the Atlantic and Pacific fleets. This, however, is where the similarity ends.
In 1969, “Yankee”-class submarines began operational patrols in the Atlantic, and in 1971 in the Pacific, with the vessels periodically coming within missile range of the United States.3 This pattern of operations changed only slightly through the mid- 1970s, with about three ships on patrol in the Atlantic and one in the Pacific at any time. These patrols included excursions close enough to the U.S. mainland to hit “deep” targets. All in all, the Soviet Navy seems to relegate about 15% of its SSBN force to continuous ocean patrol.4 This is especially significant in light of the range limitations of the SS-N-6 missiles carried on board the “Yankee”-class submarine.
The SS-N-6 ballistic missile has three variants: modifications 1, 2, and 3. The initial Mod. 1 had a single reentry vehicle and a range of about 1,300 nautical miles. By 1973, the Mod. 2 variant came into service with a single reentry vehicle and a 1,600-nautical mile range. The Mod. 3, with the same range limitation as the Mod. 2, was phased in about 1975; however, this later version is equipped with multiple reentry vehicles5 similar to the American longer range (2,880-nautical mile) Polaris A-3 missile. So, with about 15% of 34 Soviet “Yankee”- class SSBNs on patrol, with missiles limited to a range of about 1,600 nautical miles, with a singlecrew concept, and an absence of forward basing, it is difficult to equate “Yankee”-class SSBN missions and operations to those of U.S. FBMs. Most certainly, explanations for the Soviet concept of operating SSBNs have been offered. Robert Weinland, for example, suggests the role of Soviet sea-based strategic forces is one of deterrence through assured minimum destruction. This would be achieved by maintaining a small portion of the SLBM (sea-launched ballistic-missile) force within target range of the United States and keeping the majority of the force in home waters. His assumption is that the larger portion of the force would be deployed on warning, thereby providing a maximum number of missiles on station during a period of high tension.6 Timing, of course, is critical in this type of operation. Should the SSBNs be deployed too soon, then forced to return to port prior to hostilities for logistics needs or other reasons, the strategy becomes counterproductive. And, if belatedly deployed, command and control communications might be uncertain after an initial nuclear exchange. However, if the “Yankee”-class SSBNs do not deploy on warning, then their operations do not suggest the immediate response required to support a Strategic Rocket Force preemptory first strike, or, for that matter, a time-sensitive retaliatory attack.
Combating the Enemy Fleet: Fleet versus fleet is a traditional naval mission recently applied to Soviet ballistic-missile submarines. The roots of this mission arise from:
► Soviet writings identifying the sea-based threat and indicating the use of tactical nuclear sea- launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) against surface and subsurface naval targets
► Development of the medium-range SS-NX-13 SLBM with terminal homing
► Progress in Soviet satellite surveillance systems
► “Yankee”-class SSBN ship characteristics and operations
In reiterating a traditional naval mission, Marshal of the Soviet Union V. D. Sokolovskii noted in his 1962 edition of Military Strategy, “The main aim of the fleet operations in naval theaters is to defeat the enemy navy and to sever his maritime communications.”7 Nevertheless, Sokolovskii and other Soviet military writers have also made it clear that the mam threat facing the U.S.S.R. from the sea is a nuclear strike. Until the early 1960s, this threat would originate from attack aircraft carriers. However, with the advent of the Polaris FBM fleet, Sokolovskii elevated combat against enemy submarines, especially those carrying nuclear missiles, from “an important naval task” in 1962,8 to “the first priority mission of naval operations” in 1964.9
How, then, are American SSBNs to be combated? In 1962, Sokolovskii stated, “Submarines can be successfully combated by hunter-killer submarines armed with missiles and torpedoes. . . .”10 a statement readily acceptable to Western navy men- However, in his 1963 edition of Military Strategy
Sokolovskii added the phrase “with homing missiles and torpedoes [emphasis added].” Homing missiles were seen as cruise missiles because Western conventional wisdom tells us cruise missiles are tactical antiship weapons and ballistic missiles are strategic weapons to be used against land targets. Herein lies a problem. Naval analysts (K. J. Moore in particular) ernphasize the danger in trying to view Soviet systems as “mirror images” of those of the West. Moore points out ”... nowhere in Sokolovskiy’s three editions of Military Strategy is there explicit differentiation between ballistic and winged missiles. . . ,”n In other words, there is a possibility the Soviets envisage employment of sea-launched bal- hstic missiles in a tactical naval role and conversely, employment of sea-launched cruise missiles in a strategic role.
Is there any significant advantage in adapting Medium-range SLBMs to an antiship/antisubmarine
as a ballistic missile with a range of 350 to 400 miles and guided by either aircraft or satellite. Initial reports suggested the terminally guided missile would be used against surface ships, but subsequently there were indications that it would be targeted against the U.S. Polaris-Poseidon submarine force.12 Additional reports suggested that the in-flight guidance feature had a capability to vary its initial aim point by up to 30 nautical miles.13 Moreover, the missile is compatible with the “Yankee”-class SSBN launch tubes and has been evaluated as a tactical ballistic antiship weapon. The unanswered question is: what is the source of target-locating data for this system?
Metical role? With the large SLBM nuclear warhead fhere is an inherently large target “kill radius.” If this advantage is combined with the short time of ^Ight (reduced dead time) of a steep-trajectory, Medium-range, terminally guided ballistic missile and the survivability of a launching submarine, there aPpears to be ample reason for pursuit of such a systeM. And indeed, it is claimed the U.S.S.R. did develop the SS-NX-13 for these very reasons.
In 1973, the press began describing the SS-NX-13
Proven means of providing naval target-locating data include aircraft and surface ship reconnaissance, acoustic devices on the ocean floor, direction-finder positions from a ship’s electronic emissions, and submarine trailing operations. However, it appears the Soviets are developing satellite systems for con-
tinuous open-ocean surveillance. References in the literature to sensors that might support this application include optics, radar, thermal wake detectors, and infrared (for SLBM engine ignition detection). We know, for instance, that in 1965 the Soviets launched their first radar ocean reconnaissance satellite with the capability of providing target data to Soviet missile launchers.14 Also, during the worldwide fleet exercise Okean-75, the Soviets launched two Cosmos satellites that had the orbital characteristics of ocean reconnaissance vehicles.15
From open source information, one might marginally credit the Soviets with a real-time satellite target-locating system which is effective in good weather against surface ships. However, there is little evidence that such a system exists for continuous tracking of submerged submarines. A hypothetical case might be made for a “Yankee”-class SSBN, within SS-NX-13 range of a Western FBM, receiving real-time satellite locator data of a launch, counterfiring with SS-NX-13S, and destroying the Western FBM before all 16 of her missiles were away. (This would be a commendable task for a Soviet weapon system designed 17 to 20 years ago.) This scenario, however, depends upon the "Yankee” being within 400 nautical miles of the Western SSBN—a situation that will become less likely as Western SLBM ranges, and corresponding operating areas, increase with the introduction of the Trident missile system. Nonetheless, there is little doubt that the Soviets are actively working on a satellite means of providing constant target-location data for all Western sea-based strategic systems.
Perhaps the earliest indicator of ballistic-missile submarines assigned an antiship role dates back to the early deployment patterns of the Soviet “Golf ' class SSBs and the “Hotel”-class SSBNs. These submarines seemed to operate in holding areas farther from the United States than their 750-nautical mile missile range. Since operations reoccurred in the areas west of the Azores, northeast of Bermuda, and east of Nova Scotia, one could draw some inferences from plotting these areas on a chart. Namely, they appear to lie on the transit routes between major U.S. East Coast naval bases (carrier home ports) and the U.S. Navy’s forward deployment areas in the Mediterranean and Norwegian seas.16 Additionally) Soviet “Bear-D” aircraft patrolled these transit routes, thereby providing a vehicle for early and constant target-location information and/or mid-course missile guidance.
This background, superimposed on certain “Yankee"-class anomalies that militated against the ships’ use as strategic systems, led K. J. Moore to conclude the “Yankees” were conceived as hunter- killer submarines from their inception.17 Anomalies
Two early classes of Soviet ballistic-missile submarines were the “Hotel” (opposite page) and “Golf." The “Hotel" was the first nuclear-powered Soviet FBM submarine, while the “Golf’-class boats were built with diesel power plants.
NAVAL INSTITUTE COLLECTION
Moore identifies in support of this position in-
^ Foreshortened missile tubes
High shaft horsepower and resulting high speed * Lack of ship inertial navigation system
Extended production after the introduction of the S'N-8 ballistic missile18 (The SS-N-8 is a 4,000- nautical mile missile currently deployed in the Delta” classes of SSBNs.)
The weaknesses in the case for assigning Soviet SBNs an antishipping/anti-SSBN mission seem to fall •nto three areas. The SS-NX-13 missile is not deployed, the Soviets are not likely to want antisubmarine warfare ships counted against their submarine-launched missile limits in SALT (strategic arrBs limitation talks), and the existence of a satellite °cean reconnaissance system for continuous tracking j Submerged submarines has not been established. n support of this contention, Mike MccGwire asked '''hat role would be left for the large antisubmarine warfare ships (“Kara,” “Kresta II,” and "Kri- vak”)—which now make up the bulk of long-range new construction—if the Soviet Union had been able to develop some really effective counter-SSBN system.19 In response, K. J. Moore might assert that these ships are designed for closed or limited areas where satellite systems are less effective.
Most certainly the SS-NX-13 project could be revived, and an antisubmarine warfare satellite tracking system breakthrough could occur. Time and again, references to new capabilities appear in the literature. For instance, in 1975 Marshal A. A. Grechko wrote,
New forms of naval operations have arisen which are connected with combating enemy atomic missile-carrying submarines and strike aircraft carrier forces, as well as anti-submarine forces, and waging warfare on sea and ocean lines of communication.”20
And in this country, General George S. Brown, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, observed,
The SS-NX-13 is a tactical ballistic antiship missile. It may have been intended for deployment in YANKEE-class SSBNs. It has not been tested since November 1973 and is not operational. However, the advanced technology displayed by the weapon is significant and the project could be resurrected.”21
Withhold for Intra-War Fighting or War Termination Bargaining: The limited range of the SS-N-6 missile and the small number of “Yankee”-class SSBNs on patrol at any one time militate against inclusion of a significant number of these vessels in a preemptive (no warning) first strike. If this is true, then some other rationale is needed to explain their role as strategic weapon systems. One persuasive hypothesis advanced by James McConnell is that ”Yankee”-ciass SSBNs not on patrol will be withheld (protected by friendly antisubmarine forces)22 at sea in local operating areas.2,! After the initial nuclear exchange, they would deploy . . to carry out ‘deterrence’ in war, conduct intrawar bargaining and influence the peace talks at the end of the war.”24 The SSBNs on patrol during the initial exchange would supplement the Strategic Rocket Force in attacking designated, initially missed, or otherwise high-value targets.
Integral with this hypothesis are implications relative to Soviet SSBN force survivability that must be considered. Foremost, perhaps, is the necessity for Soviet SSBNs in the Atlantic to pass through an antisubmarine barrier, the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom gap. And, since the Soviets have known about the U.S. Navy’s sea-floor acoustic detection system (SOSUS) capability for a long time,25 it seems prudent they maintain, in peacetime, a minimum number of SSBNs on patrol at any one time.26 Moreover, it follows that any pre-hostility mass deployment of Soviet SSBNs would negate surprise and might be risky for their survival.
On the other hand, an obvious advantage of withholding SSBNs is one of degrading Western antisubmarine warfare capabilities through an initial strategic rocket force attack. This, of course, could provide Soviet SSBNs better security and opportunity of survival.27 Security and survival alone seem reasonable explanations for a withholding strategy. Additionally, in terms of good management, one could suggest minimal peacetime deployments and a one- crew concept, made possible by a withholding strategy, contribute to economy of forces in terms of personnel, materiel, reactor core life, and intervals between overhauls.
The “Delta” Classes of SSBNs: In early 1973, )uSt prior to termination of the “Yankee”-class construction program, the first “Delta’’-class SSBN went to sea. The first of this class, the “Delta I,” displacing 8,000 tons surfaced and 426.5 feet in length, Is equipped with 12 SS-N-8 SLBMs having ranges in excess of 4,000 nautical miles. Within two years of the appearance of “Delta I,” a second variant, or “Delta II,” displacing 16,000 tons and armed with 16 SS- N-8s, was at sea. Not only does the “Delta’s” SS-N-8 missile have a range advantage over the “Yankee class’s SS-N-6, but it has stellar-inertial guidance indicating improved accuracy for deployment against hardened land targets. In fact, by November 197° the SS-N-8 had been flight tested to an extended range of 5,600 nautical miles. And, in early 1978, the Soviet “Yankee”- and “Delta”-class SSBN inventory stood at 34 “Yankees,” 14 “Delta Is, and 12 “Delta II’s" (one of which may be an even larger “Typhoon” class armed with 20 or 24 MIRVed missiles with a range of 6,000 miles). The building rate of “Deltas” is four to six pet year.
The “Delta”-class submarines, then, have a significant advantage over the “Yankee” class in that their long-range missiles allow target coverage of most or the United States while operating adjacent to the Soviet coast. For example, a “Delta”-class SSBN leaving a Soviet port in the Arctic can be within missile range of New York or Washington, D.C., while still in Soviet coastal waters. Likewise, a “Delta” leaving the Soviet base of Petropavlovsk in the Pacific can almost immediately have Seattle and San Francisco within range of her missiles. This indeed avoids the dilemma faced by the “Yankee” class in having to risk detection by passing through the Greenland- Iceland-United Kingdom gap in order to strike the United States. Furthermore, a “Delta” deployed close to a Soviet naval base has more time on station (the equivalent of having additional SSBNs on station), and is provided a degree of sanctuary from hostile antisubmarine warfare forces. So, the advent of the “Delta” class not only added new flexibility to Soviet SSBN operations, but it also increased the “deep- strike” threat.
New SLBMs for the “Delta”- and “Yankee '-clast SSBNs: Soviet research and development tend to complicate analysis of Soviet sea-based systems by fielding new weapons and weapon systems before we
•dly understand the old ones. This seems to be the case with the “Yankee”- and “Delta”-class missiles SS-N-6 and SS-N-8. The 2,400-nautical mile SS-NX-17 SLBM began testing in 1975. It is the first SLBM to use a s°bd propellant and the first equipped with a Post-boost vehicle, suggesting multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles or MIRV capability.
0 date, however, the new missile has been tested ^■th only one reentry vehicle. This missile is proba- destined to replace the shorter range SS-N-6 in the ‘Vankee”-class SSBN. On the other hand, the >600-nautical mile SS-N-18 is similar in some respects to the SS-N-8 but appears larger. The SS-N-8 is elieved to have a more refined guidance system (capability for two celestial observations), and it too wdl have MIRV, probably delivering three reentry vehicies. This missile began deployment in the Delta”-dass submarines in 1977. Increased missile range, of course, is the significant development in °ur analysis.
Baval capability he would most desire, probably his answer would be an ability to destroy the enemy’s Sea-based strategic forces. Since this seems outside ,s grasp for the present, what are likely missions and strategies for his “Yankee”- and "Delta”-class sSBNs? Taking the “Deltas” first, it seems likely their mission, with intercontinental-range missiles, ls the destruction of land-based targets either as part of the Strategic Rocket Force (as Mike MccGwire
suggests), or in a supporting role. This support could take the form of a first-strike attack or of a time- sensitive retaliatory response. Moreover, it is likely the “Deltas” will continue to cover U.S. targets while operating unprotected, in proximity to the U.S.S.R. where Western antisubmarine forces are least effective.
A probable mission for the 34 “Yankee”-class SSBNs is intra-war fighting or war termination bargaining. Deployment patterns will probably remain about the same as they have been in recent years. The present minimal deployment allows realistic crew training while providing protection for the major portion of the force which is withheld. Additionally, a breakout of the “Yankee” class after an initial nuclear exchange increases the probability of a degraded Western antisubmarine warfare capability. So, holding the “Yankee” class in reserve supports the Soviet war-winning strategy. It also could support the ultimate goal of victory should the “Yankee”-class submarines be used as bargaining chips for war termination on Soviet terms.
Certainly, if there is a breakthrough in satellite
reconnaissance or some other exotic system for tracking submerged submarines, it is more than probable that the SS-NX-13 missile system will receive renewed attention. Should this come to pass, the major mission will be anti-SSBN.28 Otherwise, it is possible that each “Yankee” might be equipped with a few SS-NX-13s (as Bradford Dismukes suggests) for use against surface antisubmarine warfare forces in a breakout to the open ocean.
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If the Soviets terminated the “Yankee” program in favor of the “Deltas” because the former would have to go on station within range of U.S. and allied antisubmarine forces, then it appears reasonable that we might see a new intercontinental range SLBM installed in the “Yankees.” This, after all, is just as possible as the forthcoming retrofit of the U.S. Trident I missile into some Poseidon SSBNs. A longer- range missile in the “Yankee” class would maximize SSBN fleet flexibility, reduce the ships’ vulnerability to antisubmarine warfare detection, and minimize potential command-and-control problems. This, it would seem, is a worthwhile goal in itself.
Professor Ackley, a retired commander, received his B.A. in history from the University of Southern California, his M.A. in political science from the University of Hawaii, and his Ph.D. in international relations from the University of Southern California. He is a graduate of the Naval Intelligence Postgraduate School and the Russian language course at the Defense Language Institute. While on active duty, his assignments included command of the submarine Bream (SS-243) and Submarine Division 31. He also served as assistant naval attache in Moscow and as command center director, Submarine Force Pacific Fleet. Dr. Ackley is a consultant to the Department of Defense and to the Cortana Corporation and Santa Fe Corporation, Washington, D.C.-based, defense-related organizations. He is the author of many articles and a contributor to books in the field of military strategy and defense policy. He serves as associate dean of academic administration and assistant professor of political science at the California State College, San Bernardino. His articles on the Soviet fishing fleet (July 1975) and Soviet merchant fleet (February 1976) have appeared in the Proceedings previously.
sions, Michael MccGwire and John McDonnell, editors (New Yor Praeger Publishers, Inc., 1977), p. 411 (hereafter abbreviated SND• ’
J. Moore, “Future Soviet Naval Policy: Some Factors in its Formula tion,” (unpublished paper, Cortana Corp., 20 March 1977), p- 10- 5MrrOwire “Soviet Naval Procrams,” SNl, p. 346.
6Weinland, p. 415.
7V. D. Sokolovskii, Soviet military Strategy, RAND R-416-PR (SjnH Monica, Calif.: Rand, 1963), P- 420.
Hbid., p. 422. k
“Sokolovskii and M. Cherednichenko, quoted in K. J. Moore, Mar Flanigan, and Robert D. Helsel, "Developments in Submarine Systems, 1956-76," SNl, p. 162.
10Sokolovskii, p. 422.
“Moore, et.al., p. 158.
12Norman Polmar, “Thinking About Soviet ASW," United States Nara Institute Proceedings, May 1976 (Naval Review Issue), p. 126. '“MccGwire, p. 347.
'■•For a comprehensive discussion of potential surveillance technologies, see K. J. Moore, “Antisubmarine Warfare” in SNl, and Future Sov
Naval Policy: etc.," p. 31.
‘“William H. J. Manthrope, Jr., “The Soviet Navy in 1975,’ Procee ings, May 1976, pp. 206-207.
'“Moore, et.al., p. 159-
17Moore, "Future of Soviet Naval Policy: etc.,” p. 8.
19U.S. Congress, Senate, “Naval Power and Soviet Oceans Policy l Michael MccGwire in Soviet Oceans Development, 94th Congress, 2nd Ses sion, 1976, p. 151.
20A. A. Grechko, The Armed Forces of the Soviet State, translated under t e auspices of the U.S. Air Force (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govern Printing Office, 1976), p. 282.
2'George S. Brown, United States military Posture for FY 1978 (Washing ton, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1977), p.16.
22The implication of coordinated surface-subsurface operations appears
24lbid., p. 183. I would claim intra-war fighting and/or bargaining- 25Polmar, p. 123-
26For example, during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis the U.S. Na y locate, track, and force to the surface an unspecified number of Sovie submarines. Time, 16 November 1962, p. 20.
27N. B. (Bradford) Dismukes has suggested the possibility of a portion the withheld “Yankee"-class SSBNs be equipped with SS-NX-13S- would enhance their breakout ability from home waters in the fate hostile antisubmarine warfare forces. See McConnell, p. 209n.
28There are several antisubmarine warfare scenarios, such as a "Yankee class SSBN passing satellite tracking data to an accompanying Victor class SSN armed with the long-range SS-XN-16 cruise missile. Such a combination could provide contiguous attack capability from 0- kilometers using torpedoes, ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles.
‘The “Yankee”-class SSBN is used as a basis of analysis because it was the first Soviet SSBN of comparable size and capability to the U.S. Polaris type. However, the first series of nuclear-propelled Soviet strategic submarines, the “Hotel” class, predated the Polaris SSBNs by one year. Fifteen of these vessels were constructed, each equipped with three SS-N-4 300-nautical mile ballistic missiles. Between 1963 and 1967, nine of the vessels were converted to "Hotel H’s,” equipped with three SS-N-5 700-nautical mile ballistic missiles. Today, about seven “Hotel II’s” remain in the operational inventory.
Major contributors to this ongoing debate include N. B. Dismukes, Robert Herrick, Michael MccGwire, James McConnell, K. J. Moore, Norman Polmar, and Robert Weinland.
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, U.S. Department of the Navy, Understanding Soviet Naval Developments (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, April 1975), p. 14.
Robert G. Weinland, “The State and Future of the Soviet Navy in The North Atlantic," in Soviet Naval Influence: Domestic and Foreign Dimen