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Contents:
Maintenance Management and Combat Readiness 103
By Captain Carl A. Nelson, U.S. Navy
Needed: One Shipboard Electronic
Maintenance Philosophy 105
By Master Chief Sonar Technician
Jim Bussert, U. S. Navy
The Shore Intermediate Maintenance
Activity Concept in Being 108
By Rear Admiral F. C. Collins, U. S. Navy
British Seapower: The Royal Navy in 1978 111
By Colonel Norman L. Dodd, British Army (Retired)
The Royal Navy’s Offshore Island Class 115 By James Duncan Ferguson A Different Philosophy for Antiship Warfare: Sea Skua 117 By Captain G. R. Villar, D.S.C.,
Royal Navy (Retired)
Maintenance Management and Combat Readiness
By Captain Carl A. Nelson, U. S. Navy, Operations/Plans Officer, Commander Cruiser Destroyer Group One Staff.
Old hands who were in the Navy before the advent of adequate pier-side berthing and hotel services recall steaming to the buoy or anchor and being at one-in-three inport steaming watches. Oh, those were the days!
It’s true that we didn’t shut down and we seemed to operate with less attention, but our casualty reporting system was weak and our memories ate dim on just how good we were.
Those days are past us now. A destroyer is as large and even more complex than a World War II cruiser.
The U. S. Navy has a forward strategy, but forward basing as we know it today is at best tenuous. Most tnajor war scenarios predict a strong possibility that our naval forces could be required to deploy on short notice and conduct sustained sea control and combat operations in their “as is” state of readiness with little opportunity for forward base repair.
The realization of our marginal capability to meet the challenge of such a forward strategy became well understood in the early 1970s. Then, major fleet exercises designed to test typical war scenarios showed numbered fleet and type commanders the inability of the fleet to maintain and sustain adequate combat readiness while at sea. At approximately the same time, other Navy officials were addressing the observed degradation of
material readiness which occurred following the sustained high tempo of the Vietnam War operations. The safe operation of our conventional fossil fuel propulsion plants, particularly in the higher pressure 1,200 psi steam systems, became a major concern.
The Chief of Naval Operations assigned material readiness improvement a high priority on his list of major Navy objectives. The result was a plethora of programs without a unifying strategy. The home-grown remedial programs were well inten- tioned but few provided the sailor with improved resources.
For example, as early as March 1973, the Pacific Fleet’s Readiness Improvement Program (READIMP) died for lack of resources and too much paperwork. Next came the Planned Preventive Maintenance Program. Although this program was created to improve shipboard maintenance management, it was poorly defined and misunderstood by the forces afloat.
Inspection and survey (INSURV) results began to get more and more visibility, including briefs to the CNO’s executive board. These inspections were required on a tri-annual basis, but in many cases were overdue because of the Vietnam War combat requirements. INSURVs identified needed improvements and recertified that the material condition of the fleet was low.
As a result of weaknesses in type and training commander policies, Propulsion Examining Boards (PEBs) were created to provide the catalyst for the significant improvements needed in both plant operations and general material readiness awareness. When the PEBs began their extensive ex-
aminations, commanding officers of the 1,200 psi ships, although in general sympathy, were caught in the middle. The examinations were imposed upon already bursting schedules. Standards were changing more quickly than human behavior or resources could accommodate. Ships survived the ordeal but, in some cases, at the cost of near rebellious reactions from their crews. The boards established new performance targets for commanding officers and their ships. They monitored the micromanagement and operations of our propulsion plants and pressured the type commanders to establish new standards where none had previously existed and to review old standards. The boards also retaught us how to inspect and how to monitor our engineering department administration to ensure that it matched our actual procedures. The findings helped to wrench maintenance dollars from lesser priority programs and infuse them into needed repairs. They focused attention on the best mix of pier-side maintenance time, underway operating time, technical expertise, and dollar resources.
In diagnosing our ills, most naval officers placed heaviest blame on Vietnam War operations, yet some looked beyond the war in an effort to identify root causes with a goal of developing logistic support and fleet training techniques that would prevent a recurrence. This rethinking at all echelons of logistic involvement prompted a review of the history and principles of maintenance of propulsion plant equipment and an analysis of modern industrial maintenance programs.
During the 1920s, maintenance emphasis was primarily placed on the physical aspects that limited or contributed to interruption of production. In the main, the engineers or craftsmen were concerned with maintenance. They looked for technical solutions such as improved lubricants, better lubrication techniques and improved materials. In fact, maintenance management during the 1920s was at best haphazard, ineffective, and costly.
The 1930s brought the initial entry of a management approach to maintenance and the first 3-M (management, maintenance, and material handling) conference. Progress was slow through the decade until the gearing up for World War II brought a production at an any cost effort. America discovered that good maintenance was the key to high production.
In the 30 years since World War II, management’s interest in the maintenance of plant equipment has continued to grow. Maintenance costs U. S. manufacturing industries in excess of $30 billion a year. In the past decade there have been five critical changes:
► A transition from slow-speed to high-speed production equipment, which means not only more production but also more wear
► A change from man-controlled to automatic-controlled production equipment and a resulting increased demand for higher-grade engineering talent in the maintenance area
► Increased cost per unit of productive labor, adding to the equipment down time
► Increased cost of production equipment, intensifying the pressures for greater equipment utilization
► Increased ratio of maintenance to production employees with more men assigned to the keep-ready side and less men on the operator side
Industrial managers have identified six major factors which impact on maintenance management:
► The soundness of the organization directed to maintenance, whether it be the organization of the central staff or the factory-level organization
► Maintenance policies, including objectives, strategies, and major decisions such as (1) should maintenance programs be centralized or decentralized? or (2) to what extent should operators be involved in maintenance?
► The distribution of high-quality tools and equipment to support maintenance
► Maintenance practices, including cost accounting and work simplification processes
► Personnel practices to ensure that first-rate people are hired into maintenance-related jobs
► Evaluations, trends, histories, cost effectiveness, examination of backlogged work (deferred, surveys, etc.)
A comprehensive strategy for the improved logistics support and maintenance of our ships began to evolve. The Chief of Naval Operations authorized a project entitled Ship Support Improvement Project (previously red “E”), which is by far the most comprehensive approach to ship maintenance in the history of our Navy- Many believe it was 20 years overdue.
The project’s first major element, “maintenance analysis,” attempts to relate maintenance, reliability, and siipply resources to an “adequate” martial condition in a complex analyt- *cal framework.
‘Engineered maintenance strate- SIes>” the second major element, includes the development of a structured Maintenance strategy for the new low-mix ships of the FFG-7 and PHM-1 classes, the destroyer engineered operating cycle (DDEOC) of the FF- '052, DDG-37, and CG-16/26 classes, and any future extended overhaul cycle ships. The DDEOC strategy is designed to extend the operating interval from 37 months to a new operating cycle of h0 months plus or minus six months. Heavy maintenance periods in the form of selected restricted availabilities will be scheduled during inter-deployment periods. At least 51% of the Navy’s ships are expected to have extended operating cycles by 1984. The remaining ships are candidates based upon a class-by-class investigation. A maintenance strategy analysis will develop the long-term ship maintenance strategy necessary to support extended operating intervals between overhauls of five years or more.
The objectives of the third major element, "maintenance support improvements,” are designed to provide improved facilities, industrial plant equipment, and support equipment for intermediate maintenance activities. In addition, it is intended that adequate capabilities and capacities for rework facilities and shipyards will be provided.
The last major element, “systems maintenance engineering,” is applicable to equipments and systems where installed. The objectives are to develop improved minimum planned maintenance requirements for shipboard equipments and revisions to technical documentation resulting from new maintenance strategies and to conduct an evaluation of improved maintenance and material support procedures.
The Ship Support Improvement Project is a logical and comprehensive approach to one of the Navy’s most important programs.
Needed: One Shipboard Electronic Maintenance Philosophy
0y Master Chief Sonar Technician Jim Bussert, U. S. Navy, Commander Naval Surface Forces Pacific Staff, Maintenance Coordinator Center
Since World War I, when crude electrical equipment first went to sea, and through World War II, when radar and sonar sensors were added, H. S. sailors repaired electronic casualties at sea by relying on “can do ’ spirit and on board spare parts. Vacuum-tube era equipments required much space and voltage, but troubleshooting was simple. It was easy to remove a tube for testing, swapping, 0r replacement, and many replacement rubes were carried in ship’s spare parts bins. By the early 1950s, some communication receivers put the tube and associated components in a plug-in can, which was followed by replacing rubes with solid-state diodes and later rransistors. Finally, plug-in printed circuit boards (PCBs) with transistors and discrete components became standard equipment. The promised solid-state benefits of long life, low voItage, and small size were soon offset by increasing equipment num- hers, complexity, proliferation of PCB types, and spiraling hardware costs. These factors forced the Chief of Naval
Material (CNM) and the system commanders (SysComs) to examine our ship electronic maintenance concept which seemed unable to handle complex circuits inside fingernail-sized integrated circuit (IC) chips or PCB cargo winches which were supported like hull, machinery, and electrical (HM&E) equipment.
After 18 months of study, CNM issued a milestone instruction in June 1973, impressively titled, “Establishment of a Uniform Naval Material Command Maintenance Program for Electronic Material.” Unfortunately, the result was not a uniform maintenance program. This NavMat Instruction 4790.19 used the term “throwaway maintenance concept,” which contractors opportunistically seized upon.
Throw-away (TA) packaging dated from the mid-1950s, and in the mid- 1960s the Secretary of the Navy advocated module design while the Department of Defense studied repair cost-estimates. Another key paragraph of the CNM instruction authorizing emergency repair by the operational commander "when necessitated by operational or combat commitments . . .” was totally disregarded, although it was covered by its own formal CNM instruction that same year. Today, two seemingly divergent maintenance philosophies are pulling the Navy in opposite directions. The two groups are the powerful and entrenched throw-away or turn-in (TA/TI) people versus the small, unfunded emergency repair at sea (ERAS) advocates.
For a naval ship, the TA/TI concept necessitates a degradation of mission, at least, and possibly a return to port if no replacement module is carried or available from ships in company. The operational restrictions of such a norepair posture are obvious, but what about the economics of the TA/TI concept?
The initial fallacy of the TA approach is the assumption that a replacement PCB will be carried in the ship. The supply criteria for being on the coordinated shipboard allowance list (COSAL) is a predicted failure of one, per system, per year, based on usage data. Logistic stowage and costs preclude carrying all PCB types in a ship. The Tl concept assumes eventual return to the fleet of repaired items from depots. Again, the money available to program managers permits only selected pieces to be contracted and funded in the fiscal year budget.
The CNM’s integrated logistic support (ILS) planning policy states that the level of repair (LOR) “establishes (1) whether an item should be repaired; (2) at what maintenance level, i.e., organizational, intermediate, or depot (respectively called O-, I-, or D-level); or (3) if the item should be discarded.” The ship receives this information in the source, maintenance, and recoverability (SM&R) codes of the equipment allowance parts list (APL). On many pieces of Navy equipment, detailed maintenance engineering analyses (MEA) are not conducted, and the SM&R codes are highly suspect. Whoever says that depot turn-in items must not be touched by ship's force is wrong. The NavSup Instruction on SM&R codes states, “when beyond lower level repair capability, return to depot,” so O- level repair is clearly allowed if possible.
The LOR analysis is very crucial in the support of electronic equipment. First, it affects the physical design of the equipment, since the initial LOR inputs from the manufacturer are made during the preliminary design phase, and the LOR feedback modifies the design. The variable data inputs from the vendor include predicted mean time between failure (MTBF) and predicted annual demand of , parts which result in supply support decisions for on board repair parts (OBRP) and on-the-shelf stocking ashore.
The Navy bible for LOR is the Military Standard 1390(A) of 1 January 1974, which consists of four SysCom appendices with detailed formulas and all data input elements. An appreciation of the magnitude of the LOR can be gained by recognizing that an electronic LOR has 65 data elements, half of which are variable, and many come from the vendor at an average cost of 125,000. Overly optimistic MTBF inputs to the computer obviously result in erroneous repair policies and low provisioning.
The complex AN/SQS-26CX sonar in our numerous Knox (FF-1052) class is an example of the current electronics situation—the SM&R coding for this system resulted from an MEA study. The AN/SQS-26CX sonar has 401 types of PCBs, for a 3,500 PCB population or 5,258 cards and modules. Of these, only 15 types, or a total of 651 boards, are classified “depot TI.” This means that 4,607 of 5,258 PCBs are throw-aways. Yet, the APL allows only 15% of the PCB types to be carried on board as replacements. The cost of the disposable CX cards average $200- $300 while some cost more than $1,000. In checking on some PCBs coded for TI, it was discovered that there was no depot to repair them, and that they were “field repairable.” Other TI coded items such as $.04 resistors and $.10 capacitors were obvious errors. Many legitimate TI depot items rust on pallets waiting to be repaired. Replacement costs for unavailable TA boards are incorrectly listed on the Navy Management Data List because they fail to include inflation and are based on artificial volume production prices during initial procurement. If the PCB is not on-the-shelf ashore, the part will not be received for many months and the cost to the Navy will be many times over the data list. Common supply practice is to hold up fleet requisitions or back orders until it is worth obligating the X-thousand dollars which is the minimum contract that the vendor requires before restarting a production line.
The TA/TI threat to electronic maintenance is much more widespread than the obvious replacement PCB problems. Currently, under this philosophy, many contracts for newly procured electronic equipments do not include theory or schematics of the PCBs. Without these, even the D-level maintenance cannot troubleshoot the card or identify bad components or piece parts.
Navy technical school training is also affected negatively by the TA/TI concept. These schools teach only the signal-in and signal-out level of the PCBs. If no schematics are provided in the equipment’s technical manuals, there is no possibility for proper training on these schematics. Also noticeable is the loss of advanced electronic rating B-schools, less hands-on skills training such as soldering, less basic A-school theory, resulting in less capable technicians in the fleet. There has been no publication on PCB miniature repair procedures since 1969, and a current set of standards is needed by the fleet.
Even ship contracts are casualties of the TA/TI philosophy which dictated “minimum manning,” justified partly due to no corrective maintenance man-hours (M/H). Initially only the operations department suffered the PCB casualties. Next was the weapons department. Now, engineering and deck departments have numerous solid-state systems. The Navy deleted PCB testers from the Spruance (DD-963) class, and the ILS manning document had no provision for casualty M/H m port or at sea. The DD-963’s AN/SQS-53 sonar has a maintenance plan which lists pages of M/H for system PCB repairs. The FFG-7S will be in worse shape.
The viability of the TA/TI concept should be highly suspect. Civilian industry cost-studied and rejected the concept of throwing away PCBs. Continuation of earlier noted trends m manning, training, and schematics will soon result in no possibility of PCB repair, even if tools were provided to do so, at any level, including the depot. Only the prime contractor who retained the drawings will be in a position to effect repairs.
There has been a small move in the Navy since 1973 to establish fleet PCB repair capability. OpNav and CNM initiated the electronic microminiature module repair (EMMR) test program for I-levels including tenders and mobile technical units (MOTU). By May 1974, the trial was called Miniature Electronic Repair Program (MERP) and extended to include some combatant O-level ships, acknowledging emergency repair needs at sea. By 1975, the 50 repair stations, now shortened to MERs, were completed using commercial Pace Corporation units. This may be the only trial in which the Navy paid for and installed new equipment for evaluation, but re-
luired no follow-up reports or keeping °f records. Today, excellent schools are available for its newest title, miniature and microminiature (2M) train- lng. But the ship must pay the ®2,500 2M repair kit cost from its right operating budget. We are a long Way from the Electronic Information Bulletin (EIB) 932 promise of “2M on aU afloat units.” No program, no matter how great, can exist without fund- lng support. 2M requires no change in SM&r codes, but there are supply problems for support of piece parts to repair bad PCBs. The alternative of carrying all PCB types on board ship is fer more expensive.
A related PCB repair area is automatic test equipment (ATE). Although ATE includes testers built into equipment or dedicated to one system, PCB aTEs discussed here will be the general-purpose, suitcase-sized, offline type. Forty-two outdated Dimote digital PCB testers were purchased in 1975 to be distributed to 2M stations, ar>d Litton’s LHAs each have two compact general-purpose AN/USM-40I board testers for selected systems. At me present time, each type commander is procuring a different model ATE.
In general, 1973 SecNav and CNM guidelines on control of ATE are not enforced. The numerous suitcase-sized digital card testers in the $10,000® 15,000 range are now competing for buys and are causes for hope in Navy ATE. Aside from the speedy PCB fault ■solation of programmed cards, good ATe would pay for itself by go-no-go tests keeping the estimated 40% of good PCBs from being labeled TA or 7l. Intelligent ATE procurement needs data such as the number and type of
PCBs on a class ship. Personal surveys on various ships reveal an average 75% analog PCB population in surface ships, indicating that digital tester procurements could be off target.
CNM defines "maintenance” as "retaining material in a serviceable condition or restoring it to serviceability.” So disposing of a bad PCB with no replacement available is really not maintenance. The TA concept evolved after a ten-year review of DoD and SecNav directives, study of hundreds of system life cycle logistic cost, and careful consideration of future maintenance with the OSD which established a standard electronic module (SEM) program. In this program TA items would be practical for inexpensive and commonly used PCBs which served as on-board repair parts. Unfortunately, most equipment in the fleet today is of a technology 5-35 years old, and contractors are not bidding on SEM jobs, because there is no lucrative sole-source repair insurance for the vendors. We are still buying vendor hardware with unique circuits that have “proprietary rights.”
The fleet can present a solid case for deviation from TA procedures. Ships, by their nature, are large enough to carry the work benches, manuals, parts, and test equipment required to successfully repair casualties “in the field.” When a mission-critical card or black-box is inoperative on board an Army or a Marine Corps tank, or on an Air Force or naval aircraft, the mission is aborted, and the PCB or box must be removed and turned in to the forward I-level or nearest D-level. By adoption of a maintenance philosophy needed by other services or types of vehicles due to their space limitations, the Navy is relinquishing the warship’s self-fix capability which permits her to complete a mission under adverse conditions.
An interesting parallel is the reverse situation in the large and heavily electronic-oriented Soviet Navy. Until the mid-1960s, the Russians operated mainly in coastal waters and totally relied upon shore bases for repairs. Distant cruises and associated logistics have caused Soviet supply officers to begin carrying “additional sets of shipboard spare parts” when sailing “beyond the limits of the Baltic Sea” according to the Baltic Fleet Commander, Admiral V. Mikhaylin in 1974. They still rely heavily on repair by depot turn-around in many systems.
Assuming that TA concept is not operationally viable or fiscally affordable for the Navy, given today’s equipment and repair part funding, and that tools for PCB troubleshooting and repair are available, what level is the most cost-effective and expedient for Navy repairs? D-level repair is mandatory for certain sealed, critical, or sensitive modules. But it is the most time consuming and costly of the three levels. One point in favor of depot repair is the OSD rule that such items are not charged to the ship. I-level repair facilities, although far better equipped in most repair shop areas than a combatant, presently offer the same level of expertise and the same tools. PCB combatant repairs of a routine nature could be better accomplished at the I-level because the shipboard sailor has more important duties. By a process of elimination, the ship becomes the cheapest, quickest, and at sea the only choice for PCB repairs. The O-level 2M repair kits are inexpensive, and all Pacific Fleet FFs, DDGs, and CGs could have kits for under $150,000, not including training costs. Although opponents to 2M point out that replacing a $25 part on a $200 PCB is not really a savings of $175 because of repair M/Hs, piece part processing, location, shipment, and so forth, the alternative costs of PCB procurement are much higher. And, if contracting is required, it may take a year to get the repaired PCB.
We ought to establish the policy that, aside from carried SEMs, no PCBs will be designated TA. If the board is not repairable at sea, the PCB should be saved for possible cannibalization. Operationally, with or without TA, a ship should have a full set of replacement PCBs on board, but the funding to support this approach would be considerably higher than today’s COSAL support. Our present allowance for spares is inadequate. For example, only $16,000 worth of modules or PCBs is allowed to be carried on board for the huge AN/SQS-26CX sonar.
To reverse our present status— which is no at-sea repair capability for most electronic casualties and wasteful disposal of valuable PCB assets—the Navy must allocate more funds to convert electronic “trash” into needed replacement assets and require vendors to include full schematics and parts identification with all current and future equipments procured.
Miniature and microminiature designs and associated automatic test equipment should be funded and distributed on a priority basis to support the fix-it or save-it directive. Then Navy training schools would have to revise and upgrade technical training from A-school to C-school levels to support PCB repair. Finally, establish a 2M man billet for each ship. The results would be a savings in dollars and down-time throughout the fleet.
The Shore Intermediate Maintenance Activity Concept in Being
By Rear Admiral F.C. Collins, Jr., U. S. Navy, former Commanding Officer, Naval Development and Training Center, San Diego/Fleet Maintenance Assistance Group Pacific, now Chief, Navy Section of ARMISH-MAAG, Iran
At least one item in the Navy’s hard-pressed budget remains a distinct bargain—the shore intermediate maintenance activity (SIMA). This single line item, representing a significant impact in the fleet’s intermediate maintenance strategy, provides the following pay-back:
^ Quality ship repairs
► Advanced engineering artificers’ training
► Prime shore duty for the deprived ratings
► Essential base-line data for the supply systems
^ Significant retention support
The requirement to provide meaningful shore duty for deprived engineering ratings, together with the need to better exploit the Navy’s maintenance dollars, combined to produce the Navy’s latest approach to fleet material readiness improvement. Labeled the shore intermediate maintenance activity, the new concept attempts to provide for intermediate maintenance needs at fleet home ports. Currently, SIMAs are planned for Mayport, Charleston, and Norfolk on the Atlantic seaboard and San Diego, Alameda, and Pearl Harbor in
the Pacific. The three Pacific Fleet SIMAs will be under the aegis of the Development and Training Center, San Diego, Fleet Maintenance Assistance Group, Pacific (DATC FMAGPAC).
Commissioned in December 1967 as a shore activity under the Bureau of Naval Personnel, assignment to DATC FMAGPAC meant long-awaited, coveted shore duty for a rating group— engineering artificers—who had previously experienced little meaningful shore duty. It also resulted in formal training and an opportunity to operate selected shops of the Navy’s formerly civilian-manned Ship Repair Facility.
Impressed with the success of the DATC, and concerned about other non-engineer deprived ratings (gunner’s mates, signalmen, sonar technicians, fire control technicians, radiomen, etc.), the Navy formed the Fleet Maintenance Assistance Group (FMAG) in September 1972. This organization capitalizes on the repair capabilities of these sea-going ratings, and gives them an opportunity to “earn their keep” ashore for two years.
In the Atlantic, these repair groups, lacking shore facilities, worked on board tenders, but did not deploy
with them.
In the Pacific, FMAG detachments were to be established for San Diego, Long Beach, Alameda, and Pearl Harbor. FMAG Long Beach was short-lived when, in September 1973, its assets were distributed between Alameda and Pearl Harbor. The latter location had a marginal industrial base in which to support the mid-Pacific home-ported ships and at the same time administer to the transitors and exercise/training transients. FMAG San Diego became part of the DATC organization, which had both the administrative and industrial base to accommodate it. All of these newly formed repair groups reported to CO DATC FMAGPAC.
In February 1972, the administrative control of DATC shifted from Chief of Naval Personnel to Chief of Naval Education and Training (CNET), and, in March 1973, it became a shore activity reporting directly to the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet. In July 1975, *£ moved to the sponsorship of its current boss, the Commander Logistic Command, U. S. Pacific Fleet.
Few of the Navy’s organizational
I
concepts have offered the potential of super” return as has the organization °f DATC and later DATC FMAGPAC. N°w, not only does the hard-pressed at-sea” artificer and his fellow nonartificer deprived rating have an opportunity to enjoy a normal, if disproportionate sea-shore rotation, but chey provide two invaluable products ,n return: quality repairs, and an ar- t*ficer who will return to sea with chanced capabilities and improved selfconfidence in his own self-sufficiency.
DATC FMAGPAC, a major factor in the Navy’s SIMA concept, is also the Navy's largest intermediate maintenance activity (IMA).1 Pacific SIMA’s
An IMA is tasked to perform that maintenance f°r ships in the area between organizational (or ship crew maintenance such as most planned Maintenance systems) and depot-level work "'hich is performed by naval shipyards or major c,vilian ship repair facilities.
customers are ships and harbor craft home-ported or visiting the San Diego/Alameda/Pearl Harbor areas. This represents some 200 surface vessels ranging from nuclear super carriers to landing craft. Submarines in the San Diego and Alameda areas, by and large, receive intermediate repairs from the tenders or shipyard. In Pearl Harbor, a special contingent of 175 repair artificers currently supplement the already significant repair capability of the Pearl Harbor Submarine Base.
The San Diego, Alameda, and Pearl Harbor detachments occupy 4 1 buildings which provide some three- quarters of a million square feet of industrial and production support floor space. Thirty-four of these buildings support the San Diego complex. The three locations have a combined allowance of 3,244 enlisted personnel, although the facilities are currently manned to only 69% of that number. In San Diego that adds up to 1,650 enlisted personnel plus 40 officers and 70 civilians.
The average DATC FMAGPAC sailor is almost a first class petty officer who
has spent five years at sea, has attended seven months of Navy schools, has about 10.9 years active duty, and has a high school education.
The DATC FMAGPAC consists of admin/training, planning, production, supply/comptroller, and quality assurance departments. The San Diego facility has an engineering duty officer as its executive officer and surface warfare captain as its commanding officer.
The production department, to which some 1,300 enlisted personnel are assigned, is structured into six basic branches: services, machinery, electrical, ordnance, structural, and electronic. In 1976, DATC FMAGPAC San Diego fulfilled some 21,000 work requests, ranging from complete overhaul and testing of automatic combustion control systems to retubing boilers, and from mount overhaul and replacement to manufacture of fire and flushing pumps from blueprints to installed pumps. DATC FMAGPAC San Diego’s pattern shop and foundry has saved numerous ships 18 to 26 month delays in replacing wasted equipment or components. DATC FMAGPAC has also earned the respect of customers by translating its goals of quality improvement, creditability enhancement, and productivity increase into tangible action. The immediate benefit is a quality repair that can be counted upon to perform reliably for as long as the equipment is operated correctly and planned maintenance performed properly. In addition, the consumer can count on receiving petty officers expert in repair and selfreliance when DATC FMAGPAC sailors complete their tours ashore and return to the fleet.
Although training is no longer DATC FMAGPAC’s primary mission, training is still emphasized. Each man assigned to the command receives a battery of tests to determine what his formal training and experience has best equipped him to do. Then, formal outside or in-house training programs address identified areas of weakness to meet both the individual and command’s needs. The San Diego command operates a basic machine shop course and welder recertification course on a continuing basis. In addition, a 40-hour industrial supervisor’s course, implemented in September 1976, provides basic industrial management technique to prospective supervisors.
DATC FMAGPAC recently developed a maintenance plan for the Navy’s newest low-mix complex surface platforms—the Spruance-class DDs, the Tarawa-class LHAs, and the Oliver Hazard Perry-class FFGs. (While the first two ship types are not classified officially as low-mix ships, as are the FFGs, their minimal crew sizes, practically speaking, qualify them for this designation.)
Strong factors support the Navy’s need to continue with the SIMA concept. First, to discontinue the program creates a significant personnel management problem—i.e., where do artificers and deprived ratings go for meaningful shore duty? The training commands, which are really the only other shore activity which could give this unique segment of the Navy’s enlisted population any degree of appropriate shore duty, could not begin to absorb such a group. In addition, there would be a tangible loss in repairs and finally, of equal or greater value to the fleet, the training the artificers receive from DATC is unequaled. DATC FMAGPAC provides its ratings—machinist mates or boiler technicians, who have perhaps spent their entire careers in destroyers, frigates or amphibious warfare ships—an exposure to repairs which span from carriers to fleet tugs. The machinery repairmen, who are familiar with very basic machinist equipment, find themselves learning techniques and procedures they never knew existed. Even the patternmaker and molder who have spent their apprentice years in tenders, find themselves making complex patterns and casting in metals from bronze and brass to stainless steel, cast iron, and monel. The horizons of their capabilities, as artificers, suddenly expand exponentially.
Some advocates of the Shore Intermediate Maintenance Concept who suggest that SlMAs replace tenders, in view of the advantage of lower overhead (no ship to operate or maintain) and no space limitations, miss the whole raison d’etre for the concept. For as long as the U. S. Navy has worldwide commitments, tenders will be a sine qua non in the Navy’s logistic program. Tenders are mobile industrial facilities which can accompany the fleet wherever it is called upon to operate.
Intermediate maintenance level work provides the most significant return on the Navy’s maintenance dollar. In addition to providing quality repairs performed by the same bluejackets who will be responsible for providing underway and combat repairs, the Navy assures itself that the logistic support provided by the Navy supply system will be kept abreast of needed repair parts and component equipment so necessary in a mobilization period. The supply system is the initial source queried for repair parts. When supply cannot respond within the time frame required, outside sources are sought. When outside sources are used in this approach, the need is documented and inventories can be adjusted to provide for future responsive supply support. When private sector repair facilities are contracted to do the work at the outset the supply system will not be responsive in the specific contact area.
Finally, in addition to quality repairs, enhanced training and supply system responsiveness, the SIMA concept provides a valuable boost to the Navy’s continuing “front-burner program—retention. By making provisions for meaningful shore duty for the Navy’s most important asset—its people—particularly in an all-volunteer environment, it offers an incentive to a long-neglected legion of forgotten men—Navy engineering artificers and other deprived ratings. The Navy’s recent announcement of a three years of sea duty and three years of shore duty rotation for E-7S with 19 years or more creates a valuable pool of experienced personnel who too often “hang it up after their two-year stint ashore rather than face another five years at sea.
If the Navy is serious about improving the fleet’s material condition, getting the most out of its maintenance dollars, and retaining engineering artificers and other deprived ratings in the Navy, then the shore intermediate maintenance activity concept is here to stay.
British Seapower: The Royal Navy in 1978
H>- Colonel Norman L. Dodd, British Army (Retired)
The Royal Navy, strongest in Western Europe and the third most powerful in the world, is committed to the support of the Western alliance as well as to national defense. Facing the challenge of the next decade with a modern fleet, the experience, expertise, and training methods of Britain s all-volunteer navy are admired and used by friendly navies throughout the world.
After the traumatic experience of the 1956 Suez operation and the steady withdrawal of British forces from overseas bases, the Royal Navy had to reexamine its role and concentrate on the NATO alliance, in accordance with government policy. For the British, this could have meant the reduction of the Royal Navy to virtually an inshore force capable only of operat- lng in consort with its NATO allies around the coasts of the British Isles and in the North Sea. Such a policy, economically attractive though it might have been, was not and is not practical for a country which imports a large percentage of its life-sustaining resources. There are approximately 700 British ships at sea with 600 more in ports throughout the world every day. The British merchant fleet is the third largest in the world following only the flag-of-convenience fleet of Liberia and that of Japan. To survive, Great Britain must rely upon the free movement of merchant ships on the oceans—it cannot hand over the protection of its lifeline to another country, however friendly it may be.
Great Britain’s lifeline is being threatened as never before by the U.S.S.R.’s modern oceangoing navy which has a strength far greater than is required for defensive purposes. Since Soviet trade travels mainly across land frontiers, freedom of the seas is far less vital to the U.S.S.R.’s existence than it is to Great Britain’s. The Soviet Navy is indeed a threat to the very life of the United Kingdom and one which alone is sufficient reason for the Royal Navy to retain some worldwide capability. But there are other reasons. The British maritime tradition includes close links with Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and other members of the Commonwealth. Great Britain would surely come to the assistance of old family members should they ever be threatened or attacked in their home waters. Within the NATO alliance, members encourage the United Kingdom to look outward as well as toward Europe, realizing that while doing so the Royal Navy is acting on their behalf also.
The British worldwide responsibilities and dependence upon freedom of the seas have affected the structure of its navy and the design of its warships.
All British governments have agreed on the necessity of retaining a nuclear deterrent force so as not to be blackmailed by any other nuclear power. The naval contribution to this force consists of four nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBN). Moreover, the increasingly important oil and gas fields in the North Sea must also be patrolled and protected against terrorists and sabotage. Thus, the Royal Navy has to retain a naval capability above, on, and below the surface of the oceans of the world.
The ships of most of the European
members of the NATO alliance are designed principally for the protection of their coastlines, whereas Britain’s warships are designed to be seaworthy in every ocean of the world. Required to remain at sea for long periods at a time, RN ships are designed to be resupplied and refueled by ships of the Royal Fleet Auxiliary (RFA). The hulls of British naval ships are bqjlt for continuous operation in gale force condi-
tions at above average speeds. In 1976, the frigate HMS Achilles steamed through a full storm in the English Channel at 27 knots en route to the aid of a sinking ship. It is doubtful whether any Soviet or U.S. ship of a similar size could have done the same thing.
The Royal Navy is manned by volunteers who must be attracted into the service and enticed to remain in it. This, too, has some effect on the design of ships, and it is in this respect that the navy has come under criticism. Some newspaper accounts have suggested that the armament systems on the latest Type 21 Amazon- class frigates and on the Type 42 Sheffield-class destroyers are not as comprehensive as they could be if the accommodation and crew facilities were not so lavish. The Type 42 ships built for Argentina appear to carry more weapons than those manned by the Royal Navy. The Leander-class ships built for Chile carry Exocet missiles as well as guns whereas the British have dispensed with the 4.5- inch gun in seven Royal Navy Lean- ders. The Royal Navy points out that its ships are able to, and do, remain at sea for months on end whereas those of most other navies spend a great deal of time in port. This operational doctrine dictates the number of maintenance and repair specialists who are carried on board and the accommodations
provided for them.
The German submarine threat in both World Wars caused the Royal Navy to concentrate on antisubmarine warfare (ASW) to a greater extent than any other navy. The Royal Navy pioneered the use of antisubmarine helicopters from ships at sea. Today every warship of frigate size or larger carries at least one helicopter. It led the world in the operation of aircraft at sea, it invented the steam catapult, the angled deck, and the mirror landing system. It was the first navy in the world to land vertical or short takeoff and landing (V/STOL) aircraft (Harrier) on a ship and is developing the new through-deck Invincible-class cruisers which will be able to operate six Sea Harriers and nine Sea King AS'X' helicopters.
Britain’s understanding of global naval strategy also led to the development of amphibious strike forces consisting of the Royal Marine Commandos and the navy’s helicopter carrier and assault ships. Once intended as intervention and shock troops for employment throughout the world, commandos are now a major part of Britain’s contribution to the defense of
the NATO regions, particularly in Northern Norway.
Merchant ships must be able to load and unload in the many harbors of the United Kingdom, for it is in the approaches to these harbors that they are most vulnerable to mines laid from the air or by submarines. The Royal Navy, traditionally efficient in mine countermeasures, as demonstrated by >ts participation in the effort to clear the Suez Canal in 1975, is a world leader in building minesweepers with glass-reinforced plastic hulls.
The strength of the Royal Navy at present is 75,085, which includes 7.620 Royal Marines and 3,725 women. They man 2 16 warships rang- mg from the SSBNs to patrol boats. There is one truly fixed-wing aircraft carrier, HMS Ark Royal. The commando carrier, HMS Hermes, is in commission as a helicopter carrier and the second, HMS Bulwark, is under conversion after being withdrawn from reserve. Both will be employed principally for ASW duties, but they retain the capability to carry Royal Marine Commandos. There are two amphibious assault ships in service, 69 destroyers and frigates, and two cruisers, each fitted out to carry four Sea King ASW helicopters. Both have facilities
All the sophisticated electronic equipment carried in the ships and their associated helicopters is designed to ensure the effectiveness of the first missiles fired. In this respect, Royal Navy ships are second to none. The Sea Dart is claimed to be the most effective antimissile and antiaircraft weapon in its class today, while also possessing a good antisurface ship capability. Eight Leander-class frigates are equipped, or being equipped, with the Australian developed Ikara antisubmarine missiles. The French Ex- ocet medium-range surface-to-surface missile is being introduced onto the decks of front-line ships. The effective new Sea Wolf antimissile and antiaircraft missiles are to be fitted on board frigates, while the SS II and AS 12 missiles are carried on assault helicopters to counter fast patrol boats or other surface ships. The RN’s Lynx helicopter will be able to carry the new antiship Sea Skua missile or ASW torpedoes.
With all these missiles and electronic equipment the Royal Navy considers guns to be a minimum requirement. However, the 4.5-inch Mk 8 Vickers gun, which is quick firing, has a range of 22,000 meters, and fires a 20.8-kg. shell, is in serv- types of weather, it has never favored the use of fast patrol or torpedo boats. Today, only four such craft are in service. The Royal Navy has opted for the typically British "Bobby on the beat” police methods for fishery protection and safeguarding Britain’s offshore gas and oil fields. This approach entails the use of extremely seaworthy, but rather slow patrol boats. (The RN’s experience on fishery protection patrols during the “Cod War” with Iceland proved the need for rugged patrol boats. Fifteen of the 21 frigates deployed were involved in collisions; an expensive method of providing protection.) The Royal Navy’s Island-class patrol ships are examined in detail in the next professional note.
ice. The gun, fitted in modern ships, is controlled by the action data automation weapons system (ADAWS) which can be fired by remote control without a gun crew. In addition, Oerlikon-type 20-mm. rapid-firing guns are useful against unprotected targets and have a certain deterrent effect against helicopters.
Based upon the Royal Navy’s concept of continuing operations in all
for directing naval forces. There are 40 mine countermeasures ships, 14 patrol boats, and 59 landing craft of various sizes. The submarine service, excluding the four SSBNs, has nine nuclear- powered fleet submarines and 19 conventional patrol submarines.
Operationally, no ship can expect to fight a World War II-type engagement, since the long-range first missile strike is now of vital importance.
One of the consequences of Britain’s maritime tradition has been its involvement in hydrographic survey and the preparation of charts for every part of the world. In an era of reduced military budgets and withdrawals from overseas bases, a close scrutiny of the Royal Navy’s requirements for hydrography has been initiated. At the same time, the civil requirements in support of world trade, the offshore energy program, and work on the Admiralty chart service have continued to grow. At present, there are
13 survey ships in the Royal Navy: four oceangoing ships, four coastal vessels, and five inshore craft. The Royal Navy also operates an ice patrol ship, HMS Endurance, which supports British interests in Antarctic winters. The Endurance has a flight deck, carries two Whirlwind helicopters, and acts as a survey ship when working with the British Antarctic Survey.
In support arrangements, as in hydrographic survey, the Royal Navy has always attempted to be self-sufficient. A “fleet-train” is as old as the navy itself, but it was not until 1911 that the Royal Fleet Auxiliary was established by Royal Charter. It is a peculiarly British service. Its 34 ships are manned by merchant seamen and are registered at Lloyds of Londop as merchant ships even though they fly the blue ensign and are employed in supporting the Royal Navy throughout the world. The vessels fall into three main categories: wet, dry, and specialist. Wet cargo ships make up the front-line tankers and freighting tankers. Dry cargo vessels carry food and general stores, including aircraft, electronics, and armament stores. Specialist ships include landing ships logistic operated on behalf of the army and the helicopter support ship, Engadine, which provides helicopter training for Royal Navy personnel.
Most of the large RFA ships are able to carry helicopters, and recently a new concept, called helicopter delivery service, has been proved using the RFA Tidespring with a Wessex Mk V embarked. The purpose of this concept is to relieve the operational helicopter flights of such extraneous tasks as helicopter replenishment, casualty evacuation, and communication flights. But perhaps the most important service that the RFA renders to the Royal Navy is that of replenishing British ships while at sea, thus reducing their dependence on shore bases.
To support the fleet, the Royal Maritime Auxiliary Service comprises 21 vessels ranging from ocean tugs, salvage and trials vessels, and cable ships. The Port Auxiliary Service also provides the manning for approximately 800 vessels for the provision of services in dockyard ports.
The Royal Navy’s assault ships are perhaps the most versatile vessels ever built for amphibious warfare. Each is fitted out as a naval assault group/ brigade headquarters from which naval and military personnel working in close cooperation can mount and control amphibious operations. These assault ships can transport a military force complete with armor. Landing craft capable of carrying heavy tanks are carried in the ship’s dock and launched through the open stern. The ships can operate a flight of assault helicopters and are armed with Seacat missiles and two 40-mm. Bofors guns.
These assault ships are important in the context of Britain’s declared policy of assisting in the defense of the flanks of the NATO areas. To augment the sea lift capability of the navy, experiments have been carried out in the use of civilian roll-on roll-off ferries to transport military forces to Northern Norway. Trials are also being carried out in the use of hovercraft. At present, however, these craft are concentrating upon their capabilities as patrol boats and mine countermeasures vessels. The hovercraft offer the advantages of speed and low pressure, making them less vulnerable to mine explosions, but they are expensive and, at present, lack the seagoing capabilities and endurance of conventional ships.
Within NATO, much emphasis is being placed on the collaborative development and production of future weapon systems wherever this is feasible. The Royal Navy, and indeed the British government, support such initiatives. As equipment and weapons grow more sophisticated and budgets get smaller, collaboration provides a means of using the resources available within the alliance more efficiently, reduces duplication, and generates considerable operational and support advantages resulting from the standardization.
Although easy to state, this policy is much harder to put into effect! For there are always outcries from manufacturers and trade unions if contracts are placed overseas and only too often time scales for requirements do not coincide. To complicate matters more, the Royal Navy’s major requirements in the design and armament of ships are not always the same as those of its continental NATO allies. They also rarely coincide with the requirements of the United States which never purchases naval ships from overseas nor, at least so far, has been willing to take part in true collaborative ship building projects. But collaboration—e.g.,
navigational systems, communications and electronics, design and building °f helicopters, and in such minor though important items as the hose connections for replenishment at sea, multi-user fuels, and the packaging of stores—is possible and is currently being carried out.
As compared to collaboration efforts, the NATO alliance has had more success in the realm of standardization °f procedures and operations at sea. Nearly all the ships of the Royal Navy are committed to NATO and play a vital part in the defense of the eastern Atlantic and the English Channel. A guided-missile destroyer or frigate is always assigned to the Standing Force Atlantic, and one mine countermeasures ship is permanently with the Standing Force Channel. Another frigate is available for the reserve NATO naval force in the Mediterranean Sea. The ships of the Royal Navy and the RFA participate fully in all NATO naval exercises, and many NATO officers attend naval training schools and establishments in the United Kingdom. Allied warships also exercise under the guidance of Royal Navy training officers at Portland.
For Great Britain, the sea is all-
important; it depends on free use of the sea-lanes for its very existence. It must take part in keeping them open and in keeping merchant ships moving to and from its ports. The Royal Navy’s cooperation, coordination, and collaboration with its NATO allies are certainly of primary importance. But this is not enough; it must retain its global capability to assist its Commonwealth and other friends if necessary. Nothing is certain in relations between nations except their very uncertainty. A country which is not prepared to guard its own freedom deserves to lose it.
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A terrorist takeover attempt of an offshore oil structure has become increasingly possible given the current European social climate. In addition to the blackmail effect of the potential pollution weapon, the fact that many of these structures are owned by multinational corporations makes them even more attractive to disaffected elements. Offshore installations would swiftly become prime targets in any shooting war, however limited, and there is always the risk of damage resulting from a maritime collision. Current thinking on North Sea threats has been detailed by Desmond Wet- tern in the December 1977 Proceedings, but specific defense equipment available to counter the threats received somewhat superficial examination.
One of the nations most dependent on offshore oil is the United Kingdom, part of which is already riven by I.R.A. terrorism. Equally, the North Sea has acquired a deservedly unenviable reputation throughout the world’s offshore oil industry for its bad weather. This latter problem also has to be taken into account along with the terrorist threat, and the combination has been worrying a variety of British official and industrial agencies for some time.
The Royal Navy has a long and successful tradition of operations in the North Sea, much of it encompassing the peacetime support of the U. K. fishing industry. This support obviously continues, with an added importance assumed since Britain joined the European Economic Community. In fact, the fishery protection task is logically and totally linked with offshore oil patrol requirements. The operational areas of both are often common, and shore-base facilities share the same ports.
The basic offshore oil area/fishery protection vessel has a civilian background. In 1975, the Royal Navy took over the Scottish Office fishery cruiser Jura and put her into service as a fully commissioned warship. She was manned and operated by the Royal Navy and, with a very limited number of alterations, became the prototype for a new class of vessels. She has since been returned to the Scottish Office control.
Despite all the dire predictions, HMSJura proved capable of withstanding the bad offshore weather. Under increasing political and public pressure to provide a naval presence in the oil area, the Ministry of Defence (Navy) monitored the ship’s successful operations and ordered a class of patrol vessels of this type to be built. In February 1975, five ships were ordered at a total cost of some E15 million (approximately $30 million). All five are now in operational service, their final cost being less than that budgeted. Like the Jura, the ships—Jersey, Guernsey, Lindisfarne, Orkney, and Shetland—were built by Messrs. Hall, Russell & Co., at Aberdeen, a yard well-known for its fishing vessels and minor warships. With the port being both a major oil support base and the home of Scotland’s largest fishing fleet this was an inspired (as well as political) choice. Collectively the ships are known as the Island class.
Although other nations with offshore interests of one kind or another have opted for fast patrol vessels, North Sea weather conditions were judged unsuitable for this kind of design. The faster vessels would be unable to maintain acceptable speeds in
heavy seas, and the extra expense involved to attain speed would thereby be wasted. The Island-class ships are not, therefore, fast, with a top speed of around 17 knots. However, they can make 17 knots in most sea states. Using their 15-knot cruising speed, they have a range of around 7,000 miles — more than adequate for offshore patrolling around the U. K. The high and well-flared bows lift the ships over advancing seas, throwing spray and green water clear. The ships are lively in a seaway with a roll period of some three to four seconds. As a result of operational experience, their bilge keels have been slightly widened to reduce movement. Unlike many of their more sophisticated sisters, their decks tend only to be swept by light spray rather than solid water. The square, rather chunky trawler stern has posed no problems in running before following seas, and the resultant extra deck space aft is an additional bonus.
The ships are diesel-powered, with twin British Polar units, each of 1,700 s.h.p. driving a single shaft. One diesel is normally used for cruising or making passage, while the other is immediately available. A variable-pitch propeller is linked to bridge controls (along with the engines). This combination effectively provides the exacting maneuverability required for the ships’ missions. The variable-pitch propeller system complicates boat-work operations but the crews have developed effective boat launching and recovery procedures. The fishery protection task requires a considerable amount of boat work to board trawlers, etc., and an inflatable dinghy is often used. This outboard- powered dinghy requires only a few hands to hoist it in and out of the water yet it is big enough to carry an effective boarding party, even in bad weather.
Each vessel carries about a 35-man crew: five officers (some are on board for training and small-ship sea experience); six senior (specialist) rates; and 24 or so leading hands and below. This manning plan reflects a considerable economy over previous types of offshore patrol vessels, which required over 100 officers and enlisted men. The captain is a lieutenant commander, and one or two other lieutenants serve as departmental heads/ watchkeepers. The availability of the new class has significantly increased the number of junior officer afloat billets, thereby providing enhanced training opportunities in all aspects of seamanship.
The ships’ armament is light and the subject of much controversy. They carry only a single, hand-worked 40-mm. Bofors gun mounted just forward of the bridge to reduce deck movement in a head sea and to improve command control, plus a limited number of small arms. The armament configuration was a deliberate and logical decision because only a few fishery incidents require gun action, usually in the form of warning shots, to stop an offender. Response to oil structure incidents would normally come from ashore, and these installations are the last place in which gunfire should be used. Misuse of weapons has previously resulted in otherwise minor fishery disputes—as in the Icelandic Cod War context—becoming international issues, and in any case the Royal Navy has found that its minimum-force policy has been highly successful.
Despite their relatively small size (length 198 feet, beam 36 feet, draught, 16.9 feet, all in 1,250 tons), considerable automation has been built into the class. In addition to direct bridge control of the engines, the ships are steered from their bridges, thereby reducing the number of cruising bridge watchkeepers to three. The Decca Navigator Mk 21, the Kelvin Hughes 1006 (two displays) radar, the
Chernikeef log, and the Master Gyro compass are all linked with the ship’s computer. Loran C is fitted for use to the north of the Shetlands, and there is also an echo-sounder. The computer system will produce print-out material of an accuracy acceptable to both Scottish and English courts. All incidents are also manually plotted, for both back-up and training purposes. Voyage planning on the computer reduces the work load since as many as ten checkpoints can be selected and updated as the vessel progresses on her course. Maintaining fishing vessel tracks and the like are also within the system’s capabilities.
The Islands’ military and civil communication capabilities are comprehensive, having been designed for use in a major offshore incident in which the ships would act as either command or information centers. A limited medical capability is also provided, but U. K. policy in this context is to provide helicopter facilities from ashore, and in view of the relatively short ranges normally involved, this has proved operationally acceptable. No on-deck helicopter capability is available, and it has been the subject of much criticism. In the design stage it was recognized that the operational area would be well within the range of shore-based aircraft, and, accordingly, all transfers are carried out by winching from the aft deck area.
Their comprehensive fire-fighting packages have already been used on a number of occasions, but it is recognized that any outbreak on an offshore structure would be best left to oil industry specialists. The ships would of course be available in a support and communications role. Spraying equipment, with large quantities of dispersant in storage tanks below decks, is carried for use in pollution cleanup operations. Due to their power, the ships have excellent towing capabilities. This useful capability is further enhanced by the variable-pitch propeller and relatively uncluttered aft deck area. Salvage work can also be carried out with available pumps and damage control items. In the fishery protection role the Royal Navy has acquired an enviable reputation for the standard of repair work carried out off shore, and RN ship specialists are often dispatched to assist with radio, engineering, or other equipment problems.
High-standard accommodations exist for all crew members, with the ships’ civilian background providing above-average facilities for junior ratings. Seasickness is an occasional problem, but the ships are popular drafts in what has become an increasingly sophisticated navy. Small ships are always attractive because of their flexible disciplinary standards which rely more on personal standards than regulations, but all the Island-class crews have been trained to a very high level of operational efficiency.
Normal six-week patrols are broken up into shorter operational periods. The ships call at the smaller fishing or oil industry ports which allows for the collection of mail, shore leave, reprovisioning, and, more importantly, an on-going liaison with civilian interests. Up to 90 days’ provisions can be stowed, but the current patrol routine has been refined by operational experience and is now unlikely to be varied in normal circumstances. Of the five ships, under the control of Flag Officer, Scotland and Northern Ireland, three are usually patrolling assigned areas.
The current U. K. defense budget is in a parlous state, but the Royal Navy has acquired a most useful class of ships at what amounts to bargain terms. Two more ships have been ordered from Hall, Russell for 19791980 delivery, and others could well follow, perhaps for export.
A Different Philosophy for Antiship Warfare:
Sea Skua
By Captain G. R. Villar, D.S.C. Royal Navy (Retired), Naval Consultant to Jane’s Weapon Systems and Naval Advisor to British Aerospace, Dynamics Group
In 1967, I recall discussing the Gabriel, the first ship-launched surface-to-surface missile (SSM) outside the U.S.S.R., with Shlomo Erel who was then head of the Israeli Navy. His view was that the Gabriel’s 22 kilometer range was adequate; mine was that one needed to outrange an enemy. In retrospect he was right; the range was accurately matched to that at which the target could be identified as an enemy; at any greater range, there was a considerable risk that the target could be a friend or a neutral in waters which abounded with merchant shipping; and the shorter the range, the smaller and cheaper the missile. Although the Gabriel Mk 2 has now entered service with a range of 41 kilometers, it appears to retain a television eye whose picture can be received in the missile-firing ship to enable a firing to be aborted at the last minute.
Indeed, the identification problem is no less important than the target location problem. There is virtually no possibility that a pacific West would open fire on a ship that was not known positively to be an enemy. Arid there is no certain means by which a single ship can achieve such identification other than visually. Identification friend or foe (IFF) is an unreliable system with poor discrimination which may fail to identify a friend and class him as an enemy. Intercept and analysis of the target transmissions by electronic warfare support countermeasures (ESM) also have their shortcomings. The results provide a bearing only and do not give a match with the radar picture to identify a particular blip on the scope.
In a force, it can be argued that ESM cross bearings from ships some distance apart can be used to give an accurate range. But consider the inaccuracies. A 1° bearing error is quite normal; a 5,000-yard baseline between ships is fairly optimistic; and an intercept at right angles to this line is even more hopeful. Simple mathematics show that, in these optimum conditions, a target which is actually at 20 miles away can be calculated as being at any distance from 15.5 to 27.5 miles. Surely this is too imprecise to give certainty that the target detected by radar is indeed the same as that identified by ESM.
So it is that the shipborne weapon must rely on visual identification of the target, and this can only be achieved, in the absence of outside help, at a range of perhaps 20 kilometers. At this distance, ship- launched missiles are highly effective and provide fast reaction. At greater ranges outside help is needed to identify and locate the target, since ship- borne radar range is not likely to greatly exceed the horizon at 20 to 25 kilometers. Another ship could be sent forward, providing she has a data link with the firing ship, to enable target position to be set into the missile before firing. But this implies some complexity and even then there are limitations—i.e., the target must not be able to steam outside the search area of the missile’s homing head during its time of flight. A missile which cannot be updated with target position data after it has been fired sets a limit on its usable range, which clearly increases as missile speed increases and time of flight for a given range decreases.
Therefore, the ship-launched SSM is not the only answer to a hostile enemy ship. SSMs have definite limitations which can only be overcome, in part, by additional complexity and cost. Yet, the potential enemy has long- range weapons; he is not as pacifically minded as the West and might well not be as cautious in identifying his target; and he has the advantage of a developing satellite reconnaissance system which could provide over-the- horizon location and identification information.
So one must turn to the one practical alternative—the air. The identification problem is made much easier. An aircraft can fly at right angles to the bearing of an ESM intercept to obtain a range to more accurately match with the radar picture than can the surface ship with her slow speed. In effect an aircraft provides a baseline for triangulation that is not only at right angles to the target but is also of considerable length. Visual identification is then not essential. Nor do aircraft have any difficulty in matching the range of ship-launched missiles. But some problems associated with working with a shore-based maritime headquarters are likely to develop, and air crews are also likely to have trouble providing the firing ship with sufficiently accurate target location information to set a missile-homing system. Generally, aircraft-supplied submarine datum positions prove inadequate even for an expanding box search. Complex and expensive equipment is needed for better results, and this tends to call for a specialized aircraft. This problem can be overcome by mounting the antiship missile on the aircraft.
Yet, experience tells surface sailors that aircraft are never there when they are needed. Land-based aircraft have limited range and are slow to respond to a call up; carrier-based aircraft are available in quantity only in the U. S. Navy and frequently ships operate without a carrier. But almost every ship of any size in every navy has a helicopter-launching capability. So we have an obvious and efficient platform for an antiship missile.
This logic had not been developed when Sea Skua started. Instead, the requirement was to develop a response to a growing threat posed by the “Osa” and "Komar” small missilefiring boats in inshore waters. Helicopters were present in a growing number of ships, and they were an obvious tool for attempting to outrange an enemy. Accordingly, the Sea Skua fits today’s philosophy which is as straightforward and simple as is the system itself. To illustrate, take a helicopter which can be widely carried in relatively small ships; any helicopter will do, for the system does not have to be limited to one particular brand. In this case, the Westland Lynx WG 13 (under 10,000 pounds) has been chosen. Give it the normal airborne intercept (AI) radar required in any event—for example, the Ferranti Sea Spray. Give this radar a tracking mode so that it can be switched to track one target constantly. Use a missile which will home semi-actively on to a target illuminated by the Al radar. Make this missile a sea skimmer to make the enemy’s defensive problem more difficult, and launch these missiles in rapid succession from low altitudes. If added fire power is required, employ more than one helicopter in a coordinated attack from widely separated directions.
Helicopters used in such a scenario have considerable advantages. First, they themselves are small and difficult targets for an enemy’s defensive missile systems, and, since they do not have to identify the target visually. they should be able to remain outside or below the cover of these defenses. An enemy’s first indication that the helicopter is attacking will be detection of Sea Spray AI radar being switched to constant tracking. But in this game the helicopters can confuse the enemy by switching the radar on and off. Each Lynx can carry and launch four Sea Skua missiles. Having its range matched to that of the helicopter system, the Sea Skua weighs about one-fifth of the equivalent but longer range ship- and air- launched versions of the Exocet and Harpoon. Finally, the range of the system is not limited by factors such as how far the enemy may steam during the missile time of flight. The helicopter’s range has the potential to out range any shipborne missile.
Sea Skua will enter operational service in 1980. Originally conceived to deal with small fast patrol boats, it has the ability to inflict considerable damage on far larger ships, particularly when four or more missiles are launched together. It is a highly effective and flexible system. As the missile-firing fast patrol boat can still threaten a frigate in inshore waters, Sea Skua gives the frigate the ability to threaten far larger ships throughout the oceans of the world.