Through-Deck Cruiser: The New Capital Ship

 

 

 

embarked for general-purpose missions. While a par­ticular aircraft complement would determine the primary mission of. a through-deck cruiser, other missions could be carried out during a deployment- The through-deck cruiser concept is superior to the current CV concept because air capability would be complemented by corresponding capabilities in ship' board armament and electronics. This cannot be said of traditional aircraft carriers.

The through-deck cruiser hardly represents a deci­sion to opt for a second-best air-capable warship, &1" though the clear impression has been obtained that a navy which procures through-deck cruisers in lieu o expensive attack carriers is opting for a very limited application of naval air power. Such an observation might be made of the British decision in 1966 not to go ahead with building new carriers as replacements for the Ark Royal, Eagle, and Victorious. It is true that the Invincible-class through-deck cruisers were the product of years of political bickering and com­promise, as well as a sign of the limited funds avail­able for new defense construction. The British through-deck cruisers that have emerged wi nonetheless provide greater operational flexibility an

DDG-47 class as the new-generation carrier escorts. Other reasons center on the manner in which naval power, particularly a projection capability, is em­ployed.

From time to time, carriers have been deployed in various places—largely for political missions—with fewer escorts than usual. Perhaps the most notable recent example of this was the cruise of the Enterprise (CVAN-65) to the Bay of Bengal during the Indo- Pakistani War of 1971. The attempt to use a large carrier to signal American wishes was, in this case, a conspicuous failure:

“The carrier’s arrival was intended to signal India not to drive against West Pakistan after its suc­cessful military operations in the east. Whether any such signal was needed is open to debate; but there appears to be little debate among those in­volved that the chosen U. S. signal was particu­larly heavy-handed. Ostensibly, the Enterprise was sent to protect the few remaining Americans in what was to become Bangladesh. But . . . the de­ployment of the Enterprise had precisely the oppo­site effect — in addition to driving Indian- American relations to a new low.”² Had a complete company of escorts been sent with the Enterprise, the problems attending her arrival in the Bay of Bengal would have been magnified. The above incident is by no means an isolated example.

What would appear to be in order is a ship with credible projection capability, yet one which is not wedded to a task force in anything other than a very low-threat environment, and one which can perform politically sensitive missions with subtlety, if need be. The projected successor to the supercarrier, a ship approximating the dimensions of the Essex (CVS-9)- class carriers and designated CVV, would be no more survivable than the supercarrier, and she would be fully as dependent upon escorts for protection as the larger vessels. The answer lies in the through-deck cruiser, of which examples are provided by the Kiev and Invincible. Although through-deck cruisers are not panaceas for all the ills attending shipborne air capability, they do provide projection capability, sea control capability, and a high degree of defensive capability. At the same time, these ships are and will be fitting symbols of national resolve. If the U. S. Navy is serious about maintaining a substantial naval air capability, controlling the sea-lanes, and having a Navy with flexible political capabilities, then the through-deck cruiser provides a sensible answer.

A Through-Deck Cruiser for the U. S. Navy: The re­quirements of a broadly-based combat capability and substantial defensive capability dictate that the through-deck cruiser have equipment commensurate with the missions for which she is designed. The broadly-based combat capability leads to a changed role for the aircraft complement of such a ship. Un­like the traditional carrier, the through-deck cruisers embarked aircraft would constitute only one part of the weapon system. The other parts would be anti­ship, antiaircraft, and antisubmarine capabilities not possessed by aircraft. By the time a substantial number of through-deck cruisers were in commis­sion, they would constitute the “high” end of the surface force mix. They would be augmented, in a total force mix if not in a specific deployment, by “low”-end, more numerous vessels with narrower role definitions. It is unreasonable to expect that a through-deck cruiser could operate singly in all situ­ations. The attractiveness of the concept is that such a vessel could operate effectively with fewer attend­ing vessels than conventional carriers or with none at all, across a broader spectrum of situations, and per­form a greater number of roles.

The basic through-deck cruiser’s combat capability would consist of the shipboard armament and elec­tronics. In such a configuration, she would perform the role of a cruiser. The nature of the aircraft com­plement embarked at any one time would be deter­mined by the assigned mission. Alternatively, the nature of the aircraft complement could determine what additional missions the ship could execute at a given time. Of course, a mixed complement could be

greater availability, bearing in mind the lengthy re­fits that all British carriers underwent from the mid-1950s onward to remain updated and opera­tional. Given the fact that the air capability of the British through-deck cruisers will be built around helicopters and V/STOL (vertical or short takeoff and landing) aircraft, fewer modifications to the launch, retrieval, and maintenance facilities for the aircraft

will be necessary over the lifetime of an individual ship. The Kiev, however, is a better example of a ship in which other features of the vessel compensate for the relatively small number of embarked aircraft.

Since a number of capabilities must be accommo­dated in the through-deck cruiser, space manage­ment and compact design are of the utmost impor­tance. Much also depends on advances in both elec­tronics and power plant design which will liberate areas of the ship previously occupied by boilers, engines, etc. The design requirements for the through-deck cruiser fall into the following categories: propulsion, hull, electronics, and arma­ment. The desired characteristics in each category are described below.

Propulsion: The optimum system for the proposed ship would be the gas turbine, coupled to electric drive rather than reduction gearing. The advantages of electric drive are reduced shaft length, quiet oper­ation, and ease of compartmentation. Perhaps the

Two existing examples of air-capable cruisers are the Italian Vittorio Veneto, left, and the Soviet Kiev, below. The Kiev is shown during antisubmarine warfare exercises earlier this year off the coast of Scotland. Visible near the stern are flares fired from the Kiev to keep a Royal Air Force Vulcan from coming too close while shadowing the Soviet ship.

greatest drawback in the past has been the weight of generators and motors. The technology for substan daily lighter and smaller electrical equipment is at hand, however, as superconductors and overall miniaturization are applied to motor and generator design. Electric drive offers the additional advantage of greater flexibility of location for the propulsion system, a matter of great importance in the design o a large multi-mission warship. The coupling of nu clear reactors to steam turbines would negate the economies of space offered by gas turbines and woul defeat a primary advantage of the through-dec' cruiser, low cost.³

y.

Hull: The dimensions of the ship must be sue that she can pass through the Panama Canal. Such * requirement is a necessary corollary of the requi^ ments for fast reaction and operational flexibility. ^F° the through-deck cruiser’s several mission

Another aid in reducing the size of the power plant would be the speed requirements for the through-deck cruiser. Acceptance of a slightly re­duced speed, perhaps 27-28 knots, would permit lower fuel consumption and greater range, as well as less space devoted to the power plant. Because one o the values of the through-deck cruiser would be her ability to operate outside a task force or supp°^ft group if called upon, increased range is in order. The slight reduction of speed over the ship’s true cruiser and carrier counterparts would not substantially ^e crease her fast-reaction capability.

capability might be few. Functional coordination caust be tied to physical compartmentation of the various electronics systems for maximum efficiency and efficacy of operation, a consideration permitted ^by the great amount of below-decks space which could be devoted to electronics.

capabilities, a large and sophisticated electronics suite will be required. The availability of midships sections for purposes other than propulsion will allow ^rhe placement of the electronics suite below decks, chus affording greater protection and isolation for the equipment and its operators than if they were in the superstructure. Through-deck cruiser capabilities would be enhanced by the successful application of vertical or horizontal modular missile launchers. A well for variable-depth sonar would be provided in the stern.

Assuming a hull 886 feet (270 meters) long and 102 feet (31 meters) at the beam, a hangar deck would have an optimum length of 344 feet (105 me- cers), considering the likely size of the aircraft com­plement assigned to the ship (25-30 helicopters or V/STOI. aircraft). There would be accommodations for ^a relatively small number of troops or evacuees from War zones. Within the hull dimensions given, all these requirements and capabilities could be accom­modated. Unlike the Spruance (DD-963)-class de­stroyers and the Tarawa (LHA-l)-class amphibious as­^Sault ships, the through-deck cruisers will not be loosely packaged,” that is, given room for expansion °f sectors or capabilities without major alterations. The very number of capabilities built into suggested dimensions of the through-deck cruiser prohibits loose packaging.” Displacement would be in the range of 45,000 tons (approximately 41,000 metric tons). The deck plan would be somewhat similar to that of the Invincible. To permit transit of the Panama Canal, a straight or slightly angled deck is called for. The forecastle would be rather longer than rhat of the Invincible and would be devoted to some °f the ship’s armament.

Electronics: Appropriate systems to deal with air, surface, and subsurface threats are called for. In­cluded must be environment-evaluation systems such as the Navy tactical data system (NTDS), and a fire- control system which could automatically control the rype of weapon to be used in a given situation. In­herent in such a system, though, would be an emer­gency override capability, whereby the commander could select the type of weapon to be used, even though the opportunities for exercise of the override

Armament: The cruiser armament which is so es­sential to the operational success of this vessel would ideally consist of sophisticated gun and missile bat­teries. Canister-type Harpoon cruise missile launchers, as well as dual-purpose vertical launchers for Standard surface-to-air missiles and antisubmarine rockets (ASROC), would be provided. An essential part of cruise missile defense would be a close-in weapon system (CIWS), which could also operate against aircraft. Inclusion of the Aegis system for air defense would increase costs of the through-deck cruiser to an unacceptable level. Present-day Aegis might well be obsolete by the time the. first through-deck cruiser is commissioned, if not sooner. The ship’s armament would be rounded out with a battery of 76-millimeter (3-inch) Oto Melara guns such as are fitted to the Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7)- class frigates, and new lightweight 203-millimeter (8-inch) guns of the type fitted on the Hull (DD-945). Inclusion of the larger guns in a twin turret would greatly increase the ship’s firepower for a relatively small increase in the amount of space devoted to the gun, mounting, and hoists. The tightly packaged na­ture of the through-deck cruiser might pose substantial problems were the modular concept not extensively applied. The containerized nature of the ship’s arma­ment would facilitate alteration of armament over the lifetime of the ship, if necessary.

Cost: With the wide range of equipment in the proposed ship and the pioneering technology in some of the equipment, it should be apparent that this would be an expensive vessel. The costs of research and development for the propulsion and fire-control systems would be high, but in other areas much off-the-shelf” technology could be used. An upper-bound cost estimate for the prototype through-deck cruiser, in 1978 dollars, would be about $900 million, succeeding units being some­what cheaper. This figure is based on a cost compari­son of other new classes of ships built or building for the Navy. While a through-deck cruiser might be three to four times as expensive as a Tarawa-chss ship and twice as expensive as the fourth ship in the Virginia (CGN-38)-class of nuclear-powered, guided-missile cruisers, the ship would still be ob­tained for 53% of the cost of the oft-proposed strike cruiser and 35% of the cost of the now-defunct fifth nuclear-powered carrier. She would be about as ex­pensive as the lead ship of the DDG-47 class of de­stroyers.⁴ The strike cruiser is representative of a ship which the through-deck cruiser would render un­necessary. For an estimated $1.7 billion, the Navy would get, as a strike cruiser, a stretched Virginia- class cruiser with Harpoon missiles and an untried, costly Aegis system. The strike cruiser would be op­erationally worthless outside a carrier task force, for the cruiser and carrier are complementary systems. It is both operationally more flexible and more econom­ical in terms of fuel, manpower, initial cost, and continuing cost to fuse the offensive and defensive capabilities into a single ship.

Naval Air Capability and Smaller Navies: Within the next several years, smaller navies with aircraft carriers will have to choose whether to obtain new carrier-type ships or to opt for a more modest air- capable force of cruisers and destroyers. The ex­British light carriers of Argentina, Australia, Brazil, and India, and the ex-U. S. light carrier in the Spanish Navy, constitute the secondary carrier forces of the world. Considering the age of these ships, all the above countries are faced with the need to obtain replacement ships in the near future for a relatively modest investment.⁵ In terms of a nations budget for new naval construction, these replacement vessels might well be relatively more expensive for the coun­tries which procure them than for the countries which design and/or build them. This consideration is important in any analysis of whether or not to maintain a carrier-based naval air arm, for it is open to question whether a secondary navy can afford the initial and recurring costs of the magnitude posed by even a medium-sized aircraft carrier.

With the advance of V/STOL technology, the vari­ety of ships from which meaningful strike and anti­submarine capabilities can be exercised will increase slightly. For navies intent on retaining a serious naval air capability, the choice will be essentially one of a through-deck cruiser or half-deck cruiser, an ex­ample of the latter being the Jeanne d'Arc or Italian Vittorio Veneto. While a $900 million through-deck cruiser approximating the dimensions of the Tarawa would be a bargain for the United States in several respects, it might well be unaffordable under any cir­cumstances for smaller sea control-minded navies. An alternative would be an Invincible-class ship, or a scaled-down version of the U. S. through-deck cruiser. At an estimated $300 million each, scaled- down through-deck cruisers equipped with Exocet ship-to-ship missiles and Sea Dart surface-to-air mis­siles would be formidable warships and excellent re­placements for superannuated carriers. The other ap­proach is to opt for a vessel of more moderate dimen­sions and aircraft capability, but a significant air- capable vessel nonetheless. A Vittorio Veneto-type cruiser, with the same aircraft complement (nine helicopters or about six V/STOLs), and armed with Harpoon or Exocet and Sea Sparrow or Sea Dart mis­siles could fulfill the missions likely to be assigned to

her and would still be a formidable ship.

An idea which has been advocated is for Western navies to replace existing ships and augment their naval capability with a more or less standard type carrier. Perhaps the model for such a vessel ought not to be a U. S. one, at least not as long as American proposals are based on unsuitable designs such as a modified Spruance. Considerations of cost-effective­ness argue strongly in favor of a major air-capable vessel with broadly-based combat effectiveness—the through-deck cruiser. The combination of capabilities in a major vessel will satisfy increasingly stringent budget requirements among our allies, and will allow for operational flexibility rather than the necessity of tying up numbers of warships on escort duty. It is to be hoped that—all else having failed—financial strictures will lead the way to sen­sible warship design and force allocations.

Both the flight-deck Spruance and the propose British “Harrier carrier” are valueless because they would need escorts. Some problems might be over­come if such small carriers were integrated into exist­ing destroyer squadrons, but the combat capability o the small carriers would have to be increased and perhaps the role definition of the destroyers changed- Within the close confines of the Harrier carrier, it is doubtful that combat characteristics could be added, much the same would be true of the flight-deck Spruance.

For a smaller navy, the question of which type to adopt will be largely a matter of cost and compatibil­ity with the rest of the fleet and its missions. The availability of several scaled-down through-deck cruisers of similar size in the NATO forces would enhance their overall antisubmarine capability, f°^r even a scaled-down version would still have an elabo­rate antisubmarine warfare electronics suite, among other things. Additionally, such ships would retain strike and close-support capabilities with V/STOL air­craft and would have adequate armament against air and surface threats. Such ships could work quite well in the company of other ships but would not be operationally required to do so. A considerable return could be expected from such a relatively inexpensive vessel. Needless to say, the full-size through-dec' cruiser would be more attractive in certain cases, but it is doubtful that the contemplated missions o smaller navies or the allied navies of NATO require the greater number of capabilities embodied in the full-size through-deck cruiser.

Should We Just “SLEP” Along? The through-deck cruiser described here might be criticized for featur­ing “all the eggs in one basket” with regard to the

number of capabilities embodied in the ship. Such a criticism would be valid if no other types of warship were produced. While the through-deck cruiser is meant to supplant the traditional aircraft carrier, she would operate very well in company with different ^lypes of antisubmarine vessels. Her limited landing ^and evacuation capability would be augmented by the more specialized capability of built-for-the- Purpose amphibious warfare vessels, and the through-deck cruisers themselves would augment the

big-gun capability of the Navy. In showing the flag, the through-deck cruiser would be an impressive ves­sel indeed, esthetically and functionally. She would be able to project American power positively and as­sert an American presence forcefully in times of crisis, whether the circumstances demanded evacua­tion of American nationals or intervention of a lim­ited number of American troops. Her unsurpassed versatility would soon make the through-deck cruiser a workhorse of the fleet, a highly flexible and adapt­able vessel. The ability to change, quickly and com­pletely, an aircraft complement or to operate a mixed aircraft complement, would permit general-purpose or specific-purpose deployments as circumstances dic­tated, while retaining survivability and offensive capability in any environment. Aircraft would be based at shore stations, and could be exchanged

The author considers flight-deck Spruance-c/<m destroyers, left, to he valueless because they would require escorts. In their place, he proposes a scaled-down through-deck cruiser which would have an air wing and he capable of defending herself. The scaled-down version would carry fewer guns and missile launchers than the full-sized one on page 35.

among ships at sea.

The service life extension program (SLEP) for the large carriers ought to be discarded altogether and the ships permitted to continue in operation until all are replaced by through-deck cruisers. Diversion of funds away from carrier SLEP would permit the con­struction of more through-deck cruisers. The follow­ing is a possible timetable for the introduction of through-deck cruisers and the retirement of carriers:

Through-Deck Cruiser Introduction Schedule

Year #

0                       Appropriations for long lead-time

materials

1

2

3                       Funding for first through-deck

cruiser; contracts let

4

4                       First ship launched; two more ordered

(TDC 2, 3)

5                       Three more ships ordered (TDC 4, 5, 6)

6                       First ship (TDC-1) completed;

TDC 2, 3 launched Two more ships ordered (TDC 7, 8)

7                       TDC 4, 5, 6 launched;

TDC 9, 10 ordered

8                       TDC 2, 3 completed; TDC 7, 8 launched;

TDC 11, 12 ordered

9                       TDC 4, 5, 6 completed; TDC 9, 10

launched

TDC 13, 14, 15 ordered

10                    TDC 7, 8 completed; TDC 11, 12

launched

TDC 16, 17, 18 ordered

11                    TDC 9, 10 completed; TDC 13, 14,

15 launched

12                    TDC 11, 12 completed; TDC 16, 17,

18 launched

13                    TDC 13, 14, 15 completed

14                    TDC 16, 17, 18 completed

This schedule reflects the need to build many other ships. It is the fastest compatible with the time needed to build ships of their size and the new- construction needs of the Navy and other branches of the armed forces. If we assume that CVN-71 will not be built after all, through-deck cruisers will ulti­mately replace carriers at a 3:2 ratio. Upon comple­tion of the first ship in year 7, one carrier would be retired; upon completion of the second and third ships in year 9, one more carrier would be retired. Thenceforth, carrier retirements would be at the rate of two in year 10, one in year 11, one in year 12, one in year 13, two in year 14, two in year 15, and one in year 16. If sufficient funds and shipyard space were available the construction schedule could be ac­celerated, say, to three ships ordered each year after year 6, thus cutting the construction program from 12 to 11 years. (This is reckoned from the ordering of the first ship to completion of the last.) An addi­tional year would be saved if four ships were ordered each year after year 6, to a total of 18 through-deck cruisers. This last schedule would be the optimum for the program.

Operationally or financially, no navy can afford to be hamstrung by the inflexibility which the tradi­tional carrier—and by extension, the carrier task force—represents. The bureaucratic obstacles posed by the carrier lobby are substantial but not insupera­ble. Operational obstacles are great but they, too, can be overcome. Models and cues for change are being provided from abroad, but the powers that be lack imagination, philosophical innovation, and vi­sion. Perhaps the increasing remoteness of the carrier operations of World War II will remedy the prevail­ing poverty of ideas, but the time for substantial change is at hand, and it cannot be ignored.

■ Mr. Cairl was graduated from Fordham University iⁿ 1976, receiving his B.A. degree magna cum laude ⁱⁿ political science and history. He received the degree of master of international affairs from Columbia Univer sity in May 1978. Toward the latter degree, he did much work in strategic studies and naval affairs, spe~ cializing in Western Europe and foreign policy analysis- He founded the Arms Control and Military Affairs Workshop at Colum­bia and was its director in 1977 and 1978. In October 1978, after this article had been written and edited, Mr. Cairl was employed by ^c^^e Naval Sea Systems Command as a contract specialist.

¹ Soviet designation: Bol'shoi protivolodyochnyi kreyser (large antisubmarine

^Sh‘^p)'                                                                                                                                             A f.

²Michael Krepon, “A Navy to Match National Purposes,” Foreign AJ'

fairs, January 1977, p. 363.

³The America (CVA-66) and John F. Kennedy (CVA-67), commissione three and seven years after the Enterprise (CVAN-65) respectively, were 55% and 61%, respectively, of the cost of the Enterprise.

⁴Estimated cost for the DDG-47 is $938 million. See Jane's Fighting Ships 1977-78 (New York, Franklin Watts, 1977), p. 592.

Construction of all these ships was begun during World War II. ^^ie last to be completed was the Indian Vikrant, in 1961.

⁶James L. George, “Maintaining a Western Carrier Capability, Unite States Naval Institute Proceedings, October 1977, pp. 30-40.