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This year marked another round of deliberations and decisions on carriers. The vessels examined included Nimitz-class CVNs, vertical or short takeoff and landing (V/STOL) and other smaller carriers, air-capable destroyers, and non-carrier systems. Although President Jimmy Carter’s August veto °f the Defense Authorization Bill torpedoed the construction of another large nuclear-powered carrier, or any carrier, this year, the controversy remains unsettled. Accordingly, another carrier alternative is proposed here for consideration in the next round, if not sooner.
The emphasis to date has been on the question of Nimitz-class versus smaller carriers. The Navy’s CVNX study, tasked to develop alternative carrier designs to the Nimitz, found the smaller carriers more vulnerable, less capable, and less cost effective than the Nimitz. Captain Stephen De- LaMater attributes the Nimitz's advantages over smaller carriers to “devastating” economies of scale.1 He recognizes that this suggests the possibility of additional advantages for a new carrier even larger than the Nimitz. But he finds against this alternative, citing such reasons as psychological factors, diminishing returns to scale, port restrictions, and lead ship costs. He also notes that there are no serious advocates of a larger carrier.
Economies of scale make the CVN preferable to smaller carriers2, but the advantages of size should not stop with the Nimitz. A larger carrier does indeed pose the problems Captain De- LaMater notes, yet she cannot properly be ruled out just because of them. She may also offer some major benefits. The question is how her advantages and disadvantages compare with those of alternative carriers. To this end, the present proposal is for serious consideration of a carrier substantially larger than the Nimitz, designed for improved survivability and increased cost effectiveness. This carrier, pictured on page 125, has the displacement of an ultra-large supertanker; for brevity it is called the ultracarrier.
The concept described here is not new to the Defense Department. An earlier non-nuclear version of this proposal was submitted to then-Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger in September 1975. After a minor revision, it was evaluated unfavorably by the Navy (DCNO Air Warfare) in April and by the Office of the Secretary of
Defense (Director of Defense Research and Engineering) in September 1976, under Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld. After substantial changes to meet criticisms raised in the evaluations, it was submitted to Defense Secretary Harold Brown in February 1977 in essentially its present form. The Navy responded in March 1977, again unfavorably. Noting that the revised proposal met several of the earlier criticisms, the finding was negative because of other unresolved problems, budget cuts, and a Defense Department policy at that time favoring the smaller V/STOL carriers.
Congress soon reopened the carrier question. In April 1977, the House Armed Services Committee opposed the V/STOL carrier aircraft program. In May 1977, the Senate Armed Services Committee called for a comprehensive Defense Department reevaluation of carrier alternatives. The reevaluation, which apparently did not include the ultracarrier, found in favor of “building another carrier of some kind,” according to Secretary of the Navy W. Graham Claytor, Jr.3
In 1979, maybe all the carrier alternatives— including the ultracarrier—will be evaluated.
The ultracarrier features very large displacement and deep draft to carry heavy tonnages of active and passive protection, and to exploit the protection of space as well as mass. Cost is minimized by an emphasis on low- technology, low-cost-per-ton structures and protection, and by settling for the slowest speed capabilities practical in a carrier designed to launch and recover conventional takeoff and landing (CTOL) aircraft. The ship is powered by a combined nuclear and conventional power plant. Nuclear propulsion is employed to give the ship long range at an acceptable cruise speed; conventional propulsion generates the boost for the higher speeds required for combat.
The ultracarrier design illustrated here displaces 500,000 tons fully loaded. (The Nimitz's combat load displacement is 93,400 tons.) Almost half of its light ship weight of
400.0 tons consists of active protection equipment and passive protection. Length is in the supertanker’s dimension, draft a little shallower, and hull beam even wider. Hull lines, similar although fatter than the Nimitz's, permit speeds much higher than a supertanker albeit slower than the Nimitz. The 280,000 s.h.p. Nimitz-type nuclear main power plant provides long-range cruising at up to 23 knots. Augmentation by a
120.0 s.h.p. conventional power plant provides 26 knots maximum speed in combat to accommodate CTOL aircraft landings in a dead calm. This speed is estimated to be adequate for takeoffs if present catapult throws are increased about 10%, with no change in catapult force. There is adequate space for the longer catapult runs. A total of six large-diameter propellers are protected within armored ducts. Multiple, heavily armored rudders are backed up by ducted bow and stern sidethrusters for maneuverability and redundancy.
The 100,000-ton deadweight capacity includes a generously equipped and provisioned air wing of about 100 aircraft, conventional ship fuel for up to 30 days continuous operations at 26 knots, and large tonnages of ship munitions and other provisions. There is space for two air wings; but stationing two air wings on board would put too many expensive eggs in one basket. The ultracarrier’s survivability is substantially improved, but it is not invulnerable. The extra space is used instead for such purposes as more protective compartments and spaced armor, spacious maintenance facilities, crew quarters, and other amenities.
The wide hull houses a large hangar deck and a flight deck up to 400 feet wide. The large dimensions make possible an unorthodox flight deck configuration which contributes to increased protection and increased sortie capability. The four aircraft elevators, located centrally rather than peripherally, are sheltered under a heavily armored island hangar on the flight deck. Damage from a penetrating hit on this hangar is localized by armored hinged partitions between the elevators, leaving the elevators and the hangar deck below relatively unexposed to the elements and enemy fire. The flight deck hangar is flanked by separate port and starboard landing areas, and topped by a central command island. Space permits six catapults rather than the usual four. All elevators and the four catapults farthest forward can be occupied and operated concurrently with operations on both landing areas. (The ultracarrier and the Nimitz are compared in Table 1.)
Ship structure is primarily mild steel, costing less but weighing more than more advanced materials. The weight margin for armor and other protection is nevertheless very large; the structural mass contributes to protection, especially against shaped- charge weapons. (Weights for the ultracarrier are roughly estimated in Table 2.) Structural weight totals
160,0 tons, including internal decks and bulkheads but not protective partitions and compartments. This weight is more than double that of a comparable supertanker, reflecting the ultracarrier’s greater ship volume above the waterline, greater total deck area, and more demanding structural standards. The total estimated weight of the ship’s structure, propulsion, other equipment and facilities leaves 195,000 tons of the assumed total 400,000-ton light ship weight
available for active and passive protection equipment.
The best allocation of available protective weight among the various kinds of active and passive protection is a matter for experts. The allocation shown here is purely illustrative. Active protection equipment is allowed
10,0 tons; active protection munitions are included in the 100,000-ton useful load. The remaining 185,000 tons allowed for passive protection includes compartments and armor, the latter for the hull sides and bottom, flight deck, flight deck hangar, command island, internal spaced armor, and for local protection of magazines, propulsion, and other vitals. Again, for low cost and good protection, the armor and protective structures are primarily mild steel. This steel is of course less effective per ton than hardened steel, alloy, or composite armor against weapons which can be better defeated by strength, toughness, or hardness than by mass; it may or may not be less effective per dollar, all things considered. Be that as it may, mild steel can provide substantial protection in the large tonnages contemplated here.
The passive protection of 185,000 tons is in addition to the protection provided by the 160,000 tons of the ship’s basic structure. Although that is a lot of protection, there is a lot of space to protect. Exterior surface totals about one million square feet and internal volume about 35 million cubic feet, about double the surface and quadruple the volume of the Nimitz. The large target area and moderate speed make the ultracarrier easy to hit, but hit probability with modern guided weapons is high against almost any ship. The idea is to withstand hits which cannot be avoided. Large size contributes to this capability in several ways: it facilitates dispersal of magazines and other vitals; puts more protective material between the carrier’s contents and the enemy; and allows more spaced armor and protective compartments, which increase the number of hits and/or the potency of the warheads required to disable the carrier by damage or flooding. No amount of passive protection can make the carrier invulnerable, but a large
Table 1. VItracarrier vs. Nimitz Characteristics
| Ultracarrier | Nimitz |
Dimensions (feet) | ||
Length (waterline) | 1,250 | 1,040 |
Beam (waterline) | 280 | 134 |
Draft: maximum | 75 | 37 |
light ship | 61 | 30* |
Flight deck width | 400 | 252 |
Displacement (long tons) | ||
Light ship | 400,000 | 72,700 |
Full load | 500,000 | 93,400 |
Propulsion | ||
Nuclear (s.h.p.) | 280,000 | 280,000 |
Conventional (s.h.p.) | 120,000 | — |
No. of shafts | 6 | 4 |
Aviation Features | ||
No. of aircraft | 100 | 94 |
No. of aviation elevators | 4 | 4 |
No. of catapults | 6 | 4 |
Speed (knots) | ||
Maximum | 26 | 30+ |
Cruise (nuclear) | 23 | 30+ |
Ultracarrier performance estimated from Taylor model residual resistance data. Nimitz data from footnotes 1 and 4. | ||
* Author’s estimate. |
Table 2 Ultracarrier Weights (Long tom)
Light Ship | |
Hull, flight deck structure | 130,000 |
Internal decks, bulkheads | 30,000 |
Nuclear propulsion system | 25,000' |
Conventional propulsion system | 10,0002 |
Other ship equipment, facilities | 10,0003 |
Active protection equipment | 10,0004 |
Passive protection material | 185,0004 |
Light ship total | 400,000 |
Deadweight | |
Aircraft munitions | 15,000 |
Ship munitions | 15,000 |
Aircraft fuel | 25,000 |
Ship fuel (conventional) | 25,000s |
Air wing and other | 20,0006 |
Deadweight total | 100,000 |
Maximum Displacement | 500,000 |
‘Data-free guesstimate.
Estimated from footnote 5 data.
^Illustrative assumption.
Illustrative allocation of total protective weight.
' Estimated for 30-day endurance at 26 knots. Remainder of deadweight arbitrarily allocated.
Includes ship spares, support equipment, personnel, and provisions other than munitions and fuel.
'Based on footnote 4 1967 cost factor, doubled for 1976 dollars.
2Based on footnote 4 1967 cost factor, doubled for 1976 dollars.
"Data-free guesstimated cost factor.
4Assumes mild steel protection, similar to basic structure in cost per ton in place.
Table 3 LJltracarrier Procurement Costs (Millions of 1976 dollars)
Basic Structure: | 160,000 tons @ $ 1,750/ton | o 00 CN </> |
Conventional Propulsion System: | 140,000 s.h.p. @ $220/s.h.p. | 2bi |
Other Ship Equipment, Facilities: | 10,000 tons @ $ 10,000/ton | 100[1] |
Active Protection Equipment: | 10,000 tons @ $ 10,000/ton | 1003 |
Passive Protection: | 185,000 tons @ $l,750/ton | 3224 |
Nuclear Propulsion System: | not estimated | • X |
Electronics: | not estimated . |
|
Total unit procurement cost $828 + X
amount can make it correspondingly difficult and expensive to put out of action.
The total weight of passive protection material amounts to about 400 pounds per square foot of exterior surface or about 12 pounds per cubic foot of interior volume. If the passive protection were all concentrated in external armor encasing the flight deck and hull, the armor would average about ten inches thick. The protection can presumably be more effective, however, if distributed more uniformly throughout the ship volume, for example in spaced armor, compartments, and local protection around critical items. In that case a warhead might have to penetrate a total thickness of several feet of steel, in addition to the ship’s structure, to reach a magazine or other vital element buried up to 100 feet within the ship. But again, this type of protection can also be breached, at a cost. The 10,000 tons of active protection equipment is in addition to defensive fighters in the air wing. Its allocation among antiaircraft artillery (AAA), surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), antisubmarine and other such weapons is again a matter for experts.
Table 3 presents rough and incomplete estimates of the ultracarrier’s procurement costs. They exclude nuclear propulsion and electronics costs, assumed here to be the same for the ultracarrier and the CVN. They also exclude nonrecurring lead ship costs such as R&D, tooling, and investment in new construction and support facilities, treated briefly below. The items figured here total about $800 million (1976 dollars)—presumably comparable to the corresponding CVN items, within a few hundred million dollars. If this is so, total procurement cost of the ultracarrier should be in the same vicinity as the CVN’s, including nuclear propulsion and electronics but excluding nonrecurring lead ship costs. Be that as it may, carrier procurement cost is a very small fraction of total carrier system cost, which includes life-cycle costs of the carrier, its air wing, and all associated escorts, support ships, and facilities.6 The case for or against the ultracarrier may hinge primarily on considerations other than its procurement cost.
The ultracarrier admittedly poses serious problems in construction, maintenance, repair, and replenishment, primarily because of its deep light ship draft and very large light ship displacement. Its draft is too deep for some harbors and for most or all existing shore dry docks and loading docks. Its dimensions are too large and light ship displacement too great for any existing floating dry dock. New facilities are thus required for ultracarrier construction and support; yet new shore facilities may be prohibitively expensive, considering the costs of constructing and maintaining shore docks and access channels accommodating a light ship draft of over 60 feet. This carrier proposal features new floating dry docks for ultracarrier construction and overhaul, a high degree of ultracarrier self-sufficiency in other maintenance and repair, and heavy reliance on underway replenishment in both peace and war.
The ultracarrier dry dock must accommodate a hull length of about 1,300 feet, a beam of 280 feet, and clearances for construction and overhaul equipment. It must be stressed for 400,000-ton capacity. By my calculations these requirements can be met with a floating dry dock structure primarily of reinforced prestressed concrete, costing well under $100 million (1976 dollars). Concrete fatigue and stress corrosion problems can be minimized by confining the dock to sheltered deep-water harbors to avoid exposure to the stresses of heavy seas. A production run of two or more ultracarriers requires at least two such facilities, one for ultracarrier construction and the other for overhaul and nuclear refueling. (These dry docks were not included in the ultracarrier proposals submitted to the Defense Department.)
The ultracarrier has the space and weight capacity to carry the personnel, equipment, spares, and other supplies needed for self-sufficiency in nearly all maintenance and repair activities conducted afloat. This requires more generous manning, equipping, and provisioning than customary in carriers, but saves on repair ship requirements and maximizes carrier time on station in peace and war. To this end, crews are rotated between sea and shore duty via airlift or other transport, returning the ultracarrier to home port for dry-docking only. External hull inspection and defouling employ the submerged cleaning and maintenance platform (SCAMP) system used on some supertankers. Minor underwater hull and propulsion system damage is repaired by caissons designed for the purpose.
The ultracarrier is replenished at sea or in deep-water harbors by ship-to- ship transfer from oilers, ammo ships, and cargo ships; packaged cargo is transferred via crane or crane helicopters. The latter are expensive to procure and operate, but Navy tests found them very productive for shuttling prepackaged slung loads over short distances. A modest helicopter force may suffice for nearly all the ultracarrier’s dry cargo needs in a given theater in peace and war and probably at an acceptable cost. The large capac- *ty of the ultracarrier permits relatively infrequent replenishment, albeit ln correspondingly large tonnages.
The construction and support concepts outlined above require departures from customary procedures and investments in new facilities and ec]uipment. More ships are required for peacetime replenishment than customary. Considerable R&D is required to develop and implement these conCePts, as well as to design the ultracar- riet, all of which add to initial and operating costs.
On the other hand, the ultracarrier also offers some savings: repair ship requirements are minimized; the high fovel of active protection aboard the ultracarrier minimizes the need for fighter protection (releasing more of the air wing for attack and other primary missions) and the need for active protection by escort ships (reducing requirements for such ships in the earner task force); its large capacity per- ttuts wartime operations without replenishment for several weeks (if the provisioning has been kept at or near foil levels in peacetime); it spends tttost of its time on station, maximiz- lng early wartime availability in that theater; and relatively high survivabil- ‘ty and high sortie capability contribute to high wartime effectiveness. Thus one ultracarrier may conceivably fie equivalent in combat to two or tfore cvns or other carriers.
The present proposal may elicit the following negative reactions, among others:
(1) The CVN is already adequately protected, virtually unsinkable, and can be returned quickly to action if damaged in combat.
(2) V/STOL carriers are best.
(3) The ultracarrier is wasteful in not using existing construction and support facilities, requiring costly new facilities instead.
(4) The ultracarrier poses several unresolved problems.
(5) All-conventional propulsion is preferable.
(6) The day of the carrier has passed.
These propositions deserve serious consideration and more comprehensive study than they gave been given up to now. Space limitations here preclude more than the following brief counterpoints:
(1)The CVN is no doubt protected as effectively as possible for its size, and may be nearly unsinkable. The question, however, is whether it can remain operational long enough under fire and recover from damage soon enough to provide combat capability to make it worth its cost, including the cost of the air wing and all associated task force and support elements and facilities.
(2) The Navy was right the first time in opposing V/STOL carriers as being more vulnerable, less capable, and less cost effective than CVNs.
(3) Net cost, after deducting sav
ings in other resources, should be the measure of the program.
(4) True, but other carriers also pose unresolved problems, such as how to last long enough in combat to make them worthwhile.
(5) The ultracarrier is well suited for all-conventional propulsion because it has a large potential fuel capacity which would not significantly reduce the ship’s protective weight.
(6) Conceivably true, but worth confirming or refuting sooner rather than later.
In any event, the present proposal is not that the ultracarrier concept be adopted, but rather that it be seriously and objectively considered as a possible alternative to CVNs, other carriers, or no carriers. This means still another reevaluation of carrier alternatives. [2] 3
The First Horse Out of the Firehouse”
% Lieutenant Bruce R. Linder, Operations Officer, USS Lynde McCormick (DDG-8)
Signal flags and naval ensigns snap ln the brisk wind that sweeps across Tokyo Bay. The silent gray forms of destroyers, cruisers, and carriers strain at their moorings while occupying fierths at the former headquarters of che Imperial Japanese Navy. These ships, which form one of the most powerful task groups ever to guard the approaches to the Japanese archipelago, have just returned from a series of fleet exercises off the Home Islands. But they are not Japanese. The flags and the naval ensigns that
fly in this crisp breeze are American.
These U. S. ships are an entire attack carrier task group consisting of a carrier and her air wing, two cruisers, a destroyer squadron, and even supporting service ships. They operate as units of the U. S. Seventh Fleet, but
are not on a deployment cycle from a West Coast or Hawaiian port. Yokosuka is their home port. The U. S. Navy has, in peacetime, home- ported various cruiser, destroyer, and amphibious units overseas, but never such a powerful task group—missilearmed and built around a major combat-ready carrier.
Destroyer Squadron Fifteen and the U. S. Seventh Fleet flagship, USS Oklahoma City (CG-5), have been representative of ships that have been stationed in Yokosuka. With the stationing there of the USS Worden (CG- 18) in 1971 and the USS Midway (CV- 41) in 1973, the strategic as well as the personnel considerations of Pacific Fleet employment have been significantly affected. For instance, CONUS- based ships’ at-home time has been increased or, at least, stabilized in spite of the maintenance of arduous overseas commitments with a reduced force of ships.
What about the families and crews of these overseas home-ported ships? Ships participating in the Overseas
Family Residency Program face a significantly different operating schedule and an in-port schedule requiring different priorities than their CONUS- based sister ships. Rather than a cyclic deployment schedule of, perhaps, six months assigned to the Seventh Fleet and 12 months operating from West Coast ports, the forward-deployed unit may be at sea from Yokosuka for three weeks, in port ten days,’ at sea for seven days, in port in another Far Eastern port for five days, and then at sea another two weeks. The longest time one can reasonably expect to be away from Japan is perhaps two and a half to three months during rare “show-the-flag” cruises or Australian port visits. Most ships maintain a 50% time-in-port average throughout the year, although only 33-40% of the total time (depending on ship type) is usually spent in the home port.
But, whereas the overseas-home- ported unit does not have to endure the long family separations and extended operating conditions of the CONUS-based deployer, neither does she enjoy the extended in-port periods and the low tempo refresher training periods. Her in-port time, on the average, is in ten-day, two-week, and three-week periods with extended time for needed repair work only rarely scheduled throughout the year.
Japan-based ships must always be ready to respond to short-fused Seventh Fleet contingencies. The words “stand down” are unknown to these ships, and in most cases ships remain in port in a condition of underway availability. In the words of one experienced WestPac skipper, “When the bell rings, we’re the first horse out of the firehouse.”
Effective management of scarce resources, training facilities, and technical assistance, while coping with an extended supply system, is a day-today necessity if the overseas home- ported unit is to survive. Engineering personnel must constantly balance infrequent “cold iron” time with major equipment maintenance schedules so that the ship will be ready for sea on
(W. M. POWERS)
short' notice. Engineering plant repair support from the Ship Repair Facility (srf) in Yokosuka is generally excel- knt, and their 1,200-psi plant experience increases daily. But SRF can be overwhelmed with priority work during conditions of high Yokosuka port loading. This results in another dimension in planning that the manager must consider. The high operating tempo and the necessity to have major equipment on the line for a large per- eentage of the time leave little room for error in the managing of an effective engineering plant.
The difficulties that ship’s officers m the combat systems, electronics, Weapons, or operations disciplines must face in an overseas home-ported environment are a result of the distances to CONUS supply channels, cONUS-based contractors, and the operating units. They are the same headaches of long delays for needed repair parts and financially curtailed contractor technical assistance visits that plague most managers on normal overseas deployments, the only difference being that the combat systems officer in Japan must cope with these conditions 12 months of the year. To be able to call the manufacturer of your long-range air search radar to discuss an intermittent casualty or to walk across the pier to discuss a fault with your missile launching system are luxuries that are not often available to the operator in Japan. There develops a much higher dependence on the quality and ingenuity of the enlisted personnel on board and a lower level of patience to absorb their mistakes.
Training opportunities have also been a big question mark to the shipboard planner or manager. In general, training sites and shore-based training management are adequate, but they are not to be confused with the training possibilities available in the Southern California and Hawaiian areas. In several cases, WESTPAC training sites are among the best in the world, especially in such areas as air bombing targets. However, one of the training weak points that cannot be improved is that the permanent de- ployer must endure periodically rotating back to EASTPAC/MIDPAC operating areas. Submarine services for surface ship ASW training near Japan are, at best, hard to schedule; the surface-to-surface missile target has questionable availability due to a preponderance of local fishermen and salvagers on the target. By far the greatest training problem, though, is with available and convenient shore air training for the Midway's air wing. Difficult air traffic problems in the Yokosuka area, and other local restrictions, require a higher at-sea time for the carrier to keep her air wing proficient and also extended trips by air wing aircraft to distant airfields when the carrier returns to port.
The personal leadership aspects of overseas home-porting have, in many ways, been more difficult for the naval officer to adjust to than the material and training problems. The most obvious change that he must go through is cultural. Japan is no longer a shortstop, exotic, liberty port with good buys in stereos and china for him; it becomes home, and one must go through a very definite adjustment process to get used to the ways of the Japanese people. Cultural shock is a very real subject to be dealt with for both the new junior officer reporting aboard and for the young seaman who must be counseled.
A pre-assignment screening process attempts to order only the most stable to an overseas unit. In spite of this, it still becomes difficult to adjust to a non-English speaking society which operates with different priorities and with a differing tempo than are comfortable to the average Western- educated person. The situation can become especially depressing for the bachelor navy man who must withstand the rather high rent payments ashore without the help of BAQ payments and also finds a distressing shortage of single American women or Japanese girls willing to date Americans. Personal leave is also difficult to adequately plan because of the paucity of "dead” times in the operating schedule and the considerable distance and money necessary to visit acquaintances in the United States. Still, there are some very definite advantages to be found on the personal level when operating from Tokyo Wan. Perhaps the most important of these is professional in nature. Because forward-deployed units are operating almost continuously, one quickly becomes more proficient in the execution of most operations at sea. In a normal two- or three-year tour, one is likely to see every conceivable operation that the class of ship is capable of performing—and normally more than once. The chance to work at the forefront of naval operations is also important to many, and the exposure to potentially hostile naval forces is an exhilarating experience that is not usually available on a continuous basis to CONUS-based deployers.
The chance to live in another culture and learn first-hand how another people live and think is also an advantage that cannot be overstated. The opportunity to visit ports which have not seen American ships for 10-15 years and then mingle with the townspeople is especially intriguing. Almost without exception, Americans leaving Japan after their tour leave a lirtle richer in their understanding of intercultural relations and with a much deeper appreciation of the world.
Of course, the advantage of no six- to eight-month deployments with extended family separations is important to many. It also serves as an inducement for some to extend their time assigned to overseas units. This is an extremely important aspect of the entire Overseas Family Residency Program and has been successful over the years toward reducing time away from home port for those in Japan and by extending time between deployments for those in CONUS and Hawaiian home ports.
Since overseas home-porting began, there has been some smoke and a few false alarms—but no real fires. Still, the American stallion—fed, groomed, and exercised regularly — is ready when and if the bell should clang in the Far East. It will be the first horse out of the firehouse, the first on the scene.
An Advanced Attack Airplane Design
By Colonel John M. Verdi, U. S. Marine Corps Reserve (Retired), former CO of VMFA-122 and Director of Safety of the Third Marine Aircraft Wing and an Aviation Technical Writer
Development of an attack airplane capable of battlefield fire-support is historically associated with Dr. Hugo Junkers, who designed the J.l in 1917. Subsequent evolution proceeded everywhere along similar lines for the next 18 years; and what evolved was Dr. Junkers’s definitive "Stuka,” the Ju87. Airplanes derived from the same basic design rationale were widely employed during World War 11 (the American SBD and SB2C, the Soviet 11-2) and even some years afterward (the Soviet 11-10).
Concurrently, World War II gave rise to a proliferation of alternative at-
tack airplane designs: special-purpose and multi-purpose, single-engine and twin-engine, single-crew member and multiple-crew member, and with internal and external weapons carriage (and combinations). Eventually, it proved expedient to hand-me-down obsolete and deficient fighter airplanes to attack units. Following World War II, this process was particularly evident as all aviation units were reequipped with reaction-propelled airplanes. The few jet airplanes, which were designed to attack specifications (the A-4 and the A-7), were the answer to a primary strategic, rather
than tactical, requirement.
While the Air Force and Navy pressed to acquire “all-jet” airplane inventories, the Army developed an altogether different aircraft the armed helicopter—for battlefield fire-support. Not surprisingly, a capability gap accompanied these divergent developments; and now we are seeing efforts to close the performance gap between the armed helicopter and the jet figher-attack airplane. These efforts have resulted in attempts to (1) push helicopter development beyond the state of the art (AH-56) and (2) design airframe and power plant combi-
rent technology. A useful comparison between propeller and jet tactical attack airplanes could have been made had the A2D turbo-prop become operational, but it did not. Similar airplanes developed in other countries were never tried in battle.
Thereafter, the nuclear attack impetus put an end to the discussion. The high/low mix of airplanes developed for nuclear attack were jet airplanes (A-3/A-4). As the enemy’s capability to detect and intercept the aircraft improved, successors to these planes (F-105, A-6, A-7, and F-lll) were designed for “low” attack profiles. They were equipped for navigation and weapons delivery at night and in all-weather conditions, with increased on-board fuel and air-refueling capabilities.
Having actively participated in the nuclear attack program, I have personal knowledge of much wishful thinking and some outright fraud which went into it. Take, for example, the “terrain-following” capability. The correct operational description of terrain-following is controlled flight in the airspace from 50 to 200 feet above ground level. Whether or not the human pilot can or should be in the control loop is beside the point. The real problem is vehicle response. Can the airplane answer the command? The answer for all currently operational jet airplanes is no.
The terrain-following sensors and associated logic networks on board existing jet attack/bomber airplanes are not being used to accomplish terrain
nations to the constraints of the battlefield (AV-8 and A-10).
The advantages and disadvantages °f the classic Stukas deserve review. Advantages:
^ Simplicity: They were easy to produce, operate, and support. A swarm °f airplanes could be deployed for battlefield fire-support.
^ Agility: They generated high transient load factors and rates of turn. They operated within vertical and horizontal airspace limits imposed by weather, friendly gunfire-support plans, terrain, and ballistic dispersion of compatible munitions.
* Crew Coordination: Suppressive fire could be laid down on enemy ground- fire during both attack (fixed gunnery by the pilot) and withdrawal (free gunnery by the observer). The observer could (and did) recover the airplane when the pilot had been hit; and besides flying duties, the observer performed the duties of refueling/ rearming/repairing the aircraft, with °t without ground crew assistance. disadvantages:
► Survivability: Although they did well surviving infantry small arms and light automatic weapons fire, they did not survive attack by capable fighter airplanes competently operated. Nor could they penetrate areas heavily defended by massed antiaircraft artillery.
^ Forward Base Security: The airplanes’ limited fuel and munitions payload and their slow cruising speed meant that their supply/support train had to accompany infantry and armored units. When infantry and armor were beaten back or overrun by counterattack, grounded airplanes and support personnel and their equipment were lost to the enemy.
The post-World War II through Korea period saw the employment of the “used” propeller airplane concurrently with the “new” jet airplane. Numerous tactical and technical writers attempted to compare the aircraft’s relative merits. None of these comparisons were useful because the requisite basis for comparison was absent. The A-i represented the final development of prior technology, and the F9F (and comparable jets) represented ongoing development of curfollowing flight, because terrain cannot be followed by these airplanes, as everyone who has flown the low-level profiles without killing himself knows. What is actually accomplished in these airplanes is terrain avoidance. This satisfies the requirement that airplanes not collide with obstacles, but does not satisfy the requirement that airplanes will not be detected and intercepted. Terrain-following maneuvers require en route maneuvering airspeeds between 200 and 400 knots and a power plant of which the specific power increases as the airplane specific energy decreases. These are design objectives which cannot be met by a jet airplane without surrendering the fuel and payload required to perform the attack mission.
Commitment of U. S. tactical fighter and attack aircraft to interdiction and battlefield fire-support in Southeast Asia and subsequently in the Middle East generated some lessons-learned and others relearned which deserve a review.
► The armed helicopter introduced the vertical takeoff and landing capability, but otherwise repeated the tactical history of the Stuka, thereby furnishing two lessons. First, this kind and level of fire-support is still necessary; second, neither the traditional Stuka design nor the armed helicopters by themselves provide enough firepower.
► Avionics made continuous air operations—day, night, all-weather—a reality. Radar, infrared (IR), and low- light level television made it possible for airplanes to attack the enemy (or defend friendlies) as required; to avoid collision with terrain and other airplanes; and to return to base and execute an instrument landing with or without assistance from ground facilities. Then, radar homing and warning (RHAW), electronic counter-measures (ECM), and electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCM) arrived, and became both routine and indispensable.
y Guided weapons—active and passive, homing and commanded—added new capabilities and new hazards, without superseding the old ones.
► The remotely piloted vehicle became operational. Its principal application was reconnaissance; its principal means of launch, command, and recovery was a manned airplane.
Combat experience also identified failures, some new, some old.
^ “Attack” airplanes optimized for long-range and high-speed penetration, with high wing loadings and low thrust-to-weight ratios, exhibited negative specific power at tactical maneuvering load factors, even when carrying the single-store carriage for which they were designed. “Adapted” for multiple-stores carriage, maneuvering performance of these airplanes became much worse. The additional weight and drag also resulted in repeated instances in which an airplane would not take off from the available runway (or into available wind-overdeck), or would not fly at all because airframe drag exceeded engine thrust. Pilots who survived a combat tour in these airplanes learned that negative specific power at tactical maneuvering load factors is a fancy way of saying that the airplane can make only one pass at a target.
y A battlefield commander calls for fire-support by attack airplanes when the objective is beyond the ballistic or destructive capability of his assigned artillery and helicopters and especially when he, his troops, and supporting arms are being overwhelmed by enemy counter-fire. These circumstances demand airplanes capable of hauling massive and diverse munitions and of repeated tactical delivery maneuvers. These tactical demands require airplanes with low wing loadings and high thrust-to-weight ratios. Such airplanes were not available in Southeast Asia or in the Middle East. What were available were fighter airplanes, which had high thrust-to-weight ratios and high wing loadings. These fighter airplanes, “adapted” for multiple-stores carriage, provided the interim answer to battlefield fire- support requirements. y High-thrust jet fighter/attack airplanes carry heavy loads and generate specific power at maneuvering load factors to enable repeated attacks. But they are still fighters, optimized aerodynamically, mechanically, and electronically for air-to-air combat. The features and systems associated with their primary mission are specialized and complex. Fighter airplanes are expensive to produce, operate, and support. Their employment in secondary missions is justified only when their capability to perform the primary mission is continuously maintained.
y Fighter capability for sustained maneuvering (repeated attacks) is developed at high levels of specific energy. This means they generate high sustained load factors, but not high rates of turn. Because maneuvering airspeeds are high (400 knots plus), they require airspace and time for repeated attacks.
► As for any capability to lay down suppressive fires during repeated attacks, the mainstay fighter (F-4), “adapted” for battlefield fire-support, carried no guns! It was necessary to resort to the expedient of externally suspended gun-pods, then to redesign the airplanes to include internal guns—a necessity the U. S. Navy, unlike the Air Force, stubbornly refused to acknowledge.
y The additional crew member again proved that his contribution to routine and emergency operations is worth many times the weight and cube he adds to the airplane—a lesson the U. S. Air Force refuses to acknowledge. However, in contrast to helicopter operators, fixed-wing airplane operators never demanded (and so never got) traversing guns for additional crew members to employ.
► Fighter maneuvering, plus ECM,
enabled penetration of enemy base areas defended by fighters, surface-to- air missiles, and guns; but fighter survivability in battlefield small-arms fire was degraded by omission of armor for crew and control systems, a lack of self-sealing internal fuel cells, the vulnerability of axial-flow turbojet engines to foreign object damage (FOD), and the hazardous behavior of multiple-carriage munitions and suspension hardware. Battlefield hazards have been further escalated by enemy hand-held heat-seeking SAMs from which hot jet engine exhaust cannot be hidden.
y Fighters’ high cruise speeds enabled acceptable on-call times operating from bases or ships, but bases in unstable nations were infiltrated, and ships managed to set fire to themselves. Large numbers of expensive fighter airplanes were destroyed which were not engaging any enemy.
New attack airplanes are now becoming operational which have not yet been battle-tested.
y To what extent does the design of these airplanes demonstrate that painful lessons of recent conflicts have been learned?
The AV-8 provides greatly increased operational flexibility, which permits the widespread use and dispersal of more ships and bases. Ergo, one lesson has been learned.
The A-10 has lower wing loading than adapted fighters, and higher thrust-to-weight ratio than the previous generation of one-pass attack airplanes. It carries massive and diverse munitions. It can make 50% more reattacks in 50% less airspace than fighters can. It is built around a bigger and better gun. Crew and flight control systems are protected by armor, and internal fuel cells can withstand small arms projectiles and fragments without fatal loss of integrity. Four lessons have been fully learned; two more have been partially learned. y What lessons have not been learned? And what additional capabilities are both necessary and attainable?
The airframe and power plant characteristics required for en route terrain following by low-flying attack airplanes
Penetrating enemy base areas are the same as those required for repeated attacks within battlefield airspace. BeSIdes low wing loading and high thrust-to-weight ratio, we have noted that specific power must increase as specific energy decreases. This cannot be achieved by a turbo-jet power plant; it can be done by a turbo-fan power plant, providing the fan by-pass ratio is sufficiently high. And sufficiently high in this case means a very large-diameter propulsive rotor driven by a turbo-shaft engine. This is the correct configuration—proved by wind tunnel test of an aerodynamic model—for the required performance. '
The credo of cost-effectiveness has given rise to much clever conversation among analysts and marketeers about most-weather” airplanes as opposed to all-weather” airplanes. Most-weather is a phony label for daytime/vFR only, propagated by people who would have us believe it never gets dark and never tains (or snows). And even if it should, the enemy will not inconvenience us by conducting operations during darkness °r inclement weather. People who have been to war lately understand that a continuous capability to interdict enemy battlefield support must be complemented by a continuous capability to provide battlefield fire-support for friendly forces. These requirements dictate that attack airplanes be all-weather capable.
Traversing guns afford soldiers who operate armored vehicles and sailors who operate warships offensive and defensive flexibility. Airmen who operate armed helicopters understand (as did the airmen who operated battlefield fire-support airplanes 60 years ago) that compatible rapid-fire guns can be traversed more quickly than the platform can be turned, and that turning the platform can abort a concurrent other-weapon delivery. Optical designators and fire-control computers can now lay aerial gunfire on the diverse and lethal weaponry deployed with enemy units. This capability can and must be included in new attack airplanes.
Operation of all-weather offensive weapons delivery systems, defensive firepower, and active and passive electronics will require at least one, and possibly two, additional crew members. The inevitable growth of avionics added during the life cycle of the airplane must be allowed for. Back-up crew members, in the event of an aerial casualty, not only enable the recovery of an airplane and injured crew members, but they also reduce the requirement for rescue forces to extract downed airmen. Tactical dispersal also requires the dispersal of refueling/ repair/rearming capabilities.
Besides armor protection for crew and critical systems and self-sealing fuel cells, it is necessary to protect the airplane from the power plant. The turbo-jet engine is, as has been noted, highly vulnerable to FOD. Adding engines is not the answer because they can FOD each other. Helicopter operators have shown that turbo-shaft engines can be isolated from FOD and from each other, and the lower exhaust heat can be masked.
From the earliest days of aviation, airplane operators have created one of their own worst problems by employing the “Christmas-tree-ornament” munitions-suspension configurations, or ‘‘wing tip-to-wing tip” bomb loads. Such under wing loadings have given rise to uncontrollable rolling moments. The fundamental error underlying the “Christmas-tree” configuration has been the continuing insistence on attempting to dispense weapons of ever-increasing mass ratio from other than the airplane’s center of mass. This error should not be perpetuated.
A proposal to arm infantrymen with individual small arms which had to be returned to armorers for reloading would be dismissed as absurd. Likewise, a warship which had to return to a naval shipyard for replenishment would be unacceptable. But operators of military aircraft have continued to perpetrate such foolishness from the early days of flight. The only progress which has been registered in replenishment of combat aircraft is air refueling. That this development has not suggested aerial replenishment of other consumables (particularly of munitions) is a secondary consequence of the “Christmas- tree fixation.” Obviously, given this configuration as a precondition, discussion of the matter is necessarily negative. Besides the evident tactical dividends which would be realized
from an aerial replenishment capability, it is a fact that an airplane can be air-launched with up to twice the payload it will haul off a runway or flight deck. Naval aviators operating F9C-2 airplanes from the Akron (ZR-4) and the Macon (ZR-5) proved this over 40 years ago.
It has been (and it will continue to be) reasonable to eject free-fall weapons downward in dive-toss attack maneuvers. Ejection of retarded weapons downward in the minimum- altitude terrain-following airspace (50 to 200 feet above ground level), which is the only option afforded by the “Christmas-tree" configuration, is not reasonable and never has been. The conflict between weapon functioning and vehicle survival is reconcilable only by upward ejection.
Low wing loading in combination with high specific power maximized at minimum specific energy defines the short takeoff and landing (STOL) capability. This will multiply options to disperse or concentrate airplanes ashore or afloat. So-called V/STOL capability (e.g., AV-8, which is really a STO/VL) is undeniably useful, but the range and payload penalties are too high, and the cost would be better spent for all-weather systems. STOL will get more payload airborne from the same ship or airstrip, and a properly designed STOL airframe-power plant combination will come aboard all but the smallest air-capable ships with or without arrestment. As for dispersal options, these make tactical sense only when the turn-around crew accompanies the airplane, or when the airplane can be replenished in the air.
We are now ready to list specifications for the advanced attack airplane (AAA). These specifications are based on the same definition of the tactical maneuvering envelope as the A-lO’s, namely between the armed helicopter and the jet fighter. Just as in the definition for the A-10, this means a further airplane development and not a hybrid helicopter (AH-56) or a hybrid lunar-lander (AV-8).
The new attack airplane picks up where the A-10 leaves off. It is of similar size and weight, but characteristics and configuration are altogether different.
Munitions magazine: The central mechanism, around which the airplane is built, is a rotary magazine located at the airplane’s center of mass. The magazine accepts up to Mk 84-size munitions which can be loaded from below (ashore or afloat) or above (airborne replenishment). The magazine dispenses munitions optionally, downward or upward, and 45° to either side. The crew has in-flight access to the magazine, which has a capacity for eight munitions. Weapons are exposed to weather only after they are dispensed.
Fuel: A four-hour supply of internal fuel is carried in one self-sealing cell forward of the magazine. An additional six hours of fuel can be loaded in the magazine for overseas tactical deployments.
Power plant: Four turbo-shaft
engines are housed in a screened insulated plenum, armored from projectiles, each other, and the crew compartment. Located in the lower fuselage forward of the fuel cell, the engines drive a single propulsive rotor through a combining gearbox. Incidence of the propulsive rotor blades is variable collectively and cyclically, including provision for reverse thrust. Design horsepower-to-weight ratios are 1.0 at basic airplane weight and 0.6 at tactical mid-mission gross weight. Water recovery from crew/ avionics refrigeration system is used to replenish water-alcohol engine compressor injection system and water- exhaust-damping system.
Airframe: Wing loading at midmission gross weight is 50 lbs/ft2. Wing incidence is variable for direct lift, boresight flight path, for rotor moment control, and for reduced maneuvering drag. STOL lift augmentation is provided by full-span Fowler flaps. Lateral control is provided by spoilers and differential stabilizer incidence. Powered stabilizer and fin incorporate back-up manual elevators and rudder. Direct side-force is obtained from the fin in combination with counter-moment from rotor cyclic pitch.
Gum: A heavy fixed forward-firing gun is mounted concentrically with the magazine and the propulsive rotor. Two lighter automatic guns are mounted in traversing barbettes abeam the aft fuselage.
Avionics: Forward-looking radar, 1R, and TV scanners are located forward of the propulsive rotor. Aft-looking sensors are in the tail. Full spherical coverage is assured by forward-lookers and aft-lookers in combination.
Crew: Minimum crew is a pilot and an offensive systems operator. Provision is made for a third crew member who would operate defensive systems and assume replenishment duties.
Performance: At mid-mission gross weight, stall speed is 80 knots, climb speed 200 knots, maneuvering speed 300 knots, and maximum cruising airspeed is 400 knots. Specific power at climb speed is 250 ft/sec (or 15,000 ft/min). Sustained load factor at maneuvering speed is 5.0; design load factor is 8.0.
Finally, we have to ask what it will cost to build this machine. If we elect to embark on the Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council process with the principal U. S. aerospace contractors, the specifications will be evaded; it will take six years to get production moving; and the airplanes will cost $10,000,000 apiece. Clearly, this is not the way to go.
The Soviet Union would build the aircraft to specifications; production would be moving within three years; and unit cost would be on the order of $1,000,000 apiece. The catch is that the Soviet Union cannot be depended on to deliver or to sustain delivery and supply parts.
What is the answer?
It has been more than 30 years since the Naval Aircraft Factory went out of the business of building airplanes. It is time to recommission the Naval Aircraft Factory. It is time to end the games between the system commands and the contractors. It is time to learn another lesson from the bad guys. It is time to get to work.
Research at Woods Hole: Dividends from Oceanography
By Commander John C. Harlett, U. S. Navy, Oceanographer, Office of Naval Research, Boston, and Scientific Liaison Officer to Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution, and former Commanding Officer, Oceanographic Unit One
From its earliest days, Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution (WHOI) has enjoyed the support of the Navy. During World War II the investment paid off as WHOI scientists first learned how the ocean thermal structure affected sound transmission, then taught naval officers how to use this information to detect or to avoid detection. Other work supporting the war effort included development of anti-fouling materials, smoke screen study, underwater explosives research, and development of a tide gauge for use by swimmer reconnaissance teams.
Incorporated early in 1930 as a private nonprofit organization devoted to the study of ocean phenomena, the Institution, always a leader in oceanographic research, has continued to grow in size and prestige. The scientific staff numbers about 225, which includes those at Woods Hole and the
new Quisset Campus a short distance away. In 1967 the Institution became a graduate educational institution at the doctoral and postdoctoral levels and since 1968 has participated in a joint program in oceanography with the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. In 1977, income for sponsored research and education totalled over $24 million; of this total 22.9% was provided by the Navy, 42.5% by the National Science Foundation, and the remaining 34.6% by other government agencies and from private income. To support this research, WHOI operates four large oceanographic research ships and several smaller vessels, including the Woods Hole-designed deep submersible Alvin and its mother ship Lulu.
The impact of Navy funding is sometimes dramatic. Under recent Office of Naval Research (ONR) sponsorship, a group of oceanographers and ocean engineers at WHOI developed a unique capability to set large, deep- moored arrays of oceanographic instruments. This team, informally known as the Buoy Group, first provided the means to make reliable long-term measurements in the ocean and formed the backbone of the multi-institution Mid-Ocean Dynamics Experiment (MODE). This program, since supplanted by the larger POLYMODE program, revealed an ever-changing pattern of medium- scale circulation in the ocean. Each time moorings are recovered, new evidence from current-meter, pressure, or temperature recorders helps to solve the puzzle of energy exchange and circulation in the ocean.
The accomplishments of the WHOI Buoy Group over the past few years are clearly important in developing an
accurate characterization of the ocean, the key to improved forecasting of sound transmission and effective ASW tactics. For example: t Eddies, closed circulations of either warm or cold water, having horizontal scales from 100 to 1,000 kilometers, are widespread in the western North Atlantic study area.
^ A new current found flowing southward at the 4,000 meter depth
along the western foot of the Bermuda Rise may be part of a deep, westward recirculation pattern.
► Large currents have been observed at depths where the ocean was assumed quiet; a complex mean flow exists in the deep Gulf Stream. y A bottom mixed layer has been observed at many stations in the deep parts of the study area.
At Woods Hole and other oceano-
graphic research centers, work continues to develop further the physics of these complex processes. Paired with emerging technology from satellite remote sensing, this knowledge offers a means to observe and predict oceanographic conditions, and therefore sound propagation, over a wide area.
While the Buoy Group concerns itself almost entirely with physical oceanography, a second, larger proposal is submitted to ONR each fall. This proposal covers research by principal investigators in all areas of oceanography. An example of research in marine biology with potential benefit to the Navy is a continuing study of marine biological sounds. Understand- mg the biological contribution to the ambient noise field is basic to prediction of noise conditions in the ocean. Started in 1948, these studies have progressed from discoveries of underwater sounds produced by whales and other marine animals, through recognition of echolocation techniques, to correlation of the sounds with animal behavior and distribution. Each step m this study required development of new equipment and techniques—i.e., underwater and aerial photography and acoustic tracking, recording, and analysis. Researchers have been able to obtain high-quality recordings of marine animal sounds which are used to distinguish the characteristics of individual animals and to compare the sounds of various species. (Sperm whales, for example, produce codas—short repeated click sequences, assumed to be a form of communication—that occur when these whales approach each other.)
Some regions of the ocean, due to their unique properties, demand cooperative study by oceanographers of all disciplines. One of these regions is the benthic (bottom) boundary layer, that zone of the ocean just at the interface of the sediment and the overlying water. This relatively thin layer has been recognized recently as the site of processes which play an important part in erosion and deposition on the ocean floor. The importance of the benthic boundary layer was emphasized during the spring of 1975, when participants in an ONR-sponsored workshop in Boston discussed progress and plans for further research. One of the participants was WHOI marine geologist Dr. C. D. Hollister who presented evidence, obtained from side-scan sonar records and bottom photographs, that large furrows are being actively eroded into the fine sediment of the Blake-Bahama Outer Ridge. The morphology of these furrows suggests that they were formed by the action of large-scale vortices in the boundary layer. This mechanism of formation calls for bottom currents much stronger than those previously thought to exist. Where present, such features would strongly attenuate sound bounced off the bottom, dramatically decreasing sonar range in that mode.
A firsthand look at the conditions in the benthic boundary layer has been provided by a series of dives in the Navy deep-diving nuclear-powered submarine NR-1, the Navy bathyscaphe Trieste, and the WHOI DRV Alvin, a three-man submersible capable of conducting a variety of experiments to depths of 12,000 feet. Dr. Gilbert T. Rowe, a WHOI marine biologist, participated in the Alvin dives to investigate the interaction of bottomdwelling organisms with the sediment. Although the presence of life on the deep-sea floor is very sparse and growth and metabolic rates are low, the quantity of organic material settling through the water column is hardly sufficient to support the benthic community. Under these conditions, reworking of the sediments by animals stirs up nutrient materials into the boundary region, strongly modifying the distribution of chemicals within the layer. Alvin established a permanent station for future observations; marked by an acoustic transponder, the station will be reoccupied periodically to sample and photograph the bottom.
Another program of direct interest to the Navy concerns an investigation of the fundamental phenomena of sound scattering and interference, which govern the propagation of sound in the ocean, and the effect of internal waves (underwater moving swells). Designed to test theories describing the interaction of sound and internal waves, the experiments employ sound sources and receivers in arrays hundreds of kilometers long, with intermediate moorings to measure currents and temperature fluctuations. Dr. Robert Spindel, the principal investigator, records low-frequency fluctuations in sound as a function of range to determine the dominant horizontal and vertical acoustic scales. Such experiments, while providing basic knowledge about the ocean, are of utmost importance in the development of predictive models to be used in support of ASW.
The foregoing examples represent only a fraction of the Navy-supported research conducted at Woods Hole. WHOI’s R/V Knorr, a large research ship, and Alvin, a research submersible, are owned by the Navy. Equipment loans from the Naval Oceanographic Office (NavOceanO) and the Naval Sea Systems Command enable researchers to stretch funds; expendable bathythermographs have been supplied by the Fleet Numerical Weather Central in return for the data collected in little-traveled areas of the ocean. Geological research programs rely on using the Navy bathyscaphe Trieste and submarine NR-1, and have been aided by bathymetric surveys conducted by NavOceanO. NavOceanO surveys also supported the FAMOUS (French-American Mid-Ocean Undersea Study) project, a geological investigation of the mid-Atlantic Ridge median valley.
The continuing cooperation between WHOI and the Navy pays off handsomely. Included in the 1975 WHOI proposal was the final report of Mr. Frederick “Fritz” Fuglister, who has enjoyed ONR support since 1946.
A pioneer in the study of the Gulf Stream System, Mr. Fuglister was the first to characterize the complex system of meanders and eddies; his 25 papers and reports produced under ONR contract describe a Gulf Stream that is only half as wide but twice as fast as had been previously estimated. Fuglister’s work is but one example of the return from Navy sponsorship of oceanographic research, a contribution of increasing importance to today’s and tomorrow’s Navy.
The Empty Billet: The Light Destroyer in the U. S. Navy
By Thomas S. Hoback, Customs Inspector, U. S. Customs Service
When the U. S. Navy strikes its last World War II destroyers, it will have no warships less than 400 feet except for the two single-screw Bron- stein frigates and, it is hoped, the six Pegasus missile-equipped hydrofoils. This does not necessarily mean that a warship less than 400 feet isn’t worth having. Many of the world’s modern navies have, and are building, capable small fighting ships. These ships usually cost less money to build and operate and require smaller crews. Unfortunately, the U. S. Navy appears incapable of designing an adequate light warship.
Criticism of U. S. warship design has been widespread in recent years and seemed to reach new heights with the decision to build the large, single-screw frigates. Although longer than the Charles F. Adams-class guided-missile destroyers, these new “frigates” cannot perform all the destroyer’s duties. And because the cost of the successful Spruance destroyers does not permit them to replace the Gearing and Allen M. Sumner destroyers in anywhere near the same numbers, the new frigates will be assigned destroyer duties. The criticism of the new U. S. warships ranges from inadequate firepower and power plant redundancy to complaints about bloated appearance. Many comments are far more accurate than the Navy cares to admit, but others show a lack of understanding of naval problems and even common sense.
I have drawn up a list of features desired in a replacement for the 90 FRAM destroyers and the 34 destroyer escorts. Necessities for any warship operating with the U. S. Fleet in the 1980s have also been added.
► A two-shaft, split power plant
► 30+ knot minimum top speed (sustained)
► High endurance (minimum 8,000 miles)
► Two 5-in. gunmounts
► Antiship missiles
► Point defense or area missile system
► Close-in weapon systems
► A two-light airborne multipurpose system (LAMPS) capability (including hangar)
► Integrated command and control system (including Navy tactical data system)
► Digital fire control systems
^ A medium frequency, keel- mounted sonar
► Tactical towed array system (TACTAS)
► Air control capability (positive identification radar advisory zone [PIRAZ] duty, air search radar, tactical air navigation [TACAN])
► An automated threat-detection radar
► Electronic warfare (EW) suite for antiship missile defense (ASMD) use
► Habitability to meet modern standards
► Low manning
Two facts become obvious: cost will be the ultimate criterion, and some serious compromises must be made since there is no way to fit all the foregoing features on a hull less than 400 feet. An additional consideration is the need for smaller and faster warships—similar to the European medium-sized warships produced to perform duties previously handled by destroyers — to supplement the decreasing number of large combatants.
Can the U. S. Navy use a vessel similar to these cheaper European fast frigates in view of its global commitments and light task force organization? Designers have two options. One is to remain true to a restricted size and suffer the logistics/endurance penalties. The other is to allow additional growth and/or reduce the payload. Since the Garcia, the U. S. Navy has both reduced payload and allowed growth.
What size must a warship be to fit into the fleet and still remain capable of independent operation? For a warship to remain under 400 feet, either the second gun or the helo hangar capability must go. Since LAMPS is the more useful and gives necessary antisubmarine warfare (ASW) and early- warning protection, the second gun would be lost. However, only one LAMPS could be carried without forcing severe design penalties on the ship. An area defense missile system costs too much and is too large for such a ship although a point defense missile system (PDMS) is feasible. TACTAS would be another casualty and the worst loss, severely curtailing the vessel’s ASW abilities. However, ASW escort would not be a major mission for this ship so a self-defense capability is all that is needed; also, much of this vessel’s work would be in shallow waters. The antiship missiles and PDMS will compensate for the second gun and LAMPS for TACTAS to some extent. With these modifications, a ship similar to the British Amazon (Type 21)-class frigate or the Italian Lupo-class frigate comes into view. Both European vessels now meet or exceed all requirements except for range and air control capability. These fast frigates are balanced combatants having speed, modern electronics, and both good offensive and self-defense capabilities.
A proven design of roughly the same dimensions as these two ships exists in the U. S. Coast Guard—the Hamilton (378)-class high endurance cutter. The Hamilton has been a successful design serving both general Coast Guard and Navy ASW needs.
But the cutter has two drawbacks: low speed and a poor surface combat capability. Nevertheless, she has several appealing features not available in large U. S. vessels. As technology improves, and a new vessel is designed combining the Hamilton % hull with modern innovations, the result could be a combatant of great versatility— and available at a reasonable price.
As designed, the Hamilton is a 378-foot warship capable of 29 knots using a combined diesel and gas turbine power plant. The gas turbines are Pratt and Whitney FT-4AS of 14,000 + s-h.p. each. The two 3,500 s.h.p. Fairbanks-Morse diesels are capable of driving the ship at a sustained 20 knots. At 11 knots, the range is 11,500 miles, at 19 knots, 9,600 miles. Despite her reliable and versatile twin shaft plant, she is inadequate for destroyer duties with a fast task group because of her low 29-knot maximum speed. Alternatives to the first generation FT-4A gas turbines are the greatly improved second generation’s turbines: General Electric’s LM-2500 and Pratt and Whitney’s FT-9. A further option is Garrett’s ME-990 which produces 5,000 s.h.p. and would be used as a cruising engine. The LM-2500 produces 25,000 s.h.p. at 80° F. At 100° F the FT-9 will be in the 33,000 s.h.p. range while being no larger than the LM- 2500. Although the FT-9 is still under development, these engines can provide attractive alternatives to the current system.
The FT-4A could be replaced with either LM-2500S or FT-9S. The present diesels could remain or be replaced with the ME-990. Choosing a cruising engine may not be necessary if the LM-2500 is used. A recent study has shown that a power plant consisting of two LM-2500S, each driving a separate shaft, is economically feasible. This is because of the LM-2500’s low fuel consumption down to 11,000 s.h.p. Selecting between the FT-9 and LM- 2500 is choosing performance versus economy. Using the FT-9 guarantees a speed of at least 33 knots, yet the LM-2500 will easily produce over 30 knots also. The FT-9 will probably need a cruising engine compatriot, the most compatible being the ME-990 gas turbine because of gearbox ratios and engine revolutions.
The choice is complicated. Although past power plants were selected principally by cost, we should now try to produce a quantity of affordable warships of uncompromised quality. The primary criterion for this design is the ability to operate on a sustained basis with a 30-knot task
group. The LM-2500 has the advantage if it can do the job; it is already in the fleet. Also it probably costs less and has a wide range of economical horsepower settings. Should cruising engines not be needed with the LM- 2500, the basic Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7) system, this may prove unbeatable because of the simplification of the design. For example, the ship could have much simpler single- input/single-output gearboxes and reductions in the size and number of ducts for intakes and exhausts. Overall weight and space requirements would be reduced significantly. Survivability would be increased by compartment- ing a four-engine power plant with bulkheads between the cruise and boost engines. (If a two-engine plant is chosen, the auxiliary machinery would be separated from the main engines by bulkheads, while an increased electrical system would be fitted using space and weight saved from the modernized engines.)
A new superstructure is needed to reduce topweight and wasted space. The flight deck and a combined hangar/balloon shelter would be resituated aft on the main deck. Its dimensions would accommodate one SH-60B LAMPS III helicopter. Recovery assist securing and traversing and helicopter in-flight refueling capabilities would be fitted. The ship’s boats and davits and the Mk 32 torpedo tubes and their torpedo magazine would also be resituated on the main deck with the Mk 32 tubes beneath the boats. The bridge and charthouse would be lowered to the 0-2 level and placed forward of the combat informa
tion center while the 0-1 level would be extended forward beneath them. New lighter masts would be fitted, stacks shortened, and intake faired into the superstructure. The superstructure would be extended aft into the area previously occupied by the balloon shelter and helo workshop, providing cabin space that was lost on the main deck. Below, the galley and crew mess would occupy the aft crew quarters which would be relocated forward in the former passenger rooms.
All armament, except the Mk 32 torpedo tubes would be replaced. A modern Mk 45 5 in./54 cal. mount would succeed the old Mk 30 5 in./38 cal. A Mk 29 improved Seasparrow launcher would be located above the hangar. Mk 140 Harpoon canisters would rest on the main deck amidships. Dual purpose close-in-protection would consist of two General Electric EX-83 (GAU-9) 30-mm.
mounts on the 0-1 level alongside the hangar.
Lockheed's Mk 86 gunfire control system would perform all fire control functions except ASW. It would have a second SPG-60 air track radar added on with both SPG-60s having continuous wave injection to control Seasparrow. Norden’s new SPS-67 would perform surface search and navigation. It retains the original SPS-10 antenna reflector which is shared with Westing- house’s SPS-65 threat warning radar by a dual-feed horn system. The SPS-65 features automated threat detection as does the Norden SPS-40B (AM) which is installing an automation module to provide automated detection and tracking. The data from the SPS-40B (AM) and SPS-65 is correlated and combined by an SYS to present single non-duplicated target tracks to a command and decision system composed of two UYK-7 computers and UYA-4 displays. The ASW system would use Raytheon’s SQS-56 sonar and Mk 309 underwater fire control system. Other electronics would include the ASMD SLQ-32 (V-2) EW system with
pected need for this vessel to conduct extensive antisurface and shore bombardment work. In addition it has superior detection and acquisition ranges, which are important in dealing with high-speed missile threats. The Mk 140 Harpoon canisters are a compact means of saturating an enemy’s defenses at long range and offer a faster means of launching over a single launch rail. The Mk 29 can fire the improved RIM-7F having a more lethal warhead and longer range than the RIM-7E Seasparrow. While inferior to the Standard missile, the RIM-7E is an effective self-defense AAW weapon. The 30-mm. mounts are interfaced into the Mk 86 so that the gunfire control system can pass a target to them from the heavier weapons when the target has closed inside the larger mounts’ optimum envelopes. The GAU-8, superior to the M-61 20-mm. Phalanx gun, in both range and destructive capacity, offers the option of using either high explosive or armor piercing rounds or a mixture of both.
Naval Sea Systems Command responded to an earlier draft of this proposal, which lacked the fundamental improvement in the power plant. NavSea pointed out that priorities have not favored smaller warships. Lower cost options, such as the PHM, were being considered which attested to a continuing interest in other- than-large ships. Although the underlying concepts are entirely different, it is inevitable that the modified Hamilton destroyer design will be compared to both the PHM and surface effect ship (SES) as well as the FFG-7.
The SES is obviously a very capable ASW vessel, but it is several years away from joining the fleet. The Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7) is the result of the serious compromises needed for a moderate-sized frigate to carry both the Standard missile and two LAMPS in the escort role. The Pegasus (PHM-l), on the other hand, is ready for service and has a speed advantage giving her tactical superiority. However, she is expensive, and she is limited in scope. The hydrofoil has the sole mission of surface warfare, but she lacks range and a sustained combat capability. She needs additional equipment to func
the associated Mk 36 rapid-bloom off-board chaff and URN-25B TACAN. As in the Oliver Hazard Perry, this destroyer would feature add-on LINK-ll and LAMPS III data processing equipment. Some electronic intelligence gear (ELINT) may also be fitted. Acoustic protection would include Prairie Master (further aided by the quieter new engines) and other systems.
The above-deck antennas are to be fitted as follows: Both SPG-60S are deck mounted, one above the bridge, the other above the hangar forward of the launcher. The foremast supports the Mk 86s, SPQ-9, the TACAN, and the antenna used by the SPS-65 and SPS-67. The SPS-40B (AM) rests on a small platform forward of the stacks. A pole topmast is stepped onto this platform to support the Mk 86’s optional system, a stabilized low-light level TV. Later, Seafire, which adds forwardlooking infrared and laser range- finder/designator, would be used.
Some will find all this unappealing as the ship looks overloaded with electronics and inadequately armed compared to other frigates with similar surface armament and either better antiair warfare (AAW) or ASW capabilities. However
► No U. S. frigate can match this proposed warship’s speed, range, and maneuverability.
^ The electronics suite guarantees both operational flexibility and survivability against high-speed threats.
► The weaponry is sufficient for the primary mission of antisurface warfare.
► Only a much larger and therefore more expensive hull could handle additional systems.
► Costs strictures are critical if sufficient numbers of destroyers are to be acquired.
► This warship would be well suited to many missions which are inappropriate for larger vessels.
The weapons were also chosen for maximum flexibility. The 5-inch Mk 45 has a long range and a lethal shell, and a specialized ASMD round would be provided in the future, which is an infrared-guided (not merely fused) projectile specifically designed for the ASMD mode of the Mk 86. The Mk 86 fire control system was selected because of the ex
tion as an ASW vessel and cannot perform electronic intelligence gathering or effectively picket during mid-ocean operations. And she cannot operate for extended periods without the aid of support ships or a maintenance support logistics group. So, the PHM does not provide suitable independent patrol and sustained operations within fast task groups as addressed by this presentation.
The proposed destroyer will be able to perform several major tasks:
► Serve as the fleet’s offensive flotilla vessels in support of or in lieu of light forces
► Carry out independent patrol and gunboat duties
► Perform the surveillance role, tailing enemy surface ships
► Gather intelligence (including ELINT) and other data
► Conduct coastal operations, including blockade, interdiction, and shore bombardment
► Furnish additional firepower against surface threats to convoys and task groups near coasts and narrows
► Integrate into task groups to provide forward air control, search and rescue, and support for helo operations, including ASW.
It is important to reiterate that this vessel is to be an additional type, not a replacement for any current vessel. Having several additional destroyers like this will give commanders flexibility they presently lack. No longer will the commander’s choice be between weakening his screen by detailing a high-value combatant to operate alone or risking a frigate never intended for such an independent role. This vessel would be no burden to her consorts during task group operations. She would have features hitherto unavailable in medium-sized warships. This combatant has speed, the ability to use air assets for ASW, antisurface ship targeting, and the same rapid reaction command and control system of larger warships. In short, the fleet will get a versatile, fast destroyer, large enough to fend for herself, yet able to pose a significant threat to an enemy. And most importantly, the fleet would get the number of vessels it needs at a reasonable price.
[1]Aviation Week & Space Technology, 10 April
1978, p. 7.
'Jane's Fighting Ships, 1977-78, (New York: Franklin Watts Inc., 1977), p. 570.
' R. P. Johnson and H. P. Rumble, "Determination of Weight, Volume and Cost for Tankers and Dry Cargo Ships,” The Rand Corporation, RM-3318-1-PR, April 1968.
"Congressional Budget Office, Planning U.S. General Purpose Forces: The Navy (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976), p. 45.
'Stephen T. DeLaMater, "The Carrier," V. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, October 1976, pp. 67-74.
See also T. F. Connolly, "The Nimitz-Class Carrier, U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, July
1977, pp. 83-85; and E. M. Stever, "The Nimitz-Class Carrier, ' U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, November 1977, pp. 78-79.