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intents:
/STOL Design for Tactical Aircraft 119 y Lieutenant Colonel Clifford A. Lindell,
' Marine Corps (Retired) hipboard Fire Protection in the Shipyards: ^he Inport Fire Department 125 y Commander M. R. Edwards, U. S. Navy
The Yugoslavian Navy: A Critical Review 127 By Milan N. Vego
‘Forger” lift-plus-lift/
ttuisp „
ac^. COr>cept. Despite the remarkable air 6'ferrients °f these concepts, many 0p va 1 design experts are still critical Co °L capabilities in comparison to (Q.^enSocial takeoff and landing
Myths’
V/STOL
amine
Th
e Purpose of this paper is to ex-
'T’l
tak r concePt °f a vertical or short tac60" and landing (V/STOL) design for sub' a'rcraft has been an intriguing UumeCt tbe Past ^5 years- Despite p r°Us early failures,' two concepts pj 31 ed and are operational—the rJr'er vectored thrust concept and
the Vak-36
aircraft. There are certain °r misunderstandings about
Petuated*hat C°ntinue t0 be per'
a^out S°me t*ie misconceptions f0r V/stol, provide updated in- *Uu at*0n on V/STOL’s capabilities, and Strate that vectored thrust V/STOL
*F°r acjj. .
°fV/oTltlQnal information describing the use articje ^ at sea’ aut^or recommends two DireCfS Wr’tten by Mr. John Fozard, Executive Kin °l an<^ Deputy Chief Engineer of the Ayi^tio°n ^es*gn Group of Hawker Siddeley Chief u* ^now Part British Aerospace) and of arr>er Designer: “Sea Harrier—the First (hnua NeW Wave'" The Aeronautical Journal V/SToy D77), and “Winds, Seapower and Jet ’ Proceedings (September 1977).
is truly a powerful technology.
► MYTH #1: “You must pay a severe weight penalty in order to get a V/STOL capability. ”
The Harrier has two systems which permit V/STOL flight: (1) the engine nozzle drive and control system, and (2) the reaction control system for jet- borne flight. Without these two systems, the Harrier must operate in the same mode as CTOL aircraft. The weight of these systems is 260 pounds and 243 pounds, respectively. This “penalty”—503 pounds—is valid for comparable land-based aircraft, but the CTOL aircraft must pay a weight penalty to operate at sea. Catapult takeoffs and arrested landings require strengthened aircraft. And, for a CTOL aircraft the size of the Harrier, the penalty would be in the order of 700 pounds to meet the severe structural requirements. Therefore, for ship- based operations, V/STOL capability can result in a weight savings. In addition, V/STOL’s “weight” penalty for thrust vector pays off in improved air combat agility.
I MYTH #2: “V/STOL aircraft consume enormous amounts of fuel on takeoff. ” The Harrier’s fuel allowance in either the vertical takeoff or short takeoff mode is 398 pounds for the
start, taxi, takeoff, and acceleration to climb speed. The equivalent allowance for other aircraft, for example, is 650 pounds for the A-4 and A-7 series air-
craft, and 1,087 pounds for the A-6 aircraft.
The theory that a V/STOL engine is mismatched between takeoff and cruise has been overcome in the Pegasus design. The Pegasus is capable of producing a large amount of thrust for a short period of time during takeoff, yet retains good cruise specific fuel flow with its large bypass ratio turbofan design. The Pegasus 11 engine burns only 1,900 pounds of fuel per hour when the aircraft is cruising in the clean configuration, which is comparable to the cruise efficiency of the A-4.
► MYTH #3: "Lift-plus-lift/cruise is the only way to go on V/STOL design.”
Although this theory is widely held, it really only applies to operations which are entirely dependent on vertical takeoff flights. Transferring this theory into reality is sometimes difficult, however, particularly when the engineering solution drives the designer to an "elegant” design rather than a “simple” design. As Figure 1 shows, the theoretical solution indicates that the vectored thrust solution is only one-half as efficient as the lift-plus-lift/cruise design. In real-life engineering results, a comparison of the first cut at development of an operational capability is shown in bar chart form for the VAK-191B and the AV-8A, both built in approximately the same time frame.
This first development result is not intended to downgrade or eliminate the role that might be performed by a lift-plus-lift/cruise design. The Soviets have now succeeded in developing and deploying the Yak-36 aircraft and are apparently satisfied with its performance. The principal factor to be considered here between the two successful concepts is: which design best meets the overall operational requirement for the aircraft?
\ MYTH #4: “You lose 50-75% in aircraft performance for a V/STOL design.”
This statement must be treated carefully by design concept and mode of operation. It is interesting to trace the growth of the performance capability of the vectored thrust aircraft, which is plotted on Figure 2, with a projected point design of an advance V/STOL aircraft (AV-XX). Figure 3 shows the growth of useful loads in vectored thrust aircraft. Figure 4 provides payload-radius curves for the vectored thrust family of aircraft, including the original PI 127 prototype
tl
which was designed in the late 19? ^
and was powered by a Pegasus eng1'
with a thrust rating of 11,0* ^
pounds. Myth #4 may have been tr
ten years ago, but the phenomenalfl
in vectored thrust V/STOL performs11 p
should force a reevaluation of des'l .
is
concepts. _ ^
Figure 5, an extract from 19 congressional testimony, shows ^ comparison of performance data * y. four different aircraft on one spec1' ^ mission. A performance "carpet pl^ of a variety of mission loads and tances would also show that the general relationship exists for the aircraft for each comparable mission .
The AV-8B’s performance is dout that of the AV-8A’s, surpasses A-4’s, and is almost equal to the A- s In fact, the A-7 must have a take" p
Figure 2 V/STOL Payload/Radius Progression 10
PAYLOAD 1000 LB
2 -
|
|
| A V (PEG | XX 171 o |
|
|
| AV-16-i (PEG 15 W-8B | i D |
|
|
| (F AV-8A | EG 11) o | TAKE 10C | OFF CONDI1 0 FT, NO Wl OR T, 20 KTS W S.L. —90°F | noNS SID |
( G.R. M (PEG KESTREL | PEG 11) K 1 O 610 |
| 600 | O.D. | |
(PEG 5)^ 191 | 50 197 | 3 1980 |
| 1990 |
|
c
r
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
RADIUS -NM
THEORY
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
il91B O''™
UNINSTALLED THRUST . -1000 LB
VTOGW "-1000 LB"
REAL WORLD
STOGW ■ -1000 LB-
s
R*1
M.
9?
igi!
ot
tr>
1 f -laH esii
19'
iVS
i
ed
plo*
&
. fo' ioR o ut1 ; t( A-l'
;kef
ro 1 in excess of 6,500 feet in order to exceed the AV-8B’s performance. The m°st significant factor about this COrnParison, which has escaped many Pe°ple and is not indicated on Figure ja’ ls ^at the AV-8B attains a very £e payload-radius capability and yet ernPty weight is 6,000 pounds j1®.ter than the A-7’s empty weight.
|s true that a portion of the empty Weight delta is for the increased avi- bnics 'n the A-7 (about 600 pounds), ut the weight difference is neverthe- Ae ^U*te rernarkable. This evidence is , e brst clear indication that vectored rust aircraft may have passed the Ventional aircraft design in per- °rniance potential.
Th
p. ne casual observer may look at ,;«-e 5 and say, “V/STOL technology 0 viously a powerful technology; it ^as almost caught up to CTOL sbC n°logy.” The keen observer vj°u^ say, “V/STOL technology is ob- UsIy a powerful technology; I won- bow powerful it really is?” The ctaftl0n 'S bovv do we compare air- t / °f different sizes and different est L°!°S*es? One method could be to llsh a performance efficiency t‘x (PEI) based on pound-miles of e0ad-radius capability per pound of sev^ We*fiht. A plot of this index for pE]a aircraft is shown on Figure 6. s'on °^course> varies with type of mis- sbo ' The author has attempted to jache maximum possible calcu- cP£I for each aircraft, using a 'firnon weapon drag index (a Mk-82 ^ed bomb).
da 1160 exarn*ning Figure 6, note the ^AV ^°'nts f°r the AV-8A and the ^ 8B The ^umP °f 130 points in PEI Cre^°btained through a remarkable in- bj e *n technology, and, more nota- a 2ero increase in thrust and a ^Hcrease in empty weight for the
the an 'nteresttng exercise, calculate Pi1qPEI y°ur favorite aircraft. (B-52 tes are not allowed to enter the con- have ^ ^°U score 250 or better, you si atl exceptionally fine aircraft de- tha!' N°w compare the score with cjat °f the AV-16+ (14,500-pound cls or the AV-xx (18,500-pound
&-l7S l F°r World War 11 buffs> the oomber scores 245 at an empty
weight of 37,000 pounds.
Supersonic fighter/attack aircraft, such as the F-4, F-16, and F-I8, do not tend to be efficient payload movers because of the weight penalty inherent in the design of supersonic fighters, their primary mission. The F-18 is probably the most efficient of this group, but its score is still well below the A-7 s.
Aircraft efficiency is sensitive to such factors as aircraft size, sea-basing requirement, installed mission avionics weight, and type of gun installation. For example, if the GAU-8 gun were removed from the A-10 aircraft and replaced with internal fuel, the PEI score could be increased by 75 points. Similarly, the A-7’s PEI would increase as mission avionics and air-
Figure 6 V/STOL-CTOL Payload Efficiency Trends
O V/STOL A CTOL |
|
| ---------------- 1 V/STOL | ^ AV-XX |
|
| - | AV-16+/^ |
|
| A-7 | CTOL A O “o AV8B | O W " V.' /;■ OAV8B* |
|
A-4 A | A ' A A-6 |
|
|
|
| HARRIER MKI O O KESTR | O AV-8A YAK-36 o :l |
|
|
future advanced vectored thrust
01950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
TIME
craft sub-systems are reduced. If '■ data on Figure 6 were rationalized account for these factors, they mi# show general efficiency trends sim>‘ to the plot on Figure 7.
Figures 6 and 7 support the cond sion that V/STOL technology is rapid bypassing CTOL technology in p( formance potential, particularly in d high subsonic speed regime. WW not as spectacular as the increase in1 ficiency in the short takeoff mode, vertical takeoff efficiency also shows- increasing trend, as evidenced by F|f ure 8.
Although the AV-8B program is i{ portant in its own right, it is the c sign technology which the AV-8B exhi- its that should attract the attention1 aircraft experts. The performance P tential which is emerging in vectof thrust V/STOL is an important p which should be considered by airtfi designers and government decis1' makers.
Until recently, vectored thr11 technology has been fostered priman by British Aerospace, Rolls Royce,* corporated, and the McDonnell Do1- las Corporation. Now other Amer>c' companies are showing an interest this design concept. The Boe|f Company has some very innovafi adaptations for this technology. H°f fully, to assure production of the V possible aircraft at the lowest cost, * quirement will be developed throw British and American cooperation- As an example of V/STOL technof' potential, a check on a point desif designated the AV-XX, has been ew1 ated with the assistance of personf from the McDonnell Douglas Corp0' tion and Rolls Royce. The AV-XX craft is an extrapolation of AV-8B ^ technology to a new aircraft progr'' which could be developed in 1980-1990 time frame. No alloW^ has been made for additional airnJ design technology improvemef which also might occur in that l> frame. The AV-XX is simplf aircraft. The P of this noti°r‘ aircraft are contained in Table I>
W
W
Le
H,
W
In:
Ur
Vi
ST
•ST
m<
xj
ir>(
tes
A\
formation obtained on a poWe
Table I /{ V-XX Characteristics 0976 Technology Data Base)
400 sq. ft. 40 ft.
56 ft.
15 ft. 18,500 lb.
(VS!
ft
s if
9,000 lb.
900 nm or
Payload Radius or
Payload 12,000 lb.
Kadlus 600 nm
Performance (Hi-Lo-Hi)
Payload
Radius or
Payload
Radius
St Unref«eled Ferry Rangl (Tanks retained)
3,000 lb. 400 nm
5,500 lb.
100 nm 3,400 nm
1,400 miles. And •y doesn’t necessarily require 'ton carrier as a home base.
3,420 LB PAYLOAD PLUS
GUNS AND AMMO HI-LO-HI
Figure 9 Ship-Based Aircraft Performance (20 Knots wind over the deck 90° F)
Sffaitv
4 °>00i
- _________
e<1 ity ,e AV-XX’s payload-radius capabil-
than " aPProximately 100% greatei A'7's and is in the order ol is a0 greater than the A-lO’s. This a'rcraft°Slt'Ve ‘ntbeation that V/STOI CTql^, not only can compete with
| 1400 |
| 1200 |
| 1000 |
RADIUS | 800 |
NM | 600 |
| 400 |
| 200 |
| 0 |
1111 I I I I
100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800
o
AV-8A
O
AV-XX
Figure 8 VTO Performance Efficiency Trend 80
60
40
20
|
|
|
|
| YAK-36 ____________ | AV-xx < | ) |
| w AV-8B _ O | O AV-8B+ |
|
AV-8A O |
|
|
|
1970
1980
YEAR
1990
2000
O
AV-16+
o
AV-8B
AIRCRAFT | EMPTY WEIGHT (LB) | TAKEOFF WEIGHT (LB) |
A-4 | 12,000 | 24,600 |
AV-8A | 12,400 | 22,300 |
AV-8B | 12,700 | 27,950 |
AV-16+ | 14,500 | 32.500 |
AV-XX | 18,500 | 49,000 |
A-7 | 19,000 | 42,000 |
A-6 | 27,000 | 56.400 |
:fi
ed w
mil W‘ng Area Win8 Span
nd1 *-ength piS height
Pj Nht ^Pty ib.
n i “ailed Avionics Weight 1,000 lb.
^ vrnStalled Thrust 37,400 lb.
in'ST^Gross Weight 33,200 1b.
° Gross Weight 49,1361b.
<1.000 ft., no wind)
(600 ft., 20 lets wind)
(d0° ft., 20 kts wind, sk, jump)
Performance (Hi-Lo-Hi)
Payload Radius
5,500 lb. 1,200 nm
•eif
iff
‘^mode, rP •
P x So f CSt ln tlle NASA Ames 40-foot *ng d°°C tunneE Additional engineer- f tests eS'Rn ar>alyses and wind tunnel ^ Av.yv'°U^d required to confirm the • -p, aircraft design. ,
|pi n0rn 6 AV~Xx design exhibits phe- ’f' and ena* ST° performance capability abiij.Cred'^(e VTO performance. The n< P°und t0 pro'ect tEe P°wer of a 5,500 }°: miieWeaPon load to a point 1,200 5 t\y0 pj r°m a ship is unparalleled. A ^ ^ad arp00n’ two Sidewinder mission prox.C°u'd be flown to a radius of ap- ‘ ,‘Rarely 1,400 miles. And this
' bettei.airCraEt but provide substantiall Rer perE°rrnance on many missions erring to Figure 5, the AV-X:
would fly to a radius of approximately 1,300 miles. Now we are able to compare the true potential of V/STOL with existing CTOL aircraft of the same weight category. When the mission profile on Figure 5 is moved to a ship-based operation, the data would be replotted as shown on Figure 9. As Figure 9 illustrates, when used properly, vectored thrust technology approaches the power of a steam catapult.
Concurrent with the development of V/STOL airframe technology in the United States, the U.K. government has investigated V/STOL aircraft performance improvements with a ski-
PEI
1960
A-6
(CATAPULT)
A
A
A-7
(CATAPULT)
A
A-4
(CATAPULT)
TAKEOFF ROLL - FT
jump technique. Ski-jump tests have confirmed that improved V/STOL aircraft performance is achievable. The data from the U.K. trials indicate that aircraft performance in the STO mode from a 600-foot flat deck run can be equalled with a 300-foot run using a ski-jump. The 300-foot run is equal to current steam catapult lengths on large aircraft carriers. The combination of the original British V/STOL creation, British engine technology, advanced American airframe technology, and British ski-jump deck design can result in packing the equivalent power of a steam catapult into the aircraft itself!
The Harrier Carrier design could be the model for a new line of warships. Originally designed to have an 8,000-ton displacement and a 25-knot maximum speed, the concept is valid for different size ships. The Harrier Carrier has a 5° upward ramp at the forward end of her 420-foot flight deck to increase the Harrier’s takeoff weight. Tests of the ski-jump continue, as British Aerospace’s Harrier Mk 52 G-VTOL launches at a 15° angle.
How can this potential performance be exploited? By 1985, the U.S. Navy will likely be the last of the Free World fleets still operating large aircraft carriers. The trend toward smaller, V/STOL capable ships is on the rise. The United Kingdom will have three ships of this class, the first is the HMS Invincible which is scheduled to commence sea trials in 1980-1981.
Other nations are following the lead of the Royal Navy. The French, Italian, Spanish, and Australian navies are now building, or planning to build, small carriers in the 20,000-ton to 30,000-ton range. Brazil, India, and Iran have also shown interest in V/STOL aircraft and ships. (Even the People’s Republic of China has made overtures for procurement of Harriers.) If these future ships are to have a fixed-wing jet aircraft capability, then they must depend on V/STOL aircraft, and the design combination of vectored thrust aircraft and.ski-jump deck ramp fit the requirement with great efficacy.
The probable shape of ships to come in the 1980s and 1990s can be visualized in the form of the “Harrier Carrier,” conceived by Vosper Thorney- croft. The ship will be relatively small and will have a through-deck design and a ski-jump ramp on the bow. The Harrier Carrier, originally envisaged at 8,000 tons, may be slightly small to meet the requirements of all navies, but the fundamental design concept can be expanded to 15,000 tons, 20,000 tons, or 30,000 tons.
The Western world is not alone in recognizing the growing importance of V/STOL power. Soviet seapower is a growing threat which is evident by its number of combatants and the introduction of the Kiev with embarked V/STOL aircraft. A Soviet vectored thrust aircraft can be expected to be on the scene within five to seven years.
To meet this growing threat at sea,
rr
Allied navies continue to dep(Vl strongly on the large carrier task f0 of the U.S. Navy. To supplement1 ^ large carrier capability, deploymef1st dispersed, highly capable aifd’ operating from relatively small & may be essential for survival. i^
But, how much power can V/$ provide in the 1980s and 1990s? ’ ure 10-A illustrates the potential be ibility of V/STOL air power at s^ sh the mid-1980s. This flexibility erf Ca used from a 90,000-ton ship l’: hi 20,000-ton ship. The latter erf co deployed independently as part 1 w, small task group, or used to pr°f to the flanks of a large carrier task i° Weapon loadings for the missj| °r shown on Figure 10-A are: attac (d four Mk-83 1,000 pound boi”
missiles and two air-to-air mis-
1984 STO Flight Radius poo' 3n<^ amrno’ antiship—two Har
> and air defense—four air-to-air '2les> gun, and ammo, thr ntlnue<^ development of vectored hic)-,^ V/STOL technology can provide AexibT unknown basing and tactical Fu *l* increased firepower.
rther growth in the 1990 time
frame can be achieved by development of an A-7-size V/STOL aircraft. The potential capability of an 18,500 pound aircraft (empty weight) is projected on Figures 10-B and 10-C.
The vectored-thrust concept has produced a superior attack aircraft design. Serious questions should now be posed to aircraft designers. Will this concept work for multi-engine aircraft? Could this concept be adapted for the Navy's Type “A” V/STOL aircraft? What is the weight penalty to obtain supersonic capability in vectored thrust design? Obviously, much work still awaits the aircraft design industry, but there should be no doubt that V/STOL is here to stay!
Se‘bert
U-S. Naval Reserve
stagjn f
her I i cranes> and gaping holes in her nC* an<^ suPerstructure, but often
lfir deck ; ...... __.........................
‘nor*.01^3* sc‘lf-protection systems are itig ft|Ve’ disconnected, or undergo- deai of ^ ^ a^'t‘on’ there is a great
activity, many strangers
0/ Sador who has participated in served , large vessel’s inport
Ot
OUty
Action) fire drill will attest to
Wh
sbjp en a sk‘P of the line enters the °t s |3r^ b°r a complex overhaul (COH) vU|neC^ repair availability (SRA) her fol^ Dl lry to fire increases several ttw ot only does she look like a - r Safcty hazard with wires, cables, ship.; an<^ a ^oss °f continuity among CaU$e C<‘mpany and duty sections. Be- highj a^ this activity, the ship is C°ntrol Vu^nera^^e to fire and damage Wee].0 Pr°blems after liberty call, on tOUti^J1^5’ and during holiday Any
(d..°bserved the origin of the "Chinese fire drill. Too often the drill lacks order. The disorganized operation is due to (1) tradition—as the duty section fire party is made up of a wide variety of rates and ratings, (2) lack of team training, and (3) the attitude of the fire drill participants. This is not to imply that today’s sailor is any less professional in his normal duties, nor is he trained to a lesser degree in fire fighting and damage control (the opposite is more probably the case), and his desire to keep the “old girl” intact has certainly not waned. The problem stems from the fact that sailors from all the ship’s departments/divisions do not necessarily make a professional fire fighting team, for the duty section approach lacks the continuity and team interaction of a dedicated cadre.
In an effort to provide the
maximum fire prevention as well as the best fire fighting and damage control team possible during her yard period, the USS America (CV-66) created an “inport fire department.” The objective was simple: to provide an autonomous, cohesive, and highly trained group of men to eliminate hazards contributing to fires, and to quickly and effectively combat any fire within the ship. To achieve this objective, the import fire department, a division of the ship’s safety department, was manned, trained, and functioned along the lines of a civilian fire department.
Three sections of 20 men each, consisting of a duty fire marshal/on-scene leader, a hospital corpsman, and 18 fire fighters, were established.2
All members of the fire department
To
wer
i
dep
by the section leader, were follow
the
cer.
frv.
^, A , , _ ^
Deficiencies which cod the
Of the Ship, i^iu-.cm-ica wi.ii.ii v, ^ be corrected on the snot W‘:
not
While it is obvious that duty F
ft
partment found all members on bo'^ answering the bell whenever a fire ''A. called. At least one fire drill was ducted each day without prior no™y ) and on a varying time schedule d^jav:
at different locations. As a back up e°:
jrthc
were issued standard safety hard hats and red long sleeve jerseys. In keeping with the civilian fire department organizational theme, each man assigned to the inport fire department had no other duties or watches, nor was he assigned to working parties.3 Each section stood 24 hours of duty followed by 48 hours of free time. Sections were designated as 1, 2, and 3, and were headed by a first class hull technician who served as section leader, on-scene leader, and duty fire marshal.
While volunteers were desired, each shipboard department was required to provide, on a prorated basis, responsible, highly motivated men, for permanent assignment, subject to the approval of the ship’s safety officer.4 The records of all nominated personnel were screened and most individuals were interviewed. In the event that a member of the fire department proved undesirable, as a result of misconduct, unauthorized absence, or poor performance, the respective department/ division was required to replace him.
Based on statistical data provided by the Naval Safety Center (see footnote 1), centralized berthing was provided for the entire fire department. An athwartship’s berthing area on the 03 level, frame 177 was selected, as it is easier and faster to go down ship’s ladders with fire fighting equipment than it is to go up. A small lounge area in the berthing space was converted into an office and training area. The space was equipped with a 1MC, 2JZ sound-powered circuit, alarm bell, two telephones (one, a ringing telephone extention of the damage control central fire reporting number, ext.
333), and a set of the ship’s plans. The fire reporting phone extension was a listen-only feature to give the fire fighters advance warning when a fire was reported to damage control central.
To minimize reaction time, racks were constructed within the berthing area to contain oxygen breathing apparatuses (OBAs) and cannisters, gloves, battle lanterns, electricians’ tool kits, overhaul tools, and gas-free test equipment. A blackboard, bulletin board, and clipboards were added to facilitate training and to serve as a check on equipment status, duty assignments, etc.
All America personnel assigned to the fire department trained a minimum of four hours a day on the way home from a Mediterranean deployment. Daily training consisted of at least two hours of fire fighting and two hours of damage control with hands-on practice receiving the major emphasis. Each member was cross trained in a minimum of two other section positions, and, upon the ship’s arrival at her home port, team members attended the Fire Fighting School at the Norfolk Fleet Training Center.
In addition to completion of the standard damage control personnel qualification standards (DCPQS), all personnel completed a special PQS consisting of first aid and rescue, safety precautions, firemain systems, drainage systems, ventilation systems, fixed and portable damage control equipment, personnel protective equipment, twin agents, and OBAs.
The fire department assumed the watch as a unit upon the ship’s arrival in CONUS, thus providing an additional ten days of training to correct any weak spots in the team prior to entering the Norfolk Naval Shipyard for SRA 77.
At 0720 each day an on-sight relief and muster was held by the off-going and on-coming duty sections. All equipment was inventoried, checked for material condition and readiness, and signed for. On-sight relief and equipment checks were conducted by each team member. Therefore, an off-going dury section member could not be relieved until his counterpart from the on-coming section arrived, which ensured a complete fire fightif, team, actively ready, at all tirrtf Morning inspection duties, assign^ by training sessions which lasted ufl1 the noon meal. The afternoon ^ evening routines generally consisted'^
tarn
Was
"C’ . Sp0t '>g written up and turned in to the cot1^
mand duty officer at the eight o’clo1^^
reports for corrective action. Duty
sonnel also checked all hot work (C"a[1j
ting, welding, etc.) frequently -j
ensure compliance with all appropfUfj^
safety regulations and precautions. ^ sonnel would respond to all fires $ fire drills, the cohesiveness of the
the fire department, the rescue assistance detail mustered amidshipsj the hangar deck for all fires and ^ drills, and the shipyard fire depj[ -j- ment was called, using the fire aMt t( box, for all reported fires. teip
During the shipyard period, ?a8e hands were encouraged to report ‘Pap sight or smell of smoke immedi>ltlSng. by calling telephone extension This permitted the fire department Wep get the jump on any fuming trout1.
htif
;r^° the
ignf(
lovrf
COH;
7 F
■S
;eX
re ''A. .
5 co1 rUical Review
nofy Milan
e ‘ll^aVal ^e6°, former Yugoslavian
uf ^c°rge JCer and now a Ph D. candidate, „ ,i School c ash'ngton University, Graduate ■ I 0 Arts and Sciences
,pS
d f’
ep«'
ahl( it
•t < P; iat(e
art
3-’Ui
)ub[
isan gaged
crew’s credit, no false alarms tim *ere made.
Administrative matters of the fire ^Partment were the responsibility of section leaders, the division offi- at r> and the ship’s safety officer. Reted * . cmts were submitted via the
~ cornmand. In order to provide
dailen^Xlrnum training and safety and to ectif re continuity, fire department ^jsonnel were not permitted leave ^fing their assignment to the fire
questtrnent- Accordingly. sPec'al te-
v® on St C^'tS ^or standbys were accepted ^as 5 ^m‘ted basis. Standbys had to be eachqUally tra*ned and qualified in terpa^art*CU^ar Pos't'on “ their coun-
ari . e lact that the America completed "month COH and a 3.5-month djc without a major fire strongly in- ness ? C^e ^*re department’s effective- ^ flie^ ^tatistically, during COH 75, 80 ^ department responded to over fUmaar^s caused by smoke, sparks, ickl'atrr-L ’ "eat> or flames. Six fires were tane ° t0 arson> and one to spon- was °^s c°mbustion. The remainder "C” ,1V’ded between class “A" and COlCedua arms, with faulty hot work proving th^ ^e*n® che primary cause. Dur- c°the l C the department answered half SOme 20 times with almost V ^Stnok C*ass "A” alarms caused by c ^ and 6 °r sParks, five were class “C,” :ly ^t^o were class “B.”
’pd’ fife °, flUote the ship’s report on the 1S' the rvfPartment upon completion of
Yugoslavian Navy:
The V i •
tod u8°slavian Navy, as we know temb a^’ traces its beginnings to Sep- lage to the small fishing vil-
°dgora, near Makarska, where naval units first successfully - Utj| , enemy forces. Thereafter, and ;nl>elhat 6 SUfrender of Italy, small, trned Partisan boats (“leuts”)
‘‘Placement of a fully dedicated cadre of highly trained personnel in a space where primary fire fighting equipment was immediately available without reference to a Repair Locker, and which was proximate to the locus of the majority of CV/CVA fires was the primary factor in AMERICA’S rapid response time. Daily inspection procedures under controlled conditions minimized problems of loss of fire fighting equipment which were experienced by other ships. Continuity of the Fire Department and intensive cross training within each duty section ensured a degree of response to each alarm which completely precluded major fire damage during AMERICA'S COH 75.”
‘In October 1974, before the America entered the Norfolk Navy Shipyard (NNSY) for her COH 75, Commander S. P. Dunlap, the ship's safety officer, called on the Naval Safety Center to build a “Mishap Profile” of all aircraft carriers which had experienced damage during overhaul or restricted availability for the preceding five years. The points of commonality were: (a.) the majority of fires were caused by a combination of “hot work," such as cutting, welding, or brazing, and an accumulation of flammable debris or atomized paint; (b.) virtually all fires of a catastrophic nature occurred above the main deck after liberty call or during a weekend; (c.) more than 70% of all class “C fires during complex overhauls occurred as a result of weak quality assurance of inspection procedures; (d.) reaction to a fire alarm was, in many cases, improper and/or slow, allowing a minor fire to become a major one; (e.) fire party continuity was
ambushed numerous Italian convoys and ships. By May 1945, the Yugoslavian Navy consisted of 8 warships, 66 patrol boats, 24 steamers, and 159 motor-sailing vessels.1 Its personnel strength totaled 13,719 officers and enlisted men.2
Immediately after the war, the navy
often seriously degraded by transfer of key and/or knowledgeable personnel; (f.) the ship’s 1MC announcing system was not reliable throughout the ship; (g.) ship’s fire party efforts were often degraded or hampered by a lack of proper tagout or notification of fire main termination or repairs and/or major rework of fire fighting equipment within the ship and repair lockers often precluded its use when needed; and (h.) few class “B” fires were experienced. 2During the America's COH 75, the fire department was made up of three, 25-man sections, a reduction of five men per section was acceptable during the SRA and still provided manning of all essential positions.
3The hospital corpsman was the one exception in regards to berthing, and additional duties. He mustered daily with the section leader, stood 24-hour duty, responded to all fire alarms and fire drills by reporting to the scene of the fire/fire drill, but was not required to berth or remain with the fire department section. While he was not permitted to stand other watches he was allowed to perform his normal medical duties.
4The inport fire department’s personnel requirements were based on a prorated basis, plus the SRA workload and departmental training schedules, and resulted in the following allocations: executive department (2), navigation department (1), operations department (4), CDS (cic) department (2), weapons department (5), deck department (4), engineering department (15 with 3 HTls and 6 electricians), air department (12), communications department (2), supply department (8), and aimd department (5).
5The proven results of the fire department during the yard period were so successful that a trial period is now under way, using the fire department concept during normal inport periods to replace the old duty section provided inport fire party.
command began to plan the first fleet construction program. The original proposal planned for a fleet of 380 combat vessels, i.e. 28 submarines, 12 destroyers, 20 patrol ships, 120 torpedo boats, 130 patrol boats, 70 minesweepers, and 15,000 tons of auxiliary ships.3 It was proposed that
In recent years the Yugoslavian Navy’s offensive strength has rested with its Soviet-supplied missile and torpedo boats. ("Osa-l" missile boats are pictured below; a “Shershen” torpedo boat is on the facing page.) The navy’s only destroyer, the Split, is obsolete and serves as the flagship for the torpedo boat brigade.
ri
far
a main naval base be built between Saldun and Marina and that existing bases be rebuilt and enlarged. The same program provided that a coastal aviation branch be developed within the Yugoslavian Air Force. It further suggested that an air division strengthened with a reconnaissance and a liaison squadron be detached for permanent cooperation with the navy. This program also provided for a river flotilla which would consist of three divisions of patrol boats, armored boats, and minesweepers and a division of landing craft and auxiliary ships. Finally, the existing shipyards in Split, Trogir, Kraljevica, and Rijeka were to be rebuilt and new ones constructed at Lusa-Krapanj and at Blaca.
The People’s Assembly Presidium, however, rejected this program on the grounds that it was not in “accordance with the needs and capabilities of the New Yugoslavia.” A new plan was drawn up, which was ratified on 27 December 1946 by the People’s Assembly..
The new plan authorized the building of 580 combat vessels—i.e., 140 submarines, 4 cruisers, 20 destroyers, 16 patrol ships, 200 torpedo boats, 100 patrol boats, and 100 minesweepers. Other parts of the original plan were left virtually unchanged. But the proposed fleet construction program never was realized. It was soon abandoned as unrealistic and later conveniently forgotten.
A former Commander of the Yugoslavian Navy claimed in 1969 that the first fleet program was “suggested by some of our war Allies and that essentially the Fleet which would be built was to be employed in the Mediterranean but operated, based, and maintained by the Yugoslavs.”4 On the other hand, the navy commander who was responsible for this plan asserted in 1970, that “no one of our Allies in the war suggested anything to us” and that the whole plan was a Yugoslav idea from the very beginning.5 Considering all the facts however, it seems certain that the Soviets were behind the proposed program.
The post-World War II Yugoslavian Navy consisted of many captured Italian and German submarines, minesweepers, and tank landing craft (LCTs). The navy’s first large surface- units were five escort destroyers acquired from Italy under a war reparations agreement. In 1946, the United
nat
States transferred eight torpedo biin to Yugoslavia. And a few fohfa Royal Yugoslavian vessels were als^fr service. *is
Great economic difficulties of no country delayed progress on the fa fleet program until 1952. During'fa- next ten years, however, a destrofall 96 torpedo boats, two patrol sl,av marines, two patrol ships, 24 sltdi marine chasers, a coastal minesweef'gi four inshore minesweepers, a 1 number of small amphibious war’fa- craft and auxiliary ships, and tw‘> * r perimental torpedo boats were f'fa domestically. Further, a patrol -uo and three coastal minesweepers tS, built in France, and two British ’®t stroyers were purchased in 195<5 cs later modernized in a Yugosfa Navy yard.
By the end of the first fleet pr«£POtl in 1961, it was apparent that ships were already obsolete and s'fa would have to be replaced. The h1 rt modernization of the naval forces fa undertaken during the second 6 program (1962-1974). Between (;Cc and 1970, ten “Osa-1 ’’-class fl1'"*11
boats and four “Shershen”-class
1 'ii
the U.S.S.R. and ten addit'1’
pedo boats were acquired directly
are
s
lv f^nss Strv'ces: army, antiaircraft de id ’ anA navy.
were built locally under nodfrom the U.S.S.R. Also, three jx -^-class patroi submarines, M-l 17”-dass inshore mine- nd CrS’ ten ^ T’-type patrol boats, [()Sev.eral auxiliary ships were built Urv:Stica%. Finally, a “Moma”-class >„]a^jS^'P was acquired in 1972 from tro ' Of the six then-existing de- tfs Hnly one was left in service. Yas °nce great force of torpedo boats ,ers drastically reduced in num- ardtcj most of them were dis- )thers °f S°^ t(> civ‘fian operators, natej Were retained and approxi-
0 lAing ^ ^ were reconstructed begin- fot®e Ca'n '^3 into gunboats. While
. als^tre arnaran‘ty.pe amphibious barges ajjtj rern°ved from the navy list, all Ldif8 Lcrs were modernized and he Mine] ■ t0 lrave an additional 'ing sjl^'ng capability. On the whole,
strojully C(°nd flcet program was success- id fvyseXeCUted’ and’ alrhough the >4 slfduCtjnUrntr'cal strength was greatly wetfignjp ’ lts offensive capability was a S( ThtUytly strengthened, wa^'hf to' ,^uS°slavia.n Navy is now in two's rtp(| st its third fleet program. It e We b ftCd "A31 rite new classes of mis-
1 slubrri(a)atS/,f’Unboats, patrol and midget
rs ''Ssaui !nes’ tank landing ships (LSTs), ;sh 'ary C anding craft (LCAs), and auxil- 56 4signShiPs—all of indigenous
5S]aVi '"are being built.
The v .
iro^Prtip,) uSoslavian Armed Forces t Amy*611 the Yugoslavian People a id s'^nits TkPA^ and Territorial Defense „ OTresjj ne Supreme Commander is the ces |Ubljctrit °A the Socialist Federal Reel fbterciof Yugoslavia (S.F.R.Y.) who n ifcO ^*s command through the S^retary for National De- YPA is composed of the
The General Staff of the YPA exercises effective operational control throughout the YPA. Directly subordinated to the General Staff are six army regions, a naval region, an independent military region, command of the frontier units, and the antiaircraft defense command. Although there is no separate navy ministry, a navy section (Momaricka Uprava) exists within the General Staff of the YPA. It is headed by the Navy Commander. (The official title is the Assistant of the Federal Secretary for People’s Defense [Navy].) This section is the navy’s main administrative organ, and it is chiefly concerned with the budget, construe-
MARINE-RUNDSCHAU
tion programs, education, regulations, and personnel. It is also in overall control of the navy’s shore establishment.
The naval forces are subordinated to the Split Naval Region in Split. The Split Naval Region Command is responsible for all defense measures, including planning, preparations, training, and the eventual employment of all subordinated commands and units. Its area of defense responsibility covers almost the entire coastal area, all islands, and a large part of the inland. Because its units are located on the territory of several republics, the naval region is a unique command within the YPA.
ALBANIA
^J.tograd
lot or
Titograd Military Region
lercignovn
’loce*
*Mostor
Sarajevo Army Region
°SorO)t<io
Julia
■O'CulQ:
Jmotshi
JdjC»1
Beigrad
,Banja L
Bosanski
Petrovac
r roijevica
HUNGARY
' s
YT \
C!) * Naval Slrongpoint m : Naval Basa : Airfield
*fo Liubhono Ljubljana Army Region
AUSTRIA
The major component of the naval region is the fleet. Since a December 1974 reorganization, all offensive capability of the navy is now concentrated in the fleet. It is composed at the present of a missile boat and torpedo boat brigade, a submarine division, and a patrol ship and a minesweeper flotilla. The last two have probably been renamed brigades. A sole gunboat division's strength has decreased in recent years and probably
ing the amount of time permitt^ia,
r'
The navy’s patrol submarines were built in Yugoslavia but are equipped with Soviet equipment. The three Heroj-class subs (the Heroj pictured) are the most modern, but reportedly an improved version of the class is under construction. The Yugoslavians also are building a new class of missile patrol boats. The Rade Koncar, the lead ship in the class, is pictured.
will be dissolved, if it has not already. Also it is probable that a missile/ gunboat brigade and an additional submarine detachment is being formed.
Two naval districts (Pula and Sibenik) and a naval sector (Kumbor) are directly subordinated to the naval region. They are territorial commands and are responsible for mobilization planning and preparations for their respective areas of authority. They are also responsible for training, security, support, and deployment of all army and naval units under their command. There are a great number of units and facilities directly subordinated to each of the naval or military districts. The Sibenik Naval District, where most of the navy’s ships and shore establishment facilities are located, is the largest and most important district.
All air force units located on the naval region’s territory, except for the liaison detachment and the recently formed antisubmarine warfare helicopter squadron, are subordinated to the air corps in Zagreb. An air regiment, however, is being detached for permanent cooperation with, and support of, the naval forces.
The Naval Region Command cooperates with the staffs of the Territorial Defense of the Republics. The naval component of the Territorial Defense is composed of armed boats, naval di- versionists, divers, and local guards. In the case of a mobilization or war, they would become a part of the regular navy. Their main task would be the protection of the coast and various buildings and facilities in the coastal zone against enemy raids or landings.
Today, the Yugoslavian Navy consists of 108 combatants and more than 30 other vessels. The service’s sole destroyer, the Split, serves as a flagship of the torpedo boat brigade and is obsolete. The submarine arm is comprised of three modern Heroj-class and two Sutjeska-class patrol submarines. Both submarine classes have Soviet equipment and torpedo armament. The Sutjeska submarines are obsolete and serve mainly for training purposes. There are reports that two patrol submarines of an improved Heroj class are being built domestically. Also some "Mala”-class midget submarines, which are deployed with underwater demolition teams (UDT), are presently being built.
The backbone of the navy’s offensive strength rests with its ten L j- “Shershen”-class torpedo boats 'vl(,r possess excellent seakeeping qual>ttl0 A high degree of commonality ty tween both classes greatly simpl'if the maintenance and supply funct>l|Qi Both classes have identical prop^j^ systems and artillery armament almost the same type of electf°L equipment. Their greatest s|(1,iQ| shortcoming is that the engine^ quire a general overhaul after only 50t hours of operation, thus severely ^ operations. New Rade Koncaf'Th guided-missile patrol boats are ^ entering service at a rate of two Jj year. Of the ten units which are.iai portedly being planned, three of are already in service. This i°“ ce nously designed class is similar if pearance and general technical teristics to the Swedish Spica-d&s ' pedo boats. Only six or eight ‘ ”)p] type gunboats are currently in set' iuj Their combat value is low, and
-j.^ein8 withdrawn from service, f a r navys ASW capability consists -class and two Mornar-
Ws cPautro1 shiPs and 13 Kraljevica
—uuu i j t\.r cttyc
drrne^ mar'ne clasers. Although the 9^q ^v,ere extensively modernized in , 'rfo. l/3 > their combat value is not
rcat. Tl ,
?bsoiet06 latter class *s considered ■fyjce6 and *s being withdrawn from
‘OtieTh |The navy s ASW capability,
tren if ess> bas been somewhat <lSty^L 6ned by tbe recently formed Omjj e 'copter squadron which is
,e,ir;sed °f Ka-25 “Hormone” ASW p°Pters.
nineUr ^ukqv Klanac-class coastal haraSHeel>ers’ which are similar in cteristics to the French Sirius
M-
,dasrr:stlcs to the -..................................
. 17*’ and four Haw-class and six .... ip ass inshore minesweepers maki ", ient 1 naVy’s m‘ne warfare compo ^'pode ^ chese ships are relativel; y ty tQ j’ although they lack a capabil P. if etect and sweep the latest typi
. . sweep uie latest ty
fjC 1 ^ines i
I°ty * Ane navy also possesses
11 iftiitej1^ °^s°lete large minelayer o c In. . value and 24 LCTs/minelavers
^ caiivj t, i ll 13/ iiiiucidycrb.
>e ,, ntatines and torpedo boats can
. used lQns
,n offensive mining opera-
t A
”ew class of 2,980-ton LSTs re-
Mortedl . - ..................... „
d ^'ch w *S ^e'n^ built domestically,
' bs. . Sionifiranflit pnKonro
>avy, W°uld significantly enhance th
”C/bete amPbibious lift capability
'ey, .are now in service a few of th
0 ligenr,aSS 601” series of LCAs of in - Spoils
l'aVysand modern design. i^etitgj^Pbibious capability is aug 1 Ce- In ^ tbe LCTs presently in serv n 'f f«. Case °f extreme need, a numbe
The
,* rer , vAuvint ntcu, a iiiuuut
"'•Ould k 0ats and the merchant ship ’ >, e used for such purposes.
The „ • * •
'Nit. k,. lnc’Pal naval base is Lora-
,'PHt, ^ naval Dase is cora
[f’JPpottUt *S t0° small to adequately 1 the large number of ships anc
commands which are based and located there. Other operational phases of less importance are Pula, Sibenik, Ploce, and Gulf of Cattaro.
While the navy’s offensive capability continues to grow, its defensive component has been permitted to lag far behind. The most serious situation exists in antisubmarine warfare. Its ASW forces are becoming increasingly obsolete and urgently need to be replaced by modern vessels. At present, there is a great lack of advanced types of ASW detection equipment and armament, particularly in the surface ships. Serious shortcomings exist in naval communications, electronic support measures, electronic counter measures, and electronic counter counter measures. The navy also does not have a force of medium-size surface ships, such as missile corvettes, suitable to serve as command ships for the combat groups of missile boats and torpedo boats.
Serious deficiencies also exist in the maintenance and supply fields. Aside from the problem of mass obsolescence for many classes of ships, there is an additional problem of supplying reserve parts to support many ships acquired from many varied sources. The present large dependence on Soviet equipment and armanent greatly complicates the supply and maintenance problem because the delivery of reserve parts is irregular and unreliable.
Nevertheless, all ships on the navy list are kept in active service and in a very high state of readiness. Even when a vessel is in her home port, half of the crew is on board at any time. During the recent crisis situations in the Middle East or Europe, the major part of the naval forces has been sent
out to their dispersal ports or anchorages. Also, mobilization exercises of individual units and larger parts of the fleet are held regularly throughout the year. The greatest handicap of fleet units is that the ships spend too much time in port and not at sea. The main reason behind this is the scarcity of financial means. Exceptions to this are seen in some categories of vessels such as LCTs and auxiliary ships. Only a few years ago, missile boats and torpedo boats spent an average of 90 to 100 hours at sea a year, while submarines spent even less. Such a situation likely persists today, if it has not worsened. There are not sufficient numbers of missile, torpedo, or artillery firing exercises, and this inadequacy has seri-
Vti
ous consequences on the overall combat readiness of the fleet.
The personnel strength of the Yugoslavian Navy is estimated to be about 17,000 officers and enlisted men. About 25% of the total personnel is assigned to ships. Only about 10% of the officer corps is assigned to sea duty.
The main source of naval officers is the naval academy. It was formed in 1972 by merger of the naval academy in Divulje and the naval technical academy in Pula. Academy applicants are mostly high school graduates. A certain number of active duty noncommissioned officers (NCOs) and workers who meet the entrance requirements also may apply. All must possess “good moral-political qualities,” i.e., to be a member of the League of Communists or at least very active in the youth organization. The naval academy offers two main programs, one for line officers and the other for naval engineers. The curriculum for the former requires four years and for the latter, five years. The greatest defects of the educational system in the academy seem to be too heavy a stress on technical subjects and too liberal regulations within the midshipmen corps.
An officers’ specialist school is intended to give specialized training to naval officers. It is obligatory for all officers after finishing their first three to five years on sea duty. Several courses are offered (navigation, missile/artillery warfare, torpedo warfare, ASW, communications, etc.), and each lasts about ten months. A naval reserve officers school was reorganized in 1972 to train line officers and naval engineers. The schooling lasts between 12 and 18 months. At the end of the training program, those enrolled advance to a rank of NCO. After the first exercise and upon receiving a positive fitness report, they advance to the rank of reserve ensign. Reserve officers are called periodically to participate in naval exercises.
The naval command-staff academy
Yugoslavian cadets receive training on an antisubmarine weapon.
in Split (corresponding to the U.S. Naval War College) is the highest naval school of professional staff training. The curriculum is for lieutenant commanders and commanders and takes two years to complete. Under a continuing program, which began in 1965, several Yugoslavian naval officers were sent each year to the naval war college in Leningrad. The quality of naval education in the latter is allegedly very high, and graduates of this school have a much better chance for advancement and reaching high positions than others. In recent years, small groups of officers have also attended schools in the West, particularly in Great Britain.
Most NCOS (now called "younger officers”) have not come up through the ranks, but from the naval technical school which was formed in 1971 in Pula. The applicants must be graduates of four-year high schools and younger than 17. The technical training lasts for four years, and it is intended for all specialities. Graduates of the school must enlist for eight
years of active service.
Seamen are recruits who serve 18 months. Their basic training in naval recruiting center in Pula 1 about four-and-a-half months. Tb[1] after, they go to the various fleet if or shore establishment facilities.
The officer ranks in the Yugosls' Navy are very similar to those of U.S. Navy. Advancement throughi grade of lieutenant commander is ally automatic, i.e. based only on number of years spent in a given and on a favorable fitness report order to become a commander, an cer must occupy the position in thef rank for a year in advance and also! multiple oral and written exams. ^ possibility also exists for an officer t(a ^ advanced ahead of time. Although was a well-intended move, it is
cause of much dissatisfaction within officer corps. It is generally based oG affinities of superiors and only 'frQ rarely on merit. The advancement officers through the rank of Kap ye fregate (between the rank of commf and captain in the U.S. Navy) is aW^
v..
in most
stay in the rank o(Kapetan
Hah
e for 10
age.
ssionalism and motivation are
off " Cr()ats and Slovenes within the th^'' ran^s' Although Serbs and ab()Ut ^etuten Montenegrins represent tou.,. of the total population,
these ^ of all officers belong to poSsi, tw<) nationalities. There is no '■foded *t^’ forced retirement is ex- \vijj rhat the nationality structure yCar " ^tast*cally changed for many situ .to c<)me. A somewhat better the t^t>n 'n r^'s respect exists within
°th(.re^ atl<^ *S muc^ ^aster c^an 1 Pa f6ty nav*es- At present, however, only
MofW ever succeed in reaching the rank or higher. Because there are ew available positions on top, m°st officers,
fro ' "Jl lu to 15 years until they retire n ttius aCt've service. Officers and NCOS t year^ ret'te after 40 years of service or 60
1HJ Pr<>foss yuutes sorely lacking in the present systt°slav‘.an Navy. Under the existing if atm Hfr advancement, there is little |Stay ‘ucentive for young officers to jafter°n ^°ard the ships. The majority, I try ^0rnpleting their first year or two, |Cwrnf° ^Cavt" sca duty and find some l^a . °rtahle position on shore. They | ()fficerCOtne ^at^' a resuh> fo‘w line
I Peri.fS ^aVt extensive operational ex- |on t^ce- The number of years spent ll)ne'sSta generally do not enhance [nor ' P°ssihilities for advancement, Vanc' *r Cven a requirement for ad- ^ Th*!^ t0 the next rank.
| pe*rsnat'unality structure of naval baian. e *s’ at present, heavily un- J< cernC<a and seems to be of some con- j| art Tugoskvian officials. There
Communist Party control of the navy was quite loose in the 1960s. Now, however, a party cell is being organized in every ship regardless of its size. There is also now much more stress on political-ideological work, but it is not known what results such attention has had.
The officers and NCOS in general have a strong centralist or “Yugoslavian” outlook. They usually take a hard-line approach to almost any question concerning the domestic scene. Their loyalty to the present political leadership and especially to President Josip Broz Tito is beyond doubt. It is questionable, however, whether their political commitment will undergo some change when Tito passes from the scene. Most naval officers display a strong pro-Soviet bias, especially in viewing relations between the United States and U.S.S.R. The continous anti-West propaganda has not been without its effects.
The Yugoslavian Navy has traveled a long and difficult road from its early days following World War II. Although it is beyond doubt that great advances have been made, especially considering the navy’s conditions at its inception, one must question whether this progress would not have been greater had there been better leadership. During the 1950s and 1960s there was an endless chain of reorganizations. Financial resources were wasted without any benefit to the navy as a whole. And, there is no sign that such a tendency is being reversed.
The fleet presents a picture of an unbalanced force in which the offensive capability is far greater than the defensive. Without a stronger and more potent air support, the Yugoslavian Navy will not be able to achieve sea supremacy or even sea superiority in the Adriatic. Finally, dependence on foreign sources for sophisticated armament and equipment while seemingly unavoidable for most small navies, weakens the navy.
Despite all its shortcomings, however, the Yugoslavian Navy should not be underrated. Its human element is good and basically competent and could provide the margin for victory in any encounter in Yugoslavia's coastal zone. * [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
'"Ratna Mornarica," Vojna Encikloptdija, vul 7, 2nd edition (Belgrade: Vojno-Izdavacki Zavod, 1972) p. 788.
[2]1bid, p. 790.
[3]Comment of retired Admiral Josip Cerni, Vojno Dt/o, No. 6, 1970, pp 60-62.
[4]Discussion of retired Admiral Mate Jcrkovich
in "Vidovi, rodovi i sluzbe u opste narodnom ratu," Vojno Dt/o, No. 5, 1969, p. 78. ■’Admiral Cerni, Vojno Dt/o, No. 6, 1970, p. 61.
[6]Raymond V.B. Blackman, Editor, Jam's Fighting Ships 1951/52 (London: Sampson, Low, Marston and Co. Ltd., 1951), pp. 541-545.