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The Wartime Role of Soviet SSBNs”
R. T. Ackley, pp. 34-42, June 1978; C.C. Holcomb, pp. 21-22, July 1978 Proceedings)
| Hamlin A. Caldwell Jr.—The wartime r°le of Soviet nuclear-powered fleet ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) is open to varied interpretation and may still be evolving in the Politburo and at Naval Headquarters, Moscow. Perhaps the surest bet is that the role does not conform to most of our bland assumptions of the past ten years.
The SSBN intra-theater warfighting role is another theory deserving consideration. It is compatible with the svithholding-war termination bargain- tog strategy mentioned by Professor Ackley. “Yankee”-class SSBNs withheld n protected Russian home-water havens could strike all European NATO military targets. They would be sur- vivable and flexibly responsive to typically Soviet tight centralized control exercised through redundant, reliable, and relatively short communication links. The Soviets seldom mention deterrence but often write of extended, nuclear war-fighting against counterforce targets. Baltic Fleet “Golf’-class SSBNs are obviously positioned for an ■ntra-theater role in this type of war. The more potent "Yankees” could have a similar role.
Soviet offensive doctrine provides for attack in two echelons in nuclear as well as conventional war. A prudent commander is enjoined to withhold a strong uncommitted force for security ' and to retain freedom of action for a final winning blow. For hundreds of years Russian commanders have run very prudent patterns because of military doctrine, political considerations, and perhaps some deeper Slavic com, pulsion. A protected, withheld SSBN is the type of "shoot anytime” rather than “use or lose” secure second echelon force and would provide a strategic reserve.
The composition of the Soviet service force may be a major clue to the
wartime role of Soviet SSBNs and, indeed, their general-purpose naval forces. The Soviet Navy has a modest number of underway replenishment ships but many tenders and support ships capable of dispersion as mobile bases in home waters. At least seven missile cargo ships appear capable of rearming SSBNs in sheltered anchorages. The Soviets may envision a nuclear war in which SSBNs individually slip in from their haven areas to mobile bases to rearm and replenish to sustain an extended nuclear war. We don’t seem to think in terms of submarine-launched ballistic missile reloads but the Soviets may, as a feature of a home waters withholding strategy.
The suspicion, mentioned by Professor Ackley, with which some U.S. submariners view the possibility of Soviet pro-SSBN operations may be an unfortunate reflection of the narrow field of view of too many U.S. nuclear submarine periscopes. An SSBN haven, protected by mines, quiet diesel submarines in an operational environment uniquely congenial to them, fixed acoustic arrays, asw air and surface forces, would be a tough challenge for an intruding U.S. Los Angeles-class nuclear-powered attack submarine. In this tactical context, many Soviet ASW sensors with puzzlingly short detection ranges make eminent good sense. Countering postulated Soviet SSBN withholding tactics with Los Angeles class and the proposed SSNX may be unhappily analogous to entering a new Rolls Royce in a demolition derby.
“The LAMPShip Team”
(See R.E. Hammond and P. Tierney, pp. 154-158, March 1978; A. Van Saun, pp. 90-92, June 1978 Proceedings)
Contents:
The Wartime Role of Soviet SSBNs The LAMPShip Team
’Cause a PBY Don’t Fly that High
The Persian Gulf: Central or Peripheral to U. S. Strategy?
Seagoing Guinea Pigs
Technology and Future Warship Design
In the Navy’s Future: The Small, Fast Surface Ship
Is It Time to Sink the Surface Navy?
ASW and the
Naval Officer Oceanographer
The V/STOL Catch 22s
Background for the Future of the U. S. Naval Reserve
American Forces in Foreign Cultures
Vertical Assault:
The Proof Is in the Doing
The A-7E Aircraft/Pilot Team:
I Man, 1 Machine, and 101 Missions
South American Navies: Who Needs Them?
Maintaining a Western Carrier Capability
Historic Naval Ships Association of North America
Colonel Sharp Delany: Father of the U. S. Coast Guard?
Lieutenant Commander A.W. Swinger, U.S. Navy—Commander Van Saun’s comment could be used as a predeployment, let’s-go-get ’em speech for his submarine crew. However, before he straps a broom to his peri-
scope, I believe a few rational words about the pros and cons of submarine and surface ship antisubmarine warfare are in order.
Commander Van Saun is certainly correct in his view that submarines are potent and effective antisubmarine and antisurface ship weapon systems. The advantages of the submarines are many. To list a few of the more well known, they are covert (their biggest advantage), their armament is dedicated to their target(s), they can operate in three dimensions in order to capitalize on environmental vagaries, and U.S. submarine crew training and proficiency are undoubtedly superior to that of any potential opponent. Submarines, however, are not “virtually undetectable,” their weapons do not necessarily outrange those of surface or other sensors, they are not immune to poor acoustic propagation conditions, they do not operate exclusively without use of active sonar and/or radar exposure, and they certainly cannot operate against opponents, surface or otherwise, without fear of attrition.
With regard to the practice of ASW, Commander Van Saun has somehow missed the point of what the Navy is up to. ASW is not reserved for what he calls the “primary ASW ship.” In fact, it is the preserve of no one platform, but the challenge and task of all.
Surface ships operating independently can certainly be at a disadvantage in one-on-one encounters with submarines. However, defeat for the surface ship is not a certainty. Nevertheless, surface units do not normally pursue solo ASW. Rather, they operate in groups, using information from shore-based sensors, long- range towed arrays, passive/active hull-mounted sonars, and sea- and land-based aircraft.
Tactical towed arrays are in the surface navy now, and, over the next few years, these systems will increase in both quantity and quality. The LAMPS III system, a logical improvement to the LAMPS I , is near at hand and is slated to be assigned to new cruisers, destroyers, and frigates in large numbers. These and other state-of-the-art surface ship systems, employed as intended, are effective ASW tools for ferreting out and attacking enemy submarines. The performance of these surface ship systems will improve as the users come to better appreciate and integrate them with the rest of the Navy’s air, surface, and subsurface capabilities.
Our submariner author implies that a 75/25 split between “sacred cow” surface ship non-ASW and ASW weapons is a disadvantage. Given the multi-mission tasking of the surface warship and her potent and ever- improving ASW capability, I view this split as a plus.
Such versatility in weapon systems when combined with the other attributes of speed, endurance, communications capabilities, and peacetime visibility is quite a bit for the money in our balanced force Navy. In fact, maintaining a balanced capability at sea has been and will continue to be vital both for the U.S. Navy, and for national security.
“ ’Cause a PBY Don’t Fly that High”
(See W.E. Scarborough, pp. 59-73, April
1978; C.K. Wildman, and G.O. Boles, p.
90, July 1978 Proceedings)
Vice Admiral John T. Hayward, U.S. Navy (Retired)-Willie Scarborough’s article was excellent. Having flown all of the aircraft portrayed, including the XP2Y-1 and XP3Y-1, his article covers the subject very completely. He was one of my outstanding pilots when we were starting what is now China Lake in 1944.
Willie did not mention the PBY-l, probably because he never knew about it. It was a PBY fitted to sweep magnetic mines. It had a 48-foot diameter ring and a Ranger 550 h.p. engine to drive the generator to produce the vertical magnetic field. The ring was designed to activate German magnetic mines by the vertical component. We were not in the war at the time. The aircraft was the original XP3Y-1, later the XPBY-1, Bureau number 9459, which set all kinds of records. As the top speed of this aircraft was 110 knots, escape from a mine detonated at the low altitude required for sweeping operations was a hazardous mission.
It was perfectly simple to defeat such sweeping which the Germans promptly did. The Royal Air Force fitted a Wellington bomber with the same such device.
But in addition to fond memories and other sea stories, there is a lesson today’s U.S. Navy should learn from the PBY story. The charade of assigning a PBY to a high-altitude bombing mission against fighter aircraft and combatant ships was an example of very ppor thinking on our part. It was apparent to any fighter pilot that the PBY was a sitting duck at any altitude. We spent millions of dollars on such an outdated concept. While I was in the South Pacific, we had a standard joke about a contact report from a PBY: “Trailing enemy carrier, notify next of kin!” As a commander of a B-24 squadron, and I mean B-24 not a bastardized version later called a PB4Y, we were able not only to attack but to defend ourselves. Our long-range searches took us into hostile waters such as Kavieng, Rabaul, and Truk. The exploits of Buzz Miller and Bruce Van Voorhis showed what could be done. The losses of the Vincennes (CA- 44), Astoria (CA-34), and Quincy (CA-39) may have been prevented if we had had an effective long-range air search that could have tracked the Japanese force down the slot in an unfriendly air environment.
What is the lesson? We have the modern counterpart of the PBY in our Navy today. It is the P3C Orion—the backbone of our shore-based ASW long-range effort. It doesn’t even have the PBY’s obsolete .30 caliber bow gun. It has no defensive armament. I mean none!
Having been involved in the original procurement of this aircraft in the late fifties, I know our philosophy at that time. We were going to be doing this task always far at sea in a friendly air environment. Soviet aircraft had not put to sea. Today, the Yak-36 Forger’” is there and the P-3C would be a dead duck from its air-to-air missiles or guns. As time passes, P-3Cs will become more vulnerable to the advanced types of vertical or short takeoff and landing aircraft. We must recognize this problem and do something about it.
Will history repeat itself?
“The Persian Gulf: Central or
Peripheral to United States
Strategy?”
(See W. J. Crowe, pp. 184-209, May 1978
Proceedings)
G. David Gitkov, Master Mariner— Admiral Crowe’s essay is one of the best articles ever published in the Proceedings. However, he makes one historical error, which does not affect his thesis. On page 202, he states “. . . coupled with the overthrow of Czarist rule in 1917, forced the provisional government to make a separate peace with the Central Powers.” Not so. The separate peace of Brest-Litovsk Was signed by the Communist (Bolshevik) government after the overthrow of the Provisional Government •n the October Revolution. The principal point of Bolshevik propaganda was the slogan, “Down with the imperialist war!” The Provisional Government, though inept, had tried to continue the fight against the Central Powers.
“Seagoing Guinea Pigs”
(See pictorial, pp. 74-83, June 1978
Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander James M. Steussy, V. S. Navy—I recently completed a tour as operations officer of the John S. McCain (DDG-36). The decision to scrap her was undoubtedly correct as a proper repair job would probably have cost well over $50 million and the lead time required on some of the essential items would have delayed that work several years. The propulsion plant had many unique features which precluded replacement with standard items used on other classes. Much of the machinery had been hand made for the ship by shipyards, contractors, the Development and Training Center/ Fleet Maintenance Assistance Group, WestPac ship repair facilities, and her own crew. Major items like the main feed pumps should have been junked but, since duplicates did not exist, had to be repaired time after time. Much of the auxiliary equipment ran on 1,200 psi steam and replacement by off-the-shelf 600 psi equipment would have required a comprehensive redesign of main space piping. Topside, many things were similarly unique and in need of replacement. The Mk 42 Mod 3 and 4 gun mounts and Mk 67 gun fire control system were cases in point. Substitution of these antiques by more modern armament was feasible, but lead times were prohibitive.
The reader may well wonder why these improvements were not carried out during the class conversion of the late 1960s. (DL-3 was decommissioned in 1966 and was recommissioned as DDG-36 in 1969 ) I too would like to know. Documentation on board the ship in 1976 revealed that these deficiencies were well known and ardently prosecuted by the commanding officers of that period. It appears that an expensive missile battery and height-finding radar were installed topside, while, below decks, the propulsion plant was given its customary patchwork repair. If the disgusting and disgraceful job done on the plumbing of the AN/SPS-37 radar cooling system is any indication of the steam pipework done by Philadelphia Naval Shipyard during conversion, the John S. McCain's engineering problems may have been little reduced after three years in the yard.
Life on board “Building Thirty-Six” was not all heartbreak and misery, though it seemed that we had more than our share of those. The ship’s song was “Big John,” and it was played topside as we steamed toward the exit of Long Beach harbor for sea trials after nearly 18 months of being towed, docked, and moored. Our landlubber deck seamen danced with glee on the forecastle. About one year later, after another nine months of almost continuous repair work, the ship got under way from San Diego. Personnel on board the ship across the pier stopped work to applaud our departure. As the last lines were taken in, that ship’s public address system played “It’s Impossible” and, as we backed away from the pier, "Anchor’s Aweigh.” In a WestPac missile exercise, casualties to both steering engines threatened to eliminate the John S. McCain from the rare chance to fire missiles. The skipper, however, taught his conning officers to steer with engines only and we scored two for two in the shoot. Subsequently, the ship was awarded the Missile E for the squadron. No one on board that I knew could remember or document previous Es of any kind.
Ships that remain too long in port get many visitors and so it was with the John S. McCain. The ship would turn to for days to prepare for "working visits” by numerous VIPs who no doubt came to see for themselves why the ship could not safely go to sea. On one occasion, a visiting admiral learned that I was the ops boss and remarked that I probably did not have much to do. Though I thought otherwise, the admiral’s friendly jest illustrates the importance of being a "can-do" outfit. Prodigious effort by the crew and skillful use of generous repair assets actually meant little if commitments could not be met. This point was brought home to me by a salty old chief petty officer at Com- NavSurFPac headquarters. In response to my query about possible Indian Ocean operations, the chief advised me not to worry about them because, as he put it, “there ain’t no tugs in the I.O.”
ENTER THE FORUM
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(Continued from page 25)
“Technology and Future Warship Design”
(See R. Leopold, pp. 36-47, March 1978 Proceedings)
“In the Navy’s Future: the Small, Fast Surface Ship”
<See R. E. Adler, pp. 102-111, March 1978 Proceedings)
“Is It Time to Sink the Surface Navy?”
{See W. S. Lind, pp. 62-67, March 1978; B. A. Becken, p. 87, June 1978 Proceedings)
Commander W. S. Hoffman, U.S. Navy — Dr. Leopold concludes his otherwise straightforward survey of future trends in ship design with the somewhat offhand assertion that innovation is “as much a bureaucratic/ sociological issue as a technological one.’’ He doesn’t expound on this, but his implication that the Navy stifles advances in ship design is disturbing. Coincidently, the authors of two related articles in the same issue are also concerned about the pace of technological change in the Navy. They don’t cloak their concern in organizational or sociological cant, however. Their charge is that we are not getting the ships and weapons we need because ultraconservative Navy high-ranking officers are dedicated to perpetuating today’s naval force structure.
Commander Adler argues that high-speed ship technology is here, but missions and functions for such ships remain “vague.” Navy planners don’t see the advantages of high speed, and the connotation is that they don’t want to. Mr. Lind's accusations are less subtle: defying both common sense and congressional intent, the Navy is “blocking the development of promising alternatives” to conventional surface combatants. Mr. Lind predicts dire consequences if we persist in plans to build more cruisers, destroyers, and frigates. (Perhaps his title should be the less equivocal, "Sink the Surface Navy!”)
Neither Commander Adler nor Mr.
Lind credits the Navy’s attempts to find the most cost and combat effective force structure. After all, aren’t the results a foregone conclusion? In fact, most Navy planners (who have read a budget lately) agree that we need smaller, faster, less costly ships.
The Navy’s recent air platforms study, which traded-off some of the alternatives Mr. Lind proposes, is only the latest in a long line of analyses that recognizes the advantages of increased numbers of smaller, less- capable ships. But the question of which smaller, less costly platform to build is complex. While the Navy’s studies conclude that no one platform is best, Mr. Lind asserts that for “virtually every mission” there is a better alternative to the conventional surface combatant. Like most analyses that find a “best” solution, his is highly scenario-dependent. It assumes the primacy of the ASW mission (no real quarrel there), but in the context of the “short war on the Central Front” scenario. Surely Mr. Lind, a historian by inclination and training, feels a sense of deja vu when writing about short wars. (There is a new wrinkle in the current vogue, however; in the past, nations that have based their strategies on “short war” scenarios have assumed swift and sure victory, not defeat.) Likewise there have been a gaggle of analyses and studies highlighting surface effect ship (SES) and hydrofoil ship capabilities, to which Commander Adler provides more credible, or at least less controversial, scenarios. Why, then, he may well ask, have there been no demonstrations of these ships with prototype combat systems? Perhaps because of the Navy’s reluctance to invest in the high cost of developing new, lighter combat systems before the new hulls are proven.
For although the costs of combat systems can and sometimes do exceed hull, mechanical, and electrical costs in ship construction, the hull is a long-term investment. Weapons and sensor technologies turn over rapidly, therefore most ships will accommodate two or three combat systems in their life-cycles. Low initial cost and high initial mission effectiveness ought not be the only criteria for selection of a ship design. We can hardly afford a new technology or a new surface fleet to satisfy every whim of the DoD analysts. Over the years the conventional surface combatant hull has proven its versatility in adapting to the Navy’s multiple and changing missions. In this regard, the Navy’s conservatism has served it well.
But cruisers, destroyers, frigates, small carriers, and fast surface ships alike could be made more versatile by “uncoupling the payload,” a technique discussed by Dr. Leopold. It’s not a new idea, and it has a great deal of merit. But, so far the Navy hasn’t adopted it in practice. Why not? Bureaucratic/sociological reasons, of course!
Let’s face it, we can be slow to change. It’s a legacy, a part of our seniority system. Officers typically get their hands-on technical experience at the division and department head levels, after which they continue to hone tactical and judgmental skills. But those skills can atrophy. When most senior officers in the Navy today served as department heads, the large-scale, centralized computer was just being introduced in ship combat systems. Now the state of the art is distributed networks based on the minicomputer and microprocessor.
The “When-you’re-CO-you-can-do- it-your-way” syndrome also fosters conservatism. What junior officer hasn’t been frustrated by an unreceptive senior who has strong but outmoded ideas of his own? “WYCO” (When-you’re-CO-etc.), the senior tells his junior, who dutifully waits. Unfortunately, by the time the junior is in a position to influence or make the decisions, the technology he advocated is not so new anymore.
I suggest the primary reasons we are
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slow to change have more to do with our failure to recognize and deal with the organizational implications of change than any concerted resistance to change itself. For example, Dr. Leopold cites a recent Navy laboratory study that points up the advantages of designing weapon (and I would add sensor) system modules with integral processing. It’s a safe bet that no one is studying the organizational changes needed to implement this technology. Do we need to realign weapon, sensor, computer, and software design and procurement responsibilities? (Yet another reorganization in the Naval Material Command?) Should we change our practice of combat system “integration” by committee? (Yes!) Who controls the electrical interfaces between the weapon and sensor modules and their mechanical interfaces with the hull(s)? And, how is it done? There are no easy answers, but we won’t see this vital advance in ship design in the fleet soon if we don’t face up to the accompanying organizational issues.
Yet, in spite of the obstacles to innovation—organizational, sociological, or WYCO—there has never been a shortage of Navy men and women who try. That knock at the admiral’s door is probably a young lieutenant bursting with a new idea and the hope that maybe, just maybe, this time he’ll persuade the Old Salt that there is a better way.
“ASW and the Naval Officer Oceanographer”
(See E. W. Shaar, Jr., pp. 43-49, February 1978; T. W. Perkins, p. 88, July 1978 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Mark A. Unhjem, U.S. Navy—Lieutenant Commander Shaar’s article makes three points. First, effective ASW depends greatly on reasonably accurate knowledge of environmental conditions and their effects. Second, afloat group staffs (both carrier and cruiser-destroyer) should have an officer assigned with the necessary training to provide the information in situ. Third, such an officer should be a naval officer oceanographer or oceanographic subspecialist.
The first two points have been strongly and effectively supported, but the third point is open to question. All staffs are, by definition, bureaucracies, and in any bureaucracy underemployed people tend to make work within their area of specialization in order to justify their existence. An oceanographer attached to such a staff would be usefully employed in oceanographic work just prior to, during, and perhaps immediately after an at-sea period. His employment at other times would depend upon his own abilities outside the area of oceanography. It is for this reason that there is a justifiable hesitation to create a billet for an oceanographer on these staffs.
There is, however, a viable alternative: the ASW subspecialist (0044P). The small but growing community of graduates of the systems technology (antisubmarine warfare) curriculum at Naval Postgraduate School receives sufficient postgraduate training in oceanography, acoustics, and detection theory to provide the support the staff needs, but also has the training to provide a broader range of ASW support to the staff. The ASW curriculum is “an interdisciplinary technical program which integrates mathematics, physics, acoustics, electrical engineering, oceanography, operations analysis, human factors, computer science, and meteorology.” All three major warfare communities are represented in the ASW subspecialist community. Therefore, instead of requiring an additional staff billet, one of the existing operations billets could be designated for the 0044P code.
“The V/STOL Catch 22s”
(See J.L. George, pp. 23-29, April 1978
Proceedings)
Captain W/. J. Ruhe, U. S. Navy (Retired)—One might say that Lieutenant George’s prize-winning essay is in itself a Catch 22 proposition—a win using a no-win situation. But one suspects that there are more attributes to vertical short takeoff and landing (V/ STOL) aircraft than shown by the author. Why, for example, do the marines hold out for the low payload
AV-8 V/STOL, against the Navy’s offer of the “higher, faster, farther” F-18?
Lieutenant George implies that the attractiveness of the AV-8 lies in its ability, as a close ground support plane, to operate near the front. But he notes that its characteristics are "certainly not adequate for a sea based airplane with missions that require both long range and lots of firepower.”
Yet, there is an interest being shown in V/STOL aircraft for naval use which does not belie this simple write-off. For as long as naval warfare is fought in the traditional fashion, in the words of Lieutenant George, no one can expect “that a V/STOL plane would ever be as good as an F-14.” The V/STOL advocates acknowledge this. Yet, like the marines who see their land warfare so changed as to make a V/STOL attack aircraft attractive, the V/STOL advocates say that the mission requirements for sea-based aircraft are also changing. They seem to believe that naval warfare is changing with the advent of missilery and other technologies. And the V/STOL is felt to have certain unique capabilities which are responsive to the changing nature of sea battles.
What other advantages might V/STOL aircraft offer? Long-range antiship missiles are apparently expanding ocean battle areas to such an extent that manned aircraft flying from one or two sea-based carriers may no longer be able to adequately respond to long-range, stand-off attack. By firing at great distances from the carriers, enemy missile-launching aircraft and surface ships may then be able to escape scot-free. However, if V/STOL aircraft like the AV-8 or the Soviet “Forger” are based on far-out screens around a carrier task force (or other escorted group of ships), they would be- in position to effectively attack the cumbersome long-range aircraft with air-to-air weapons. They might also guide antiship missiles, launched from the decks of their sea base, toward threatening missile-carrying enemy warships.
With the likely battle area greatly increased, such V/STOL-armed, widely dispersed screening ships help ensure task group integrity while expanding the sea control capability of a naval force—over the far larger area required when dealing with an enemy armed with very long range stand-off weapons. In this function they do not tend to eventually replace conventional takeoff and landing (CTOL) aircraft, as Lieutenant George implies, but rather complement them to maximize group effectiveness.
The screening protection against enemy submarines must also be greatly expanded in area coverage—to cover not only the area of torpedo attack against high value ships but also for long-range antiship missile attack. This can mean ASW operations at several hundred miles from the carrier which would favor the employment of the more efficient CTOL antisubmarine- aircraft—the S-3. But again, like the defense against enemy long-range aircraft or like the marines’ AV-8s at the battle-front, V/STOL aircraft stationed close to the enemy can provide an efficient ASW capability without having the high-performance characteristics of the S-3. Since the payload of all types of V/STOLs (helos, AV-8s, Yak-36s, etc.) is limited, V/STOLs should be used as missile-directing units for weapons fired from sea bases.
Thus, being able to proliferate the V/STOL to many warship or merchant platforms, and particularly small ones, is an important functional characteristic which responds to the great increase in size of sea battle areas. A task unit’s offensive strength is thus increased through a wide dispersion of air power, controlled by satellite relay.
Being able to rapidly respond to an enemy contact from a deck-ready position through unassisted takeoff is also an important functional characteristic. Responding to surprise long- range missile attack or enemy submarine overt action nearby is becoming more and more a critical requirement.
And, remaining motionless over the oceans may be a best means for an aircraft to prevent detection or identification from enemy airborne sensors. Providing a no-doppler target could make V/STOL aircraft difficult to distinguish from small surface craft. The ability to fly at very slow speeds or hover may also be important in the use of passive sensors, like towed linear arrays or unexpendable array buoys.
It’s difficult to see how V/STOLs can replace CTOLs in the U. S. Navy; it’s far easier to see them in a role which complements the U. S. Navy’s superior CTOL assets.
“Background for the Future of the U. S. Naval Reserve”
(See J. H. Hessman, pp. 144-157, May 1978;
J. S. Kellogg, p. 25, July 1978Proceedings)
Lieutenant Stephen R. Campbell, U. S. Coast Guard—On page 150, Mr. Hessman states that the Coast Guard constituted another Naval Reserve. We in the Coast Guard know that the reverse is true. The Navy constitutes another Coast Guard reserve which is used in wartime. From the Coast Guard’s beginning as this nation’s oldest continuous seagoing armed force, through its subsequent participation in this nation's wars and conflicts, it has been demonstrated time and again that the Coast Guard is the nucleus about which the Navy forms in time of war.
“American Forces in Foreign Cultures”
(See D. M. Bishop, pp. 42-51, April 1978 Proceedings)
Joseph Dykstra, Senior Reliability Engineer, Western Gear Corp. —I think Captain Bishop has hit the nail right on the head with his observations of American ignorance of foreign cultures and the behavior of the American military overseas. Based on personal experiences, 1 wholeheartedly agree with the points made in the article.
In 1956, I emigrated to the United States from the Netherlands. I was amazed at the number of Americans who were either totally ignorant of the Dutch society or had some outdated notion as to what the Dutch were like. The basic perception seemed to be that all people in Holland wort- wooden shoes and lived in windmills.
In the late sixties, I spent two years in Vietnam working as a civilian advisor primarily with the U.S. Army 1st Air Cavalry Division. As a civilian, an outsider on the inside, I observed among the military personnel many of the culture shock reactions Captain Bishop describes. Although in all fairness, I saw similar behavior, and in some cases worse, among my fellow civilian employees. Culture shock can be a bewildering experience.
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P. O. Box 2280—D86 Bamberg, West Germany Telephone 33333
I was helped tremendously by the profusion of booklets printed and distributed by the U.S. military on subjects like Vietnamese culture, history, simple language phrases, foreign military uniforms, etc. The reward for a minimal reading effort was immediate. I was able to better understand my surrounding environment to the point of becoming fascinated with the “mysteries of the Orient.” A simple thing like being able to say thank you in Vietnamese would bring enormous smiles in restaurants and shops and recognition upon return visits.
A situation such as in Vietnam tends to bring out the best and worst in people. I saw many acts of genuine compassion by U. S. servicemen and extensive volunteer efforts in civic action programs. On the other hand, there were those who could only see the “gooks.” One of the largest of the so-called camp towns was outside the base camp of the 1st Air Cav Div at An Khe. Nicknamed “Sin City” or “Disneyland East,” it received worldwide notoriety via an article in Time. In fact, this place was a depressing collection of tin-roofed shacks, surrounded by barbed wire, and featuring sex on an assembly-line basis. Through an extensive out-ofcountry R&R program, sister sin cities grew up in Hong Kong, Taiwan, Malaysia, Thailand, and even Australia.
Again, thank you for an excellent article.
“Vertical Assault: The Proof Is in the Doing”
(See P.L. Townsend, pp. 117-119, November 1977; E.G. Panas, and J.D. Harris, pp. 83-84, April 1978 Proceedings)
Vice Admiral S. Mourikis, Hellenic Navy (Retired), Honorary Chief of the Hellenic Navy—Major Townsend suggests that the actual assault against Cyprus be studied by the U.S. armed forces and, in particular, by the Marine Corps. Remember the Cypriot Navy was less than negligible, the island’s air force simply nonexistent, and, practically speaking, only the ill- equipped “Homeguard” was called to oppose the overwhelming superiority of the Turkish army, navy, and air forces. It should also be taken into consideration that following the criminal coup d’etat of 15 July 1974 against the legal Cypriot government, the greatest part of the “Homeguard was deployed in the southern and central areas of the island against the troops loyal to the Cypriot government. So, at the time the Turkish Army landed on the north beaches of the island, almost none of the fortifications and the coastal defense weapons were manned.
In light of the unique and extremely unfavorable conditions for Cyprus, I really wonder what kind of conclusions and advice could be drawn from such an operation.
“The A-7E Aircraft/Pilot Team:
1 Man, 1 Machine, and 101 Missions”
CSee F. J. West, pp. 102-105, April 1978;
T. L. Wilson, p. 25, June 1978 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Jeffrey G. Coffey, U.S. Navy, Attack Squadron-128—A tip of the hat to Commander West for a fine, public affairs article. Lest he become too worried about the tarnished image of the A-7E, he should be aware that most airwings would probably vote to keep at least one A-7E squadron on board their carriers. After all, even a bombing derby needs someone to come in second.
In deference to the many nonaviators who may have read Commander West’s article, let me hasten to assure them that the A-7E cannot simultaneously do all of those things he described. In fact, A-7E pilots seem to avoid many of them, such as laying a sonobuoy field, tanking, reconnaissance, and night flying.
At this time, objectivity forces me to put in a plug for the A-6E Intruder—the “other” Navy attack aircraft. The A-6E does not have an internal gun or an internal strike camera. It does have two engines (take one away and you can still fly), an internal, radar video tape recorder, and a bombardier/navigator. Please note that the bombardier/navigator enables the A-6E to simultaneously fly low, authenticate, lead strikes, fly self-contained radar approaches, and bomb with unequaled accuracy in any weather. Future A-6Es will be equipped with laser designators and infrared viewing capability. It is also important to note that three out of four recent bombing competitions between West Coast A-6E and A-7E aircraft were won by the A-6Es.
And, the A-6E carries more ordnance than the A-7E.
“South American Navies: Who Needs Them?”
(See R. L. Scheina, pp. 61-66, February 1978 Proceedings)
Commander G. J. Tarrico, U.S. Navy, Plans Officer, Commander South Atlantic Force Staff—The U.S. Navy needs the navies of South America.
Most of the free world’s petroleum supply passes westward around the southern tip of Africa. In the last ten years the Soviets have made considerable progress in establishing air and naval bases in Africa. They operate regularly from their African bases and, equally important, have established logistic support for deployed forces in Africa. On the other hand, the free world nations have seen a steady erosion and loss of bases in Africa.
Suppose the U.S.S.R. elected to use its bases in Angola and Guinea to slow or stop the transport of oil to the United States and Western Europe. This, in conjunction with any other hostile act, would probably overburden our already committed naval assets to the degree that, operating from our nearest secure base in the Northern Hemisphere, we would be faced with very taxing support and logistics efforts. Use of just land-based patrol aircraft would cover only a relatively small part of the vast South Atlantic, if operated from Puerto Rico or even Ascension Island.
Use of base facilities in South America, particularly Brazil, would offer any naval force a significant military advantage, and augmentation of U.S. or NATO forces by modern, well-trained South American naval forces would serve to alleviate the strain on our naval resources.
The question, of course, is whether
South Americans would permit such base use and whether they would commit naval forces to such action. It is possible that some South Americans might if the threat were sufficient. Brazil, for example, imports almost 80% of its oil, much of which transits the Cape of Good Hope. Brazil would almost certainly be threatened by a disruption of these oil routes and would most likely join in measures to overcome it. Other South American countries, if similarly threatened, might join in too.
If traffic through the Panama Canal were disrupted, the need for South American cooperation would be even more pertinent. If shipping were forced to travel through the Strait of Magellan or around Cape Horn in a hostile situation, we would find ourselves with considerable control of shipping and ASW problems. In this eventuality, South American cooperation would be absolutely essential.
Fortunately, the framework for such cooperation has been established. The major navies of South America have active, effective training programs. Almost all engage in combined operations such as UNITAS (United International Antisubmarine Warfare) and bilateral exercises with other nations, including France, the United Kingdom, and Canada. These combined efforts serve to familiarize the South American navies with Allied tactical doctrine and prepare them to participate in Allied naval operations as full partners. In addition, we already have an inter-navy communications system, the Inter-American Naval Telecommunications Network. We also have the elements of control of shipping organizations in such countries as Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, and Paraguay, and shipping information exchanges exist among others.
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THE LOG
It is apparent that if hostilities broke out in the South Atlantic, we would have difficulty in committing sufficient naval and air assets to do the job. Minimally, we would require the use of South American naval and air bases. We would also welcome the South American aircraft carriers, frigates, submarines, and tankers which might be offered.
■ ilJk
“Maintaining a Western Carrier Capability”
(See J. L. George, pp. 31-40, October 1977;
S. L. Morison, pp. 22-23, January 1978; J.R. Eckelberry, p. 79, March 1978; N. Polmar, pp- 93-94, June 1978; R. J. Ghiradella, pp. 88-89, July 1978 Proceedings')
Conway D. Davies, Vice President of Engineering, Ingalls Shipbuilding—Since the mid-1950s, when the first techniques for standardization of military weapon systems were initiated, the Navy has evolved many significant concepts and methods for achieving intraclass and intrafleet standardization. To some extent, common hulls, propulsion machinery, and auxiliary systems have been used in a number of ship classes to satisfy a variety of fleet operational requirements.
Today, the Navy finds itself in a military environment which is undergoing change at a much more rapid rate than ever before. These changes, in turn, create a steady stream of new mission and operational requirements which then dictate new combat systems and platforms on which to place them. This situation provides impetus for serious consideration of additional methods to achieve greater fleet standardization.
One potential, the sea systems modification and modernization by modularity (SEAMOD) program, is now being examined by the Navy. While SEAMOD may be a long-term answer to providing the required naval operational flexibility, SEAMOD may be as much as five to ten years from detail design and even more to operational status.
In addition to the problems of operational flexibility, are the problems caused by the continuing rise in the cost of combat systems and the current prospects for continued limitations on Navy appropriations. A potential interim solution to these problems and perhaps an acceptable long-term solution (in conjunction with the SEAMOD program) is the Navy’s further use of its latest modern ship designs as standard platforms, an approach which seeks to maintain a high degree of commonality with existing and future ships of the same approximate size.
Currently, three existing designs, the FFG-7, DD-963, and CGN-38, provide a surface combatant tonnage range from 3,500 to 11,000 tons. Using these proven designs as “standard platforms” for all new surface combatants can substantially reduce new ship construction and delivery times. This could result in more ships, delivered earlier, at less cost.
Standard platforms would bring a higher degree of standardization (with attendant cost savings) to the areas of logistics and training. There would also be a savings in engineering and design time and effort, and a reduction in procurement lead time for equipment, which would result in lower platform costs and shorter time from funding to deployment. In addition, if it is indeed possible to reduce costs and thereby acquire more vessels, it might be possible for the Navy to plan additional acquisitions from current series production programs, such as the FFG-7, DD-963, SSN-688, and SSBN-736 classes, yielding another increment of attendant cost savings.
The standard platform concept is not new. It is similar to the approach taken by the aircraft manufacturers. Almost every modern aircraft design comes out in a variety of models and sizes. A given basic fighter may have variations including attack, defense, reconnaissance, surveillance and targeting, trainer, etc. These various models are essentially mission adaptations with payload variations to the same basic airframe.
One of the Navy’s design requirements for the DD-963 was the provision of space and weight margins for conversion and modernization. This was necessary to assure that the vessel could accommodate a multitude of advanced weapon systems which were still undergoing development at the time the destroyer program was awarded in 1970. This high growth potential built into the DD-963S is now yielding significant benefits as the Navy adapts the hull and machinery to advanced combat systems. Congress has authorized funds for two variations of the Spruance-class destroyer, the Aegis-equipped DDG-47 and the four- helicopter capable DDH-997. In addition, over the last couple of years the Navy has examined a destroyer with significantly upgraded weapons, a strike ship based primarily on advanced missile capability, and another increased air capability design, all of which were based on the hull, machinery, and principal auxiliary systems of the DD-963 design.
'es/changeout for mission effectivity
DD 963: Flexibility of combat systems using
M/iod
- ".ED): 8"/55 gun, Tomahawk, SM-2s, 3" L|WS, LAMPS Mk III
C
3) iH
363V (STRETCHED HANGAR): Eight helicopters n Lamps Mk III, Sea Sparrow, ASROC, ASMD
k^3F (FLIGHT DECK): Eight V/STOL type A with 300-foot runway, vertical landing
MAJOR WEAPONS DIFFERENCES
ij?63 USS SPRUANCE: ASW platform with ASROC tw° 5"/54 guns
^Up^NIZED DD 963: Sea Sparrow launcher, CIWS,
I 3 Mk I, towed array
INERTED DD 963 (proposed only): 8"/55 gun,
1 ^ 26 missile launchers, CIWS, LAMPS Mk I
993: Two Mk 26 missile launchers, two 5”/54
in.997 (EXTENDED HANGAR): Four LAMPS helicopters, Sea Sparrow, CIWS, towed array
i.?^7 (AEGIS): SPY-1 radar system, two Mk 26/1 e launchers, harpoon, LAMPS Mk III
^(VERTICAL LAUNCHERS AND
As a corollary to the Navy’s investigation of combat system possibilities for the DD-963 platform, Ingalls Shipbuilding initiated an effort several years ago to establish the feasibility of standard ship platforms for Navy surface combatants. As the only current builder ofU.S. destroyers, Ingalls’ efforts to date have centered around analysis of the Spruance-class design to determine its suitability as a standard platform.
Ingalls has identified a multitude of potential combat system variations for the Spruance-class platform. These variants range from an upgrading in size, quantity, and effectiveness of guns, missiles, and sensors to the radically altered mission capabilities inherent in significantly expanded air capability.
To test the feasibility of the standard platform concept, Ingalls conducted a series of feasibility analyses
which examined concepts proposed by the Navy as well as totally new concepts resulting from Ingalls’ own research. These studies indicate that the DD-963 platform has a significant potential for growth in combat capability and for design flexibility to meet the ever-changing nature and level of potential threats. Since the level of engineering accomplished by Ingalls is
only of a conceptual nature, there has been no attempt to measure the potential combat effectiveness of the variant designs in an absolute sense, but a relative comparison with the basic DD-963 design, or the more heavily armed, modernized version being produced today, is strikingly favorable.
The development of a flight deck version of the DD-963 class led to the examination of the impact on standardization of extending the beam of the vessel for added stability. This analysis indicated that little impact on standardization cost savings would be incurred through simple hull modifications since the major commonality cost items were inside of, rather than a part of, the hull itself.
An increased beam configuration allows even greater flexibility in the application of standard ship platforms because it extends the platform’s ultimate payload capacity through added volume and increased stability with a minimal penalty in speed and endurance. There is also an additional advantage in topside arrangement since the foredecks of surface combatants tend to be narrow, restricting the forward location of some weapons and SEAMOD modules.
While Ingalls’ standard platform efforts to date have been directed toward the Spruance-class design, any of the Navy’s newer surface combatant designs could serve as standard platforms. The current displacements of the three surface combatant designs now being built for the U. S. Navy could be easily extended by using lengthened or extended beam designs. This would provide the Navy with a wide range of flexibility in selecting platforms to carry specific combat systems and yet maintain a high degree of commonality and standardization in the fleet.
It is important to emphasize that the standard platform technique would in no way jeopardize the U. S. Navy’s current technological lead in ship design. Ship structure and hull design are very slowly changing technologies by today’s standards, and have changed little since World War II. Propulsion plants are major cost items, but most modern Navy ship designs could easily accommodate other types of power plants than those currently installed or propulsion plant improvements which are projected for the next 30 years. This is particularly true of the major surface combatants which already show a high degree of commonality and potential flexibility in their propulsion systems.
“Historical Naval Ships Association of North America”
(See pictorial, pp. 61-73, September 1977; T.C. Rizzuto and S.G. Guadagna, pp. 85-86, January 1978 Proceedings)
Vice Admiral Harry G. DeWolf, Royal Canadian Navy (Retired)—I feel bound to point out that the notes regarding my old ship HMCS Haida's wartime activities contain some errors.
The Haida was an escort in the convoy that the Scharnhorst attempted to attack at Christmastime 1943, but she took no part in the action that followed. Units of the Home Fleet, acting as a covering force as the convoy rounded Cape North, intercepted the Scharnhorst as she approached the convoy, and subsequently sank her. Several destroyers were detached from the convoy and took part in the action, but not the Haida.
The 10th Destroyer Flotilla was formed in the spring of 1944, at Plymouth, with the purpose of clearing the few remaining German destroyers out of the English Channel prior to the invasion. These operations were successful, accounting for some 43 enemy ship sinkings in a period of about four months. It was during this period that Haida made her name.
“Colonel Sharp Delany: Father of the U. S. Coast Guard?”
(See T. R. Strobridge and B. C. Nalty, pp. 112-113, March 1976 Proceedings)
Captain Robert E. Bassler, CEC, U.S. Navy (Retired)—Upon writing the U.S. Coast Guard Academy, I was informed that Alexander Hamilton was the “Father of the Coast Guard,” if that term were to be applied to anybody, while Captain Hopley Yeaton was the Coast Guard’s first commissioned officer.
*