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aster Chief Avionics Technician Hugh
Leakology; The War of Words”
B. Baker, pp. 43-49, July 1977 Pr«ceeJi„f,s)
Vietnam: Winnable War?”
(Sef W. P, Hughes, pp. 60-65, July 1977 P'oaedings)
rostering Dissent”
(See H.O. Nygren, pp. 54-55, March 1977 Pr«ceec/ir,j,s)
M.
r«inard, LI.S. Naval Reserve Retired)—Two July articles present a lchotomy that needs to be resolved: ‘eutenant Commander Baker, “It is t0 the benefit of the government, ne'Vs media, and public to have fac- ;‘nd balanced public information, ho will tell our story if we don’t?” ^aPtain Hughes, “Military voices are ^uted because of strictures against of- 1Cers on active duty in responsible portions challenging their civilian leadership publicly, and this must remain So- How will the concerned citizen react to these statements?
*f Major General John K. Singlaub a<a waited until his retirement to V°Ice his concern over the proposed tr°°P withdrawals from Korea, his c°ncern would be as relevant to the |Ssue as the great Chicago fire. leutenant General Donn A. Starry 1<a not challenge civilian leadership Policy. Was his reprimand a bit hasty?
- Historically, Captain Hughes, the ‘etnam War was lost in 195 1 when United Nations decreed Man- c*1Uria a sanctuary. By accepting the stalernate, the United Nations com- ^hted the armed forces and the re- s°Urces of the United States to take r°°t in Korea. A victory in the spring 1951 would have allowed the Ufiited States to render far greater aid to the French in Indochina at a time '''hen both the French and the United jjtates had a greater will to fight— x‘l°re the United States became so conscience-stricken.
Admiral Nygren’s admonition in the March Proceedings needs to be expanded beyond the Navy; we need to “institutionalize dissent” all the way to the Commander-in-Chief. Some may find it difficult to conceptualize General Douglas MacArthur as a dissident, but he was a conscientious objector to the conduct of the Korean War. He could not in good conscience order his men to fight under rules of warfare dictated by noncombatant nations giving the enemy a sanctuary from which to stage and launch their attacks. The general spent over 40 years of his life defending the Constitution of the United States and his
continued opposition to the U.N. strategy was in defense of that same Constitution.
The Naval Safety Center uses a method of reporting aviation safety incidents that might lead itself to channel dissent within the Navy. The “Any- mouse Report” can be anonymous or signed at the discretion of the reporter and may or may not be published at the discretion of the Safety Center. I wish there were a solution for the expressions of dissent by men such as Generals Billy Mitchell, MacArthur, and Singlaub. I can only admire their courage to state their convictions over their own names.
The public pays handsome salaries to the professional soldiers to encourage them to become experts in an unpopular field of endeavor, but the public never benefits from the knowledge and experience of these professionals except through the oracle of the Commander-in-Chief or an “informed defense official.” I, as one of the public, recognize the credentials of General Singlaub. I cannot associate an "informed defense official” with anyone except ‘‘Deep Throat.” If “Deep Throat” exists, he is as despicable as Benedict Arnold and, as an “informed defense official,” as creditable as Machiavelli.
Obviously, General Singlaub did not advise the Commander-in-Chief in this policy matter, but what are the credentials of those who did? Are they from the same school that advised an earlier Commander-in-Chief that he did not need air cover for an amphibious assault? I can also remember a Commander-in-Chief who did not need advice. He took the charts of North Vietnam to bed with him. In the morning, he would issue the new bombing targets to the JCS.
I believe the civilian-orchestrated wars since 1950 have been fought for objectives other than victory, and they have been sheer disasters. They have been a disgusting waste of human life, an unpardonable waste of the national treasure, and an irretrievable waste of the world’s resources. The monuments honoring our dead are the walled citadel of Berlin, a U.N. financed by the United States and dominated by the Third World, a 25-year-old DMZ in Korea, a united Vietnam, a serene, if bloody, Khmer Rouge Republic, a
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“. . . [(]DoD Directive 1325.6[)] . . . state[s] that, ‘Commanders are not authorized to recognize or to bargain with a so-called “servicemen’s union.” ’ ”
This directive was modified on 20 December 1976 to eliminate this provision.
“In Europe . . . strikes by military unions are prohibited. . . .”
One nation’s military, that of Sweden, has limited rights to strike, but their military has disavowed exercise of such a right.
“In an occupation . . . the form of advancement is via the trade union.” The majority of employees in the United States do not belong to a union.
“After the first term, the enlistee is already part of the management and the appeal of a union is correspondingly less.”
Career enlisted and junior and midgrade officers are the groups most interested in union membership.
“. . . the Defense Manpower Commission . . . [was] dominated by military officers. . . .”
Only two of the nine members were retired military officers, and the rest, including the chairman, were civilians.
. . no civilian agency can match the [Survivor Benefit Plan (SBP)].”
The SBP was copied from the Civil Service Commission plan which it matches.
”. . . [civil service] retirement pay is 51% of fheir final pay check, the military 62%.”
Military retiree at 20 years of service (YOS) will
receive approximate!! 35% of his regular mil'" tary compensation (RM® 30 yos—52% RMC; and 40 YOS—52%. Civil service: 20 YOS—36%; 3° YOS—56%; and
YOS—76%. Average military retiree receive* $7,256/yr, average civi! service retiree, $8,435/yr- "The [servicemen’s] union argues for . . . an end t® saluting, passwords, alld other ‘demeaning fitU‘
national debt over S700 billion, and a schism in the people that will not be closed with all the pardons imaginable.
If the civilian masters of this great country continue to subvert the glory that rightfully belongs to us and our progeny in an attempt to mollify foreign politicians of dubious legitimacy who are manipulating the guilt complex of a large and well-placed American elite in their efforts to brainwash this country into oblivion, this letter will have been in vain.
“The Military Union Card”
(See P. R. Schratz, pp. 25-31, June 1977; L. Y. Wald, pp. 85-86, September 1977 Proceedings)
Vice Admiral James D. Watkins, U.S. Navy, Chief of Naval Personnel—As one who is deeply involved in the controversial military unionization issue, I looked forward to the appearance of the June issue article by Captain Schratz in the hope that it would contribute to the developing dialogue on the subject. It certainly lived up to my expectations as an expression of another constructive viewpoint; however, it did contain numerous factual inaccuracies which I am afraid may have misled some readers.
In the interest of allowing all readers to form an objective judgment relative to this critical and topical issue, I believe the following misstatements in the article should be clarified:
Article: "... teamsters are also
active [in the area of military unionization].”
Fact: Teamsters have publicly
disavowed any such interest.
ENTER THE FORUM
We welcome brief comments on material published in the Proceedings and also brief discussion items on topics on naval, maritime, military interest for possible publication on these pages. A primary purpose of the Proceedings is to provide a place where ideas of importance to the sea services can be exchanged. The Institute pays an honorarium to the author of each comment or discussion item published in the Proceedings.
Article:
als.’ ”
Fact: The Enlisted Peoples 0<'
ganizing Committe£ (EPOC), not the AFGE, h»* made such statements.
Article: “. . . we are already be1"
ter off than the compara' ble union worker. . • ■
Fact: Since 1972 negotiate"
wage settlements have resulted in a 6% increase lfl real income for uni°n workers; during this same time frame the military • has fallen behind 6% ‘n
real income.
Article: “The fringe benefits 0
the military . . . [®re equivalent to] 55% [of hlS salary].”
Fact: The figure developed by
the Third Quadrennial
Review of Military Compensation Staff was 32^ of regular military compensation.
Many of the points raised in the article as contributing to military unionization are certainly valid; however, my own intensive invoIvemer>r in this issue leads me to the concln- sion that a dominant factor exist* which must be resolved before improvement in other areas can be effectively made. This factor is the growing uncertainty being experienced by service personnel over the economic security offered by a military career This uncertainty arises from the piecemeal approach to administration of the military compensation system- Until such time as stabilization of the military compensation process >s achieved, this uncertainty will exist-
and arguments over the adequacy or equity of benefit changes will not add to an easing of member apprehension. Once comprehensive management of military compensation is attained, many of Captain Schratz’s recommendations might prove beneficial.
“Tactical ASW: Let’s Fight Fire
with Fire”
(See A. Van Saun, pp. 99-101, December
1976; K.W. Estes, pp. 80-82, March 1977;
H. S. Stoddard, p. 81, June 1977 Proceedings')
Commander A. Van Saun, U.S. Navy, Commanding Officer, USS Barbel (SS- 580)—Commander Stoddard ought to reread my professional note. I advocated building ASW submarines only in lieu of those surface ships that have been assigned a primary mission of antisubmarine warfare. Also, the 200 new nuclear and diesel attack submarines I introduced were predicated on the "ultimate” number required to counter the Soviet Navy, not on our shipbuilding budget.
It is high time the surface navy sailors stopped trying to be jacks of all trades and started mastering those in which they honestly have the potential for success, specifically those missions Commander Stoddard mentions, with the exception of ASW.
Commander Stoddard talks of ASW surface ships gaining a long-range passive, as well as active, detection capability which rivals the submarines'. In so doing he ignores the fact that the surface ship captain attempting to employ these devices in a hot war is setting himself up as an easy target for the submarine. In exercise after exercise such ships are continually “sunk” by “enemy” submarines.
Let's make surface warfare ships indeed surface warfare ships and, with the exception of embarked LAMPS, leave most of the undersea war to submarines and aircraft. This would allow us to make surface ships that would be more effective in surface conflicts such as Mayaguez and Vietnam, as well as making them masters of at- sea antiair warfare (AAW). To provide AAW coverage, surface ships must be close to the high-value ship rather than wandering around as attractive targets trying to play ASW.
Our submarines working individually can beat the Soviet Navy’s submarines and surface ships, but our surface ships working in squadrons cannot defeat either. I recommend that Commander Stoddard forget his obvious loyalty to surface warfare ASW and realize that until we build an ASW frigate that can submerge, every ASW frigate we own is a very vulnerable and attractive target to an enemy submarine.
"NROTC: Quo Vadis?”
(See E. N. Bouffard, pp. 33-42, July 1977
Proceedings)
Captain Sanford N. Levey, U.S. Navy—It appears obvious that Captain Bouffard has lost a good deal of objectivity in his academic billet. His article leads one to believe that there is no education outside of academia. The impression given is that if you do not get a liberal education at college, you are forever fated to go through life as a “technocrat.” I do not believe this. I know too many well-rounded naval officers who started with an engineering background and who now understand economics, business, sociology, psychology, the arts, music, etc. That is what life is about, and the good naval officer will learn about these subjects in many ways.
Second, whether we like it or not, our modern ships and aircraft require that the officers who man them are good, well-rounded engineers. The officers who supervise the skilled technicians who maintain and repair the sophisticated systems must be able to understand the engineering problems if they are to be effective leaders. One of our most pressing material readiness problems appears to be the inability of our junior officers to effectively plan and implement preventive and corrective maintenance. There has thus far been no magic plan evolved to train them to do this, but a prerequisite must certainly be to train them as engineers. They must understand the problems if they are to solve them.
There seems to an assumption among liberal arts educators that an engineering education results in a narrow-minded, technically orient person who is incapable of origin thought and is an absolute clod in 511 cial or business situations. I can only relate this assumption to my own e> perience, which has all been in t*lt Navy, and I find it not true. I l’aVj known engineers who were well verse in all the arts, and I have kno"11 others who indeed were narro" minded. I have also known physicia*15 and lawyers who fit these molds. ^ the other hand, I have known histoO majors who have become excellenI practicing engineers. In other word5, education after college may be signltl cant and must not be discounted.
I think it is clear that we must tnlin our new officers basically as engine^5' What we must not do is allow the* education to stop when they are c°n! missioned.
Commander A.M. Wildberger,
Navy (Retired), Associate Professor v Quantitative Methods, Howard Un> versity—I confess to being surprised jI Captain Bouffard’s vision of doom re suiting from the rather mode-'1 changes in the NROTC academic fC quirements. For instance, I fail to see why a student is prevented fr°nl majoring in (say) history by being quired to complete calculus, physic5, and two other technical or science courses. No more is a student P,e' vented from majoring in (say) electf' cal engineering by being required r° complete a year of history, one of Eng' lish, and two of a foreign language Both sets of requirements, taken W*^ the two major fields, are educational^ broadening or “liberalizing.”
There are, I suggest, two signd1' cantly different ways of thinking (a11" arguing) about any subject of hurna11 interest. Their extremes may & exemplified, on one hand, by the mathematical theorem, and, on the other, by the legal brief. The educated person should be at least conversafl1 with both. The requirements levied of NROTC students, while not ideal, no more unreasonable than was the efl' trance requirement to Plato Academy: “Let no one destitute ot geometry enter my doors.” “Should Military Unionization
Be Permitted?”
(See C. L. Parnell, pp. 18-24, July 1977
Proceedings)
Captain G.J. van de Griendt, Royal Netherlands Navy—Commander Parnell, when stating that the Dutch armed forces have recently gotten a reputation for slovenliness and unreliability, generalizes too much. The Netherlands Marine Corps certainly does not deserve to be included in this statement. Indeed, a discipline problem has developed in the Netherlands Army as a result of activities of the Association for National Service Men (WDM). This organization, which is less then ten years old and which has ties with the political left, adheres to union-like methods.
To better understand the Dutch armed forces one needs to know the data on the composition of its three branches. The navy, including the marines, numbers 17,000 with 12% national service men (conscripts); for the army and the air force these figures are 63,000 (with 62% conscripts) and 18,000 (with 30% conscripts), respectively. The easiest way to eliminate the discipline problem would be to do away with conscripts altogether. For various reasons such a solution is not possible in the Netherlands in the near future.
As for Commander Parnell's summing up of arguments in favor of and against military unionization, the former looks a bit thin. I offer a few more positive aspects, which are based on personal experience with these institutions in the Royal Netherlands Navy. First, there is the Association for Enlisted Naval Personnel (VBZ), which was founded in 1946. It can, however, be considered a descendant of earlier associations of naval men dating as far back as 1897. The primary aim of the VBZ is the promotion of its members’ interests. This association is governed in a professional way, keeping to a serious, realistic, and respectable policy. It is fully accepted by the Director of Naval Personnel in the Ministry of Defense as representing the enlisted men. Besides bargaining to obtain benefits from the naval authorities, the VBZ has proven that one can also achieve success by activities brought up by the members. They have set up and operated for many years now a highly efficient system of domestic assistance for naval families in case of illness of the housewife.
The Association for Naval Officers (VMO), traditionally aiming at professional, social, and cultural activities, more recently has recognized the promotion of its members' interests as an important goal. In discussions on pay and fringe benefits with the authorities, both VBZ and VMO now coordinate with ten similar army- and air force-orientated associations, and as far as possible with the more extreme WDM.
A most interesting example of positive moves by institutions promoting the interest of their military members is the joint VBZ-VMO meeting held in Amsterdam on 24 October 1975. This meeting was attended by 5,000 members, most of them in uniform, to discuss the consequences of a proposal for drastic cuts in the defense budget. The meeting resulted in the drafting of a statement of concern by the joint associations, which was submitted to the congress. This action received considerable press coverage, most of it quite favorable, and the public clearly got the message that the navy needs the tools for its men to do their jobs properly.
On balance, I believe that military unionization can fulfill a valuable function if it is developed gradually and if it remains independent of the civilian sector.
“In VS, The Enemy Has Been Found and the Enemy Is Us”
(See S. L. Chappell, pp. 120-122, October 1976; J. Goodrich, pp. 87-88, December 1976; E. L. Jewett, p. 78, March 1977; F. H. Saunders, p. 83, April 1977 Proceedings)
Lieutenant (junior grade) J. A. Murray, U.S. Navy, Air Antisubmarine Squadron 32—The S-3A NFO-copilot issue has been a controversial one. It has been discussed in rhetorical terms by people on every side and from various backgrounds. As one of the originally trained NFO copilots (there are 14 of us), I have a vital, albeit slanted, interest in the problem, and I would like to appeal to all concerned for1 little cool-headed reason.
The man who occupies the rig*11 j front seat of the S-3A is the only one in the crew who has access to all of *^e : aircraft’s navigation, communication radar, and magnetic anomaly deter- tion (MAD) controls, and is a full Paft’ ner in the operation of the IR (‘n’ frared) and ESM (electronic warf*re support measures) gear. Obviously* 3 mission-oriented copilot is a trerne11' dous asset to his crew during an AS1* problem. I would not, of course maintain that there are no pifo1' trained S-3 copilots who are missfo*1' oriented. I do assert, however, thatc0 date I have not met one. Pilots wot*) about worldly things like angfo'ot' attack, automatic thrust control* night currency, “looking good around the ship,” and so on. All this is n0t reprehensible; it is simply part of pilot package.
A crew with two NFOs and ofie pilot would be expected, then, to be
significantly more mission-capabb than a two-pilot, one-NFO crew, and1 believe that fleet experience has de***' onstrated this to be the case. Why* then, is the issue still controversial? I*1 particular, why do many informed* experienced people maintain that the S-3 should have two pilots? I have e*1' countered three reasons, and I would like to address each individually.
► Safety of Flight. This argument say5 that flight safety—always the primaf consideration—is enhanced by t^e presence of two pilots at the control5*
I offer two objections to this line ot reasoning. First of all, safety is not the primary consideration. Mission effeC' tiveness is. Moreover, I have flow*1 with all of my squadron’s pilots, and the fact that I do not hesitate to strap in with any of them is testimony *° my faith in their ability to bring me back safely, single-handed. Secondly* there seems to be an underlying a5' sumption here that VS (air antisub' marine) pilots are simply not as good as, say, VA (attack) pilots, who are e*' peered to fly at high speeds and lo5*1 altitudes, day and night, and bring their birds back aboard safely. Do we really expect anything less from ^
the
aircraft was designed that way on
P'lots? I don’t think so.
* Experience for Junior Pilots. This argument is less clear. Junior pilots in other communities generally function ^uite well without any apprenticeship Pefiod in the fleet. The real substance chis argument is this: pilots should e mission commanders.
The pilot gets no sensor data from any of the s- 3’s avionics systems, and
Purpose. Safety of flight is assured °n,y when it is the object of someone’s ^divided attention. Safety, tactical Section of the aircraft, and coordina- tl0n °f the complex weapon system is a huge task for any one man, although have flown with one or two highly Capable and experienced individuals ^ 0 can handle it after a fashion.
oreover, in a four-man crew, I see n° reason not to share the responsibilities. Many people, however, Seem to believe that our pilots are not Professional enough to fly without ar>other pilot in the cockpit, yet are Capable of assuming the role of mis- sl°n commander.
The mission commander, then, mould be the TACCO (tactical coor- 'nator). That is what he has been tra'ned for —in fact that is the only lng he has been trained for—and uar is the way the aircraft was deigned. This brings us to the real crux the issue. It is rarely heard above a ^hisper, but it is there.
NFOs in the KS community represent a c allenge to an established hierarchy. The uPper levels of command throughout .e VS community are peopled exclu- Slvely with pilots. A VS squadron with aH two-NFO flight crews would be a sSuadron in which the NFOs out- Uumber the pilots two-to-one. That a group of proud, professional, and somewhat clannish men should be moved by arguments of reason to reduce themselves to minority status in their own community is perhaps too much to expect, pilot-NFO rivalry being what it is. This is an obstacle that has been met and overcome by NFOs in numerous other aviation communities, and it may yet be so in VS. I believe it is important, however, that the NFO copilot issue be put into its proper context.
It has been maintained, in Proceedings and elsewhere, that NFOs should be S-3 copilots because pilots don’t like to be. I don’t know what to say about a bad reason for a good proposition, so I won’t comment further. Basically, the argument for NFO copilots is that the S-3 A works better that way. And, the argument against us is one I like to paraphrase as “things should stay the way they’ve always been.” Tradition, of course, is valuable as long as it is productive. After that, however, it is just stagnation by another name.
“The Current Fitness Report: Howgozit?”
CSee W. T. Pendley, pp. 101-102, March 1977; R. E. Hauck, p. 90, July 1977; A. R. Shapack, pp. 66-68, August 1977; F. B. Shemanski, pp. 81-82, September 1977 Proceedings.)
Captain Walter “R” Thomas, U.S. Navy, Assistant Chief of Information for the U.S. Navy—Despite frequent attempts to shine a light of objectivity on the officer fitness report system, the gleam remains obscured. And, like “darkest Africa,” the darker part
There is no need, yet again, to call attention to the fact that most line officers are rated in the top 5% category of their fitness reports, except to remind everyone that any grade substantially lower than 5% implies that criminality is suspected. But it is important to mention that within the current system many officers benefit from an overall halo effect that often results in high marks which are not justified in areas such as “speaking” and “writing” abilities wherein many line officers are, in truth, woefully deficient—and often non-participatory.
One solution to solving the evaluation enigma would be to develop a fully objective grading system. Since this is considered, in some quarters, comparable to the desecration of shrines, a lesser shock to the hierarchical structure is proposed.
First, partial grading/weighting standards might be adopted for line officers in absolute categories, as follows:
A. Basic education: 10 points per college year successfully completed, with a maximum of five years; plus, 20 points for a master’s degree and 20 additional points for a doctor’s degree. Maximum: 100 points.
B. Technical qualifications: 50 points per qualified specialty such as surface warfare, naval flight officer, aviator, submariner, etc. Ten points for each sub-specialty qualification, as determined by BuPers. Maximum: 100 points.
C. Achievements/awards: Ten points for each special achievement such as OOD underway, qualified engineering officer (these cannot be earned twice on similar class ships); BuPers certified professional Navy schools (Surface Warfare Officer School [swos], Naval Justice, etc.); or, combat and other specifically designated meritorious awards. Lesser awards and letters of commendation could be assigned points as determined by BuPers. Maximum: 100 points.
D. Off-duty education: One point per course for each designated Navy or other professional correspondence course completed, plus one point per credit hour for each college course
72
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, October 1977
Figure 1 The Annual Evaluation Section
SPECIFIC ASPECTS OF PERFORMANCE (TYPE IN OCR CODE LETTEpFR ' 29. GOAL SETTING j | 30 SUBORDINATE man- I - & ACHIEVEMENT 1 AGEMENT S DEVELOPMENT | OM WORK SHEET) 31 WORKING | n 3?. EQUIP « MATER- 1 1 1 33.NAVY OB- RELATIONS j | IAL MANAGE III GAN SUPPO^^ • | |||
34 RESPONSE IN I ' STRFKSFIII | - SITUATIONS | 35. EQUAL fTl 36. SPEAKING | 1 | 37. WRITING OPPORTUNITY j ABILITY | ABILITY____________ J,, | |||
OESIRAEILITY (TY IE 1 1 57 COM- | OCR CODE FROM 8 OPERATIONAL | YORK. SHEET) j 59. STAFF j | 50. JOINT/ OSD | j 61. FOREIGN | SHORE_ ! • |
PERSONAL TRAITS (TYPE IN OCR CODE FROM WC - 67. JUDG- I I J 66. IMAGIN- . MENT I ATION | IK. SHEET) G9. ANALYTIC ABILITY | 170 PERSONAL BEHAVIOR | 1 71. FORCEFUL 1 NESS | | 72. MILITARY J bearing^__^JJ |
U.S. NAVY
The proposed fitness report system retains many blanks from the currently used report, but it weighs them differently.
categories A-G, and 300 maximum points in category H.)
An example of an ensign’s first report
Total 58
As a lieutenant (junior grade), the report
Therefore, with five years service'
2 o' of
the lieutenant has accumulated 197
completed on one’s own time. Special correspondence courses, such as the arduous Naval War College courses, could be given double weight (or more) per lesson. Maximum: 100 points.
E. War colleges/foreign language abilities: 15 points for each war college curriculum of nine to 12 months (ten points for five-six-month courses), plus one to 15 points for each foreign language qualification. (For example, 15 points would be allowed only for qualified translators or graduates of designated language schools.) Maximum: 100 points.
F. Responsible sea duty assignments (at least six months in job): Five points as division officer, ten points as assistant department head, 15 points as department head, 20 points as executive officer, and 30 points as commanding officer. Maximum: 100 points.
G. Responsible shore duty assignments (at least six months in job): Five points as assistant department head, ten points as department head, 15 points as executive officer, and 25 points as commanding officer. Equivalent staff positions would be designated by BuPers. (For example, a project manager would equate to a commanding officer.) Maximum: 100 points.
H. Annual evaluation section: Ten points maximum per annual report, with each item of the report graded from 0 (unsatisfactory) to 10 (outstanding). Although there are 20 individual items to be graded, each item would be assigned a value of 0 to 10. The 20 areas to be graded would remain the same as items 29-37, 57-61, and 67-72 in the current report. Since each of the 20 “subjective” items would be marked on a grade of 0-10, the total would be divided by 20 (the number of items) for an overall numerical grade. Therefore, a maximum total of ten points could be assigned to any single report. Maximum: 300 points throughout an officer’s career.
This last category assumes that officers will receive only one fitness report per year—all other reports (detachment, special, TAD, etc.) will be computed at the individual’s current or next command for annual averaging, on the applicable anniversary date, by the cognizant senior. These additional reports (detachment, special, TAD, etc.) would be attached to the annual report for filing and review purposes, and would eliminate short term “Not Observed" reports. Annual submission dates, by rank, would remain as they are now, or as revised by BuPers in the future.
After the first report was filed on a newly commissioned officer, items A-G would be revised and updated, as changes occurred, in the annual reports. The annual report would require brief justification for the update, together with a new total grade summary. This data could be programmed so that each selection board could have an accurate record of an individual’s score in every column, A-H, as well as a total count on a “base of 1,000.” (100 maximum points in seven might be:
A. ba degree—Notre Dame 40
B. na (not applicable) 0
C. swos school graduate 10
D.na 0
E. French language (2 year college) 2
F. NA 0
G.NA 0
H. Annual evaluations to date (1) 6 might read:
A. NC (no change) 40
B. NA 0
C. OOD-underway (add 10) 20
D.Correspondence course (add 3) 3
E. NC 2
F. 1st Division Officer (add 5) 5
G.NC 0
H.Annual evaluations to date (3) 20
Total 90
As a lieutenant, the report might read:
A.MA degree (add 20)
B.Surface Warfare Officer (add 50)
C.NC
D. College credits (add 6)
E. NC
F. Assistant Gunnery Officer (add 10)
G. NC
H. Annual evaluations to date (5)
Total
a possible 1,000 career points, course, when eligible for promotin'1, he will be compared with othe' ^ lieutenants on both his numerical b®se and the subjective weight which lieutenant commander promotin'1 board determines for each category- Additionally, a current summati011 statement would remain in each cer’s service record so that the officef and the command could assure th"c the evaluation was accurate.
A similar system can be adapted f°r enlisted evaluations, with minor reyl sions for Navy enlisted classificati°n designations, A, B, or C school5’ watch qualifications at sea, etc.
While it is not suggested that ”cljt scores” be established for promotin'1’ it is recommended that more tha® brief attention be paid to a statistic" base for the advancement of our futute officer corps, and less obeisance to the shrines of detailing officers and bally fluent evaluators.
This system still assures that about one third of an officer’s total grade will be based on his evaluation5’ which is about as subjective a systeff1 as we can stand in today’s technolog1' cal age. If we are ever to rely on objec' tive criteria, it is apparent that tne current fitness report system must be' come only an archaeological treasure-
The airship, on the other han1
d,
“The Rigid Airship in the Sea
Control Mission”
CSee B. B. Levitt, pp. 112-114, January 1977
Proceedings)
Robert P. Largess—Commander Levitt’s article will no doubt provoke much controversy. However, much of the discussion in recent years concerning the revival of airships has been unproductive. Extremes prevail: opponents dismiss the airship as obsolete, a useless fossil; while partisans tend to cite numerous functions which the airship could perform without regard to problems of development. No doubt both attitudes derive largely from the romance and disappointment of the airship’s career in a past era of technology.
But in fact the airship is no more or less than a machine, and it seems desirable to analyze it in terms of its engineering characteristics, capabilities, and limitations as a vehicle, without emotional overtones. Perhaps the simplest description of the airship as a vehicle is that it is between the surface ship and airplane, in terms of speed, range, endurance, payload, surface search ratio, bulk of equipment and cargoes carried, and many other features.
Like the airplane, the airship is free of friction and other hydrodynamic drag with the sea surface, which permits it to attain speeds in excess of displacement vessels’ speeds. But the means for achieving lift—obtained from an internal volume of helium— requires a tremendous surface area compared to the airplane. Drag from this source limits the airship to a practical maximum speed well below 100 knots.
However, at this speed the airship is capable of very great ranges and an endurance far in excess of any heavier- than-air (HTA) craft; no other airborne vehicle can match the 9,500-mile, ten-day voyages of the ZPG-2 ships in the 1950s. The airship has such endurance because its lift is obtained without any expenditure of power. The power required to lift airplanes, and to an even greater degree in helicopters, consumes vast quantities of fuel.
But is there a requirement today for
a vehicle intermediate in both speed and endurance between the surface ship and heavier-than-air craft in the U.S. Navy? The answer is yes, if the attention given the development of the surface effect ship (SES), hydrofoil, and semi-submerged ship is any indication. All these vehicles are attempts to achieve greater speeds than are possible by surface ships by breaking free of the air-water interface. At the same time they possess, because of efficiency in fuel consumption, far greater endurance and potential payload and size than HTA aircraft.
For what purposes have these “semi-airborne” vehicles been developed? Partly, as improvements on fast patrol boats, which are cheap, fast, difficult to spot and hit, and ideally suited for action in narrow, hotly contested waters. But partly, also, to screen larger naval ships or convoys. Surface warships have become too expensive for screening operations and require screens themselves; their speeds are insufficient to enable them adequately to cover the perimeters of a possibly very dispersed fleet formation. Greater speeds are necessary to make the escorts invulnerable to torpedoes, and give the escorts an advantage over the nuclear submarines. In addition, as suggested by Captain J. K. Clifford in his article, “A Hydrofoil Home for the V/STOL Jet” (December 1973 Proceedings), or in Captain R. C. Truax’s “Surface Effect Ships in the Surface Navy” (December 1973 Proceedings), these advanced hull forms offer the possibility of being equipped with a V/STOL (vertical or short take-off and landing) aircraft as their “main battery.” Due to their
high speeds, air operations from thesC vehicles would resemble those P1 oneered by airship “aircraft carriers’
All of the above statements apP^ equally well to the LTA (lighter-than air) craft, for example the Navy’s Zl’j' ships. The LTA’s speed, payl°a ' range, and endurance equalled or ceeded these newer “intermedia[C speed, endurance, and cost” craft- there any reason why the hydrofoil an SES are being contemplated as the fleet screen and convoy escorts of the futafe while the airship is not?
The answer again is yes. In spite 0 j similar speeds and payloads, they o' ■ fer dramatically in one respect. Like surface ship, the hydrofoil and SES c‘in “hide,” visually and electromagnetl cally, in the sea surface. As a result . they will be difficult to detect, iden tify, and hit. Conversely, they pay tn penalty of small radar horizons an I surface interference with their sensor5' which are also limited in numbers b) lack of space in these ships.
operating at hundreds or thousands 0 feet above the sea surface, with |t5 huge radar cross section, is most easy to detect by sight or radar. Howevef’ it enjoys a wide radar horizon simdaj
to the airplane’s. No doubt it c0j detect surface vehicles well beyon their strike ranges, but if it were to defended against airplanes an active defense would be necessary, with l(| terception of the attacker by the fleet S (or the airship’s) own HTA aircraft- any event, it would be no more vid nerable to this threat than a P-3- ^ fact, William O’Neil’s DoD rep0^ suggesting an LMNA (land-base multi-purpose naval aircraft)—a huge’
*°w. fixed-wing aircraft of tremen- 0us endurance for sea control and convoy escort—seems to be working ack toward the characteristics of
the
airship. Mr. O’Neil relies on the
Same defense—superior sensor and
fissile
hide
range—for his sea control ve- f ns Commander Levitt proposes 0r the airship. (Possibly the combina- tlQn of extreme range sensors and Smded weapons would suffice; an air- fP so equipped would resemble the 0r'ginal Missileer aircraft concept for ich the Phoenix missile was once
^tended.)
^he airship has four advantages over Patrol airplane, however. First, its
the
antastic endurance and ability to be ^Pienished from ordinary surface *ps make it much more independent ases and strategically more mobile. . ote: the ZPGs made two-way unreed Atlantic crossings and blimps ,0/e‘ed from escort carriers as early as 4-) Airplanes can only be concen- ed and dispatched to distant areas, vided that bases are within a few
hoi
'Urs reach.
Second, the airship
Nation
can remain on
a'tpla,
much longer. Although an
in
c°nvi
■ne can search a much larger area
shorter time, it cannot follow a °y across an ocean because of its
^‘Sher speed.
th^1'1^’ ^ecause °h *ts huge volume, airship can carry vastly larger sens aloft—potentially the largest an- ^ nas of any mobile vehicle, as °mrnander Levitt points out.
°urth, while the airship shares n the fixed-wing aircraft the advan- i.|,e Hear invisibility and invulnera- ^ y to the submerged submarine, it ares the surface ship’s or helicopter’s
ability to pierce the surface with integral, non-expendable, variable depth sonar. Again, the airship could carry more powerful and a larger array of antisubmarine sensors than any other form of aircraft.
The airship, however, does possess two unique disabilities. One is that its relatively low airspeed makes it vulnerable to reduced mobility in unfavorable winds. The second is that its huge surface area makes ground handling a problem.
The airship becomes more efficient in lift as its volume increases; but as its volume increases so does its area—simultaneously making the forces which crosswinds exert upon it more difficult to control when the vehicle is on the ground. The little two-man “sea scout” blimps used by the British in World War I could be manhandled in and out of sheds, or hauled to the ground and “bagged down” in bad weather, while their contemporaries, the German Zeppelins, were trapped by crosswinds in their sheds for many days out of the year. The actual solution to this problem seems to be to make the airship as independent as possible, first of sheds, then of the ground.
Whether these problems represent crippling drawbacks is impossible for me to say. Certainly they are nothing new, and the experience of ZPG operations should have provided the answers.
In summation, it seems that no exotic new vehicle beyond the ZPG is required to perform the tasks for which the airship is best fitted, through its great endurance and capability as a sensor carrier. As an an
tisubmarine vehicle, less a replacement for the P-3 for area surveillance than as an escort, the cheaper, more tactically mobile airship would be able to cover a wider area than a surface ship. And, as a vehicle for air and surface surveillance, the airship could be deployed to distant areas—the South Atlantic and the Indian Ocean—more quickly than a surface ship and remain on station longer than an aircraft.
Whether an advanced airship with multiple “sea-control” capabilities, armed with antiship missiles, remotely-piloted vehicles, or lightly-manned aircraft would be successful is a question which cannot yet be answered. But the same question cannot be answered for the antisubmarine SES, the hydrofoil aircraft carrier, or the 2,000-ton, land-based multi-purpose naval aircraft. The fact that such vehicles are being contemplated shows that there is a requirement for some vehicle between today’s surface ships and aircraft. This requirement has existed since the disappearance of the inexpensive, relatively capable surface escort as a feasible proposition.
Should the U.S. Navy resume development of the airship? Yes, probably. The hydrofoil and SES are not new concepts, but required the technology of the last decades to be realized as practical vehicles; just as important, they required the weapons and sensors developed in the last decade to acquire a real military utility. Perhaps the same conditions will prevail for LTA craft. But to resume its development all that is required is the reactivation of the last ZPG-3W and its reequipment with modern sensors and armament.
That Was No Lady . . . --------------------------------------------------------------------
^ ^He day, a lady came on board a warship and asked to see the captain. The officer of the sent an ensign below to tell the captain that he had a visitor, h she pretty?,” asked the captain. “Yes, Sir, very pretty,” replied the ensign.
^atet, after the lady departed the ship, the captain said, "Ensign, you certainly have a eT strange taste in women.”
Responded the ensign, “Well, Sir, I thought perhaps it might have been your wife.”
^ was,” said the captain.
Captain Edgar K. Thompson, USN (Retired) (The Naval Institute will pay $25.00 for each anecdote published in the Proceedings.)