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apoleon observed that . the whole art of - consists in a well reasoned and circumspect de- ense followed by rapid and audacious attack.”1 This ls precisely the approach Admiral of the Fleet of the 0viet Union Sergei G. Gorshkov has taken. From a Str°ng defensive posture, the Soviets have shifted to development of a wide-ranging, offensively Rented navy. To counter this development, the •S. Navy must devise a “well reasoned and cir- Curnspect defense” from which successful offensive derations can be conducted. This will require that
we forget the idea of superiority that has been the backbone of our naval strategy since before World War II. We must accept the reality that we are the underdog and thus employ the strategy and tactics of the underdog if we are to survive in a confrontation with the Soviet Union.
A warfare capability too long neglected that must receive priority attention under the new power relationship is mine warfare. Always effective, this capability can provide the cornerstone for a flexible defensive strategy that is the prerequisite to gaining control of a desired portion of the sea. Our mine warfare capability must be improved immediately.
The growth in the size and quality of the Soviet
Minelaying-1918
U. S. NAVY (NAVAL INSTITUTE COLLECTION)
Minelaying-1968
Every time the United States has employed mine warfare, the desired results have been achieved. The fear of mines, either real or perceived, is enough to cause an enemy to alter the employment of its vessels. In World War I, the United States participated in the mining of the North Sea and implanted more than 50,000 mines in a 240-mile-long zone to limit the employment of an aggressive German surface and subsurface Navy. In concert with the British, the combined mining commitment totaled more than 170,000 mines during the course of the war. More than 100 German warships and 40 submarines were sunk.
There are reasons why mine warfare has been at^ remains effective. Professor Andrew Patterson, Jr., ,n a lecture delivered at the Naval War College 1971, enumerated the advantages of mine warfare:
► Mines have profound psychological and politic[1] impact. The danger of mines is invariably deemed t0 be vastly greater than the mines really present.
► Mines are versatile and can attack not only mil1' tary targets but have telling effects on a nation5 economy and war-making capability.
Navy and the sea control strategy that has evolved for our own Navy make it vital that we critically appraise the value of mine warfare, our readiness to carry out mine warfare at strategic and tactical levels, and our willingness to take the steps required to eliminate the current low level of readiness. In fact, it is time the U.S. Navy changes its negative attitude toward mine warfare and begins in earnest to shape and harden our air, surface, and submarine forces as well-supplied and ever-ready mining forces.
Admiral James L. Holloway III sounded the keynote of this shift in attitude in 1975 by ordering Rear Admiral Roy T. Hoffman, Commander, Mine Warfare, to institute a mine readiness certification program. The voice of the CNO should be all that is required to get the Navy moving in this direction. In due course, other persuasion will be unnecessary because the Mine Warfare Inspection Group will leave its telling mark of “failure to meet certification standards” on some otherwise crack units. These cases will alert others, and the fear of inspection failure will achieve what should come naturally—a desire by every mine warfare-capable unit to stay trained and ready.
The effectiveness of past mine warfare experiences at both the strategic and tactical levels provides good reason to accent and give higher priority to this capability.
Throughout World War II, mining was effectively employed by the United States as both a strategy and a tactic. On the strategic level, “Operation Starvation” was carried out jointly by the British in the Atlantic and the Americans in the Pacific. The Pacific campaign consisted of saturation of Japanese home waters with more than 12,000 mines in a four-month period of 1945. More than 650 ships, including 65 men-of-war, were sunk or severely damaged. One ship was sunk for every 60 mines implanted in the Pacific campaign, and more than two millions tons of Japanese shipping were sunk by Allied mining during the war.
At the tactical level, the use of mines to bottle 32 Japanese ships in the harbor at Palau in the Carolines by carrier-based TBF Avengers was a superb success. Enemy ships were forced to remain in port where they became easy prey for follow-up strikes by the carrier dive-bombers and torpedo aircraft. All 32 were sunk, and three salvage ships that later tried to enter the harbor were sunk by the mines. The Japanese abandoned the port.[2]
More recent experience with mines in North Viet' nam further substantiates their total effectiveness- When President Richard M. Nixon reopened the ait offensive against the North in 1972 and committed the strategic bombers along with tactical aircraft ^ the Navy and Air Force to “Linebacker” operations! he also executed a mining contingency. Three maj°r ports were mined by naval aircraft, and nearly ^ ships were trapped in port. They remained there until the end of hostilities—more than 300 days. A1 the going rate of $18,000 per ship per day, the U-S- investment in mines versus the cost to the enemy 1(1 shipping costs justified the use of mines from 0ie dollar angle alone. The mining also cut North Vie1' namese imports by 30% and thereby reduce^ supplies reaching the combat areas by an estimate0 800 to 1,500 tons per day. The enemy "tail” ha^ been clipped.
Rerouting of supplies to overland routes also >n' creased the vulnerability of the supplies to around' the-clock strike operations and caused the diverse11 of large numbers of people from other war supp°ft missions to maintain the overland logistic flow- ^ short, a few mines at the right time had a vital i01' pact on the outcome of the last U.S. offensive again51 North Vietnam.
The American experience with mine warfare ha5 been paralleled by others throughout history' Perhaps that is why the Soviets now maintain an <n' ventory of mines more than 20 times as large as th3t of the United States. Admiral Gorshkov has ab° developed a formidable minesweeping force. He #e‘ appreciates the choking and limiting effect that m*n' ing would have on Soviet combatant vessels and th£lf use of the sea lines of communication. More thafl 170 Russian ocean minesweepers are backed up W 160 coastal and 16 shallow water minesweepers. Tne United States has only 39 ocean and seven coast^ sweepers and a significant helicopter sweeping cap3' bility.3
3Jean Labayle Couhat, editor, Combat Fleets of the World 1976/77: Tkl,( Ships, Aircraft, and Armament (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 19^’ pp. 426, 508.
^ Mines are waiting weapons that maintain long- tetrn vigilance waiting for the target to come to the ^'ne. A face-to-face confrontation can be avoided.
^ Mines are normally invisible weapons that may or may not be there. The layer has the option of an- n°uncing his execution of a mine plan for psycholog- 1CaI impact or surreptitiously laying the mines for Sutprise and maximum physical damage.
^ Mines are flexible and can be set to be active for speciflc durations.
^ Mines are ideally suited to provide a variety of responses to attain a chosen military goal. The intensity> area, and time of attack can be precisely Planned and executed.
* Mines change the geography of the theater and provide the layer sea control advantages.
There are additional advantages:
destruction when he challenges an announced minefield or avoiding his own destruction by avoiding the mines.
^ Mining is ideal for use in support of other operations. A full spectrum of mine warfare capability at hand for the use of the strategic and tactical planners will provide a multiplier for other conventional and nuclear capabilities.
► Mining can redress an unfavorable balance of forces in a theater. Mines can force enemy warships into selected channels and seas by denying access and transit through other straits and seas. Anchorages and narrows in the enemy’s sea lifeline can be effectively interdicted, thereby denying him reinforcement and supply support. He can be isolated and his tactics limited.
► Mines can be precisely laid by all naval
(JAMES C. FAHEY COLLECTION)
Mines are the ultimate standoff weapons — aUnch-and-leave devices that can be implanted when at)d where enemy defenses are the weakest. The attri- tlon of our limited laying forces, all of which have 0ther vital combat tasks to perform, must be ay°ided.
Mining is a war art that is acceptable to the ^rnerican people. This type warfare precludes the necessity for face-to-face confrontation and gives the enemy the option of either bringing about his own
These two ships represent a type non’ long gone from the U.S. Navy. The minelayers Keokuk (CM-8), left and Weehawken (CM-12) are shown at the Yorktown, Virginia, mine depot pier in November 1942.
Three VA-105 Corsair IIs, including one flou n by the author, carrying two Mk 52 mines each while operating from the USS Saratoga (CV-60) in March 1977. Inset: Mk 52 mine hung on A-7E aircraft, showing low-speed faring and fin assembly.
components—aircraft, surface ships, and submarines.
► Mines have a long shelf life and are therefore a sound investment.
► Mines are difficult to counter. Even the large Soviet minesweeping force would be hard pressed to counter a large coordinated U.S. mining attack.
► Mines are ideal weapons for the current political climate. While confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States has become a way of life, alternatives other than a nuclear confrontation must remain available to our leaders. It is possible that mine warfare could be waged without bloodshed in order to stabilize a deteriorating situation and provide time for negotiations and a settlement of differences.
Mining has been effective in the past and is an essential capability that must be retained. More than that, our ability to prosecute mine warfare must be improved. An apparent reluctance to make an increased commitment to mine warfare throughout the Navy must be overcome. What will be required to make improvements will not come easy. The Navy is now bringing on line a formidable family of mines. Included are the Mk 65 Quickstrike that will be effective in shallow water, the propelled rocket assisted mine (PRAM) that will cover medium depths, and the Captor mine/torpedo that will operate in deeper water. These programs must be expanded to provide large inventories at depots and on board every naval vessel so they will be readily available to the laying forces. Additionally, mine technology should receive a boost with a goal of developing a mine weapon or family of weapons that would allow the planting 0 mines that:
► Have no depth limit and can be moored in any se3
► Have the ability to identify and attack specif targets, both surface and submarine
► Can be monitored by the laying and relieving forces
► Can be destroyed or recovered by the laying fo[CC instead of swept when no longer required
► Have virtually indefinite shelf life
► Are easy to maintain as “all-up rounds” that can be positioned on board every ship and submarine Ifl the Navy and be available to every air unit—bot*1 carrier and shore based
► Can be delivered by all naval forces
► Are reliable and pack a kill wallop
► Can be produced in sufficient numbers to enafc>le all naval forces to count on their availability to fulfil existing and anticipated requirements.
This is a tall order. But is the development of th*s capability any less important than the effort pended to bring our conventional and nuclear warfet£ capabilities to their present state of readiness? Indeed not. For as noted previously, mine warfare is an al' ternative that is increasing in importance. We m^1 therefore, have available in great numbers sophist1' cared weapons that will in fact provide a deterrent t° aggressive actions by the world’s number ofle Navy—that of the Soviets.
A
While the requirement for large numbers^ perhaps 100,000 smart mines—might appear exceS' sive, their cost-effectiveness as a-weapon system makes them a wise investment. It should also be pointed out that once we have the advertised mineS and well-trained and deployed forces, we can in mos1 instances drop concrete blocks or old bathtubs at^ still get the desired psychological and political effect That is all that would have been required a1 Haiphong. And, of course, this is the same psycho!' ogy that has worked for more than 30 years from the development of the nuclear arsenals. We must buil^ an awesome mine inventory and delivery capability
b,
will build and sustain respect. Actual capability >s a prerequisite to this deterring respect.
Our minelaying forces must also be broadened and ^ter trained. Mine warfare should be a primary mission for every air, surface, and submarine unit.
continuing Mine Warfare Certification Program Is a step in the right direction. But we need training ^'ues, training facilities, and regularly graded exer- dses to evaluate our ability to precisely lay properly arrned weapons. The old rule that the way you prac- tlCe is the way you play applies to mine warfare train- lnS- Inadequate attention to this relatively simple Weapon-delivery maneuver will result in the poor results that have been repeatedly demonstrated by air Un'ts in infrequent training exercises and actual min- operations the author has observed during the ten years. Without practice and without an at- ritude of positive desire to get a good mine into a P'npoint spot on a preplanned mineline, mines can e dropped miles from where they are expected to be Wanted. Many are damaged on impact with the Water because of loading and switching errors. Mine Warfare training must therefore receive Navy-wide attention and renewed emphasis in individual unit Gaining plans.
Professor Patterson has accurately observed that ^Ose in the Navy who are charged with planning and executing mine warfare assume mines are avail- akle and ready while in fact they are not, know little rnine employment, and fail to realize that mines are complicated weapons that require special training ar>d preparation.4 These shortcomings must be rectified. Professor Patterson has a possible explanation °r why the Navy has failed to fully develop the potential of mine warfare. He says that the Navy is Vehicle oriented rather than weapon oriented and that ^•nes are the least desirable weapon for a delivery Pfi°t since he never sees one explode and can hardly e decorated for a mission that lacks “bang.” He c°ntends that mines have fallen into the category of Weapons more often chosen by the poorer nations.
hey are cheap and therefore below the dignity of a j?reat nation. He also notes that service in the mine 0fCe does not contribute to professional advance- rr'er>t. His final conclusion is that the mine is a basic aild ancient weapon that remains unsophisticated and datively unchanged by time.5
The time is ripe to reverse all of these conditions °Utlined by Patterson. First, we are in an era where a Weapon in use by one element of the Navy team is e'ng modified for use by others. The mine is ideally
p. 64.
suited for use by a wide variety of delivery systems. Navy people are vehicle oriented, but there is new interest in weapon orientation. As for the lack of bang appeal, the mine is a welcome weapon for delivery pilots who are now studying enemy target environments that are increasingly formidable. The mine can be delivered at low altitude and high speed when and where the pilot wants, and target defenses can be at least partially countered. This is a matter of survival that aviators understand. Aviators also understand that mines are effective weapons. The missing bang appeal is no longer a deterring factor.
Our effective employment of mines in North Vietnam is a clear indication that their use by the United States is as dignified as the employment of any other weapon system. And perhaps that is because the mine is no longer an inexpensive and unsophisticated weapon. Cost-effective, yes, but the new weapons—Captor, for example—are not cheap. Finally, there is Professor Patterson’s observation that mine service fails to contribute to professional advancement. This may have been true in the past, but it certainly cannot apply in the present and future. For just as vital to our national security as are the maintenance of strong conventional and nuclear forces, our mine warfare capabilities must also be held strong and ready. This will require that every possible unit be involved, thereby bringing a vast number of hard-charging line officers into the mine service. The best and most highly motivated of these officers should be singled out to oversee the development and maintenance of weapons and tactics that will ensure that the nation is defended by a mine warfare capability second to none, particularly since our Navy is now second to one. We require a new infusion of mine warfare believers and skilled practitioners to manage this dynamic capability. And our Navy leaders and Congress must be ready to support and reward their efforts to maintain it as the cornerstone of a well reasoned defense.
Napoleon would approve.
t Commander Taylor received his B.A. degree from the Naval Postgraduate School at Monterey in 1965 and is a 1975 graduate of the Army War College at Carlisle, Pennsylvania. After completing flight training in 1957, he served in several light attack squadrons (VA-12, VA-125, VA-113, VA-174, and VA-46) before assuming command of VA-46 in 1973. He has had three staff assignments, including duty as staff strike plans officer, Commander Task Force 77, in 1970-71. His duties included mine planning. He flew 200 strike missions over North Vietnam and accumulated 1,000 arrested landings and nearly 6,000 flight hours as a carrier pilot. Until August of this year, he commanded Carrier Air Wing Three on board the USS Saratoga (CV-60). He is now serving in OP-962 on the OpNav staff.