Professional Notes

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The Royal Navy: A New Philosophy 103 By Captain G. R. Villar, Royal Navy (Retired)

The Soviet Naval Air Force 96 By Norman Polmar

The Current Fitness Report: Howgozit? By Commander W. T. Pendley, U.S. Navy

The Soviet Navy’s principal strik­ing forces are its submarines and air­craft armed with antiship missiles. Soviet Naval Aviation ([SNA] or Morskaya Aviatsiya) or Aviatsiya Voenno-morskovo Flot is directly under navy control, as is U.S. naval avia­tion. However, SNA is a more highly specialized branch of service than its U.S. counterpart, with different ranks, career structures, and other characteristics different from the Soviet sea-going Navy.

Soviet Naval Aviation can be con­sidered one of five "air forces” within the Soviet defense establishment. (The other four components are: the Air Force of the National Air Defense [Protivo-vozdushnaya Oborona (Strany)], Long-Range Aviation [Aviatsiya Dal’nevo Deistviya], Frontal Aviation [.Frontovaya Aviatsiya], and Transport Aviation [Voenno-transportnaya Avi­atsiya].) These forces are organized along more pragmatic lines than are the U.S. military and naval air forces.

Soviet Naval Aviation has about 50,000 personnel and operates over 1,200 aircraft. This is a greater air­craft strength than the entire Royal Air Force if one discounts British training aircraft, but considerably less than the U.S. Navy’s strength of 7,100 aircraft. The Soviet Navy relies on the Red Air Forces for most train­ing requirements while the U.S. Navy has its own training command with some 1,500 aircraft.

In the mid-1950s, the Red Navy had some 4,000 aircraft. The decline in numbers to its present strength would seem to indicate a diminution of Soviet naval air prestige and capa­bility. In fact, quite the contrary is true: Soviet Naval Aviation today en­joys a major position in the allocation of Soviet resources. Possibly one-half of the production of the variable-wing “Backfire” bomber is being allocated to SNA; the aircraft carrier Kiev, at al­most 40,000 tons displacement, is the largest warship ever built in the Soviet Union and represents a considerable investment of resources; although A.A. Mironenko, the current Com­mander of SNA, is a colonel-general, his predecessor, 1.1. Borzov, held the rank of marshal of aviation at the time of his death in 1974. Borzov thus was senior in grade to all officers of the Soviet Air Forces except the Commander-in-Chief, Chief Marshal of Aviation P.S. Kutakhov.

After World War II the Soviet Navy devoted extensive resources to the development of antiship missiles, principally to counter U.S. Navy car­rier forces. Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Sergei G. Gorshkov has called this period of missile develop­ment the “revolution in military af­fairs.” Antiship missiles were devel­oped for use from surface ships, sub­marines, and land-based bomber air­craft.

Beginning in the late 1950s, Soviet aircraft were armed with a turbojet antiship missile, designated the AS-1 “Kennel” by the United States and NATO. A bomber could fire two of these missiles, which resembled scaled-down MiG fighters, with a standoff range of 60 miles from the target ship. In the early 1960s, large numbers of Tu-16 “Badger” medium bombers were transferred to the naval air arm. These aircraft, with “Kennel” and then more advanced antiship mis­siles, joined missile-armed submarines to become the primary striking force of the Soviet Navy.

Today, the Soviet Navy flies some 290 “Badger-C” and “Badger-G” air­craft armed with antiship missiles, the 100-mile-plus AS-2 “Kipper,” 100- mile-plus AS-5 “Kelt,” and the new AS-6 “Kerry.” These aircraft have a po­tent antiship capability against naval forces operating within range of Soviet airfields. Their tactical radius is nom­inally 1,500 to 2,000 miles with air- to-surface missiles, but this could be extended by overseas basing and in­flight refueling.

The missile-carrying Tupolev “Backfire” bomber, believed to have entered SNA service in late 1974 or early 1975, has a combat radius esti­mated at 2,750 to 3,500 miles, sig­nificantly extending the ocean areas vulnerable to Soviet naval air attack. Again, in-flight refueling can extend this range still farther.

American intelligence analysts also credit Long-Range Aviation (LRA) “Bear-B” and “Bear-C” bombers with AS-3 missiles and “Blinder-B” aircraft with AS-4 missiles as having some antiship capabilities. LRA aircraft have participated in antiship exercises, ap­parently under navy operational con­trol. This concept differs from U.S. Air Force proposals to employ B-52 bombers and other aircraft in the anti­ship role because the U.S. operations would be fully under U.S. Air Force control.

During the Soviet Navy’s periodic maneuvers, antiship bomber strikes are flown in close coordination with simulated missile launches from sur­face ships and submarines. The Soviet Navy has demonstrated the ability to carry out simultaneous air strikes against target ships in the North At­lantic and Western Pacific.

In addition to some 290 missile­armed “Badgers,” Soviet Naval Avia­tion flies several “Badger-A” aircraft in the conventional bombing and ad­vanced trainer roles, and some 50 Tu-22 “Blinder-A” bombers in the strike role. The “Blinder” has been rated by the U.S. Navy as “unsuccess­ful” in the naval strike role, although LRA has a number of "Blinder-B” air­craft carrying AS-4 “Kitchen” missiles as well as bomb-carrying “Blinders.”

Also capable of striking enemy ships are a few 11-28 “Beagle” light bombers that apparently can be em­ployed in torpedo attacks. These planes are believed to be used mainly for training, but could be used in at­tacks against merchant ships and pos­sibly lightly armed warships. Report­edly, they will be phased out of ser­vice in the near future and be replaced by fighter-type attack aircraft. (Ger­man sources identify these aircraft as Su-17 or Su-20 “Fitter” ground attack planes. They have variable-geometry wings, can carry almost 8,000 pounds of ordnance, and can fly at Mach 2.17 when “clean” and at 40,000 feet.)

Supporting the missile-armed strike aircraft are perhaps 75 navy-flown “Badgers” configured for in-flight re­fueling. LRA tanker aircraft also have conducted in-flight fuelings of naval aircraft, again demonstrating the high degree of interservice cooperation and the high priorities assigned to some maritime missions.

Other aircraft used in Soviet Naval Aviation’s strike operations are twin- jet Tu-16 “Badger-E” and “F” and later variants fitted for electronic reconnais­sance and countermeasures. Appar­ently these aircraft support missile­carrying planes in attacks against heavily defended targets.

Reconnaissance is a key element in potential Soviet operations against Western warships and merchantmen. There are about 100 Soviet naval air­craft configured for these missions. About one-half are large, turboprop

The Soviet Navy flies a variety of large, land-based bombers in an antiship strike role. “Backfire” <upper left) and “Blinder” (lower left) are pictured. The “Fitter” ground attack aircraft (above) will reportedly join the Soviet naval air arm soon.

“Bear-D” aircraft with ranges of about 8,000 miles, and half are “Badger- Ds.”

These aircraft use electronic sensors and visual observation to detect sur­face ships. They can provide the loca­tion of enemy ships to strike forces and some, if not all, have the equip­ment to guide antiship missiles launched by surface ships, sub­marines, and other aircraft.

Although the large, M-4 “Bison-C” variant of the turbojet bomber has been used for maritime reconnaissance in the past, U.S. sources indicate that this plane is no longer flown by Soviet Naval Aviation. The Soviet Union now seeks to use satellites to detect ships at sea; however, the reconnais­sance and weapons-guidance pooling capabilities of the “Bears” and “Bad­gers” flown by Soviet Naval Aviation will be needed for the foreseeable fu­ture because of their flexibility and multiple sensors.

The naval “Bears,” like other Soviet land-based aircraft, normally operate

from airfields in the U.S.S.R. From 1970 onward, “Bear-Ds” have flown periodically from Cuba, some making flights along the U.S. Atlantic coast, and from 1973 onward from Guinea in western Africa. These flights per­mit reconnaissance over much of the North Atlantic. “Bear-Ds,” flying from the U.S.S.R., have also operated over the Indian Ocean by overflying Iran. It is not known if they have used airfields in the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen or Somalia, but the use of bases in those Indian Ocean states by other Soviet naval aircraft makes “Bear-D” operations probable. Other “Bear-D” recce aircraft have op­erated over the Western Pacific from bases in Soviet Siberia. The “Badg­ers,” smaller than the "Bears,” gener­ally are used to keep track of Western warships closer to Eurasian shores. “Badgers” generally attempt to keep track of major ships of the U.S. Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean.

Soviet Naval Aviation also appears to have a few An-12 turboprop trans­port aircraft for electronic reconnais­sance. This plane, designated “Cub- C” by NATO, has been observed over the Norwegian Sea, the eastern Mediterranean, and western Indian Ocean.

Increasingly, the Soviet Navy em­ploys satellites for maritime surveil­lance, with two types of satellites in the Cosmos series being used for this mission. One satellite is a passive elec­tronic intelligence (ELINT) collection satellite, which seeks to detect elec­tronic emissions from ships. The other is an active radar satellite, which ap­parently seeks to form an electronic "picture” of the ocean surface.

Through the use of an extensive command, control, and communica­tions (C³) system, the data from these satellites are transmitted to Soviet Navy headquarters in Moscow and, presumably, to other navy command centers. Soviet pronouncements on the ability of a single commander, ashore or afloat, to direct multi-ocean opera­tions indicate that elaborate satellite sensor terminals as well as other C³ facilities are found at several shore lo­cations, as well as in certain flagships. Thus, the information gleaned by these satellites and from naval recon­naissance aircraft has become a key element in Soviet naval operations.

The Soviet Union, primarily a land power, has traditionally had only lim­ited need for ocean shipping. That situation is changing. Since the early 1960s, the U.S.S.R. has maintained a flow of Soviet-flag and Bloc merchant shipping to Cuba. In the Vietnam War, merchant ships carried most of the material transported from the U.S.S.R. to North Vietnam; and the Soviet political-economic interests in Asia, Africa, and South America have further increased Soviet use of the sea and hence its vulnerability to U.S. submarines. Thus, there has been an increasing Soviet interest in antisub­marine warfare (ASW) for protecting its shipping.

But more significant, since the de­ployment of the first Polaris missile submarine in late 1961, U.S. sub­marines have threatened the Soviet homeland with submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). The Polaris represented an entirely new type of threat because of the relatively short launching and flight times of its SLBMs compared with manned bomb­ers or the early ICBMs based in the United States, and the impossibility of pretargeting a moving submarine.

The Soviet approach to ASW has been far different than that of the U.S. Navy.* However, there have been some similarities in the two navies’ ASW aircraft development. Soviet Naval Aviation’s long-range maritime reconnaissance/ASW force is made up of about 75 Be-12 "Mail” fly­ing boats, over 50 11-38 “Mays,” and a *See N. Polmar, “Thinking About Soviet ASW,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings Naval Review, May 1976, pp. 108-129.

few ASW variants of the “Bear.” These aircraft appear to be used over the coastal seas of the Soviet Union and such nearby seas as the Mediterranean. Although some have been flown from Egypt with Egyptian markings, they generally do not operate from distant bases as do U.S. Navy maritime patrol squadrons. Thus, the land-based Soviet naval aircraft cannot be consid­ered effective counters to U.S. Polaris/Poseidon submarines operating at their maximum missile ranges of about 2,500 nautical miles. (The first Trident submarine, with a missile range of about 4,000 miles, should begin entering the U.S. fleet in 1979 or 1980, and will further reduce Soviet land-based air ASW effective­ness.)

In addition to radar, magnetic, and optical detection equipment, Soviet aircraft can drop expendable sonobuoys to radio data to aircraft whose on-board computers perform tactical calculations.

For shipboard ASW, the Soviet Navy flies the turboshaft Ka-25 “Hormone-A” helicopter. This helicopter presents an “ugly” appear­ance with its tandem rotors distinctive to Kamov designs. Developed specif­ically for shipboard operation, it has chin-mounted radar, dipping sonar, and can drop sonobuoys. An internal weapons bay can hold torpedoes or depth charges.

The “Hormone” initially went to sea in 1967 with the “A” configura­tion for ASW flying from the Moskva- class helicopter carriers and the “B” configuration for over-the-horizon targeting of guided missiles on board the “Kresta-I” missile cruisers.

The Moskva and her sister carrier Leningrad were developed to counter U.S. submarines armed with the Polaris strategic missile. The 1,200- nautical-mile range of the initial Polaris A-l missile actually limited the operating areas of U.S. missile sub­marines to restricted areas in the Norwegian Sea or Barents Sea. Thus, the ability of a Moskva-class ship to concentrate 15 to 20 helicopters could be considered an effective counter to the submarines carrying A-l missiles. However, in mid-1962 the 1,500- mile Polaris A-2 became operational, followed in 1964 by the 2,500-mile A-3. These longer-range missiles gave U.S. missile submarines sufficiently large operating areas while still being able to target Moscow, as a result seriously limiting the effectiveness of the Moskva-c\&ss ships. The Moskva program was halted after only two ships were built.

Subsequently, the ASW-configured “Hormone-A” helicopter has gone to sea in the “Kresta-II” and “Kara” antisubmarine cruisers, and, more re­cently, in the aircraft carrier Kiev. The “Hormone-B” with its over-the- horizon missile targeting and guid­ance equipment was limited for al­most a decade to the “Kresta-I” cruis­ers which are armed with the 300- mile-plus SS-N-3 “Shaddock” missile. The four earlier "Kynda”-class cruisers which also carry the “Shaddock” have a helicopter landing area, but no han­gar or other major aircraft support facilities.

The carrier Kiev, in addition to some 15 to 20 “Hormone-A” helicop­ters, carries a couple of “Hormone-B” helicopters, probably to support the

Yak-36 “Forger”

ship’s long-range SS-N-12 missile sys­tem which is the apparent successor to the “Shaddock” missile.

While the intended missions of the Moskva and Leningrad are obvious, there is much speculation on the roles of the larger carrier Kiev and her sister ships. The Kiev, some 925 feet long and displacing almost 40,000 tons, is also a missile cruiser forward with multiple antiaircraft and antisub­marine weapons as well as the long- range SS-N-12 cruise missiles.

In addition to her “Hormone” helicopters, the Kiev operates some 15 Yak-36 “Forger” VTOL (vertical take-off and landing) aircraft. The “Forger” is a Harrier-type, subsonic fighter/strike aircraft. Because of the number of var­iations seen on board the Kiev when the carrier went to sea in 1976, in­cluding some two-seat versions, the “Forger” still may be in development. Still, it has shown that the Soviets in­tend to operate modern fixed-wing aircraft as well as helicopters from the Kiev and her sister carriers.

Although the Kiev could not stand up against a modern U.S. carrier with the latter’s squadrons of high- performance fighters and attack planes, the Yak-36s and later VTOL or V/STOL (vertical or short take-off and landing) aircraft could have a field day against reconnaissance planes and low-performance combat aircraft in those areas where airfields or carriers are not available to the West, or the Soviet fixed-wing aircraft could be used in a strike or close-air support role. The number of U.S. overseas land bases has been dramatically re­duced over the past few years, and the number of U.S. aircraft carriers has declined from 24 to 13 over the past decade.

Estimates vary on numbers of Kiev- type ships the Soviets can be expected to build. The yard at Nikolayev, where the Kiev was built, could pro­duce carriers of that size at intervals of about three years. There is at least one additional yard at Leningrad which could immediately undertake the con­struction of sophisticated warships of that size.

Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., the U.S. Chief of Naval Operations from 1970 to 1974, has stated: “In my judgment they are going to build a larger number [of Kiev-type ships] than the combined number of our car­riers, plus sea control ships.” That number would indicate a Soviet force of at least 20 carriers. The eight planned U.S. sea control ships, essen­tially small V/STOL carriers, have not been built; a more capable but later V/STOL support ship has been proposed by the U.S. Navy.

Shortly before the Kiev sailed into the Mediterranean and the Atlantic on her first deployment in July 1976, an official U.S. Navy study [Office of the Chief of Naval Operation, “CVNX Characteristics Study Group Report,” January 1976] noted: “it is antici­pated that after operational experience with the early Kz'ef-class ships the Soviet Union will develop still larger carriers to gain the benefits that ac­crue to larger ship design (e.g., the greater aircraft, aviation fuel, and avi­ation ordnance capabilities).”

While the exact roles of the Kiev were not known as this volume was written, it is interesting to note that the Soviet Union has regularly em­ployed the Moskva and Leningrad in the political presence role, taking to sea foreign leaders to permit Soviet of­ficials to entertain them in an advanced-technology, isolated envi­ronment, and to demonstrate the naval capabilities of the U.S.S.R.

Also, in 1974 the Leningrad oper­ated in the Red Sea, flying Mi-8 “Hip” helicopters to sweep mines from the southern end of the Suez Canal. (At the same time, the U.S. Navy was sweeping the canal, using RH-53 Sea Stallions from a helicopter carrier.) These Soviet aviation ships also are capable of an amphibious role. The Soviets are well aware of the potential effectiveness of a few hundred marines landed in the right place at the right time and are increasingly employing helicopters in the assault transport of ground troops and marines.

Soviet Naval Aviation is fully inte­grated into the Soviet Fleet structure. At the navy headquarters level, there is the Commander of Naval Aviation, currently Colonel-General Mironenko. Born in 1918, Mironenko served in World War II as a fighter pilot. He became Commander of Soviet Naval Aviation in 1974, having previously served briefly as Chief of Staff, and be­fore that, from 1956 to 1971, as Commander Naval Aviation of the Black Sea Fleet. His long assignment with that fleet made him a key figure in the development and operation of the Moskva and Kiev classes of carriers. Mironenko replaced Marshal of Avia­tion I. I. Borzov, who commanded Soviet Naval Aviation from May 1962 until his death in June 1974. Borzov, who had been First Deputy Com­mander of Naval Aviation from 1957 to 1962, was one of the architects of the modern Soviet naval air arm. His tours in the two top naval air assign­ments correspond with the tenure of Admiral Gorshkov as Commander- in-Chief of the Navy, during which the Red Fleet underwent its transition to one that now can challenge the U.S. Navy in many areas of naval op­erations.

The Red Navy’s aircraft, except for a few training, support, and transport aircraft, are apportioned among the four fleets—Northern, Baltic, Black

Sea, and Pacific. Each fleet com­mander appears to have direct control of his air assets, with a colonel-general or lieutenant-general commanding the fleet aviation component. A fleet avia­tion command, like many other Soviet commands, is a long-term assign­ment. Colonel-General G. A. Kuznet­sov, now Chief of Staff of SNA, was air commander in the Northern Fleet from 1966 to 1975; Colonel-General S. A. Gulyayev has commanded in the Baltic since 1961; Lieutenant-General V. I. Voronov in the Black Sea and Lieutenant-General A. I. Pavlovskii in the Pacific have held their positions since 1971. The present Commander of Naval Aviation in the Northern Fleet has not yet been identified in the open press. The other key men in the naval aviation organization are Colonel-General A. N. Tomashevskii, Deputy Commander, Major General

P. V. Mordashenkov, Chief of the Political Department, and Lieu­tenant-General M. M. Kruglov, Senior Aviation Engineer.

The composition of a fleet’s air arm is classified; however, the Northern and Pacific fleets obviously have most if not all long-range “Bear” reconnais­sance aircraft because of their open- ocean missions. The Baltic Fleet is configured to fight in that enclosed area, while the Black Sea Fleet primar­ily provides ships and aircraft for Mediterranean operations. Although most Soviet ships in the Indian Ocean come from the Pacific Fleet, land- based air support is provided from the Black Sea Fleet. The helicopter car­riers Moskva and Leningrad are as­signed to the Black Sea Fleet. The permanent assignment of the Kiev is not yet known, but in 1976, when she became operational, she was trans­ferred from the Black Sea, where she was built, to the Northern Fleet.

The high rate of modernization of Soviet Naval Aviation, as currently manifested in the deliveries of the “Backfire” strike aircraft, “Fitter” at­tack aircraft, and the Yak-36 “Forger” VTOL, can be expected to continue. In the near future, a new helicopter can be expected to appear for use on board the Kiev and the growing number of Soviet missile cruisers.

Soviet Naval Aviation thus will re­main one of the two major strike components of the Soviet Navy, espe­cially in light of the deliveries of the new “Backfire” aircraft. Indeed, the immediate allocation of this aircraft to the Soviet Navy, as well as to Long- Range Aviation, demonstrates the high priority allocated to this arm of the Soviet Navy.

The Current Fitness Report: Howgozit?

By Commander W. T. Pendley, former Commanding Officer, Patrol Squadron Forty-Five, currently Operations Officer, Patrol Wing Eleven

Does the current U.S. Navy officer evaluation system provide “a complete and comprehensive evaluation” which accurately reflects past performance, personal traits, and future potential? Is the current fitness report a useful tool for selection boards and detailers? Has the requirement to apprise the of­ficer of his performance and show him his fitness report had a positive or negative overall effect?

BuPers Instruction 1611.12D is the current directive establishing the sys­tem for the evaluation of the perfor­mance of all naval officers. This sys­tem has been in effect Navy-wide since January 1974, and it appears to be time to reassess the OCR (optical character reader) form NavPers 1611 and the overall officer evaluation sys­tem.

Having recently commanded an op­erational squadron with 65 to 70 of­ficers, I had the opportunity to ob­serve the effects of this evaluation sys­tem in a relatively large wardroom and in other co-located units. This ar­ticle is a summation of my observa­tions and recommendations concern­ing the present evaluation system.

First, with regard to the current OCR form, revisions to categories for evaluation of performance are re­quired. The specific aspects of perfor­mance are strongly oriented toward a management situation and with a minor one-word change in block 33 could be used by any business firm to evaluate junior executives. To make the fitness report more pertinent to a naval officer’s performance, it would be clearer to substitute: (1) Perfor­mance in primary billet as ; for

Goal setting and achievement. (2) Leadership and development of subor­dinates; for Subordinate management and development. (3) Performance in

collateral billets as _ ; for Navy

organizational support. And, retain : (4) Performance in watch-standing as

_______ ; (5) Performance in warfare

specialty as ___ ; and (6) Perfor­

mance in professional subspecialty as

_____ Since these major areas are

the areas in which a naval officer is required to perform professionally, they should, therefore, be the areas in which he or she should be evaluated.

An evaluation of the officer’s speak­ing and writing ability and his or her support of equal opportunity in the U. S. Navy should be retained, but they are not the more significant areas of professional performance.

Mission contribution or overall per­formance with its summary data should be retained as the most impor­tant single indicator of relative stand­ing among peers. The categories, 1%, 5%, etc., are basically meaningless and could be reduced to the five categories of outstanding, excellent, effective, satisfactory, and unsatisfactory. Any five categories with any five descrip­tive terms would provide for adequate differentiation of performance. Percen­tages imply a bell curve which is not required nor desirable.

A clear ranking requirement for all officers of equal rank in the command, rather than just for those recom­mended for accelerated promotion, could be added by using the following format:

(1)     Ranks (standing) of (total as­signed) assigned (rank) in this command.

(2)     Is (relative seniority) of (total assigned) assigned (rank) in this command.

(3)     Is (ranking) in time on board of (total assigned) assigned (rank) in this command.

Trend of performance should be clearly indicated as in the present form.

Two additional spaces could be provided to record courses or schools completed by the officer during the reporting period and awards or recog­nition received (unit and individual). With these additions and modifica­tions, this section would clearly and concisely evaluate all aspects of profes­sional performance including a rank­ing among peers and a trend analysis.

The current form severely limits the personal traits evaluated. For example, traits such as initiative, loyalty, coop­eration, self-confidence, energy, deci­siveness, involvement, integrity, and dedication are not included at all or have been effectively submerged in the much broader categories of blocks 29 through 35. Limitations on the num­bers of personal traits evaluated and, particularly, not specifically evaluat­ing such critical command traits as in­itiative and decisiveness gives only a partial description of the naval officer. A broader list of personal traits should result in the report being a more use­ful picture for selection boards and de- tailers. The requirement for a ranking of all officers discussed above should encourage more candid evaluations of both performance and personal traits.

The final requirement of any evalu­ation system is a clear indication of potential. This could be indicated by a combination of three basic blocks. The first of these could address poten­tial using five descriptive categories, e.g. unlimited, excellent, satisfactory, limited, or none. This factor is cur­rently a comment item but could eas­ily be included in the format. The second block would deal with desir­ability as in the present form. The categories could be revised to com­mand, operational staff, support activ­ity, subspecialty area, and service rep­resentative (i.e. OSD, joint staff, over­seas duty, NROTC, recruiting, etc.). Finally, there should be provision for recommendations for promotion (ac­celerated, regular, or none), augmen­tation, postgraduate education, and specific types of duty.

The changes indicated above would expand the current form to provide a more complete and comprehensive evaluation of past performance, per­sonal traits, and future potential. The changes could easily be incorporated into an OCR format and adapted to a computer program. The changes should significantly reduce the narra­tive comments to specific achievements for use in detailing and in presenta­tions to selection boards. The revised report should result in a more com­plete picture of the naval officer and thereby be a more useful tool for selec­tion boards and detailers.

Now we must turn to the final key question posed at the beginning of this discussion: “Has the requirement to apprise the officer of his perfor­mance and show him his fitness report had a positive or negative overall ef­fect?” My observation has been that the overall effect is negative, and the requirement has not contributed to improved unit performance or the de­velopment of more professional naval officers. The only discernible positive effect has been an established re­quirement for counseling. However, even in this regard, counseling should be a day-to-day activity and should not be carried out by the commanding officer except in very small units. It should normally be done by the of­ficer’s immediate senior in the chain of command. Counseling should be concerned with the development of the naval officer and not his evalua­tions.

The overriding negative effect is a growing obsession with performance evaluations rather than with perfor­mance. There is too much concern today with relative standing and an unhealthy competitive spirit which does not encourage cooperation and working together to achieve unit goals and objectives. In summary, this cur­rent requirement does not necessarily contribute to the forging together of a wardroom in the Nelson tradition of a “band of brothers,” but rather tends to promote an atmosphere akin to sibling rivalry. To provide counseling is a valid requirement of command but the tying of counseling to fitness reports is a form of "forced feeding” which has had a negative overall effect and should be discontinued.

Officer performance evaluation is a command prerogative and responsibil­ity and should not be subject to the review of the officer evaluated. Offi­cers’ fitness reports should be for­warded to the Bureau of Naval Per­sonnel as a communication between the commanding officer and the Bureau. Signature of the officer evaluated should not be required and comment not solicited. Copies of fit­ness reports should be provided to the officer concerned at the completion of each tour for his personal records and should not be available to him during the current tour.

The revisions of the fitness report presented above, coupled with a re­moval of the requirement for a signa­ture and counseling directly tied to the fitness report, should encourage more objectivity and a clearer descrip­tion of each officer. A required profes­sional prospective commanding officer course established and conducted by the Bureau of Naval Personnel for all warfare specialties and communities could, among other things, facilitate better overall evaluations and more Navywide consistency in standards of evaluations.

No system of human evaluation will be purely objective or achieve per­fection. It is submitted that the re­commendations presented here would result in an improvement in the cur­rent evaluation system.

Britain’s Royal Navy still has a highly significant role to play despite a dwindling Ministry of Defence budget and with the last of her car­riers to be decommissioned in a year or two. Perhaps it is less than it once was, and more confined to the NATO sea area, nevertheless the Royal Navy remains the foremost fleet in Western Europe.

Less money has not only forced a reduction in size, but ensured that the maximum use be made of what is available. And the expected loss of the carrier force, with its ability to strike direct at the enemy, has brought a new philosophy and new weapon sys­tems. To understand this navy, it is necessary to understand the role of the Royal Navy, and how it has evolved a new concept for the use of ships and weapons.

Nuclear war is the ultimate. Every step taken on the ladder of war has the intention of avoiding an all-out nu­clear battle. Even the Polaris sub­marines themselves are deterrents only, for once they fire their missiles the war is effectively lost for both sides. So there tends instead to be a nuclear stalemate which allows conventional war to be possible.

In terms of conventional war, that famous American, Admiral A. T. Mahan, analyzed the purpose of navies as twofold: (1) to protect commerce, and (2) to project power. The projec­tion of power, in terms of the Empire, may be a thing of the past but, in terms of providing a visible capability to prevent an enemy’s maritime opera­tions, it is very much a matter of the present. And the protection of com­merce from attack by ships, sub­marines, and aircraft is vital to a na­tion heavily dependent on its seaborne trade.

Britain’s naval philosophy may therefore be summed up as the deter­rence of nuclear war; the protection of commerce in conventional war, at whatever level that may occur; and the visible ability to show force to deny an enemy’s maritime operations. Whilst these are not all exclusive, they point the direction of the main of naval de­velopment.

Although Mahan’s analysis of the role of navies is as true today as when it was made, there are fundamental changes in the method of conducting a war which have only begun to show in the past few years.

Mahan’s naval war was a close fought affair. It was characterized by two basic factors: the need to locate and identify the enemy visually, and, having done so, to strike at the enemy’s weapon platform—generally a wooden ship. It was a matter of striking blow for blow and endeavor­ing to put the enemy’s weapons out of action by sinking or capture.

The same basic concept applied even into World War II. Despite the introduction of much sophistication and the use of radar, an above water enemy had to be identified visually as an enemy before opening fire; a sub­marine, whilst not visible, would be identified at comparatively short range simply because its presence was un­explained or because it fired its weapons. In both cases fire could thus be directed to the same purpose of sinking or capturing the enemy vessel and its weapons. The change that did occur was in the range at which op­posing fleets fought: carrier aircraft took this out to several hundreds of miles; guns reached almost to the horizon; and torpedoes were developed with longer and longer ranges.

World War II did provide a great impetus to weapon development, and this trend has continued. In the face of the long-range strike capability of the carriers, so ably demonstrated in war, the Russians, instead of develop­ing defensive systems, placed em­phasis on acquiring their own long- range strike capability. Antiship mis­siles became widespread with quoted ranges of up to a 100 miles or more.

The tactical use of such missiles brought problems which are still partly unsolved. How do you locate the enemy at long enough range to match the missile’s capability? How do you know that the target is an enemy? Perhaps the Russians have enough offensive intent to enable them to attack without identification. Perhaps they believe they could at least detect and identify very large task forces at long ranges.

Certainly the Russians must have great difficulty in identifying small groups of ships or single units at long range. Equally certainly a Western navy, dedicated to its peaceful princi­ples, would need to identify the enemy first.

Thus, even in the antiship missile era, war at sea is generally subject to the same two basic factors which applied in Mahan’s day: find ’em and finish ’em.

The main factor which has changed today is the ability to overwhelm an enemy ship in one surprise blow. The power of modern weapons is so devas­tating that he who fires first may well win the day. Defense therefore be­comes of pressing importance, particu­larly if one is peacefully minded. An offensively-minded nation may get away with offensively-armed ships with little defense, as the Russians do, although even they are reputed to be­lieve that their surface fleet is expend­able. But this is a safe move only if one knows that one will achieve sur­prise with such a devastating blow that no reply will be possible.

Thus a defense against missiles be­comes essential to a peacefully-minded West. And the battle is a joint one of defending against the missiles while, at the same time, attempting to sink the enemy’s missile-firing platform.

Since Mahan’s day, there has been a gradual shift in the concept of war from striking at the enemy direct, to a combination of striking at the enemy and defending against his missiles. The range at which one may strike at the enemy has increased greatly, but the limiting factor is, as ever, the need to locate and identify the enemy before firing. And the above water war depends largely on visual identifi­cation.

In 1967, the Russians launched their first ocean surveillance satellite. Today they have numerous satellites in orbit. While the exact characteris­tics of these systems are not known, it is safe to assume that the Russians will soon have the ability to track and identify shipping worldwide. Perhaps there will be a minimum size of ship which they can track—500 tons or so—but they should be able to monitor the majority of the world’s navies and merchant fleets.

Having done this, there is little to prevent them feeding target location and identification into a missile con­trol system. Nor, as technology ad­vances, is there much to prevent this missile being fired from the U.S.S.R. proper. Can one then attack the firing platform with the same relative ease as one would an enemy ship? Can one even identify the firing platform in the whole of the U.S.S.R? Would any attack on the firing platform be considered an escalatory act which might lead to nuclear war? The prob­lem bristles with politico-military dif­ficulties.

So the future sees yet greater diffi­culty in striking at the hostile missile-firing platform. And, necessar­ily, there must be a greater degree of emphasis on defense against missile attack.

But one must not forget that offen­sive weapons placed this emphasis on defense. Offensive weapons have made the enemy go to longer and longer range; they have made it more expen­sive and complex for him to attack; and they have resulted from greatly advanced technology. And one must retain these offensive weapons, and improve them.

War is a matter of offense and de­fense; of making the enemy believe that it will be so costly for him to at­tack that he thinks several times be­fore doing so; and of ensuring that one's defense is good enough to sur­vive a first surprise attack and yet able to deliver a devastating return second strike. Increasingly, however, the dif­ficulties of offense are becoming appar­ent as the potential range of enemy missiles increases. And a peacefully- minded West, which will never con­template making the first offensive at­tack, must have an adequate defensive system.

The threat against which it must defend itself is becoming more and more severe. From the early days of the SS-N-l and the AS-1—ship- and air-launched missiles which were large and subsonic—the Russians are mov­ing towards faster and smaller mis­siles. As yet they have not concen­trated seriously on extended range, though that is beginning to come with their SS-N-13 which appears to rely on satellite target information.

Today, however, the trend is, inter alia, towards smaller and faster. Mass attacks may saturate the defenses. Short-range attack from submarine- launched missiles may catch the de­fenses unawares. Missiles may descend from near the zenith above the radar cover of the defenses.

To deal with these, one must have a high-performance system which is completely automatic; no human can react with the speed necessary to deal with a missile approaching at Mach 3 plus. Nor can human reactions be equated with the surprise of an anti­ship missile being fired by a sub­marine and lofting itself out of the water at supersonic speed only a few miles away.

The British reply lies in a defense in depth largely dependent on two surface-to-air missile systems: the Sea Dart and the Seawolf.