Nobody Asked Me But ...

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Can do!

Should do?

Serious problems exist within the Navy, and they are centralized in its junior officers.

Young officers are quick to place the burden of fault upon all other members of the chain of command rather than to carefully examine themselves. Within one breath junior officers complain of their commanding officer violating the chain of command by speaking directly to the chiefs, while they take pride in doing all the “coun­seling” of subordinates. Junior officers will blame their seniors for not conducting proper training and yet feel justified in leaving all the enlisted indoctrination up to their divisional training petty officers. In anger, they accuse seniors of not briefing them on their responsibilities, yet they have never outlined their own objec­tives and communicated them to their own divisions or departments. They will damn the apparent inconsistencies practiced by their CO at captain’s mast, while rationalizing why they should not enforce grooming standards or saluting regulations. They will admonish vehemently their department heads for not allowing the division officers to run liberty, and yet they will complacently drive a vessel through heavy fog at 15 or 20 knots, as was confided to me by at least 30 officers.

Although the officers driving the vessels at such illegal speeds said they were well aware of the illegality, they were quick to provide reasons for their lack of compliance with the rules of the road. Many have stated that they depended completely upon radar to guide them past dangerous areas. Some have stated that although they had informed the commanding officer of the situation, he still pressed the officer of the deck to continue at that speed. In this situation, the junior officer then comments, “He’s the CO, it’s his responsibility, his order, and I just do what he tells me to do!” Apparently these officers believe that they are totally relieved of all forms of accountability simply because the CO gave them an order. It would seem that the results of Nuremberg have gone unheeded as to what happens when we blindly follow illegal (and/ or immoral) orders.

Other officers have stated that illegal speeds were justified by operational necessity. When queried about this “operational necessity,” the answers were not in relationship to matters of life or death or to combat situations in the Gulf of Tonkin, rather the replies related to meeting the mayor of Seattle at the pier at 0800, or getting on station off San Clemente Island. These “rational” explanations for our continuance of illegal activities show how well the junior officer corps can rationalize.

Some officers have stated that they have acted illegally, performing in a fashion that has jeopardized the lives of their fellow crew members as well as hazarding their aircraft or vessel. They have performed in such a manner in response to the assumption that if they inform their seniors of the illegality or hazards, they will suffer by receiving a poor fitness report. Therefore, there are many junior officers who have failed to even mention, much less take a stand on, the fact that they have launched F-4s on an unsafe catapult, reported a fire team “manned and ready” during flight quarters when only half of the people assigned were on station, failed to check the JP-5 fuel for water contami­nation, or allowed a drunken sailor to light fires in a 1200-P.S.I. boiler.

This fear of the fitness report and this false perception of “can do!” attitude is killing people . . . quite literally. There must be a reasonable willingness on the part of the junior officer to say “No,” when illegal and unsafe operations begin. If this does not occur, we shall be no better than those amoral men of Watergate who have been condemned by the same students who drive the vessel in the fog at 15 knots! This incorrect inter­pretation of the “can do” spirit has isolated rational men from being aware of their responsibility for safeguarding the lives of their own people. Although optimism is a necessity for success, it cannot be based upon unsafe materials, untrained personnel, or illegal pronouncements.

What frightens me most is that I could see myself in each of these junior officers. I recall driving in the fog, saying “can do,” when I should have said no; complaining about the CO’s inconsistencies while I let my hair grow long, shoes go unshined, and I came to work late. Yet it took two-and-one-half years as a leadership and management instructor for me to realize the degree of blindness that I possessed while I was on board that ship. Albert Speer, Hitler’s Minister for Armaments and War Production, relates his own feelings about matters of this type in Spandau: “And then this beastly way of talking! How was it I never really felt revolted by it, never flared up when Hitler . . . spoke of ‘annihi­lation’ or ‘extermination’. Certainly those who would charge me with opportunism or cowardice are being too simplistic. The terrible thing, the thing that disturbs me much more, is that I did not really notice this vocabulary . . . only now in retrospect, am I horrified. Certainly part of the reason was that we lived in a tightly shut world of delusion isolated from the outside world (and perhaps from our respectable seifs).”

I had to sit back and examine myself, away from the vessel where the illogical illegalities resided. Like those in Hitler’s camp, too many of the officers never break from this isolation created by the organization. Too often what the young ensign sees in the real Navy causes him or her to make the assumption that such behavior is right, proper, and acceptable. Perhaps that’s why we breed COs who expect their juniors to do whatever is necessary to show that we “can do.”

I have often polled junior officers to see how many of them were sufficiently acquainted with U.S. Navy Regulations that they would know what is legal and illegal. Consistently, only 10% responded positively, while a shocking 30% have never opened this book which forms the backbone of our system of law in the Navy! These figures include officers who have from three months to 25 years in service. All officers are required by Navy Regula­tions to acquaint themselves with this important publication, for unless they have read the book they will never realize this assigned responsi­bility. The only other way of making the junior officer aware of this task is to have the senior inform the subordi­nate. The obvious assumption made is that the senior knows the regulations, but this is inconsistent with the statistics on junior officers. It appears that at no time is an officer held accountable for his knowledge of the regulations until after a violation has been committed.

Such rampant “unprofessionalism” could be disastrous to the hope that the Navy has regarding the obtainment of more funds from Congress. Such a happening could occur if any of our more aggressive investigative reporters were ever to interview an officer who violated a regulation without knowing of its existence. With the media gaining more access into the govern­ment fortresses of secrecy, such revelations could come quite easily.

For those who do not know the regu­lations, they obey and enforce only those rules which are compatible with their own value systems. While they establish a priority list of rules to be concerned about, they refuse to allow the enlisted person to utilize the same prioritization process— the classic double standard. The overall effect is that the goal of Navy Regu­lations, to provide a consistency among all commands, is seldom if ever attained.

In summation, we cannot allow ourselves to continue to think that our junior officers are the true professionals that we expect them to be. Although they may be able to write a report well, fly an aircraft expertly, and rendezvous with another vessel at night, there seem to be moments in all of their lives when they shirk the ethical, moral, and legal responsibilities that their oath of office carries with it.