Comment and Discussion

 

 

 

cers outside of the surface community if there were absolute assurances that every surface force ship afloat was commanded by an officer who had been rigorously qualified and was in­deed a specialist in surface warfare. While in my own parochial view I agree with Admiral Salzer that surface ships should be commanded by surface officers, I don’t believe we should im­pose standards on others we are unwil­ling to subject ourselves to. SWO PQS must be accomplished by everyone, not just lieutenants and below.

The current qualifications, if rigor­ously adhered to for all officers, will have the effect of creating a wet and dry force without officially sanction­ing it, for many will be unwilling or unable to accomplish the qualifica­tions. At this point I believe the SWO program will ensure its own success and many of the other changes that will be needed will come as a natural product of the organization.

Until then, saying we are “profes­sionals” doesn’t make it so! We can either requalify those officers who pre­ceded the SWO program, or wait until the community purges itself. In either case, in the years to come the surface warfare badge will be a device an of­ficer can be proud to wear. And, if SWO becomes a select community, rigorously regulated, we may become eligible for some of that "scarce per­sonnel” pay our brother officers now enjoy!

“In VS, The Enemy Has Been Found and the Enemy Is Us”

(See S. L. Chappell, pp. 120-122, October

1976; J. Goodrich, pp. 87-88, December

1976 Proceedings)

Lieutenant Eric L. Jewett, U.S. Navy, Naval Electronics Systems Command—If Lieutenant Commander Chappell would unwind his silk scarf and hang up his leather helmet and goggles for a moment, perhaps I could offer a gentle rebuttal to his discussion of the plight of the VS (antisubmarine) pilot. As a typical VP (patrol) TACCO (tacti­cal coordinator) with approximately 1,000 hours, I view his comments with some concern, considering that I might some day have to fly with him. It sounds as if my VS TACCO brethren may be in the same situation the VP types were in several years back— pilots very used to doing everything for themselves, and not too sure what to do with this critter with the funny wings.

While it is true that S-2 copilots may not have been particularly effec­tive as safety observers, being heavily involved with plots, tactics, sub­marines, etc. . . . (TACCO stuff), is this any reason to blithely assume that the guy in the right seat has no useful function, and that one set of eyes (however steely-eyed) will automati­cally assure the safety of the other three souls on board? ’Twould appear likely that some of those S-2s that did fly into the drink might not have if the gent in the right seat hadn’t been all wrapped up in submarines.

I object to the implied suggestion that the NFO (that’s Naval Flight Of­ficer, not Naval Air Observer) might profitably assume the safety pilot role, leaving the pilot free to squint mean­ingfully into the sun and look dash­ing. The TACCO is supposed to be the tactical specialist, all wrapped up in plots, tactics, submarines, etc. (TACCO stuff), and should not be di­rectly responsible for mid-air avoid­ance, keeping one’s body out of the water, air speed, altitude, etc. (pilot stuff). Although any NFO with an ounce of brains will take more than a peripheral interest in the preceding, ASW tactics and systems are a full­time job, and the TACCO should no more be overloaded with flying than the pilot(s) should be overloaded with tactics. Similar comment applies to the “suggestion” that, if VS flying takes two pilots, how about replacing the “back-seat driver” in ye F-14, A-6, etc. with a good ole pilot—all for the sake of equality. Take the number of

U.S. NAVY

The VS community seems to he wrestling with a pilot/copilot problem the VP community solved years ago.

specialities, divide by the number of seats.

If new VS ensign-type pilots are mumbling about what they fly, it may have something to do with the example being set by the greybeards around them who (apparently) secretly wish they were out alone in their Spads and Nieuports after the Red Ba­ron. If the published commentary is typical, it would indeed appear that VS pilots may be their own worst enemies. If having two pilots on board is such a terrible blow to the poor steely-eyed pilot’s ego, how is it that VP pilots seem to survive the ignoble fate of driving a many-motor with all those funny fans out front, three (count ’em-three) pilots, no (horrors) tailhook, and the possibility of an NFO as (shudder) mission commander? It must be a terrible thing, yet they don’t seem to flock to the shrinks in droves.

After years of marginal effectiveness as an ASW force, largely attributable to the S-2 copilot trying to do too damn many things, the VS community has a powerful new tool—soundly di­vided responsibilities between pilots and NFO, and a modern platform from which to exercise them. I, for one, have the utmost respect for a wholly professional, mission-oriented aviator, whether the mission requires a lone pilot in single combat, or a complete, cohesive crew, each member with his own area of responsibility. I anticipate that the VS community will develop into an effective modern ASW force, as soon as its members learn to work to­

gether.

“Sea Power of the State”

(See M. J. Whelan, pp. 85-86, November

1976 Proceedings)

Commander Thomas A. Brooks, U.S. Nary—Commander Whelan provides an excellent overview and analysis of this, Gorshkov’s first full-blown book. As Commander Whelan points out, there is nothing startling or new in the book; most of the thoughts are expressed elsewhere. Gorshkov and other senior Soviet naval officers have written very prolifically over the years, and Sea Power of the State must be viewed as part of a continuum of Soviet writings, each one of which can contribute a little more to our under­standing of Soviet naval strategy, doc­trine, and missions. It is a shame that these writings are read by so few.

Although Gorshkov has written and been quoted in writings for more than 20 years, it is only in the past five years that he has been most eloquent in explaining and espousing the cause of the Soviet Navy. Looking at Gorshkov’s writings over time, subtle—and sometimes not too subtle—changes of positions and at­titudes are apparent. In a I960 article in Sovetskii Plot Gorshkov stated ”... Surface Ships can no longer play as important a role as they played in the past,” citing submarines and air as the main arms of the navy. In 1962, his tune changed somewhat when he was quoted in Pravda saying “Surface mis­sile ships armed with missile weapons are equally as important as sub­marines.” All during the Sixties the carrier was castigated as being an outmoded, vulnerable, and largely useless ship, but within the past few years there has been very little of this, and what has been seen is a more posi- ^c,ve approach toward the need for fixed-wing aircraft at sea. All of these changes in attitude reach a culmina- rion in Sea Power of the State which ef­fectively “sums up” Soviet naval thought in the twentieth year of Gorshkov’s tenure as CinCSovNav. To me one of the most significant aspects °f Sea Power of the State is Gorshkov’s goal—stated in other recent writings but reiterated strongly in this book—of creating “a balanced fleet,” implying no further dependence on only submarines, or only land-based air but, rather, the creation of a true high seas navy in the Western sense of the word.

Some other areas where I suggest there may be new-found emphasis in­clude:

► Restating that the SSBN is the navy’s primary weapon and strategic attack its primary mission: “Attacks from the direction of the sea against objec­tives in enemy territory have become their [navies’] basic mission.”

►  Additional emphasis on anti-SSBN ASW as the primary mission of the ‘‘general purposes forces:” ‘‘The employment of naval forces against the enemy’s seaborne strategic nuclear systems in order to disrupt or blunt their attacks against ground targets to the maximum degree has become the most important of [the navy’s] efforts. ”

► Re-emphasis of the Soviet Navy’s role in interdiction of sea lines of communication: “Interdiction of the enemy’s sea shipping . . . strengthens the special feature of the navy ... to carry out offensive strategic missions through direct action against the source of the military might of the enemy.”

► Some fascinating references to the projection of power ashore, a mission which Soviet naval writers have tradi­tionally eschewed: “The mobility of the fleet and its flexibility in the event limited military conflicts are brewing permit it to have an influence on coastal countries, to employ and ex­tend a military threat to any level, beginning with a demonstration of military might and ending with the landing of a landing party. ”

► An interesting reference to Soviet need for “sea control” (albeit of lim­ited areas of the sea): "Consequently, the achievement of sea control [in the context of a limited area] is the factor ensuring the success of the operations of forces prosecuting the primary mis­sions. . . . Such a category of the art of naval warfare as the gaining of sea control continues to retain its validity and, therefore, the development of it in all of the aspects applicable to the present day is one of the important tasks of naval science.”

► Recognition of the interest in the sea which the Soviets have acquired by virtue of their large merchant marine and fishing fleets and acknowledge­ment of the navy’s role to protect these interests on the high seas: “The transport and fishing fleets are coming to the forefront, ensuring the exploita­tion of the riches of the world ocean and the further expansion of . . . ties with peoples of many countries of the world. . . The Soviet Navy protects the inviolability of the sea frontiers of the motherland and supports her state interests at sea.”

As Gorshkov strives to put together his “balanced fleet” and articulates the

growing Soviet interest in all the facets of sea power from merchantmen to men-of-war, his naval missions begin to sound more and more like the traditional missions of Western navies, and his navy, with the build­up of a carrier capability, expansion of underway replenishment, and launch­ing of a steady stream of well-armed high seas ships, begins to look more and more like a Western navy. This evolution has most profound implica­tions for the U.S. Navy. Sea Power of the State, better than any other single document, spells out what Gorshkov is striving for. I hope the U.S. Naval Institute will publish significant ex­cerpts from this work so that this ex­cellent compendium of current Soviet naval thought is made available to the broadest possible U.S. Navy audience.

Editor’s Note: The Proceedings will publish “Comments on Gorshkov’s The Sea Power of the State” by Lieutenant Com­mander Bruce W. Watson next month.

“High-Low”

(See E. R. Zumwalt, pp. 46-56, April 1976; R. L. McIntyre, p. 76, July 1976; J. T. Hayward, pp. 69-72, August 1976; H. San­ders, pp. 75-76, September 1976; R. D. Heinl, p.'91, October 1976; P. A. Young, p. 73, November 1976; G. E. Miller and E. B. Meyer, pp. 79-86, December 1976; Pub­lisher’s Note and F. B. Leuthe, pp. 77-78, January 1977; N. Polmar, pp. 76-78, Febru­ary 1977 Proceedings)

Captain Paul Schratz, U.S. Navy (Re­tired)—I agree with the spirit of the Publisher’s Note printed in the Janu­ary issue and suggest that the discus­sion get away from personalities and get to the tasks for which Admiral Zumwalt was brought in as CNO. The first task was to rebuild the surface Navy. The point of controversy here is the “high-low” concept, and, primar­ily, ships of questionable capability filling the low side. What Admiral Zumwalt was trying to do is perfectly sound. The skyrocketing cost of the big ships—primarily aircraft carriers and their support units—allows them to be purchased only in very limited numbers. Within reasonable budget expectations it becomes necessary to build less costly, less sophisticated ships capable of performing limited missions and which can be purchased in greater numbers. Whether a sea control ship, a “small” 50,000-ton carrier, or whatever, the Congress and the Navy are far apart on an accept­able design, and no funds are forth­coming. (Admiral Rickover’s influ­ence on Congress and his persistence in seeking an all-nuclear Navy may be a factor, but that’s another problem.)

The “high-low” issue came to a head on Zumwalt’s watch, no ques­tion about it. But is it a Zumwalt idiosyncracy? The present (aviator) CNO’s posture statement for fiscal year 1977 still seeks the “balance between those very capable multipurpose but relatively expensive ships [such as car­riers and cruisers] and the useful, single purpose, and less expensive ships which are affordable in greater numbers [such as frigates].” The words are not Zumwalt’s but the tune still sounds like “high-low.” Further, a National Security Council study re­leased in September 1976 also con­cludes that defense is better served by a mix of both Cadillacs and Chev- rolets, but with no more N7»z/7z-class supercarriers to be constructed beyond the four now operating or pro­grammed.

Do we build only the “high” side of a few very large, expensive ships? Admiral Hayward claims that convoy escort is a thing of the past, that all reasons for it are no longer valid. It may be that the next war will be a short one, and hence convoy and es­cort operations—and ships—are un­necessary. But if that belief leads us to build only a small number of costly, ultra-sophisticated vessels to respond solely to a short, intense war, then we’re in real trouble. To prepare for only one strategic possibility is to en­sure that that possibility will never arise. Our too few full baskets of eggs will be heavily targeted, and we’ll be challenged in other ways for which we aren’t prepared.

Let’s find a “low” vessel which Congress will support. Surely the genius of a nation which can fly a machine a couple million miles through space to land at a precise spot on Mars can build a couple of boats so the Navy can do its thing in liquid space here on our own planet. Maybe we should take the concept, design, and construction out of the hands of those who are prisoners of past experi­ence; build beautiful, capable ships; and make America once again proud of her warships on the high seas.

The subject of presentations to Congress on ships, weapons, and budgets brings up another point. The members of congressional committees clearly need to hear the dissenting views of military witnesses as indis­pensable aids to their excercise of legislative responsibility. Admirals and generals—even captains and commanders—are initially obliged to support a Department of Defense party line but are morally obliged to give personal opinions, identified as such, when asked. The inquiry, in other words, requires an awareness on the part of Congress of a militarily respectable difference of opinion on critical issues. Congress specifically wrote into the 1958 amendments to the National Security Act the provi­sion for such testimony. President Eisenhower opposed the idea, calling it “legalized insubordination,” but the provision is necessary, despite the po­tential risk for witnesses when they provide non-party line opinions.

Admiral Arleigh Burke once drove to the Hill with Defense Secretary McNamara for an appropriations committee hearing. When asked for his opinion, Burke gave a straightfor­ward answer, which differed consider­ably from the Defense Secretary’s posi­tion. McNamara was clearly upset, and when Burke tried to rejoin the Secretary for the drive back to the Pentagon, he found he had been left stranded and had to seek his own transportation. Others, certainly, have paid a far higher price.

“Tactical ASW: Let’s Fight Fire with Fire”

(See A. Van Saun, pp. 99-101, December 1976 Proceedings)

Captain Kenneth W. Estes. U.S. Marine Corps—Lieutenant Commander Van Saun’s refreshing suggestion for a mixed nuclear-conventional submarine force suggests at least part of an an­swer to Vice Admiral George P. Steele's article in The Washington Post (16 May 1976), which has haunted me for quite some time. In it, Admi­ral Steele voiced his concern over the increasing vulnerability of carrier- cruiser forces, particularly in the Mediterranean where they are exposed to a dense concentration of land-based aircraft as well as the ubiquitous mis­sile craft which are proliferating the world’s littoral waters. Steele’s “Naval Formula” solution to this much- discussed dilemma was more typical of the submarine “union” than Com­mander Van Saun’s position. Steele called for the withdrawal of aircraft carrier groups from “hot” areas and their replacement by elements of an enlarged battle fleet of nuclear attack submarines. The submarines, he said, could turn the tables on the Soviets in the Eastern Mediterranean, making the hunter now the hunted. By periodically surfacing to expose its presence, the submarine battle line would render any Soviet commander impotent with the realization that his force would be quickly neutralized in any ensuing conflict.

Steele’s article contributed a telling blow toward pointing out the current strategic bankruptcy surrounding our deployments of naval forces. However, he has not succeeded in establishing his independence from the Rickover Navy, and his “Naval Formula” panacea proves to be as narrowly con­strued as those of the attack carrier and strike cruiser advocates.

Steele indicated very well the perplexing situation that our naval forces must face in the Mediterranean. We insist upon the forward deploy­ment of our valuable carriers because °f their political importance and the need to array combat potential in that area above that of the Soviet Navy. That power is a chimera, however, since forward deployment places these high-value ships in a position where they could be overwhelmed by land- hased air or swarms of small rocket craft before they ever could engage a Worthy opponent. The difficulty that the Royal Navy had in operating car­eers in support of Malta convoys ^against Axis land-based air in World War II should be an historical lesson to our admirals—however, it’s one lesson which seems to have been ig­nored.

In a similar “heads-up” manner, we now propose to meet the Soviet rocket cruisers overseas with our own copy, the one billion dollar strike cruiser. The absurdity of meeting the Soviets’ strong suit with identical craft was clearly avoided by the Soviets them­selves when they rejected any notion of deploying attack carriers to match our experienced air groups and instead chose a counterforce system in their rocket-firing sub and surface ship groups.

At this point I must depart from Steele’s line, though, because I do not share his awe for Admiral of the Fleet S. Gorshkov’s position. Gorshkov clearly is not ten feet tall and probably has problems with his own civilian masters—just as our own Admirals Zumwalt and Holloway have had—in justifying his own shipbuilding pro­grams juxtaposed with national priorities. Soviet ships are not unsink- able heavyweights but will go down under bomb, rocket, and torpedo fire at least as rapidly as our own. Nor would I envy the Soviet “surprise at­tack strategy,” for building a navy on such narrowly-defined premises must be quite unnerving to any military leader.

Steele proved no different from other sea power strategists when he hit upon a technological panacea for our current naval dilemmas. He dif­fers only in choice of specific weapon systems, this time the submarine. Evacuate the carriers from the trouble spots, he says, and send in nuclear submarines which, by exposing them­selves periodically, would strike terror into the heart of any Soviet squadron commander. Even if this was so, would swarms of unseen submarines have any effect upon third-power ob­servers, the objects of these naval demonstrations? Could the submarines provide visible air cover for U. S. arms shipments or display amphibious reinforcements to influence third- party opinions in the short-of-war scenario?

If we did choose to accelerate nu­clear submarine construction, who would man the new subs? Already, we have resorted to $20,000 bonuses to retain submarine officers past their in­itial obligations, and personnel shortfalls still exist. Since the Rick­over men insist that virtually every of­ficer be a qualified reactor operator, this policy would increase the brain- drain toward the silent (and unseen) service. In fact, one must really chal­lenge the contention that all U. S. submarines must be nuclear powered. This smashing “victory” of the nuc sub advocates means ultimately fewer, larger, and more expensive submarines at the same time we are crying out for that magical 600-ship fleet! If our technology can produce powerful 6,000-ton nuclear attack subs which dare not dive until passing the 100- fathom curve, why not invest some of our space-age technology in the quiet hunter-killer diesel submarines Com­mander Van Saun has advocated?

Essentially, we have the means at present to execute successful naval op­erations in any intensity of conflict with our present force levels and a sound replacement and modernization program. Advances must be made, though, in the areas of strategic de­ployment and tactical doctrine. By as­signing forces commensurate with na­tional interests and real threats, we would thin forces in the Pacific to limited security, disaster relief, and low-intensity intervention levels and concentrate our battle fleet in the At­lantic, thereby abandoning the 1940- vintage, two-ocean navy concept. The South Atlantic and Indian Ocean zones would be left to our trusted al­lies. (If we have none, why are we there?) Light forces could show the flag in confined areas such as the Mediterranean, and the carriers would be withheld in Mid-Atlantic stations out of range of land-based attack air­craft, with sea space for maneuvering. Tactical doctrine must address the problems of command and control to allow the incorporation of nuclear at­tack submarines into the carrier task forces. The combination of carrier air protected by surface and submarine screens will provide the balanced force necessary for the mobile battle forces to deliver sharp ripostes against Soviet rocket ship forces that threaten NATO sea frontiers.

Such a scheme of deployment would call for no crash shipbuilding programs nor any breakthrough in technology. What the U. S. Navy most assuredly needs in the present decade is a rational doctrine and a state of training that will permit it to serve a useful military function in to­day’s demanding environment. There is no formula for control of the seas, because the present state-of-the-art suggests that such control is unattain­able. Hence, naval planners must now address the problem of acting in a given space in a finite time frame, rather than securing and retaining domination over any particular sea­scape.

“The Eyes of the Fleet”

(See T. A. Guarino and C. F. Muller, pp.

117-120, October 1976 Proceedings)

Lieutenant (junior grade) William G. Garvey, U.S. Navy, Carrier Airborne Early Warning Squadron-122—While it is gratifying for those of us in the airborne early warning (AEW) com­munity to see our names “up in lights,” it is obvious that Guarino and Muller are suffering from the rampant optimism which infects aircraft man­ufacturers. Not only did they disre­gard non-Grumman AEW aircraft of the past, and highly overrate the E-2’s contribution to the Vietnamese War effort, they have also given the impression that the new Hawkeye is a panacea for all the ills of naval avia­tion. Unfortunately, most air wing and admirals’ staffs base their knowl­edge of the Hummer on such articles rather than on the bulky Naval Air Training and Operating Procedures Standardization or tactical manuals. The misunderstandings and lost mis­sions which have resulted from such idealized notions have been a source of embarrassment to us, and have contributed to the low esteem in which E-2s are held among carrier air wings. The authors have accurately portrayed the capabilities of a factory- fresh, computer-avionics suite; they have failed to mention the limitations placed on it by crewmen, tactical con­siderations, and the wear and tear of shipboard operations.

As an example, it is true that the E-2C’s computer can track both air and surface contacts over water and “squawking” contacts over land. This doesn't mean that the two naval flight officers on board can successfully con­duct simultaneous airborne early warning, intercept control, and sur­face search. In such a situation each operator would be tasked with evaluating contacts, correcting com­puter errors, keeping track of assets, controlling intercepts, talking on radios, and filling out logs. All of this would be done while strapped to an uncomfortable, vibrating seat for over three hours at a time, despite NATO studies which show a radar operator’s performance decreases rapidly after two hours of concentration.

One mission and one mission only must predominate, despite electronic sophistication, if the task force com­mander wants more than mediocre re­sults. The authors mention an exercise in which an E-2C , teamed with several F- 14s, successfully countered 90 bogeys. What they failed to mention was that even with exercise ar­tificialities, such as a defined threat axis, lack of jamming, and no pros­ecution to kill, the E-2 had to concen­trate on AEW to the exclusion of SSSC, Link 11, and AEW in non-threat sec­tors. Somebody on some staff is going to read the article and expect his Hawkeyes to track and intercept 90 bogeys in addition to the myriad other duties expected of E-2s. In an exercise he’ll be disappointed; in a war he’ll be dead.

We in the AEW community have been cutting our throats by condoning misleading statements of our capabilities. Our reputation suffers when real world results are compared to overblown expectations. The recent discussion of reducing VAW manning from four to three aircraft is another effect of our overly optimistic prop­aganda. The new Hummer has a good system, and properly employed will be a distinct asset to an air wing. However if the E-2C is expected to be everything to everybody it will soon become known as yet another big, funny looking, and useless aircraft.

“Who Gets the Gravy While the Navy Gets the Beans?”

(See W. R. Thomas, pp. 82-83, February 1976 Proceedings)

“Is Military Unionism An Idea Whose Time Has Come?”

(See J. E. Kane, G. C. Reynolds, A. R. Thorgerson, and J. Gordon, pp. 36-44, November 1976 and pp. 24-28, December 1976 Proceedings)

Senior Chief Personnelman C. E. Burns, U. S. Navy, Air Reconnaissance Squad­ron Two—Unionization in the mili­tary cannot be tolerated, but neither can the apathy toward our enlisted people be tolerated for much longer without serious side effects. We have the finest military in the world, and I hope that we will never be called upon to defend our shores against Com­munist aggression, but I hope that someone realizes, before it is too late, that what makes us the best is our people. I also hope that we will never have to look back and say "My God, how did we ever let our military get into such a state?”

I enlisted in the U. S. Navy at the

age of 17, 18 years ago. I had full in­tentions at that time of staying 30 years. Late last year I had to make the decision to serve less than 30 years. The reason: The G. I. Bill that I have earned expires in 1989, which is be­fore I serve my 30 years. My wife who is a first class petty officer in the Navy with six years of naval service and with intentions of staying in and retir­ing has also had to make the decision to get out and take advantage of the G. I. Bill before it expires. I do not believe that the people who made the decision to terminate the G. I. Bill in 1989 realize the ramifications that date has had upon the military. I be­lieve that my wife and I would have been of increasing value to the mili­tary for the next few years because of the experience and knowledge we have gained. I think that if more thought had gone into the termination of the G. I. Bill more consideration would have been given to the enlisting/ retention factor involved in its attrac­tiveness. The result of our early vacan­cies, and thousands of others, is a waste of time, money, experience, and knowledge for the military and the individual.

I was recently selected as the senior enlisted man to represent the men of Fleet Air Mediterranean to two senators from a Senate Armed Services Committee on board a 31-year-old carrier in the Med. For the first time ■n 18 years, I was able to speak to some of the people who make the de­cisions that affect the enlisted people °f the U. S. Armed Services. I think I ^was a lot more impressed with this opportunity than they were. The point being that I do not think we are well represented at that level of gov­ernment.

I strongly believe the enlisted popu­lation of the services should at least have a voice in the laws that directly affect them. I do not think that vot- ^lr>g is the only answer. I think more congressional fact-finding trips are needed. I also believe a senior enlisted man from each service should sit in on some of the committees that make laws that directly affect our retention problems. The lawmakers need to get the word straight from the service­man, not after it has been filtered through a lot of people.

As an example of what I am refer­ring to, a single recent issue of the Navy Times headlined the following erosions of benefits:

► Mileage allowance raised to $.10—maximum allowed by law. (It pointed out that the allowance should be $.155.)

► G. I. Bill expires 1989. (The reser­vist on active duty for more than 180 days receives same educational benefits I would receive after 30 years.)

y Inflation has reduced the pay: the raise needed to restore an E-8's 1972 purchasing power should have been 9.6%. (His raise was 4.8%.) y The five-point credit toward civil service exam for veterans who enter the military service after 1 October 1976 has been eliminated.

► State income tax will be deducted from active duty military. (I have not personally been back to my home state in 18 years. However, I pay other taxes wherever I am.)

The following is an example, on a smaller scale, of how we are treating our career people. In November 1975, my squadron was redesignated from overseas (sea duty for rotation) to over­seas (shore duty for rotation). The ef­fective date was made retroactive to July 1975. Everyone suddenly found himself on shore duty retroactive a few months back, consequently disrupting the career planning that we are always trying to sell. I understand the reason­ing behind the change, but I think it was wrong to change the duty status of the men already attached. At least let them serve out their tours as they were originally assigned. The Bureau of Naval Personnel stated that their contracts had not been legally vio­lated. Maybe not, but morally I be­lieve they were. These career men see this case as another “breach of faith” against them.

I realize and appreciate that some of the programs/benefits should be ter­minated, but not the ones that are at­tracting and retaining our first- termers and our careerists.

I realize that our retention prob­lems are not easily solved, but I would like to make a couple of recommenda­tions to improve the situation. I realize that over 50% of the DoD budget is spent on personnel, but much of this is spent on incentives to enlist, rather than to reenlist beyond the 10-year point.

I am not suggesting the G. I. Bill not be revised but rather that it be considered as an incentive for our all­volunteer service. For example, re­quire an individual to serve say two years for one year’s benefit. After a full four-year enlistment he could qualify for an associate’s degree and after eight or more years he could qualify for a bachelor’s degree. Re­quire a person to use the benefit within three years for the AA and five years for the BA, and really tighten up on the administering of the program. The way college costs are rising the changes would offer an incentive to at­tract quality men and women in the all-volunteer service. I believe the costs would be reduced in the long run because many of the young men and women would decide to become careerists along the way.

I also think that we should not try to attract people by offering a good wage right from the start. Put the benefits later down the road, up to and after 20 years, not during the first four years. Almost everyone gives as their reasons for joining, training and the G.I. Bill. I think we should start listening to them.

I am not suggesting that the mili­tary be exempt from income tax, but I believe that we are suffering from dual taxation in a lot of cases. We have to pay tax on everything we buy in states like Florida,which has no state income tax, and, in addition, we also pay state income on our base pay if we are from Georgia for example. I do not believe we should have to pay state income tax if we are not stationed in the state. I have spent seven years either on board ship or overseas in which I spent no time in any state.

A recent poll of American attitude toward the military shows that we want a strong “No. I” military. To remain “No. 1” requires much more concern for our enlisted people. Five years ago if a senior enlisted man had mentioned unionization he would have been kicked off the ship by his peers and shipmates. Today, people are actually discussing it.

"Simulators in Flight Training:

A Pilot’s View”

(See C. A. Wheal, pp. 50-57, October 1976

Proceedings)

Captain A. H. Vito, Jr., U. S. Navy (Re­tired)—As an "older” pilot, my contact with simulators began with the infa­mous Link trainer, and I quickly became one of those Commander Wheal men­tioned whose "feelings toward simu­lators (varied) between cordial dislike and active loathing.”

Just once, I did score a victory against both the trainer and its associated in­structor, and that memory helped in many later moments of frustration and embarrassment.

Twenty-odd years ago, following the requirements for a Pentagon-based avia­tor whose instrument card was coming up for renewal, I found my way to the jet instrument trainer buried somewhere in the building. My first flight was a "Fam” (familiarization) in which I was indulgently permitted to fool around and become familiar with the "flight characteristics” of the device.

The air speed indicator was fitted with the then-familiar barber pole, and I asked the instructor what would happen if I exceeded it, knowing full well that the non-existent wings weren’t going to come off. He suggested immediately that I go ahead and try it, and I should have been suspicious of the air of antici­pation in his transmission.

Rolling into a split-S from 35,000 feet with power on, I found the air speed quickly passed the barber pole. Watch­ing the altitude unreel, I asked, "So?” and was rewarded with, "Okay, now try to pull out!”

That was when I found that the stick was mechanically locked and wouldn’t come back! In desperation, I pushed it forward and found that the "aircraft” responded more or less as an aircraft would. I deftly executed the bottom of an outside loop, pulling about 16 simu­lated negative Gs, and rolled out in a gentle climb. The instructor, disap­pointed by the absence of buzzers and flashing red lights indicating a crash, was flabbergasted.

Happy in my small triumph over the machine, I never did explain that neither a real aircraft nor my average-to-below physique could ever survive that maneu­ver in real life. I gather from the article that flight training simulators have come a long way since then.

"USS Colorado: The 'Other’

Battleship”

(See G. F. Shrader, pp. 46-47, December 1976

Proceedings)

Lieutenant W. T. Mallison, Jr., U. S. Naval Reserve (Retired)—As one who made two cruises in the USS Colorado (BB-45), I found Mr. Shrader’s article most interesting. The Colorado and her two sister ships, USS Maryland (BB-46) and USS West Virginia (BB-48), were the only U. S. pre-World War II battleships which had main batteries of 16-inch guns. There were only seven such ships in the world; the British had the Nelson and Rodney, and the Japanese had the Mutsu and Nagato. The Colorado and her two sisters were the preeminent capital ships of the U. S. Navy from the early 1920s until the late 1930s when the new high-speed battleships started joining the fleet.

My first connection with the Colorado was on a Naval Reserve midshipmen’s cruise during the summer of 1937. What began as a routine training cruise from the West Coast to Pearl Harbor and return, soon extended into a search below the equator for the missing air­craft of Amelia Earhart and Captain Fred Noonan. At the crossing of the equator I found myself in an honored place as a member of King Neptune’s Court since I was the only "shellback” midshipman on board. The Colorado was a highly pro­fessional ship commanded by Captain Wilhelm L. Freidell of the Naval Acad­emy Class of 1905. The executive officer was Commander Donald B. Beary of 1910. Each of these officers subsequently served with distinction as flag officers afloat, and Vice Admiral Beary relieved Admiral Spruance as President of the Naval War College. The cruise was in­valuable for Reserve midshipmen who were about to become naval officers in a shooting war.

As Mr. Shrader indicates, our consist­ent involvement "where the action was” started with Tarawa. Major General Julian Smith, U. S. Marine Corps, gave us credit for knocking out the central command post where the Japanese rear admiral-island commander was located. Colonel Emery E. Larson, U. S. Marine Corps, who had been a highly successful football coach at the Naval Academy 1938-1941, was on board the Colorado as an observer at Tarawa. He participated in the war with conviction and enthusi­asm. The attack was to be "striking a blow for freedom,” and we went over a model of Tarawa and identified all of the targets for several days before D-day in November 1943. "Swede” Larson’s pointed criticisms of the inadequacy of the pre-invasion bombardment helped the Amphibious Force to do a much better job at Roi-Namur and the rest of the way across the central and western Pacific.

Mr. Shrader states that in December 1941 HMS Warspite, a greatly respected ship which sank an entire squadron of German destroyers during the Norwe­gian campaign, continued "regular leave and liberty for all hands” after Pearl Harbor while the Colorado did not. This was standard procedure for the Colorado in contrast to any other ships in the Bremerton Navy Yard. We were regular customers at Bremerton to have battle damage repaired. To put it in the most charitable terms, the Colorado suffered from incompetent personnel manage­ment.

The Colorado retained her ancient 5- inch/51 caliber broadside guns which used silk powder bags as well as a 1930- style AA battery of 5-inch/25 caliber guns. These were supplemented by nu­merous 40-mm. and 20-mm. guns that were added to our topside. In the new battleships, everyone who was topside had some protection. In the Colorado there were several hundred people standing in the open, and this certainly increased the number of casualties we suffered. In summary, the Colorado en­tered the Second World War with everything that was needed to win the First World War and our great ambition to have 5-inch/38s was not achieved. In contrast, our sister ship West Virginia was rebuilt from the main deck up and presented a profile quite similar to the new South Dakotas. Following an un­pleasantness in Leyte Gulf where the Maryland managed to wedge a kami­kaze plane between her No. 1 and 2 tur­rets, she returned to Pearl Harbor and had the coveted 5-inch/38s installed. The Colorado, although battered by kamikazes and with our AA armament on the port quarter substantially knocked out, carried on as usual. One of the good things about serving in the Colorado was that there was never a dull moment while at sea from Tarawa through Okinawa. After first serving as a 5-inch/25 battery officer, I was sta­tioned on the navigation bridge which had, in contrast to the new battleships, wings extending the entire breadth of the ship and visibility limited only by the horizon and the skies, in lieu of armor protection.

The only Colorado sailor who is still on active duty is Vice Admiral R. L. J. Long, who is currently Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Submarine Warfare). Bob Long served first as a junior officer m the Fox Division and then as the fire control officer. He and his associates deserve a major share of the credit for the high quality performance of the Colorado’s main battery. Among these were the aviators who flew our two "90 knot with tail wind” OS2U float planes to take a close look and who on occasion reported, "That was a miss. Move it 50 feet North.”

'"Lunchbox Charlie’ Bonaparte”

(See J. Downin, pp. 49-51, August 1976

Proceedings)

Captain Edgar K. Thompson U. S. Navy (Retired)—Charlesjoseph Bonaparte, was a chronic and indefatigable reformer and for 25 years hunted down and penalized graft and corruption in his native city of Baltimore. His political enemies tagged him with various opprobrious nick­names including "Academic Pharisee” and the "Imperial peacock of Park Ave­nue.” The public school system in America was just beginning, and, Bona­parte, a Catholic, violently opposed it. He maintained that it was as outrageous for the state to supply free schools as it would be for it to provide free soup houses. Some wit of the era gave him the nickname of "Soup-House Charlie,” and it stuck for 30 years.

Theodore Roosevelt first came in contact with Bonaparte through the National Civil Service Reform League.

Both were sincerely and deeply con­cerned with civil service reform, and Roosevelt admired Bonaparte’s caustic wit and considerable learning. Roosevelt also was greatly flattered by the atten­tions of a man whom he looked upon as being of royal blood. After he was elected to the Presidency, Roosevelt made Bonaparte a part of his official family at the first opportunity and, thereafter, made frequent references to the fact that a member of the imperial house was in his cabinet. Prior to his being named Secretary of the Navy, however, the State Department asked the French Government if the appoint­ment of a Bonaparte would be regarded as a reflection upon the ruling party in that government. France had no objec­tion, and the appointment was an­nounced 31 May 1905.

Bonaparte was the chief topic of comment in the press. His relationship to Napoleon was detailed in depth and he was the subject of countless cartoons. In one, the spirit of Napoleon was de­picted receiving a telegram from Roose­velt reading: "I have made your grand­nephew Secretary of the Navy,” and Napoleon replying: "I hope he does better with ships than I did.”

For 18 months—from July 1905 to December 1906—Bonaparte was proba­bly the worst SecNav the Navy ever endured. He was extremely competent, but indolent. For weeks on end, his attendance in his office was limited to one hour a day. He continued to reside in Baltimore and generally took the 11 o’clock train to Washington, which ar­rived at noon, rushed to the Navy De­partment, and caught the 1 o’clock train back to Baltimore. Only on days of cabi­net meetings, did he linger longer in the Capital. There is no evidence that he stayed long enough to carry his lunch when Secretary of the Navy.

Later, when he lived outside of Balti­more, in a mansion known as "Bella Vista,” he used a silver container to carry two sandwiches to his law office in the city.

Bonaparte never visited France, did not speak French, and had no communi­cation with any member of the Bona­parte family. He denied that he had French blood in his veins, saying he was of Italian and Scottish descent.

"Last of the Four Pipers?”

(See W. H. Langenberg, pp. 79-81, October 1974; R. Hammell, C. W. Bond, and A. Ben­nett, pp. 84-85, January 1975; J. M. Kennaday, p. 83, February 1975; A. P. Guzowski, pp. 78-79, April 1975; J. B. Lamb, T. Stone, W. J. Brady, and J. Gillespie, pp. 78-80, June 1975; H. C. Armstrong, p. 74, August 1976 Proceed­ings)

Lieutenant John Dahlgren Wilson, U. S. Navy (Retired)—As an old four-piper sailor, I was quite interested in Mr. Harry Armstrong’s article and his ex­ceptionally good model of the USS Tracy (DD-214), one of the better four pipers that originally came from William Cramp & Son’s Shipbuilding Co., and, with Bath, Maine, produced what this writer considers the best of this very fine class.

During 1921-1928, I was on five four pipers—Dahlgren (DD-187), Dickerson (DD-157), Paul Jones (DD-230), John D. Edwards (DD-216) and Noa (DD-343). During the time I was in the John D. Edwards, I had lots of time to observe the lights of the Tracy as we followed her in formation. She was flagship of the 38th Division on China Station and Admiral (then Commander) William (Bill) Glassford was her skipper and Division Commander.

No, Harry, the Tracy is not the last four piper, you will have to share that honor with the Noa (DD-343) — I have built a model of her—in which I spent three years, seven months, under the command of Lieutenant Com­mander R. G. Smith, Jr., and in which we created naval history at Naking, China on 24 March 1927 when she opened fire on very unfriendly Chinese troops who were firing on civilian and Navy personnel on Standard Oil Hill. I gave the signal to open fire on orders from the American Consul.

The writer will always remember the four pipers as very satisfactory duty. They were a good proving ground for those who served in destroyers in World War II. They would roll and pitch, but I never heard of one turning turtle. They were seaworthy.

They had two firerooms, two engine- rooms, and two props, and they could make over 35 knots, maneuver well, and turn on a dime. In my estimation, their performance is better than the fleet frig­ates of the Knox-chiss.