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The "American Way of Life” in the Canal Zone is but a chain link fence away from tenements different dreams. But, if the author is right, most U. S. "zonidhs” share a common yearning: more than anything, they want a higher, more impregnable fence.
In the 20 years I have been traveling to Panama, I have collected a lot of information and opinion. I do not always go to the Canal Zone. I travel in the interior, and my friends are campesinos, merchants, teachers, politicians, and taxi drivers. A few have big spreads of cane or cattle and are always traveling to New York or Paris.
Inevitably, one’s views toward a particular situation are colored by his experiences and perceptions. Thus, U. S. diplomatic and military personnel approach the unsettled Panamanian situation from a different viewpoint than I do. My own experience in the isthmian nation convinces me that something can and must be done to solve what has become an increasingly difficult problem, particularly in light of the interest it generated during the recent political campaigns. Before dealing with the current situation, though, I think it would be instructive to provide some background in Panamanian history.
First, we must remember that in 1846 Panama was part of Colombia (New Granada), only recently released from Spanish control. Ships went up and down the coasts of the Americas, and people tried to cross from one ocean to the other. This was especially true at the isthmus—the narrowest place. They could save the months of discomfort and expense of a Cape Horn passage by crossing here. But there were fever, robbery, murder, and other problems. Persons going overland had enough trouble without robbery and assault. Colombia (New Granada) requested that the United States help protect the shore of its Panama province so that traffic would not be impeded by the outlaws. After the Bidlack-Mallarino Treaty of 1846, things were better. U. S. ships were always in the vicinity of the isthmus. More than once, they accepted refugees from the continuing political revolts and insurrections.
When the California Gold Rush came about in 1849, the transcontinental railroad had not yet been built, and it was almost impossible to get across to California. So the gold seekers came down the coast from New York or New Orleans in any ship they could board, expecting to cross to the Pacific and get another vessel that would take them north to the goldfields.
The only other crossing was by a way Cornelius Vanderbilt had developed in Nicaragua. There, by crossing a river and two lakes, one could get to the Pacific. This was a longer crossing, but a shorter distance from the United States. The problems there involved rapids in the rivers and lack of port junctions of any kind.
For centuries, people had wanted to build a canal across the Colombian isthmus. Many said there had to be a canal somewhere across the Americas, but nobody knew exactly how to do it. Some suggested it should be across the Isthmus proper; others called for one farther south, at the Atrato river. They talked of the Nicaragua crossing and the one across the Mexican isthmus at Tehuantepec. But until Ferdinand de Lesseps started to build a French canal across Panama in 1879, no one had ever undertaken construction. The French effort, plagued by problems, was granted an extension of time by Colombia but, when this concession was due to expire, barely 25% of the work was done.
In the meantime, the U. S. Congress, alert to the possible effect on the Monroe Doctrine, was not sorry to see France fail. There must be a canal but, with Senator John T. Morgan, the Congressmen agreed it had to be in Nicaragua—almost 1,000 miles closer to New York. The United States and England had agreed in the 1850 Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, that if there were to be a canal across the isthmus, they would build it jointly. But at this point it seemed unlikely anybody could ever build such a canal.
A French engineer, Philippe Bunau-Varilla, had worked on the French canal project. He had bought up a lot of the defunct French Company stock and was determined that there would be a Panama Canal, that he could sell his stock, and "protect the honor of France.” He traveled all over the world to promote his plan but finally realized that only the United States would do it. At that point, however, this country still wanted the canal to be in Nicaragua.
In 1902, there was a spectacular volcanic explosion in the West Indies, with great loss of life and property damage. Bunau-Varilla recalled that Nicaragua was proud of her volcanos and had even pictured one on a postage stamp. He collected these stamps, placed one in a letter to each Congressman, and asked: Do you want your canal in a country like this? Congress reconsidered
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"l took the isthmus,” Teddy Roosevelt told The New York Times in 1911, "started the Canal and then left Congress not to debate the Canal but to debate me. ”
and voted that any canal built should be across Panama.
Great Britain, then involved in the Boer War, was freed by the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty from responsibility in building a Panama Canal, so the United States could build one alone. The Herran-Hay Treaty (1903) was arranged between the United States and Colombia. This country agreed to pay $10 million for a strip ten kilometers wide, across the isthmus, for a period of 100 years, during which it could build a canal. The United States was relieved to have the matter settled, and Panamanians were delighted. They welcomed anything which would restore the economy and get the canal going again. But, to everyone’s dismay, in 1903, the Colombians rejected the treaty. There was hint that Colombia was only delaying until after the imminent expiration of the French concession, so there would be French assets that could also be sold to the U. S.
Panama was devastated. It was an outlying province, almost surrounded by water. The Colombian capital, Bogota, was high in the mountains, not privy to the problems of people who lived beside and with the sea. Some Panamanians talked quietly about doing the canal themselves—-they were willing to revolt from Colombia. Bunau-Varilla heard this talk and had a fertile idea. He encouraged the rebels. But they had no money. That would be no problem, said Bunau-Varilla. Appoint me your Foreign Minister, to sign treaties for a canal and a new republic and I’ll get you the money. They hesitated, because Bunau-Varilla was a French citizen—not Panamanian. But he assured them this made no difference. He was an engineer, familiar with the French project, knowledgeable about U. S. political matters and a suitable representative. They concluded that he was right. Once he secured their agreement in writing, he gave them the money and departed for Washington.
There, Bunau-Varilla consulted with Secretary of State John Hay. He learned that the USS Nashville would be at the isthmus on 3 November 1903, and he notified the Panamanian rebels that that would be a good day to revolt. The Nashville arrived but, to the consternation of the rebels, so did the Cartagena, a Colombian warship bound on investigating rumors of dissent. However, Colombian sailors on board the Cartagena hadn’t been paid for a long time. Somebody found money to pay them, and they returned to Colombia. The revolt took place, and the flags went up. The next day, the cables reported U. S. recognition of the new Republic of Panama.
The rebels named a committee to design the treaty and they left for Washington, where they were met with enthusiasm by Bunau-Varilla, hearing the signed treaty. He had embroidered the Herran-Hay Treaty a bit and made it $10 million for a strip of land ten miles wide, for perpetuity, with rights of sovereignty. The committee, a little insulted at being overreached, went home to see about putting the new republic together. One by one, the nations of the world recognized Panama. But, right away a problem developed. President Theodore Roosevelt, in his usual, extroverted vigot, announced in public about Panama, that "Yes, of course I took it!” That did make Panama uneasy. In 1904, there were more troubles. The United States had sent a battery of operations, plans, people. The officials did not always agree with what Panamanians though1 should be done about such things as tariffs, postage, customs duties, sanitation, legal problems, employment, and police protection.
Matters became increasingly complicated, but the Panamanians had to cope because the proposed canal was their excuse for being a republic. The United States was determined to see the canal built, and the Panamanians were amazed at the efficiency this country displayed. The U. S. builders were unlike the French, who had been dramatic about the job, celebrating every shovelful of dirt dug and pouring champagne for every new achievement. The U. S. construction people didn’t create so much fun. On the other hand, they had more money, and the merchants liked that. Goethals was finally in full command of construction. Gorgas was doing a mighty job of disease control. In spite of all the difficulties, the canal was built. By 15 August 19N, there was a beautiful new canal of which the world could be proud. But the whole world was faced with World War I, so the celebration was muted.
In 1921, the United States got around to paying Colombia $25 million for the assets of the Panama Railroad. There was no discussion of the fact that a U. S. ship had stood by and watched Panama province revolt from the Republic of Colombia. Several times, Panama had to ask the United States to assist at times of internal distress. Once, it was necessary to arbitrate the boundary dispute between Panama and Costa Rica. After the United States did so, Panama was wholly displeased. In 1925, Minister Alfaro asked for a new treaty. Panamanians thought they should get more money from the canal. Alfaro consulted Frank B. Kellogg in Washington. Panama had rent riots, and this country had to intervene. Finally, the Kellogg-Alfaro Treaty got down to the problem of competition between Panamanian merchants and the Canal Zone commissaries. Congress passed a motion limiting Canal Zone operations. This conflicted with the League of Nations requirements and Panama, an eager signatory to the League of Nations, rejected the treaty. There was much agitation, and students shouted "Soberania” (sovereignty). To this day, that is the battle cry.
In 1933, President Harmodio Arias came to this
country. The Depression was hurting Panama. Arias ■wanted to restrict Zone activities more, especially the ln& T2% beer instead of Panama’s own good beer. heT&S finally agreed that operations of the Zone would united to maintenance, operation, sanitation and This ended the protest. Now the republic 0^ ^ave to negotiate on any future situations. In and^ W°r<^S’ t^le ^nd was not subject to expropriation _n the United States had no further responsibility for ^anama s disruptions. The United States agreed to build lghway across the isthmus, more or less parallel to aC ^anah The annuity—$250,000 gold—was actually, ^ t e devalued price, $430,000, and when Franklin 192 an° ^oosevelt authorized this change in amount in 9, he was a real hero to Panamanians. n 1940, Arnulfo Arias, brother of Harmodio, was ected President. American-educated, a Harvard physi- an, the clever, intense personalist went all out for onahsm. He threw out all foreign merchants, or- re Spanish spoken exclusively, even printed Pana- 0i^nian CUfrency for a few months. But he was thrown th ° °®ce shortly. There was some small suspicion mat * e United States might have helped. The foreign . , ants came back, and purchases were again made
lth American dollar bills (called balboas) as they are
today. pa„.m, , . \ J
j duama nas its own coins but not paper money.
a ° ^42, during World War II, a U. S.-Panama ^eement was reached concerning military bases. U. S. rad^ Wante<^ ab sorts of spots for observation and fiel^ ^°°^outs’ and they wanted larger areas for air- one S ^ WaS a£ree<^ tbat fbe bases would be returned e year after hostilities ceased. The United States inter- e this as one year after the peace Treaty was signed. The to °S ^nes treaty of 1946 called for the United States ie °^eratc ^ remaining bases, but the treaty was re- sh ' an<^ stuc^ents loudly affirmed the rejection, ^tlng "SoberaniaV in the face of American "usurpa- bonai t^e*r riShts- December 22, 1947 is still a nana day of mourning, because of the bases. Exasperated, the U. S. military forces promptly moved out everything—men, equipment, and vehicles. The merchants looked in dismay at their empty stores. It was Christmas, but there were no customers. The money had gone with the departing servicemen.
In 1949, the United States helped build the big Tocumen Airport—the field that services the world’s air traffic through Central America. The same field is just now being rebuilt. But then there was another President in Panama, Jose Remon Cantera, a National Guard officer who had come up from the ranks to be a thoughtful, pragmatic, efficient officer. He too went to Washington to see about more money, more tolls, less zone competition—the same sort of things as before.
In 1956, Egypt appropriated the Suez Canal, and this inspired agitators, thinking about the Panama Canal. But, said Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, this was very different, because the United States had rights of sovereignty in the zone. There were more riots and more wage disputes. Panamanian employees were not paid as much as U. S. employees in canal operation. It was finally agreed that U. S. employees would be paid more—a 25% differential, a hardship pay for having to work away from home.
It was finally agreed, in I960, that flags of both the U. S. and Panama could fly in one place in the zone. President Dwight D. Eisenhower said, in announcing this concession, that it was made to calm the people. In the beginnings of canal construction, many laborers were brought from the West Indies because they could do heavier work than the natives of Panama. All laborers were paid in silver, all professionals—usually white—in gold. Facilities were designated gold or silver—cashiers’ cages, drinking fountains, stairways and toilets. It was clearly understood that only whites could use gold facilities. Panamanians are color conscious; many are proud of their Caucasian background. Many buckled at using the silver (black) facilities. When President Eisenhower erased this insult, a major annoyance was eliminated.
The new ambassador, Joseph Farland, was well-liked. So was General Bogart. They started Operacion Amistad (operation friendship), and zonians were encouraged to associate with Panamanians and try to speak their language and let their children play together. Canal Zone license plates were no longer required of Panamanians before they could drive into the rest of their country.
Panamanian students have been shouting "Sovereignty!” for the canal since the mid-1920s but, in 1974, the voices became more shrill, the words—"Yankee animal, get out of the canal!"—became more insulting.
Certain areas and buildings in the zone were turned over to the republic. The Alliance for Progress was started.
But in 1961, Panama announced a 12-mile offshore limit. Since the U. S. recognized only a three-mile limit, this would box in the canal and the zone. There was agitation. When, in 1964, a thoughtless zone kid tore down the Panama flag from its regular place in the zone, all the simmering agitation on both sides was unleashed. There were death and destruction and mutual humiliation for both countries.
Arnulfo Arias, the same fellow who had been President two times before and been twice thrown out of office, again proposed to be President. He is a father figure to the Panamanian poor. They adore him, despite his admitted villainies. After he was elected and inaugurated, he lasted eleven days before Omar Torrijos, then a lieutenant colonel in the National Guard, threw him out. That was in 1968.
Torrijos, now brigadier general, continues as dictator. He has stifled most legislative activity, and there is strict censorship. But Torrijos has done much for the poor. He has instituted control over employment, with fringe benefits, medical care, protection against eviction—all matters previously unknown to the Panamanian poor. Even casual labor is monitored, and a worker can complain to the government if regulations are not adhered to. Roads and highways are being built. Panama City is a forest of new condominiums and a complex of big banking institutions. Panama hopes to be the banking capital of the world. Where does the money come from? Panama has approximately one and a half million inhabitants. Who lives in all those expensive high-rise condominiums?
But, at any rate, there are construction and activity, and the poor are optimistic. Not so, all the middle-class merchants, who are alarmed about increasing red tape and restriction. They have to pay more and more taxes and comply with more and more edicts. They do not talk openly about it, but they are very uneasy. There is no provision for the government to continue in any set way once Torrijos is gone. Privately, they are very fearful that the U. S. may release the canal to them; they like the canal the way it is, if not the zone.
There is great dissatisfaction among people in Panama who can afford to go to places that sell regular food products, supermarkets. I resent it when I go to a Panamanian supermarket and see Sara Lee foods and Hunt tomato juice and Del Monte fruits and all those other U. S. products, in their usual containers, sometimes with Spanish subheads, but usually in half the size, at twice the cost I expect. Of course, the poor probably buy their rice and beans at the open market and do not shop at the supermercado. Still, if Arnulfo
Arias ran again, people would vote for him again. He is their idol, their papa, their provider.
I see no reason why Panama can’t raise enough foodstuffs for itself. Why are there so many imports? There is good land and lots of manpower. But Panamanians who have been to school don’t want to do farm work. They have seen the Canal Zone Zonians go to school, get good jobs, and wear white collars. They want the same things. So, every campesino struggles to send his kid to school, assuming that when the boy returns, he will never have to use a machete again. He will have a good job, as all U. S. kids do. Only there are not nearly enough jobs of the kind wanted, for the graduates. This is the yeast of agitation.
Young people are being educated for nonexistent jobs. Something has to be done because the republic is not ready for—and not suited either by geography or equipment—for farm projects common in Kansas or eastern Washington where huge quantities of corn or wheat are grown. In Panama, rice, sugarcane, and coffee grow in quantity. Small truck farms have been bought out by big cattle or sugar interests. Guaymi Indians pick the coffee. Cane goes for domestic sugar and for rum. There is not enough rice for the country. Despite the many cattle on the countryside, one sees only ground meat, liver, tripe, kidneys, sweetbreads, fish, or chicken in the butcher shop. Where does all the good meat go?
More startling to the outsider than even the wonderful, efficient canal is the shocking disparity between the Canal Zone and the slums of Panama which abut the zone. There is no fence between the green zone and much of the ghetto. Dissatisfactions of poor people in urban centers are tremendous when they can look across at wide green lawns with small families living in big, white homes. Zone people, of course, can’t own their own property, so it is all run by the orderly Canal Company. Panamanians resent it all. When zone people look across at the tenements, they see herds of people, draping laundry over every fence and balcony, sleeping anywhere, practically living in the street. They are embarrassed and look away. They don’t want to associate with that way of life.
We always talk of Latins as liking togetherness, perhaps more than Yankees do. Perhaps it is just that, in Panama, climatic differences permit people to wear much less clothing and be out of doors much of the time. The only real problem is rain, of which there is much, eight months of the year. People stand around, watching and talking, pressing closely in crowds. One seldom sees anyone reading, although literacy is high. Of course, these days, there is television to watch. Whoever has a TV set has constant company to watch with him. You know what shows crowd your TV set, so you can guess what Panamanians probably see of life in
■n IfTr
nited States. Can you be surprised if they resent e zone people, across the street, who can do what is 'ctured on their television?
c^e people who come to run the canal were ro-
n^and S3^' ^1C arme<^ f°rces Southern Com
’ t^ere would not have been this problem. I am b h t^e Zon*ans d° not realize how parochial their ju^av’or seems to others. I do not blame them; it is to ri c*rcumstances have encouraged them
opt. Panama has never seen rotation of canal
someone retires.
^erations, except occasionally, when
^ people, with new personalities and new ideas, j£°U ^ave made it more human, less "establishment.” we are ever to adjust this problem, we must begin c the status of people in the zone. They should be co—d with suitable benefits, but they should not tinue workjng and living in the zone. Security atT^n c reSuire that all live in one little enclave. Pan- of f *S t0° sma^ a country to encompass a large group feigners with such stereotyped behavior patterns, ut Congress will have to unravel this Civil Service- created problem.
Over the 20 years she has been traveling to Panama, Airs. Niemeier has seen the country’s lush green growth hacked away to make room for a modern alabaster jungle of condominiums and financial institutions wherein wealthier Panamanians plan to make their country the banking capital of the world.
There is nothing wrong with having Panamanians on the board of the canal management. Perhaps then they would realize the extent to which the United States has absorbed such a large portion of the costs of the Canal. It has run at a loss for so many years. Perhaps they wouldn’t feel so cheated out of rich profits they insist the United States must be making. Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker says he has a very pragmatic approach to working out Canal problems. I hope he is right. I wish him luck.
At present, people dispute canal problems from violent prejudice and minimal factual knowledge. They are likely to be kids in the republic with one hope—either
to go to the United States (for a good job), or to get the Yankees out of Panama. Or else they are zonians with only one wish—that the U. S. Government will build a higher fence to protect them from the Panamanians.
We own the Canal. We own the zone—as much of it as we want to assume. I don’t want us to continue giving in to Panama—conceding, conceding, conceding. That doesn’t do any good for our posture in Panama or anywhere else in the world. South America is watching intently. I don’t want to see us buffaloed into doing something or agreeing to something just to make Panama happy. Panama won’t stay happy. It isn’t as if you could buy compliance and silence. It is a blackmail situation that we should eliminate.
The canal, itself is an upright, ongoing operation. Panamanians working on the canal know that there is more than one person competent to open a valve or decide a question of operations, just as there is a change of personnel regularly for a nuclear submarine or an aircraft carrier. But there must be fundamental change in the zone. We don’t need these 550 square miles of land to run the canal. Do you say it is for security or protection against sabotage? Damaging the canal would mean great inconvenience for us and for the world’s shipping. But for Panama, it would mean absolute ruin. The canal is Panama’s reason for being.
Let’s offer to sell the zone back to the republic and be rid of our tangle. In the same transaction, let’s lease back however much land we want in order to operate the canal properly. And, for goodness’ sake, call that leased land by a new term. Call it Canalside, Canal Strip, Canal Area—anything, just so long as it is completely different from that hated word "zone.”
There was a little matter in Panama a few years ago that had tremendous significance. We blew it completely! When the canal was first built, most Panamanians had to ferry across the canal to get to their capital city. Workers crossed daily on the ferry boat that the United States had agreed to run. It was called the Thatcher Ferry, after a U. S. Representative. Much later, a beautiful bridge was built to replace this ferry. Panama expected, and I always assumed, that this graceful bridge would be named the Bridge of the Americas, uniting the two great continents. But, no, it was called the Thatcher Ferry Bridge. If ever there was an unnecessary insult, a stupid, conspicuous mistake, that was it!
Oh, I know Panama will have trouble finding the money to pay us for the land of the zone. But, in setting the price, negotiators will have to decide how much money the United States has invested in that land. It will be a salutary lesson for us all. Panamanian history books don’t talk about the canal; they don’t even recite the events of the republic’s creation. They don’t show that Panama offered its land to us, on its terms and conditions—$10 million for ten miles, in perpetuity—and that we accepted the offer, paid the $10 million, and then paid much more for its development. Aside from the $40 million we paid the French company, and the $280 million we paid for canal construction, we paid millions for clear title to the land, for its reclamation, for road construction, and development. We must not be imperial in setting our price, but it is well to know just what is actually involved. We need make no profit, just a recognition of the cost of our investment in the zone.
The people who live in the zone now must have their rights fully protected. They should be able to live as they please and where they please, not comply with company edicts on their suitable life-styles. They should work for the canal because they want to and are qualified to. And they must admit it’s no hardship to work there—not like the days of mud and yellow fever. Their pay should reflect the work they do, not a phony distinction between qualified persons of different race or citizenship. It is important that people who work on the canal live with other people in the republic, not as a race apart. Not all managers have to live inside their business establishments.
There should be new people coming in to run the canal, with a new outlook and understanding of where they are and why they are there. New people can learn the procedures necessary. We have a wonderful canal, and we want to keep it that way. The world needs it. Panama needs it. We don’t want to abuse any of our people and we don’t want to hurt any one else either.
So what are we waiting for? For someone to tackle the Civil Service aspect of the Canal Zone and arrange transfers and compensation in order to integrate the facilities of the zone with the republic and to be forever rid of the problem that so irritates Panama and invites such criticism. We have a chance to do a spectacular job in Panama.
Let’s not muff it!
SMrs. Niemeicr was married to the late Captain Edward A.
Niemeier, U. S. Naval Reserve (Retired) until his death in 1975. She has a bachelor’s degree in social work and a master’s degree in communications from the University of Washington. Since 1958, she has lived in Panama two or three months of almost every year. She and her husband owned a cruiser in which they made a journey from Seattle to Panama, up the East Coast, through New York state, into the Great Lakes, down the Mississippi, and up the Ohio. The account of that experience was published in Mrs. Niemeier’s book Wild Blue Water. Her other books include What’s What on the Sea, a dictionary for landlubbers, and The Panama Story, a history of Panama.