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Her sides streaked with rust, a reserve fleet Liberty ship, left, awaits the fate of one of her sisters, above, seen being towed off to the scrapheap. These and hundreds of other such ships have played an important role in the maritime affairs of the nation. Does the NDRF have a future?
At the end of World War II, the U. S. Government was owner and operator of the largest fleet of merchant ships the world had ever seen. An orderly and prudent disposal of these vessels was a matter that could not be delayed if international commerce was to be quickly reestablished. The task, however, was not a simple one. Between 1937 and the end of fiscal year 1945, more than 6,400 merchant-type ships had been built under the aegis of the U. S. Maritime Commission at an estimated cost in excess of $13 billion.1 Even subtracting wartime losses, the government held title to more than 5,000 vessels when Japan surrendered in September 1945.
The initial legislation dealing with the disposal and management of this fleet was the Merchant Ship Sales Act of 1946. It gave U. S. citizens preference in purchasing government-owned ships and also authorized the Maritime Commission to accept in exchange older, American-owned and registered vessels as a credit toward the purchase of the newer, war-built ships. Sales to foreign nationals were to be allowed, provided the vessel or vessels were not necessary to the defense of the United States, or necessary to maintain and promote the American merchant marine. Yet, even with liberal sales terms for American operators and sales tb foreign nationals, the government expected that a considerable
number of inactive, but nonetheless potentially useful, ships would still be left. The 1946 Ship Sales Act addressed the problem by creating a government-owned and administered National Defense Reserve Fleet (NDRF). Specifically, the act required the Maritime Commission to "place in a national defense reserve such vessels owned by it as, after consultations with the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, it deems should be retained for the national defense . . The commission was made responsible for the preservation and maintenance of this reserve shipping. At the end of fiscal year 1946, there were 1,421 NDRF ships at eight anchorages in commission custody.2
In the years following World War II, additional tonnage was added to the reserve fleet. Many older vessels were taken in trade; many—mostly Liberties— were returned by American companies as the very high immediate postwar demand for ships subsided to more normal levels and firms placed orders for new ships especially built for particular trades. At the end of fiscal year 1950, the reserve fleet reached its high point with respect to number of ships. There were 2,277 vessels moored in seemingly endless rows at quiet backwater anchorages on the East, Gulf and West coasts. Many had gun tubs and platforms still mounted, mute reminders of their recent wartime roles.3 Table I indicates the size of the NDRF over the period 1946-76.
The Ship Sales Act of 1946 did not mandate that every ship in the NDRF be retained indefinitely. Those government-owned ships which were considered to have a potential national defense purpose or could be used to support the merchant marine in time of excess demand for shipping were to be preserved. A 1950 amendment to the Ship Sales Act allowed NDRF vessels to be bareboat-chartered (that is, only the ships themselves) for use in any service not adequately served by U. S.-flag, private operators on reasonable conditions and at reasonable rates.4
Legislation authorizing the sale of reserve ships to operators for commercial trade purposes expired on 15 January 1951.5 For all intents and purposes, reserve ships could thereafter only be sold for scrap or for non-transportation purposes or broken out only in time of a national emergency or when their use was demonstrably necessary to support U. S. national interests.
Korea to Vietnam: The first test of the efficacy of the reserve fleet concept came in 1950. The decision by the United States (and United Nations) to support South Korea militarily posed a sealift problem that privately owned shipping could not quickly meet. It was obvious
Table I National Defense Reserve Fleet 1946-76
Fiscal Year | Total Ships in Fleets | Fiscal Year | Total Ships in Fleets |
1946 | 1,421 | 1962 | 1,862 |
1947 | 1,204 | 1963 | 1,819 |
1948 | 1,675 | 1964 | 1,739 |
1949 | 1,934 | 1965 | 1,594 |
1950 | 2,277 | 1966 | 1,327 |
1951 | 1,767 | 1967 | 1,152 |
1952 | 1,853 | 1968 | 1,062 |
1953 | 1,932 | 1969 | 1,017 |
1954 | 2,067 | 1970 | 1,027 |
1955 | 2,068 | 1971 | 860 |
1956 | 2,061 | 1972 | 673 |
1957 | 1,889 | 1973 | 541 |
1958 | 2,074 | 1974 | 487 |
1959 | 2,060 | 1975 | 419 |
1960 | 2,000 | 1976 | 360 |
1961 | 1,923 |
|
|
Source: U. S. Maritime Administration
that NDRF tonnage would be needed. The method of utilizing reserve ships was the General Agency Agreement (GAA). Under this arrangement, an NDRF ship was operated by a private shipping firm for use by the Department of Defense—specifically, the Military Sea Transportation Service. The private operator was responsible for providing a crew, overseeing repairs, and provisioning the ship. DoD paid these expenses and overhead costs, in addition to a fee to the shipping firm for operating the vessel. The government also paid the cost of breaking out and activating the ship. At the peak of such operations, about 300 NDRF vessels were utilized in support of U.N. forces in Korea.
Concurrent with the Korean conflict, a world shortage of bulk shipping loomed in the winter of 1950. A chief cause was unusually large European imports of American coal. (The European winter of 1950-51 was one of the coldest on record.) Freight rates on coal from the U. S. East Coast to Europe increased more than threefold from $3.50 a ton in mid-1950 to more than $13.00 a ton by February 1951. To drive down rates and thereby insure that Marshall Plan aid would not be disproportionately spent on shipping charges, the breakout of additional NDRF ships (mostly Liberties) was authorized. Yet, no sooner had the coal problem been dealt with than another and more pressing situation arose. Crop failures in India made it imperative that massive amounts of grain be immediately shipped to that country. Many believed such a move was absolutely essential if the new and fragile democratic government was to survive. In any case, the necessary tonnage could come only from the NDRF. The 1951 Annual Report of the Federal Maritime Board/ Maritime Administration noted the role of reserve shipping during this period:
"The increased tonnage, without which it would have been impossible to meet supply commitments in Korea and foreign aid commitments elsewhere, came entirely from the National Defense Reserve Fleet of the Maritime Administration. Over an 18- month period beginning with Korean hostilities, 778 Government owned ships were withdrawn, repaired, refitted, and put into service at the rate of more than 3 vessels every 2 days.”6
By 1953, the need for NDRF ships had decreased considerably. At the beginning of the year, only 160 reserve fleet vessels were in operation. However, two months later a new use developed for the fleet. On 11 March 1953, the Department of Agriculture requested the use of 50 Liberty ships to be used for surplus grain storage. It was the beginning of a program that would continue for the next ten years. By February 1954, the Maritime Administration had made available a total of 317 ships in which 72 million bushels of grain were
price-supported wheat in the United States.
In late 1955, world demand for ocean shipping once more began a slow but steady increase. Shipping and charter rates moved up correspondingly. Much of the pressure on rates was occasioned by increased American overseas shipments of military and foreign aid cargo. Such was the world shipping environment when Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal in July 1956. Its subsequent seizure by an Anglo-French expeditionary force and the concurrent scuttling of a number of ships by Egyptian authorities effectively blocked the waterway to international commerce for almost a year. Full canal use was not restored until April 1957.
stored. During any one year, light ships would be withdrawn from the fleet, and loaded, some laden ships would be discharged, and some discharged ships would be loaded with new grain. At the peak of the program in 1959, a total of 400 ships had been used to store 136 million bushels. Five years later, the Agriculture Department released all grain ships, and the program was concluded. It is interesting to note that at one time, NDRF ships had on board 10% of the total surplus,
The result of the so-called "Suez Crisis” was an almost instantaneous world demand for additional tonnage as shipping between Europe and North America on the one hand and the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf on the other could now move only via the Cape of Good Hope. On some routes the total number of nautical miles to be traveled doubled or tripled. And in some markets charter rates rose by more than 300%. As in the case of earlier coal shipments to Europe, excessively high shipping rates not only placed an added financial burden on the American treasury in terms of
various aid programs but also disrupted a carefully structured U. S. foreign policy. The net result was that for the second time in four years, large numbers of NDRF ships were reactivated. At the end of fiscal year 1957, the reserve fleet had decreased by 172 ships from a year earlier.7
In summary, the decade of the Fifties was the period when the concept of a National Defense Reserve Fleet was proved beyond question. Coal shipments to Europe, the demands of the Korean War, grain shipments to India, and the demands occasioned by the closure of the Suez Canal all proved the worth of having a merchant-type shipping capability in reserve. Nor should the contribution of the fleet in its role as temporary grain silos be overlooked. It would be almost impossible to estimate the millions of dollars it would have cost the government for grain storage facilities had the reserve fleet not been in existence. (The decade also saw the launching of the SS United States and the world’s first nuclear merchant ship, the NS Savannah. Both would, in their own time, join the NDRF.)
In I960, a joint Navy-MarAd (Maritime Administration) review group determined that many ships in the NDRF no longer warranted preservation for national emergency purposes. These non-priority ships—mostly Liberties—were to be disposed of by scrapping. Selected for continued retention were 891 ships.8 Of these, some were earmarked for DoD logistical support in a contingency or a national emergency, while others were considered valuable to augment commercial shipping in times of severe shortages, such as the Suez Crisis. The first group was designated Navy priority ships, the second, MarAd priority ships. The two groups were further broken down into numbered categories with ships in the lower number categories being given preference with respect to maintenance and repair.9
As the United States entered the Sixties, the NDRF received but scant attention. Funds for preservation were often given a low priority in MarAd budgets. As often as not, emphasis was on selling non-retention ships rather than improving the condition of those planned for retention. Moreover, the rapid decline in the fortunes of the active American merchant marine was rapidly surfacing as MarAd’s most immediate problem.10 In 1965, the NDRF was composed of 1,594 vessels, of which 960 were classified as priority vessels. In addition to the 960, 388 Liberty ships were designated as an Emergency Reserve. Limited preservation work was scheduled for the latter.
If the first half of the Sixties was one of relative inactivity at reserve fleet sites, the second was not. As the American military buildup in Southeast Asia increased, it once again became apparent that privately operated U. S.-flag shipping would not be sufficient to meet both commercial and military requirements. As in the case of Korea, the decision was made to reactivate large numbers of reserve ships. By 30 June 1966, 105 NDRF vessels had been withdrawn.11 Most were Victories. During the five-year period (1965-70), 176 of these ships moved more than 30% of all cargo to Southeast Asia. With the winding down of operations in 1970, the last reserve ship reactivated for Vietnam service was returned to layup status. Again, the concept of a reserve fleet had proven its worth, but this last time out the twin strains of age and neglect were plainly visible. Several reactivated ships never made their initial ports of call. Breakdowns and lengthy repairs were not uncommon.1" As the NDRF approached its fourth decade of existence, it was apparent that the concept of maintaining a reserve merchant fleet required a thorough review.
On 23 October 1969, President Richard Nixon signed into law the Merchant Marine Act of 1970. The legislation’s chief purpose was to revitalize the nation’s merchant marine. With respect to the future of the NDRF, opinion was divided. Some argued for a continuation of the existing policy, others opted for an upgraded NDRF, and still others felt the reserve fleet had outlived its usefulness. In this latter respect, the Maritime Committee of the AFL-CIO urged Congress to accept the fact that the National Defense Reserve Fleet was the remnant of an age that had passed. To perpetuate it would be to burden the future. When finally approved, the act was silent with respect to the future of the fleet.
In November 1970, the last of the Southeast Asia sealift ships was returned to a reserve fleet site. These 170-odd ships had carried more than 30% of all cargoes shipped to Vietnam. They had done their job well, but a decision on the future direction and role of the NDRF could no longer be put off.
Post-Vietnam: In 1971, a wide-ranging, inter-agency review of U. S. sealift capabilities was sponsored by DoD.13 The result, published in 1972, was a comprehensive, four-part document, the Sealift Procurement and National Security (SPANS) study. One of its recommendations was that "relatively new used ships should be acquired for the NDRF if they would otherwise be scrapped or sold to foreign operators.
A year prior to publication of SPANS, the Maritime Administration had, in fact, floated the idea of purchasing ten newer breakbulk ships for layup in the NDRF rather than to have the ships sold to foreign buyers or scrapped.14 In 1972, $30 million was added to the Department of Commerce budget for this purpose. However, the request was disallowed by the Office of
Management and Budget. In a memorandum to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Installations and Logistics, the acting director of OMB asserted that "the role of the NDRF is clearly military in nature and determination regarding the need for improving the capability of that fleet is a military responsibility.” The memorandum went on to assert that if funds for upgrading the NDRF were necessary, they should be requested by DoD. The OMB decision was appealed by the Maritime Administration the following year, but again funding was denied.
By 1973, the number of reserve fleet sites was down to three (James River, Virginia; Beaumont, Texas;
, Suisun Bay, California) and the MarAd retention list numbered 325 vessels, of which 130 Victories were designated priority ships. To determine the cost, time, and problems in breaking out a priority ship should the need arise, partial reactivation of the SS Greely Victory was completed in 1-972. From this test, it was estimated that a Victory ship could be broken out in an average time of 21 days at a cost of approximately $800,000.
While there was always some interest in the NDRF at MarAd, the agency was more concerned in 1974 with implementing the shipbuilding program authorized under the Merchant Marine Act of 1970. Personnel at reserve fleet sites decreased in numbers. Just staying even with necessary preservation work required an even greater dedication on the part of the remaining fleet site personnel. Nor was there much external encouragement. Official visitors were few and far between, and any communication from Washington was more than likely to bring notice of a further reduction in manpower and/or money. For fiscal year 1975, the total Maritime Administration budget request was ► $586,162,000. Of this amount $4,358,000—less than
1%—was earmarked for the NDRF.
But if funds were not being put into the NDRF, some of the old ships were generating a constant stream of money into the Federal Treasury. In 1974, scrap steel prices reached an all-time high. Bids per ton on non- • retention ships reached as high as $40.00. In this market
The nested lifeboats of a sister vessel obscure part of a long row of gray-hulled Victory ships laid up in mothballs at a National Defense Reserve Fleet site.
an AP5 Victory troop transport sold for between $160,000 and $180,000; a C-2 from $100,000 to $150,000 and a Liberty for around $100,000. In 1974, 87 ships were sold for $28 million. Between 1958 and 1974, the government realized $156 million on the sale of 2,101 ships for scrap or non-transportation use.
On 2 January 1975, President Gerald Ford signed Public Law 93-605. As an amendment to the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, it authorized the Secretary of Commerce to acquire Mariner-class vessels from private owners (who might otherwise scrap them) in exchange for obsolete vessels in the NDRF that were scheduled for scrapping. The exchange would be on an approximate ton-for-ton basis of potential scrap steel. The declared purpose of the legislation was to upgrade the NDRF with newer ships.15 While the plan was well conceived, no Mariners have been acquired to date, mainly because they can still earn profits at sea. A number have been converted to containerships.
In June 1975, the Merchant Marine Subcommittee of the House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee began oversight hearings on progress during the first five years under the Merchant Marine Act of 1970. The role and future of the NDRF was a specific question on the committee’s agenda.
In addressing the committee on the need for an NDRF, Dr. John Bennett, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations and Logistics), stated:
"There are presently 138 general cargo sealift vessels in the NDRF including 130 Victory ships of World War II vintage. We would like to see these vessels, over a period of time, replaced with any newer vessels which become excess or are replaced on
existing commercial trade routes. By this means the NDRF can be modernized for an assured long-term capability. The NDRF is an essential shipping resource upon which DoD depends.”
Other witnesses, however, were less charitable. Herbert Brand, President of the Transportation Institute, made the point that "the only true reserve fleet is the active U. S. Merchant Marine. Mothballed rust buckets from World War II are of no value and couldn’t be ready in time.” And James Reynolds, President of the American Institute of Merchant Shipping, stated:
"But with all due respect to the DoD, I do not think we can realistically place any further substantial reliance upon these aging veterans that remain in mothballed condition. They are essentially World War II vintage ships. To reactivate them again would pose very substantial time and engineering problems, and even more substantial costs, as was so clearly demonstrated in 1964 and 1965. They are slow and prone to breakdown. Indeed, beyond possibly serving as floating warehouses, a role frequently played off Vietnam, there appears no further real use for them.”
The Future: As noted above, the Department of Defense wholeheartedly supports the goal of an upgraded NDRF. Its vessel preference in this regard is the more modern general cargo ship.16 In this respect sealift analysts have been increasingly concerned with the marked decrease in the number of active breakbulk ships under American registry.17 And although the economics and efficiency of the fast, new containerships are well understood, defense planners still perceive a major role for breakbulk shipping in a number of contingency situations.
A chief problem that arises in the increasing dependence on containerships is the fact that the highly sophisticated container handling equipment and facilities necessary to work the ship simply might not he available when needed.18 It is certainly not difficult to imagine a number of contingency and mobilization scenarios where this would be the most likely case. The net result is that over-the-shore discharge of containerships is receiving increased attention at the Pentagon, particularly as some of the more sanguine assumptions about •the availability of containerports in a NATO war have been rethought.
One option for maintaining a quick-response break- bulk capability now being tried by the Military Sealift Command (the successor to MSTS) is to keep in a high state of readiness a number of the idle general cargo vessels that the agency now has on charter from commercial shipping firms. The concept has been endorsed by some industry spokesmen and has the tacit approval of the Navy. Several problems however, can be expected to develop over the long term. First, the program is relatively expensive. The charter cost of the vessel is ongoing as is the cost of maintenance. And having access to a crew should the ship be called into service must also go down as an expense. Under these circumstances, there would be constant pressure to utilize "ready reserve” ships to move at least some DoD cargo, and this could only be at the expense of berth line shipping. Moreover, an MSC fleet of ready reserve cargo ships is in more ways than not a duplication of the NDRF function which Congress has mandated to the Department of Commerce. And this duplication of effort will become more pronounced if former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s proposal in the fiscal year 1977 defense budget "to increase the readiness of 30 NDRF [Victory] ships so that they can be broken out on short notice” is favorably acted upon by the Congress.
Yet, even if the proposal for a joint MarAd/DoD program to upgrade and maintain 30 so-called "hot ships” carries, it is still generally agreed it is but a short-term solution. Upgraded Victory ships are probably a viable alternative into the early 1980s, but they cannot be expected to endure forever.19 This was a problem that Congress attempted to alleviate with the "Mariner bill”—specifically how to get newer ships into the NDRF.
Several possibilities for upgrading the NDRF exist. One would be for Congress to appropriate sufficient funds to buy outright a number of the newer, break- bulk ships (circa 1960-65) from their owners. Many are idle and would be available. The sale could be conditioned on the proviso that the monies received be used for new ship construction. In the same vein, MarAd might be given authority to purchase suitable American or foreign-flag shipping on an "opportunity” basis. Another and undoubtedly more expensive option would be to rebuild some of the better preserved World War II ships in the fleet. The Maritime Administration has made some tentative estimates in this respect. To convert a P-2 troop carrier to a breakbulk ship would cost approximately $10 million, and to convert an AP5 Victory troop carrier would cost approximately $6 million.
Still another "NDRF problem” that must be dealt with is the ultimate fate of the passenger ship SS United States. This one-time pride of the American merchant marine was purchased from U. S. Lines for $4.6 million (and cancellation of mortgage and interest payments due the U. S. government) in 1973. It is now berthed at Norfolk, Virginia, and is a part of the James River Reserve Fleet. The ship is literally loaded with national
defense features, has a troop carrying capability of 15,000, and is reputed to have a top speed approaching 40 knots. Like many of the world’s great liners, the rising cost of fuel and labor made her continued operation in transatlantic service uneconomical. However, uneconomical in a peacetime environment does not translate to uneconomical in a contingency or mobilization situation. The Navy has testified in favor of maintaining the ship as a national defense asset yet has been reluctant to put money into her conversion as a troop carrier and earmark subsequent funds to maintain the ship in a high degree of readiness. The cost of converting the United States to a troop carrier has been estimated at $15 million. The cost of maintaining her as a troopship in an idle status would be directly proportional to the desired breakout time.
In the past three years, a number of proposals have been made respecting the vessel. The latest (April 1976) surfaced in hearings on HR 13218, a bill to permit the ship to be used as a floating hotel. In its comments on the legislation, the Navy again stressed the desirability of having the ship but did not specifically object to her use as a hotel as long as the ship could be requisitioned in a national emergency.
Conclusion: The concept of a Military Sealift Command ready reserve fleet is at best a temporary and expensive expedient. Assuming Congress acts to upgrade the NDRF, then the MSC’s program can be safely phased out. On the best use of the 55 United States, there is little agreement. That she is a valuable national resource there is no doubt. Yet, converting her to a troopship raises the very question of whether movement of troops by sea is a reasonable option in the age of the 747 and C-5. Conventional wisdom at the Pentagon heretofore has been that the sealift troop option is not a viable one. Moreover, the underlying thrust of the $6.8 billion
DoD proposal to modify existing privately owned wide-bodied aircraft to a cargo convertible configuration seems to be that initially material, as well as troops, will move by air in a long-range deployment of forces. Yet to assess the usefulness of the United States, the possibility of a sea-air mix in terms of both supplies and men is almost mandatory. And when contrasted with the air enhancement program, the cost of developing a troop sealift option is not unreasonable.
In considering the role of sealift in a deployment of men and/or material, it would not be remiss to point out that 74% of the material moved in the 1973 Israeli resupply effort was by ship, a fact that in no way depreciates the significant contribution made by the Military Airlift Command’s C-5 and C-141 cargo planes. And it might be further noted that the crucial first shipments by sea were in nine Israeli-flag vessels. The simple truth was no American tonnage was readily available. MSC-controlled shipping was dispersed worldwide, privately owned U. S. ships could not be requisitioned (there was no declared national emergency), and it would have taken upward of 30 days to break out NDRF Victory ships. The lesson seems plain enough. Of the three mentioned sources of emergency shipping, a modern and time-responsive NDRF would seem to offer quite a bit for a modest expenditure.20 All things considered, the most economical and satisfactory way to maintain an NDRF in the long run is to purchase newer ships as they come on the market.
If today one visited the James River Reserve Fleet, he might notice a rusting Liberty heading a long row of retention Victory ships and wonder why an obvious scrap candidate should still be afloat. The Liberty in question is the Betsy Ross and as one Maritime Administration official put it—no one would scrap the Betsy Ross during last year’s bicentennial celebration. (Actually, parts of the ship, perhaps even her engine, are destined for the Smithsonian Institution if funds can be found). However, the Betsy Ross is more than a reminder of those "workhorse” ships of World War II; she is equally a reminder of the important role that this aging fleet played and will continue to play in the maritime affairs of the nation.21 Congress on several occasions has indicated its interest in the NDRF. Now it must appropriate the necessary funds to insure its role in the future.
The one-time pride of America's merchant marine is the passenger ship SS United States, berthed in Norfolk as part of the James River Reserve fleet. An inarguably valuable national asset, her ultimate fate may be as a drab troopship, a luxury hotel, or both, or neither.
yogm* Dr. Whitehurst is a Professor of Industrial Management at
Clemson University and is a member of the ad hoc Defense HCE 9} Studies Group in that department. His teaching and
-■—** * research areas are in logistics, transportation and defense
' economics. Professor Whitehurst received his Ph.D. in ecoJR nomics from the University of Virginia and did post-doctoral IlH fm ZllaS study in defense studies at Edinburgh University. He is the author of a number of articles and books on the merchant marine.
1Of the 6,469 ships constructed, approximately 1,200 were small craft. The largest oceangoing categories were the Liberty ship (2,700), the Victory Ship (275), and T-2 tankers (217). There were also a number of Maritime Commission-designed C-l, C-2, C-3, and C-4 type ships.
2NDRF anchorages were at Astoria, Oregon; Olympia, Washington; Beaumont, Texas; James River, Virginia; Suisun Bay, California; Mobile, Alabama; Hudson River, New York; and Wilmington, North Carolina.
3NDRF sites on each coast were selected on the basis of nearness to shipyards yet away from major harbors. In 1945-46, major American seaports were literally clogged with ships, hence the desire not to aggravate the situation by establishing reserve fleet sites in the vicinity of larger ports. Another consideration was to locate the sites as far up (fresh water) rivers as feasible in order to retard marine growth on the hulls.
4 Before a charter could be arranged, extensive public hearings were required, and once charters were made, they were reviewed periodically to insure that NDRF vessels did not compete with private, U. S.-flag tonnage.
5In the five years following the end of World War II, more than 1,900 government-owned ships were sold to American and foreign shipping interests. The vast majority of these sales were war-built Liberty and Victory cargo ships and T-2 tanker-type vessels.
6Following World War II, Title II of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 underwent considerable modification. In 1950, the Maritime Commission was abolished. Its functions were divided between two new agencies established in the Department of Commerce, the Federal Maritime Board and the Maritime Administration. The former assumed the Maritime Commission’s regulatory functions. The new Maritime Administration assumed the remaining administrative functions not transferred to the Federal Maritime Board. In 1961, the Federal Maritime Board was replaced by an independent Federal Maritime Commission. The new commission was charged with handling the regulatory functions authorized under various shipping statutes. The Maritime Administration remained within the Department of Commerce. One of its responsibilities was the preservation and maintenance of the NDRF.
7 At the end of fiscal year 1958, the situation was reversed. The NDRF had a net increase of 185 ships.
8 Hull preservation for retention ships is by a cathodic protection system whereby an electric curreat renders the steel hull inert, in effect preventing the formation of rust. Originally a ship’s engine and machinery were protected with a coat of grease (contact preservation). Since the end of the Vietnam War, however, contact preservation has been replaced by a dehumidification system wherein the ship’s interior spaces are sealed and a low relative humidity maintained, thereby effectively inhibiting corrosion.
9 Over the years a number of naval reserve ship anchorages have been phased out and Navy merchant-type ships moved to MarAd fleet sites either for preservation or scrapping. As a general rule all government-owned inactive merchant or noncombat naval ships are maintained at NDRF anchorages. However, while MarAd has the responsibility of administering the fleet sites and maintaining all ships in NDRF custody, disposition of Navy-titled vessels rests with the Department of Defense.
10The percent of U. S. foreign trade carried in American bottoms in terms of tonnage had declined from 20.7% in 1956 to 7.2% in 1966.
11 The Suez Canal was closed on 6 June 1967 as a consequence of the Egyptian-Israeli conflict. While the closing sharply increased shipping rates on routes normally using the canal, it did not occasion any massive breakout of NDRF vessels.
12 See Lester Velie, "Our Leaky Pipeline to Vietnam,” Reader’s Digest, December 1966, pp. 113-118.
13 Agencies participating in the study were the Maritime Administration, Federal Maritime Board, Department of Defense (JCS, OSD, services) and Office of Management and Budget.
14 It is interesting to note that the rapid change from breakbulk to contain- ership (and the initial competitive edge it gave American vessels) was in large measure due to the existence of the NDRF. Many types of government-owned ships were converted to containerships by U. S. firms under the long-operating Ship Exchange Program (Public Law 86-575) whereby the Maritime Administration exchanged government-owned ships—suitable for conversion to containerships—for privately-owned, war-built cargo vessels.
15During the 1950s, the government built 35 Mariner-type vessels. They were 20-knot ships of 13,400 deadweight. Five were turned over to the Navy and the remaining 30 sold to private firms.
16 Examples of such vessels would be U. S. Lines "Challenger”-class ship and Lykes Brothers Steamship Company’s Gulf Pride and Gulf Andes series.
17In a report issued in 1971, the National Academy of Sciences estimated that by 1985 there would be only 30 conventional breakbulk ships operating under the American flag. See National Research Council, National Academy of Sciences, Containership Underway Replenishment (Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Sciences, 1971), p. 31.
18The roll on/roll off (Ro/Ro), Seabarge and Lighter Aboard Ship (LASH) vessels will also be coming into the U. S. inventory in increasing numbers. While these ships are less dependent on a sophisticated port environment and hence have a wider defense application, they will still form only a relatively small part of the general cargo tonnage when contrasted with the containership.
19One interesting aspect of the Victory ships is that on the average they have a running time of approximately 10 years while they are chronologically all more than 30 years old. It is for this reason that they have been retained well beyond what would be considered a useful economic life.
20It is estimated that it would cost $2.5 billion to replace (in terms of equivalent tonnage) the present 130 Victory retention ships. The present direct and indirect cost of maintaining a Victory at a reserve site is about $10,000 per year. To break one out would cost approximately $900,000. However, the breakout cost is only incurred when the ship is needed and presumably in an emergency, cost would not be the primary consideration. Thus, the cost of maintaining the NDRF option—even assuming the cost of maintaining Secretary Rumsfeld’s "hot ships” increases significantly—would seem to be an excellent investment in terms of sealift readiness.
21 At present, there are no plans at any government level to preserve a Liberty ship in a walk-aboard condition. Many states have claimed their battleship namesakes, e.g. North Carolina and Alabama. Charleston, S.C. is the home of the carrier Yorktoum and probably will be the final home for the world’s first nuclear merchant ship, the NS Savannah. The only state interest in a Liberty ship has been to acquire one or more and sink them off their coasts as fish reefs. They deserve better. The contribution these ships made in World War II and their later role in rebuilding the war’s aftermath should count for something in a nation that takes pride in its maritime heritage.