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“I am the Two-Headed Ogre ...”
(See B. Keener, pp. 38-45, April 1976; J. C. Snedecker, p. 79, July 1976; G. L. Negron, E. Shimberg, and A. T. Church, pp. 72-73, August 1976; C. S. Campbell, p. 77, September 1976; W. B. Patterson, pp. 99, October 1976; P. R. Schratz, p. 87, December 1976 Proceedings)
Chief Yeoman Harold F. Pierce, U. S. Navy (Retired)—Captain Schratz is right on target with his remark: “The only duty opposite the captain’s name on a ship's roster is morale. ”
In the years since my retirement, I have given much thought to identifying why two of the ships I had served in were especially outstanding, happy ships. Eventually, I gained an insight on this matter. Competence would get a captain by, but for highest morale, for a happy ship, the leader must possess one extra ingredient: true consideration for his crew.
Captain Rufus Z. Johnston, commanding officer of the USS Utah (BB- 31), and Captain Walter F. Jacobs, commanding officer of the USS New Mexico (BB-40), demonstrated their fitness for leadership and their greatness by possessing and practicing this one invaluable virtue—consideration of their men. Men will follow their
ENTER THE FORUM
We welcome brief comments on material published in the Proceedings and also brief discussion items on topics of naval, maritime, or military interest for possible publication on these pages. A primary purpose of the Proceedings is to provide a place where ideas of importance to the Sea Services can be exchanged. The Institute pays an honorarium to the author of each comment or discussion item published in the Proceedings.
leader to hell and back when they know their leader will lead them to hell and back. So they are called “Officers and Gentlemen” because to be a better officer one must also be a gentleman; and gentlemen always show consideration for others.
“Is Military Unionization An Idea Whose Time Has Come?”
(See J. E. Kane, G. C. Reynolds, A. R. Thorgerson, and J. Gordon, pp. 36-44, November 1976, and pp. 24-28, December 1976; E. J. Ohlert, p. 75, and C. E. Burns, pp. 82-83, March 1977 Proceedings)
Richard S. Mathews, Jr. -I was very interested in your two-part unionization article. To see the issue openly discussed in the Proceedings is, in itself, almost an answer to the article’s title question.
In the July 1976 All Hands magazine, the CNO stated that an alternative to unionization is the effective use of the chain of command. Your article went further and proposed creation of an organization by executive order to represent the interests of military personnel. I would like to go beyond his position and say a military union is our best chance of obtaining the equity we deserve.
I am a junior enlisted man in a highly-technical rating. My ship has a Human Relations Council which has not met in nine months. As the divisional representative to that council, I went up the chain of command to find out why we were not having monthly meetings as is required. The officer in charge stated, “If the ship has no problems, I see no reason to have the meetings.” His superior was informed of the situation and replied he didn’t know the specific guidelines for meetings, or how to hold such meetings. The issue was "dropped.” Recently we got a cut in our clothing allowance. Heeding Admiral Holloway’s advice, I put in a chit requesting reinstatement of my clothing allowance to its previous level. My chit was stopped by my chief who said I should send a letter to someone, but he didn’t know who the someone was.
Does Admiral Holloway honestly believe that I can use the chain of command to be allowed to grow my hair to the length of President Carter’s? Or how about a 40-hour work week with overtime? I would be laughed out of my command if I put that chit through. Or, if I offended a superior I would be transferred or set up.
Did the chain of command protect four of my friends who were busted because a first class petty officer saw one of them smoking what he believed to be marijuana? Was the chain of command used to decide what types of uniforms we are to wear?
My point is this. I am not represented anywhere. Your article says to vote. I went to my voting officer, and he helped me fill out a request for an absentee ballot. I didn’t get to vote because he helped me fill the form out incorrectly. When I confronted him with just what had happened, he shrugged it off and said he wasn’t the voting officer any longer.
I am no malcontent. I love the Navy and believe in a strong national defense. But, I believe a man who is treated with dignity and respect,
rather than like a child by an elitist, is bound to be a better fighter. I am going to join the American Federation of Government Employees and stand up and fight for myself.
We need no right-wing extremist groups like the Veterans of Foreign Wars, American Legion, or the Fleet Reserve Association to speak for us junior enlisted people. We need a strong voice, an able voice, a young united voice; we need dedicated professionals who want the United States to have an Army, Navy, and Air Force which can live up to the ideals our forefathers fought for.
Robert W. Nolan—As a retired chief petty officer and the National Executive Secretary of the Fleet Reserve Association, I read the two-part unionization article with great interest. I compliment the authors on part one. However, I believe they have completely missed the mark with their proposed solution to the threat of military unionization, the establishment of a “U.S. Navy Regency Board.”
This solution reveals that the authors do not understand the primary reason many career military personnel are expressing an interest in becoming unionized. It is not just because they are experiencing an erosion of their earned benefits. It is also because they perceive that government officials and military leaders who are charged with the responsibility of protecting the service person’s welfare are not endeavoring to properly discharge that responsibility.
Please note, it has been the recent Secretaries of Defense and Administrations, and not the U.S. Congress, who have recommended and fully supported reductions and changes in military compensation and benefits. Military personnel have lost faith in their leaders to represent them. And for this reason, a “Regency Board” would be viewed as an extension of the Administration and an unacceptable alternative to a union.
When military and civilian leaders discard their dollar-sign criteria on personnel costs and exercise a measure of equity in implementing personnel benefit changes, they will regain the faith of military personnel and the perceived need for a military union will be dispelled.
Unfortunately, the civilian leaders of the defense establishment cannot understand this. They prefer to have the U.S. Congress pull their chestnuts from the fire by enacting a law to prohibit military unionism—a law which if enacted, may not stand the test of constitutionality in the courts and might possibly backfire and create a greater reason for a union in the minds of military personnel.
Do not misunderstand; the Fleet Reserve Association is adamantly opposed to a military union. We were the first military association to oppose and take effective action against the threat. But, I feel the issue could be quickly defused by responsible leadership in behalf of military personnel within the establishment.
Commander Steven H. Edwards, U.S. Navy—In attempting to sort out the varying reactions to the article in question, I am primarily unsettled by the conclusions that were reached! As the four young officers were indeed bent on answering their own question (and they most certainly did), it cannot escape even the most casual review that they are convinced the time has indeed come, and there remains only the task of defining what this military union will look like, and be called! The recommended U.S. Navy Regency Board, composed of civilian personnel and funded by voluntary dues of perhaps five or six dollars per month per member, is their answer. The argument advanced for this Regency Board is the quintessential danger the armed forces face today. The error of interpreting the current threat of unionization as proof that a union is necessary and to then embark on a course to develop a palatable response is a serious one. We can ill afford to indulge such analysis for one moment. The words used to assess their own proposed solution were: ”... success is quite likely in that it satisfies many requirements and yet poses a minimum number of obstacles when compared to other alternatives.” Such a hesitant, uncertain, and conservative approach is akin to admitting it’s a poor choice, but the best available among many poor ones.
Unaddressed, and too often ignored, is the fatal mistake of equating civilian “management” with the military officer corps. Certainly this is valid in describing the mechanics of how we are organized, but for the purposes of analyzing the military union debate, employee vs. employer and labor vs. management, the officer corps through perhaps the mid 0-5 (commander) level is in fact labor. To depend on this group to stave off the problem of a unionized military is dangerous indeed, and is not unlike having an accountant audit his own books. Perhaps this Proceedings article is proof of this.
I think the answer lies in a totally different direction, namely the action taken by our current senior civilian and military leaders. Their decisions will be, of course, the sine qua non, for only these men can realistically offer an alternative which ensures a perpetuation of military life as we know it today. At the risk of repeating myself, I would like to use two excerpts from my rather lengthy article addressing these, alternatives which appeared in the December 1976 U.S. Naval Academy Alumni Association magazine Shipmate to best articulate my beliefs.
"We must stop addressing the consequences of a unionized military in completely unrealistic scenarios offering only a worst-case analysis to make an unnecessary point in the first place. There are admitted shortcomings inside and external to our military that feed unionism. These must be identified and dealt with summarily. We must learn to recognize each and to react in an appropriate manner. If unionism is our problem then let’s get on with understanding unionism, not just the problem. If, after 200 years, our military is now confronted with unionism, then why? If, after 150 years of organized labor in the United States, it now appeals to an heretofore very anti-union work force, what hap-
pened? To shrug it off as ‘it was a matter of time’, a very real and current attitude amongst many, is to miss the whole genesis of the threat and guarantees its inadequate and unsatisfactory resolution.”
. . What then are the Options? There are three:
—Ignore the Union —Accept it then regulate it —Combat it
The first flies in the face of accountable national leadership and is dismissed as irresponsible. The second, while appealing to those who have accepted unionization as inevitable, is also rejected from a deep personal belief that it’s wrong. Our answer lies in the final alternative—combat it—and it’s to that end we must bend our efforts. It would seem there are several ways.
“First, we must determine why there is a union movement and from where it springs. If it’s the result of conditions external to our organization then simple legislation as currently proposed by 25 senators will terminate the threat. This approach has historically been effective and can surely apply here. There presently exist sufficient precedents for legally combating unionism quite apart from proposed legislation. As a starter, the Supreme Court in a 6-2 decision rendered in March 1976 cited the American tradition of a ‘politically neutral military’ in ruling against political campaigning on military installations. As most of the present unions being touted as involved in the military unionization movement have alleged if not institutionalized political leanings (AFL-AFGE-CORE), their future association with military personnel should be short-lived. On the other hand if the movement to unionize is due primarily to the dissatisfaction of our own service personnel, an opinion to which I personally subscribe, then such legislation will only serve to mask the problem and solve nothing.
“Pursuing this latter assumption then, the key lies in just how we’re doing business today. In a Navy Personnel Research and Development Center Study conducted in early 1976, it was observed . . .‘it is of interest to note that the 1975 male recruit seems to be looking for basic security, which is probably a reflection of the high unemployment rate of his civilian contemporaries. However, he considers a supervisor who cares as important as guaranteed benefits; a finding which has important implications for military leadership.’
“Practically speaking the rules have changed, the people have changed, and we must first recognize this in order to exercise effective personnel management. More important than study groups to develop a plan of action, and milestones to blunt the union momentum, are initiatives to find out why the problem exists at all. We have been and continue [to be] entirely too defensive on the subject. It is not that unionism is closely identified with the strike that ought to upset us all, but rather its acceptance admits a rearrangement of leadership principles we have held as basic to our organization for 200 years. Too many are accepting the trend of Navy men and women toward using organizations such as the Fleet Reserve Association to look after their rights and privileges. That has always been our responsibility!
“Military unionism to me as a career Naval Officer is an anathema, but realistically considered as a Federal Manager its threat demands a more rational consideration. The fact we are addressing its presence is a warning that something is wrong, not a signal to prepare for the inevitable. Our proper course is to correct the leadership and organizational weaknesses that have lent respectability to a concept heretofore dismissed as unthinkable. While we as Naval Officers cannot substantially alter the social changes that now require so much more of us as leaders within our military communities, we must recognize that the loss of social acceptance of military service by an alarming proportion of our citizenry places a new and demanding responsibility on our shoulders. If even some of our people look to outsiders for solutions to their problems, if even some of our people feel frustrated and abandoned by their leadership both military and civilian, and if even some remain convinced their only effective spokesman against erosion of benefits is someone outside their service, then even the threat of a unionized military should spur all of us to do a better job in each of these categories. We absolutely must!’’ Essentially I agree only with the authors’ evaluation of their own solution as a compromise: "... the compromise solution proposed in this treatise addresses the problems which encourage military personnel to unionize while avoiding impairment of our military strength.” I personally think this is a shameful and disreputable concession that we should dismiss out of hand. To offer compromise is to dignify the legitimacy of the argument in the first place. In its stead we must initiate strong, imaginative, compassionate, and throughly professional actions that are designed to work within our existing organizational structure. To attack the union movement otherwise is to hasten its arrival.
“Is TacAir Dead?”
(See G. G. O’Rourke, pp. 34-41, October
1976; J. R. Graffman, pp. 81-82, January
1977 Proceedings)
Lieutenant R. A. Deal, U.S. Navy, Fighter Squadron-211—At the functionary level of Navy Tactical Air we seem to shake our heads over the problem of the surface-to-air threat while proceeding about the more traditional business of prosecuting our air-to-surface or air-to-air attack plans. We train to detect and evade SAMs and AAA to a degree, but we avoid meeting the problem head on. Maybe because the opposition’s surface-to-air capability was not all that effective in Vietnam or because the surface-to-air threat blurs our focus on mission accomplishment, we skirt the issue. Most likely it is one of those “too-hard-to-solve” problems that we shuffle off to the back of our minds hoping the big planners in all their omniscient wisdom will resolve.
Whatever our rationalization for circumnavigating the issue, it is certain in TacAir that we need a system, such as Captain O’Rourke describes, which confronts the problem squarely and negates it. The cost of our sophisticated aviation hardware will not allow us to wage a war of attrition. We in TacAir can expect heavy losses from surface-to-air weapons almost anywhere we may go unless we have a system designed directly to mitigate the effects of these weapons.
Technologically, we hold an edge over our potential adversaries, especially in the area of electronic and computer wizardry. It seems not only reasonable, but also logically necessary, that we employ this scientific advantage in a “systems approach" to pinpoint, designate, and expeditiously destroy, in a coordinated manner, this threat to TacAir. As advanced as our airborne weapon systems are, they are not viable if they can be destroyed before they execute their mission. We need a “system” to counter the surface-to-air nemesis. We need to plan and train to implement it as an integral part of any air superiority policy if TacAir is to remain a valid concept.
“High-Low”
(See E. R. Zumwalt, pp. 46-56, April 1976; R. L. McIntyre, p. 76, July 1976; J. T. Hayward, pp. 69-72, August 1976; H. Sanders, pp. 75-76, September 1976; R. D. Heinl, p. 91, October 1976; P. A. Young, p. 73, November 1976; G. E. Miller and E. B. Meyer, pp. 79-86, December 1976; Publisher’s Note and F. B. Leuthe, pp. 77-78, January 1977; N. Polmar, pp. 76-78, February 1977; P. Schratz, p. 80, March 1977 Proceedings)
Vice Admiral Robert S. Salzer, U. S. Navy (Retired), first Commander Pacific Naval Surface Force—The excerpt from On Watch, published in the April 1976 Proceedings, has amply served the Institute’s aim of stimulating discussion of ideas of importance to the sea services. In the main, however, the comments published to date have taken such issue with Admiral Zum- walt's concepts and actions as to require some redress of the balance. That is my purpose.
In particular, it seems useful to proffer to the upcoming generation of naval leaders a different perspective on two key points raised by Vice Admiral Jerry Miller in the December 1976 Proceedings. I believe Admiral Zum- walt’s determination to emphasize the low end of the force mix stemmed from his correct perception that changes in the balance of maritime power necessitated a shift in U. S. Navy priorities from power projection to sea control, rather than being due to bias in favor of his own “union.” Furthermore, Admiral Miller’s view that the U.S.S.R. still has a defensive navy is demonstrably in error.
The U. S. Navy’s hallmark in the post-World War II era was power projection; and it was a period of infinite value to the nation. We had emerged from that conflict supreme on the oceans of the world. Our erstwhile foes had been crushed; and the Soviet Union was preoccupied with the consolidation of its continental empire and the reconstruction of its economy. Moreover, during World War II, we had developed and proven our capability to project naval power against land-based defenses and decisively prevail, once control of the seas had been gained. It would have been sheer folly not to exploit this situation as fully as possible to support our vital interests abroad during the postwar period. As a consequence, apart from the development of strategic weapons such as Polaris, the highest priority was accorded to improving naval projection power by all informed naval officers, regardless of their “union.” I feel confident that Admiral Zumwalt’s force priorities would have been quite similar to Admiral Burke’s if he had become CNO at a time when our capability to control the seas was not at serious issue.
These singularly advantageous circumstances prevailed for two decades—long enough for the power projection mission to become enshrined in the pantheon of naval lore in much the same manner as the invincibility of the dreadnought was acclaimed during the early part of the 20th century. However, the prospects for our continued unquestioned supremacy in maritime matters had changed by the time of Admiral Zumwalt’s turn at the Navy helm. It had become evident that the U.S.S.R. was committed to expanding its sphere of influence into the Third World vacuum created by the decline of the British Empire and the global revolt against the detritus of 19th century colonialism. The creation of a credible offset to the U. S. Navy’s control of the seas and resultant capability to project naval power ashore was an indispensable element of this endeavor; and there was no question that by 1970 the Soviet Navy was rapidly and effectively transforming itself from what had been a defensive fleet into one designed to contest the U. S. Navy’s abilities to project power ashore and protect U.S. sea lines of communications on a worldwide basis.
Would Gorshkov have initiated a carrier program or invested in development of his mobile logistic support force to deny us access to the sea approaches to the U.S.S.R.? Why build so many nuclear-powered, cruise missile submarines rather than quieter and cheaper diesel boats for the defense of the contiguous seas? Would the U.S.S.R. have invested in the worldwide command and control capabilities manifested in the Okean- 70 exercise for a coastal defense mission? Today’s Soviet Navy is, by any calculation, a global force designed to challenge U. S. control of the seas through its offensive capabilities.
In this endeavor, the U.S.S.R. was substantially aided by the developing technology of naval warfare. This has not been favorable to the carriers and other surface ships on which the U. S. relies for the projection of tactical naval power. Nuclear-powered submarines, antiship missiles, and satellite reconnaissance have all substantially increased the vulnerability of such forces. Vast resources have been committed to improve their protection; and the carrier will probably still be the queen of naval battle for some time. As in chess, however, these queens must be carefully conserved until the tide of combat has made application of their offensive power feasible at an acceptable risk.
In the context of this changed balance of power, I question whether any CNO, regardless of his “union,” could, have objectively concluded other than to place priority on the sea control mission. This necessarily involves emphasis on the low end of the force mix. Numbers are important in the context of sea control. No matter how capable a single force may be, it can influence events in only a limited geographic area at any one time. And a competent adversary will adjust his tactics correspondingly. In the light of realistic resource constraints, how else does one meet the requirements for numbers except by emphasis on relatively low-cost platforms having high payloads? Moreover, the vulnerability of all surface platforms to submarine and missile attack in today’s environment makes it prudent to avoid putting too many eggs in a few baskets.
My own views on the specific mix in the force modernization program differed at times from those of Admiral Zumwalt. For example, I would like to have seen even more emphasis accorded SSN construction on the high side of the mix in view of the capabilities of these vessels to take a toll of Soviet sea denial forces. Investment in such forces seemed to me more desirable than constructing additional nuclear-powered cruisers as carrier escorts. The unlimited endurance of these surface ships provides very desirable operational flexibility; but they are relatively vulnerable and too costly for essentially defensive systems. Also, I would have preferred to have our LPH and LHA ships adapted for employment in either a sea control or amphibious assault mode rather than investing heavily in a new sea control class. However, these are not simple issues; and I can readily understand how Admiral Zumwalt arrived at his decisions on the basis of valid military and political considerations, rather than through parochial bias.
In any case, I do not think that, on the basis of his record, Zumwalt can be charged with failure to understand the vital importance of air capabilities in a struggle for naval superiority. On the contrary, I would submit that his strong backing of LAMPS, the V/STOL program, and the ill-fated sea control ship provide proof that he fully appreciated the indispensable role of air power in sea control operations. Similarly, his sponsorship of the CV concept was designed to permit these very capable and costly systems to contribute their weight to the battle for sea control which will be a necessary precursor to power projection in any future conflict involving the Soviet Navy. Again, Zumwalt was not hesitant about shifting the mine countermeasures function from a surface mission to one which relied primarily on aviation units when it seemed to him that this was a more effective utilization of forces. These actions are hardly indicative of a mind closed to all but the interests of his “union.” Rather, they betoken a determination to concentrate resources on aviation capabilities which, despite their lack of glamor, are necessary for the future Navy’s most urgent priority.
Finally, I would like to differ with the view that those who expressed dissenting views to Admiral Zumwalt stood in imminent peril of having their careers terminated. In my own experience I felt impelled, on occasion, to disagree with him when my opinion was solicited (and sometimes when it was not). I cannot say that my batting average on influencing the outcome of these matters was high; but there was no hint of retribution for Fese majest'e. To be sure, once he had made a final decision, Admiral Zumwalt expected his subordinates to bend their efforts wholeheartedly toward making it a success. Those who chose to do otherwise should have read the oath of office more carefully.
Thomas A. Lutz—Admiral Miller’s comments concerning the “unions” and leadership within the fleet spoke to me.
As the CO of the Franklin D. Roosevelt (CVA-42), Captain Miller was probably the single most positive influence in my naval experience as an engineering junior officer. Here was an aviator who had the respect of every black shoe on board. His leadership qualities bordered on the phenomenal. From holding memorial services for our fallen Commander-inChief in November 1963 during a troubling yard period to periodically making his way down to the boiler rooms to observe progress on “firesides,” his crew knew he was sincere.
He would often speak to the crew over the 1-MC after piping down “all hands” himself, saying, “This is your
Happy Captain speaking ..." and go on to deliver a stirring pep talk that made every man I knew want to do his best for the "Old Man.”
At the same time, he repeatedly gave brown and black shoe alike lessons in shiphandling while in command of the 63,000-ton Roosevelt. We were impressed each time we came alongside to refuel with his smartness and precision in conning the ship. I also understand he held the distinction of being the only carrier skipper to back down the entire length of the channel at Gitmo. I presume these were the types of experiences he felt Admiral Zumwalt missed.
I was sure I had served under a superb naval officer. However, he probably served his country best as a spokesman for good judgment in the F-lliB/F-14 controversy. He alludes that his stance cost him politically— perhaps the job of CNO itself.
“In VS, The Enemy Has Been Found and The Enemy Is Us”
(See S. L. Chapell, pp. 120-122, October 1976; J. Goodrich, pp. 87-88, December 1976; E. L. Jewett, p. 78, March 1977 Proceedings)
Commander Franklin H. Saunders, U. S. Navy, Commanding Officer Attack Squadron 105—Lieutenant Commander Chappell made many fine points in his well-written article. However, I do take exception to his statement that during shore-based training VA and VF pilots find it is “extremely boring, day after day, to hurl themselves at the ground in rocket and bomb practice.” I have yet to have the displeasure of meeting an attack pilot who finds this mission boring. In the A-7 community we don’t bomb, rocket, and strafe enough, and the pilots’ main complaint is that they do not get time to practice their “bread and butter” mission. With additional missions of EW, recce, CAP, photo, low-level and radar NAV, SSSC, Seccap, and tanker, to name a few, the average attack pilot is a multi-mission and far-from-bored pilot. To those ex-VS types who went VA/VF but prefer MAD circles, I say go back to VS; but don’t insinuate that VA/VF flying is boring or not a challenge.
“The Surface Forces”
(See R.S. Salzer, pp. 25-35, November 1976;
J.J. Shanahan and P. Shepherd, pp. 75-78,
March 1977 Proceedings)
Captain D. R. Stefferud, US. Navy, Commanding Officer, USS Ajax (AR- 6)—Vice Admiral Salzer’s comments on the Naval Surface Forces (Pacific and Atlantic) come at a particularly important time in the life of these organizations, and, of course, he speaks with the best credentials.
The payoff is coming soon for the strongest argument in the reorganization’s favor: a sense of community, continuity, and even-handed administration of the surface forces’ officers and men. My impression is one of rapidly crumbling walls between the subcommunities, although vigilance is in order to avoid fragmentation in the future.
The area of ship maintenance and repair presents a somewhat dimmer picture. Although increased material readiness was not, according to Admiral Salzer’s expert testimony, an initial primary goal of the reorganization, it is a natural corollary to improved administration through updated and streamlined organization. Engineering and maintenance standards are higher and qualifications of officers and men in these fields are improving steadily, but a wide gap remains between effort applied and combat-ready end product.
Something is going seriously astray in the translation of men, money, and material into deployed ships with all systems up and ready. Admiral Salzer identifies insufficient allocation of these basic resources as a cause, and it is undoubtedly one. He identifies the submarine force as an example of the way to do this better, and many surface sailors share his opinion.
There may be, in addition to lack of money and skill, a more basic organizational factor at work which keeps us from using what we have to best effect. The type commanders and their immediate subordinates, the group commanders, are not organized for the repair and maintenance of ships day-to-day, in real-time. They may suffer from an inhibiting confusion between their operational and
administrative missions.
The type commander, through scheduling, provisions of services, meeting of deployment commitments, and training, is a strong force in the daily operations of ships. Concurrently, because he has the money and at least knowdedge of the whereabouts of people and material, he is the true administrative commander as well. Long-range policy planning must suffer to some degree if a staff must daily dispense money, repair assets, operating time, inspection schedules, and people to its forces.
The group commander does not have money, people, or parts to allocate. He administers, guides, and commands in port without the wherewithal. He is charged with, and organized for, operations at sea. He coordinates with other operational forces in the preparation of complete integrated operations at sea. It seems therefore unfair that he be delegated a horizontal slice of the type commander’s responsibility.
Who, then, is in charge of fixing ships? One asset, the Fleet Maintenance Assistance Group (FMAG), works for the fleet commander. The afloat intermediate maintenance activities (IMAs), tenders, work for a group commander. They are coordinated, but not centrally commanded. Symptomatic of the underlying organizational ambiguity are the atrophy of combat systems and ordnance repair capability in the tenders, failure to exploit the automatic data processing capability in tenders through use of automated work requests, failure to provide concurrent introduction of intermediate repair capability with the introduction of new classes of ships (e.g. Spruance class), lack of tightly written upgrade and modernization plans for IMAs, and difficulty of defining and justifying the billet structure and equipment requirements for FMAGs and tenders.
Vertical cuts in manning or money have stultified such areas as boat repair, rigging services, advanced welding techniques, advanced calibration, and test procedures.
With some reluctance, I agree with Admiral Salzer that another organizational “tweak” is in order, but I think
I can identify the source of personnel, at least, to carry this one out. I recommend:
► The type commander take a step back from real-time administration of the repair and maintenance of each ship of his force and direct his effort toward that of repair and maintenance policy.
► The group commander (and squadron commander) leave the field of repair and maintenance entirely, except for normal command and monitoring.
► A centralized authority command the repair assets of each Surface Force and conduct the day-to-day provisions of repair services to the force.
► That this centralized authority draw his staff from the type, group, and squadron material sections, which he relieves of the nuts-and-bolts responsibility.
“A Case for Foreign Military Sales in American Persian Gulf Strategy”
(See W. C. Remick, pp. 18-26, January 1977 Proceedings)
Bern Price—I was brought up sharply by a section in Fernand Braudel’s two-volume discourse on The Mediterranean in the Age of Philip II outlining consequences stemming from a failure to grasp the limitations of basic weapon systems.
The reason, it seems, the Arabs were unable to conquer Iran during their expansionist period, beginning in the 7th century, was camels.
The Arabs—and most Westerners today—do not realize the distinction between camels and dromedaries. Professor Braudel perceptively notes that camels developed in Bactria and are generally impervious to cold and altitude. Dromedaries, however, are fragile creatures of the desert.
Thus, when the Arabs sought to invade the high Persian plateau, their dromedaries sickened and their forces lost mobility. In short, the scimitar- man-dromedary weapon system, victorious in one context, was a failure when used under circumstances exceeding design limitations.
The Arab commanders, of course, should have been aware of these limitations. To this day on cold nights in
the Sahara, the few remaining nomads make certain their dromedaries have their heads inside a tent, according to the professor. Certain groups, I might note, dismiss the dromedary-tent relationship as a fable.
I offer these observations in case the camel vs. dromedary weapon system controversy should ever arise in connection with our relationships with Iran or Saudi Arabia. Clearly, a judicious mix of weapon systems is an imperative, something Congress seems unable to grasp.
“Survival of the Fittest:
Five Years Later”
(See W. W. Turkington, pp. 58-65, October 1976; C. W. Lazelere, R. W. Clark, and J. Caldwell, pp. 78-80, January 1977; D. E. Netherton and A. L. Keating, pp. 73-74, February 1977 Proceedings)
Captain D. J. Sperling, U.S. Navy, Commanding Officer, Fleet Logistics Support Squadron 24—The article contrasted promotion statistics for three major aviation categories: CVW, ASW, and “Other.” My squadron came under the collective “other” category. Based on past performances before selection boards, I believe VR (transport) promotion statistics are significantly lower than the statistics given under this general heading “Other.” Nonetheless promotion statistics for “other” pilots clearly indicate that the deck is stacked against them. Specifically, during the last round of promotions in my squadron, eight of 12 LTjGs were promoted to LT, zero of two LTs were promoted to LCDR, and zero of seven LCDRs were selected for CDR.
As the article states, federal law places submariners, surface officers, and aviation officers of all tactical specialities in one group in order that all unrestricted line officers be considered equally, and the best fitted be promoted. However, the results of selection boards indicate that the selection process did not grant equal consideration and that candidates were unofficially subjected to a quota system or were segregated without deference to federal law or its intent. Promotion opportunities appeared to vary with the proportions of each general category of members comprising the selection board.
Commander Turkington proposes to use the co-variance phenomena to eliminate disproportionate promotions among aviation categories. He offers as a tenable solution that each aviation specialty being considered be represented on selection boards in proportion to its actual numbers eligible for promotion. This solution, although it may eliminate the symptoms of nonegalitarian promotions, is not rooted in the principle of promoting the most fit. Instead, every member of the board is implicitly charged with looking after those under his tutelage.
Many pilots currently in my squadron were aware of the traditionally poor promotion record associated with VR squadrons before reporting on board. Generally, it was “needs of the service” and not individual volition that ushered VR-24 pilots into the ranks of the great unpromoted. Nonetheless, they arrived at VR-24 equally enthusiastic, motivated, and talented as their CVW and ASW contemporaries.
Aviators are ordered into VR-24 to perform a mission essential to the Sixth Fleet. On a continuing basis, we routinely restore operational readiness to task force units in the Mediterranean by delivering CASREP and NORS items as well as technical representatives. During the Cyprus, Lebanon, and other Middle East contingencies, VR-24 was the only air delivery avenue open to carrier task forces positioned in the Eastern Mediterranean. Carrier operations, transportation of ambassadors, congressmen, and foreign dignitaries, urgently needed parts and technical assistance, and life-saving emergency medevacs are common ingredients in VR-24’s mission. Yet, one tour in VR-24 oftentimes precludes a successful naval career. It is not uncommon for my aircraft commanders to acquire 60-70 or more hours a month while, at the same time, performing normal ground duties.
While being bludgeoned by selection boards, VR-24 pilots still continue to exhibit the type of professionalism required of ideal naval officers and aviators. They eagerly accept the responsibilities and challenges intrinsic to our mission. Unfortunately for the Navy, many junior officers in the squadron observe that their fledging careers have the growth potential of a bonsai tree, and they begin planning a civilian career in anticipation of an early promotion passover for LT or LCDR. When it does occur, out they go and with them goes invaluable experience and hundreds of thousands of training and operational dollars.
In the most recent lieutenant commander selection board, the squadron’s two eligible lieutenants failed selection. One of them (an OV-10 pilot in Vietnam) had a particularly sterling battle record: 350 combat missions, two Purple Hearts, the Distinguished Flying Cross, four individual Air Medals, the Navy Commendation with Combat “v,” and Presidential and Meritorious Unit Commendations along with a host of Vietnamese awards. His OV-10 colleagues who somehow circumvented the “other” aviation category were promoted normally. Hence, another outstanding naval officer and aviator is eclipsed by the more visible Vf/va/vs/vp pilot with a warfare specialty, and a passover is humbly celebrated with the bitter matzo of career stagnation.
In conclusion, it seems that all naval aviators have several points in common. They are all naval officers detailed to billets by BuPers. Each naval aviator is assigned a responsibility ultimately essential to our country’s defense. Generally, they all accept their missions and resolve to put forth prodigious efforts to accomplish those missions. They are all evaluated by superiors and go before the same selection board for selection. Here the common ground appears to end. The VR pilot who has performed equally well in his assigned role is oftentimes overlooked at selection time while his CVW and ASW contemporaries advance. With the Navy’s recent emphasis on equal opportunity, this brand of myopic equality is in dire need of reform. In order for those of us in the “other” community to compete with our contemporaries, we require: (a) equal representation on selection boards, and (b) a warfare specialty or the opportunity (especially for junior officers) to transition to warfare specialty communities sometime after completion of first tours.