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VV hen the first major discoveries of oil under the North Sea were made public in 1970, many people, particularly we Britons, were skeptical. We remembered the nuclear power “bonanza” which, after early promise, did not prove either an immediate or inexpensive source of energy. But then came the Arab-Israeli War of 1973 and, almost overnight, North Sea oil assumed great importance in the minds of politicians and economists in Western Europe. At that time, there were some exaggerated predictions, mainly by politicians, of likely production levels and revenue. We might guess that these inflated figures were published to allay fears of longterm gasoline rationing.
The target figure for 1974 was to have been 15-20 million tons, but there was a shortfall with actual production totalling 11.9 million tons. The 1976 figures, according to the British Government’s Department of Energy, show that the target and production figures almost matched at between 35-45 million tons.
In fact, offshore oil resources will be considerable by the 1980s, but they are unlikely to make Britain self-sufficient in oil. One reason is the necessity to blend the rather light North Sea oil with denser grades from the Middle East. Norway, the only other West European nation now obtaining oil from under the sea in appreciable quantities, is in somewhat better position. Its annual oil consumption is much less
by virtue of having a far smaller population than Britain.
The British offshore oil and natural gas resources are popularly described as “North Sea oil" though many rigs are well to the north of Scotland in an area more correctly called the Norwegian Sea. Only some of the natural gas production platforms are located in what many regard as the “North Sea” in the Thames estuary and also in an area about 50 miles east and northeast of the East Anglian coast or the eastern “bulge” of the British Isles.
In due course, further research will be undertaken
The troubled waters around the crippled oil platform off Norway are both literal and figurative. Helicopter pilots flying to the drilling rigs frequently encounter conditions that naval pilots would face only in emergency situations. There is also the threat that the oil rigs could he the victims of enemy attack in a naval war. The platforms are considered sovereign territory of the owner nations, hut they are largely defenseless.
What makes the North Sea oil industry essentially
forces, it is necessary to consider the likely threats.
At the extreme end of the scale are the Soviet Navy and Air Force. Attacks on offshore oil and gas installations by the Soviet Union would seem unlikely outside the context of a major East-West confrontation. Countering such attacks would involve the NATO navies and air forces. A more probable threat from the Soviet forces is one that could arise if Moscow continues its policy of declaring certain sea areas dangerous to shipping for limited periods during naval and air exercises. A situation could arise fo which an oil rig was inside such an area.
Although so far Soviet naval exercises have kept to the north of the drilling areas, the most northerly of which are concentrated about 150 miles northeast of the Shetlands, the Soviets show scant regard for the 1,000-meter safety zones around each rig. In June
in the western half of the English Channel, in the Irish Sea, in the Celtic Sea southeast of Ireland, and to the west of the Shetland Islands. The enormous depths in the last area are likely to cause even greater difficulties for the oil companies. The search for oil in current exploration areas in the northern North Sea and Norwegian Sea has been described by some oil companies as 50 times more difficult than similar exploration off Florida, for example.
The spread of undersea oil and gas exploration areas is already considerable and now covers some 50,000 square miles in the North Sea alone. Within the British sector by mid-1977, there were some 50 oil and gas drilling rigs and production platforms. Another 25 locations are likely to have drilling rigs by 1980. There are a further ten or so rigs and platforms in the Norwegian zone and one each in the Danish and Dutch zones. The North Sea and southern Norwegian Sea were divided into exclusive economic zones under international agreement between the surrounding nations—Britain, Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, West Germany, and Belgium. A similar agreement has been reached between Britain and France over the area at the western end of the English Channel. Eire and Denmark are concerned about oil exploration west of the Shetlands since both claim rights in the area the latter by virtue of continuing links with the Faeroe Islands. In addition to the various oil and gas production platforms and rigs, there is a growing number of pipelines, one as much as 280 miles in length, linking production platforms to shore refineries and tank farms in both Scotland and England. By autumn 1975, the various oil production consortia and the Norwegian Government (all Norwegian offshore oil resources are state-owned) had to commit some $10 billion because of the conditions involved in exploration and development of the offshore oil and gas industries. As much as $100 billion may eventually be needed.
Such a rapid-growth industry has had a considerable impact over a wide range of services in the maritime field. New navigation regulations and communications nets have had to be produced. Supply and safety ships have had to be built or converted (the latter are often former minesweepers from the United States and other NATO nations). And the West European shipbuilding industries have been given some unusual construction problems building huge drilling rigs and platforms. A government- sponsored diver training school has been opened in Scotland. There is also a rapidly increasing demand for deep-diving submersibles for helping to lay pipelines and for underwater surveying and diver support.
different from that in, say, the Gulf of Mexico is that the former frequently has some of the worst sea and weather conditions encountered anywhere in the world. Helicopters ferrying men and stores between the shore and the rigs are often flying in conditions that few naval pilots would be expected to face except in gravest emergency. Rigs have been damaged by heavy seas, and some have been lost.
On the question of national sovereignty, the attitude of Britain, which is shared by Norway, is that a rig is national territory regardless of its distance from the shore. Legally, the British rigs are classed as merchant ships in that they have a fully qualified mercantile captain in charge for navigational safety. By claiming full sovereign rights for each rig, a government inevitably accepts the responsibility for maintaining that sovereignty—if necessary by force.
It is probably true that the Royal Navy, which largely has the ultimate responsibility for upholding the sovereignty of the rigs, has seldom in peacetime faced so many and diverse problems as those with which it is now confronted. According to a former NATO Commander in Chief Channel, Admiral Sir Terence Lewin, who was also until late 1975 Commander in Chief of the British Fleet and is now First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff, NATO would undertake the security of the various offshore installations in time of war or grave international tension.
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But in peacetime so many problems tend to circumscribe any positive and direct line of action that the Royal Navy is being criticized by politicians and the media for doing both too much and too little- Some academicians have suggested that offshore oil installations attract possible terrorists because they are a naval and civil security responsibility. Before, however, examining present and planned security
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1977, two Soviet “Natya”-class ocean minesweepers carried out what was believed to be a sidescan sonar survey of sections of the 280-mile gas pipeline from the Brent field to St. Fergus, about 40 miles north of Aberdeen. While not due for completion until 1978-79, enough of the pipeline had probably been laid for the minesweepers to obtain an idea of its planned route and possibly to ascertain whether it had been buried in the seabed to any degree. During their survey, the two Russian ships disregarded the safety zone and were pursued by the nearest rig safety boat. The patrol ship HMS Orkney was also ordered to the scene and spent several tricky minutes maneuver- tng to avoid a collision with either the Russians or the safety boat.
This incident followed similar activity in 1976 off the Shetlands by two “Natya”-class minesweepers. Although initially puzzled by the Soviets’ desire to know the pipeline routes, the Ministry of Defence in London now believes they may not accept the actual and planned pipeline routes marked on charts of the area as accurate. And, since many Soviet charts are believed to be inaccurate for security reasons, they tnay be trying to establish the degree of accuracy of British charts.
Because helicopters and supply and safety craft are around most rigs virtually every day, a situation could come about in which it was necessary to use Warships to escort supply vessels through Soviet exer- c*se areas. Such a move would obviously create the r*sk of more grave confrontations. But the most Probable threat from the Soviet forces is one arising from miscalculations. In June 1974, a Soviet intelligence collector (AGI) came well within the naviga- honal safety zones of some gas rigs—in one case to a distance of about 30 yards. In London it was offi- c*ally assumed that the Soviet’s intention was to check if the rigs were equipped with radar or passive s°nar, but some officers in the Ministry of Defence Privately believed that the Soviet captain had ex- cfeded his orders by ignoring the rigs’ safety zones f ough this was clearly not so with the two “Natyas”
^ 1977, for their actions were quite deliberate.
There have been several other close approaches by oviet surface warships, submarines (on the surface), ar>d AGIs to a number of rigs and platforms—so ^uch, indeed, that such incidents are becoming J-ornmonplace. Since the Soviets are known to have ^gun searching for undersea oil in the Kara Sea, it 'Pay be that they are also anxious to study the tech- JPcal aspects of oil rigs’ construction and operation.
at they believe the rigs may be used for passive |*efense purposes by the West has been indicated in alks they have had with the Norwegians over oil
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COPYRIGHT © U77 NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC SOCIETY. REPRINTED RY PERMISSION
prospecting in the Barents Sea. Moscow’s fear that rigs owned by American oil corporations might have been set up in this area and used by the Department of Defense to provide surveillance of Soviet naval and air activity was probably one reason why all offshore oil exploitation in sea areas off Norway is undertaken by the state-owned national oil corporation.
In Britain the most likely threat to offshore oil and gas installations is considered to be from terrorist groups such as the Irish Republican Army, various Palestinian organizations, and the so-called “Tartan Army a Scottish nationalist movement which claims, among other things, that the offshore oil industry revenues should exclusively benefit Scotland since the waters concerned are “Scottish.”
Terrorist threats could take a variety of forms. The most likely would be attempts to blow up pipelines and pumping machinery ashore, and such attempts have been made, with minimal success, by groups claiming to represent the “Tartan Army.” Destruction of a pipeline on the seabed would pose no great problems for a group with wet suit divers using plastic explosives because the pipeline could be detected without much difficulty using a simple magnetometer device towed by a fishing boat.
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Yet the political and economic effects of attacks on pipelines would be very limited because the damage could be quickly repaired, and the risk to human life, if any, would be small. This would not suit ter-
rorist groups seeking publicity or ransom money. To achieve such aims, they would have to attack a rig, thus threatening the crew. The British security authorities believe that a terrorist group using a boat would require such a level of planning and organization that the preliminary preparations would come to the notice of the authorities and allow them time to act before an attack was mounted.
Much more difficult to counter would be an attempt to hijack a rig’s crew by terrorists operating from supply ship or helicopter. Police in Aberdeen, in northeast Scotland, enforce national laws in cases such as theft or assault on the rigs supplied from there. Aberdeen is the "home port for the large majority of such installations, and its police have for some time been worried by the reluctance of the oil corporations and their personnel to undergo normal immigration and customs control on arriving in Britain. At one time, the first indication the police often had of an oilman’s presence in Britain came if he had to be brought ashore from a rig and hospitalized. But now, though rig crews may transfer almost immediately from an international flight to a helicopter at Aberdeen, they undergo normal security screening and identity checks before flying out to a rig.
Yet another problem would be an attempt to blow up a rig by divers. In 1975, security authorities in Britain were alerted after a phoned threat that time bombs had been placed on some East Anglian gas rigs. The crews of the threatened rigs were taken off, and the structures were searched by a naval diving
team before it was found that the call was a hoax.
Apart from threats from terrorists, there is a possibly greater threat of a collision between a ship and a rig. A collision could lead to a serious and widespread pollution problem even though automatic cutouts operate to stop the oil flow if the pressure in a pipeline drops following a fracture. Fire, explosion, and the possibility of a helicopter crashing while landing or taking off from a rig are further hazards- All these have already occurred, though fortunately casualties have been few.
The spill from a rig in the Norwegian Ekofisk field in April 1977, which called for the eventual intervention of Texan oil troubleshooters to stop the flow, could have produced a massive pollution problem. Existing resources in Britain, Norway, an Denmark, the countries most likely to be affected, would have been hard put to counter such a spill- But thanks to heavy seas and favorable winds, the oi was largely dispersed before it could become a threat to adjacent coastal areas.
In brief, these are considered to be the more likely security problems facing this new industry. But what of the defenses? The various oil corporations must provide the initial defense by screening and checking the backgrounds of candidates for jobs on the rigs> checking personal tool kits, and improving com munications between rigs and the shore.
Although a study was made in the Ministry of De' fence in London to examine the problems of putting the Rapier short-range surface-to-air missile system Or on oil rigs, the oil corporations remain adamant tha[ th they do not want weapons or any form of explosive5 gi kept permanently on board the rigs. The most the) are likely to do by way of providing physical securib '1 would be to have emergency systems to prevent & M cess to a rig by boat or helicopter. That would mea1’ i obstructing the rig landing platform and ladder t from sea level by barbed wire or oil drums on th
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The first active line of defense against terrori5 H
; threats is the police working with various governmental counterespionage and antisubversion agencies. Indeed, there would need to be an overt threat from a paramilitary terrorist group before, under I British law, the police would be likely to call for military support. In the event of police being required on a rig, they would have to use either a civil- I *an supply helicopter or one from the services. The Royal Navy has a squadron of Sea King helicopters Based at Prestwick in southwest Scotland. At least °ne aircraft is kept on permanent standby for search and rescue and to meet other requirements. Nearer the oil exploitation areas is the Royal Marines’ base at the former Naval Air Station at Arbroath in eastern Scotland. Sea Kings could be deployed from there or from the Shetland Islands north of Scotland.
Royal Marine commandos from Arbroath would provide the ground element in a major antiterrorist operation, and exercises are now being carried out regularly in which commandos are landed on a rig by helicopter, or from a warship using both a helicopter and Gemini and outboard-powered rubber dinghies. T’he Royal Marines’ canoeists and divers of the Special Boat Service are also used in these exercises.
Aside from these relatively minor and occasional commitments, the Royal Navy in the summer of 1975 Commissioned the Scottish Home Department’s e'vilian-manned fishery patrol vessel Jura with a ^aval crew. Built on commercial fishing vessel lines, rhis 900-ton ship was armed with a 40-mm. gun and tw° machine guns and fitted with modified communication systems. Later in 1975, the naval tug Reward was reactivated from low degree reserve and s'milarly armed for patrol duties.
By late 1976, the first of five new “Islands”-class Patrol ships, HMS Jersey, was commissioned. These 'fill all be in service by the end of this year and have fifeady replaced the Jura, which has been returned to f <-• Scottish Home Department, and the Reward vhich was lost in a collision in 1976.
When, two years ago, it was announced that the t'tNV ships were to be built, some naval officers, Politicians, and the media criticized their speed of qly 17 knots and their lack of a helicopter. But al- °ugh their armament consists of only one 40-mm. ^Un> they can maintain their maximum speed in sea , ’uditions which would cause severe speed reductions y a. warship twice their 1,250 tons displacement. In dition, the kind of sea and weather conditions sten encountered in the northern parts of the North j,a w°uld make it impossible for a larger warship a frigate to operate a helicopter. t(iEach of the five ships cost only $4.25 million, and fir seakeeping qualities show that they can fulfill
the routine patrol tasks on the fishing grounds and around the oil rigs (they are all assigned to the Royal Navy’s Fishery Protection Squadron) even in the sort of weather that would cause deepsea fishing vessels to run for shelter. In the event of some serious situation developing, the Navy emphasizes that the five would quickly have the support of frigates.
The 1975 announcement of plans to build the new patrol ships also stated that four Royal Air Force Nimrod long-range maritime patrol planes would be assigned to patrols of the oil production areas. But the task of both the Navy and the RAF has been compounded by the implementation on 1 January 1977 of the European Economic Community’s (EEC) 200-mile exclusive economic zone surrounding the British Isles. Not only has the Navy’s Fishery Protection Squadron to keep watch over the oil and gas rigs but it has also to ensure that nine regulations governing licenses, quotas, geographical limitations, net sizes, kinds of catches, and fishing methods are observed by both EEC fishing vessels and those of the various nations permitted to fish within the zone.
While, for example, 15 Soviet fishing vessels were for a time allowed to catch haddock, mackerel, saithe, whiting, and sprats in the zone, East German’vessels| limited to five in number, may catch only saithe, while the same number of Polish vessels may catch anything except whiting and sprats. Licenses are granted only to named ships. So the Navy and RAF expend considerable effort checking the nationalities and then the names of fishing vessels in the zone. Their task may be eased after the withdrawal of Soviet vessels which were ordered out by the EEC following a September 1977 ban on EEC vessels in the Barents Sea.
Apart from the five new patrol ships, the Navy has ten mine countermeasures (MCM) ships and a patrol craft assigned to fishery protection. Inevitably, the five new patrol ships will be stretched on occasion to meet their assigned tasks. Though the Navy’s Director General Ships Department is currently considering a variety of possible designs for more new patrol ships and craft, these, when they are ordered probably sometime in 1978, will be replacements for the aging MCM vessels rather than additions for the offshore patrol task. By keeping their construction cost low, there should be no detrimental effects on the Navy’s overall new construction budget. The intention is to have three of the five new ships on patrol at any one time. By operating them much of the time from commercial ports, the government hopes to establish closer liaison with fishermen and other seafarers who could assist in intelligence gathering on unusual movements by unfamiliar craft and crews. The RAF also has the task of re-equipping several
HMS Lincoln (F 99) steams near the “Brent Bravo” platform during a patrol of gas and oil installations. Others on patrols of the North Sea rigs at various times include a Royal Air Force Nimrod from its base at Kinloss, Scotland, the 560-ton coastal minesweeper Soberton (M 1200), and a Soviet "Kotlin”-class destroyer. Opposite page: A Royal Navy Wasp helicopter from the frigate Tartar (F 133) takes off for a platform in an antiterrorist exercise, the frigate Ashanti (F 111) steams near a rig, and the offshore patrol ship Reward provides support for divers checking out bomb threats.
° its search and rescue flights at a number of air , ases with Sea King helicopters. Because of the much- improved range and load capacity of these aircraft, it ls likely that those in Scotland and eastern England 'v°uld be called upon in an emergency to move * P°lice or troops to rigs. There are legal problems in- °lved if a civilian helicopter pilot has to perform a Military task in peacetime by flying armed serv- *j-emen to a rig in an operational role. There is also e question of insurance of pilot and helicopter. The overall operational command of both the naval air patrols is from the joint Naval-RAF Maritime k ^quarters at Pitreavie, a few miles north of Edin- jUrgh. The Flag Officer Scotland and Northern Ire- (atl<T whose headquarters this is, is responsible for °rdinating the work of the various agencies both °vernmental and private, that could be involved in
fremergency. These include police, Trinity House
^sponsible for pilotage and navigational aids), the . producers, and many subcontractors operating •copters, supply vessels, deep submergence vehi-
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still another means of providing oil rig secu-
T. there have been suggestions in Parliament and
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be, some critics suggest, that the required funding would not come from the defense budget. But government spokesmen claim that the logistics and additional administration required to support a force of patrol ships not under naval control would create yet one more administrative layer without diminishing the powers, personnel, and costs of any of the existing agencies involved.
Aside from security factors, the Royal Navy’s most important additional task in connection with offshore oil is that of surveying. During 1974, the hydro- I
graphic survey ships HMS Hecate and Hecla began a geophysical survey of the continental shelf around the British Isles. This will be a continuing commitment |
for the Navy for some time. In 1974, the Hecla also assisted in positioning buoys in the Frigg gas field I
some 200 miles east of the Orkneys. Navy survey ships have been charting deep water passages for oil production platforms under tow from construction sites on the west coast of Scotland to areas northeast of the Shetlands. The deep draft of these platforms has made it necessary to find channels with a minimum depth of 50 fathoms or more.
The Royal Navy now has 13 hydrographic survey ships, but as a result of dwindling overseas commitments, the actual defense requirement for such ships is stated to be ten. The question of retaining the extra three ships by paying for them out of the budgets of other government departments has been agreed for the 1977-1978 financial year, and the Navy hopes this method of financing the three ships
the Navy, Norwegian Coastguard ships are not under naval command. Thus, the planned new construction program will not adversely affect the naval budget.
The Norwegian Coastguard at present has six ships, of which three are converted commercial whalers. They range in size from 500 to 930 tons. All are armed with one 3-inch gun and have a speed of 16-17 knots. The new ships will be of 1,940 tons displacement, will have a speed of 23 knots, and will be armed with one 76-mm. and two 20-mm. guns^ They will be strengthened for navigation in ice and will be equipped with firefighting, antipollution, and diving systems. They will also be able to operate a helicopter and, probably only in wartime, could be fitted with Penguin surface-to-surface missiles and limited antisubmarine equipment. The Norwegians are planning to have at least one deep-diving vehicles support ship which will also be under Coastguar control.
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will continue on a permanent basis.
At the Naval Construction Research Establishment at Dunfermline and Rosyth in Scotland, senior scientists have been advising oil corporations and construction yards on the design of rigs and platforms.
For some years, the establishment has been carrying out stress and other tests on the designs of commercial ships such as large tankers.
HMS Vernon, the naval torpedo, antisubmarine, and diving school at Portsmouth, has been assisting the offshore oil industry in instructing personnel flying by helicopter to the rigs how to escape from a ditched helicopter. The school has a mockup of a helicopter’s cabin for instructing in underwater escape techniques.
But the Royal Navy’s involvement with the new industry has not been entirely one-sided. As a result of the rapid development of small, deep-diving sub- mersibles for use in underwater surveys, covering seabed pipelines, positioning rigs, and providing diver support, Vickers Oceanics, which operates a number of these craft, has successfully completed tests using one as a rescue vessel for sunken submarines. The tests were carried out in 1975 off the Royal Navy’s submarine base at Faslane on the river Clyde in Scotland with the Canadian submarine Ojibwa. Personnel were successfully transferred from the submarine to the submersible at a depth of 100 feet. British and Canadian diesel-electric submarines are being fitted initially with modified escape hatches to allow a submersible to lock onto the hatches.
The Royal Navy is anxiously awaiting the outcome of the current government design study contract for a replacement for the 28-year-old deep diving support ship HMS Reclaim. Naval medical diving specialists believe that a new support ship capable of handling deep diving support capsules of the type used in the Anglo-American SeaLab experiments is now essential, particularly because of the high incidence of injury among divers working in the North Sea. It might be necessary to take an injured or sick diver from the seabed to the surface and then to a shore hospital in the minimum time. That would mean his being kept under pressure throughout the time as the decompression process would take too long.
As for oil rig defense measures by Norway, a new force of seven ships and three P-3 Orion aircraft to be purchased from the United States will be responsible for patrolling offshore oil installations and safeguarding national fishing grounds. The new ships and planes, which will all be in service within ten years, will be administered by the coast guard organization and will cost a total of $220 million. Though a part of
No other nation, apart from Britain and Norway, has so far assigned ships or aircraft specifically for patrolling offshore energy installations. At a seminar at the Royal Naval College Greenwich in the summer of 1975 under the auspices of the Atlantic Treaty Association, Rear Admiral A. P. Besnard, [1] Dutch officer who was then Chief of Allied Staff NATO Channel Command, suggested that the task o patrolling the oil producing areas should be a West European rather than an overall NATO responsibility—except, presumably, in the event of a direct Soviet attack.
But since only Britain and Norway are reaping any very considerable economic benefits from North Se oil and gas, it is hard to see much hope of agreement by other West European powers that they should help shoulder the responsibility and cost of peacetime patrols. However, under a NATO agreement, if the oil needs of any member nation fall below more that[2][3] 93% of requirement as a result of some external fee tor, the other members of the treaty organization may be asked to make up the shortage.
For the moment at least, Britain and Norway would be unwise to count on any assistance in th« task of policing the oil-producing areas. Those wfo reap the benefits must pay the costs.
since 1961 and of the Daily Telegraph since 1972.
I the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve and subsequent!
served in the Royal Navy and Royal Naval Rese^
[3] until 1970. He was naval correspondent for the Lond° Sunday Graphic from 1958 to 1960, when he was | pointed London editor of The Nato Journal. He has be
________________ I naval correspondent of the London Sunday Te/egrf