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The Marine Corps has become synonymous with the words—amphibious and ready. Acclaimed for highly successful amphibious operations in World War II, “fire brigade” operations in Korea, and a sustained land campaign (supported frequently by selective amphibious operations) in Vietnam, the Marine Corps has over the years successfully demonstrated the effectiveness, responsiveness, and flexibility of its forces. These characteristics are essential to all of the many varied missions that the Navy and Marine Corps may be called upon to perform. The frequency with which the National Command Authority will employ these amphibious capabilities in the future will depend on the stability of the international environment. All visible indications are that the demand will be great.
The stability of the international environment is dependent upon a series of equations involving difficult-to-predict interactions of various political, economic, and social factors. In recent years these interactions have become much more complex and have created potentially unstable situations which are not likely to be resolved in the foreseeable future.
Industrialized societies are becoming more and more dependent upon underdeveloped countries for raw materials and for sources of energy. The other side of this “interdependent” relationship is the fact that these countries, in striving for modernization, are receiving increasing quantities of manufactured products and manufacturing technology from the developed countries. The initial indications reveal a growing tendency toward a bartering arrangement wherein underdeveloped nations provide vital resources to the industrialized nations in exchange for modernization needs (and in many instances simply nutritional needs). This broadening interdependence has, at least initially, been accompanied by some redistribution of the world’s wealth.
Because of recent concern and high visibility, problems associated with energy supplies and agricultural products are fairly well known. However most of us are considerably less knowledgeable about the magnitude of consumption of other mineral5' Worldwide mineral consumption in the last 30 yeJj equals all prior total consumption, and the deman is climbing at a 6% rate per year. Many industn countries have essentially no recourse other than large-scale dependence on foreign suppliers for m°st minerals. As an example, the United States relie5011 foreign sources for many minerals of critical imp°r tance to our industries (e.g., chromium, manganese’ and nickel), a dependence that is not likely to be reduced in the foreseeable future.
If anything, the entire problem of ensuring aCC& to critical raw materials is becoming more acute Current and traditional sources will be subject t0 pressures for change. The recent oil boycott by ^ Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countf>eS brought this into sharp focus as political, economlC’ and military considerations tended to fracture tra^1 tional economic alliances. We can expect this “caf tel” concept to be expanded and, in fact, there afe already organizations or quasi-organizations made UP of the major developers and/or producers of bauxite’ copper, tin, and phosphate. A more important in^1 cator of change in this regard is the fact that the special session on raw materials held by the U-^ General Assembly in 1974 called upon all develop^ countries to form commodity associations in order l° exercise full “sovereignty” over their natural fe sources.
Economic rivalry is also moving into the oce^ areas and involves the control of both offshore fishi°f grounds and the exploitation of undersea energy mineral resources. In the case of undersea mining’ there is growing concern over the extent that coas^ nations will exercise offshore economic exploitation control and the broader question of regulating open ocean area operations. Obviously, the technology and economic base necessary to undertake open o
“The Marine Corps stands unique among the world’s military organizations as a ready force of combined arms, linked solidly to the Navy through integrated doctrine, training, and structure. It is truly a mobile force, prepared to respond to contingencies anyivhere in the world, using any available atid suitable means of strategic lift. At the same time, it retains its amphibious character, providing not only the institutional memory but also the expertise necessary to keep the state of the art of amphibious warfare in step ivith the times.”
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mining operations limits the number of participating countries, and opposition by lesser developed nations to perceived threats to their control over raw materials can be expected.
All of these trends seriously complicate the international environment and increase the potential for instability in regions of the world that are of critical economic importance to the United States. The growing Soviet ability to project influence and to exploit developing situations to the disadvantage of the United States further compounds the problem. The potential threat to the United States and its allies is one that cannot be ignored. The obvious answer is to maintain the necessary capability to protect vital U.S. interests overseas and provide for support of U.S. allies under existing treaty commitments. As long as the oceans of the world provide access to the critical raw materials needed by our industries and the sea lines of communication serve as the main arteries for U.S. economic sustenance, strong naval forces will be required to assure protection of our vital overseas interests.
The continuing Soviet naval buildup and increase in overseas operations underscores emphatically the importance that maritime considerations will continue to have in peace and war. The requirements are obvious. Naval forces must be capable in four areas: strategic deterrence, sea control, power projection, and presence. Amphibious forces contribute in a major way to all but the strategic deterrence role. While their role in power projection is well recognized, the contribution of amphibious forces in other areas, although equally important, is frequently overlooked. It may therefore be worthwhile to briefly discuss requirements for Marine Corps forces across the full range of crises and conflicts.
At the lower end of the crisis spectrum, the Marine Corps makes a major contribution in maintaining peacetime forward deployments in areas of the world critical to U.S. national security interests. There is no reason to believe that this requirement will not continue in the future. Marine forces, both forward land based and afloat, provide a unique and flexible capability to conduct a variety of presence functions. These forces can:
► Support diplomatic efforts by providing a visible show of force and demonstration of U.S. interest in areas of threatening crisis.
► Assist an ally by providing the precise level of military assistance required by the situation.
► Facilitate early commitment of U.S. forces to combat if required.
Should pressures to reduce the level of forward land-based ground and air forces persist, the capability to demonstrate presence and power without the problems attendant to land basing could enhance the value of forward-deployed amphibious forces afloat.
The next level of crisis emphasizes the requirement to maintain general-purpose forces capable of inter* vening in any area of the world in which U.S. interests are threatened. The primary goal of this unilateral type of military action is to attain our objectives while limiting the scope of conflict and having the option of quickly ending U.S. military involvement on order. This implies that our forces must have the capability to react swiftly, deploy over great distances, prosecute an action rapidly and effectively- and make a timely withdrawal.
Marine forces clearly meet the prerequisites f°r this case. They are maintained in a high state of readiness and are capable of deploying by a variety 0 means. Amphibious force deployment is not dependent on base or overflight rights. Since some MarWe forces are always based on board ships of the Navf and supported from the sea, the United States selectively project ashore that level of force require[1] to stabilize the situation. These amphibious foreeS have the capability to operate independently in ^ austere environment with little preparation minimum support.
There is no requirement to establish elaborate- highly visible facilities or stockpiles ashore. Air support can be provided by Navy or Marine carrier n,r and/or Marine air operating from expeditionary airfields ashore. Reembarkation can be accomplish^ without difficulty. In short, the same characteristic which are required for all-out amphibious assault (r£ sponsiveness, flexibility, and readiness) are ideal!)' suited to the requirements of these intermediate tyPe crises—whether or not an opposed landing is in volved.
Missions that may be assigned Marine forces undef this limited case include:
► Selected assistance to allied forces
► Evacuation of U.S. and friendly foreign nationals
► Protection of U.S. lives and property
► Interposition between contending parties
► Protection of some geographical area or resource As mentioned earlier, the history of Marine CorP5 operations since World War II is notable by our fre' quent involvement in these smaller, but more ffe quent “bread-and-butter” contingencies.
Next up the crisis ladder is the situation that reC ognizes the possibility of either a direct or indite^ confrontation with a major power beyond the NAT^ perimeter. Such a confrontation might involve tlie use of U.S. forces to deter, limit, or counter direC involvement by a major enemy power in a confix
ltlvolving U.S. allies or in a country wracked by Vernal strife.
In the main, initial U.S. efforts would be designed to thwart major power objectives while avoiding actUal combat. Should U.S. forces become engaged, 'haximum efforts would be made to terminate the c°nflict quickly while attempting to limit its scope and intensity. As in the previously mentioned situa- tlQn, Marine forces are a natural for employment in case. The missions that might be assigned arine forces are:
Selected assistance to allied forces
Interposition of U.S. forces between contending
^ Parties
Reinforcement of allied forces
Commitment to combat in either a land warfare or
amphibious role
he reader will note that they are similar, in part, to ^°se listed before. However, the possibility that S. forces could become engaged with a major enerny power in combat requires our forces be prehated to perform missions appropriate to a major c°nflict.
"Ehe final possibility is the all-out conventional ^ar. NATO has emerged as the primary focus for dense planning and programming guidance. The ar*ne Corps must be prepared to provide amphibi- °Us forces for support of combat operations not only 111 Europe, but also in other strategically important areas of the world.
Marines board the amphibious assault ship Guadalcanal (LPH-7) in preparation for exercise Solid Shield 77. Current amphibious lift capabilities are inadequate. Thus, the Corps looks forward anxiously to the delivery of the remaining three LHAs now under construction. [2] I
port of the land campaign. While I recognize that events may require a commitment of Marine forces on the central front, their employment in an amphibious role is considered to be strategically more effective.
For example, a Marine amphibious force poised to strike at the flanks or rear, or to counter amphibious and airborne landings in vital Baltic approaches, represents a significant “ace in the hole.” Used in this way, amphibious forces provide, as they did in World War II, a strategy option which the enemy cannot ignore. If history is an accurate guide, our amphibious forces would operate against the enemy’s mind, influence his operations, and tie down a substantial portion of his forces.
In short, Navy-Marine amphibious forces so employed would strengthen the overall defense out of all proportion to their numbers and costs. And they would do so to a much greater degree than if committed to a purely land warfare reinforcing role. Let me make it clear that the Marine Corps does not categorically reject the employment of its forces in a collateral land warfare role. Indeed, there is both legal and historical precedent for such a role. However, we do reject the idea that our forces should be specifically structured for extended land combat operations when such structure runs counter to what is needed for our naval role.
Our objections to these often innovative approaches to structuring are not rooted in resistance to change but in more fundamental concerns. Foremost among these is the belief that the unique service functions assigned to the Marine Corps under the National Security Act of 1947 are essential to the military needs of this nation and constitute an indispensable complement to the functions assigned to the other services.[3][4] [5] [6] Accordingly, our functional responsibility must serve as the primary basis for force structuring. To proceed otherwise would be to overlap and duplicate the programs of other services while neglecting our own unique responsibilities.
The strength of the National Security Act lies in its wisdom, durability, and flexibility. It is the only approach which both assures the preservation of all combatant capabilities needed for war on land, at sea, in the air, and in the “transitional” zones which lie between these basic dimensions of war. It is also the only approach which provides the varying fc>rce levels necessary to accommodate the differing threats worldwide, national strategy, and fluctuating defense budgets.
Structure which does not conform to our primary service functions tends to degrade our capability t0 serve with the fleet in naval campaigns. If we were to allow such structure to dominate our program, the strategic utility of amphibious forces would become increasingly less credible, and the nation would he deprived of a highly versatile force in readiness.
Now that I’ve portrayed the spectrum of roles and missions that the Marine Corps can expect in the fu' ture, let me proceed by discussing how we intend to maintain the high state of readiness that will be re' quired to accomplish these tasks.
We remain convinced that the ultimate weap°n we have to carry out our roles and missions is the young Marine rifleman on the ground. In the fm^ analysis, everything we do in the Marine Corps lS designed to support that 19 or 20-year-old Marme and his comrades. This support takes not only ^ form of individual weapons and equipment, it als° entails the more sophisticated and costly equipment employed by combat and combat support units that perform air, artillery, armor, and other essential functions. This requires the integrated effort of ^ entire supporting establishment of the Marine Corps—our schools, training centers, support base[7]- and supply activities.
In this modern age there is a tendency to overlook the human element in many of our day-to-day affairs- and it is in the military environment that the human factor is the most vital of all. In other words, when we talk about our Corps, it is always a Marine who lS at the heart of the issue, and that Marine is young man up front, holding onto a piece of ground- For this reason, our first readiness efforts must be aimed at making every individual Marine aware 0 his responsibility to live up to that which is expected of all who bear the name Marine. He or she must be fit and ready to go anywhere, anytime, to carry out our mission. To accomplish this, our first priority 15 to recruit the kind of young man or woman who cal’ adjust to military life and can perform to Mari°e standards. We have found that these characteristic are found most often in a person who has exhibited ;1 certain level of natural aptitude, and has already demonstrated a degree of self-discipline in his every'
ay life. Experience shows that high school graduates '■°rr|e closest to meeting these criteria. They have not et themselves be defeated by the many obstacles y°Ung people face in completing high school. They are more likely to make good Marines than those "'ho drop out. Our recruiting goals stress this fact.
Once we have recruited quality personnel, we rr*Ust provide them with the best equipment and lining available, and we must ensure that they can employ that equipment effectively in any battlefield eOvironment for as long as it takes to accomplish our Mission. We have taken a hard look at our weapons arid equipment and have found that our basic fight- lng packag e is sound. Properly organized and gained, these combat capabilities provide the flexi- _ ity to be effective in widely divergent combat en- v,ronments created by opposition ranging from a "'ell-equipped land army to a less sophisticated inSUrgency force. This flexibility is achieved by an organizational concept that allows us to tailor our °rces with the capabilities necessary for whatever op- efational mission is assigned.
Obviously, there is the requirement to ensure that ah members of the Marine air/ground team can per- °rm effectively, both individually and as part of a sPecifkally tailored team. The Marine Corps is on ^°P of this requirement. A combined arms training acility has been established at Twenty-Nine Palms, Odifornia (the Marine Corps Air-Ground Combat lining Center) specifically to provide the advanced Gaining necessary to totally integrate the application
all weapon systems (both ground and air) and COrnrnand and control capabilities in realistic training t5cetcises that emphasize the coordination of fire-sup- P°rt weapons with the maneuver of infantry and ar- rr’°ted units. The objective is to ensure the effective
An M-60 tank crew surveys the beach as helicopters bring in equipment and logistical support to advance ground forces during a landing at Namsos Fjord, Norway. Navy-Marine amphibious forces would strenghten the overall defense of NATO out of all proportion to their numbers and costs.
and efficient use of all combat capabilities in the Marine Corps inventory in whatever combination is required by the mission assigned. This training emphasis is working, and the payoff is better combat power, more flexibility, and greater responsiveness to operational requirements.
Our training in the future will continue to prepare Marine Corps forces for commitment to potential contingencies anywhere in the world. Exercises will be conducted in varying geographic conditions. We may be committed to either flank of NATO, in a reinforcing role elsewhere in Europe, or to secure islands or littorals along the Atlantic sea lines of communication. We may be involved again in Asia or anywhere else, and we must be ready. To this end, we are constantly searching for training areas which will enable us to test personnel and equipment in conditions that would exist in the most likely of future contingencies. While our focus at times will of necessity concentrate on the Middle East, Africa, or any other potential trouble spot, we dare not have tunnel vision. Marine responsibilities are functional, and therefore global.
The final challenge is to ensure that our weapons and equipment provide both for the mobility necessary to respond rapidly to a wide range of possible conflicts and the firepower necessary to be effective against a modern, well-equipped enemy force. We continue to modernize our force, while maintaining this essential balance between mobility and firepower. The principal ground combat weapon systems in our modernization program are the Dragon, TOW, M60 tank, and improved artillery weapons.
The TOW (tube-launched, optically-tracked, wire-command missile) and Dragon systems are highly mobile but can defeat any existing armor at ranges much greater than were possible with the antitank weapons they are replacing. Constituting the primary improvement in ground antiarmor capabilities, they preclude the necessity for trying to accomplish the impossible, i.e., matching potential enemies tank for tank or track for track. These new antitank weapons, combined with recently acquired M60A1 tanks and increasingly effective aviation ordnance and delivery capabilities, will provide Marine forces with the capability to defeat armor- heavy adversaries.
The Marine Corps is also benefiting from the Army’s artillery modernization program to gain additional punch without degrading mobility. Our aging 105-mm. and 155-mm. towed howitzers are scheduled for replacement with new and greatly improved weapons. We will also complete a program to upgrade our 8-inch howitzers with a new cannon assembly in order to obtain extended range.
Equally important modernization programs are planned to improve the capabilities of Marine Corps aviation to support the man on the ground. The most important aviation modernization effort will be the development of the AV-8B advanced Harrier as the replacement for the AV-8A and A-4M Skyhawk light attack force. Capitalizing on experience gained with the successful AV-8A, this second generation V/STOL (vertical or short takeoff and landing) attack aircraft will provide optimum flexibility to achieve fully the desired capability of phasing high- performance aircraft ashore rapidly during an amphibious assault. By acquiring an all-V/STOL light attack force capable of operating independently of existing airfields, we will be able to exploit fully the advantage of surprise inherent in amphibious operations. The AV-8B will provide more response and effective close air support and, in low-threat air environments, will enable Navy aircraft carriers to redeploy for other missions at an early stage in an amphibious operation.
To further improve our close air support capability and our aircraft survivability in a high-threat environment, all Marine Corps fighter and attack aircraft will have the capability of delivering electro-optical and laser-guided standoff weapons. These precision guided “smart weapons” have a high first-round hit probability and will greatly enhance the tank-killing capability of Marine forces. Equally important, these weapons can be safely delivered as close to friendly troops as the lethal radius of the ordnance permits.
Air defense and close air support firepower will also be enhanced in the near term by improvements in the F-4 Phantom to include an advanced weapon system, smokeless engines, and modifications to the airframe for greater maneuverability. In the long term, it is planned to replace the F-4 with a supersonic V/STOL fighter/attack aircraft.
Another antiarmor-enhancing program is the introduction of AH-IT attack helicopters configured with the TOW missile system. These attack helicopters will be capable of performing several vital missions, including helicopter escort, close-in fire support, and standoff attack against enemy armor and hard targets.
The first CH-53E Super Stallion heavy lift helicopter is being procured this fiscal year. With its 16-ton lift capacity and extended range, this aircraft will greatly enhance the tactical mobility of the entire force. It will allow fully 93% of the equipment items organic to our divisions (to include towed artillery- prime movers, and engineer equipment) to be lifted from ship to shore or from one tactical location ashore to another. The CH-53E will also provide a capability to retrieve almost all types of Marine aircraft, including another CH-53E.
The EA-6B Prowler tactical electronic warfare aircraft will be replacing the EA-6A Intruder. This new weapon system will enhance survivability of all aircraft in today’s sophisticated, electronically controlled antiaircraft environment. It will also provide Marine commanders with an improved tactical electronic intelligence-gathering system.
All of these improvements are compatible with the capabilities of amphibious ships and aircraft carrier5 in the fleet. This is important because Navy and Marine Corps forces share the amphibious mission and must be totally integrated into a single system order to assure success. In the broadest sense, this amphibious team must also be an integral part of 3 balanced fleet. It is, after all, a prerequisite for an amphibious assault that effective control be established in the objective area and its sea approaches- including surface, subsurface, and air environments’ Obviously, achievement of these prerequisites requires balance and strength across the spectrum ot naval capabilities.
Navy programs designed to provide increased firepower in support of landing forces during the assault phase of amphibious operations are extremely important and progressing well. The timely pr0' curement and installation of the 8-inch major calibef lightweight gun on board suitable ships, along wirb successful development of the 8-inch laser-guide*! projectile will help overcome critical deficiencies 111 naval gunfire support capabilities which are essential during amphibious assault operations until such time as the organic artillery of the landing force can be established ashore.
The landing craft air-cushioned (LCAC) vehicle lS now in the final stages of development, with two prototypes under construction. This extremely ii°' portant modernization program shows promise providing the greatest advance in amphibious capabilities since the advent of the helicopter. The LCAC, a high-speed air-cushioned craft will enable landing force elements to be launched in surface assault from extended ranges at sea, to assault across shorelines not traversable by present landing craft, t0
elirninate the offloading bottleneck at the shoreline, and to attain a more rapid force buildup ashore. The sPeed of the LCAC will also greatly reduce exposure tlrne of troops in the ship-to-shore movement. Equally important, the LCAC will allow the ships of amphibious task force to stand off beyond the fange of shore batteries. This, of course, will reduce ln a major way the vulnerability of amphibious ship- P'ug during the conduct of amphibious assault operations.
Obviously, all of these improved capabilities will of no value in an amphibious sense if sufficient arnphibious shipping is not available to meet the requirements of the national military strategy. Current arnphibious lift capabilities are recognized as being '^adequate, and increased levels are being pursued as Patt of the overall growth of the Navy. The Marine Corps looks forward to a step-by-step attainment of 'Ucreased amphibious force levels within the context an overall balanced fleet structure. A key step aI°ug the way will be the delivery of the remaining three LHAs, general purpose amphibious assault sEips, now under construction. In the meantime, 0ther means of transporting Marine Corps forces to °Pcrating areas during a full mobilization situation must be utilized to augment amphibious lift Capabilities.
One interim method of supplementing the current evel of amphibious lift is to rely on military airlift to transport Marines as airlifted assault troops. Recent events have demonstrated the effectiveness and
capabilities of Marines in conducting airlifted operations. It will be necessary that we continue to work in close cooperation with the Air Force as a means of supplementing our surface mobility. The movement of Marines by the Military Airlift Command is a proven method of exercising our ability to respond rapidly to contingencies worldwide. Training exercises with the Air Force will continue to be a part of our future planning.
I have discussed what I think the future holds for the Marine Corps and how this is basically an extension of the past—stressing the tangibles of readiness and amphibious expertise. But the intangibles are equally important and play . a major role on the battlefield. The discipline and esprit of a unit are vital to success and survival in combat. The discipline and esprit of the Corps today are based as much on the knowledge and conviction of the individual Marine that he is ready and capable of handling any combat challenge, as on the continuing history of the Corps’ unmatched success in battle. The Marine Corps stands unique among the world’s military organizations as a ready force of combined arms, linked solidly to the Navy through integrated doctrine, training, and structure. It is truly a mobile force, prepared to respond to contingencies anywhere in the world, using any available and suitable means of strategic lift. At the same time, it retains its amphibious character, providing not only the institutional memory but also the expertise necessary to keep the state of the art of amphibious warfare in step with the times.
Our contingency responsibilities have been, and will continue to be, worldwide. In addition to the visible threats posed by the conventional military forces of potential enemies, unseen snares and pitfalls are emerging that will require ready and responsive amphibious forces. Terrorism, seizure of hostages, economic warfare, and incursions into ever expanding territorial waters have or could become realities of an increasingly complex international environment.
In meeting the challenges of this uncertain world, the nation can always count on a mobile, ready, general-purpose force possessing amphibious expertise—the U.S. Marine Corps.
The citation accompanying his Medal of Honor confirms that when, as a 24-year-old company commander, he was ordered to seize and hold a portion of Ponte Hill on Guam in July 1944, former enlisted reservist Louis Wilson was ready. Today, he continues to preach the gospel of readiness and exhorts others to live up—as he did—“to that which is expected of all who bear the name Marine.”
[1] foresee a prominent role for amphibious forces in NATO. Looking beyond the narrow confines of a defensive land campaign, I see a complementary, two- part naval strategy.
The first grows out of the requirement to rapidly reinforce NATO, the absolute precondition to a successful defense. Although the strategy tends to rely initially on rapid reinforcement by strategic airlift, enormous quantities of equipment and supplies still must move by sea. Of course, this cannot be done unless we control the North Atlantic sea-lanes.
There is a growing awareness that Marine amphibious forces can play a key role in the campaign to control the North Atlantic. In particular, amphibious forces may be essential to maintaining control of the islands and coasts along the Greenland- Iceland-United Kingdom gap. These, with their harbors and airfields, form a natural naval battleground, control of which is vital to the success of allied land armies engaged on the European continent.
The second aspect of the naval strategy visualizes the employment of amphibious forces in direct sup-
With this continuing focus on NATO defense requirements, it is important to recognize the full range of possible contributions that can be made by the Marine Corps in the defense of this vital area. These contributions include, but are not limited to:
► Employment of a Marine air-ground task force in conjunction with a naval campaign to control the North Atlantic. Amphibious forces could be used to seize or control islands and littorals which dominate the sea lines of communication.
► Use of amphibious forces on the northern and/or southern flanks of NATO, ranging from an amphibious assault to a reinforcing role against enemy forces in these areas
► Employment of amphibious forces in the Baltic approaches to assist in the control of exits from the Baltic Sea
Consistent with the role of strategic reserve, these amphibious forces have not been assigned a specific mission, although planning priorities for employment have been set. Suffice to say that these priorities place emphasis on their employment in an amphibious role.
[3] Title 10 states in part,
“That the Marine Corps shall be organized, trained, and equipped to provide fleet marine forces of combined arms, together with supporting air components, for service with the fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of such land operations as may
be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign. In addition, the
Marine Corps shall provide detachments and organizations for service on armed vessels of the navy, shall provide security detachments for the
protection of naval property at naval stations and bases, and shall perform such other duties as the President may direct. However these additional duties may not detract from or interfere with the operations for which the Marine Corps is primarily organized.”