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The origins of today’s defense stature grew out of the latter part of World War II and early postwar era when the United States had a nuclear monopoly. It was a period during which there was no equal to our overwhelming military strength, capped by the ultimate weapon which, in its only combat employment, had brought the Empire of Japan to its knees in a matter of days.
Following monopoly came a period of U.S. predominance in which both the Soviet Union and the United States possessed the capability to deliver nuclear weapons to the homeland and allies of the other. Yet, the West held a substantial military advantage, based on U.S. nuclear power and overseas bases. As Western predominance faded in the late Sixties, the United States moved toward a strategic arms limitation agreement.
The United States had impaled itself on twin horns: fear of the Soviet Union’s growing nuclear strength and a wary regard for the heavy arms burden which would ultimately become necessary to maintain nuclear predominance. An open-ended strategic arms budget would crush domestic programs. The crucial doctrinal escape from this dilemma was mutual assured destruction (MAD), a concept framed by policymakers in the early 1960s. Under that dim light we saw no necessity or advantage in enlarging the arms inventory. The MAD doctrine had sprung from a colossal and inexcusable misapprehension of the Soviet motive for nuclear arms escalation.
Even after the advent of the Soviet atomic specter, American power remained supreme in the test of confrontation. As John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State during the 1950s, pronounced the doctrine of massive retaliation “. . . at times and places of our own choosing ...” the Communist world was torn asunder by disagreement as to its proper reaction. In the 1958 Taiwan Straits crisis, the Soviet Union under Premier Nikita Khrushchev promised to come to the aid of the People's Republic of China (PRC) if it were invaded. That there was no danger of this the PRC was well aware. Mainland China’s aim was the forcible recovery of land which it believed to be its own rightful territory. Bitterly, the PRC came to the sad realization that atomic weapons in the hands of the Soviet Union were not the same as atomic weapons in China’s own hands. It therefore made th£ momentous decision to develop its own nuclei weapons at a sacrificial cost for a nation barely able t° feed itself. Thereby, the PRC sealed the fate of fhe bipolar power structure which had developed aftef World War II, yet Communist expansion 'v‘,s curbed.
The force of U.S. nuclear predominance remained sure through the October 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis- during which President John F. Kennedy announced “. . . any nuclear missile launched from Cub1 against any nation in the Western Hem|S‘ phere ...” would be regarded as “. . . an attack by the Soviet Union on the United States, requiring full retaliatory response on the Soviet Union- Khrushchev withdrew the offending ships, missileS’ and aircraft, dreaming nightmares of burning flesh 1(1 Moscow.
In short, it was the sobering reality of impending destruction, without recourse or escape, which 1*7 behind the. success of U.S. power confrontations >n this era. Men such as Air Force General Curtis £• LeMay were confident that if we could win the bif! wars (with nuclear weapons), we could, of course- win the little ones. The proponents of large budgetS for strategic programs combined with the opponent of ponderous conventional arms budgets to convince the public that Dulles’ doctrine of massive retaliati0*1 could be carried forth primarily by nuclear arm5’ Further, this did not mean that the world vVilS doomed to undergo the midnight terror of nuclei war, for the mere threat of atomic retaliation in an)'
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confrontation, nuclear or conventional, would be sui' ficient to carry the day. In a word, by the wonders 0 deterrence we could have both peace and power ;,t bargain-basement rates. Democracy could now be d£' fended without paying the price of mud, blood, and broken bodies which had so recently been our lot 1(1 Korea. At a time when the cost of arms alarmed the comptroller, we could reduce expenses by relying our well-known and highly touted technologic-^ superiority. We need not spend money for infantry divisions, tactical squadrons, aircraft carriers, escort- crews, and iron bombs which were delivered ov£f their targets by sixes and twelves. We could prevajj by delivering the same or greater firepower by 6ie megaton. Clean, impersonal concrete silos buried *n
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btts the heroic call of Don Quixote de la Mancha broke the stillness of ancient Spain as he prepared to sally forth to right all wrongs, aid the needy, and ensure triumph of virtue. Yet it was a noise in vain. For, alas, he was ill prepared f°r knightly combat, and his weapons were unworthy of the holy endeavor to uhkh he had consecrated them. Don Quixote's defense posture was the result of ,s having laid down the “. . . melancholy burden of sanity.” Now, ive must ask, what is our excuse?
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the West, constantly ready nuclear bombers, and the gleaming stealth of nuclear missile submarines cruising beneath trackless waters would prove supreme. Who would, or could, stand in our way?
After the dependence on nuclear arms was well established, validated by computer-based war games, and integrated into the defense program planning budget for the ensuing decades, there remained a final step—that of granting the other great nuclear power the right to deter the United States. It was discussed in theory long before the necessity befell us. It seemed fair. If it meant there would be no nuclear war, it certainly was not objectionable.
Thus, from the loins of massive retaliation, suited to the brief period of our nuclear preponderance, came the illegitimate birth of the doctrine of mutual assured destruction (MAD). But the growth of technology cannot be stemmed. The Soviet Union was diligent and successful in strengthening its nuclear forces. At the time, our knowledge of Russian efforts was fragmentary, and it is now apparent that erroneous estimates were welcomed eagerly—as justification for higher force levels—by those best qualified to cast a steadying and critical eye. We survived first the bomber gap and then the missile gap, both of which were used in later years by opponents of strategic forces as evidence of overblown and hysterical scare tactics. Persistently and steadily, the Eastern threat grew.
The Kennedy-Johnson years in the White House were the McNamara years in the Department of Defense. From those years to this day, our nuclear missile force has remained constant at 1,056 intercontinental ballistic missiles and 656 submarine- launched ballistic missiles. The freezing of these figures was based on the ability to define a limited requirement for nuclear retaliatory force under the doctrine of mutual assured destruction, the basic premise of which is that once the enemy is deterred, he is deterred. Once the ability is assured to wreak sufficient havoc in his country to cause him to shrink from attacking, there can be no advantage to the accumulation of further nuclear forces.
The false reassurance of corporate management in the Department of Defense and the challenge of insurgency in Southeast Asia arrived on the scene virtually simultaneously. We were told our strategic forces were sufficient. In the demands on the taxpayer and the military levied by Vietnam, we had our greatest motivation to believe in mutual assured destruction, come what may.
The doctrine was also effective against defensive weapons such as the antiballistic missile (ABM). Merely reason in the reverse of the case of offensive
weapons: if the enemy is assured of his ability to r£' taliate on the United States, he will feel more secufe and therefore less inclined to precipitate an attack through fear of preemption—for, clearly, if we »rf sure of the destruction of our cities in any nuclei war, we will not start one. Through this reasoning the ABM became an offensive weapon, destabilize to the international military balance.
U.S. strategists were confident that this scheft would work, of course, since all it required in ^ way of preliminary assumptions was that the other side was equally as rational as ourselves. In the sp>f|t of international understanding, that was easy t0 grant. The Russians were not madmen. Surely, did not want to see the world destroyed, and if the' were sure of their own destruction in any nuck1'1 war, they would bend all efforts to prevent it. An so, as we shall see, they did.
They did so in a most rational manner, follow^? their own doctrine—that of war fighting—a doc" trine which has equal validity, seen from the Sovk[ perspective, as the MAD doctrine does when set from ours. Their solution was simply to build bed1 their conventional and nuclear forces to a level whid would enable them to win, not merely deter, any W’;1J in any combination of nuclear or convention*1 weapons. Thus the double purpose is served’ dictate—or take!
The fine distinctions between counterforce an countervalue strategy are lost in this scheme, for the) are merged in the overall goal of victory. If 'fli, comes and is conventionally fought, the Soviet superior numbers and firepower will give them th£,r ends. If there is limited nuclear war, they will well able to meet any bluff and up any ante. 1° ‘1 major exchange, they will have large reserves 0
weapons with which to emerge from the ashes wt superior power, should the West be suicidal enou# to demand such a test.
The intermediate stage in this chronology marking * the growth of Soviet nuclear capability has bee!l termed in U.S. official circles “essential nuclei equivalency.” We are now approaching a time wh£(1 a new term will have to be coined.
These brief periods of rapid technological advance U.S. nuclear monopoly (from the end of World II until about I960); U.S. nuclear preponderant (roughly the early Sixties); and U.S./U.S.S.R. clear equivalency (from 1968—1972) are joined by*1 fourth which is still taking shape. Some have alrea^) termed it the age of U.S. nuclear decline, but it 111 too soon to be certain about that.
In the late 1960s began the series of contact- which led to the signing of the SALT I agreements 1,1
% 1972. We were confident the Soviets would afiree to limits which were reasonable in the light of limited requirements of both nations in order to achieve mutual deterrence. We found it unusual that s°me Soviet negotiators knew relatively little about ^eir own nuclear systems; strange how considerations of doctrine and strategy were rigidly limited t0 those appropriately invested. We felt secure in the efficiency of our intelligence collection and the truth the doctrine which underlay our negotiations.
.0rne commentators even remarked on the broaden- 'n8 effect that discussions of strategic doctrine must ave on the members of the Soviet delegation, since they seemed uninformed of the fine nuances of the doctrine. In retrospect, it seems more likely ^at some may have been uninformed on our °ctrine—but not theirs.
Russian military doctrine has remained essentially lritact since czarist times. When superior, win by direct confrontation; when inferior, win by attrition, Using time and distance in the hostile Eurasian plain as a substitute for strength not possessed. The his- t0ric scorched-earth policy, so effective as an attrition ^ct*c, was used from bitter necessity, not preference.
Russian has learned to view the broad expanses to his west as an unprotected flank. Any armed force Refers the offensive, if practicable. The military ^aders of the Soviet Union are now steadily building e highly effective and sophisticated arms they need t0 take the offensive.
. ^et how much do we really know regarding Soviet 'Mentions concerning nuclear weapons and world e8emony? Acknowledging the endless protestations everlasting combat against capitalist imperialists xvhich have been endemic to Soviet political literature since the 1917 revolution, still, allegations of ^Pending preemptive attack may seem bizarre. Urely, reasonable men will not wish to place their c°untry and the world in danger of annihilation, ^'ther in the sudden flash of an instantaneous sun or eath by slow degrees as radiation wafts about the
globe.
What can be determined about the Soviets’ strat- e8y from their strategic weapons acquisitions? There ls considerable information available in the open literature. For example, the SALT I agreement speaks of °Mer missiles which can be replaced by newer mis- S|!es on board nuclear submarines. These older mis- SlRs are deemed “soft,” meaning they are easy to de- Str°y even with a near miss. Further, they use liquid Uel and complicated launch procedures which con- Sunae precious time. They are vulnerable. Therefore, tl'e United States found it advantageous to encourage Soviets to dispose of these weapons because they are destabilizing; that is, the temptation is great to launch them on early and possibly unconfirmed warning—or to preempt with them In fact, this latter technique—preemption—is the only way to be sure of their survival until launch, since they are opposed on the American side by the Polaris, Poseidon, and the Minuteman—solid-fuel, rapidly launched missiles which might well arrive on target before Soviet launch completion.
The only practical use for these soft missiles is in preemption. Yet, the Soviet Union retained them for many years as a adjunct to its missile force which was protected in silos. This is incontrovertible proof of long Soviet dependence upon a strategy which includes the concept of preemption as a highly likely form of nuclear attack.
The United States, believing in deterrence as the ultimate purpose of a nuclear force, placed its intercontinental ballistic missiles in silos many years ago. They are meant to ride out a nuclear attack. The Soviets are only now dismantling the last of their “soft” missiles and this under the terms of the SALT I agreements which allow them a compensating benefit for doing so: additional modern missiles on board submarines. Does this mean that the Soviets have had a change of heart and are now ready to subside to a peaceable position of mutual deterrence? It is doubtful.
Despite official complaints by the United States to the Soviet Union at the Standing Consultative Commission in Geneva, set up under SALT I agreements, the Soviets have been slow to dismantle these “soft” missile sites when their new SSBNs are launched. What can be their reason for keeping these old and vulnerable missiles, if not a continuing dependence upon a preemptive strategy, even after signing the SALT I agreements?
Guidance systems which are reportedly capable of being produced now or in the near future will allow even light MIRV (multiple independently targeted reentry vehicle) warheads to be aimed with sufficient accuracy to destroy any fixed target, however hard or well protected. In fact, given sufficient accuracy, there is virtually nothing on the face of the earth which cannot be destroyed by nuclear weapons, including the most deeply buried command centers and, of course, missile silos—ours and theirs. There are only two truly effective passive defenses against nuclear attack; redundancy (give the enemy more targets than he can cover) and mobility (complicate his fire control problem).
In the future, therefore, even missiles which are protected by silos will ultimately become vulnerable to attack, just as the older “soft” missiles of the
Soviets, and they will therefore be just as destabilizing. Their sole raison d'etre will be closely associated with preemptive doctrine—a war-fighting doctrine.
These are the considerations which are causing U.S. defense planners to consider ways of protecting our nuclear retaliatory forces for the future by placing them aboard submarines, aircraft, or other means of mobility and concealment. At the same time, the Soviet Union has continued new programs to place large MIRVed missiles in silos.
There are yet other indications of the Soviets’ strategy and future intent. Consider, for example, their attitude toward their own submarine-launched ballistic missiles. The United States has held the number of these missiles to 656 since the inception of its original SSBN (ballistic missile nuclear submarine) program during the McNamara regime in the Department of Defense. This was the number that was felt to be sufficient to deter nuclear war. And since U.S. needs were limited to deterrence, that was all that could be justified. The Soviets, however, already have far more submarine-launched ballistic missiles than we. The 1972 SALT agreement provides that they can have a force of 740. And there can be additions beyond that if older, “soft” missiles are dismantled, thus providing a total of 950. Why, then, may we ask, is there such a large difference between the numbers which we deem sufficient to deter the Russians and the numbers which the Russians deem adequate to deter the United States?
Why, indeed? Could it be that the Soviet Union has wider uses for the ballistic missile submarine than mere deterrence? There are a multitude of employments which will serve to illustrate. First and foremost, they can be used as a quick-reaction, preemptive attack means on U.S. missile silos and Strategic Air Command bases. Yes, missile silos. The law of probability provides that the lowered accuracy characteristic of a sea-launched missile can be compensated for by greater numbers. These additional shots have been legitimized in SALT I.
Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Sergei G. Gorshkov understands well the relationship of the war-fighting strategy to superior numbers and preemption:
“The ballistic missiles of submarines have ensured the capability of destroying the strategic targets of the enemy deep in his territory from different directions.
“Under today’s conditions the basic mission of navies of the great powers in a world-wide nuclear war is their participation in the attacks of their country’s strategic nuclear forces, the blunting of the nuclear attacks by the enemy navy from
the direction of the oceans, and participation in the operations conducted by ground forces in the continental theaters of military operations.
“At the present time, when in a matter of nnn" utes it is possible to reach major strategic target . . . the need is objectively arising to maintain i the highest readiness for naval forces and weaponry.
“In the light of what has been said above, the old well known formula—‘the battle for the fifSt salvo’—is taking on a special meaning. . . . Delny in the employment of weapons in a naval battle of operation inevitably will be fraught with the mo5t serious and even fatal consequences, regardless ^ where the fleet is located, at sea or in port.
“In the future, clearly the strike will becotf>e the main method of using naval forces. In tin5 connection, it will be the solitary method in the strategic field, since only the delivery of strikes from vast ranges and different directions will make it possible to achieve such a strategic goal as crush' ing the military-economic potential of the enemy.”
In discussing surprise and control, Gorshkov agalfl gives high value to preemptive doctrine:
“Today, surprise presupposes active, strict!) goal-oriented actions to create conditions hinder' ing the enemy’s capability to react operationally t0 the actions of the other side. This thesis stem5 | from . . . the pattern of military operations 111 nuclear warfare when surprise can put . . . the advantage in the hands of whoever holds the it11' tiative. . . .
“Under today’s conditions when . . . nuclei weapons . . . are . . . sufficient to completely destroy one another many times over, control ot j forces is ... to ensure surprise and swiftness operations and to gain time over the enemy. 1° this case, control of forces is a guarantee of sue' cess. It has become especially critical in the real*11 of the employment of nuclear forces and the force5 whose mission it is to knock them out.”
Consider the implication of the above for the motivations of the Soviet Union for arms control- The ultimate aim is the achievement of superiority and surprise in order to deliver a crushing blow t0 i the military and economic potential of the enemy- ; This aim is aided by surprise, which is achieved by hindering the enemy’s capability to react operation' ally. The highest and most urgent use for the virtu' ally invulnerable SSBN is to cripple the U.S. strategy force: SSBN bases, missile silos, and bomber bases.
Under the 1972 ABM Treaty, each side was lim' | ited to two antiballistic missile installations 01
specified characteristics: one protecting an ICBM field and another, the national capital. More recently, it Was agreed to further limit such sites. One thing is Nearly demonstrated by this move: neither side con- Slckrs an ABM capability to be essential to its national security. Why?
The MAD doctrine brands the ABM an offensive, estabifizing weapon; the faithful therefore feel no °ss at its passing. But what of the U.S.S.R.? Under C^e war-fighting stance, wouldn’t the ABM defend its Cltles and fighting power? Not in preemption. Such an attack would break the West’s offensive back, ss’hile U.S. counterforce weapons would fall on emPty silos. The MAD doctrine would suggest a seri- °Us question whether, once brought low by a surprise ^tack and its retaliatory capability crippled, the uited States would persevere in any return at all! 0r the desired end result of MAD would have been enied us; deterrence would have failed, and the n*ted States would lie crushed, retaliate or not. the means and the purpose of victory would
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Vladivostok is indicative of the inexorable pressure of
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^ave been lost.
Tet the United States could hold its SSBN fleet at ships because, under the MAD doctrine, its size need not grow in proportion to enemy conventional nuclear forces. The SSBN fleet’s prime targets are e enemy’s cities, which are held hostage for the Safety 0f tf,e united States.
This is a gross error of strategy. It ensures we V’°uld expend our limited arsenal upon those inno- CerU civilians who have the misfortune to be caught aj’ hostages in the web of nuclear doctrine. It reduces e portion of our arsenal which could be applied gainst the true enemy, conventional and nuclear of- nsive forces. It illustrates well why the MAD doc- tr'ne is the most destabilizing element in the current lnternational strategic power doctrine, for it leaves 110 place for an intermediate level of attack against ‘s°lated military forces. With limited nuclear forces at Our disposal, we have only two options should our eployed forces or our allies be attacked: retaliate jT°n enemy cities in the hope of spurring enemy auers to reappraise their attack, or do nothing, pre- Sefving our strategic forces as a deterrent against direct attack on the United States. If the Soviet Union
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assured our options are limited to these two by our misguided planning, they are thereby encour- a8ed to launch their own attack preemptively and ecisively. It increases the odds that nuclear war, should it occur, would be uncontrollable if we re-
ta] ■
“ate and unwinnable if we do not.
Soviet rejection of President Carter’s proposal to '^er arms levels which were provisionally set at
Soviet nuclear growth—a growth which the Soviets will abandon only if they are convinced of its futility by a clear determination on the part of the United States to maintain superior nuclear and conventional forces. The Soviets believe that they can win in the complex and dangerous international game of threat and war. We must convince them they cannot. To do that, we in the West must demonstrate superiority, not merely “essential equivalency.”
The failure to allocate adequate strategic forces for the defense of our military forces, especially those based overseas in allied countries, makes both these forces and the alliances which they support untenable. When this situation is evident to our allies, the Third World, and the Soviet Union, the power and influence of the United States will end at the water’s edge.
The United States has adopted the tactics in its relations with the Soviet Union of a status quo power {detente, accommodation, and compromise) in response to what is now revealed as a bid for world domination by the Soviet Union. This status quo policy is as inappropriate now as it was in 1938 at Munich.
We shall have lost the ability to continue the alliances upon which we now depend for our national security. We shall find that the term “friendly/ neutral” will change to “neutral,” as strategically placed countries of the Third World perceive that close ties with the United States are more a liability than an asset. The great potential strength of a unified network of free nations—able and willing to defend democracy with combined assets of wealth, manpower, and technology—will be forever lost to the planet, and the events of the next 50 years will have been given an inevitability which cannot be reversed.
“Sancho!”
Lieutenant Commander Allen served as a specialist in naval intelligence until his retirement in June 1976. He was intelligence officer of the USS Intrepid (CVS- 11), during her service in the attack role in Southeast Asia, a specialist in reconnaissance and weapons effects at the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff at Omaha, Nebraska, and headed the Analysis Division at the Fleet Intelligence Center, Pacific, Pearl Harbor. More recently, he was in charge of the Conventional Targeting Branch, IPAC, and on the staff of the Commander in Chief, Pacific at Camp Smith, Hawaii. He received the M.A. degree in political science from the University of Hawaii in 1973, and Ph.D. in 1976. His doctoral dissertation dealt with the 1922 Naval Arms Limitation Treaty and the 1972 SALT Agreements. His article "China: Nuclear Dragon” was in the June 1972 Proceedings.