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Contents:
The Submarine-Launched Cruise Missile And International Law: A Response 120 By Major Hays Parks, U. S. Marine Corps
W,nd> Seapower, and Jet V/STOL 109 % John Fozard
^esRon Airdale, Arriving” 115 y Lieutenant Commander Arthur D. Schatz, U.S. Navy ^at‘n American Naval Purpose 116 y Robert L. Scheina
Seapower and let
V/STOL
B T
^ John Fozard, Executive Director and 1} ^uty Chief Engineer of the Kingston Avi'^n Group of Hawker Siddeley an !at!0n- now part of British Aerospace, Chief Harrier Designer
'vind era of fighting sail, natural was fundamental to contempo- fii>h naVa^ weaPon systems. Tactics, tlng rules, construction, and opera-
rion
adv;
were all framed to maximize the an^antaRes t0 be gained from the wind Kr 1t0 rn‘n'rn*ze che hazards. Only l9athUalIy over the second half of the scentury did steam propulsion figH 3nt and Anally eliminate the in 1 COnstra*nts on the uses of fight- wi>s resulting from centuries of 'dependent seamanship. ajr[^nce the earliest days of flight, anj have recognized that taking off adv an^’n& *nt0 wind offered specific Ir,„ atlta8es — shorter distance and Ie$s groundspeed; hence there was eil Potentially destructive kinetic 'Vto^^ t0 d*ss‘Pate when things went t0n&' When aircraft were first taken jeJea’ the ship-generated wind-over- hj i ^°D) allowed the lightly-loaded andaneS cfiat time to be launched rtlt^recovered without any form of f anical assistance within the con- ajj °t—by today’s standards — *asUrdIy small decks. Launch power (he ^r°v'ded by the airplane; wind by *indh,P- The influence of the natural retu °n fighting ships had begun to perj.rt1' Gradually, as more mission born°rnaance was demanded of sea- aviation, mechanical aids were
introduced on the deck in acknowledgement that, in the limit, in calm conditions, WOD equalled ship speed through the water. This, in practical terms, was under 30 knots.
Arresting wires quickly came into universal use. Catapults—initially cordite, then hydraulic—were later features of the aircraft carrier. Just after World War II the final generation of high-performance piston-engined British naval aircraft—Sea Fury, Sea Hornet, Bearcat—with their catapult launch and arrested landing set the style which has been integral to conventional naval aviation ever since.
With the advent of jet propulsion, deck approach and launch speeds, as well as aircraft weight, increased significantly and engendered the development of the steam catapult and the high-capacity arresting gear. The angled deck also evolved during the early 1950s from the impossibility of safely retarding in a barrier a ten-ton aircraft moving at 100 knots, having missed all the wires. As aircraft weight and speed still further increased by the 1960s, the stabilized mirror sight provided the means to defeat a growing landing accident rate. Compared with the 1920s’ biplanes, launch and recovery power is now essentially provided by the ship, in conjunction with the WOD. Dependence on the reliability of flight deck machinery is today inseparable from conventional fixed-wing operations at sea.
The modern flat-topped ship carrying conventional aircraft thus represents the culmination of decades of applied technology, and its resultant high performance provides an awesome supply of airpower for the maritime battle. Nevertheless the natural wind imposes at times severe limitations on tactical flexibility.
Launch and recover operations frequently prevent the carrier from continuing along the course and speed dictated by the current tactical situation or from maintaining the force’s speed of advance and normally will require the ship to turn into the natural wind. Throughout the world this wind has a perversely low probability of being the reciprocal of the ship’s navigational course and shows an alarmingly high proclivity—always in coastal waters—to blow offshore!
In a task force, as the carrier turns or accelerates for flying operations, either ships of the force are detached to take new escort stations, or the carrier is committed to separate for tens of minutes from the relative safety of the escorts’ antisubmarine warfare screen.
Either way the integrity of the force and its progression are adversely affected. On all occasions of little natural wind, the carrier has to accelerate to and continue at high speed resulting in an uneconomical fuel consumption—less than ten yards-per- gallon for a big fossil-fuelled carrier—for many miles during the launch and recovery phases of a deck cycle. Ten periods of 20 minutes each at 30 knots during a day’s flying will use the equivalent of at least 24 hours’ normal (15 knots) cruise fuel.
Since the course and speed for flying operations are wind-dependent, they very often require the ship to steam at an angle to the swell, particularly in conditions of low natural wind. Consequently ship motion is increased at the very period—during aircraft recovery—that it needs to be minimized, resulting in an unnecessarily high incidence of missed approaches or landing accidents.
It comes as somewhat of a shock, therefore, to realize from all this that the influence of the strength and direction of the natural wind upon the tactics and operation of today’s ship of the line (as the carrier can be regarded) remains almost as significant and potentially hazardous as it was in the day of the sailing man-of-war.
In the April 1976 Proceedings, the Naval Institute published Admiral Zumwalt’s views on the roles and missions which modern first-rank navies must be prepared to undertake. He identified as a notable deficiency the lack of ships from which effective jet airpower can operate in sea control missions. The highly-capable attack carrier is so expensive that, by the mid-1980s, the U.S. Navy will be the only service flying catapult launch/ arrested landing sorties at sea. And, even the United States can afford to procure, man, and operate only a dozen or so such ships. Between the attack carrier and the helicopter-only ship an enormous inventory gap has developed—a breach significant for its lack of adequate capability as well as insufficient numbers of ships.
Thus the U.K. government’s May 1975 decision to initiate development of the Sea Harrier for Royal Navy service in 1980 in HMS Invincible, the first of a new class of 20,000-ton command cruisers (sea control ships, by another name), was not only an event of historic importance for the Fleet Air Arm, but also marks a watershed in the deployment of seaborne airpower for all the navies of the Free World.
The Harrier currently in Royal Air Force and U.S. Marine Corps service has already proved beyond argument the merits of vectored-thrust jet V/STOL (vertical or short take-off and landing) at sea. Operations and trials have been conducted on some 30 ships of nine navies over the past 14 years. By far the greater part of this experience has been accumulated by U.S. Marine Corps aviators who operate their AV-8A Harriers routinely in STO/VL (short take-off and vertical landing) and VTO/VL (vertical take-off and vertical landing) missions from ships such as the USS Guam (LPH-9), a single-screw helicopter carrier without catapults or arresting wires, capable of 20 knots at most.
No aircraft can carry its maximum payload from its minimum takeoff run. The Harrier cannot escape this principle, notwithstanding that its minimum run is zero, i.e., VTO. The Harrier has wings; when an airstream flows over them the same laws apply as with equivalent conventional aircraft: the wings provide lift. It should be no surprise, therefore, to learn tha1 500 feet of deckrun into a 30-kno1 wind will just about double the di*' posable load of fuel-plus-weapons thaf is possible in pure VTO.
Yet in this close-to-maximum ST° condition, only about one third of the weight of the aircraft is carried by t^e aerodynamic lift on the wings aI launch. The remainder is supported W a component of the thrust vector unt> full flying speed is attained. Missi°fl capability is therefore not so critically wind-dependent as with the con' ventional naval aircraft, even in tbe rare maximum-launch-weight sortie*- Within broad limits deckrun can be traded for wind speed. The launch power is provided solely by the ai(' craft.
In VTO no taxi time or marshalling is required. The aircraft can start op and lift off within two minutes fro111 its flight-deck spotting. Clearance be' tween aircraft at VTO can be as little a* 30 feet. The ship need not turn int0 the wind for VTO launch, nor accelef' ate to a higher speed. Ship fuel is the3 conserved and reaction time min1
mized. .
With typical end-of-sortie foe loads, even with weapons retained an in any climate, the Harrier can hove| on return from a mission; hence, 3 recoveries to a deck are vertical land ings. In VL (as in VTO) the wing b3* no part to play in supporting the aO craft. Hence, by its nature, vertic3. recovery is virtually independent 0 wind speed or direction: VL is quicken more economical in terms of ship ^ fuel consumed, and is less weather an sea-state dependent than the conven
tl0nal naval aircraft’s arrival into the lfw at 120-plus knots on a precise ea *ng in a critical attitude. VL is ^nionstrably safer and easier for the
to °u a^S0 8'ves greater flexibility C e S^*P and the command and bet- e°durance since the ship’s fuel is cha erV6<a recovery not requiring a /lSe of ship cruise speed or course. the ‘mpact of jet V/STOL on flat- les S^*AS *s tflus realized by way of Ss demand on the ship, in terms of
shf C'^eC^ s‘2e an<^ machinery, and in P propulsion and overall man- en^er' V/STOL provides better ship ft jranCe at sea and much greater tje0rri °f maneuver due to minimal ^Pendence on natural wind for most ^•riches and for all recoveries. All of f *e benefits lead, directly or indiy> to reduced costs.
of appreciate the importance
Vect e near-future gains which nav<]red'thrust )et v/STOL offers to
£y • , 11 *5 UtLCoidiy HIM L1
dy 310 C^e mechanics and aero- aamics of the short take-off launch. uree Basic Short Take-Off Launch. Fig- a u sf10Ws the essential dynamics of gto atr*er flat-deck STO launch at a
tha S 'Ve’8flt some 20 to 30% greater k n the VTn : - .1 j_..
Plus- r‘ght
deck
Ho- , “-au oi tne dow tne engine tjVeSs are down (typically to 50° rela- beent0 ^Usglage), and the aircraft has y,jnrotated to give 4° to 5° greater
show ‘ncidence- The f°rces are as ofthn ln fhe polygon. Note that most the 6 a*rcraft weight is supported by VeCt ^tS and that the resultant force ^ ^rePresented hy the open arrow) iog ^ Newton’s Second Law, provid- al0 Positive rate of change of speed ta| ? t*le flight path and is horizon- def lnd*cating no overall lifting force
iCncy: u
telenCC estahlished in vertically unac- ^‘^ht off the bow (preferably
truh
The Ski-Jump Launch: Figure 2 shows the same Harrier (weight, etc.) as Figure 1. This time nozzle rotation is effected as the aircraft leaves a curved ramp at a speed considerably less than the flat-deck STO of Figure 1. The curved ramp was termed a Ski-Jump by Lieutenant Commander D. R. Taylor, Royal Navy, who first proposed this concept in his 1973 University of Southampton thesis, “The Operation of Fixed-Wing V/ STOL Aircraft From Confined Spaces.” As the force polygon shows, at exit from the Ski-Jump there is a resultant forward/downward acceleration (open arrow). The aircraft is clearly not yet truly flying. This resultant vector has two important components, the one along the upward flight path increasing air speed and the other vertical, representing unsupported weight which will deflect the velocity vector gradually downwards. With a longitudinal acceleration adding several knots-per-second, a few seconds after exit the force polygon takes the shape in the center diagram. Lift and drag have grown; less weight is unsupported; and the increased flight-path component of the acceleration is providing an even better rate of air speed increase. Note that the nozzle angle relative to the fuselage is fixed throughout this phase of the trajectory. Thus the pilot is performing the simplest possible flying task after making the initial configuration change (nozzles down) as he leaves the deck.
Finally, on the left side of Figure 2, the reader will find the flight conditions which we saw applied off the bow in the flat-deck STO launch of Fig-
nc
nozzle angle schedule with height 1 speed) until the aircraft has attain vertically unaccelerated flight at ^ start of transition. As a result d1 most critical phase of the trajectory shortened, and the pilot is required 1 function only as a straightforv'3^ stick-and-rudder-bar man, a task which he customarily excels.
After exit from the ramp the p1
has to fly the part-ballistic trajectt>r
with the aircraft attitude chang‘*’|
gradually nose down. Should he 1
angle of attack? Is a special direc'1
display needed in the head-up dispk1!
First simulator trials with a pilot
the loop have confirmed earlier
alyses that the task is not diffic0*1
It can be flown “on instrument'
without external visual cues, and [
. O'
maneuver is tolerant to over-
ure 1. Much of the takeoff distance to reach an airspeed for sustained flight takes place in the air, thus reducing the deck length that would be otherwise necessary. From this point in the sky the pilot can initiate rearward nozzle rotation to achieve fully wingborne flight after a further 15 seconds of standard-transition flying as in the flat-deck launch.
Figure 3 shows a direct comparison between these flat-deck and Ski-Jump launches. Aircraft weight, configuration, power, and atmospheric conditions are the same in each case. The Ski-Jump exit angle is about 20°.
The most dramatic and immediately evident gain is in the shorter deckrun consequent upon the greatly reduced launch speed which the Ski-Jump permits. From the 66- pounds-per-knot of launch air speed trade-off; it is deducible that, from a deckrun giving a 60-knot exit speed, a Ski-Jump of about 20° could enable the aircraft to carry some 2,000 pounds more payload than from the same length of flat deck giving about the same launch speed. (Only a few knots of speed are denied in climbing the ramp compared with the flat deck- run.)
It is also obvious that, for many launches at lower gross weight, the Ski-Jump ship need not steam at high speed in calm weather because the ramp provides the equivalent of about 30 knots WOD. Thus, on average, a significant economy in the use of ship fuel is realizable. At a 20-knot cruising speed in calm air, a Ski-Jump ship has the Harrier launch capability of a 50-knot flat-deck ship if one can find such a vessel credible (USS Inconceivable?).
Clearly, departure on a 20° upward-inclined trajectory will permit a Harrier to leave the deck safely at any point in the pitching cycle, whatever the amplitude of the deck motion, within the constraints of practical aircraft maneuvering and handling on deck. For comparison, large conventional carriers cease peacetime flying when deck pitch exceeds about ± 1.5°, i.e., bow and stern vertical motion of order ± ten feet. Recovery success, too, is motion-sensitive in conventional naval flying.
Independence of ship motion at launch, while not readily apparent, is therefore a real and very important asset of the Ski-Jump, particularly when we consider its use on smaller ships, which are more responsive to a given sea state than today’s giant carriers.
For practical reasons attention is at present focused on Ski-Jumps with exit angles of about 20°. To avoid major changes to the landing gear, the incremental load factor experienced as the aircraft traverses the curved ramp at deck speeds up to about 90 knots is limited to about 1.5Gs. At this increased wheel loading, strut modifications are confined only to damping and recoil orifices; the structure would be unchanged. For a 90-knot ramp speed and a 20° exit, the Ski-Jump need be only about 90 feet long with a 15-foot height at the forward end. The contour can be a circular arc. The width need be no greater than the 40 feet required for a flat deck STO runway. The additional weight of such a Ski-Jump, added to the foredeck of an existing ship, is approximately 200 tons. This is low-cost, welded steelwork—no systems, no moving parts.
likely to cost little more per pout1 than today’s coffee beans, so that the doubters are correct. The Ski-Jump |S
decidedly not something-for-nothin?
but certainly for not much more W the accustomed values of today weapon system costings. Jet engine set you back by well over $200 Pe( pound of weight.
Finally, it is appropriate to all3! concern over the piloting demands 0 the Ski-Jump jet. The Harrier is a fe latively simple flying machine; it 0,11 be convincingly argued that this is ^ reason for its success. It has a thrte axis autostabilizer working as a pd*’1 aid in V/STOL, but this is singly channel in each axis, and of lirmte authority. An autocontrol system 11 fly the aircraft through the ski-jurnf switchback ballistic trajectory orig1^ nally envisaged by Taylor would r>ee a level of authority and redundant which is not feasible in this conte*1 Fortunately, detailed investigati0*1 have shown that, with practical tn^ gins at launch, the aircraft will fly 0 the peak of the trajectory. For sim>k: reasons of reducing pilot workload, 1 was decided to leave the configurati011 fixed immediately after launch (i.e-
ilo‘
under-rotation of the Harrier at laun1
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ar>d not sensitive to late-nozzle selection.
The aim is to develop a technique fe'ving less pj]ot workload than the ^at-deck STO launch. From work so ar accomplished, this objective appears err>inently achievable. A flight Path giving a minimum height of 200 pSet above the sea (compared with 50 eet 0r so for a flat-deck launch) must c°ntribute wonderfully to a pilot’s Peace-of-mind. And a relaxed pilot is pUch more likely to cope with devia- s> excursions, and emergencies.
In these times of austere defense . 8ets, a customer must be con- by full-scale reality before he ^ commit resources to a new idea, owever soundly based. The Procure- ^Xecut*ve tbe U K- Ministry cfence has funded considerable pj3 ytical work on the Ski-Jump at awker Siddeley Aviation (HSA) these tr t tvvo years. Earlier this year a con- sj3Ct Was placed with HSA for the de- fQ“n an<f construction of a trials ramp r ’ght tests of the Ski-Jump con■ tne ramp was constructed on a t ,nway at the Royal Aircraft Es- ^ 'shment at Bedford, England, in 8ust. It js 4q feet wjjg atKj about
100 feet long, adjustable in angle from 6° up to 20°.
Trials will commence with the ramp at 6°. After satisfactory launches at this angle and analysis of the trajectories, the exit angle will be raised by a few degrees. By the end of the year launches will have been done at 12°, and, by mid-1978, the tests will have covered launches by day and night with single and two-seat Harriers up to the full 20° Ski-Jump profile.
The Ski-Jump has all the classic attributes of a significant practical leap forward. In common with other notable advances in naval aviation—e.g. the angled deck—the idea is so obvious when explained that you can’t ever imagine why someone didn’t think of it earlier.
The concept is simple and elegant. The Ski-Jump itself may even be beautiful, and it offers unrivalled cost-effectiveness. It is of some significance to note that the deeper this development is explored, the more the benefits it provides seem to accrue faster than do the problems it raises. None of the problems so far identified can be termed major. All can be readily solved given a little time and modest funding. No major changes to existing versions of the Harrier are required.
A little thought quickly shows that the Ski-Jump cannot have significance for a conventional naval fighter. It is inseparable from vectored-thrust V/STOL configurations—Harrier, Sea Harrier, AV-8A, AV-8B, etc. Consider an F-4 Phantom or an F-14 Tomcat, in full afterburner, boosted to say 60 knots by a short catapult inclined upwards at 20°. The aircraft will accelerate into the sky, certainly, but what supports enough of its weight so as to yield an adequate trajectory time? How is it controlled at such low air speeds? Ski- Jumps and jump jets are indissolubly wedded forever.
It is certain that, by the 1980s, the Ski-Jump will be providing as great a contribution to high-performance jet V/STOL operations at sea as did the steam catapult, the angled deck, and the mirror sight (all of these, also, British innovations) to their generation of fixed-wing naval aircraft.
The first ship ever to be conceived specially for the Harrier is the project by Vosper Thornycroft Ltd known as the Harrier Carrier. This ship can be
summed up as the smallest and hence the most economical vessel able to provide a full and effective Harrier capability at sea.
The ship is basically frigate-sized, but with greater beam and a full-load displacement of about 8,000 tons. The flight deck, some 450 feet by 90 feet, provides a runway which, aided by the modest 6° ramp at the bow, offers the same Harrier STO launch capability as from much larger flat- deck ships. Ten aircraft can be carried and housed in the hangar. These can be any mix of Sea Harriers and Sea King helos. “Seamen” crew totals 250, and the accommodations allow for a further 150 officers and ratings to come on board with the air group.
This ship illustrates dramatically the reverse trend in size and cost which Harrier jet V/STOL will permit compared with the accepted norms of today’s fixed-wing carriers.
By mid-1978, after trials qualification of the full 20° Ski-Jump launch technique, ships for jet V/STOL aircraft can take on a new look. Not only can through-deck ships then become much smaller than the conventional carrier of today (note how the Vosper Thor- nycroft ship exemplifies this trend), but also they will all feature the characteristic Ski-Jump profile at the
forward end of their STO runway.
In the early 1980s a modest-sized jet V/STOL aircraft carrier, some 500 feet long and displacing 10,000 to 12,000 tons, will have her front third looking somewhat like the model pictured on this page.
Such a ship could carry 15 to 18 Sea Harriers and large helicopters. With a complement of 600 to 650 men (HMS Ark Royal carries some 2,500 for some 30 aircraft, and U.S. Navy carriers up to 5,000 men for up to 100 aircraft), running costs as well as procurement costs will bear a bargain ticket by current standards.
There can be little dissent from the view that jet airpower integral with a fleet is the most powerful and flexible conventional weapon available to its command. After all, this is the premise on which the contemporary strike carrier is based. It is also true of ships operating in a sea control, as well as in a projection mission. Since even the modest-sized Ski-Jump V/STOL carriers of the future will not be available to every task force and escort group, what further potential can be seen for the Ski-Jump jet?
A Ski-Jump runway 40 feet wide and less than 300 feet long will pef' mit Harriers to be launched at weight5 which currently require well over 500 feet of flat deck. If such a runway is combined with a landing platform, say 75 feet by 100 feet, the resulting flight deck does not completely dominate the upperworks of a fighting smP of about 8,000 to 10,000 tons displacement. Certainly some compromise to the layout and capability ot a cruiser-type warship will be necessary, but the topside decks of the ship are far from completely dedicated t0 fixed-wing aircraft operation, as occur5 in the flat-topped carrier. Instant jet airpower, even on this scale, will pr° vide an enormous increase in £he maritime capability of such a fighting ship.
Through-deck ships which mote navies can afford, typified by the H#' rier Carrier and the Ski-Jump deck configuration, are the necessary and mo5' important next step forward. This a vance will generate the impetus for je‘ V/STOL to spread into other naval veS' sels. The strait jacket worn for so 1 ort by naval aviation is about to be ufl laced. Ski-Jump jets operating fr°^ many and more economically size warships in the navies of the Free World promise much more effective’ flexible, and economical naval de fenses. The Harrier is setting a ne" style for naval aviation which will e(1 dure into the 21st century. j
Destroyer (or small cruiser)-size ships can now become candidate ) carriers. The Ski-Jump ship has built-in WOD of at least 30 knot5 Once more we shall enter an era wh^ the natural wind will have minimal e feet on the tactics of air-capable fig^ ing ships. The naval rewards in term- of ship mission flexibility, enduran^' passage time, and reduced vulneram ity to the submarine threat are ve!/ considerable.
It was said of yesterday’s sailor tn he was never happier than wm traveling with the wind behind 1 beam. Today’s carrier crews find d light in a wind which blows their destination. Tomorrow’s n»v aviation offers a ship manned by men who will be unconcerned natural winds.
^esRon Airedale, Arriving”
B T '
Sch 'eUtenant Commander Arthur D.
at2> U.S. Navy, former Destroyer '^uadron Four Air Ops Officer
,aAsw capability. The “Air Di
cbis ASW unit for its __________
Problem then is how to coordi
mission
^hy would a destroyer squadron an aviation officer?
A k t*le a<^vent of LAMPS (Light 0rne Multi-Purpose System) and sh' lntro^ucti°n on board selected ASW su f’ t^le tota* integration of air/ ate Asw has emerged. The LAMPS lcopter is an extension of the ship-
P^rtrrjpnp” l * '
nt ^aS ev0^ve<^ aboard thesi
begj S ships, and, as LAMPS ship
Wjth t0 deploy in growing number
c0rri destroyer squadrons, DesRoi
ne ^^ders are suddenly faced with ;
^'mension to their tactical em
•j^ent of forces.
a h' u LA^tPS"ship interface is in itsel
Mi, ^ ^'polished, well-trained team lUch pff .
Pare ^ ort an<^ c*me are sPent to pre
The
r'ate th ■ ■ • ~
vaf nese individual units and th
a|0 °f conventional ASW ship
b with an occasional P-3, S-3, c
H-3 air ASW asset. These are daily problems of a DesRon commander.
His staff, while eminently prepared to handle ship-oriented tactics, may not be equipped to control this additional, relatively new mixture of assets.
Captain Arie C.A. Sigmond,
Commander, Destroyer Squadron Four, was recently faced with this very situation, as he prepared to deploy with his squadron to the Mediterranean. Included in his task group were four LAMPS-equipped ships.
Realizing the necessity for additional expertise to augment his staff, he requested from AirLant the “loan of a qualified aviation officer well-versed in LAMPS/ASW operations, who has recent officer-in-charge experience aboard a LAMPS ship.”
The LAMPS community is a rapidly expanding entity and qualified pilots are difficult to produce at a rate commensurate with the increasingly available LAMPS decks. An officer of the caliber required for the DesRon's needs was difficult to provide without hurting existing LAMPS squadrons mission needs.
A compromise was reached whereby AirLant tasked Helicopter Sea Control Wing One, based at NAS Norfolk, to provide an officer on temporary duty for the transit and inchop to enable the DesRon staff to be brought “up- to-speed” in the essentials of multiLAMPS utilization. Helicopter AntiSubmarine Squadron Light Thirty- Two provided the officer, and the Air Ops billet of the DesRon staff was created.
Prior to deployment, the air ops officer, who was given an autonomous role in directing the DesRon’s LAMPS and airborne ASW effort, met with accompanying carrier and air group personnel. This meeting established priorities, airspace restrictions and separations, launch authority for LAMPS, and EmCon (emission control) conditions and restrictions.
With these ground rules established in advance, many potential problems were eliminated before the task force began its transit. One of the major areas Captain Sigmond wanted to explore was an expanded role for the LAMPS beyond its localization or pouncer mission. Together with his new air ops officer, the Commodore wanted to provide a limited search scenario for his LAMPS helos, investigating threat axis coverage with a 24-hour airborne ASW asset.
Since the accompanying carrier had no ASW aircraft of her own, the ASW task fell on the four LAMPS ships.
LAMPS around-the-clock coverage commenced the third day out of port; the two previous days were dedicated to initial and refresher quals. During
the transit, LAMPS pilots accumulated over 180 hours airborne, with only one, four-hour time slot not covered by an airborne asset. The transiting task group intercepted two unidentified submarines, both initially contacted and prosecuted by LAMPS airborne assets in a search mode (mini-barriers) and aided by designated SAU (search attack unit) ships. In the interest of continuing the transit both contacts were broken off at the direction of higher authority but only after attack criteria had been gained.
In a message to the SurfLant, Commodore Sigmond stated: ‘‘There is no doubt that a knowledgeable LAMPS Air Officer is a most valuable asset to a Destroyer Squadron Commander’s staff. The coordination of multiple LAMPS Helicopters operating from platforms in close proximity is in its infancy and in order to maximize benefits of this capable asset in the ASW environment, all aspects of these types of flights must be thoroughly understood. It is doubtful that the depth of knowledge required to maximize LAMPS Ops is available at the Squadron level today. The presence of an Air Ops Officer is not only desirable to enhance the availability of LAMPS, or to act as the flight scheduling coordinator, but also his services are invaluable to coordinate/direct mutually supportive Ops between MP [maritime patrol], Air, Surface Units and LAMPS Helicopters.”
Both ComNavSurfLant and Com- NavAirLant are in agreement with the concept and need. AirLant, in a recent message following the DesRon Four success and Commodore Sigmond’s attempts to establish a permanent art ops billet, stated: “The establishment of a billet on those DESRON staffs which are assigned and deploy with ;1 majority of LAMPS-equipped ships |S fully supported.” Additionally, In' formal discussion with BUPERS OPNAV Cognizant Officers indicate* that a proposal for the establishmef1 of a LAMPS qualified Air Ops Off>ceI billet in DESRON Staffs would be in * line with the Bureau’s ongoing officer development studies and would ^ well received.”
As more LAMPS units deploy and a*1 increased share of the ASW role lS assigned to them and their DesR0" commander, the DesRon air ops off cer will become an essential link 111 maintaining ASW supremacy for IP' forces at sea.
John Moore, editor of Jane’s Fighting Ships, assigns two tasks to Latin American navies: "(a) Antisubmarine defence of the sea-lanes in a maritime war. (b) Coastal and riverine defence in the event of internal upheaval with external aid.” In the 1965 Proceedings article, ‘‘Latin America and Naval Powers,” former Ambassador to Argentina, Robert McClintock, wrote, “. . . it is obvious that they [the southern fleets] are best designed for antisubmarine warfare.” The nature of the annual U.S.-controlled UNITAS (United International Antisubmarine Warfare) exercises underscore this view. For the past 15 years, an American task force composed of a few destroyer-type warships, a submarine or two, and a detachment of ASW aircraft, has circumnavigated the southern continent, participating in ASW-oriented training with combat units from the Latin American navies.
Historically, the mission of Latin
American navies has been to support national objectives and to confront the enemy in the air, on the surface, or under the sea. In the 20th century, Latin American navies have participated in both world wars and numerous police actions. These navies have been employed in gunboat diplomacy, as exemplified by the presence of Argentine and Chilean warships in Spanish waters during the mid-1930s.
Showing the flag, a more benign application of gunboat diplomacy, is also an important mission. Latin American training ships regularly visit world ports. Social and economic factors are expanding the roles of Latin American navies. The Patagonia region in southern Argentina, Tierra del Fuego in Chile, and the Amazon complex in Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru all receive the special attention of their respective navies. These navies explore new territory, found cities, and establish
industry—missions equivalent to role of the U.S. Army in the Westef|1 United States during the 19th c&
tury‘ . •s
A fleet’s composition reflects 11
postulated mission. All Latin Amefl can navies, with the exception Brazil’s, place first emphasis on tisurface warfare; antisubmarine ^ antiair warfare receive significant less attention. Surface-to-surface m|S siles are used by many Latin A meric1’ navies. Argentina, Brazil, Chile, uador, Peru, and Venezuela have will shortly have either Exocet or 0[ omat missiles. The first surface-to-a1 missile systems in any Latin AmerR'f inventory became operational in 19' point defense missiles also are used e> tensively.
The best antisubmarine weap0 currently available for surface ship*1 an ASROC-type and the heavy helicnf ter. There are only two ASRC^ equipped ships in Latin America, t‘
Despite an Anglo-American desire to see Latin American navies as ASW forces, antisurface warfare remains the primary mission for most of these navies. In 1973, Peru’s Palacios (left) and Ferre became the first Free World warships in the Western Hemisphere to he fitted with antiship missiles (Exocet). Argentina also plans to go the SSM route for such Fletcher-c/rfjj destroyers as the Rosales (ex-USS Strembel [DD-644]) below.
0r fut,
to r Var
’ 0r island states in, the Caribbean, Pt for Brazil. The events leading
St;
^■izilian FRAM-I destroyers, Marcilio ,l*s and Mariz e Barros. Heavy 1^' lcoPters can be accommodated only 7 the Argentine light carrier Vein- ,c'nco de Mayo and the Brazilian car- ler Minas Gerais.
Brazil is the only country whose Projected acquisitions emphasize an- j'^ubmarine warfare. The British Mk.
destroyer currently entering service Wlth the Brazilian Navy carries impressive ASW armament. The future ^ttphasis of the remaining Latin etican navies will be antisurface 'Varfare. Argentina’s future destroyer 0rce will be two British Type 42 kUlded-missile destroyers and possibly British Type 21 frigates. The two ^t'tish Type 42-class ships, currently e‘n8 completed, possess no long- n8e ASW weapons. The best ASW •j.eaP°n that will be carried by the ype 21 frigates will be the medium-
ari8e U.S. Mk. 32 torpedo tubes, the settle j •
e medium-range weapons found th °ar<^ t'1C ^Pe 42-class ships and e much older U.S.-built and sup- led Allen M. Sumner and FRAM-II 1 es. Peru and Venezuela are acquir- St® the Italian Lttpo-class. The ingest feature of its armament J/a8e is antisurface weaponry, the ^US’ tb°se wb° say that ASW is Am ^fSt ^uty of the major Latin Pas er*Can navies are not supported by t efforts, present fleet composition,
ure projections.
at‘n America, like the United in3^5’ WaS distant from World War I 1914. Eventually, eight republics ers 3re<^ War against the Central Pow- 0 ^ were small nations bordering
e*ce
tazil’s decision to enter into the Paralleled those of the United pfates- In mid-1917 Great Britain, nce> the United States, and a neu-
U. S. NAVAL INSTITUTE COLLECTION tral Brazil established South Atlantic patrol zones; Brazilian responsibility was limited to coastal areas because of its nonbelligerent status. On 25 October 1917, after a succession of sinkings by German submarines, Brazil declared war on the Central Powers. A squadron composed of two light cruisers, four destroyers, and an auxiliary operated off the northeast coast of Africa. Brazil had committed three of her four major fleet ships plus a sizable proportion of her destroyer force to the distant naval war.
Between World Wars I and II, U.S. naval influence spread throughout Latin America. Franklin Roosevelt’s “Good Neighbor” policy contributed to the atmosphere of political cooperation. With the beginning of World War II in Europe, Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay began cooperative fleet efforts to preserve a western hemisphere neutrality zone. Ultimately, Brazil, Colombia, Cuba, Mexico, and Peru declared war on the Axis Powers.
In 1942, the Inter-American Defense Board was created to coordinate joint efforts. A Brazilian Expeditionary Force participated with Allied troops which landed in Italy. One- third of the Brazilian merchant marine was sunk. In July 1945, the light cruiser Bahia sank while supporting U.S. troop movements; all 383 hands went down with the ship. Mexico also sustained heavy merchant marine losses and contributed a naval air detachment to the Pacific theater.
Latin American navies have also served during the Cold War. On 10 May 1951 Colombia’s only frigate, Almirante Padilla (ex-USS Groton [PF-29]) assumed blockade duties off the Korean coast. She provided gunfire support at Chongju, Songjin, and Wonsan. The following year, Colombia acquired a second frigate, Capiton Tono (ex-USS Bisbee [PF-46]), which permitted ship rotation. Negotiations were under way for a third frigate when hostilities ended.
The navies of Argentina and Yen-
ezuela participated in the 1962 blockade of Cuba. The Argentine destroyers Espora and Rosales and the Venezuelan destroyers Hueva Esparta and Zulia operated with the forces of Commander South Atlantic. Military forces from Brazil, Costa Rica, Honduras, and Nicaragua participated in the 1965 Dominican Republic operation. Although many of these contributions were small when judged by the total efforts, each nation gave according to its abilities.
U.S. naval aid to Latin America began during World War I when a commission was sent to help the Brazilian Navy. It became necessary to establish a legal basis in order to extend naval assistance beyond this wartime environment; on 5 June 1920, the U.S. Congress enacted legislation to permit naval personnel to serve in foreign navies. During the following 20 years, missions were based on contractual agreements between U.S. military personnel and Latin American governments. By the end of World War II, these contracts had been transformed into bilateral agreements, with a U.S. naval mission located in every major Latin American nation. In 1950, the Military Assistance Program (MAP) was extended to Latin America, with administrative responsibility granted to the mission chiefs.
Through the mission system, U.S. naval officers exerted a dominating influence within Latin American navies; they have even commanded Latin American squadrons. On 14 August 1924, Captain Sherwoode Taffinder, U.S. Navy, relieved Capitan Loayza, Armada Peruana (Peruvian Navy), as commander of Peruvian forces in the Pacific. North Americans have been voting members of Latin American promotion and inquiry boards. In 1949, a Board of Inquiry, which included a U.S. commander, established responsibility for the collision of two Peruvian submarines.
Education and training have been almost exclusively promoted and advanced by Americans. Rear Admiral C. T. Vogelgesang, U.S. Navy, remodeled the Brazilian War College after that of the United States. Captain Charles Davy, U.S. Navy, was a memorable superintendent of the Peruvian Naval Academy. Latin American naval personnel have been extensively trained in the United States. During the 1920s half of all pilots and all instructors of the Argentine Navy were graduates of Pensacola.
Professional literature has been dominated by American authors. Latin American naval journals abound with articles translated from the Proceedings. Many articles cite the responsibility Latin American navies will assume in future wars between United States and an extra-hemisphefe nation. In 1925, Commander Alfr^Jj Bazo, Armada Peruana, authors “Peru and the Next War,” projecting a Japanese-U.S. conflict and the r°^f that his country should play.
The roots of U.S. naval aid tf Latin America are deep, but Latl(1 America has not acquired a first-l>n^ ASW combatant from the Unite States during the past 30 years. DnfJ
ing the period of contractu^ agreements with U.S. personne (1917-1940), armament was available t(1 Latin America from private U-'*' firms, but not directly from the g°v, eminent. In March 1941, military n'1, was granted to U.S. allies under Lend-Lease Act; by the end of Won War II, approximately $400 mill*°n of military hardware had been pr° vided to Latin America. Seventy-fi'( percent of this equipment was used [l equip the Brazilian Expeditions^ Force, which took part in the landing in Italy. Consequently, little equip ment was available to replace obsoleS cent material throughout the remai*1 der of Latin America.
In 1945, under the Surplus Prof erty Act, nonbelligerent nations &ett permitted to purchase at a mod^ price ships that were to be mothball1 or scrapped at the end of the ^ This, in effect, permitted the transfd of obsolete combatants and modet: support types. In discussing militaP hardware, obsolescence is determine by competition, not age. The imp^1
J
^he destroyer evolved out of World ar II as the prern;er asw platform. °wever, ships of this type were ^de available by the United States to atln America only as ships neared the end of their useful lives, and after s 'ps of each of the classes had been transferred to allies in other world re-
A dive U.S. Units
__ Class | IOC | First Foreign Transfer | First Transfer to L.A. | Total Built | at Time of L.A. Transfer |
Fletcher Alltn M. Sumner | 1942 | 1957 Spain | 1959 Brazil | 175 | 79 |
^Hen /VI, Sumner | 1943 | 1969 Taiwan | 1972 Brazil | 20** | 3 |
fRam ii Gearing | 1960* | 1971 Iran | 1972 Colombia | 33 | 26 |
fRam II bearing | 1960* | 1971 Greece | 1973 Argentina | 16 | 2 |
fRam I | 1960* | 1971 Turkey | 1973 Brazil | 79 | 54 |
Da
tes are IOC (initial operational capability) of FRAM **Non-FRAMMED units only
Table I U.S. Destroyer Transfers
°f revolutionary warships such as the Monitor and HMS Dreadnought underscore this.
8‘ons. A summary of this situation is re ected in Table 1. Today, there are jnore Fletcher-class combatants in atln America than any other class, fgentina has four; Brazil, seven; de, two; and Peru, two; these 30- |'ear-old ships are equipped with ‘niited-range ASW weaponry and ob- so ete sensors. The five Latin AmeriCan Allen Al. Sumner-class ships are y slightly better equipped to oper- agamst modern submarines. There are nine fram II destroyers in Latin ^ttierica. The principal ASW weapon these ships was to have been the
0 (drone antisubmarine helicopter) ^manned helicopter. DASH proved to ^ a failure; consequently, these ships
no better armed than their pred- ssors, although their sensors are de r,0r' Only tw0 Latin American stroyers have received the extensive ^ L ASW modernization.
1 *s Anglo-Americans, then, who have ascribed antisubmarine warfare as the primary mission of Latin American navies. To fulfill such a mission, large numbers of modern warships are necessary. Fleet Admiral S. G. Gorshkov of the Soviet Navy states that this was the key to success in World War II and is the only hope for combating the submarine in the future.
. . if ASW forces which were so numerous and technically up to date [for that time], possessing a vast superiority, turned out to be capable of only partially limiting the operations of diesel submarines, then what must this superiority be today to counter nuclear-powered submarines, whose combat capabilities cannot be compared with the capabilities of World War Il-era submarines.”
But, financial restrictions throughout Latin America and lack of sufficient and appropriate foreign material aid have blocked the development of modern ASW forces in any Latin American country. One other fact that must not be overlooked is that priorities established by Latin American navies preclude an emphasis of antisubmarine warfare. Brazil is currently the only country that has revealed any semblance of achieving a limited capability in antisubmarine warfare.
To complicate the picture yet further, on 14 April 1977, President Carter outlined before the Permanent Council of the Organization of American States (OAS) a new approach to Latin America. This approach is to be based upon the individuality and the sovereignty of each Latin American nation, respect for human rights, and the relations between developed and developing nations. The second point of this program has caused much apprehension. It led in June to the OAS delegates’ passing a resolution which stated: “There are no circumstances that justify torture, summary execution or prolonged detention without trial contrary to law.” Many Latin American nations, including Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay, all of whom militantly opposed the resolution, see themselves engaged in civil wars with opponents no less resolute than our own during the 1860s. Their enemies have adopted guerrilla tactics. Whenever employed, these methods have forced the defenders—regardless of their respect for human rights—to restrict individual freedoms during the crisis period. Many in Latin America fear that such steps judged necessary to ensure stability will be interpreted as an unnecessary restriction upon human rights and will lead to the loss of aid.
Hence, Anglo-Americans must reassess their perception of Latin American navies. If Latin American navies are to assume an ASW role, then adequate aid must be forthcoming. The inadequacy of this support to date can be interpreted as being intentional when associated with statements such as, “We have absolutely opposed the acquisition of what I would call sophisticated weapons [by Latin America],” made by Robert McNamara in 1965 before the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs.
Should the aid be intentionally inadequate, and the rationale to support this decision continue, then a different, more realistic role should be assigned to these navies. A thorough, realistic, and accurate appraisal of the southern fleets will lead to a better understanding and respect of potential and valuable assets and allies.
of
signed the Protocol by the start
Submarine-Launched Cruise Missile and International Law:
A Response
By Major Hays Parks, U.S. Marine Corps, Office of Legislative Affairs, Secretary of the Navy
In a professional note last month, Scott C. Truver alleges that the submarine-launched antiship cruise missile (SLCM) may contravene international law in that it “erodes neutral and belligerent rights to an unacceptable degree.” Present technological shortcomings of the SLCM, it is alleged, violate the London Protocol of 1936, necessitating its classification as a weapon which is illegal per se and thus prohibited. I concur neither with Mr. Truver’s conclusions nor in the premises upon which they are based.
I leave to those with technological expertise Mr. Truver’s statements regarding the purported technological shortcomings of the SLCM. I do question the challenge from a legal standpoint of any weapon based on its performance in development rather than on its standards for acceptance. Similarly, some of Mr. Truver’s objections appear to relate not to the SLCM but to its method of employment. In this regard he does not give any consideration to questions regarding the rules of engagement for its employment or whether its employment is under general or limited war conditions.
I object to Mr. Truver’s statement and interpretation of international law. He is seriously in error in his statement of the law as it relates to submarine warfare, international law principles in general, and in his understanding of the evolution and nature of international law.
As Mr. Truver correctly notes, international law and weapons development are strange bedfellows. In the consideration of any new weapon, technology must yield to the law, or the law to technological change. Where a weapon has proved effective, the latter usually has occurred. Challenges couched in humanitarian terms more often than not shroud objections to the change in status quo among nations that the weapon effects, or similar less-than-altruistic motives. The evolution of the submarine is a classic example of a technology which outpaced international law and of the conflict between the abstract and the practical in the promulgation and implementation of the law. This is particularly true when each nation must retain some degree of independence in interpretation which is consistent simultaneously with that nation’s right of survival and the collective needs of the society of nations. Individual state interpretation is important, for any law which is perceived as unrealistic soon is disregarded.
World War I brought to the fore the effectiveness of submarine warfare, the tactics and countertactics of which had placed in question traditional methods of “visit and search.” Moreover the war had confirmed Great Britain’s fear of more than a century, first voiced in 1804 by Earl St. Vincent, that the submarine represented a genuine threat to its rule of the waves. Thus began a 15-year struggle to outlaw the submarine as a legitimate weapon of war, culminating in the London Protocol of 1936 upon which Mr. Truver’s argument depends. Great Britain’s effort was hampered by skeptics who challenged the sincerity of British arguments for abolition based on humanitarian reasons, continuation of the disagreement which had begun in 1916 with the United States’ regarding the combatant status of armed Merchant vessels, and the fact that the submarine had proved itself to be an effective weapon. In addition to its being a compromise measure, the adoption of the London Protocol reaffirmed the principle that weapons are “restricted in inverse
proportion, more or less, to [their] fectiveness; the more [militarily] eff*' cient a weapon or method of warfare the less likelihood there is of its bein? restricted. . . ,”1
International law generally is consi' dered to express (1) the customary practice of states, or (2) what staM desire that practice to be. Contrary t0 Mr. Truver’s statement, the London Protocol did not codify what had bee|] customary law. The following are re" quired before a matter is considered t0 be customary international law:
► a concordant practice by a numb^ of states with reference to a type situation falling within the domain 0 international relations;
► continuation or repetition of the practice over a considerable period time;
► conception that the practice is fe" quired by, or consistent with, prevail' ing international law; and
► general acquiescence in the practke by other states.2
The London Protocol did not refl^1 the practice of states during Wof^ War I. Although 48 nations ha^
World War II, it remained for tha11 conflict to determine its acceptance.
At best, the London Protocol rep' resented an ideal, and ideals seldoO1 make good laws. The principles of the U.N. Charter are an example of ideal* not easily attained. Federal attempt to legislate prohibitions of alcohol’ marijuana, and speeds in excess of ^ miles-per-hour on our nation’s high' ways are examples from our domesti1- experience. The London Protocol' born of diplomatic compromise, wa* criticized from the outset as an u0" workable ideal couched in ambiguoo* terms which did not address the prat' ticalities of submarine warfare. ^ young naval officer writing in the Sep'
the
provision which was to become the
timber 1935 Proceedings observed:
The conclusion is inevitable that, except in rare circumstances, it is •tnpossible for the submarine to carry on commerce warfare in accordance with international law as 11 stands today. Consequently, states must either renounce this Weapon as a commerce destroyer or undertake a revision of the laws governing naval warfare, taking into account the changed conditions °f modern war and the appearance °f new weapons capable of operat- ‘n£ under water. . . ,”3 ter detailing the impracticalities of
ndon Protocol, he concluded:
The controversy over the employ- tfent of submarines as commerce
warning on the ground that resistance was to be expected."5 Mr. Truver quoted the opinion of the Nuremburg Tribunal in the trial of Grand Admiral Karl Donitz to support his position that the London Protocol remains viable.
But Mr. Truver erred in stopping his consideration of the Donitz case at that point. Papers prepared during the deliberations of the Tribunal concluded that “once a merchant ship was armed it forfeited its immunity,” contrary to the London Protocol, but in accordance with a view “shared by most international law experts.”1’ The Tribunal at the urging of Donitz measured German submarine warfare practice to Allied practice, and found that the refusal to stop and warn armed
destroyers is now twenty years old and no agreement has been reached. Failing such agreement it is almost Certain that the submarine practices °f the World War will be repeated ln a future war.”4
At the beginning of World War II, e German Navy attempted to adhere tQ the London Protocol. The Protocol ^®s abandoned in stages in response to r,tish actions, culminating in an °rder issued 17 October 1939, “to attack all enemy merchant ships without
merchantmen was a “ ‘common practice’ for all navies . . . including the submarine services of Russia, Britain, and the United States.”7 With regard to the blanket sinking of vessels travelling darkened at night, the papers in deliberation indicate that “Churchill had admitted that the British Navy proceeded on the same assumption,” as did the United States.8 The evidence also indicated that the sinking of neutrals was incidental rather than intentional.8 The
of
however, in prohibiting weapons
■i
Tribunal concluded:
“In view of all of the facts proved, and in particular of an order of the British Admiralty announced on 8 May 1940, according to which all vessels should be sunk at night [sic] in the Skagerrak, and the answer by Admiral Nimitz that unrestricted submarine warfare was carried on in the Pacific Ocean by the United States from the first day that nation entered the war, the sentence of Donitz is not assessed on the ground of his breaches of the international law of submarine warfare.”10
The acceptance by the Tribunal of Donitz’s argument of tu quoque (“you also”) served as an acknowledgement that there has not been the necessary "general acquiescence” in the London Protocol. Rather, the practice of states in two world wars would suggest the acceptance of states of the submarine as the principal weapon for employment of guerre de course. Nor is any distinction between armed and unarmed belligerent merchant ships supported by the practice of states. In legitimizing attack without warning upon belligerent merchant ships, the Nurem- burg Tribunal cited as a factor in its decision the incorporation of merchant shipping, whether armed or unarmed, into the British intelligence network. That practice is even more commonplace today, particularly within the Communist bloc, and is of greater significance in light of the submarine’s increasing dependence upon concealment. Indeed, at the outset of the nuclear submarine era, an article published in the Proceedings concluded that . . the entire legal doctrinal basis for the restrictions on submarine warfare is without merit, unsound in theory, and ... rejected in practice. ... A fair appraisal of the [Nuremburg] judgment would then be this: The [London] Protocol of 1936 is still on the books; that Donitz violated the rules laid down therein cannot be denied; but the Protocol is no longer law; its provisions are obsolete; it is defunct.”[1] Notwithstanding Mr. Truver’s erroneous interpretation of the London Protocol and the decision in the
Donitz case, his challenge to the SLCM merits further consideration. He argues that the SLCM endangers “human values” (as well as neutral shipping) to an “unacceptable” extent. He suggests the SLCM be declared illegal, citing as precedent Hague Convention VIII of 1907, which forbids the use of torpedoes which do not become harmless when they have missed their intended target. The example is a poor one inasmuch as the Convention is deemed to have rendered illegal a weapon lacking military value which, considering the proliferation of antiship cruise missiles during the last decade, is not the case with the SLCM.
The legality of a weapon generally is considered with regard to the requirements of military necessity when weighed against limitations on the development or utilization of a weapon which may cause unnecessary suffering. Military necessity has been defined as permitting “a belligerent to apply only that degree and kind of regulated force, not otherwise prohibited by the laws of war, required for the partial or complete submission of the enemy with the least possible expenditure of time, life, and physical resources.”12 The concept of unnecessary suffering is derived from the annex to Hague Convention IV of 1907, which states:
Article 22. “The right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited.”
Article 23. “[I]t is especially forbidden—(e) To employ arms, projectiles, or material calculated to cause unnecessary suffering; . . .”13
In considering the concept of unnecessary suffering, it should be noted that the original French text of Article 23(e) when properly translated states “. . . calculated to cause superflous (or excessive) injury.”14 Unnecessary suffering does not attempt the impossible by prohibiting any suffering by noncombatants, but that which is excessive. While primarily concerned with prohibiting weapons such as barbed spears and dum-dum bullets which "uselessly aggravate the sufferings of disabled men, or renders their death inevitable,”15 unnecessary suffr' ing has been related to the protection of noncombatants from excessive suffering which is incidental to the engagement of enemy forces. The test becomes one of proportionality, that is. 01 weighing the military advantage to be gained against the amount of suffering which may result to noncombatants The classic example is the destruction by artillery barrage of a village and tts noncombatant population in order t0 kill a lone enemy sniper. Milittfl necessity dictates his neutralization, bu[ the means utilized is disproportionate to the military advantage gained considering the injury sustained by noncombatants.
The test of legality goes further
indiscriminate effect. As one source states, however,
“This principle has not been taken to mean a ban on weapons . • ' which, though directed again*[2] military targets, entail the risk incidental [noncombatant] casualties or damage to [noncombatanu objects in the vicinity of targets. I1 does imply, however, that weapon* which by their nature are incapabk of being directed with any certain1) to specific military targets, °r which in their typical or normal u*e are not delivered with any certain9 to such targets, are in violation ot this principle.”16
But indiscriminateness, which appe°rS to be the essence of Mr. Truver’s °r" gument against the SLCM, is not easil) established. Since 1973 the Interna' tional Committee of the Red Cross ha* sponsored three conferences of gov' ernment experts to consider standard* for the prohibition of weapons tha! may cause unnecessary suffering °( have indiscriminate effects. Some eX' perts thought a weapon ought to be classified as indiscriminate (and therefore illegal) which could not be employed with sufficient or predictable accuracy against the chose0 target. Another expert cautioned against reliance on accuracy solely, accuracy was a relative concept an<* could never provide a clear guideline Another expert questioned only the indiscriminateness of area (as oppose1
Division Officer’s Guide
t0 point) weapons, while another, re- y,n8 on history, voiced skepticism regarding efforts to ban specific WeaP°ns.17 As this difference of opin- 10n of the experts continues, no agreernent has been reached regarding ‘nternational law standards for classify- lng a weapon indiscriminate.
Because of this difficulty of deflni- tl0n, questions regarding the indis- Cr>niinate effect of weapons traditionally have addressed the method and Clrcumstances of employment of a Weapon against a particular target rather than examining the characterises of a weapon to determine its legal- lty- Questions regarding the former knowledge the fact that any weapon, owever legal, may be used in an il- e8al manner. Thus the firing of naval gunfire or of torpedoes at a lone bel- gerent vessel in a neutral harbor CfOwded with neutral shipping may 'nvolve the indiscriminate use of those
^eapons. Limitations on the use of force
tern;
.”18 Since the
■ustr,
rules of engagement"—take ^t0 consideration the characteristics each weapon in specifying the con- ^ *ons under which each weapon may employed. Very specific guidelines ave Been established for the employment of the acoustic torpedo, for e)tample. Employment of the SLCM is .0 different from any other weapon in s dependency on carefully-tailored es of engagement which consider its performance characteristics to ensure at ft can accomplish its mission in a gal manner.
. history and the difference of opin- n °f the experts suggest that the Question of the legality of the SLCM is ^t °ne easily resolved. In concept cer- n*y it is more accurate than any Weapon previously employed by submarines. The course from concept to Ployment is not always smooth, U'vever. Recognizing this, the Department of Defense in 1974 issued an ^struction requiring that the Judge vocate General of the applicable military department conduct a legal feview of any new weapon at appro- Pdate milestones in its development to Usure that the weapon “is consistent u the obligation assumed by the n‘ted States under all applicable in- ational laws.
Action was not retroactive, the
first milestone the SLCM Harpoon will reach since promulgation of the instruction is service acceptance. Weighed with its rules of engagement, such a legal review should determine in an appropriate manner any questions regarding the legality of the SLCM. 1 11
The U. S. Navy has changed considerably since the sixth edition of Division Officer's Guide was published in 1972. Renewed emphasis has been placed on the moral and human aspects of naval leadership, while some of the customs of the past have been altered. These changes are reflected in the seventh edition.
. This new edition contains an important new chapter devoted to counseling, human goals, and welfare which emphasizes the complexity of personal relationships and the steps which can be taken to meet the inevitable human problems that arise. Another new chapter covers correspondence, including report and memorandum writing techniques. The book also reflects the long overdue recognition of the surface warfare officer who must now qualify formally in the same fashion as the aviation or submarine officer.
Chapters on organization, administration, training, discipline and inspections represent the distilled and updated experience of thousands of junior officers who have gone before. This resulting volume is designed to help any new division officer face his responsibilities with both confidence and understanding.
1976. 286 pages. Illustrated. Index.
A Naval Institute Press Book
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[1] Lieutenant Commander Alex A. Kerr, USN, “International Law and the Future of Submarine Warfare," Proceedings, October 1955, p. 1110.
12 NWIP 10-2, The Law of Naval Warfare (Department of the Navy, 1955), para. 220b.
13 36 United States Statutes at Large 2227; Treaty Series No. 539.
14 See generally, R. R. Baxter, "Conventional Weapons Under Legal Prohibitions," International Security (Winter 1977), p. 42.
15 The Declaration of St. Petersburg, 1868, as found in Department of the Army Pamphlet 27-161-2, International Law (1962), p. 277.
16 Report on the Work of Experts: Weapons That May Cause Unnecessary Suffering or Have Indiscriminate Effects (Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross, 1973), p. 13.
17 Conference of Government Experts on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons, (Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross, 1975), pp. 10-11.
18 Department of Defense Instruction 5500.15, "Review of Legality of Weapons Under International Law,” October 16, 1974. DoD Instruction 5500.15 was implemented as SecNav- Inst 5711.8 on 14 January 1976. Another directive, DoD Directive 5100.77 of 5 November 1974 (SecNavInst 3300.1 of 4 February 1976) gives to the Judge Advocate General of the Navy the authority for review of rules of engagement.
[2] W. T. Mallison, Submarines in General and Limited Wars (Naval War College International Law Studies, 1966), p. 155, quoting Royse, Aerial Bombardment and the International Regulation of Warfare, 1928, pp. 131-132.
2 Department of the Army Pamphlet 27-161-1, International Law (1964), p. 9.
3Lieutenant H. G. Rickover, USN, "International Law and the Submarine," Proceedings, September 1935, p. 1213, 1219.
4 Ibid., p. 1223.
5 Judgment of the Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal (September 30, 1946), as published in Leon Friedman (ed.), The Law of War: A Documentary History (New York: Random House, 1972), vol. II, p. 997.
6 Bradley F. Smith, Reaching Judgment at Nuremburg (New York: Basic Books, 1977), p. 252.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid., pp. 253-254.
10 Friedman, op. cit., p. 998.