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Contents:
The Virginia's Combat System Department 90
By Lieutenant Commander George N. Maddox, U. S. Navy Mk 86 Gunfire Control System 92 By Vin Vinci
Requiem for the PHM Program 79
By Commander John P. Kelly, U. S. Navy
Legal Status of Submarine-Launched
Cruise Missile 82
By Scott C. Truver
USS Virginia (CGN-38) 85
By Captain George W. Davis, Jr., U. S. Navy
Requiem for the PHM Program
By Commander John P. Kelly, U.S. Navy, B.ureau of Naval Personnel
Together, the termination of the pHM (patrol combatant missile hydrofoil) program and the forthcoming October decommissioning of the U. S. Navy’s only four operational missile boats—USS Antelope (PG-86), USS Ready (PG-87), USS Grand Rapids (PG-98), and USS Douglas (PG-100)—represent a new low-water mark with respect to U. S. interest in missile-armed patrol craft as elements of our naval order of battle. These actions prompt me to add nay comments to the continuing discussion of the high-low mix and the impact of the surface-to-surface missile °n naval warfare. I will confine my comments to the extreme low end of this controversial mix—fast missile attack craft—and primarily to its potential within the U.S. Navy. My opinions are based on two years of experience with Patrol Division Twenty One, which, until last month, was based in the Mediterranean and comprised of the four aforementioned missile-equipped patrol combatants (PGs) and, at that time, their support ship, the ex-USS Graham County (AGP- •176). I served concurrently as commanding officer of the AGP and as the division commander.
First, the potential value of fast missile attack craft to the U.S. Navy has not been appreciated, at least within our own service. This value should be neither exaggerated nor underestimated, but weighed and understood in the context of current Soviet naval strategy and potential confrontation scenarios.
Operational employment of small missile combatants within the U.S. Navy has been limited to Patrol Division Twenty One’s four PGs—hardly a sufficient number to prove or disprove tactical worth. The overriding demands for PGs in aggressor or “orange” roles during NATO and national exercises precluded the full development of their potential in support of friendly or “blue” task forces. An additional part of the problem was of an educational nature. Staffs, accustomed to working with frigates and destroyers, found it difficult to adjust to the unfamiliar characteristics of missile boats (communications limitations, markedly different speed vs. endurance curves, and the like). Sensitivity to sea-keeping ability, although to an extent deserved, too often resulted in PGs’ being considered more as liabilities than assets in the overall conduct of an exercise. Our PGs were not originally designed as missile boats; fast patrol boats designed from the keel up as missile platforms, hydrofoil or otherwise, can be expected to evidence markedly improved seaworthiness.
Of greater importance is the tendency to relegate the potential value of missile boats to scenarios of littoral waters and choke points. This value is not disputed; however it can be overemphasized to the detriment of the full exploration of the PHM’s potential within the context of the U.S. Navy’s requirements. Scenarios which envision missile boats attacking warships transiting choke points, or missile boats of opposing forces engaging in actions reminiscent of the 1973 Arab-Israeli conflict, imply that hostilities are already in progress. Obviously such scenarios are not to be ignored, but they should be of secondary importance in our tactical develop-
ment of missile-armed fast attack craft. In view of the Soviet Navy’s apparent commitment to a philosophy of first strike saturation attacks in a naval war of short duration, it is essential that we pursue the potential of missile boats, hydrofoil or otherwise, in the initial minutes of a confrontation. Despite the fact that they are primarily offensive weapon systems, during the period of tension likely to precede hostilities missile boats should be viewed as integral elements in the friendly force’s defensive posture. This should be recognized as a distinctly U.S. mission in support of the carrier task force and not one that should be relegated to Allied missile boats. Several missile boats riding herd on an unfriendly surface group could, in the event of an enemy-initiated preemptive attack, alert distant friendly forces (i.e. the carriers), as well as limit the effectiveness of the attack by a quick reaction counterattack. The presence of the missile boats in such a setting will, at the very least, compound the hostile force’s self-defense problem. Not to be discounted is the potential impact of missile boats in the same scenario in the event of a U.S.- or NATO-initiated preemptive attack.
Second, a missile boat squadron or division should be viewed as an integrated tactical unit which includes the support ship. The tone of the press coverage surrounding the demise of the PHM program seems to indicate that a contributing factor was the PHM’s dependence on a support ship.
It should be noted that the PHM was designed from the keel up with a different maintenance concept than for any previous class of U.S. Navy ship, including the present PC. For the PHM the organizational level maintenance, which is normally accomplished by the ship’s company, was to be conducted by a support group. Initially, the support group was located ashore, but, as with Patrol Division Twenty One, the ultimate objective was to provide each PHM squadron with the flexibility inherent in having a dedicated support ship. I submit that this area was given too little attention. The PHM program was successively advertised as a 30-, 24-, and finally six-ship program. The support ships should have been included in the program on a 1:6 basis. Certainly the $43 million in the latest budget for conversion of a support ship should not have taken anyone by surprise.
Besides the maintenance concept associated with the minimum manning of missile boats, there are other considerations which support viewing the missile boat squadron as an integrated tactical unit including the support ship. I return to the scenario depicted earlier. I do not envision the support ship anchored in some protected backwater but rather on the scene of action refueling and rotating the missile boats whose main limitation is that of fuel endurance at high speeds. The availability of a dedicated support ship to fill this frequently occurring role precludes burdening other ships with a significant logistical problem. The net result is maximum flexibility for both the missile boats and the supported task force. The dedicated support ship also supplements the missile boats’ capabilities with those that can be accommodated in a larger platform. Added communications is obvious, but signal intelligence, helicopter support, AAW, and ASW capabilities are additional possibilities. We need not be constrained to traditional “auxiliary” configurations- Perhaps the vessel in question would more appropriately be designated a missile craft leader. The vulnerability of the missile boats and their “leader should not be a limiting influence in such a scenario; indeed, the survival of far more significant vessels in the opening minutes of an all-out saturation exchange between major naval task forces is a moot point.
Third, and I offer this opinion at the risk of being labeled a heretic, Harpoon is probably not the optimum of the currently available surface-to- surface missiles for the U.S. missile boats.
Based on information available in unclassified sources, Harpoon is a highly effective active radar antiship missile with a maximum range of about 60 miles. Its search pattern options (large, medium, and small), its bearing-only launch capability, and its flight profile lead me to believe that it has been optimized for use at relatively long ranges. If the U.S. Navy must employ only one type of antiship missile on all its surface-to-surface missile combatants, Harpoon is probably a wise choice; however, why must we put all our eggs in one basket? In the roles and operational environments I envision for U.S. missile boats, particularly close-in surveillance in a Mediterranean scenario, minimum range is of equal, if not greater, significance than maximum range. In a congested operational environment with discernable threat axes unlikely, I find difficulty in visualizing the situations which would call for Harpoon’s employment by missile boats at
t
anywhere near the missile’s maximum range. Ideally, the missile boat commander should have the option, depending on the circumstances, of firing an active, semi-active, or antiradiation missile. The latter capability would be particularly attractive in countering platforms whose missiles are radar controlled. Barring a selection of missile-seeker options, I would favor a surface-skimming active missile tailored for top performance in the two- to 30-mile range. Gabriel II, Exocet MM39, and Penguin Mk 2 invite consideration. Further, as antiship missile defense systems grow in sophistication, the addition of highspeed homing torpedoes to the armament of missile boats is worth considering.
During a visit to Patrol Division Twenty One by then Secretary of the Navy, J. William Middendorf, and then Commander of the Sixth Fleet, Admiral Frederick Turner, Secretary Middendorf asked why we didn’t have more fast missile-armed patrol craft. Admiral Turner, who in my opinion is an admiral with an appreciation of missile boats, responded that it was a question of “mission.”
I am convinced that there is a mission for missile boats in the U.S. Navy. In an age of micro-mini-
U. S. NAVY BY C. R. BEGY aturization it was inevitable that potent weapon systems would be wrapped and put to sea in small packages. Because of their speed and size, missile boats, particularly when deployed in numbers, are an added dimension in the surface warfare threat equation. They exist today in the arsenals of the majority of the world’s navies—most significantly those of the Communist Bloc.
Unless we own and operate missile boats ourselves, we will not fully understand them, or be prepared to counter them. More importantly, the close-in surveillance role envisioned above for the U.S. missile boats will have to be accomplished, at greater risk to men and equipment, by our larger multimission units—i.e. destroyers and frigates—that should be more productively employed at that time. While one of the downfalls of the PHM was the fact that it was a single-mission platform, this is a case that calls for a platform that is as cheap as possible in terms of men and equipment. Multimission capabilities can only be bought expensively—in terms of personnel, size, money, and complexity. Furthermore, arguments that the antisurface ship mission can be more cost effectively accomplished by patrol aircraft at the outbreak of hostilities are unconvincing; patrol aircraft at such a time would be fully occupied with a more familiar threat—the submarine.
It is important that the U.S. Navy keep the door open for the eventual development of fast missile attack craft. They need not be hydrofoil; they need not be armed with Harpoon; and they need not be as dependent on a dedicated support ship as the PHM would have been. The PHM is certainly one alternative; however there are other missile-armed fast patrol boats on the market today that could be adapted nicely for use in the U.S. Navy.
I would advocate a modest beginning: at least one seven-ship squadron comprised of six missile boats and a combat-capable support ship, homeported on the U.S. East Coast and making periodic Sixth Fleet deployments, but ready to deploy to either the Mediterranean or the Caribbean in contingency situations.
In the context of the total U.S. Navy, missile boats are of relatively low priority, competing against Aegis cruisers and the like for a portion of the Navy’s budget. I believe, however, that to say the U.S. Navy has no requirement for missile boats is analogous to saying that since the Marines have artillery, they have no need of mortars.
The Legal Status of Submarine-Launched Cruise Missiles
By Scott C. Truver, Candidate for the Doctoral Degree in Marine Affairs at the College of Marine Studies, University of Delaware
The current development of the submarine-launched cruise missile (SLCM) presents some thorny juridical problems. The technical shortcomings of this new weapon are such that the legality of the SLCM is brought into question. Essentially, the target identification and acquisition problem inherent in the present technology of the SLCM erodes neutral and unarmed belligerent rights to an unacceptable degree.
The development of the modern international law of naval warfare is at center concerned with the preservation of fundamental human values during war. Indeed, the legal question of whether in wartime all law may be disregarded has confronted civilized mankind for thousands of years. The ferocity with which war was waged during the 16th and 17th centuries prompted Hugo Grotius, an eminent legal scholar and commentator, to protest:
Throughout the Christian world I observed a lack of restraint in relation to war, such as even barbarous races should be ashamed of; I observed that men rush to arms for slight causes, or no cause at all, and that when arms have once been taken up there is no longer any respect for law. . .; it is as if, in accordance with a general decree, frenzy had been let loose for the committing of all crimes. . . -1 On the contrary war ought not to be undertaken except for the enforcement of rights; when once undertaken, it should be carried on only within the bounds of law and good faith.2
The same considerations of respect for all law during war were raised upon the introduction into battle of new weapons of warfare. At the time of their introduction, the machine gun, airplane, and submarine were all at first perceived by many states as il
legal weapons, capable of committing heinous crimes against all nations because of their inherent ruthlessness.
This discussion has a specific emphasis on the current development and deployment of the tactical SLCM in light of the customary and positive international rules of naval warfare which restrain the use of the submarine in its tactical antishipping role. The primary question is whether these rules, drafted in the first half of this century and based upon 19th century principles of naval warfare, remain valid in the 1970s and 1980s. The examination is focused specifically on the dangers to merchant shipping inherent in the use of the SLCM.
The widespread use of the submarine during World War I brought into sharp relief the problems of compliance with the customary rules of warship-merchant vessel rights and obligations, particularly the time- honored principle of visitation and search. Citing the practice of unrestricted submarine warfare waged by German U-boats within “submarine operational zones,” the major surface naval powers at a number of postwar arms limitation conferences succeeded in extending the customary law to the new and dangerous weapon. For example, Article 22 of the London Naval Treaty (1930) stated what was required of submarines exercising belligerent rights:
The following are accepted as established rules of International Law:
In their action with regard to merchant ships, submarines must conform to the rules of International Law to which surface vessels are subject.
In particular, except in the case of persistent refusal to stop on being duly summoned, or of active resistance to visit and search, a warship, whether surface or submarine,
may not sink or render incapable of navigation a merchant vessel without have first placed passengers, crew and ship’s papers in a place of safety. For this purpose, the ship’s boats are not regarded as a place of safety unless the safety of the passengers and crew is assured, in the existing sea and weather conditions, by the proximity of land, or the presence of another vessel which is in position to take them aboard.3 Upon the expiration in 1936 of the remainder of the London Naval Treaty, Article 22 remained in force, and was given further international legal status by being incorporated into the London Protocol of 1936. At the outbreak of World War II, 36 nations, including all of the major naval powers, had accepted the 1936 Protocol. A number of naval powers, including the United States and Germany, had given the provisions of the Protocol a prominent place in instructions to their naval forces.4
Nevertheless, the major question which arose from the ashes of World War II was whether the laws codified in the 1936 Protocol are to be considered valid international law today, particularly in light of the almost universal reliance upon unrestricted submarine warfare by the major belligerents during World War II. The postwar proceedings of the International Military Tribunal in the case of Grand Admiral Karl Doenitz of the German Navy are instructive in this regard. Because of his orders to his submarine commanders permitting unrestricted attack against all vessels, Doenitz was charged with waging submarine warfare contrary to the 1936 Protocol, a crime against all civilized nations.
The judgment of the tribunal is interesting because of its attempt to make the legal distinction, long- honored in custom, between the mer-
chant vessels of neutral and belligerent states. Also, a distinction appears to have been drawn between armed and unarmed belligerent merchantmen. Doenitz was found not guilty for his orders of unrestricted warfare against British armed merchant vessels. In the svords of the tribunal, it was
■ . . not prepared to hold Doenitz guilty for his conduct of submarine warfare against British armed merchant ships.
However, the proclamation of operational zones and the sinking of neutral merchant vessels which enter those zones presents a different question. . . . The order of Doenitz to sink neutral ships without warning when found within these zones was therefore, in the opinion of the Tribunal, a violation of the [London] Protocol.5 Thus, if a submarine will endanger itself by attempting to comply with the procedures of visit and search when confronting an armed merchant vessel, it is not compelled to refrain from unannounced attack. However, Unrestricted submarine warfare against unarmed enemy merchant vessels and all neutral merchantmen was contrary to the 1936 Protocol and hence to be outlawed.
The contemporary legal situation is clearly defined by the experience of the first half of the 20th century. The submarine is subject to the same rules ®s are surface warships. However, if the submarine would be exposed to any disproportionate risk of destruction by surfacing in compliance with the 1936 Protocol, such compliance is neither warranted nor required.
The primary questions posed here With regard to SLCMs are familiar. Specifically, the question of whether the existing rules of naval warfare respecting the discrimination between tnilitary and civilian targets can be observed in practice in the event of the Use of SLCMs must be considered. Sec- °ndly, attention must be focused on the companion question of whether in Practice the immunity granted neutral shipping from unannounced attack can ■ndeed be respected today. One scholar of international law recognizes the problems of compliance with the Protocol and the use of SLCMs, but he argues ... in principle, at least, submarines are required to act in the same manner as surface warships in attacking belligerent merchant ships, and hence to respect the lives of civilians.
. . . the principle would seem to require that a submarine, attacking by means of missiles at a range where its own safety is not unduly threatened by the conduct of a merchant ship, is legally obliged to discriminate between naval and merchant ship targets.6 Following from this, however, the question must be resolved of whether the target identification and acquisition characteristics of SLCMs are such that in the interests of protecting human values and safeguarding the rights of neutral and unarmed belligerent shipping such weapons should be outlawed. As a historical note, the Hague Convention (VIII) of 1907 provides a precedent for regulating the use of a particular weapon employed by the submarine.7 This convention forbids the use of torpedoes which do not become harmless when they miss their intended target. These considerations and the ruling in the Doenitz case accentuate the question posed above: are SLCMs sufficiently discriminating to distinguish between belligerent and neutral or unarmed targets?
The only tactical SLCM currently in use is deployed on Soviet “Charlie”- class submarines, while the U.S. Navy is now testing a submerged-launch version of the Harpoon.8 The Soviet missile, the SS-N-7, is a solid fuel tactical missile of horizon range (estimated at 35 nautical miles) and is capable of submerged launch. Designed for an antishipping role, the SS-N-7 cruises at Mach 1.5 and probably employs a terminal guidance system which uses either active radar or infrared guidance. The comments which follow, although derived from an analysis of the SS-N-7’s characteristics, are applicable to the current state-of- the-art of SLCM technology.
The threat posed by the use of SLCMs against shipping at sea and coastal areas endangers neutral and unarmed belligerent shipping to an unacceptable extent. The primary danger is that the missiles will fix on a ship other than the intended target. The threat is increased when the missile is subjected to electronic countermeasures (ECM) and other diversion-^ ary tactics employed by the target. A similar increase in threat-level arises primarily from inherent design shortcomings of the missile, which at present are thought to be great.9
Because of the SS-N-7’s submerged launch capability, it is highly unlikely that a submarine commander would risk the chance of becoming the object of a successful antisubmarine warfare (ASW) attack by increasing his vulnerability through a surface detection of targets and a surface launch. Indeed, the fundamental premise upon which the development of SLCMs is based is the capability of submerged launch to increase platform invulnerability. This then necessitate "a reliance upon sonar detection, which is a risky business given the present capabilities of the technology of sonar to successfully detect, identify, and track potential targets, especially in crowded sea lanes. Thus, the risk of choosing the wrong target at the outset is heightened as well as is the possibility of erroneous information being fed into the submarine’s on-board fire control system. Concomitantly, the dangers to neutral shipping are increased tremendously.
Once the SLCM is launched, a number of things may happen before the correct target is hit. The intended target may take a variety of measures to oppose the incoming SLCM. First, the target may employ the tactic of screening in which two courses of action may be taken. The ship may discharge alternative reflection areas, through ECM, which tends to confuse those SLCMs employing an active radar terminal guidance system. Similarly, the vessel may create alternative heat sources to divert the SLCM with infrared homing devices. Secondly, the target ship may attempt to hide among other vessels and confuse the incoming SLCM by presenting it with a number of possible targets. At any rate, if these measures are successful, the result would be a fully-armed, errant SLCM searching for a target and perhaps choosing any vessel close at hand.
In addition to these situations, the chances of an unopposed missile’s being diverted from the intended target and homing in on another vessel are unacceptably high. Even in the absence of design failures, the unopposed SLCM with terminal guidance systems may home in on the wrong target since in most cases it will discriminate between vessels only on the basis of size or heat source. Infrared terminal guidance systems tend to home in on targets emitting the largest heat source. In the case of active radar guidance systems, the SLCM will choose that target most closely resembling the data supplied it through fire control on the basis of largest reflected area detected by its on-board radar. Again, both systems can be confused by the proximity of other vessels closely resembling the intended target.
In the case of missiles not guided actively by the launching platform and relatively indiscriminate with respect to the target selected, which is the situation regarding the contemporary SLCM, certain legal considerations arise. This is particularly true of SLCM attacks in dense merchant traffic areas, such as regions of the Mediterranean Sea where many U.S.-Soviet naval exercises now take place. The use of SLCMs
. . . would seem to constitute a danger to shipping which is protected by international law. In the case of submarine launched missiles, their use might amount to unrestricted warfare in a new guise.
. . . [U]ntil accurate targetting at long range is achieved it will remain a major threat to civilian and neutral shipping in the event of its use.10
At present the technological arts of SLCMs do not allow for foolproof identification and destruction of intended targets. The characteristics of the weapon result in a risk which is far greater than permitted by international law. The immunities granted all unarmed merchant vessels by international law should be rigorously respected, particularly in this period of limited war situations. By observing the limitations on attack as contained in the 1936 Protocol, belligerents may well be taking steps to ensure that the conflict, if it comes, will remain limited.
Furthermore, using SLCMs presents much too great a risk to neutral shipping, especially in well-traveled sea- lanes. The missiles will not discriminate adequately to allow for the observance of both customary and positive international rules of war respecting the distinction between belligerent and neutral vessels. The casual response, “that’s really too bad,” rather simplifies and ignores a complex legal and moral problem. Such an attitude accentuates a lack of concern for those values which ought to be protected during war.
Measures should be taken to obtain and preserve the human values protected by the 1936 Protocol. To this end, two courses of action may be advocated. First, the SLCM may be declared an illegal weapon, much as in the case of the 1907 Hague Convention outlawing certain types of torpedoes. The legal, and indeed ethical, situation today is analogous to that faced in 1907. Because of the nature of the beast, the tactical SLCM should be outlawed in the current round of arms control negotiations as an unconscionable threat to neutral and unarmed belligerent shipping.
A second alternative is perhaps politically more viable, considering the naval arms competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. The further deployment of tactical SLCMs should be restrained until the weaknesses of the system can be corrected. In effect, a rational argument can be made for a more sophisticated and reliable weapon, one which incorporates the necessary technology to make the SLCM a more effective weapon. Such additional development would reduce or perhaps even eliminate its inherent dangers to unarmed or neutral merchant shipping.
This discussion began with a brief examination of the customary and positive rules under which the submarine was to operate during war. Today the opportunity exists to limit a weapon not widely deployed which in its present stage of development possesses more shortcomings than strengths. If the experiences of the past have any relevance for the present and the future, they must be heeded in the interest of preserving certain values common to all civilized peoples. If the first alternative presented here is much too political to be acceptable to those naval powers possessing the necessary technology 10 deploy the tactical SLCM, the second option must be seized. If not, the world may witness the erosion of neutral and unarmed belligerent merchant rights to a level unacceptable to civilized nations.
1 Prolegomena, section 28, in The Law of War and Peace (De Jure Belli ac Pacts Libri Tres), Hug0 Grotius, translated by Francis W. Kelsey (New York: Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1925), p. 20.
2 Ibid., p. 18.
3 The Limitation and Reduction of Naval Armaments (London Naval Treaty), 22 April 1930. Treaty Series No. 830, p. 27.
4 Proces-Verbal Relating to the Rules of Submarine Warfare Set Forth in Part IV of the London Naval Treaty of 1930 (London Protocol), 6 November 1936. Treaties and Other In' ternational Agreements, vol. 3, pp. 298-9- See, for example, the 1941 Tentative Instructions for the Navy of the United States Governing Maritime and Aerial Warfare, par. 50; and the German Prize Law Code of 1939, Article 74.
5 International Military Tribunal, Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the Nuremburg Mil'' tary Tribunal, vol. 1 (1946), pp. 312-136 D. P. O’Connell, "The Legality of Naval Cruise Missiles,” American Journal of International Law, vol. 66, no. 5 (Oct. 1972), p. 7857 Convention VIII of 1907 Relative to the Laying of Automatic Submarine Contact Mines, W Hague and Geneva Conventions (Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1911), PP' 78-84.
8Jane's Fighting Ships (New York: 1976), P789. The U.S. Navy's tactical SLCM, the encapsulated Harpoon (RGM-84A), not to be confused with the 2,000-nm strategic SLCM now under development and testing, will be launched from the torpedo tubes of an SSN and will possess a 60-nm. range.
9 For a discussion of the characteristics and weakness of Soviet cruise missiles, see Michael MccGwire, et al., ed., Soviet Naval Policy: Objectives and Constraints (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975), especially pp. 433-4. These same legal considerations can be extended also to the use of surface-to-surface antiship missiles, particularly those possessing over-the- horizon range. The use of over-the-horizon ASMs in areas of dense merchant traffic may result in the unwanted destruction of neutral or unarmed merchant vessels which present no conceivable threat to the launching platform.
10 O'Connell, op.cit., p. 793.
USS Virginia (CGN-38)
By Captain George W. Davis, Jr., U.S. Navy, Commanding Officer
Built in Virginia by Virginians, the Navy’s newest cruiser is the first of a four-ship class. She was commissioned 11 September 1976 and is to be followed by the Texas (CGN-39) in September 1977, Mississippi (CGN-40) in 1978, and CGN-41 by 1980. As they join the fleet, these ships will bring to the operating forces the latest available combat systems equipment, the first fully integrated command and control-capable ships, a workable reduced manning level, and an outstanding platform for incorporating new equipment for the remainder of this century. The Virginia and her sisters will be considerably more capable to meet fleet operational needs than any previous class of cruiser.
As stated in the Ship Aquisition Plan, the mission of the CGN-38 class is “. . . to operate offensively in the presence of air, surface, or subsurface threats independently or with nuclear powered or conventional strike forces, and to provide protection for these forces and other Naval forces or convoys against air, surface, or subsurface threats.”
To execute this mission in today’s quick-reaction, tightly controlled environment, the Virginia is equipped with a highly integrated combat system built around seven centrally located AN/UYK-7 digital computers. They perform all command and control and Navy Tactical Data System (NTDS) functions. They also perform all fire control computations and control of weapons for the antisubmarine, surface-to-air missile, and gun subsystems. Locating all computers in one space permits the use of a common memory bus between the units and a resulting increase in information exchange rate and a reduction in the number of men required to operate and maintain the computers. Computer control is normally from the combat information center (CIC) with a completely redundant set of controls and switching devices available for backup in the computer center. This latter is conveniently located directly below CIC.
The Mk 116 Mod 1 underwater battery fire control system (UBFCS) is
combined with the long-range AN/SQS- 53A sonar for submarine detection, tracking, and weapons firing. This new UBFCS is a part of the ship’s NTDS. In this subsystem, the Virginia’s sonar information is first sent to the computer center for processing. This information, along with that received over NTDS data links from other ships, aircraft, and shore stations, is then presented in a composite picture of appropriate symbols on the antisubmarine warfare (ASW) officer’s console. The weapons control panel of the underwater battery fire control system is iocated next to the ASW officer who operates it. Thus, all ASW information and weapons control are immediately available to the single officer responsible for controlling the ship’s sonar and conducting antisubmarine attacks. Other information such as datums, sonobuoy patterns, and limiting lines of approach can be called up from the command and control program for presentation on his console. The underwater battery fire control system also presents weapon release points on the console used by the antisubmarine air controller for vectored attacks by fixed-wing aircraft or helicopters.
The antisubmarine weapons consist of ASROC (antisubmarine rocket) and torpedoes which can be launched from tubes on the Virginia's main deck or from her airborne helicopter.
A hangar sufficiently large to house the LAMPS III helicopter is built into the ship’s fantail. An electrically driven elevator raises or lowers the helicopter which, when in the hangar, is beneath a retractable cover upon which helicopter operations can be conducted. This means the Virginia class can carry two helicopters, one on deck and one in the hangar.
The ship’s antiair warfare capability is built around the Mk 74 missile fire control system using the Standard medium-range missile. There is no separate weapons designation system for missiles. In CGN-38-class ships, this function is performed by a software module of the command and control program. Appropriate target symbols are generated from information received either from the Virginia's own sensors or via data link and are presented on standard NTDS consoles in CIC. From these consoles, targets are designated either automatically or manually to the missile radars for tracking and fire control.
The ship is outfitted with two twin-arm Mk 26 launchers. They provide the magazines and firing capability for the ASROC and surface-to-air missiles. The launcher is also designed to receive and fire the Harpoon antiship missile and SM-2 surface-to-air missile when those two become operational. The incorporation of ASW, surface-to-surface, and surface-to-air capability into a single launching system increases redundancy and reduces the number and variety of trained launcher personnel required on board. This gain is offset to some degree by the increased complexity of such a “jack-of-all-trades” launcher. The Mk 26 launchers are remotely controlled from consoles in CIC and need not be manned for normal operation.
The Virginia carries two lightweight 5-inch/54 guns and the Mk 86 gunfire control system. Although not of major caliber, these guns are extremely accurate and provide a good measure of naval gunfire support, antiship defense, and backup antiair capability. The gun mounts are completely automatic and are normally controlled and fired from the gun control console in CIC, thus greatly decreasing the condition III manning requirement.
The first "design-to-price” electronics warfare (EW) suit, the AN/SLQ- 32, is being installed on board during the Virginia’s current shipyard period at Norfolk. This equipment is not integrated directly into the ship’s command and control system. However, the EW control console is centrally located in CIC next to an NTDS console- This arrangement, along with a dedicated command and control software module makes insertion of electronic warfare information into the NTDS system fast and easy.
Throughout the combat systems, the most consistent thread is centralized control from the ship’s CIC. This is indeed an exciting feature of the Virginia. There are no vertical plotting boards, no manual ASW plotting (indeed there is no NC-2 plotter), no EW control hidden in some remote corner behind a curtain, no weapons control “downstairs” or off in another space, no separate plotting room for gun control. Best of all, there is no noise or shouting during missile firing, ASW action, or naval gunfire support even when these events are conducted simultaneously. With Virginia-class ships, the CIC has finally been designed to manage the combat system of the ship as a single entity- The commanding officer can and indeed must fight the ship from CIC. The captain or, in his absence, the tactical action officer (TAO) delegates authority for action to three principal watchstanders. The ship’s weapons coordinator (SWC) engages all air and surface targets. The surface/subsurface coordinator (SSSC) directs ship’s maneuvers and antisubmarine warfare- During naval gunfire support, a gun-
1. | Commanding Officer’s/ Tactical Action | 7. Gun Control Officer Console 8. Gun Control Console | 14. | Ship Weapon Coordinator Console |
| Officer's Station | 9. Antisubmarine Warfare Officer | 15. | Surface/Subsurface Surveillance |
2. | Gunnery Liaison Officer’s | Console |
| Coordinator Console |
| Station | 10. ASW Weapons Control Panel | 16. | Computer Control Console |
3. | Operation Summary Console | 11. Missile Launcher Control Console | 17. | Electronics Warfare Officer |
4. | Air Intercept Console | 12. Engagement Controller Console |
| Console |
5. | Dead Reckoning Tracer | 13. Fire Control System Coordinator | 18. | Electronics Warfare Control |
6. | Gun Control Console | Console |
| Console |
nery liaison officer (GLO) conducts all shore bombardment. The layout of the large CIC is ideally suited for such control. An operations summary console (OSC) is located in the center. Within ten feet of the OSC are the operating stations for the SWC, SSSC, and GLO. The commanding officer or tactical action officer can thus position himself quickly wherever the situation requires. An organized command area adjacent to the operations summary console provides the essential equipment necessary for both internal and external communication and publication reference. Figure 3 shows the convenience and control of the CIC layout. The commanding officer’s po
sition is in the center of the space at the operations summary console. At the end of a ten-foot radius are the ship’s weapons coordinator at 12 o’clock, then clockwise the fire control system coordinator’s console, the Mk 26 launcher control console, the ASW weapon control console, the ASW officer, the gunnery control console, the gunnery liaison officer (during gunfire support), the electronic warfare officer and, completing the circle, the computer control console next to SWC. The Virginia’s CIC is a well-engineered space.
Just as the equipment and layout compel the commanding officer to fight the ship from CIC, the high degree of integration of combat equipment and function has dictated that the ship’s organization will have a combat system department instead of the traditional weapons department. All computers, fire control equipment, sensors, electronics repair, weapons, and weapons-related equipment and spaces are under the cognizance of the combat system officer. All operations including communications, CIC, electronic warfare, intelligence, and deck are the responsibility of the operations officer. This organization has been in effect for more than a year in the Virginia and has produced excellent results.
As delivered, the Virginia is lightly
armed for an 11,000-ton cruiser. However, the near future is to bring the long-promised Harpoon antiship weapon and the advanced SM-2 surface-to-air missile when they become operational. Of even more importance perhaps is the fact that the CGN-38 class has been built with future growth in mind. There is an abundance of electrical power and air conditioning reserve built into the ship. Space and weight are reserved for the close-in weapon system, satellite communication, and special frequency generators. There are also several undesignated spaces. The ship has adequate reserve bouyancy and good stability. There are a number of suitable topside locations for adding the long-range, surface-launched cruise missile. In retracing the history of the Virginia class, one finds that the initial plan was to install the Aegis combat system. In the late 1960s, when it became apparent that the ships would be completed before Aegis could be operationally tested, the present design and equipment outfit were selected. As an alternative to the expensive strike cruiser, planning is now in progress for extending the present class beyond CGN-41 and outfitting the follow-on ships with the Aegis system. The Virginia herself will con
tinue to be made more combat-capable throughout her design life as new weapons come into the fleet.
Over the years, manpower costs have increased steadily, and the ability to obtain, train, and retain the desired number of men has decreased. Because this trend will undoubtedly continue, every effort was made in the design of CGN-38-class ships to reduce manning to an absolute minimum. Many labor-saving ideas were incorporated into the combat system arrangement, in the selection of equipment, and in the computer program options. The 445 enlisted men and 27 officers who make up the crew represent the lowest number ever for a ship of this size, complexity, and capability — nearly 100 fewer than cruisers of the California (CGN-36) class. In nearly a year since her commissioning, the Virginia has been operated extensively and has tested this manning level. The authorization has proved realistic. As with any other skill-dense Organization, there are problems. Training becomes more vital than ever, and the number of key enlisted classifications escalates. Cross-rate qualification on related equipment is essential to fill temporary gaps. There are sometimes too few low-rated personnel as the designated strikers and petty officers continue to advance. These problems, however, are easily managed and are more than offset by the small numbers of disciplinary cases, the initiative of the crew to fix what is broken, and the fact that jobs get done right the first time.
As originally designed, the Virginia-class ships were to have an ultra-liberal habitability package which would give the individual the maximum in privacy, convenience, recreation, and pleasant surroundings. The spaces were to be easy to maintain. The final package was far short of that, and only the Virginia retains a significant portion of the original intent. Still, it is the best yet for our surface ships. There are 17 living complexes, and each has a berthing area with modular bunks f°r maximum privacy. This space is separated from a locker and dressing area. All complexes have access to a lounge and recreation room, and most complexes have their own. There is a shower and head for each complex. A closed circuit television services each lounge. The overheads are paneled, and the bulkheads are sheathed with colored vinyl. The decks were originally carpeted but because of the unserviceable fire-retardant carpet available to the Navy, they are being tiled. The spaces are air conditioned and have air cleaners (precipitators) to keep them smelling fresh. The ship has a spacious library, a small gymnasium, a photo laboratory, and—the most unpopular room on board—a two-chair barber shop. It is a great start on modern living for a naval ship but falls short m many ways of achieving the desired impact. We hope that the Navy’s habitability designers will monitor the Virginia’s spaces and provide improved living arrangements for future ships.
On deck, two retractable kingposts equipped with sliding padeyes provide a means for underway replenishment of beans and bullets. (The nuclear- powered Virginia doesn’t need black oil.) When not in use, these kingposts are lowered and covered with flush- deck hatches to clear the missile and gun firing areas. The kingpost can be completely rigged in less than ten minutes.
The bridge of the Virginia is located immediately forward of the captain’s cabin and directly above the CIC. There is no sea cabin. This arrangement provides the commanding officer with excellent access to the bridge either from his room or his normal battle station in CIC. A steering console in the pilothouse provides a chair for the helmsman, automatic steering, remote control of steering engine pump motors, remote dummy log control, and bridge wing steering units. The navigator’s chartroom opens onto the bridge and houses the satellite navigation terminal and an Omega terrestrial navigation system. There is no NTDS display or control on the bridge. The arrangement and equipment permit a reduction from normal bridge manning.
The Virginia has adequate facilities to serve as a unit commander’s flagship. Specific berthing, administrative, and operating spaces have been set aside for this purpose. However, if it should become necessary to embark a flag officer’s staff, the ship’s facilities would be inadequate. There is a shortage of both officer and enlisted accommodations. The one small unit commander’s office is totally insufficient for a full-size staff. On the other hand, the staff operating area, the dedicated NTDS equipment in CIC, and the ship’s communication equipment are adequate for task force control.
Damage control central is truly capable of centralized control of damage. All fire main valves and electric fire pumps can be operated from there. The chill water system can be remotely realigned from this space as well. A lighted status panel indicates the position of all ventilation valves and the operating condition of all ventilation fans. A flooding alarm system monitors 28 different spaces with alarms in DC central, and there are also alarm systems to check magazine temperatures and the ship’s security.
The nuclear propulsion plant, which is the same as the one in the
California class, is of the D2G design with an initial fuel load for ten years of operation. As the Virginia completes her shakedown and testing period, we look forward to nuclear task force operations. While certainly there is no glut of nuclear-powered ships, the simultaneous delivery of CGN-38-class cruisers, the Nimitz (CVN-68)-class carriers, and the Los Angeles (SSN-688)-class attack submarines will provide enough ships to meet routine commitments and to assign SSNs and CGNs and a nuclear carrier to dedicated task forces. Combining the best capabilities of these three elements, such a task force will be capable of responding rapidly to distant crises.
When the ship designers went to work on the Virginia they set out to create a truly habitable environment for the ship's 472-man crew. Numerous living complexes, lounges (pictured above), recreation rooms, and a mess deck which is divided into modules represent their efforts.
During the eight months following commissioning, the Virginia conducted numerous routine trials as well as extensive testing of new equipment. These operations took place off the coasts of Virginia and Florida, in the Bahama Islands, the Caribbean Sea, and at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Following the five-month post-shakedown availability now in progress, the Virginia will join Cruiser Destroyer Group Eight with her home port in
Norfolk. She will continue operational evaluation of the integrated combat system for several months before assuming a normal fleet operating schedule.
The Virginia has just begun her career in the Navy. In the few months she has operated, her systems have proved capable and her crew suited to the task of operating and maintaining a ship of this caliber. Bearing the name of the state for the sixth time in the history of our Navy, the new Virginia is ready and able to carry on the proud traditions of her predecessors.
The Virginia's Combat System Department
By Lieutenant Commander George N. Maddox, U.S. Navy, Combat System Officer, USS Virginia (CGN-38)
For many years, gunnery departments in battleships, cruisers, and destroyers cared for and administered the ships’ major armament—guns. As missiles and torpedoes became more significant elements of modern naval warfare, the term weapons—clearly more descriptive—emerged. Therefore, the gunnery department became the weapons department. In CGN-38- class ships, the weapons department functions are now carried out by a combat system department. This latest change, however, is far more than an exercise in semantics. It is a necessary reorganization for effective use of the highly integrated command and weapons control capabilities which were designed into the Virginias. The combat system department recognizes the new concepts employed in CGN-38-class ships for the control of the sensors, information flow, and weapons.
Specifically, the Virginias have fully-integrated combat systems.
► The NTDS (Navy Tactical Data System), missile, gun, underwater battery, and sensor computer programs utilize the same computers in a common computer center.
► The weapons designation subsystem is a software module in the command and control program, not a separate piece of hardware.
► The consoles used for weapons control functions are identical to those used for NTDS. In other words, the consoles used for engagement control, ASW control, fire control systems coordination, ship’s weapons coordination, air control, and detection and tracking functions are of the same type (OJ-I94) and generally interchangeable. ► The ASROC, Standard missiles, and Harpoon missiles are fired from the same launcher.
This integration of equipment and computer programs leaves no clear line of distinction between the classic operations department’s responsibility for ship command and control and the weapons department’s for armament and fire control. This fact was recognized early in the precommissioning period of the Virginia (CGN-38). Permission was sought and obtained from CNO to deviate the standard ship’s organization to implement a combat system department in CGN-38-class ships. The results have been a highly successful realignment of operational and administrative responsibilities. (Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the organization and composition of the Virginia’s operations and combat system departments.)
The Virginia was not the first U.S. Navy combatant to try such an organization. Beginning in late 1972 and continuing periodically for the next three years, nine different cruiser-destroyer type ships implemented pilot programs.1 Since then, all have reverted to the traditional organization of separate weapons and operations departments. The results in these early tests were mixed, for a variety of reasons. For
‘uss Halsey (DLG-23), USS Dahlgren (DLG-12), USS Jouett (DLG-29), USS Chicago (CG-11), USS William V. Pratt (DLG-13), USS Macdonough (DLG-8), USS Mahan (DLG-ll), USS King (DLG-10), and USS Bainbridge (DLGN-25).
one thing, the hardware was not integrated to the degree that it is in more modern ships such as the Virginia. Then, too, no two ships were identical, and the vessels had different levels of readiness because of the people on board. The Spruance (DD-963)-class destroyers were also programmed to institute the new organization, but the change has not yet taken place in those ships.
The original Bureau of Personnel plan for the new department organization came out in 1971, and it has since been updated on the basis of experience gained in the pilot programs. Monitoring the experimental tests has been the Combat System Training Development and Evaluation Group, based at the Naval Air Technical Training Center in Memphis. Whereas the earlier use of the combat system department was only experimental, it was virtually essential on board the Virginia because of the high degree of integration of equipment and computer programs.
Basically, the combat system includes all of the ship’s sensors, computers, programs, fire control, weapons equipment, and ordnance. And, the combat system department is responsible for the system’s maintenance and utilization. Operations embraces all information collection and dissemination and the use of this information for the command and control of the Virginia’s combat system. Operations responsibilities also include the support of embarked staffs, control of other ships, and the employment of any assigned aircraft. To
balance the overall workload and extent of responsibility between department heads, the first lieutenant and the deck division personnel are assigned to the operations department.
The Virginia has gained experience with this organization during one year of precommissioning outfitting and testing and another year of operations at sea. The anticipated benefits of clearly defined areas of responsibilities have been realized.
“Maximum operational readiness," as defined by OpNavInst 3120.32, Standard Ships Organization Manual, “is primarily a matter of internal UNIT development. Three factors—morale, training, and maintenance of material—are essential for optimum readiness. Proper administration of a unit promotes and sustains these three factors.” The Virginia's combat system organization has resulted in high morale as evidenced by an excellent reenlistment rate in the combat system and operations departments. In addition, training is easily accomplished because all the combat system maintenance technicians are in one department. Consolidation of common technical training does not require interdepartmental coordination. Adequate coverage and level of instruction for safe operation of equipment, as well as integrated system operation, are easily scheduled and accomplished. Maintenance and testing of material are the most significant areas which clearly justify the combat system organization. For one example, all major weapons subsystem tests require the command and control system (NTDS) to be on-line. Therefore, even at the subsystem level, close coordination and planning are required to efficiently accomplish tests and maintenance. At the total combat system level of testing, technicians of all ratings become involved. Having two department heads attempting to schedule planned combat system maintenance on two separate quarterly 3M boards would be difficult and very inefficient.
In the Virginia, all combat system testing is the combat system officer’s responsibility. A ship’s electronics readiness team (SERT) conducts the testing. Headed by the battery control officer, the team utilizes the senior subsystem technicians from each rating. These individuals serve SERT in a collateral duty capacity. Only the senior subsystem technician is a full-time assignment. This approach permits the balance of the team to maintain a current knowledge of both prescribed combat system level standards of performance, normal and casualty modes of operation, and the readiness status of their equipment. Using the subsystem technicians in the SERT capacity has proved efficient since total combat system testing and maintenance for the most part preclude subsystem testing or maintenance. The significant aspect is that they are a “team,” whether testing or during normal operations. They belong to and are a part of the normal chain of command. A separate group of independent testers, as had been utilized in other ships, would not function so smoothly. In addition to balancing overall manpower, the Virginia's organization results in concentrating assets with technicians in one department and operators in the other. The CIC officer no longer has to cross department lines to train lookouts. The normal steaming, radio, CIC, and bridge enlisted watches are within the operations department. This enhances training, coordination, and control.
The same benefits derived from the Virginia's experience with the combat system organization will be shared with Aegis-configured ships and guided-missile frigates where centralized control is built into the ships’ combat capability. The combat system department organization has truly come of age.
Mk 86 Gunfire Control System
By Vin Vinci, Lockheed Electronics Company
Service-approved in December 1972, Mk 86 is the major fire control system for gun batteries installed on four of the most modern combatant ship classes: guided-missile cruisers of the Virginia and California classes, Spruance-class destroyers, and Tara- uw-class amphibious assault ships.
Mk 86 is the first digital gunfire control system (GFCS) to be put into the fleet and the first new GFCS since World War II. It is the primary gunfire control director and provides an alternate missile fire control channel.
The first missile firings with the Standard (SM-l) using the Mk 86 system took place at the Atlantic Fleet Weapon Test Range in early March 1977. Two missiles were successfully fired from the deck of the cruiser Virginia (CGN-38). The Mk 86’s air radar, SPG-60, tracked BQM-34 small drones, and the missiles intercepted the targets at a range of more than ten miles. Illumination for the target was injected through the SPG-60 from an on-board continuous wave unit.
The System: Combining two radars, an optical sensor, and a general- purpose digital computer, the Mk 86 is able to control a variety of guns (ranging from 30-mm. to 8-inch), missiles, and ammunition. Each sensor operates independently and is linked via the computer to the consoles of the control officer and weapon controllers. The system exchanges analog and digital data with other ship’s sources, such as NTDS (Naval
The Mk 86 offers flexibility in fire control operations not heretofore available in the fleet. The Virginia’s Mk 86 has scored well with guns and missiles.
Tactical Data System), ITAWDS (Integrated Tactical Amphibious Warfare Data System), and the Tartar missile system.
With built-in test equipment and a self-check computer routine, Mk 86 doesn’t require external test instruments to pinpoint problems. Its modular system design permits on-board technicians to change line replaceable units and thus keep the Mk 86 on station.
One radar provides track-while-scan 360° surface search, low-level air coverage, and tracking of helicopters. The other radar tracks air targets, operates in an horizon search mode, and automatically scans to acquire targets. A zoom television camera is bore- sighted through the antenna of this radar. For missile control, the radar tracks and illuminates the target. A separate stable-mounted optical sight permits visual fire control and damage assessment.
Up to 120 targets can be automatically tracked with the computer’s track-while-scan routine. This multitarget feature not only gives the weapons officer excellent target engagement flexibility but permits weapon shifts between targets. Since several targets can be processed simultaneously, a ship can respond to a number of threats quickly.
The Mk 86’s capability to track a number of targets and its 360° view about the ship has proved to be a training advantage and a motivational lift for operators. An operator can now
see the total picture of a fire control problem rather than being limited to just one portion of it. Because all operators—not just the gunnery officer—understand the fire control problem, they are motivated to learn faster and become more proficient. Other system features enable the control officer to virtually eliminate gunnery errors because range spot can be entered, and deflection spot corrections can be made before or during a mission.
AN/SPQ-9 Surface Search Radar: Operating at X-band, the SPQ-9 searches, detects, tracks, and displays targets within a 20-mile radius of the ship. Its high resolution cosecant- square stabilized antenna is housed in a radome and rotates once each second. This high data rate and the associated digital computer routines give the SPQ-9 a track-while-scan 360° view of targets around the ship. Its real-time signal and data processing permits rapid detection, acquisition, and automatic, as well as simultaneous, tracking of multiple targets. Instrumented for Mach 3 velocity, the radar has a minimum range of 150 yards, an elevation coverage up to 2,000 feet, and operates at any of five operator-selected frequencies. It has pulse-to-pulse agility to decrease its vulnerability to jamming, suppress clutter, and permit a number of radars to operate in a cluster without interference.
ANlSPG-60 Air Track Radar: Instrumented to a range of 65 nautical miles, the SPG-60 is a monopulse, X-band, pulse doppler system. It acquires and tracks air targets automatically or manually assisted. The SPG-60 accepts two- or three-dimension target designation signals, in digital or synchro format, from either the AN/SPQ-9 or other shipboard radars, such as the SPS-10 and SPS-40. The SPG-60’s search-to-acquire capability is computer-directed. The controlled routine is performed about the designated target position, and target acquisition is automatic. Blind range and range rate problems inherent in doppler radar, as well as range ambiguity problems, are resolved by the computer. The computer also automatically controls and calibrates receiver gain and monopulse channel balance.
When used as a missile firing channel, the SPG-60 tracks the target and illuminates through continuous wave injection at the radar antenna. The continuous wave is provided by a shipboard transmitter. The radar is instrumented for Mach 3, has a — 55dB subclutter visibility, and an elevation coverage of —30° to ~b85 • Additionally, it has adaptive computer control of pulse repetition frequency, pulse width, and scan patterns. Passive angle tracking, continuous azimuth rotation, and automatic radar calibration are also provided. The antenna is fed by a four-horn monopulse system and has a boresighted television camera through the dish.
Optical Sensor System: In addition to the camera in the AN/SPG-60 antenna, another one is mounted on a stable platform in the superstructure. The camera is positioned either by computer-generated target data or manually by the weapon controller. In the manual mode, the closed-circuit TV system provides angle information to improve track-while-scan performance in the presence of clutter or to compute ballistics directly, with estimated range data, if the radars are damaged.
The TV system’s field of view is continuously adjustable from 2.1° to 21°. The system has an illuminated reticle, 729-line resolution, and zoom lens.
Computer System: The AN/UYK-7 computer performs track-while-scan for surface targets and simultaneously controls the SPG-60 air track radar. The computer provides the logic for all system controls and displays, and it controls channels for receiving and transmitting digital information to and from other shipboard computers. The computer also provides dead reckoning or reference tracking for navigation, multiple projectile/fuze combinations computation, pre-action calibration, and closed-loop spotting.
The smoothed radar data, together with the appropriate ballistics quantities, generate weapon orders in stable coordinates, which are then converted to the deck coordinate system. The ballistics computation includes the effects of the ship’s motions, parallax, meteorological data, and other ballistics factors. Ballistics are computed to the maximum range of the weapon. The final digital ballistics solutions are supplied to the data trans-
lator, which converts them to analog signals for weapon control.
For air targets, the computer samples target range, elevation, and bearing and converts them to Cartesian coordinates and altitude. Smoothing and predicting are performed in a filter similar to the track-while-scan filter. For surface targets, the system derives stabilized position and rate data from successive integrations of target position. A Kalman-type adaptively controlled numeric filter in the track-while-scan routine smooths the data and minimizes response time for maneuvering targets.
Operator Consoles: The fire control mission is controlled and monitored below decks by a control officer and weapon controllers. The control officer’s console displays all search radar returns on a plan position indicator (PPI) scope. With the PPI, the control officer evaluates potential threats and selects targets for automatic tracking. Once the target track has been established, he assigns a specific target and weapon or combination of weapons to a weapon control console.
A B-scan and TV display are included in the weapon control console. (Laser and infrared displays can be added.) The B-scan gives the weapon controller an expanded radar presentation of his assigned target area. By examining the display gate about the target on the B-scan, the weapon controller assesses the quality of the track. During an air engagement, the B-scan monitor displays an SPG-60 train and elevation error, enabling the weapon controller to determine track quality. The TV display can be used during the mission to monitor shell splash and other information.
Each weapon control console provides a digital readout of all pertinent target characteristics such as bearing, range, course, speed, and elevation. A keyboard lets the weapon controller manually enter ballistic and target data into the computer. Each console also enables the operator to check weapon status and to perform automatic daily system operability tests.
Operating Modes: Five operating modes are available with the Mk 86: visual surface fire, radar surface fire, indirect shore bombardment, air fire, and antiship missile defense.
For visual surface fire, the weapon controller will track the target with the TV system and fire the laser rangefinder (optional equipment) to obtain range. Target range and angle data are entered into the system automatically. Ballistics are then computed, orders are automatically fed to the gun, and the target is fired upon. (If the system is not equipped with a laser rangefinder, the controller will estimate range and speed.)
For radar surface fire, target acquisition, smoothed radar data, ballistics information, and weapon orders are automatically performed.
For indirect shore bombardment (used when target area is out of view of both radar and optical sight), the coordinates of both the ship and the target are entered into the computer by the weapon controller. The system automatically updates these inputs from the ship’s compass and log or from radar tracking of a beacon or navigational reference. Spotting data are entered at the keyboard. Automatic compensation for orientation of the target line by an on-shore observer is provided.
For air action, the computer automatically and adaptively controls search patterns to acquire and track. Target data—plus a TV view along the boresight axis of the SPG-60—are displayed to the weapon controller. For missile fire, the SPG-60 will track the target and direct continuous wave illumination at the target.
For antiship missile defense, a track-while-scan acquisition gate is extended to a range sufficient for threat detection. (It can provide full 360 coverage, or it can be segmented to provide coverage in selected areas.) All targets passing through the acquisition gate are then automatically detected by the system. In high-clutter environments (land masses) a digital moving target indicator search mode can be provided for target detection. This mode offers high subclutter visibility (>40 dB) and affords a target display for monitoring status. Any sector can be selected for moving target detection.
Upon target detection the following functions are performed automatically: threat evaluation, designation to a weapon system, assignment of targets to track channels, slewing of antiair director and weapon to the target, sector-scan of antiair director and track of multiple targets, firing of air-calibrated round and entering of spot, initiation of firing, selection of number of rounds/targets, and transfer of fire to second target.
The Mk 86 is a distinct step forward in gunfire control systems. It can do many more things than its singlefunction predecessors, and it can do them well.