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Despite staunch support given to the infant American Navy by such men as Adams and Monroe, commitment to an established high-seas fleet faltered in the administrations of Jefferson and Madison (1801-1817). The distrust in our own naval capabilities was so rampant that after war was declared in 1812, the order went out to withdraw our entire fleet to the safety of our own harbors. That the United States Navy was allowed to fight at sea— where it would provide nearly all our early victories—is due to the pleadings of two naval officers, Captains William Bainbridge and Charles Stewart.
In the first eight years after the launching of the Navy’s first ships in 1797, the United States fought three wars—all at sea—and won them all. Testimonials to the Navy’s effectiveness were heard everywhere, even from Jefferson. Yet at the beginning of Jefferson’s second term in 1805, the President became convinced of the value of gunboats as the primary weapon of naval defense. Gunboats, (derisively called “Jeffs”), whose contribution to the defense of our own coasts was highly questionable, fit in perfectly with the Jeffersonian philosophy of non-interference, non-provocation of the European states. In 1806-1807, the Congress duly authorized 257 of them.
While the gunboat flotillas crawled about the coasts, the magnificent frigates of our high-seas fleet were rotting, “laid up in ordinary.” In 1806, our high-seas fleet consisted of one warship, despite Monroe’s report from Europe that:
“It is by the means which we have of injuring them only that they regard us, and their regard is proportioned to those means . . . They are infidels 'till the measure is executed ...”
With the fleet reduced in size and its mission relegated to a seaborne militia, morale in and out o the fleet suffered.
Congress, responding to mounting tensions 'v,t Britain, eventually permitted the “mothballed” fiig' ates to be repaired and recommissioned, but cons**' tently refused to authorize construction of new frigates or ships of the line. Congress, like the administration, was intimidated by the Royal Navy’s history of complete, unbroken victory, and thus looked up°n further naval expenditures as “pouring money int0 the sea.”
Without doubt, the earlier confidence in the Navf evaporated as the approach of war with the greates naval power in the world became imminent. The administration grew to look upon the fleet much 115 did the London Times, which summed up America*1 naval standing in 1812 as a “Handful of fir-bud1 frigates with bits of striped bunting at their masc heads, manned by bastards and outlaws.”
Thus, in hindsight, it is not too surprising thac soon after the declaration of war on 4 June 1812- came Madison’s order that the Navy’s seven friga^5 were to be anchored at harbor entrances, dismasted’ and used as floating batteries, with half their gunS ashore in coastal batteries. The news was shocking and appalling to the naval establishment. It seen1* that only two naval captains, Bainbridge anc Stewart, were in Washington at the time, or at led*1 they were the only ones to come forward. In ^ case, the two young, famous officers took it upofl themselves to be the Navy’s de facto representatives'
Immediately, the two captains drew up a letter ^ protest which they submitted to the Secretary of Navy, Paul Hamilton. Hamilton was so impresse with their arguments that he agreed to present die two officers to President Madison the following daf
ef wards, they can be replaced by others.” The lcers had put the Navy on the line.
^ith this support the Navy was launched into the ar of 1812. The promised victories came almost at Ce: the Constitution took the Guerriere, the Wasp
Madison greeted the two officers in his reserved fanner. Stewart and Bainbridge (it is said that tewart was the more eloquent and did most of the diking) outlined to the President the various advances of the American vessels: better disciplined ITlen. sighted guns, the best marksmen in the world, C U.S. Marines to handle the small arms, and an 0utstanding officer corps. They ended; “We may be CaF>tured and probably shall be, even after taking fCes from them, because their numbers are much Sft'ater than ours. But the American flag will never
e dishonored, seldom, if ever, struck to equal t°rce ”
The President, after a long sigh, said, “You’ll give Us victories, then, you think? For it is victories we
ant: if you give us them and lose your ships arte Offi
The Stewart-Bainbridge protest set in motion a Ces of cabinet meetings, after which the President ju0^ t*le unprecedented step of overruling his cabinet. adison gave his half-hearted permission for each ntP to make one war cruise as an experiment. If the Jhises proved to be failures, the cabinet plan would e carried out.
downed the Frolic, and the United States captured the Macedonian.
At the height of the Washington social season—a naval ball at which the President, the cabinet, and nearly the entire Congress were present— the Macedonian’s. battle flag was borne into the wildly applauding hall. Over the tremendous noise and confusion, Secretary Hamilton was heard to cry, “Never forget that it is to Captains Bainbridge and Stewart that you really owe these victories!”